

AN ANALYSIS OF FOUR COUNTERINSURGENCIES  
WITH ATTENTION TO THE INCLUSION OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES  
AND THE ARTS

A dissertation submitted to the Caspersen School of Graduate Studies  
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## Abstract

### An Analysis of Four Counterinsurgencies with Attention to the Inclusion of People with Disabilities and the Arts

Doctor of Letters Dissertation by

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My doctoral dissertation is an analysis of the nonviolent aspects of counterinsurgency in the developing world. This project looks at Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe during the Cold War period between 1948 and 1980. The thesis analyzes the use of people with disabilities and the arts in political and military leadership roles and propaganda in each one of these four conflicts. My research discusses the success or failure of both military and political modalities in defeating armed uprisings. Despite taking place over the same time period, each nation ended up with very different outcomes: Malaysia was part of a declining colonial system and experienced a complete victory when British colonialism collapsed, Taiwan experienced a partial victory as Nationalist officials became refugees from the Chinese civil war and moved from mainland China to Taiwan, Vietnam endured the most chaos as the French defeat had led to a partitioned country and a complete political defeat, Zimbabwe underwent both a military and political collapse when the white-dominated government attempted to exercise racial paternalism and tried to pacify factionalized racial disputes.

The methodology used to support developing nations and their Western allies consisted of a three-pronged political approach. The at-risk members of the population were resettled with a mixture of both voluntary and restrictive methods. Reward

programs were developed to persuade the population to turn in an attempt to convert guerrillas. Direct financial rewards also proved effective in turning guerrillas. Malaysian guerrillas desired political power within a democratic system and therefore were the easiest to persuade. Taiwan's methods were partially successful in using voluntary methods to recruit defectors. Vietnamese peasants found corruption and the struggle for democracy sometimes more difficult than the harsh order imposed by the Viet Cong. Zimbabwe's counterinsurgency failed because there was an excessive emphasis on restrictive methods to frighten opponents rather than voluntary rewards for loyal Africans.

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## **Preface**

My father was a Vietnam War veteran, and I witnessed his struggles with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. This childhood scenario was the core of my dissertation about the four counterinsurgencies in Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Zimbabwe.

I am a man with spastic cerebral palsy and use a wheelchair. As such, I am empowered and have Disability Pride. I continue to pursue the relatively unknown history of the amazing contributions of people with disabilities throughout history, inclusive of the counterinsurgencies examined.

My research included traveling, which I very much enjoy as a scholar and tourist. On such research trips to Tennessee, Texas, and Michigan, I interviewed Dr. David Baker, Mary Baker, Karen Cole, Laura Frankel, and Dr. Jill Kennicoitt. Their input and information was inestimable, and the trips were filled with academia and much laughter.

In Australia, I met with Dr. Ashley Eakens at the Imperial War Museum, outside on a day with a stridently blue sky. Our substantive conversation on counterinsurgency and the sensationally warm “winter” weather are emblazoned on my memory. I also met Dr. Derrick DeHerr at the War Museum in another of my favorite settings, an enormous library. In South Africa, I met with the Honourable Benjamin Skosana inside the thrilling Parliament in Cape Town. This interview, like all the others, was compelling and informative.

Closer to home, my interviews with Dr. Susan Gronewald at Kean University and Fred Hertrich at Middlesex College were also enlightening.

Each of these people was integral to the manifestation of my dissertation, which, as noted, had begun many years ago as a child.

## Chapter One: Introduction

Counterinsurgency conjures up images that are enigmatic and covert: a British officer protecting and patrolling the vast reaches of a secret Malay fortress; American helicopters in the night, intimidating enemy guerrillas. The truth is infinitely more subtle and complex. Counterinsurgency is the organized political and social attempt to defend an existing, recognized government from armed attacks by an organized, non-uniformed, sometimes unarmed movement. Successful counterinsurgency also promotes maximum national independence. Although not totally peaceful, counterinsurgency is far less violent than conventional warfare.<sup>1</sup> More peaceful methodologies of exerting political power interest me greatly, especially because diplomatic tactics are desirable and relevant to today's violent world. With this reality in mind, it is significant to explore my reasons for selecting this thesis topic. Out of what part of my own academic and social experience did this interest emanate? Why did I select the specific counterinsurgencies of the countries of Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe, which all took place during The Cold War from 1948 to 1980?

Five main factors underlie my interest in the role of people with disabilities and the arts in these counterinsurgencies. The first relates to my own personal reasons concerning the returning veterans. My father was a Vietnam veteran, who served as a corpsman. His life struggles as a result of the war were a sad footnote in both our lives.

As a wheelchair user and son of a Vietnam veteran, I have wondered since my youth about the consequences of America's involvement in this war. My father's most important life experience was in 1969, which was the year he spent in Vietnam. The

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1. William Colby, *Lost Victory* (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 12-15.

agony, psychological and physical, that he both witnessed and endured, was profound beyond any attempt to explain. Many formerly able-bodied men returned in wheelchairs and without limbs. Like my father, some had what we now identify as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, coupled with addiction and alcoholism, which lasted decades. He returned from Vietnam unable to work and remained isolated. His struggles seemed to sum up the agonies of the nation. The old certainties were not certain any more. The disgraceful treatment of Vietnam veterans was a direct result of public discontent with the Vietnam War. Returning soldiers like my father were discarded and ignored.

Many formerly able-bodied men returned in wheelchairs and without limbs. Like my father, some had what we now identify as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, coupled with addiction and alcoholism, which lasted decades. He returned from Vietnam unable to work and remained isolated. His struggles seemed to sum up the agonies of the nation. The old certainties were not certain any more. The disgraceful treatment of Vietnam veterans was a direct result of public discontent with the Vietnam War. Returning soldiers like my father were discarded and ignored.

It is tragic that in conflicts around the globe, veterans suffered the brunt of public disenchantment with war and general desire to forget the experience once it ended.<sup>2</sup> This was common for veterans in all four conflicts; however, sometimes more progressive results arose. I will investigate these experiences, in more detail, nation by nation. Furthermore, this investigation is historically associated to the issue of veterans with disabilities in these counterinsurgencies.

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2. Douglas Reed, *Battle for Rhodesia 1967* (Bulawayo: Privately Printed, 1976), 102.

The second reason for selecting my dissertation topic concerns the impact of the developmental struggles of Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe on Western nations. These developing countries underwent booming transformations (democratic or Marxist), during the time period examined. Simultaneously, protests about these resounding expansions occurred in countries in the West, specifically, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. As Stewart Collins notes in *Study of the Vietnam War*, the experience of veterans has been central to Western nations' adjustment to the development of these countries: "The western democratic nations, the heir to the traditional western values, all suffered major societal change and upheaval in fighting guerrilla war and adjusting to the return of injured veterans."<sup>3</sup>

The efforts to promote democracy in formerly colonized countries had a transformative impact on these four nations and the Western countries assisting them. Western populations have sometimes believed that their culture, religion, and political ideologies are universal. Developmentally, Malaysia largely embraced Western ideas. Taiwan and Zimbabwe created a hybrid of Western and local ideas.<sup>4</sup>

Vietnam preferred to maintain its own way of government. Its cultural tradition was based on Asian ideas about hierarchy and obedience.<sup>5</sup> Democracy leads to individual choice, which appeared chaotic and disorganized to the newly created North

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3. Stewart Collins, *Study of the Vietnam War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 12.

4. Anthony Joes, *Resisting Rebellion* (New York: Praeger Press, 2000), 41.

5. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (London: Somerset Press Press, 1966), 8-10.

Vietnam. Its cultural tradition was that of Confucian society, which mandates that leaders are respected as fathers. This concept imposed a paternalistic, political structure and total control. Thus, the resulting, controlling government was Marxist. The South Vietnamese tried democracy for a short time, and this democracy broke down because of economic problems, visible corruption, and a general lack of interest. The outcome was a Marxist government.<sup>6</sup>

It was difficult to create modern democracy in new nations because it is imperative that those in power who are defending developing nations be aware of these nations' cultural and social heritage, past and present, as well as of their trajectory into the future. The expansion of modern multiculturalism emanated in part from the conflicts in Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. The United States sometimes assumes that its vital role can transform the rest of the world into an international version of California and New York; however, this assumption has proven incorrect on many occasions. This notion is supported in Robert Thompson's *Revolutionary War in World Strategy*. He writes: "These conflicts forced the Developed World to abandon the idea it could impose its culture everywhere."<sup>7</sup>

Paul Sweet gives an amusing analogy about the need to balance local and international concepts in his look at the developmental struggles of Malaysian New Life Villages: "Western Society is like cake, enjoyable in part, painful in excess."<sup>8</sup> There was

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6. Robert Thompson, *No Exit from Vietnam* (London: Somerset Press, 1970), 104.

7. Robert Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy* (London: Somerset Press, 1971), 138.

8. Paul Sweet, *The Malaysian Emergency*, (London: Viking Press Press, 1971), 28.

a backlash by some veterans in Malaysia against what they believed was excessive materialism and the imposition of Western ideas over people who did not desire them. The back-to-the-land, natural diet and lifestyle movement in the United States, Canada and Australia had been a key experience of many armed forces members who felt that Malaysia had been better off under colonialism, and that even the Vietnamese had a happier life under “benevolent Communism.”<sup>9</sup>

Nevertheless, democracy was thoroughly celebrated in Malaysia. It very much embraced Western ideology in its development. It progressed to be a proud and strong nation. To this day, Malaysia still remains an ally to democratic first-world nations in Asia.<sup>10</sup>

The impact of Taiwan’s developmental struggles on Western nations caused passionate disagreement throughout the 1960s as to whether or not the democratic country should attempt to retake Communist China. In *The Counterinsurgent State*, Richard Stubbs observes, “France and Britain felt it was a waste of time. The United States and Canada wished to re-conquer mainland China.”<sup>11</sup>

Western opposition to the developmental struggles of the white-controlled government in Zimbabwe led to isolation for African moderates. Consequently, the rise of dictatorship emerged. This, in turn, resulted in a lack of Zimbabwean trade with Canada, Australia, and the United States, inclusive of gold, copper, manganese, and iron,

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9. Vo Giap, *People's War* (Hanoi: North Vietnam Ministry of Defense, 1980), 123.

10. Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), 180.

11. Richard Stubbs, *The Counterinsurgent State* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 125.

as well as related employment in these countries. As Peter Abbott and Philip Botham note in *Modern African Wars*, the United States, in particular, saw a 70-percent decrease in trade with Zimbabwe by 1982.<sup>12</sup>

Details of a wide range of influences of the developmental struggles of Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe on Western nations will be later analyzed.

The third reason for my selection of this dissertation topic is that working on this dissertation has provided me with opportunities for personal growth and to travel to multiple states in the USA, as well as breathtaking opportunities to travel to Australia and South Africa to amplify my research. These two countries were selected because their archives possess vital information on the material I am assessing. I was exposed to a different world view by meeting with government officials in each country. In both countries, it was my privilege to work with high academic and political officials, who are esteemed men and women. They generously gave a good deal of their time and effort to be of assistance to me.

In Australia, I met with Captain Derrick De Herr, who works in the Australian War Memorial that houses specific information on my topic. I also met with Professor Ashley Eakins at the War Memorial. His area of expertise is Australia's involvement in the Malaysian and Vietnam Wars. Although Australia is south of the equator, it is still considered a Western nation because it is a first-world economy and political democracy. Andrew Roberts places Australia among the nations rooted in the ideology of the United Kingdom: "Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, and the United States are the

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12. Peter Abbott and Philip Botham, *Modern African Wars: Rhodesia: 1965-80* (London: Osprey Publishing, 1986), 32.

first-world, multi-racial, democratic children of the United Kingdom.”<sup>13</sup> Indeed, Roberts’ *History of the English Speaking Peoples* demonstrates the common commitment to democratic elections, a free press, and a capitalist economy shown by all of these nations.

In South Africa, I met with the Honourable Benjamin Skosana, who was an aide to Prince Buthelezi from 2002 to 2012. The prince is the head of the Inkatha Freedom Party, which is one of the most important political parties in the nation. In addition, Skosana served in Nelson Mandela’s Cabinet and in the South African Parliament. For me, he served the role of an oral historian on the counterinsurgencies about which I am writing. Skosana recommended that I take a look at the comparison of economic and political integration in South Africa to that of Zimbabwe. (Of relatively unknown significance is that South Africa is also considered a Western nation.) He truly believed that there were strong connections between Zimbabwe and the government of apartheid South Africa. The connection between the two white-led governments of the Cold War period was strident. Minister Skosana recommended I read a booklet from the late 1960s. This pamphlet, *Progress through Separate Development*, which was published by the South African government, disclosed: “Economic inclusion happened far more quickly than political integration because a better paid work force is a more contented one, and more productive.”<sup>14</sup> The economic situation was the same in Zimbabwe in the late 1960s.

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13. Andrew Roberts, *History of the English Speaking Peoples* (New York: Doubleday, 2006), 110.

14. *Progress through Separate Development* (Cape Town: South African Ministry of Information, 1973), 55.

It was my privilege to consult with a number of African experts for this particular portion of my thesis. Ms. Diane Lyle, an expert on the unique process required to gain voting rights, spoke at length about successes and failures in her particular area near the Botswana border. In my email interview with her on December 8, 2010, she explained:

There was a qualified franchise that any Black with a 'O' level education [high school] was allowed to vote, but the so-called fairness was not fair because the majority of the Black population was not allowed to attend the White and Coloured-Only schools. The only exceptions were private schools, but you had to have a lot of money to get admitted. Most Blacks didn't have that kind of money. I had the daughter of Bishop Muzorewa's African National Council in my high school.

I met with another living history resource, Johan Erasmus, whose expertise is in the Bantustan Movement in Zimbabwe and Taiwan. This movement basically removed numerous non-combatants from the battlefields there and promoted economic and social improvements. Furthermore, Mr. Erasmus has enormous expertise in Afrikaner political opinion on the role of people with disabilities in counterinsurgencies. This is relevant because the South African government played a large role in aiding the governments of Taiwan, South Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. He informed me that South Africa's assistance to the white dominated government of Zimbabwe mainly failed because the counter-insurgency movement refused to utilize people of other racial backgrounds. Communist guerrilla modalities usually made use of a three-stage process, the first phase being attempts at political indoctrination and intimidation without violence.

Mr. Erasmus next informed me about the role of Zimbabwean Resettlement and the country's simultaneous 1971 attempt at a compromise to end the civil war. Resettlement was the main policy of this counterinsurgency, reinforcing the philosophy of taking citizens out of the line of fire and transporting them to a place of safety, thereby

aligning with the counterinsurgent government. In another interview with Mr. Erasmus on August 20, 2008, he further explained: “It was about an intense loyalty transformation. The African National Congress had an external wing, which went through attacks on short targets that constituted phase two in the worldwide Communist plan.” Phase two was present in one form or another throughout all four conflicts. According to Mr. Erasmus, African conflicts involved a period of upheaval, which tended to vacillate between greater and lesser intensity.

Another part of phase two involved The Pan African Congress, an anti-Communist, African only movement, which sought to combine non-violent and military modalities. Both South African groups worked in conjunction with Zimbabwean allies to end white minority rule throughout Africa. Their ultimate outcome was the same, although goals and methods proved quite different.<sup>15</sup>

Considering phase three, I was intrigued to learn that leaders with different objectives were sometimes united via shared, personal history. For example, as Kaizer Mantazima explains: “Pan African leader Robert Subukoe, the mastermind behind the anti-pass protests [which limited African movement], had gone to university with Joshua Nkomo, the Mdebele President of the National Democratic Party.”<sup>16</sup> Due to such a close personal connection between these opposing leaders, Zimbabwean guerrillas were given refuge by Bantustan leaders as a form of protection, despite their totally opposing points of view. I found the topic of Resettlement fascinating because it was a non-violent, relatively relaxed manner of combining military access with a genuine improvement, or

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15. Kaizer Mantazmia, *Independence, My Way* (Umtata: Transkei Press, 1976), 37.

16. Ian Smith, *Bitter Harvest* (New York: Macmillan Press, 2001), 193.

an attempt at one, in the lives of the confused, the concerned, and the brokenhearted. By 1969, Zimbabwean and South African guerrilla groups focused on the propaganda elements of the struggle in unity, while undertaking separate military missions. By 1976, the Zimbabwe guerrilla movements had gone forward with the third phase of the worldwide Communist plan, according to Johan Erasmus in my third interview with him on August 21, 2008.

While on my trip to South Africa, I also had several enlightening conversations with the Director of Afrikaner Studies at Kean University, Brother James Conyers, who was the leader of the Travel Learn trip I took. He mostly talked about Zimbabwe, specifically, the Peace Indaba, which was a political meeting that the white Zimbabwean government held with tribal chiefs. This was a partially successful, internal counter-insurgency; however, counterinsurgent failure existed simultaneously because internal violence continued. The concerns of the more advanced African leaders were ignored. Further, as Ian Smith explains, “The urbanized African having earned the right to vote, wished to move away from outmoded comfortable isolation into the sunlight of full inclusion and adult responsibility.”<sup>17</sup> Racial attitudes were a mixture of discrimination and ideas based on a lack of exposure to people who were not comfortable well-fed, docile servants.

Further explanation of the sources and significance of racial attitudes in conflict-ridden areas came in my interview on December 4, 2015 with Professor Fred Hertrich of Middlesex County College. He said: “Racial attitudes had permeated every aspect of African life. It was necessary to remove mental colonialism as much as the physical

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17. Smith, 90.

reality of it.” Additionally, Dr. Hertrich and I discussed how in Taiwan, there was an attempted peace summit between Taiwan and the mainland in 1971, which failed because both sides would not compromise.

In an interview with Dr. Susan Gronewald, Ph.D., on March 8, 2013, we discussed how greater difficulty came about because international mediators gave unrealistic expectations to both Taiwan and Zimbabwe in resolving their counterinsurgent civil wars. Our discussion also covered attempts at collapsed mediation, which was new and interesting information to me. For Taiwan, mediation attempts were unrealistically promoted by the United Kingdom, and for Zimbabwe, mediation attempts were unrealistically promoted by Iran. Mahlon Meyer describes Iran’s intervention in the situation in Zimbabwe:

The Shah of Iran wished to defuse the tension in Africa in order to create harmony between the western and developing worlds. He dispatched his Imperial Court Minister Aver Hoydea to offer mediation services for the abortive 1973 Pearce Commission Agreement and the successful attempt to cause Mugabe’s rival, Ndabaningi Sithole, to rally to the side of the White government in 1975.<sup>18</sup>

Meyer’s words are significant because the international community strongly desired an end to the conflict in Zimbabwe, although this was ultimately unattainable. I will further embellish this in the chapter on Zimbabwe.

President Ford’s library in Ann Arbor Michigan, which I also visited, had more information on the Iranian efforts and mediation with Zimbabwe. Secretary of Defense James Schingler referred to a strong effort by Iran in 1975 at the Geneva Conference. The program failed because the Iranians were seen as outsiders by the Zimbabwe African

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18. Mahlon Meyer, *Remembering China from Taiwan: Divided Families and Bittersweet Reunions After the Chinese Civil War* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 78.

National Union, members then undergoing a struggle of their own between Sithole and Mugabe. “British policy for Africa led to one man one vote—once. Therefore dictatorship ensued, with chaos and the resulting denial of freedom and justice.”<sup>19</sup> The tumultuous rejection of compromise made any chance of sustaining democracy possible.

The entirety of this research, which was collected via traveling, processing the gathered literary and conversational information in a conjoined fashion, and, consequently, including the learned information into my thesis, was vital, although travel required considerable effort on my part to make the contacts and do the journeying with my two academic and wheelchair assistants. As one would think, the travel was quite marvelous, albeit funding was difficult to find.

