abstract | My doctoral dissertation is an analysis of the nonviolent aspects of counter-insurgency in the developing world.
This project looks at Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe during the Cold War period between 1948 and 1980. The thesis analyzes the use of people
with disabilities and the arts in political and military leadership roles and propaganda in each one of these four conflicts. My research discusses
the success or failure of both military and political modalities in defeating armed uprisings. Despite taking place over the same time period, each
nation ended up with very different outcomes: Malaysia was part of a declining colonial system and experienced a complete victory when British colonialism
collapsed, Taiwan experienced a partial victory as Nationalist officials became refugees from the Chinese civil war and moved from mainland China to Taiwan,
Vietnam endured the most chaos as the French defeat had led to a partitioned country and a complete political defeat, Zimbabwe underwent both a military
and political collapse when the white-dominated government attempted to exercise racial paternalism and tried to pacify factionalized racial disputes.
The methodology used to support developing nations and their Western allies consisted of a three-pronged political approach. The at-risk members of
the population were resettled with a mixture of both voluntary and restrictive methods. Reward programs were developed to persuade the population to
turn in an attempt to convert guerrillas. Direct financial rewards also proved effective in turning guerrillas. Malaysian guerrillas desired political
power within a democratic system and therefore were the easiest to persuade. Taiwan's methods were partially successful in using voluntary methods to
recruit defectors. Vietnamese peasants found corruption and the struggle for democracy sometimes more difficult than the harsh order imposed by the
Viet Cong. Zimbabwe's counterinsurgency failed because there was an excessive emphasis on restrictive methods to frighten opponents rather than voluntary
rewards for loyal Africans. |