It is also worthy to mention that for my research I additionally traveled to Texas (the LBJ Library), Nebraska (The Military History Conference), Tennessee (University of Tennessee for meetings with Dr. David Baker and Professor Lea Yount), and Pennsylvania (Carlyle History Institute). In 2016, I met with historian Karen Cole in Redford Township, Michigan, and the Artistic Director of VSA Michigan, Laura Frankel. VSA is the State Organization on Arts and Disability. Ms. Frankel and I discussed the roles of the arts and disability throughout history.

The fourth reason for the selection of my thesis topic involves the captivating, significantly marginalized history of how disability and the arts were influential during this Cold War in the four, emerging nations I examine. I have disabilities, and I am a theater arts teaching artist and playwright; so, once again, this is personal to me.

Undeniably, disability history is also meaningful to the wider world. Malaysia, Taiwan,

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19. H. W. Crocker, *The Politically Incorrect Guide to the British Empire* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2011), 270.

Vietnam, and Zimbabwe, as well as South Africa, all had people with disabilities working in political, military, and social arenas. The arts were critical because they were used for counterinsurgent propaganda.<sup>20</sup>

Malaysia had two dance companies that created performances that attracted the interest of New Life Villages. Such performances had been banned in guerrilla camps. The local militia, known as the Home Guard, created radio broadcasts designed to create a friendly image in the eyes of the public. Additionally, as Leslie Grant demonstrates, the British Broadcasting Company made use of the arts in order to influence public opinion:

The British Broadcasting Corporation created, on the advice of propaganda expert CC Peng, a comedy program, as well as daily news bulletins created to develop a bond of trust between the police and the public. Officers were shown engaging in activities of service, arranging medical care for low income people, creating cricket and football clubs for at risk youth. The comedy was designed to break down the fear factor. No one could be terrified of a policewoman who couldn't button her uniform.<sup>21</sup>

Trust between the police and the public supported the democratic idea that ultimately triumphed in Malaysia.

In Taiwan, a number of artistic programs were created to encourage the population of people with disabilities to participate fully in Taiwanese life. A traveling group of actors with disabilities developed a dramatic play called *Welcome to the White Sun* during the time period examined. The script demonstrated how people in Taiwan had more freedom than did their mainland Communist counterparts. Daniel Marston's *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* detailed these play scripts and leaflets: "In free China, people can work and worship and live where and how they please. The right to

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20. Robert Thompson, *Make for the Hills* (London: Doubleday, 1989), 265.

21. Leslie Grant, *Teacher Made Assessments* (New York: Doubleday, 2006), 104.

keep land and money earned with your own efforts is the fundamental principal of the Red Square and the White Sun [the Taiwanese flag].”<sup>22</sup> Thus, it is evident that messages about disability were conveyed through the arts in Taiwanese public life. The message was one primarily of inclusion and the opportunity for a self-directed life.

In Vietnam, the arts were central to the government’s communication with the general population. An example of arts for propaganda is the famous broadcast series of Hanoi Hannah, which denounced American involvement in the Vietnam War: “‘How are you doing GI’s? You don’t know much about this country. Look out for the mine traps. You are victims down trodden. Wall Street and Mobil Oil are getting rich off your blood and death. A tip from your Vietnamese comrades.’”<sup>23</sup> Additionally, South Vietnamese Vice President Cao Ky developed a lighthearted, national letter writing contest to be sent to troops in the field:

Create a new society where all your talents aren’t channeled [as opposed to being wasted on Communism]. Every joy found and explored by the right to be free. The opportunity to eat and sell ice cream is the ideal for new businessmen. Pleasure in your stomach, and money in your pocket.<sup>24</sup>

In *Conflict of Myths: The Development of Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War*, Larry Cable notes that desserts were also offered to “turned guerrillas who agreed to participate in pseudo operations.”<sup>25</sup>

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22. Daniel Marston, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 67.

23. Robert Chandler, *War of Ideas* (New York: Doubleday, 1981). 70.

24. Chandler, 9.

25. Ibid., 6.

Zimbabwean cadres sponsored freedom schools in Angola and Botswana. These schools combined academic subjects, traditional African history, and a heavy amount of artistic propaganda. Soldiers who had lost limbs proceeded to paint, dance and sing for packed audiences. The largest and most ambitious project consisted of a literary performance in 1975, which had taken over a year to create and research. This tawdry melodrama caused the recruitment offices for the guerrillas in Zambia and within the African locations to recruit one thousand new fighters per month. Artistic plans and programs led to a new sense of self purpose.<sup>26</sup> Josiah Torgandga, the commander of the powerful guerrilla army, placed extreme value on art as a tool of recruitment and national awareness: "One play proved more effective in demonstrating why we had to use arms than a hundred realities."<sup>27</sup>

A group of wounded cadre produced *Come Home to the Fatherland*, a three-act play concerning the recruitment of a tribesman, his success in battle, and the climax of his triumphant martyrdom at the hands of his tribal cousin. In response, the white government produced the booklet "Massacre of the Innocent" written by Robin Moore, which dealt with atrocities on the guerrilla side. Moore elucidates: "The people of the location of Helmstakoy reject the intimidation and bullying of the Godless terrorists! Loyal Africans seek only to maintain their customs, and the government stands by them."<sup>28</sup> Moore is saying that African tribes did not want to fight each other, which was

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26. Ngbandi Sithole, *Proposal for a Settlement* (Bulawayo: Ministry Press, 1978), 39.

27. Smith, 78.

28. Robin Moore, "Massacre of the Innocent" (Salisbury: Rhodesian Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1969), 119.

true for many tribes; however, Moore's comments are condescending in that he is heralding the paternalistic attitude of the white government toward native Africans, indicating that they only wanted to engage in their artistic and social customs and not seek majority rule. This paternalism led to the failure of democratic counterinsurgency in Zimbabwe.

The fifth reason for selecting my topic is the opportunity to expand on the plethora of non-military, non-violent aspects of war that usually get forgotten in the excitement of combat and the distress at the loss of life. Nevertheless, unarmed and political characteristics of war are no less important. They provide a window into the mindset of correlating forces. In *War of Ideas*, brilliant author Robert Chandler says, "In the long term, there are two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. The mind always can prevail."<sup>29</sup>

In Daniel Marston's book, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, he covers many non-military, non-violent aspects of war. Further developed in the book are social, political, cultural, and economic policies that were often effective in winning hearts and minds. The book also reveals that in Malaysia, opportunities to own property were a key component of success. In Taiwan, religious freedom and individual autonomy were fruitful. Social policy that the non-Communist government promoted for physical safety of citizens was successful for fifteen years in Vietnam. In Zimbabwe, the white-led government attempted to provide greater economic opportunity for Africans, but eventually failed.

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29. Chandler, 5.

In keeping with Chandler's statement about the mind's ability to prevail, and in connection with all my reasons for selecting this topic, is my interest in the psychology of the time period. During the Cold War, 1948 to 1980, the mentality of a changing world led to an enormous collapse of old ideas about the eternal supremacy of European nations. There was a more indirect, broader, more virile world taking shape. In that new world, some nations sought independence on their own terms; others chose a more centralized, directed path. As a result, the world was forever transformed.<sup>30</sup>

The four nation states with which this work is concerned would all be classified in the modern sense as developing nations, emerging from a colonial system under the "benevolent" guidance of Western powers. I selected these countries because as the Cold War conflict between the Soviet Union and the West developed from 1948 to 1980, all four became primary battlegrounds and bulwarks of counterinsurgency. Each of these countries proved valuable in the worldwide conflict.

Out of these counterinsurgencies during that time period, three of these nation states materialized as emerging, self-governing countries, born out of empires. Indeed, Malaysia had been a part of the British Empire. Malaysia went on to become the most successful democracy in Southeast Asia. In *The Counterinsurgent State*, Richard Stubbs shows how Malaysia distinguished itself in the arena of Southeast Asia: "The majority of Southeast Asian states were either Communist or military dictatorships. Malaysia proved the exception, retaining political democracy."<sup>31</sup>

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30. Colby, 150.

31. Stubbs, 109.

Another self-governing, emerging nation was Taiwan, which had been a formerly coveted Japanese possession and later became a rear guard defense against Communist China. Brought into existence via counterinsurgency, by 1980, Taiwan was an economic superpower, despite the fact that it did not take back mainland China.<sup>32</sup>

Vietnam also surfaced as a self-governing country, which had been a key ring in French Indochina. By 1975, Vietnam experienced some unity for the first time in 150 years, but its counterinsurgency efforts to maintain a democratic government failed.<sup>33</sup>

Zimbabwe, which had once had been controlled by white settlers of British descent, did not reach self-governing status in this time period because the world did not recognize its racist political structure, which eventually changed after 1980. Smith notes that although Zimbabwe's "multi-racial government was set up in 1978, [it] was not fully recognized until two years later."<sup>34</sup> Nonetheless, Zimbabwe is included because the minority white government used counterinsurgency in an attempt to win over Africans in order to emerge from a colonial system under the guidance of Western powers. Some programs were effective temporarily, but the reluctance to truly engage in honest dialogue with the under-represented masses made long term democracy impossible. Outmoded ideas and paternalism are deadly in anti-guerrilla work.

This dissertation expands existing information and fills in historical gaps; in it I inspect motivational factors in the examined nation states for counterinsurgency actions and the effects of those actions on a larger community of nations. One example of

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32. Joes, 224.

33. Cao Ky, *Buddha's Child* (New York: Macmillan Press, 2002), 103.

34. Smith, 68.

exploring motivational factors concerns Malaysia: I have found material on Sir Gerald Templer's creation of Malay children's stories. These stories, translated into many languages, were designed to encourage national unity and free expression for future global leaders.

The viewpoint of the Nationalist Party in Taiwan is far more complex than I had originally understood. In Milton Shiea's anthology *The Kuomintang: Historical Documents*, I discovered a number of motivational factors that demonstrated the tension between local and international issues. The Taiwanese leaders saw themselves as custodians of ethnic, religious, and political tradition to share with the world.

My conversations with living historians on South Vietnamese elections show in new depth how the nation experienced mixed results with democracy. This relates to a lack of motivational factors that resulted in limited success concerning polls and freedom. Overall, of the countries explored in this dissertation, Vietnam is the one about which there is the most previously unknown information; therefore, my exploration of Vietnam's counterinsurgency in chapter five is, by far, the most extensive.

Regarding the fourth nation, Zimbabwe, I examine its pursuit of freedom, efforts to exploit ethnic division, and use of guerrillas that produced factionalism at an unprecedented level. These issues have not been discussed to date in a thorough manner. I later explore all of these motivational factors and their effects on the wider world.

Another way that my research expands existing information and fills in historical gaps is by revealing how mightily both people with disabilities and the arts played significant roles during this time period in the regions explored. Disability History is often marginalized, or completely forgotten. In truth, the inclusion of people with

disabilities in the arts extends well beyond the limited books, plays, musicals, and movies about Helen Keller, a singular role-model with disabilities. In July 2016, noted dance instructor and disability rights activist Ms. Karen Lynn spoke to me about dance's value as a tool to promote universal brotherhood:

During the 1950s and 60s, it was my privilege to learn how to build up my body, to be able to walk, and ultimately put aside my leg brace. No one was using dance as therapy at that time. I felt amazing joy, and this joy laid the foundation for everything I have achieved. The gentle, beautiful movements were something I wanted to share with the entire world.

Ms. Lynn's experience demonstrates that people with disabilities' participation in the arts has the potential to produce positive outcomes—not only personally, but also for wider society.

As a patron of the arts and playwright with multiple disabilities, I am continually awed at how developing nations advanced the cause of disability inclusion before first-world democracies did. The reason why this particular activity took place in the developing world is because a society just beginning its capacity for growth would need to ensure the productive capacity of all its adult citizens. I truly believe the concept of disability inclusion was discovered within the developing world. In an April 2015 interview with Professor Jill Kennicott, noted disability rights activist, she declared that she felt far more welcome in Taiwan than any other country because of the Taiwan's commitment to maximum participation for underrepresented members of their nation state.

David Mamet, noted playwright and scholar, sees individualism as a way to promote disability access: “We must realize that government is nothing more than all of us combined, not a source of gifts from the sky. The fundamental idea is whether

humankind is going to figure things out, or blindly wait for an earthly version of perfection to bestow gifts without work.”<sup>35</sup> I believe that he is saying that individuals, who act on a more local level, accomplish more than the bureaucratic elite. As such, I believe that the four researched, developing nation states could be considered far more local than first-world countries like the United States, where disability inclusion was less of a priority.

The four examined countries sought to improve the lives of people with disabilities. As Taylor asserts, “This improvement took place through the arts. Arts programs were created to demonstrate the commitment of governments to inclusion and national development as well as to promote loyalty to the organized government and not to armed guerrillas.”<sup>36</sup>

Professor Robert Russell of Harvard University, a visually impaired scholar, traveled to Malaysia in 1956 to consult with Chief Minister Abdual Rahman, in order to design a national plan for theaters for the blind and hard of hearing. Sign interpreters were prevalent in Malaysia before they were in the United States. “Young dancers with difficult types of mobility impairments formed flexible dance and drama companies beginning in 1963. The introduction of television showed one of these groups of young women performing for Vice President Chen Len Chang at the Double Ten Palace on June 17<sup>th</sup>.”<sup>37</sup>

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35. David Mamet, *The Secret Knowledge* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 155.

36. Taylor, 12.

37. Margaret Sullivan, *France and the Vietnam War* (New York: Macmillan Press, 1980), 222.

As in Malaysia, Taiwan was at the forefront of encouraging people with disabilities' participation in the arts. Engaging everyone in the full spectrum of citizenry in Taiwan was vibrant long before disability legislation existed in the United States and Canada. Mahlon Meyer describes a unique way that young Taiwanese women with disabilities used their artistic talent to contribute to public life: "A group of young women with respiratory difficulties designed a water ballet, which took place on the banks of the Danshui River. Beginning in 1967, the piece titled "Rites of Floating" was reenacted during Chinese New Year, despite the cold."<sup>38</sup> These programs were exported throughout Europe and North America.

Artistic disability inclusion was not limited to the stage and creative water ballet. Innovative events were televised, as well: "Taiwanese television, between 1965 and 1976, sponsored the Heal Yourself, Heal the Land Contest, in which defectors and the nation's disability dance troop worked together to reenact Daoist marriage rites as an interpretative dance."<sup>39</sup> Dance and sculpture ended up being the most effective programs in promoting inclusion among people with disabilities.

According to Robert Chandler in *War of Ideas*, in Vietnam sculptures were created by people with mental illness in Saigon in 1971. The country also had a calligraphy contest in which people with quadriplegia drew with pointers held by their mouths. Additionally, there was a dance project that celebrated the new constitution of 1968, performed by people with vision and hearing loss. Similarly, in Zimbabwe, those with disabilities were included in the arts: "Blind sculptors in Zimbabwe created clay

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38. Meyer, 15.

39. Taylor, 44.

models commemorating the Peace Indaba of 1965 and the new constitution in 1969. A group of wheelchair users [in order to promote peace] paraded throughout the country in support of the Pearce Commission's compromise proposals in 1972."<sup>40</sup>

Throughout this thesis, I continue to provide a broad landscape of how people with disabilities used their participation in the arts to play important roles in these counterinsurgencies.

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40. Smith, 82.

## **Chapter Two: Counterinsurgency Pillars, Categories, Principles, Resettlement Modalities, and Beginnings**

Counterinsurgency in Malaysia took place from 1948 to 1960. The Taiwanese counterinsurgency, which focused on an attempt to suppress banditry and end the rebellion, took place from 1949 to 1978. In Vietnam, counterinsurgency combat occurred from 1955 to 1975, with strong involvement by the U.S. military forces from 1965 to 1973. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) counterinsurgency, as it was known in Zimbabwe, which was then called Rhodesia, took place from 1965 to 1980.<sup>41</sup>

The six “pillars of counterinsurgency are military security, protection from violence, economic development, the right to seek and receive a decent living, political awareness, and the right to petition one’s government for the redress of grievances.”<sup>42</sup> Counterinsurgency is concerned with more peaceful methods that facilitate independence, in contrast to quick, violent, or autocratic decision-making by armed guerrillas or an enemy possessing the largest military force. People in difficult economic circumstances are focused on immediate needs, which can appear to be addressed by paternalistic, autocratic actions. “Political ideas mean nothing if people are undervalued and neglected.”<sup>43</sup> Successful counterinsurgency involves not only diplomatic strategies, but also respectful methodologies.

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41. Stubbs, 441.

42. David Griada, *Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice* (New York: Doubleday, 1974), 80.

43. Thomas Bass, *The Spy Who Loved Us* (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2007), 167.

Each country analyzed made use of different methods of counterinsurgency and possessed different circumstances. Timing was also vital. Sometimes conditions outside the host country led to changes in policy. “International opposition to racism led to changes in Zimbabwe. Opposition to the Vietnam War had a strong international component,” notes Fred Gaffen.<sup>44</sup>

Malaysia’s primary purpose was to develop military security in order to make independence possible. This was facilitated by political changes in the United Kingdom: “The United Kingdom elections in 1951 brought to power the Conservative Party, which was totally dedicated to bringing about peace and independence.”<sup>45</sup> Within two years, governments within each of the twelve federated states of Malaysia had complete control of their budgets. A large racial triumvirate of Indian, Chinese, and Malayan officers was appointed to the army, navy, and air force. By 1955, the election of a national government with autonomy, except for defense and foreign affairs, had occurred. Full independence materialized two years later. A combination of incentives for loyalty, as well as short, swift punishment for the recalcitrant, was successful. The Malaysians, therefore, provided a respectful and diplomatic template of how to win over the disinterested, disaffected and frustrated. Perhaps it can best be understood as applying the maternal approach of compassion toward the entire wavering society.<sup>46</sup> John Chynoweth’s *Hunting Terrorists in the Jungle* refers repeatedly to the need for an enveloping kindness. “It did no good to shoot, if there was no plan for what would

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44. Fred Gaffen, *Unknown Warriors* (Ontario: St John’s, 1990), 99.

45. Marston, 22.

46. Thompson, *Make for the Hills*, 87.

happen after the shooting stopped.”<sup>47</sup> Having ruled over a third of the world at one time, the British possessed a unique understanding of how to administer disparate peoples. This experience would prove invaluable in attempting to defeat the uprisings that took place throughout the world following the end of World War II.

Following are overview examples of circumstances that engendered various modes of counterinsurgency related to military security, which attempted to promote national independence in Taiwan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Any possibility for success required diplomatic, respectful tactics by outside forces.

In Taiwan, a powerful outside agent that affected change was the withdrawal of Canadian and U.S. recognition of Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. This stimulated a diplomatic attempt by the Taiwanese government to win over local people by a deferential jobs program and greater participation in domestic government matters. These new improvements were designed to improve military security by removing causes of discontent.<sup>48</sup>

In Vietnam, the outside force of the election of Richard Nixon led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops and concentrated efforts to build up the local South Vietnamese army. The new strategy is detailed in Priscilla Robert’s masterwork, *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia*: “American forces would gradually be withdrawn, with the intent of building up the South Vietnamese

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47. John Chynoweth, *Hunting Terrorists in the Jungle* (London: Tempus. 2005), 110.

48. Taylor, 50.

Army while going after Communist bases in Laos and Cambodia.”<sup>49</sup> This situation had required a different mindset than American dominance. The United States had not utilized diplomatic, respectful approaches, and this led to disastrous results. Military security proved elusive.

In Zimbabwe, outside diplomatic forces from the United States and the United Kingdom promoted a more respectful approach to the African majority, which appeared, at first, to be successful. The 1976 South African uprising convinced the Zimbabwean government to move rapidly to a majority-ruled government and integrated society.<sup>50</sup> The decision to make these changes was motivated by practical concerns, as Ann Weinrich elucidates: “It was necessary to make use of moderate Africans since it was no longer possible to have a White controlled government.”<sup>51</sup> It was a desire for increased military security that persuaded the government to move toward an integrated society. African success in the military, the police, and business, persuaded the white government, they had “earned” the right to be free.

In all of the regions discussed, it was also vital to protect civilians from outbreaks of coercive violence to extort money and soldiers. “Success happened in this area most strongly in Malaysia,” Noel Barbour notes. “Due to strict food rationing, people were fed

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49. Priscilla Robert, *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia* (New York: Doubleday, 2006), 67.

50. Abel Muzorewa, *Rise and Walk* (Salisbury, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia: United Methodist Press, 1978), 32.

51. Ann Weinrich, *Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971), 92.

communally under government supervision.”<sup>52</sup> Midday meals consisted of halal meat, cooked vegetables, and rice. There was no need to smuggle food, and violence was therefore diminished.

Taiwan’s geography provided its civilians with a measure of safety. Because Taiwan is an island, it is naturally isolated, as Anthony Joes discusses.<sup>53</sup> Being surrounded by the extremely choppy South China Sea kept outside marauders from attacking. Thus, Taiwan was protected from outside violence.

Vietnam had some success in protecting civilians from violence. In *Revolutionary War in World Strategy*, Robert Thompson describes: “Non-military personnel were offered large cash rewards for serving in village defense corps, which did public service and security in areas the military was too thinly stretched to cover.”<sup>54</sup> The underserved communities were overwhelmingly grateful for the protection. In contrast, Zimbabwe offered much less protection to its civilians.

According to guerilla warfare expert Noel Barbour, “Zimbabwe was unable to fully deal with acts of extortion until police support units of women and mixed-race men were created in 1976.”<sup>55</sup> They met with local villagers to provide literacy classes and taught villagers how to protect themselves with firearms. Developing nations often neglect security in exchange for a focus on political progress.

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52. Noel Barbour, *War of the Running Dogs* (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 119.

53. Joes, 198.

54. Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy*, 67.

55. Muzorewa, 57.

Concerning the third pillar of economic development, all four nations increased their gross national product. Malaysia grew the most: “An isolated colonial backwater became an economic bulwark.”<sup>56</sup> In 1966, the first fast food franchise, Wimpy Hamburgers, opened in Penang; fifty different restaurant chains opened providing employment and cheap tasty food. Vegans and ice cream tycoons fought for consumer dollars.

“Taiwan sought to engage in trade with other Western nations and became a manufacturing hub.”<sup>57</sup> Taiwan gave young people and veterans priority in obtaining loans for businesses. Interest was waived for the first three years of any loan in an underserved part of the island, five years for veterans and their families.

Vietnam had a 9-percent growth rate annually between 1965 and 1972. International investment proved to be central to Vietnam’s development. In *Conflict of Myths: The Development of Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War*, Larry Cable notes: “Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines each took charge of a particularly troubled province [in Vietnam]. They sought to encourage small business and community projects.”<sup>58</sup> The uneven success revealed insecurity after the first oil shock and embargo in 1973. Increased inflation undermined confidence in the local currency.

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56. Joes, 44.

57. Taylor, 5.

58. Larry Cable, *Conflict of Myths: The Development of Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1988), 10.

Zimbabwe sought to create growth in the areas around the Protected Villages: “The Manicaland Province benefited from smugglers, who fought the United Nations’ sanctions. The building and repair of ships and cargo trucks gave twenty thousand men and women unemployment. Large scale recreational facilities were built around the rural areas, which lowered the unemployment crisis among the Shagaan tribe.”<sup>59</sup> As far as the fourth pillar, the right to seek and receive a living, there were varying results. H. W. Crocker explains that “Malaysia received aid from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, which provided strong employment, particularly in the underdeveloped regions.”<sup>60</sup> Such employment included gold and copper mining and selling indigenous products.

In contrast, Taiwan succeeded without outside help. Its system of free enterprise thrived. “Taiwan’s benign capitalism provided a great deal of social insurance while keeping taxes low.”<sup>61</sup> With a low level of taxation, families could better afford food, education, and homes. The Taiwanese began to truly experience a right to a decent living.

The Koch brothers’ programs improved the acquisition of a decent living for Vietnamese urban dwellers by creating a modern infrastructure consisting of improved roads, health care, and twentieth century communication. This happened in the cities; while in the rural areas, “The land to the Tiller Program improved agricultural income in

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59. Reed, 43.

60. Crocker, 20.

61. Mark Moyar, *Triumph Forsaken* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 42-44.

1970.”<sup>62</sup> During the early 1970s, the full population believed they had the ability to attain a reasonable living.

The Land to the Tiller Program was a movement for Australians, New Zealanders, and Americans to buy out large land owners and distribute the land to former share croppers beginning in 1970. The purpose was designed to defuse tensions and remove one of the Communist key platform points, by giving a chance to the disaffected.<sup>63</sup>

Economic differences, underlain by racial differences persevered in Zimbabwe: “Zimbabweans tended to combine a first-world economy for white and mixed-race settlers, with pockets of success for well-favored Africans.”<sup>64</sup> White and mixed-race people had supervisory roles in most of the major industries, which was, for this segment of the population, improvement in the attainment of a comfortable living. Most rural Africans, however, did not possess the right to seek and receive a living.

Political awareness and the right to petition one’s government were developed gradually in Malaysia, on the local level in Taiwan, and in sporadic fits and starts in Vietnam, while the Zimbabwean government kept moderate Africans out of the political process in favor of manageable chiefs.<sup>65</sup>

In *Peace is Not at Hand*, Robert Thompson explains that “Grievance protection took place throughout the Malayan Conflict through ... letters and public meetings.”<sup>66</sup> One example is that the people of Penang successfully petitioned the government for

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62. Ky, 101-02.

63. Chandler, 191.

64. Weinrich, 127.

65. Crocker, 111.

66. Robert Thompson, *Peace is Not at Hand* (London: Somerset Press, 1974), 79.

grant funds to construct a dance hall, which was used for many community purposes.

Noteworthy improvements were made for the Taiwanese, also. Chiang Kai-shek observed that “The Taiwanese had been distracted and repressed until 1965.”<sup>67</sup>

Following that year, Chiang Kai-shek decided to loosen controls, and people had the right to elect mayors and council people, as well as the right to petition the government.

Vietnam, too, moved toward greater transparency: “Vietnam tried to build an open society under the eyes of the world.”<sup>68</sup> In 1967, one hundred grievance committees were dispatched to local villages to determine sources of political discontent among villagers. This endeavor had limited success.

During that same time period, Zimbabwe’s efforts toward improved grievance procedures sprang from indigenous practices: “Zimbabwe held tribal meetings called indabas.”<sup>69</sup> There were other successful methods for government involvement for citizens, by virtue of assistance from outside. Robin Moore, an American propagandist and mercenary, recruited an army of soldiers from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. These soldiers were known as The Crippled Eagles, whose job was to uphold the Rhodesian government, which is what the white leadership called Zimbabwe until 1978.<sup>70</sup> Moore believed the anti-Communist cause needed to be defended with total, reverential commitment. This served as a valuable, but overly

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67. Chiang Kai-shek, “Chiang Kai-shek Talks to the Nation” (Taipei: Office of Reconciliation, 1967), 98.

68. Ky, 190.

69. Crocker, 238.

70. Robin Moore, *The White Tribe* (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 96.

stressed international involvement. Moore sought to minimize racial elements in his support for the white-dominated government. The Zimbabwean conflict served as a typical example of how a lack of diplomacy, exemplified by intense firepower, can be counterproductive, without an overarching goal to sustain and stimulate fighters on all fronts.<sup>71</sup>

Extending my investigation of counterinsurgency construct, following are examinations of the four different kinds of counterinsurgency and an overview of related ethnic concerns. Further explored are the subset of five principles of successful counterinsurgency, which are interspersed with the inclusion of people with disabilities and the arts. An examination of the commencement of each counterinsurgency is also incorporated. In ensuing chapters, I next interweave everything and analyze the reasons for the success of democracy in Malaysia, partial success of democracy in Taiwan, partial failure in Vietnam, and complete defeat of democracy in Zimbabwe. In addition, Western nations examined include the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, and to a lesser extent, New Zealand and Canada.

There are four specific categories of counterinsurgency, which are far less vitriolic than purely military responses. These four are officially called reward, resettlement, guerrilla conversion, and development of domestic leadership programs. In all four nations, reward programs, in close tandem with resettlement programs, provided protection to guerrillas who wished to change sides, as well as protection to those populations caught in the crossfire.<sup>72</sup> Development of domestic leadership programs in

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71. Weinrich, 671.

72. Ky, 119.

Malaysia and Taiwan created democratically committed leaders to take power when these self-governing nations emerged and the former, colonial leaders left. Guerrilla conversion programs were established to siphon off the best opposition forces and turn them into local democratic, non-Communist leaders in Malaysia and Taiwan, and at the start, in Vietnam.<sup>73</sup>

Furthermore, reward programs enticed the civilian public to engage in counterinsurgency efforts in all four nations. As one example, “In Taiwan, beginning in 1960, large rewards were offered to the general public for personal acts of kindness, which encouraged Communist pilots to defect.”<sup>74</sup>

Bribery rewards ensured alignment and encouraged defection, as well as persuasive guerrilla conversion programs in all four nation states. In one instance in Malaysia, the bribery included not only financial incentives but also the promise of influence over a program for the inclusion of those with disabilities in the arts: “The commander of the Chinese Communist Air Force was offered one hundred ounces of gold, reunion with his wife, and the ability to control the new Youth Theater Program for the Blind, if he defected.”<sup>75</sup>

Rewards of financial incentives of all kinds are probably the most effective methods of encouraging defections and behavioral changes. An incentive-based approach takes longer than other intimidation and coercion, but the long-term impact is

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73. Dale Andrade, *Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 88.

74. William Marx, *Counterrevolution in China* (New York: Libertas Press, 1988), 205.

75. Joes, 72.

more cooperative and effective. As soldier turn author Mark Moyar asserts, “Building relationships is what will lead to change. A person is far more likely to listen if they don’t feel threatened.”<sup>76</sup>

In addition, a person who has been engaged in a relationship is far more likely to not only accept new leadership, but to also aid in that new leadership. According to Richards Stubbs in *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare*, in Malaysia, civic organizations were given financial rewards to create programs for former guerrillas to change their allegiance. This was accomplished via a grant program that extended monetary rewards not only to local governments but also to the turned guerrillas, who then became supervisors. Moreover, Stubbs reveals how a similar type of new leadership was achieved through financial rewards in Zimbabwe when five thousand former Shona guerrillas created the Security Force Auxiliary in 1975. Thus, in these instances, rewards programs were connected directly to guerrilla conversion programs.

In order to further inspect the four distinct counterinsurgency categories, a succinct overview of ethnic concerns in each country is required. The new, pro-Western efforts of the Malaysian government had to juggle various ethnicities from within that were vying for power, specifically, the Chinese, Indian, and native Malayan races. In this context, as Noel Barbour explains, “Domestic development maximized benefits by persuading the population that every citizen had a role to play.”<sup>77</sup> This persuasion did not everywhere.

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76. Moyar, 278.

77. Barbour, 117.

The Taiwanese thought economic and cultural freedom could replace political autonomy and indulged in the idea of reconquering the mainland, as well as repairing ethnic divide, for too long. The Vietnamese tradition of ethnic localism crushed the development of a national identity outside the cities; government became seen as a source of headaches and tax collection against the smiling, Vietcong peasant. The Zimbabwean government possessed a paternalistic attitude toward the ethnic, African population, which belatedly developed domestic moderate, pro-Western African leaders.<sup>78</sup>

The Malaysian government spent a great deal of time and money to create a new sense of harmony with indigenous people by offering them attractive resettlement and rewards programs. For example, the people of Peheloe were offered housing, free medical care, and a substantial increase in wages. This same type of success occurred in Taiwan, when defectors were offered homes and government positions.<sup>79</sup>

Since the indigenous people were being nurtured and recruited by guerrillas in all four countries examined, the United States and other first-world nations had to create stalwart, visionary, compassionate counterinsurgency in each situation to enable multiple cultures to see the value in assistance by the West. Although this happened in Malaysia and Taiwan, it did not transpire in Zimbabwe and Vietnam, both of which were recalcitrant when it came to trusting resettlement and rewards programs from Western nations.<sup>80</sup>

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78. Cable, *Conflict of Myths*, 19.

79. Taylor, 70.

80. Colby, 99.

As a result, the difficulties in converting guerrillas in Vietnam came from a different attitude in government's role in citizens' lives, factionalism within the pro-Western government, and a general lack of experience as to just what democratic government meant and offered. Colonialism had influenced the Vietnamese expectations of government, as James Dickerson explains: "Having been part of a colonial system, the average rural person lived a much localized life. The North Vietnamese promised the safety and comfort of a paternal government, which would make all decisions."<sup>81</sup> The same paternalistic situation existed in Zimbabwe with local villagers. Some believed themselves incapable of making large-scale decisions, which made recruitment of local people easier for guerrillas because they promised that life would be good and free of difficult decisions, all the while, being free from racial discrimination.

The difficulty in transforming Zimbabwean guerrillas stemmed from outmoded ideas in the white community that Mdebele people were "more civilized than Shona and the Shagaan people [who] preferred to live in protected isolation."<sup>82</sup> The level of dedication to converting guerrillas was extremely low because the white government did not believe for the first ten years of its conflict that such conversion was necessary. In contrast, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan had stronger dedication to converting guerrillas.

Richard Stubbs expounds in *The Counterinsurgent State* that Malaysian efforts at guerrilla conversion were designed to figure out what had caused individuals to rebel in the first place. If better use were made of their talents, they would participate in a non-violent struggle. New Life Villages combined counseling, financial assistance, and

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81. James Dickerson, *North to Canada* (Westport: Praeger Press, 1999), 60.

82. Reed, 109.

recreation to remake the individual. This aid was often successful and led to the local and national development of domestic leadership by former guerrillas who took charge of local areas while working on improvements in education and the economy.<sup>83</sup>

Beginning in 1966, Vietnam's effort to convert guerrillas increased in intensity. New Zealand and Australian military leaders took charge of this new, more intense effort. They established radio broadcasts and persuaded two thousand guerrillas to switch sides in February of that year. As long as these Western nations, including the United States, remained in Vietnam, guerrillas continued to be successfully converted, but that ended in 1973 when Western forces withdrew.<sup>84</sup>

Taiwanese guerrillas found success in building new lives economically, while suffering culture shock because the locals were no longer interested in reconquering the mainland. "Any sector of the population, which has different cultural values, must make a decision whether to assimilate or develop their own social customs. The transition can sometimes be difficult."<sup>85</sup>

Taiwanese citizens believed that too much money was being wasted on international endeavors, and they wished to concentrate on the development of domestic leadership. Nevertheless, in the early 1950s, the government of Taiwan sought to spread its positive influence toward Vietnam and Zimbabwe.<sup>86</sup> In addition, psychological warfare officers were dispatched to assist powerful anti-Communist forces around the

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83. Stubbs, 19-21.

84. George Venith, *Black April* (New York: Macmillan Press, 2013), 234.

85. Joes, 226.

86. Marx, 200.

world. The Taiwanese political officers, who traveled internationally, believed that they had a divine, national destiny to guide the world to material prosperity, meaning the free way of life. As a result, a sense of inner harmony and peace would emerge. In this respect, Taiwan's political warfare division took a particular interest in the defense and development of domestic leadership of both Vietnam and Zimbabwe. General Stanley Lawson's *Allied Participation in Vietnam* explores this Asian partnership in some depth:

The Republic of China [Taiwan], when its initial offer of four thousand combat troops was declined, sought to serve in another aspect. Having already worked with defectors, the free Chinese understood just how to motivate domestic citizens within and outside its borders. It required a cool head and a big heart.<sup>87</sup>

Taipei sought to promote the internal settlement between the white government and Bishop Muzorwea as an alternative to collapse in Zimbabwe. Assistance was given in the spirit of fruitful counterinsurgency. The psychological principles in practice here required subtlety and genuine patience.

In an interview on February 25, 2016, psychology historian Karen Cole spoke about the applicable philosophy of Carl Rogers, who created the theory of Unconditional Positive Regard. This therapeutic modality proved effective outside of a treatment room in transforming political allegiance. She further explained:

Unconditional Positive Regard is acceptance regardless of what a person says. The idea is based on the concept that a person has within themselves the capacity for understanding. Rather than trying to sell a particular method or change, the purpose is to determine the individual desires and choices of each person.

Politically, for Vietnam, this meant making the former Viet Cong aware of all the possibilities inherent in a free society. It was vital to develop domestic leadership in

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87. Stanley Lawson, *Allied Participation in Vietnam* (Washington, DC: Mac Millan, 1975), 56.

order to identify what the citizenry desired in order to resume some type of normalcy. The South Vietnamese government sought to increase productivity, civil autonomy, and contentment through giving land to peasants and sharecroppers via the Tiller Reforms in 1970. Cooperatively, U.S. and Australian governments sought to voluntarily purchase unused, large estates and distribute them to the landless peasants in order to create a sense of solidarity with the non-Communist world. This pursuit of domestic leadership worked in a cyclical manner with resettlement.<sup>88</sup>

Magnifying the construct of counterinsurgency, there are five principles necessary for success, which were defined by British civil servant Robert Thompson:

The government must function in accordance with the law. The government must give clear priority to defeating the political subversion, and the government must function according to a national plan. Political leadership must have command over the military, without interfering in strategy. The government must have faith in ultimate victory.<sup>89</sup>

I believe that Thompson's five principles of effective counterinsurgency are strongly complemented by the manner in which governments embrace people with disabilities and the arts. Such inclusion resides in the forefront of securing faith in the pursuits of victory. All sides within the four conflicts utilized participation of people with multiple types of disabilities, thereby increasing the people's confidence in the validity of their causes, although this occurred to a lesser extent in Zimbabwe.

Disability and the arts were embedded in the counterinsurgencies for three reasons. First, from a moral standpoint, their political ideology and method of government were given greater credibility, if previously marginalized people or groups,

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88. Ashley Eakins, interview by Sean Dineen, August 20, 2006.

89. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (London: Somerset Press, 1966), 128.

such as people with disabilities, suddenly took sides. Second, as creative supplement, the arts underscored ideology and governmental methods. Third, the tasks undertaken by persons with hearing, mobility, and visual disabilities were cost effective and good for morale. Given responsibility and encouragement, newly disabled recruits worked with greater diligence. “Any society, which seeks to call itself just, must provide equality of opportunity, if not equality of outcome.”<sup>90</sup> Volition in all arenas of life for people with disabilities was during the Cold War era and remains today a vital part of the human experience. “The value of choice, whether in a supermarket or a ballot box, is the essential act of asserting humanity. Slaves do not have choices free sentient beings do.”<sup>91</sup> The life of people in a non-totalitarian society, even without full-fledged political freedom is, at the very least, partially their own.

Malaysia was the most innovative when it came to including people with disabilities. The Malaysian government sought to promote a cultural heritage among its wheelchair users, as well as those with hearing or vision loss, in successful theater pieces, a national sculpture contest, and national flag contest that began in 1952. The entire structure of government was employed to develop a new sense of national purpose. This required a new outlook, in which the impact of Chinese speaking resettlement supervisors, proved indispensable.<sup>92</sup> In *The Counterinsurgent State*, Richard Stubbs reveals: “When recruits could speak Chinese and understood the Chinese ways and

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90. Barbour, 99.

91. James Connor, *Conversion* (New York: Doubleday, 1982), 79.

92. Bui Diem, *Jaws of History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflon, 1987), 34.

culture, while taking an active role in developing the amenities of the settlement ...

resettlement worked well and people were generally happy.”<sup>93</sup>

Creating wholesome leisure activities was seen as a way of defusing national tension. British Colonial Secretary Malcolm McDonald allocated one hundred and fifty thousand pounds toward the construction of national community centers. To ensure full use of government and private facilities, three field police chiefs, who had lost limbs from land mines, supervised the construction.<sup>94</sup>

These creative, dynamic programs included the wise establishment of New Villages that were government-financed centers of education, living and medicine for former guerrillas and people with disabilities.

The Malay Rebel Liberation Army also supported people with disabilities, who were seen as victims of capitalism. The rebels sought to celebrate their vision of a classless, socialist nation, in which persons with disabilities would form national elite; however, this never came to fruition. In the end, the rebels did not succeed because they did not allow for individuality and dismissed cultural and religious traditions, which were important to everyone, inclusive of people with disabilities.<sup>95</sup> Nevertheless, for this part of the world and era, acknowledgment of disability issues was progressive. All four nations engaged in attempts to convince members of their society with disabilities that their contributions in thought, word, deed, and spirit would be welcomed and encouraged.<sup>96</sup>

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93. Stubbs, 118.

94. Chin Peng, *My Side of History* (Beijing: Beijing, 2006), 76.

95. Peng, 78.

96. Bass, 176.

Even the authoritarian regime of Diem in Vietnam allowed for some artistic freedom; although this was in conjunction with some attempts at conformity and limitation. In such a society, the arts became a mass produced entity, designed to inculcate ideology at the expense of true development.<sup>97</sup> This is particularly true when looking at the lives of people with disabilities, as they tend to matter only en masse as symbols of the glory of the leader and the barbaric practices of the enemy of the moment, within or without. All factions of North and South Vietnam sought to create a national catharsis through the transformative power of the arts for people with disabilities. Such a catharsis was developed in 1969 when a group of wheelchair users decided to make a sculpture out of used wheelchairs.<sup>98</sup> This sculpture, the Matauk sculpture, was intended “to symbolize how people with disabilities could go forward despite physical limitation.”<sup>99</sup>

In the United States, “In 1970, the Student Union for Peace Action created a series of paintings in support of American veterans with disabilities. These were painted [by people with quadriplegia] using mouthpieces as a gesture of sympathy.”<sup>100</sup> This also honored Canadian soldiers in the army. Simultaneously, the American Peace Vigil sponsored sculptures in Philadelphia, which symbolized sorrow and anger, created by amputee American veterans.

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97. Tony Day, *Cultures at War* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 2010), 87.

98. Dickerson, 78.

99. Gaffen, 233

100. James Hagen, *Northern Exposure* (New York: Macmillan Press, 2004), 48.

During the same time period between 1967 and 1973, two completely contrary philosophies existed. As 100,000 young men fled to the northern refuge to escape the U.S. draft to Vietnam, approximately thirty thousand Canadians sought to participate in the U.S. effort to destroy the Communist movement in Southeast Asia.<sup>101</sup> Old school conservatives summed up the new mindset in a bitter phrase: “The best of ours are going down there [to the United States]; the worst of theirs are coming up here.”<sup>102</sup>

James Hagen, in *Northern Exposure*, opines: “Young Americans who chose to oppose the Selective Service and laws of the United States, by becoming exiles in Sweden or Canada, exercised a fundamental American freedom, they left.”<sup>103</sup> Although choosing to be an exile saved young men from battle, it limited opportunities in their daily lives because they were not citizens of their new country.

Concerning the notion of limitation, in an interview on February 7, 2016, Laura Frankel, Executive Director of VSA Michigan, The State Organization on Arts and Disability, articulated, “The worst idea is to be limited, put in a box for the confidence and convenience of others. Those who do not experience, physically and spiritually, what day to day life can be like with a disability are led to imbibe the stereotypes so comfortable to media and magistrates alike.” Ms. Frankel continued, “My rights are not conditionally on blind conformity to a comfortable stereotype of what I ought to be.” Ms. Frankel continued: “My rights are not conditionally on blind conformity to a comfortable stereotype of what I ought to be.”

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101. Gaffen, 191.

102. Tracey Arial, *Canadians in Vietnam*, (Montreal: Viking Press, 2008), 19.

103. Hagen, 99.

The attitude of the general public concerning disability rights and self-autonomy was highlighted in some of my research discussions with disability rights activists who have made their careers out of fighting this struggle. Two prominent activists in the movement for disability inclusion are Laura Frankel and Jill Kenndicott. both of these scholars saw a connection between greater inclusion and the anti-colonial movements. Ms. Frankel spoke about the arts as forms of cathartic, expression leading to a more universal choice, while Ms Kenndicott, advocated a direct Vietnamese parallel: “I was engaged in my own liberation, for the right to be defined on my own terms. Paternalism, and exploitation abroad are very similar.” To them, the larger issue, in connection with the development of political autonomy and national independence, is the broader issue of choice, whether it applies to a person or a country.

I conducted an in-depth interview with noted disability activist and scholar, Professor Yvonne Singer, on April 28, 2016. She spoke at some length about her viewpoint on the use of the arts as a cleansing and transformative force: “I will not be kept silent by those who have nothing to say. Rather, I will use ordinary abilities mixed with newer methods to state an eternal idea. The idea being, that human beings have an unlimited right to identity and self-expression.” Indeed, identity and self-expression were highly esteemed in counterinsurgency movements in the four nations discussed.

All four nations created a complex series of programs for propaganda, creativity, and recreation involving people with disabilities. Each national identity was given relatively more free reign in these arenas than in daily life and the battleground.<sup>104</sup>

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104. Gaffen, 158.

Free reign of civic rights for people with disabilities was manifested in Malaysia. Theater and radio programs that allowed freedom of artistic and cultural identity created a new sense of national harmony in the community of people with disabilities. *On Guard for You*, the nation's most listened to drama, considered the adventures and frustrations of a young Malay serviceman, his Indian wife, and their adopted Chinese daughter. Created under the guidance of the Ministry of Information, the program's stars toured Vietnam to rave reviews. Once again, the argument could be brought forth that it is the small things that create a sense of loyalty: "One act of kindness is worth a thousand political posters."<sup>105</sup> Taiwan soon decided to present the same show, with Taiwanese actors. Zimbabwe created its own version, with equal theatrical success.

Australian psychological war expert Ian Mac Neil talks about the value of theater for the masses in his notes on the Australian Bush Scouts program in Vietnam: "Every artistic endeavor was a way to unlock the hoi chanah's mind away from indoctrination, into their own areas of interest."<sup>106</sup> Hoi chanah were graduates of the guerrilla program. Their most trivial decision-making revealed the free human being inside, as opposed to being completely directed from outside.

The free human spirit was nurtured not only through the arts but also through other means.

Stuart A. Herrington's *Stalking the Vietcong* demonstrates in some detail the process involved in attempting to reestablish autonomy in the individual. Captain Herrington served in Hau Nghia Village in the Bao Try district near Cambodia. He

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105. Ky, 667.

106. Ian Mac Neil, *To the End* (Canberra: Doubleday, 2008). 105.

reveals: “I spent two weeks with Sgt. Kayan and finally persuaded him to rally. I took him shopping and explained how the people of South Vietnam wished to welcome him. He initially believed everything was a trick. The psychological process of conversation took a great deal of patience.”<sup>107</sup> In this circumstance, the bond between these two enemies created a new sense of trust. Firepower could not achieve what a couple of good meals and genuine comradeship could. In this case, Sergeant Kayan was given autonomy by seeing the outside world, inclusive of choices as simple as selecting what to eat and with whom, as well as enjoying the art of conversation.

I find the prospect of autonomy analysis very intriguing. The Canadian Navy commander, Admiral Jean Pearson, encouraged his son to enlist in the Marine Corps of the United States, to “do his bit” in the struggle against Communism: “Young Pearson was assigned to the combined action platoons who lived within Vietnamese villages. Caps, as they were known, built accessible houses for veterans with disabilities, as well as promoting a national program to bring health and recreation to the underserved community of people with disabilities.”<sup>108</sup> One of the most significant ways that those with disabilities were served in all four nations was through their inclusion in the arts.

In Vietnam, increasing numbers of theater pieces starring people with multiple disabilities traversed the country.<sup>109</sup> These propaganda plays were put forth by North and South Vietnam, each seeking to win over the enemy and bolster existing patriots. Arts

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107. Stuart A. Herrington, *Stalking the Vietcong* (New York: Ballantine Press, 1987), 126.

108. Gaffen, 72.

109. Chandler, 34.

programs, such as these plays, were seen as more relaxed ways of heralding political philosophy compared to more dangerous approaches such as forced resettlements or taking prisoners.<sup>110</sup>

In Taiwan, the Marxist guerrillas continued to create propaganda plays and performances concerning people with disabilities and the hardships of resettlement programs in the New Life Villages, which were housing developments and health and education centers for people seen as being under guerrilla threat.<sup>111</sup> The Taiwanese government wanted to assist people with disabilities by removing them from militarily sensitive areas. The revolutionary Marxist play *Agonies of a Rubber Tapper* portrayed the downside of resettlement. Dancers enacted this play, which showed a brilliant guerrilla losing an arm and being forced to become the mistress of a puppet officer. “This and other plays formed the basis of the Chinese propaganda text book, *People’s Art*.”<sup>112</sup> The emerging democratic Taiwanese government recognized the plays as successful, so they created their own arts programs, which helped to propel Taiwan toward democracy. These exceptionally prosperous endeavors included lauded dance and music festivals.

Additionally, as divulged by Anthony Joes, Defense Minister Chiang Chunquko believed that making recreational programs a key part of people’s daily lives was vital to the progress and survival of the Taiwanese government. A Qumoy music festival was held in June 1970, known as the Woodstock of Asia. It brought ten Western and five

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110. Ky, Chapter Three.

111. Marx, 144.

112. Joes, 54.

Asian bands to Taiwan's industrial city. Three guitar players had mental illness, one Japanese singer was a double leg amputee, and one drummer had only two months to live.<sup>113</sup>

In Zimbabwe, the Ministry of the Interior financed three musical theater companies made up of former guerrillas, who extolled the government amnesty program, such that these and other enemy guerrillas were offered immunity from prosecution. This involved thousands of people with disabilities, who wrote the musical plays, performed them, and comprised the audiences. The creation of formalized entertainment programs seemed to be the special skill of the Mdebele converts who had been part of the Zimbabwe African People's Union. *The Old Man from Matapos*, a drama detailing the life of the great integrationist John Merriman, took two years to develop. It premiered in Salisbury on January 15, 1972. An audience of twenty thousand braved the summer heat to witness this forty-cast play. *Voting Brings Joy*, a comic tale of a newly enfranchised Shona cook, toured throughout the country and won a Founders, Zimbabwe's version of an Oscar. The Rhodesia Light Infantry allowed soldiers with acting experience to work in rehab centers, where everything from Shakespeare to Neil Simon was performed in and out of the wards.<sup>114</sup> The creation of propaganda as art is a better use of the time of educated former guerillas who would rather invest in cultural pursuits than bloody battles. Additionally, Douglas Reed who was a government propagandist theater critic describes the contributions that two women injured in the insurrection made to theater in Zimbabwe:

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113. Taylor, 226.

114. Reed, Chapter Four.

Upon their release from rehab, having had damaged legs during the Alcorn raid of 1970, Ms. Leslie Kemper, and her cousin Ms. Andrea Harper, created the Women's Theater Company of Fyfe. This company traveled to private homes, town halls, and African clinics to promote low cost theater programs to people who would not have had access to this form of entertainment. These two women put on sixteen productions of plays in 1971 and 1972.<sup>115</sup>

Although all these Zimbabwean arts programs were impressive, they did not survive the major part of the counterinsurgency, which continued unsuccessfully until 1980.

How rebellions in each country led up to counterinsurgency is also a matter of interest, especially when viewing the commencement of these rebellions in the context of the larger world and in accordance with Thompson's five principles of successful counterinsurgency. In addition, the manner in which these rebellions utilized the arts is compelling.

The Malaysian Emergency came out of the World War II occupations by the Japanese of Singapore, Brunei, and what was then known as Malaya. After the war, with the slow breakdown of British control, a natural desire for independence emerged.<sup>116</sup> As a result of this commitment to independence, the New Life Villages in Malaysia sought to create theater and broadcasts concerning the possibilities of peace and economic advancement. Limited broadcasts began in 1950 and were expanded to all Malaysian provinces one year later.<sup>117</sup> Indeed, these broadcasts espoused functioning according to newly emerging, independent Malaysian law, Thompson's first principle.

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115. Ibid., 32.

116. Barbour, 77.

117. Thompson, *Peace is Not at Hand*, 20-22.

The success of this substantive entertainment was recounted in the movie, *Seventh Dawn*, starring William Holden. The film tells the tale of missionaries working with the blind, which first coincided with the commencement of the counterinsurgency in Malaysia. This movie shows how the government discovered guerrilla elements in the disability community. Further revealed is how the government devised programs to meet their needs, which gave priority to making them useful citizens, thereby reducing political subversion.<sup>118</sup> This demonstrates Thompson's second principle of successful counterinsurgency.

Early in the Malaysian crisis, the rubber tappers, miners, and harvesters of the country's most valuable products were subject to intimidation, isolation, and murder. Secret weapons caches were stored and then stripped bare. In June 1948, open armed assaults began. The Malaysian counterinsurgency was created in response to the violent conflict. The government of the United Kingdom, which still controlled Malaysia, designed a national plan to restore peace and lead Malaysia toward eventual independence in 1957.<sup>119</sup> This demonstrates Thompson's third principle.

In accordance with a national plan, the government financed arts companies to create plays about a new housing program. These productions were much applauded because they "showed the public their leaders cared about them."<sup>120</sup> The presentations also featured people with multiple and profound disabilities. The productions, which were produced by and starred the disabled population, flourished. These plays that

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118. *The 7th Dawn*, directed by Lewis Gilbert (1964; United Kingdom: United Artists, 1964).

119. Barbour, 222.

120. Andrade, 73.

celebrated ethnic concerns became thriving, countrywide “hits.” Theatres in Peggang and Singapore were kept open all night. The entire country seemed won over with theatrics and entertainment.

A significant reason for counterinsurgency success in Malaysia was the relaxed, slow methodology adopted by the British and Australians. In *Revolutionary War in World Strategy*, Thompson wrote, “We sought to harness people’s idealism, not control it.”<sup>121</sup> He was saying that the British government sought to improve people’s lives instead of being coercive. Ethnic conflict and political subversion were further defused by collaboration in the new constitution that required equal numbers of Chinese and Malay voting members in the Parliament. Hence, democratic Malaysian political leadership gained command over the military concluding a counterinsurgency that had begun in 1948.<sup>122</sup> This represents Thompson’s fourth principle.

Less invasive non-military practices worked better in Malaysia to calm the unruly population of the urban regions. For example, greater use of the police force, which was part of the political leadership, led to a reduced military presence, which Sir Gerald Templer saw as the most important factor in victory. He writes, “Three friendly policemen can do more to win people over than an entire army.”<sup>123</sup> Local officials know their people and their needs better than any conquering foreign army.

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121. Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy*, 50.

122. Anthony Short, *War of the Running Dogs* (New York: Macmillan Press, 1971), 75.

123. Richard Hunt, *Pacification* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 89.

Culminating Thompson's five specific principles of successful counterinsurgency, after twelve years of internal strife, the Communist regime of guerrillas from the Malay Race Liberation Army was defeated, and democratic Malaysia was faithfully established.<sup>124</sup>

A government of goodwill functioned in accordance with the new, more relaxed law. Minister Tunku Rehman shipped the last of the British Military advisors home with a medal, a year's pay, and a box of Denobile cigars. The British, who had served as advisors, were no longer needed. However, a group of commonwealth troops, all volunteers, stayed on to guard the border.<sup>125</sup> Among them, "Sir Robert Thompson hung around with his wife and three youngest children as Advisor to the new government, Minister of Defense, and dealer at the new Malay Sultan's Thursday night poker games."<sup>126</sup> Thompson had always believed in ultimate victory for the Malaysian government. He just wanted to see it as an independent democracy, which is exactly what happened. In fact, he had devoted twelve years to living there and working with the locals to achieve that democracy.

Victory was formally declared in June 1960; nevertheless, it had been difficult along the way to achieve due to large scale, monetary disparities and ethnic division. The economic problems were solved, in part, by the creation of a sizable social welfare system, which gave cheap housing to the ethnic underprivileged, thereby winning hearts

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124. Ibid., 17-21.

125. Stubbs, 38.

126. Barbour, 44.

and minds of former opponents.<sup>127</sup> As such, dealing with political subversion was prioritized. “The right tone needed to be adopted, not a gloating or condescending tone, but a welcoming one. Those who were lost had to be brought back through encouragement and then encouraged to bring back others. The poachers were to become gamekeepers.”<sup>128</sup>

The community of people with disabilities shared in this success through a government program giving priority employment to them and exemption from income tax. Likewise, artistic programs flourished as four national groups of disabled artists put on performances in dance and theater. For example, “In Kuala Lumpur the National Association of Wheelchair Actors created a Shakespeare Festival. Blind dancers turned *Henry the V* into a performance, and *Beowulf* [starring disabled artists] was translated into Malay.”<sup>129</sup>

Analyzing the five principles of effective counterinsurgency in Taiwan reveals that it considered itself the legitimate Chinese government, functioning in accordance with its own law, despite the fact that it was just an island. The Nationalist Chinese (Taiwanese) conflict with the Chinese Communists was fully underway in December 1945, following the defeat of the Japanese puppet republics and the Manchurian Empire overseen by Chinese Emperor Pu Yi. Corruption within the government ran wild, along with unemployment. Former soldiers discharged by the republics were regarded as

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127. Ibid., Chapter Three.

128. Barbour, 114.

129. Crocker, 306.

traitors by the Nationalists and wooed by Mao's Communists.<sup>130</sup> As disclosed in William Marx's *Counterrevolution in China*, the 200,000 soldiers and airmen removed from active duty were also a rich prize for him. Nationalist President Chiang Kai-shek had let them go against his better judgment, as a gesture of peace to maintain good relations with the United States, which had not yet recognized Cold War realities in 1946. Although Chiang believed he was leading his country in accordance with its own law, he failed to recognize that a large number of discontented and jobless soldiers would prove dangerous to his hope of preserving Nationalist rule over mainland China and Mao Tse-Tung. In contrast, "Mao understood these former Japanese puppet soldiers could easily be maneuvered from one dictatorship to another. Chiang's partial commitment to democracy proved too much. He regarded such men and women as traitors."<sup>131</sup>

Marx also states that Mao scored a major success by winning over former enemy, Japanese-controlled troops. He agreed to an amnesty, while democratic Chiang Kai-shek sought to punish soldiers, who had been loyal to the Japanese. In this respect, via imprisonment.<sup>132</sup> Chiang gave priority to defeating political subversion, Thompson's second principle.

When it came to the arts, Nationalists were seen as far more flexible than Communist China. President Chiang Kai-shek ordered the creation of emperor's clubs in every secondary school to adopt young artists, inclusive of those with disabilities. Boy Scout troops, the movement of young freemasons, and the government-run Chinese

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130. Gerald Schomp, *Birchism Was My Business* (New York: West Island Publishing, 1971), 78.

131. Marx, 39.

132. Taylor, 54.

Youth Corps set up theaters and adaptive workshops, twenty-four in all, by 1965. These served as after school programs for young people, included active participation by their extended families, and blossomed into effective, celebratory contests.<sup>133</sup> “Madam Chiang Kai-shek would reward prize winners with an audience with the president, in which he would cook personal dinners topped off by an ice cream Coca Cola desert, known as the nation’s one vice.”<sup>134</sup> These resourceful activities functioned within a productive national plan, wherein citizens were happy.

Resourceful methods were employed to gain power over martial turncoats. First, pilots who defected from Communist China to Taiwan were paid rewards in gold, not paper money. According to Jay Taylor in *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China*, between five and fifty thousand Taiwanese dollars were given to each pilot, who switched sides and, consequently, worked for Taiwan. Second, youth groups, which adopted defectors by supplying them with education and employment, encouraged their resettlement. Third, in accordance with the law, defectors were given high level military and government positions through the “Welcome Home Program.” Defeating possible political subversion was given nonviolent priority. The rewards given to defectors demonstrated Taiwan’s determination that its political leadership have command over the military. The rewards given to defectors demonstrated Taiwan’s determination that its political leadership have command over the military. The idea of civilian control kept Taiwan from falling into chaos.

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133. Ibid., 37-40.

134. Marx, 101.

A group of conservative businessmen led by Rock Island Oil President, Charles Koch, sought to assist, as he said, ““the underdeveloped people of South Asia.””<sup>135</sup> Mr. Koch found the Taiwanese quite receptive to capitalism, as entrepreneurs. With his financing, Taiwanese citizens successfully opened fifty restaurants, ten drug stores, and five boutiques.

Creative programs for people with disabilities continued on a national level and led to further solidarity between people with disabilities and the government in Taiwan. Former guerrilla propagandist Osman China took a strong interest in working with wheelchair users in order to institute what he called, “The National Birthday Party.”<sup>136</sup> He was referring to a week-long food and drama exposition, complete with banquets, which took place every July.

Taiwan’s cultural and industrial development centered on a Western portion of the island. The first indigenous motorcycle industry was created by resettled, former Chinese guerrillas in 1965. This factory provided employment for large numbers of women and people with disabilities. Taiwanese labor laws, which provided for these minorities, were the most progressive in Asia. President Lyndon Johnson was impressed with this and shared this hiring strategy with his employment organizers. Consequently, “United States labor leaders based the [American] Job Corps on a Taiwanese program to employ members of disadvantaged groups.”<sup>137</sup>

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135. Schomp, 87.

136. Short, 102.

137. Marx, 296.

The sum total of these programs engendered an atmosphere that removed national frustrations and established a feeling that victory was possible, although only as an island nation.

Victory was joyously celebrated via the arts and people with disabilities. As William Colby notes, “Presentations of new themes of national harmony were performed by people with disabilities in universities and hospitals. This most prominent play was Li Yuan’s *Raise the White Lamp*. The writer and performer were wheelchair users and hard of hearing.”<sup>138</sup>

Taiwan’s faith in ultimate victory was dual natured. The government’s commitment to bringing about a peaceful way of living on the island was total and unequivocal. Opportunities were found for people of every background. However, a great deal of money and effort was spent trying to recover the mainland. By 1964, that possibility seemed remote, but no one could accept that reality. It became necessary to reshape government policy around resettlement to include the mainland defectors who wished to stay in Taiwan.<sup>139</sup> Housing, and medical care happened at once. High paying jobs, meetings with the President and other leaders, came later. Loyal citizens felt neglected.

Examination of Thompson’s five principles concerning Vietnam counter-insurgency begins with the defeat of Nazi Germany, which had also torn France to pieces. After France’s financial and military collapse, its former colony split and became the nations of North and South Vietnam. The end of World War II also invigorated the

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138. Colby, 220.

139. Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy*, 89.

United States and the Soviet Union to compete as the first superpowers. As extensions of their dominances, in the 1960s, the United States supported the more democratic South Vietnam, and the Soviet Union supported Communist North Vietnam. Counter-insurgency by both sides was launched.<sup>140</sup>

Initially, the United States sought to support South Vietnamese forces in rural villages. This proved ineffective. “Attempts at resettlement appeared to be little more than opportunities for graft. A lack of an efficient administrative structure increased tension and bitterness.”<sup>141</sup> South Vietnam was not functioning in accordance with any semblance of law, which was the antithesis of Thompson’s first principle of productive counterinsurgency.

Although originally joined with North Vietnam, Diem had genuine Nationalist credentials, having rejected both. These disorganized officials created chaos in all aspects of Vietnamese life. The Chieu Hoi Program languished because there were not enough officials to manage it efficiently. Conversely, Viet Cong tax collectors and soldiers were extremely efficient, if only at brutality. Guerrillas made use of what Sir Gerald Templer identified as “the long haul, low cost approach.”<sup>142</sup>

French and Japanese offers of help to gain power. He had refused a coalition with Ho Chi Minh, fearing his fate would be no better than those of Eastern Europeans, who had been used and removed in the 1940s. Diem prioritized defeating political subversion by Ho Chi Minh, with land redistribution to the poor, with whom Diem wished to ally

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140. Joes, 59.

141. Howard Penniman, *Culture and Elections in South Vietnam* (Washington, DC: Hoover Institute, 1972), 89.

142. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 74.

himself.<sup>143</sup> Author James Hagen exemplifies Thompson's second principle of counterinsurgency in quoting Diem: "We are taking a large scale population, out of childhood, trying to liberate them where it counts, freedom from debt is more valuable than political freedom at the moment."<sup>144</sup> This was an attempt to create a new sense of self-worth and undercut political subversion. The non-Communist Vietnamese government tried to bolster individual worth within a unified society. This was the Confucian concept, which believed personal choices needed to be focused on the ordinary, while well-meaning leaders would make the important choices: "Opponents of the Vietnam War saw a Faustian bargain where genuine social improvements were created in government programs, which traded obedience for inner peace and economic opportunity."<sup>145</sup>

While the guerrillas stole land, Diem and the South Vietnamese government purchased vast plantations and built hospitals, schools, and recreational centers. He believed that it was the government's responsibility to manage the daily lives of ordinary people. "This would not be done through coercion," Moyar points out, "but through development of bonds of trust."<sup>146</sup> Bonding could basically be developed through a number of artistic and social programs, which created a sense of national unity and national identification.

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143. Moyar, 49.

144. Hagen, 109.

145. Ibid., 239.

146. Moyar, 63.

Despite his desire to retain full political power in other areas of life, Diem was quite open to other multi-modality ideas. His more relaxed successors would make the attempt to promote a more stimulating way of life, before their own confusions and disagreements would cause the process to break down. This is demonstrated in the detailed analysis of Canadian volunteer Grame Webster: “I saw a number of Montagnard and Moi peoples who had been encouraged to organize a local national guard known as the People’s Self-Defense Force. I asked one gentleman what he was fighting for ... ‘I want the right to make money and make mistakes.’”<sup>147</sup>

Along with the freedom to make mistakes, artistic freedom was understood as a healthy way of defusing creative energy and creating inner harmony. This was known as “Wa”.<sup>148</sup>

Diem understood the need to bring people with disabilities, along with minority ethnic groups, into government. He also wanted to use the arts to distract people, with what Bao Dai had called “creating a national pacifier.”<sup>149</sup>

Thompson’s third principle of successful counterinsurgency (having a national plan) was initially achieved by Vietnam commencing with a national poster campaign, featuring the art of people with disabilities. This was started by the Cao Dai church, which mixed female priesthood, veganism, and Catholicism. Cao Dai aligned itself with neither Diem nor Cao Nhu, President Diem’s genius, but unstable, younger brother, who had been given significant governmental control. Nhu put a complete stop to the poster

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147. Gaffen, 92.

148. Ky, 13.

149. Marx, 40.

campaign.<sup>150</sup> In 1962, he changed his mind about not including the disabled community and ordered national radio broadcasts to focus on what he called more traditional, “vital contributions from our handicapped community.”<sup>151</sup>

The programs for “the handicapped” community thrived. As a reward for participation in government youth programs, people with mobility challenges were to be given tax exemptions. Additionally, a government-funded swimming program, inclusive of people with disabilities, was created. Can Do Lok, Deputy Director of the Ministry of Information, himself a wheelchair user, was ordered to put together a national sales tax used to fund the opera and dramatic companies working with young people with disabilities.<sup>152</sup> These meritorious ventures eventually collapsed: “In the chaos after the overthrow of Diem, these programs were put on the shelf until the return of stability in 1966.”<sup>153</sup>

In keeping with the effective use of the arts and the inclusion of people with disabilities, North Vietnamese reporters took photos of young people injured by napalm and gave them to the world as testimony of imperialist barbarism. Hanoi Hannah devoted an entire radio broadcast to the painful future faced by wounded North Vietnamese comrades.<sup>154</sup>

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150. Colby, 123.

151. Marx, 123.

152. Schomp, 97.

153. Marx, 159.

154. Chandler, 108.

Meanwhile, under Diem, South Vietnamese governmental structure mixed force with incompetence. Democracy garnered half-hearted interest. Although a unified national plan had commenced with the successful, aforementioned poster campaign, there was no follow-through. Periods of free press alternated with censorship, police raids, and arrangements in which the local organized crime bosses were bought off with immunity and government titles. Hannah Le Quart's *Green Robe, Yellow Flag* detailed the alliance between organized crime and government: "Seven khat [drug] leaders were made mayors of towns surrounding the capitol and proceeded to extort bribes from local peasants" to keep schools open.<sup>155</sup> Additionally, crackdowns by organized crime on local religious movements, most strongly the Buddhist minority and local Hoa Ho and Cao Dai sects, brought further dissolution and discontentment. This disorder led to a breakdown of political leadership having control over the military. All of this constituted breakdowns of the third and fourth principles of counterinsurgency.

Cabinet officials, misunderstanding peasants' needs, most of whom were Buddhist and cared deeply about ancestral land, expected them to sacrifice for . . . future benefits. This lack of respect led to a lack of trust. . . . This hindered efforts to obtain genuine backing for the Hamlet Program."<sup>156</sup> The Hamlet Program was the South Vietnamese government's decision to resettle peasants within military regions, supposedly to protect them; however, the Buddhists viewed this as enormously disrespectful and coercive. Fred Gaffen who was a leader in this program revealed: "The

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155. Hannah Le Quart, *Green Robe, Yellow Flag* (Viennae: Ministry of Public Information, 1971), 107.

156. Hunt, 82.

Hamlet Program was not handled properly because individual needs were ignored. All it would have taken is a free hand for local officials. When I had a free hand, all was well.”<sup>157</sup>

The South Vietnamese government benefitted from a number of programs from outside, nonmilitary supporters, who wished to aid newly resettled people in the hamlets. For example, the West German government built five clinics and two secondary schools in the area around the long Arnch Hamlet. The Iranian government sent one hundred Literacy Corps volunteers to teach English to newly resettled hoi chanah: “The Literacy Corps Program spent [the amount of money comparable to] 10 million US dollars in 1967 and another 7 million the following year.”<sup>158</sup> The Iranians thought this would successfully promote Thompson’s third principle: that the government must function in accordance with a national plan. The Iranians seemed to have a national plan for everything, including what to eat for breakfast, according to Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, experts on third-world guerrilla activity: “Persians seem to worship structure.”<sup>159</sup>

Iranian Imperial Court Minister Ali Musazerwa regarded this foreign aid as the key concept of the Shah’s nonviolent social reform program called the White Revolution. Aid consisted of not only money, but also a transformative attitude in which the needs of the receiving society were paramount. The biggest mistake some American experts made was maintaining the idea that the methods and purposes of the United States should apply

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157. Gaffen, 202.

158. Moyer, 377.

159. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 126.

to everyone. This is exemplified in an analysis of Viet Cong defectors created for the Rand Corporation in 1969; a lack of organization and long-range planning in the provinces near the Laotian and Cambodian borders led to future trouble.<sup>160</sup>

This difficulty carried over into the domestic arena, as well. In *The Strange Case of Chieu Hoi*, Captain Tam Thay wrote: “I took over a year to discover just whether or not I had the courage to rally [defect]. This was not from devotion to Communism as much as the terror of the unknown. I was not fighting for money as I thought arvn soldiers were. Where was my new idea, to replace the worker’s party?”<sup>161</sup>

There were nearly 200,000 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese defectors. Special Advisor Lee Duc Tho of the People’s Foreign Ministry in the north gloated that his Saigon counterparts had no idea what to do with such smart and useful traitors.

Ilya Gaiduk, Russian historian of the Vietnam War, quotes Lee: “Westerners and their stooges don’t know how the dialectic works. They can only think through their wallets.”<sup>162</sup> This was a main reason for failure. The Communists knew how to motivate though fear and glory; a free society even in the embryonic stage was just too complicated for control of the national narrative. Like many believers in a fallen ideology, the hoi chanah faced a perplexing question: what on earth to do with the life they had left now? During the vice presidency of Marshall Ky, there were some attempts

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160. Sera Miles, interview by Sean Dineen, November 19, 2016.

161. Tam Thay, *The Strange Case of Chieu Hoi* (New York: Doubleday, 1971), 29.

162. Ilya Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 120.

to answer this question through U.S. development programs in the disputed provinces.

“The United States thought it should help the less fortunate nations modernize, develop their infrastructure, and build new national purposes.”<sup>163</sup>

Although a few far-sighted province chiefs tried to end corruption, many did not understand that short-term opportunities for favoritism were going to lead to defeat if the disinterested believed that harsh order was better than chaos, which is what prevailed, leading to little control over the military.<sup>164</sup> Absolute faith in victory did not happen because society was too disorganized in some areas and too rigidly controlled in others.

South Vietnam did not channel its energies into civilian improvements, which undermined Thompson’s fifth principle of successful counterinsurgency. The result consisted of a historical cycle, wherein South Vietnam had in 1955 a hope for victory in unifying with North Vietnam. This vacillated over twenty years and ended in 1975, with no prospect of definitive triumph.<sup>165</sup>

Ironically, positive strides were achieved in the population of people with disabilities. Chandler explains, “In 1970 the South Vietnamese Radio Network created a disability drama program. The program depicted the life of children and adults with disabilities, who were part of a national theater troupe.”<sup>166</sup> This kind of disability inclusion and celebration existed twenty years before *The Americans with Disabilities Act*.

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163. Grant, 109.

164. Bass, 19.

165. Colby, 49.

166. Ibid., 138.

Next examined are the five principles of counterinsurgency regarding the conflict in Zimbabwe, which was fashioned out of the British colony Rhodesia, where the government was controlled by white settlers. With the collapse of the British Empire in that part of the world in the 1960s, the white settlers of Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence.<sup>167</sup> This meant that they created an illegal constitution, which was not recognized by Great Britain because this new country ignored the political and economic rights of the African community.

Eventually, African majority rule was established, and the rights of Africans were recognized. Voting rights were among those secured for Africans; Andrew Peck asserts that “Efforts to expand African voting rights were based on principles of law and freedom designed to promote stability and harmony.”<sup>168</sup> The government seemed to be functioning in accordance with the new law that ended racial discrimination in 1979; however, the democratic nation was short-lived. Zimbabwe changed over to Communism in 1980 because the democratic leaders had little command over the military and were seen as puppets of the extremely powerful, white-dominated business community.

Indigenous reservations, known as Tribal Trust Lands, began to produce sugar, cocoa, and tobacco, which were harvested largely in the north in Gazaland Province. The gift of this government farmland was to eliminate tribal, political subversion. By 1970, five percent of the world’s cocoa came from this region. While work was done by locals,

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167. Smith, 10.

168. Andrew Peck, *Rhodesia Accuses* (Belmont: Western Island Press, 1966), 78.

those overseeing the work were of other origins: Crocker confirms, “Agricultural work was largely performed by members of the Shona Tribe under the guidance of Indian businessmen.”<sup>169</sup>

Agriculture was not the only endeavor overseen by outsiders; elements of the insurgency were also masterminded by those outside Zimbabwe. As Gerald Stemper observes, “The Chinese financed the Zimbabwe African National Union, the Shona guerrilla movement. The Russians helped guide the Mdebele-led Zimbabwe African People’s Union, whose leader Joshua Komo developed an urbanized conflict military force.”<sup>170</sup> Violence led to the government’s desire to isolate and protect groups seen as in danger. As a result, the Ministry of Internal affairs built better protected villages, specifically, Bulawayo and the capital city Salisbury, now known as Harare. Those protected, cohesive villages for the Mdebele were built to first-world standards, like their Malaysian counterparts.

Culturally cohesive areas for resettlement of the Shona and many other tribes were seen as very important, but difficult to achieve. As the *Pierce Commission Report* asserts, “African members in Parliament tended to feel that new settlement areas had been designed for white and mixed race businesspeople. Many criticized the lack of consultation with urban African leaders.”<sup>171</sup>

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169. Crocker, 114.

170. Gerald Stemper, *South East Asia in Peace* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 45.

171. *Pierce Commission Report* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1973), 82.

The Shagaan people felt that the Shona and Mdebele Tribes were given priority in earning the right to vote. The Shagaan rightfully believed this was not functioning according to a fair national plan. A great many Judeo-Christian Africans felt the same, but the government listened to the soothing lullaby of tribal overseers and compliant district commissioners. One Headman sub-chief, Shoko Museamwea, expressed his enormous frustration: ““The Mdbele are treated like pets by the White man. The Shona are tolerated. The Shagaan are forced to leave their homes .... We ought to at least be allowed to vote. The District Commissioner knows we had caused no trouble. Loyalty is too often not rewarded.””<sup>172</sup>

In keeping with the chief’s commentary, Africans were manipulated by the white government in multiple ways—influential arts and disabilities programs were started to defeat political subversion. These programs were used as propaganda by the white settlers and, paradoxically, by various African tribes, who wished to work and abide by the white government. For example, initially, the Shona Tribe saw themselves as operating productively inside the white system. The Shona sponsored national painting and sculpture competitions to promote African voting rights, which were innovative methods of acting within white law and functioning according to a national plan. The winning paintings and sculptures were presented to the Minister of Home Affairs as part of his support for greater African voting, which actually remained limited.<sup>173</sup>

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172. Weinrich, 160.

173. Muzorewa, 189.

Additionally, the white government had instituted essay contests on how Africans could earn the right to vote, which the administration extended to only 10 percent of the African population. Therefore, these essay contests were mostly about how to make it difficult for tribes to vote. This was a misuse of literary arts because it undermined the quest for true democracy. Even so, African soldiers on the government and tribal sides were given voting rights if they were disabled in battle. This was enacted to pacify and reward white soldiers and to turn enemy African soldiers.<sup>174</sup> The extension of voting rights came with a procedural challenge: “The difficulty came in registering the rural people many of whom didn’t have birth certificates. Ian Smith accepted the role of the chiefs, since non-urban Africans did things differently.”<sup>175</sup> Ultimately, working with tribal chiefs failed because they were isolated from urban Africans who possessed more prestige. The white government realized in 1975 that in order to achieve decisive victory, they needed to work in partnership with urban Africans; however, they had by this time turned to Communism as a form of rebellion and independence. The limited, biased arts programs had contributed to the rebellion. Additionally, the white government had no control over the Zimbabwean military; as a result, it did not achieve ultimate victory. The white government had possessed the absolute inverse of the five principles of flourishing counterinsurgency.<sup>176</sup>

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174. Abbott and Botham, 22.

175. Crocker, 43.

176. Sithole, 82.

The Africans, who outnumbered the white government by several million, took victorious control over the government, and Zimbabwe was fully established as a Communist nation. Plays and radio broadcasts featuring people with disabilities underscored Communist propaganda, an example of which is John Zovenko's *New Land, New Life*. This play toured the country in 1978.

According to Andrew and Mitrokhin in *The World Was Going Our Way*, other Communist propaganda included a concert for peace, first held in 1979. The Mashekin Concert for Peace deplored capitalism and democracy, blaming them both for the war. The concert also traveled and went to rural areas, where it attracted enthusiastic crowds.

It was during this period that three offshoot concepts of the fundamental resettlement programs were developed, emanating as national ideas in all four countries examined.<sup>177</sup> These resettlement modalities were enlarged concepts, derived from the four types of counterinsurgency and Thompson's five principles.

The first modality is to recognize the economic potential of underused areas. Often new agricultural products or opportunities for employment can be discovered through the ingenuity of resettled people. This kind of development took place throughout the four countries, especially in Malaysia. In *Conflict of Myths*, Larry Cable writes, "The Jehore District in Western Malaysia provided enough fruits and vegetables to feed half of the country and all of Singapore next door."<sup>178</sup>

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177. Taylor, 24.

178. Cable, *Conflict of Myths*, 59.

The second modality is to specifically resettle vulnerable or underserved populations in settings as attractive and cohesive as possible. This occurred most successfully in Malaysia through the national recreation and artistic programs established in villages, as well as in Penang.<sup>179</sup> According to Barbour, “Five plays, two dance exhibitions, and a sculpture contest took place in 1951. The population was to be encouraged to develop all types of academic and recreational activities. ... It was considered vital to keep everyone busy.”<sup>180</sup>

All twenty-four New Life Villages had similar programs. Winston Churchill compared it to enticing summer camp for adult guerrillas: “There could be no part of any non-needed coercion. It remains vital . . . that villages are seen as pleasant places. Men will fight far harder if only the prison bars await them. Far better that the strong measures be followed by a taste of the good life.”<sup>181</sup> These conversions were often used to create pseudo operations. These were turned guerrillas engaging in combat, while in guerrilla uniform, under the control of the government. Another method employed was as follows: “A number of female police officers were recruited to attempt to seduce Malayan commissars who had not responded to more positive programs to encourage defection. Once a relationship was established, the women became a source of encouragement to defect.”<sup>182</sup> In these techniques, we see the effort to lure insurgents to cooperation by enticement, rather than threats.

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179. Barbour, 38.

180. *Ibid.*, 67.

181. *Ibid.*, 119.

182. Mamet, 121.

The third modality of resettlement programs is to support repatriation to another country or to a safe area for those who find themselves too distressed to cooperate with the conventional program. In Malaysia, recalcitrant guerrillas were offered first-class plane fare to The People's Republic of China, or exile to the southern region of Kuala Lumpur.<sup>183</sup> It was more human and more cost effective to exile guerillas rather put them into prison.

In Taiwan, the first modality of resettlement programs was realized by the National Development Program of 1967. This offered tax breaks; infrastructure improvement to unused areas; and preferential access to loans to businesspeople, who would hire former guerrillas, women, and people with disabilities. This new policy led to a 5-percent growth rate by 1970, according to Andrew and Mitrokin in *The World Was Going Our Way*.

The second resettlement precept proved to be a disappointment in Taiwan. There was an obsession with retaking mainland China, rather than developing Taiwan itself. As noted, much energy was wasted on this unrealistic notion. For example, Chiang Kai-shek mandated that all government documents be written in Cantonese and Mandarin (the language of the mainland). This was an enormous waste of money and resources. Although Taiwanese children and young adults spoke Mandarin, the older generation who comprised most of the population did not speak Mandarin. Additionally, Mainland defectors were given priority in government employment, health insurance, and other welfare programs, inclusive of new housing. The underserved Taiwanese peasants

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183. Ky, 114.

rightfully felt this was unfair.<sup>184</sup> Reed laments: “Free China understood how to handle its refugees far better than we did. The loyal Bantu needed his fair reward. We needed to be a light of Christian law and order to those whom we were guiding.”<sup>185</sup> Taiwanese methods proved effective elsewhere, including in South Africa where turned guerillas found opportunity for employment and academic pursuits.

Relocation programs, comprising the third methodology of official resettlement programs, were understood to be necessary, but locals found them annoying and biased; nevertheless, creative projects were effective in repatriation.<sup>186</sup>

Arts and disability programs were particularly enjoyable for women, who left mainland China to participate in grand music programs. For example, female police Lieutenant Chi Eng Char spent her evenings creating a modern opera in Taipei. The opera was about relocation and opportunities for people with disabilities. She recruited a number of former mainland elite, who had worked with Jaing Quag, Chairman Mao’s hot-tempered wife.<sup>187</sup> Forsaking the mandate that important operatic pieces had to be performed only on the mainland, Lieutenant Char adapted *City Lights*, the story of a female doctor, who saved the life of a child with cancer, then became his foster mother.<sup>188</sup> As Meyer recounts, “A number of turned [female] guerrillas performed this

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184. Taylor, Chapter Three.

185. Reed, 34.

186. Ky, 59.

187. Moyar, 14.

188. Stubbs, 90

story for the Canadian Ambassador in 1968.”<sup>189</sup> The success of this play broke down the social stigma associated with cancer while promoting high-level careers for women in medicine.

In Hue, South Vietnam, the former imperial capital, an industrial expansion took place in 1965. In *Counterinsurgency in the United States War*, Larry Cable divulges, “Chrysler opened two auto plants, and Marathon Oil recruited a number of Moi and Hmong to extract oil from the South China Sea. By 1967, the South Vietnamese economy is growing at seven percent a year.”<sup>190</sup> Such economic expansion of underused areas comprised the first modality of sanctioned resettlement programs; however, a number of native Vietnamese peasants mistrusted this massive influx of Western ideas and foreign capital. They wanted to remain within their own simple traditions. Guerrillas assured them that they could live as they wished and promised they would be allowed to remain on their lands, if they would spy for the Viet Cong or pay taxes to them. These were outright lies.<sup>191</sup>

Due to the rapid transition from colonialism, South Vietnam did not possess anywhere near a developed bureaucracy or a functioning education program. Hamlet resettlement programs appeared to be little more than exile. Financial rewards promising Hamlet resettlement were stolen by corrupt officials. The Hamlet turmoil began in 1956 and continued for seven years, until after Diem’s eventual overthrow.<sup>192</sup>

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189. Meyer, 48.

190. Cable, *Conflict of Myths*, 30.

191. Bass, 28.

192. Chandler, 24.

Armed uprisings took place after fraud during the 1957 elections, when votes for Diem were falsely increased. Nevertheless, there was no formal guerrilla involvement in the south, although disturbances actually occurred. In the censored media, these uprisings were repressed and treated as minor robberies gone badly.<sup>193</sup> The 1958 Uprising in Denang, an uprising among the Hoa Hao Daoist sect, was censored out of the papers, and a fake robbery was held to be the source of the death of seven people and the destruction of a rubber factory owned by former emperor Bao Dai's cousin.<sup>194</sup>

An uncontrolled information bureau was needed. It was during this period that Diem's brother gave his famous, somewhat jocular definition of a workable (seemingly unattainable) free press: "one that is fifty percent in favor of the government, instead of ninety-eight percent against."<sup>195</sup> In response to the frustration of dealing with censorship and corruption, the Viet Cong opposition movement was formed in 1959. It consisted of South Vietnamese forces that opposed the tainted government under Diem because the country was losing its fledgling construct of democracy.

Censored news interfered with the economic potential of underused areas because incorrect decisions were made in regard to supplying these areas with needed equipment, building materials, land, and capital.<sup>196</sup>

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193. Penniman, 38.

194. Hunt, 157.

195. Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy*, 119.

196. Schomp, 62.

In regard to the second modality of resettlement programs, the agendas in Vietnam were similar to those of Malaysia but not as effective. The Buddhist population strongly desired to remain on ancestral lands; however, the Christian and Cao Dai were happy with the migration to new living arrangements. The Vietnamese Ministry of Information sought to take advantage of those willing to move by offering incentives like cars, money, and government jobs. It promised: "Those moving to our wonderful hamlets will have nothing to worry about. Their needs will be met, and their problems solved."<sup>197</sup> These apparent improvements did not solve political discontent with Diem. Instead, they created more Viet-Cong recruits and emboldened civilian opposition among the South Vietnamese.

The third tenet of resettlement programs, repatriation of disaffected people, specifically offering alternatives like espionage to dissatisfied Chieu Hoi graduates, was fruitful. This was a way for them to earn money to buy land on which to live. Happy with the notion of acquiring land and homes, Chieu Hoi graduates were selected for two secret government programs. One was to promote unrest in North Vietnam; the other was to liaison with pro-Western forces in Thailand and Australia.<sup>198</sup> The attempt to stir up unrest within the Communist portion of Vietnam was denied for many years. Although it did not cause the enemy of the West to collapse, it did create an atmosphere of uncertainty. William Colby, Director of the CIA's Department of Asian Planning, took a dramatic step to create a new sense of fear within the North Vietnamese to counteract the impact and effects of the broadcasts of Hanoi Hannah. He understood

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197. Chandler, 195.

198. Colby, 2-5.

correctly that there remained factions and grouping within northern Vietnamese society who were displeased with the country's tilt to either the Soviets or the Chinese in the worldwide Communist, factional leadership dispute.<sup>199</sup>

Formal attempts at small-scale, direct sabotage had ended in late 1967, but the U.S. government was about to play on the divisions and fears within Vietnamese society. People with language skills or artistic ability, as well as paroled prisoners were recruited to infiltrate North Vietnamese society and create chaos. These people also established repatriation for all the frustrated Chieu Hoi alumni. Specifically, chaos was created with the help of an unauthorized, crack cadre of thirty psychological warfare experts; Director Colby began to create national resistance groups. These are imaginary groups who are ultimately presumed to become real.<sup>200</sup> The undercover branch of the U.S. intelligence forces, the Special Operations Group, began to make use of Vietnamese legends to convince the northern group and government that members within its society were overly concerned about Chinese control of Vietnamese and Laotian society. The Special Operations Group, which was working with seven graduates of the Chieu Hoi program, began to spread the word of the formation of a secret neutralist resistance group known as the Sacred Sword of the Patriots League. The attempt to transform the larger society began in 1967.<sup>201</sup> League agents, who were working with the South Vietnamese Navy as their first project, sought to create a secret base, ostensibly on northern soil: "We fattened

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199. Hunt, 69.

200. Smith, 223.

201. Thompson, *Peace is Not at Hand*, Chapter Six.

them up, cured their wounds and respected their idealism.”<sup>202</sup> This propaganda was an attempt to make use of the disputes between China and North Vietnam. The argument was whether or not conventional warfare had a role in guerilla conflict. In *Bright and Shining Lie*, famous reporter Neil Sheehan called this superficial style put forth by Diem “Government by Yak Yak.”<sup>203</sup> The military turned against him because he was becoming a dictator, which is not what the United States and increasing numbers of South Vietnamese people wanted. Nevertheless, some South Vietnamese copied Diem’s corruption, so the United States encouraged the few remaining progressive military leaders to gain control and overthrow him.<sup>204</sup>

Against the advice of William Colby, in 1963 President Kennedy gave tacit support for a coup because he felt that Diem’s style damaged American interests in Southeast Asia and alienated Vietnamese peasants. Nevertheless, Kennedy tolerated the notion that these peasants could be enticed to engage in a coup with promises of repatriation to Laos and Thailand. In the midst of this military uprising, Diem was killed. The United States spent the next ten years trying to replace him with a democratic leader and unwisely moved forward with the Vietnam Conflict. He was replaced with democratic leader Nguyen Thieu, who later resigned; as a result, democracy ended.<sup>205</sup>

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202. John Shultz, interview by Sean Dineen, March 11, 2012.

203. Neil Sheehan, *Bright and Shining Lie* (New York: Viking Press, 1976), 196.

204. Ky, 100-05.

205. Cable, *Conflict of Myths*, 303.

Nevertheless, there were some important achievements. Government programs in the arts, which were created for disabled people, promoted a bond between citizens with disabilities and the government. These creative enterprises were the first areas in which previously controlled people could express their own decisions, choices, and volition.<sup>206</sup> The programs included the disciplines of theater, dance, music, visual arts, and written and spoken word. Eventually the performances included citizens without disabilities. Although the government soon dissolved, these creative enterprises were beacons of stability and hope. As a result, national cohesion was increased, as these programs were prevalent in the big cities; however, rural areas remained isolated and divided. The rural areas were where the guerrillas abided. Such areas were neglected and under-served by the South Vietnamese government, while the U.S. and Australian forces remained in the country. Once American and Australian troops withdrew in 1973, the South Vietnamese government could no longer fight off and defeat these guerrillas, and the government collapsed two years later.<sup>207</sup>

At the same time, the first economic modality of successful resettlement programs in Zimbabwe took place in Gazaland. As the *Pierce Commission Report* recounts, “Gold mining began there in 1971. A number of former guerrillas were employed as managers and brokers.”<sup>208</sup> The unused territory became economically valuable, mined by most willing former enemies. Abbott and Botham’s *Modern African Wars: Rhodesia 1965-80*

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206. Penniman, 42.

207. James Hershberg, *Marigold* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2012), Chapter Three.

208. *Pierce Commission Report*, 29.

goes into detail about the great value this territory had: “Guerrillas were now comrades with the men whom they had sought to shoot at. Government officials had one bulwark, where the old ideas could be broken down and a new world built.”<sup>209</sup> Had a similar policy been carried out throughout the rest of the country, a multi-racial, democratic government could clearly have survived.

The second authorized resettlement program aided underserved at-risk populations and placed them in attractive areas. This was exemplified by the Protected Villages Movement, which flowered in the northern part of the country. Through this movement, “Turned guerrillas and loyal tribesmen alike were offered government housing and modern conveniences in exchange for recruiting former comrades.”<sup>210</sup> Westernized Africans appreciated the rewards offered by the white government more than their traditional compatriots did.

In the Darwin Region, Protected Villages were not quite up to white standards. Running water was from a communal tap. Abbott and Botham reveal that in these villages, “Medical care came from district doctors as well as sangomas, traditional healers.”<sup>211</sup> Those nostalgic for a more ordered way of life found support through the media, which rewarded cooperative people of African descent in Zimbabwe.

The third style of effective resettlement in Zimbabwe was facilitated by the government sending former guerrillas on international missions of goodwill, seeking repatriation. For example, “James Forcaulaeet was sent to Canada to try to encourage

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209. Abbott and Botham, 13.

210. Smith, 119.

211. Abbott and Botham, 18.

private businesspeople to find new sources of oil for the country.”<sup>212</sup> A group of sanctions busters from Canada and the United Kingdom sought to maintain the Zimbabwean regime’s policy of evolutionary development. These missions proved very successful, but the government would not allow enough of them. The intelligence community, which made excellent use of non-white moderates, pleaded in vain for further international contact.

In *Bitter Harvest*, author and Prime Minister Ian Smith quoted Intelligence Chief Kenneth Flower, as such: “‘The police should have been much more involved in partnership with the African, Indian, and Mixed-Race businesspeople, soldiers, and civic leaders. Why couldn’t we see fears of lowering standards inflame the government’s racist image?’”<sup>213</sup> The government’s failure to be sufficiently inclusive prevented the necessary progress. Additionally, efforts at inter-tribal socialization failed because of the long-standing rivalries between groups. Abbott and Botham discuss one such failed attempt: “The Women’s Institute sought to promote anti-Communist groups in Angola. . . . Everything from sports to female hair dressing classes were developed near the Angola Mozambique Border, but . . . Shona and Shagaan women were unwilling to mix.”<sup>214</sup>

Repatriation was unsuccessful also because white officials judged everything by their own hyper-sensitive, condescending attitudes. This occurred in the northern region, beginning in 1975, when propaganda exercises took place to encourage guerrilla

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212. Muzorewa, 21.

213. Smith, 39.

214. Abbott and Botham, 6.

conversions. Frustration resulted. The Shaagan people futilely focused their energies on secular missionary work, protecting the Manicaland tribal peoples from intimidation of Mozambique army forces.<sup>215</sup> “The Mdelebe handled urban propaganda mobilizing young people to support voting rights for those who had earned them,” but this was a failure because the majority of the uncommitted African population sided with the guerrillas.<sup>216</sup>

With all the constructs of counterinsurgency explored, how did these four conflicts start? It is of great importance to first ascertain the circumstances in which disaffection, justified or not, ferments into the effusion of blood, through armed conflict.

The colonial system, stewarded by the United Kingdom, had suffered moral and financial decay and bankruptcy as World War II came to an end. This led to the home population’s desire to be “shucked of the responsibility for far off lands of palm and pine,” as soon as it was feasible.<sup>217</sup> Perhaps more so than other European powers, the British genially believed in the idea of nurturing underdeveloped peoples to what they called civilization. As 1948 opened, to quote Brigadier General Frank Kurston, Malaysia ““had emerged from Japanese occupation and three hard slogging years, picking up the pieces into a new technological, politically sophisticated twentieth century.””<sup>218</sup>

A universal concept is that organized national democratic governments tend to move much more slowly than insurgent regimes, when it comes to offering advancement. This glacial movement is due to bureaucratic limitations and political structure.

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215. Moore, *The White Tribe*, 256.

216. Smith, 117.

217. Marston, 11.

218. Thompson, *No Exit from Vietnam*, 203.

Democracy requires patience and compromise; dictators can simply impose their will by shooting or imprisoning their opponents. Also, rebels tend to use up soldiers and officials rather quickly, so a new social hierarchy is created.<sup>219</sup> The disenfranchised are drawn to participation in insurgencies because they believe their actions will lead imminently to a notable difference; as James Hershberg asserts, “Previously neglected groups can be devoted to the ideas of rebel movements because they will be rewarded quickly. It’s easier to shoot or denounce a rival than vote or fill out forms.”<sup>220</sup>

A group of underutilized, hard driven young men, led by the ascetic Chiang Peng, decided to convert the skills they had used fighting the Japanese to drive out the British and create a Soviet-style utopia in Malaysia. They began the armed struggle by attacking the rubber planters on the estate of Firestone mining magnate, Norman Cleveland. On April 30, 1948, the Malaysian emergency was born.<sup>221</sup>

Similarly, Chiang Kai-shek’s movement in Taiwan was spearheaded by one individual who thrived on the support of the masses. In 1949, having slowly and painfully been driven out of mainland China, Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan to rebuild a democratic, peaceful, progressive China, the vision of his father-in-law, Sun Yatsen.<sup>222</sup>

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219. Mantazima, 226.

220. Hershberg, 205.

221. Peng, , 26.

222. Taylor, 209.

During this period, Chiang Kai-shek truly believed he could retake the mainland. It would take twenty years before the rest of the world realized it would not happen. “The island was a laboratory of idealism, in which the old war horse could study his past failures and learn from them.”<sup>223</sup> In addition, “It was necessary to transmogrify and transcend older ideas.”<sup>224</sup>

The Taiwanese portion of the Chinese Civil War began on October 1, 1949, when the Communist forces conquered the mainland. It was believed the mainland could be restored within five to ten years. As Marx reports, “Short invasions of the northern mainland happened in 1963, and more were planned.”<sup>225</sup> It was the adjustment of recognition from the West supporting Taiwan to extending legal recognition to mainland China that changed attitudes, although it took a long time for the Taiwanese to adjust to this reality. France had changed its recognition after the mainland Chinese had succeeded to launch an atomic bomb. De Gaulle strongly opposed the U.S. pampering of Taiwan and American’s participation in the Vietnam War.

The counterinsurgency in Vietnam was much less successful. The Vietnam Conflict officially began in 1955 when North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam, but both countries were still involved in guerilla warfare with France. The French effort to retain control over their prize colony Indochina, which consisted of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, had failed a year earlier at the battle of Dien Bien Phu.<sup>226</sup> The Geneva Conference, sponsored by the United Nations, was called to settle the aftermath of this

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223. Ibid., 228.

224. Marx, 686.

225. Ibid., 228.

battle. The Conference ended up developing a partition on the seventeenth parallel between a Communist north and an undetermined south that was a prime contributing factor in starting the Vietnam War.<sup>227</sup>

South Vietnam, during the early 1950s, had two leaders: the Buddhist Emperor Bao Dai, a playboy out of his depth, and his other-worldly, ascetic former Prime Minister, Ngo Diem, the stubborn but smart Nationalist who had spent the last five years in Roman Catholic monasteries of the Maryknoll Society in New York.<sup>228</sup> Moyer reveals that there was a stark contrast between the images of Bao Dai and Diem: “Diem had acquired the support of counterinsurgency genius Edward Lansdale, who had created a huge propaganda campaign. ... The isolated emperor had been portrayed on the ballot in green, a color of the past. ... Diem had an appropriated red, the traditional color of wealth and good luck.”<sup>229</sup> The creation of a republic was seen as a multi-faceted benefit to the whole country.

Thus began the start of Diem as elected leader of South Vietnam.

The Zimbabwean conflict began in 1965. The white-dominated government sought independence from Britain on its own terms. This government relied on the police to create a national informants program, which spied on Africans seen as uncivilized, or as the government preferred to call them, too radical. The informants

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226. Chandler, 814.

227. Ky, 78.

228. Thompson, *Make for the Hills*, 151.

229. Moyer, 184.

program did not work because materials were not written in English, and the government had too many policies seen as condescending toward loyal, moderate pro-Western Africans. Peaceful protests by the Indian and African communities, including the Mdebele and Shona Tribes, were ignored.<sup>230</sup> White moderates were harassed or ignored. Members of the Shagaan tribe were put in preventive detention. Community leaders denounced this [detention] as permanent infantilism. “If we are not allowed to choose our leaders, we are not adults, merely indulged babes in fancy dress.”<sup>231</sup> Regrettably, the older generation could not see the need for dramatic change until it was too late. This happened repeatedly in both Zimbabwe and Vietnam.

Respected U.S. Senator Fullbright related the War in Vietnam to the conflict in Zimbabwe. He announced: ““There is an entire generation of people throughout the world who clearly don’t desire to live on our terms. Americans need to refocus their energies on Europe and Japan, where people desire our presence and will fight to maintain themselves.””<sup>232</sup> Indeed, Zimbabwe saw itself as having a common cause with Vietnam—that being fighting imperialism and white supremacy. As a result, two armed guerrilla groups in Zimbabwe were created to fight against the government. This resulted in the commencement of counterinsurgency by moderate Africans and whites against guerrillas, whom they called terrorists. It was vital for the government to mobilize the disinterested and disaffected. If the government would not, the rebels would.<sup>233</sup>

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230. Muzorewa, 84.

231. Abbott and Botham, 79.

232. Joseph Fry, *Debating Vietnam* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 68.

233. Sithole, 7.

As Zimbabwean African National Union Commissar Herbert Chittempo asserted prior to his murder: “I have been ignored by the old system. I am tired of staying where the White Men wish to put me. The new vision of a free nation, which truly valued my contribution, is what inspired me.”<sup>234</sup> This murder proved a disastrous mistake as Chittempo, a former lawyer, could have served as a Muzorewa-type figure much earlier, with a more relaxed yet viable transition.

War is never as it looks on a chart, or on a battlefield, or in a textbook; therefore, the methods that governments choose to practice the principles of counterinsurgency vary from conflict to conflict, but they remain vital to ultimate success. Military power without effective political principles leads only to dictatorship. Conversely, political ideals without effective military force in a guerrilla war lead to quick defeat. The rebel movement arises because genuine needs are not being met or because a substantial part of the population, that being the middle class, is being forgotten or underused.<sup>235</sup> The writing of Anthony Joes, the greatest living scholar on the subject of organized opposition to armed rebellion, reveals another truth in his book *Resisting Rebellion*: “Leadership is more likely to come from [a] middle class member than out and out poverty stricken peasants . . . concerned with basic survival . . . Ho Chi Minh attended an elite school in Hanoi. Mao served as a head librarian to Yuan Saki, a would-be emperor.”<sup>236</sup>

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234. Marston, 185.

235. Joes, 109.

236. Ibid., 229.

“The interests of the disenfranchised middle class are not served by dictatorship; however, they are often seduced by the promise of quick and decisive action on their behalf.”<sup>237</sup>

Society needs to figure out a balance between the lockstep order imposed by dictators and the chaos of a disorganized society. Why is finding this balance so hard? It is turning loose an underdeveloped population, with all of the challenges that entails. A genuine attempt to embrace daily reality is what is needed. That is why counter-insurgency, which is far less vicious than warfare, is vital. Subjugation by force of arms creates hatred and the desire for revenge. A genuine attempt at compromise and mutual good will is both more moral and more productive in the long run; that is the core of counterinsurgency at its best.<sup>238</sup>

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237. Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 145.

238. Stubbs, 106.

### Chapter Three: Reasons for Success in Malaysia

Why did democracy triumph in Malaysia? Beyond Thompson's ideology, Malaysian victory, ultimately achieved in 1960, seems to be the result of three main factors. The first was the gradual transition toward independent democracy that harnessed the entire population in the struggle for self-government. Included in that comprehensive population were veterans, former enemies, minorities, and multiple ethnic groups. Additionally, people with disabilities in the arts and in daily life were integral to the wide-ranging populace of Malaysia's gradual counterinsurgency. Another factor in the Malaysian success revolved around the provision and suppression of food. The third factor was that Malaysia emerged as a culturally diverse nation that adopted new Western values while maintaining respect for indigenous cultures. This healthy balance of local and Western values resulted in an economic boom.

Having come out of a colonial situation, the British understood the need to promote national unity and slowly turn over power to loyalists. As Doris Lessing explains, "The British in Malaysia avoided the mistakes they made in a large part of the rest of their empire, moving too fast and backing the wrong horse."<sup>239</sup>

The relaxed transition of power promoted inclusivity in government, as Cable elucidates in *Counterinsurgency in United States War*:

Malaysian police and military officials began to make use of women in policy-making and leadership positions in all aspects of government. This proved invaluable later on in developing rehab programs for returning veterans. For an Islamic nation, the female approach was both unparalleled and joyous.<sup>240</sup>

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239. Doris Lessing, *African Stories* (London: Macmillan Press, 1965), 47.

240. Larry Cable, *Counterinsurgency in United States War* (Washington, DC: Salvar Publishing, 1986), 100.

Fourteen “Welcome Home Centers” were created to reintegrate veterans into the larger society. Returning military personnel spent a month in such centers to make sure their finances, emotional well-being, and prospects for the future were all addressed. Since centers were staffed primarily by people with disabilities, including women, the relaxed, compassionate approach proved very effective.

The British Broadcasting Company’s 1998 documentary *Cold War Emergency* demonstrates the manner in which former rivals were converted to friends via empathy:

The specific details of each cadre’s life were recorded in green notebooks. Everything from their diet to their musical preferences was noted. It was vital for the Chinese speaking officers to project calm compassion. The reality was these men and women were idealistic and needed to be encouraged, not pressured. The atmosphere was of a cocktail party.

Additionally, military and police units made substantial use of women, racial minorities, and people with disabilities at all decision-making levels concerning public policy. In 1951, female-led police squads organized a national radio broadcast with the aim of encouraging guerrilla fighters to seek rehabilitation in government New Life Villages.

Another successful way that people with disabilities were included in daily life was through massive investment in education. Students of all races, with and without disabilities, ages five to twenty-one, attended school together. According to Noel Barbour, “The quality of education was unparalleled because the government made it a high priority.”<sup>241</sup>

Leader Tunku Rahman found a role for all members of society to play in this struggle, from children to aborigine trackers. When one great national project includes a role for everyone, there are fewer chances of internecine, ethnic group conflicts, such as

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241. Barbour, 81.

those that befouled other Southeast Asian nations. In Malaysia, Cable notes: “It was understood from the very beginning that there would be a full partnership between all ethnic groups. There was no need to fight for power because every group got just enough.”<sup>242</sup>

Every ethnic group in Malaysia was interested in financial incentives for capturing guerrilla leaders. These financial incentives were common place because the declaration of the Korean War had caused rubber and metal prices to increase by almost 300 hundred percent in just two years in Malaysia; thus, there was an abundance of wealth. Rewards were effective because they showed the benevolent, peaceful side of free enterprise.<sup>243</sup> Friendship was demonstrated through actions. In contrast, the governments of Taiwan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe made the repeated mistake of not making use of money in the place of armed force.

Special branch interrogators were held strictly responsible for treating enemy personnel with kindness. Soldiers were given coffee and colas. Music was piped into interview rooms. Kindness is the only worthwhile and vital modality to consistently produce change. Forts for indigenous people like New Villages had to be both centers for information and safe places for refugees. The local people received everything from dental care to free phonographs in a plan to indulge them into cooperation.<sup>244</sup>

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242. Cable, *Conflict of Myths*, 18.

243. *Malaysia: The Domino that Held* (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Ministry of Information, 1998), 56.

244. Thompson, *Make for the Hills*, 130.

Capitalism was protected, and businessmen were given tax relief to hire the poor members of underprivileged groups, including minorities such as people with disabilities and former prisoners. Artists, with and without disabilities, were financed by the private funds of the monarch, the Red Crescent Health society, and the YMCA's program for the 2-percent Christian minority. One leader, in particular, experienced the political importance of the inclusion of people with disabilities: "Future Prime Minister, Mathair Muhammad, began his political career working in Jehore province, with a group of deaf painters."<sup>245</sup>

According to Thompson in *Make for the Hills*, Malaysia was buoyed by artistic programs comprised of people with disabilities, which gave this under-utilized segment of the population something significant to do. Specifically, this meant fueling the idea of national unity through the arts. There were nationwide radio broadcasts. Theater groups went into impoverished areas, and when not performing, carried out civic work like renovating housing, helping to make public buildings accessible for people with disabilities, and securing access to clean water.

The inclusion of people with disabilities also served to defuse ethnic and other tensions. The Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur spent six months working with deaf teenagers to inculcate a spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood and prevent ethnic conflicts.<sup>246</sup>

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245. Robert Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing* (New York: Macmillan Press, 1969), 117.

246. Joes, 93.

*Malaysia: The Domino that Held*, published by the Malaysian Ministry of Information, reveals that after the war, a number of teaching artists who were hard of hearing were hired to sign interpret the peace talks. This was done in order to stimulate the utmost participation. In addition, Malaysia had used the arts to conduct a mass scale endeavor to turn guerrillas via music, sculpture, and theater. This was tremendously successful because guerrillas, as well as veterans, were shown aesthetically that the time for fighting was over: “The voyage home took place over a long process. To deal with PTSD, a large-scale rehab process was put in place. The new theater programs were designed to make veterans aware of their options and assured them of their needs.”<sup>247</sup>

Major initiatives were undertaken to help those marginalized by situations other than disability, as well. For example, “The Youth Movement of the Catholic Fraternal order of The Sons of Saint Michael sent two dozen New Zealander teenagers to participate in a national service project to rebuild burnt out schools near the Thai border in Malaysia.”<sup>248</sup> Australia and New Zealand referred to their building of water treatment plants and universities in Malaysia as their governmental version of the U.S. Peace Corps.

The programs the government sponsored to foster inclusion of all citizens were broad-ranging, and their success was predicated upon nationwide awareness of the program. H. W. Crocker quoted Malayan Union Party President Data Onn in *The Politically Incorrect Guide to the British Empire*: “It was not enough to have programs,

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247. Thompson, *Make for the Hill*, 139.

248. Peck, 68.

people needed to be as aware of them as their spouse's birthday.'"<sup>249</sup> Crocker reveals: "At the request of the Ministry of National Guidance, 100,000,000 Malaysian riggits were spent to create national awareness of government assistance programs."<sup>250</sup> As a result, the hope was veterans would not have as much trauma or domestic problems when returning to civilian life.

Malaysian veterans were assigned a personal assistant for several weeks to facilitate a more constructive homecoming. Although this was not a comprehensive, slow transition, it was far better than the situation for veterans of most modern wars in other countries. In such instances, rapid transportation in returning escalated psychological difficulties. The better outcomes for Malaysian veterans added to the nation's success.<sup>251</sup> The National Bargain provided every ethnic group a chance to rise without seeming to endanger the Chinese dominant economic position, which had served as a bulwark of stability and progress, in contrast to many other formerly colonial countries.<sup>252</sup>

Nevertheless, it is very important to analyze the main arguments that seek to label the Malaysian victory an exception. The foremost of these is in Frances Fitzgerald's *Fire in the Lake*. She makes some valuable points about the relative lack of ethnic division in Malaysia, as opposed to Indonesia, Vietnam, and Laos. In her book, she observes, "The Malay New Villages organized Malaysians and Indians against ethnic Chinese. The

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249. Crocker, 9.

250. Ibid., 17.

251. Barbour, 261.

252. Thompson, *Peace is Not at Hand*, 269.

Vietnamese, strategic hamlets organized Vietnamese against their brothers and sisters down the block.”<sup>253</sup> She also claims that once a revolutionary takeover was stopped, the society returned to regression.

In *Resisting Rebellion*, Joes defeats this argument powerfully: “Members of all racial groups fought on both sides of the Malaysian conflict. The key to success was the efforts of Information Minister CC Too to tailor his propaganda to welcome back the confused into a common national home.”<sup>254</sup> Officials, from mayors to monarchs, understood there would be a need to put aside or solve past national grievances. Joes quotes Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Rahman: ““The nation will hardly get anywhere if we waste vital strength and finances kicking each other for ancestral injustices.””<sup>255</sup>

It was also believed that the national awakening required for successful defense could be used for more constructive purposes in peacetime. Indeed, it was understood that people’s talents could be turned to joyous and peaceful pursuits.<sup>256</sup>

Thompson covers the use of national energy in his book *Peace is Not at Hand*: “The bond created between a people and its government in a war can’t simply be turned off like a tap. The sense of common purpose and trust will be used in peace for social improvement, economic development, and international brotherhood.”<sup>257</sup>

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253. Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake* (New York: Macmillan Press, 1972), 222.

254. Joes, 128.

255. Ibid., 129.

256. Cable, *Conflict of Myths*, 48-49.

257. Thompson, *Peace is Not at Hand*, 208.

*Malaysia: The Domino that Held* also explores the manner in which trust was established with former enemies. It tells how Malaysia's relaxed approach to dealing with veteran defectors was more efficacious than that of other countries because converts were welcomed and encouraged to turn rather than being threatened. They were included and enticed by financial assistance, amnesty for past corruptions, and political positions in the democratic government. Their families were also embraced.

The provision of food also played a significant role in encouraging comradeship and cooperation. One special branch officer was acclaimed as a god after he brought ice cream for a collection of jungle fighters and reluctant guerrillas, whom they had captured. Amazingly, the ice cream resulted in friendships. Additionally, propagandist CC Too came up with the idea of requiring rice to be cooked collectively and served in communal dining halls. Malaysia's Special Branch (akin to the CIA) believed women could be used to transform the situation. Five hundred women were paid to cook en masse, as well as search for hidden caches everywhere.

In regard to the still-resistant guerrillas, food restriction zones were established in the eight areas thought most likely to be smuggling food to the three-person units near Penang. Rice was smuggled in clothing and children's bicycles to keep guerrilla forces alive.<sup>258</sup>

The United Kingdom understood that the Communist guerrilla movement gained a great deal of success in Malaysia through coercion. Victimized peasants were forced to distribute propaganda and make donations; however, the most serious form of exploitation came from farmers being forced to supply food staples to Malay Race

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258. Gaffen, 73-74.

Liberation Soldiers in the jungle.<sup>259</sup> The resettlement program in the New Life Villages helped somewhat, but a different modality was needed, that being control over food distribution. The British colonial office in conjunction with their Australian allies created an entire food rationing program called “Operation Starvation” to prevent food going amiss. At the start, all shopkeepers in the northern provinces were forbidden to sell rice in non-perforated bags. Rubber tappers and miners were provided with two communal meals a day at their workplace. Additionally, they were searched to make sure no one took food out of the job site. Squads of enforcement officers conducted unannounced inspections in the Penang region.<sup>260</sup>

In *War of the Running Dogs*, Barbour adds: “We burned any unauthorized stock. Loyal villagers were offered free soft drinks and brought to buffets at the military’s expense.”<sup>261</sup>

Like scientists in a lab, the district decision-makers kept coming up with harsher punishments involving food for those who resisted and more pleasant rewards for cooperative subjects. As a positive reward, turned female cadres were encouraged to work in church-sponsored canteens in the capital. Military rations were adopted to civilian tastes and distributed at local mosques on the High Commissioner’s birthday. Conversely, the resistant guerrillas became so desperate to obtain supplies that they tried to get water from tree bark. One cadre received a whipping with a rattan cane for smuggling in and not sharing packets of cocoa. Fortunately, as areas became guerrilla-

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259. Peng, 40.

260. Lam Sweet, “My Accusation” (Penang: Doubleday, 1952), 12.

261. Barbour, 129.

free, food distribution became available to everyone.<sup>262</sup> This re-allocation of community concern was seen as a form of government benevolence that increased national harmony and stability.

Finally, the British, along with their Commonwealth allies from New Zealand and Australia, as well as Malaysian locals, understood that political instability can come from hunger and hardship.<sup>263</sup> Economic development that expanded food distribution was given priority. The country was free from the greed of unregulated profiteering of food allocation, and peaceful existence prevailed.

The third factor of successful democratic counterinsurgency involved the opportunity to interact with previously unknown cultures. This proved a selling point for turning guerrillas. Initially, the head of the Communist guerrilla army Osman China had been recruited by Chin Peng, the fierce General Secretary of the Malaysian Communist Party, with a promise of earning an anthropology degree in the Soviet Union; however, China was won over by CC Too, who was a staunch activist for democracy in Malaysia. Too offered the opportunity to design an entirely new village called Utungangong, which was different because formerly segregated indigenous populations, turned guerillas, and Western-style populations lived together in peace and harmony. The country gained a cultured scholarly ally, and China and the villagers gained a new life in freedom. This pattern of incentivizing with a better lifestyle and its culturally diverse rewards served as the key to change that occurred many times over the twelve years of active combat in

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262. Stubbs, 90.

263. *Malaysia: The Domino that Held*, 99.

Malaysia.<sup>264</sup> Mr. Lam Swee, Chief Secretary to General Secretary Chin Peng, was recruited with a lifetime supply of Malaysian chocolate and cigarettes. “My stomach gave up on the party before the rest of me,” he joked.<sup>265</sup> Sweet was particularly effective at designing broadcasts for voice aircraft. He turned nearly one hundred former guerrillas within six weeks of changing sides. Sweet would alter periods of working eighteen hours a day, with periods of great rest. This time of rest and relaxation was a new and culturally different way of life for former guerillas. During those much-appreciated times of repose, Sweet could indulge his six-pack-a-day smoking habit. His forty-page tract, “My Accusation,” was translated into six languages and dropped by the United Kingdom and New Zealand aircraft over the remaining jungle camps with the enormously successful goal of turning guerillas.

Ultimately, Malaysia successfully embraced many Western ideas. The success seemed to demonstrate the proper balance between local and Western interests. Finding this balance was difficult for newly-formed regimes because of a lack of societal cohesion. There was a genuine attempt to create a free and natural Malaysia, which made the best use of modern capitalism and democracy without cultural assimilation. In *The Counter-insurgent State*, Stubbs quotes an anonymous citizen: “The western powers did not wish to abandon our beliefs, or prescripts or our identity. Real allies are not interlopers or dominators.”<sup>266</sup>

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264. Thompson, *Peace is Not at Hand*, 37.

265. Barbour, 123.

266. Stubbs, 77.

“The presence of a McDonald’s in every town doesn’t mean we are a miniature United Kingdom,” said Prime Minister Muhammad to a group of Canadian journalists in 1988.<sup>267</sup> The achieved, ultimate purpose in life for Malaysia was to figure out how to integrate an international identity with local choices.

In *Peace is Not at Hand*, Thompson asserts, “All of the nations coming out of a colonial environment had that challenge. The British concept of indirect rule, maintaining and collaborating with local officials, made this concept easier.”<sup>268</sup> The white dominions had sought to produce little Englishmen and Englishwomen in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. The sub-Saharan African colonies sought to create a hybrid of local people imbued with the traditional Judeo-Christian values and commitment to free enterprise but at the same time loyalty to their own culture and people.

H. W. Crocker explains the need for the colonial interaction to be relatively fast. “For two generations,” he comments, “we shall be able to show the African and Asian what we do, and then we will be asked to please go away.”<sup>269</sup> As with almost every other aspect of politics, the Malaysians, given their generally relaxed mindset, had the most success in breaking down old feelings of superiority and replacing them with genuine trust. Attempts to discredit beliefs and customs in favor of universal ideals had not worked. The greatest error the United States made in Vietnam was in assuming all indigenous peoples wished merely to completely copy the consumer culture of the first-

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267. Sweet, 189.

268. Thompson, *Peace is Not at Hand*, 116.

269. Crocker, 139.

world nations. White Zimbabweans made the same mistake of denying the genuine Africanness of their fellow citizens. This was summed up by African leader James Gozo: ““We don’t want to be forced into your society; I am going to be me as I am, and you can beat, or kill me. I will not be what you think I ought to be.””<sup>270</sup> Malaysians made a continuous effort to ensure flexibility and harmony by refusing to divide the Chinese and Indians cultures through forced assimilation.

It was rather for both the former controlling power and the colonized to figure out jointly how to transform a paternal relationship into a genuine partnership of equal allies in a culturally diverse environment. Future Prime Minister Razak explained the transitional process:

“British and Australian officials understood they needed to make themselves responsible for unpleasant policies while giving credit to Malay and Chinese officials for things the general public approved of, so as to create a bond of trust once the first-world officials were back home.”<sup>271</sup>

Unpleasant inconveniences could be blamed on the well-meaning, departing white people. Youth groups were encouraged to adopt former guerrillas. C.D. Abdullah, former liaison between the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the Malay Races Liberation Army, switched sides and became a primary school teacher in Sawark where he taught a literature class that embraced British and indigenous stories. He attributed his change of heart to the kind, forgiving treatment he had received in the New Life Village in the northern provinces. Boy Scouts and Islamic Youth League members kept him busy and genuinely seemed to care about his welfare. ““I had thought worldwide

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270. Mantazmia, 23.

271. Stubbs, 152.

Communists were my family,” he recalls. ““Now I had local people, human beings who for my own sake, wanted things to get better.””<sup>272</sup> This inclusive, personal, multicultural approach proved far more valuable than military firepower alone. Guerillas needed to feel that their diversity would be respected.

Sir Edward Grey, the First High Commissioner, had encouraged a culturally diverse methodology as early as 1948. Malaysian guerillas, who had initially surrendered after several sessions with the Special Branch, were released efficaciously into local employment in the urban areas where a multiracial hybrid of native and twentieth century ways of life flourished economically.<sup>273</sup> However, Malaysians of Chinese descent fared more poorly: “There were a few at the beginning but a large number of Chinese were squatters, which did not have a place to work or live following their defections.”<sup>274</sup> Although this segment of the population had limited means and prospects, on the whole, Malaysia’s culturally varied population was poised for great economic improvement and success.

The economic boom caused by the need for rubber and timber during the Korean War led to a tremendous increase in economic progress. A middle class sprung up overnight, according to social scientist David Fitz in his book *Motivation and Morale*. This rapid increase in national income led to a greater sense of national unity, calming initial sources of discontent. Fundamental change in the economy was evidenced by dramatically decreased poverty: According to Bass, “Within three years, the poverty rate

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272. Ibid., 34.

273. *Malaysia: The Domino that Held*, 50.

274. Barbour, 11.

has been cut by sixty percent. This was exposure to the possibility of growth, change, joy, and achievement.”<sup>275</sup> Such economic prosperity proved to be much more of a benefit to all parties involved than perpetuating conflicts.

Dinesh D’Souza, political scientist and culture analyst, narrates in his film *America: Imagine the World Without Her* that economic opportunity can create a sense of stability in which the individual desires to be free to take advantage of all the possibilities of a free and self-directed society. He bases it on progress coming from individual directed efforts. “It is a ladder to be pulled up, rather than a rope leveled by others,” he explains. “Well played people are not involved in social and societal disruption.”

This free way of living was demonstrated by new leaders. In 1952, Sir Gerald Templer spoke to an audience of Malay businesspeople: ““You have a great desire for everything from liquid to luxury. Independence will make possible anything you desire. A dictatorship offers the world, but it is a lie. Believe that truth that your fate is in your own hands, and all will be possible.””<sup>276</sup>

Templer based many of his successful strategies in Malaysia in the 1950s on his earlier service as a governor in the British zone of Germany after World War II. Giles MacDonogh’s *After the Reich* points out the use of a hierarchy of privileges for the cooperative and restrictions for the recalcitrant as vital to Templer’s entire career. “The task of reorientation, even successful administration requires an atmosphere of trust and

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275. Bass, 194.

276. Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy*, 64.

respect on both sides.”<sup>277</sup> Templer seemed almost predestined to fulfill the benevolent and authoritarian father figure toward the new country. Everything from access to the radio, to licenses to carry firearms depended on the writ of this dynamo. Villagers who stole weapons were placed on a fast for three days until the guilty ones surrendered, while turned guerrillas were rewarded with banquets and shopping sprees.

Conversely, guerrilla leader Chin Peng sought to embrace Communism as a solution to the problems of his colonial upbringing: “A job meant a form of isolation, pigeon holed into where the elite wanted the masses to be. Religion, charity and entertainment are cheap tranquillizers designed to promote false awareness and passive docility. The revolution was the way out.”<sup>278</sup>

Assistance from Chinese and Cambodian comrades created people’s palaces in the jungle. Recreation was seen as a way of promoting revolutionary fever, like the Nazi Strength through Joy Movement. East German mercenaries known as the Young Pioneers spent a week running football camps for Malay youth.<sup>279</sup>

“The New Zealand Logistics Corps built seven youth centers for swimming and educational support in 1955 [throughout Malaysia]. Young carpenters were given internships under the slogan ‘a workshop is kinder than a jail cell.’ Youth Offenders of Chinese and Indian background helped create new buildings throughout the country.”<sup>280</sup>

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277. Giles MacDonogh, *After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 314.

278. Peng, 29.

279. Ibid., 124.

280. Stubbs, 198.

The Malayan counterpart of the New Zealand Peace Corps was formed by the Ministry of Information. Hundreds of promising soldiers were detached and sent off to mentor non-profit organizations, which created legitimate outlets for young peoples' energy. It was Colonial Secretary Malcolm McDonald's hope that this would create brotherhood and sisterhood between the young people and the military.

In keeping with the notion of culturally diverse camaraderie, Malaysian Provincial Governor Lionel Samuelson put forth a tremendous amount of effort and great deal of time in trying to genuinely transform economic and social opportunities in the indigenous regions. Desrick trackers were offered scholarships to British universities, paid out of officers' own funds. Within a year, these formerly illiterate trackers, all one hundred of them, had become university students. It was practical, direct individualism that won the hearts and minds of the confused and broken-hearted.<sup>281</sup> Future Prime Minister Tunku Rahman sent students of his Malay Congress Alliance Party to study political movements around the world but mainly in Europe: "Malay students observed de Gaulle's Rally for the Republic Convention. The British Liberal Party had an open forum in Trafalgar Square. The New Zealand Country Party sent fifty autos to accommodate delegates."<sup>282</sup>

This was to give the entire political class a first class example of how democratic government would work. This exposure to different methods of the democratic process, each with adaptations to the local culture, would prove invaluable in asserting that Malaysia did not suffer the periodic crisis other nations in her region did. In *Behind the*

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281. Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy*, 134.

282. Hershberg, 65.

*Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia*, British politician Prisilla Roberts refers to Malaysia as “an ocean of tranquility and order in a mass of dictatorship and chaos.”<sup>283</sup>

Today, Malaysia remains democratic. It is known worldwide as a “Garden Paradise” because the scenery is tropical and filled with verdant greenery, pristine jungle, multiple species of birds, and dazzling flora and fauna. Visitors travel there from all points on the planet to enjoy everything the country has to offer. This occurs not only because of Malaysia’s panoramic beauty, but also due to its stable, peaceful, democratic government and compelling history.

Actually, over the decades, Malaysia has become a constitutional monarchy, which means there are a figure-head king and a fully democratic government, with a Dewan Rakyat that is similar to the U.S. House of Representatives. The Dewan Rakyat representatives are elected by citizens over the age of seventeen. There are 150 members of this political body, elected democratically every five years. Similar to the U.S. Senate is the Dewan Negara, elected every three years. There are thirty members comprised of intergenerational men and women of all races, with and without disabilities, faithfully serving the electorate. So, too, the members of the Dewan Rakyat are intergenerational men and women of all races, with and without disabilities, faithfully serving the country’s citizens.<sup>284</sup>

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283. Roberts, 451.

284. Stubbs, 193.

Malaysia is the most crime-free country in Southeast Asia. There is little pollution and no political unrest. It is an ally of the United States and all first-world nations.<sup>285</sup> Surely, its counterinsurgency has had long-lasting strength.

I believe that Malaysia is a great example for the rest of the developing world, a beacon of possibility in a world changing very rapidly. Tunku Prince Abdul Rahman referred to his nation as ““A textbook of just how poverty could be reduced and freedom expanded everywhere else.””<sup>286</sup> One way that Malaysia has attained this status is through its booming tourism industry. Malaysia has mightily won over the tourist industry by focusing on its first-world economy, while celebrating its large underdeveloped region. There are more varieties of monkeys in Malaysia than anywhere else on earth. The log houses of the indigenous Borneo strongmen drew 150,000 U.S. and 60,000 Canadian tourists in 2015.<sup>287</sup> Thompson also said that Malaysia is really two countries: a bastion of unspoiled nature in its jungle regions and a booming, economic superpower in its smoothly functioning cities. Nature reserves are near charming villages, which are not too distant from luxury apartment complexes and four-story mansions. The second biggest skyscraper in the world is in Kuala Lumpur. Thirty miles away is a reservation for the Dekaraklan people, who live in tree houses and wear blue body paint. Fully accessible gyms, swimming pools, and entertainment centers welcome all sorts of people from around the world.<sup>288</sup>

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285. Peng, 200.

286. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 199.

287. Stubbs, 24.

288. *Malaysia: The Domino that Held*, 118.

It is a country in which Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists live in harmony without the tension found in other countries.<sup>289</sup> The houses of worship and temples are accessible, unlike most in the United States. I would hope to visit some of the houses of worship, as they are also historical monuments.

Many of my research experiences have stimulated a desire to learn more. I see myself as beginning a great, exciting process of learning. I hope someday to visit Malaysia to explore and learn more about this wonderful, stimulating jewel of a country. It is truly exciting to believe my experiences of travel and encounters with different groups of people are just beginning. As a wheelchair user, I believe that by engaging in as many activities as possible, I am encouraging others to find and make their own achievements possible. This is vital in our technological, isolated age.

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289. Barbour, 19.

## **Chapter Four: Reasons for Partial Success in Taiwan**

With Malaysian victory in mind, why should scholars examine in detail the leadership and incomplete counterinsurgency effort in Taiwan during the Cold War? It is because of its solid democracy that was born out of counterinsurgency against mainland China. Failed efforts to regain mainland China resulted in the Taiwanese leaders' positive decision that they needed to create a model democratic society of their own.

Taiwan's attempt to transform a small island into a shining bulwark of anti-Communism shows counterinsurgency's strength at its best and the weakness of improper usage of its ideas. Mainland China had suffered through corruption, warlords, portioning the nation, Japanese invasion, and economic turmoil for two decades. The Nationalist Party on the mainland had seen its revolutionary zeal weaken and burn out.<sup>290</sup> This is the primary reason why the Communist Chinese restarted war in 1946 and won it three years later. The remnants of the old government fled to and held Taiwan. They had a chance to build a new society out of nothing, which led to misjudgments and great achievements at the same time. Taiwanese leaders clung to the dream of reunification throughout the 1960s and used offers of military support for the Western powers in South Korea, Indonesia, and Vietnam to try to bargain to get their mainland China back. The United States gave the idea lip service, but was too frightened of Communist China's atomic weapons to accept the offer. Disputes over the spilt between the Soviet Union and Communist China proved to be a decisive factor.<sup>291</sup> Although Taiwan realized successful, emerging nation status, it never regained mainland China.

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290. Taylor, 160.

291. Marx, 237.

The Taiwanese embraced foreign influence on their own terms. Chiang Ching-kuo, President Kai-shek's oldest son, spent vacations with New Zealander and Australian military advisors, who were the anti-Communist Asian and Western leaders. They sought to reshape the political and social vision of Taiwan without imposing cultural hegemony.<sup>292</sup>

The Beautification Movement sought to maintain cultural traditions during the mainland's bloody Cultural Revolution. This clinging to tradition was mixed with innovation: "Chiang combined the Bible with the Iching and baseball with calligraphy. The island was the heir and remnant of the past inculcated with the future."<sup>293</sup> This was significant because it demonstrated that Taiwan's new democracy had a place for cultural traditions.

In addition, Taiwan's government desired to reach beyond tradition and take on a larger role in the Vietnam Conflict, although there is some debate as to whether or not this was cover for an invasion of the mainland. Former, yet still determined Taiwanese Ambassador Fredrick Chen had a great deal to say about that in his autobiography:

I do understand that there was a great debate within the Nationalist Party as to whether or not our return to the mainland would be assisted by aiding anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam. My own view is that the more involved in the rest of the world our country was, the greater our chance to benefit the free world.<sup>294</sup>

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292. Kai-shek, 16.

293. Taylor, 198.

294. Fredrick Chen, *Taiwan and South Vietnam* (New York: Doubleday, 1971), 37.

William Marx reinforced Chen's way of thinking: "The Ministry of Psychological Warfare in Taiwan financed a number of Vietnamese courses in subjects ranging from spy sex traps to the proper funeral rights for former mainlanders."<sup>295</sup> The Taiwanese desperately wanted to be of military assistance in Vietnam. Australian field commander Sir John Wilton joked that a squad of Taiwanese dance troupes could have had the war won in a few months. Australian forces in Vietnam placed a great deal of importance on giving tactical and strategic advice to the Filipino and Thai troops scheduled in the key provinces to the country's center. The Taiwanese continued to press for a larger military role, which inflamed concerns about Communist China reprising its volunteers, as it had in Korea fifteen years before.

There are a number of varying opinions on whether or not mainland Chinese would have intervened. Vice President Ky strongly rejected that concern in *Buddha's Child*: "Mao was caught up in the national bloodletting of the Cultural Revolution. He had to secure his own position."<sup>296</sup> Soviet historian Ilya Gaiduk rightfully believed that the Chinese Soviet border conflicts might have prevented active military involvement in Vietnam because the Chinese were spending their energy and money on the conflict with Taiwan. There were a large number of support troops, just fewer than 200,000, involved in shipping supplies and rebuilding the anti-aircraft equipment near the northern Taiwanese border. The question as to whether or not China would become involved in the Vietnam War greatly concerned Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The official battle plan for victory included a strong number of Chinese troops, which clearly had a different

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295. Marx, 149.

296. Ky, 287.

agenda. The disagreement between western nations, over the legitimacy of Taiwan was probably the most critical area of conflict. The United States, had a strong commitment to its Nationalist compatriots.

Taiwan, which at that time called itself The Republic of China, intensified its own efforts to intervene in the Vietnam Conflict in 1967. The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, has a file dated June 23, 1967, about a meeting between U.S. National Security Advisor Walt Rostow and The Republic of China Ambassador Wei Chun concerning Taiwanese troops fighting alongside Republic of Korea forces to aid the South Vietnamese. Ambassador Chun offered seasoned naval and army commando forces, as well as mainland China's battle plans that had come into Taiwan's hands in 1966 from defectors.<sup>297</sup> Speaking frankly with Wei Chun, Rostow said, "The free states would welcome Republic of China forces, if not for the fact that the Communist Chinese now possessed the atomic bomb. The Republic of China could best serve the cause of peace by continuing its efforts to instruct Republic of Vietnam officials in the proper handling of its strategic hamlets, to truly woo the disaffected among the North Vietnam regime."<sup>298</sup>

Taiwanese psychologists, spiritual leaders, and sympathetic civilians, all of whom helped American Vietnamese veterans, sought to copy the more successful aspects of their defector program to benefit their own returning veterans. Gourmet meals were prepared. Asian and Western entertainers were hired, and fifty experts in massage were

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297. *Republic of China Transcript* (Washington D.C.: Department of State Printing Office, 1967), 6.

298. Walt Rostow, "Republic of China-Vietnam Discussion: Telegram Transcript" (Austin: The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, 1967), 5.

recruited to make sure that the veterans felt cared for and appreciated.<sup>299</sup> The Taiwanese recognized that “The key portion of a nation’s moral character is how those who have fought for it are treated.”<sup>300</sup>

The Taiwanese, like the Malaysians before them, truly sought to achieve autonomy. Veterans were respected as the most valuable part of Taiwanese society, entitled to any assistance they might desire in order to maximize the benefit of individual life at all levels. Bryan Burroughs devoted a portion of his work *Days of Rage* to the Taiwanese centers. The book concerns leftist activity in the United States, and Burroughs demonstrates how leftist activities were somewhat quelled in Taiwan by utilizing the veneration of veterans: “The Taiwanese were clever enough to use veterans to keep other aspects of society well contented.”<sup>301</sup>

However, Burroughs’s main area of interest concerned home grown guerrilla movements within the United States and Canada, the so-called New Left. Many antiwar movements were peaceful; some were not. Burroughs believed that the New Left possessed the right ideals, but a dangerous lack of understanding practical reality.<sup>302</sup> Repressed rage is not a replacement for working within the legitimate political process.

The Taiwanese sought to create inner peace by using “Welcoming Centers” as sources of connection between individuals and their government. These centers were more effective, practical versions of similar South Vietnamese Hamlets and Chieu Hoi

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299. Taylor, 403.

300. Daniel Hannan, *Inventing Freedom* (New York: Harper Collins Publishing, 2013), 302.

301. Bryan Burroughs, *Days of Rage* (New York: Doubleday, 2014), 17.

302. Ibid., 186.

centers. Defectors' needs and concerns were considered: "Fifteen Taiwanese officials, led by Taiwan's Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo, had been sent to Saigon to conduct classes on psychological warfare. It was explained that defectors needed a taste of the good life and genuine guarantees of real work in the future."<sup>303</sup> Taiwanese helpers developed the idea to give Vietnamese defectors some time in Saigon after their defections. Ties between Taipei and Saigon had been developed a year earlier, when Air Marshall Ky had spent ten days as a guest of Chiang Kai-shek, following the repression of the Vietnamese Nuygan armed monk uprising. The Taiwanese leader regarded Ky as an adopted son, going so far as to bake a moon cake for him: "We sat in the double ten palace, and the old man put cake on my plate and smiled and said, 'You are a stronger version of myself . . . it's time to place free Asia in younger hands.'"<sup>304</sup>

Chiang Ching-kuo convinced South Vietnam to undertake large-scale arts programs, inclusive of visual art, sculpture, and playwriting. This was to win over defectors and give disabled veterans something enlightening and constructive to do. The Taiwanese political left tried to use art to focus on the current injustices of the nation becoming a Western puppet:

Many on the political right saw Taiwan as a citadel of Western ideas. This was only partially true. Economic freedom, "Benign Capitalism" assured that the standard of living was quite high. Low taxes were combined with a generous welfare state. Religious freedom was absolute. Yet, political power remained tightly in the hands of the self-styled and self-anointed "Thousand Year Legislature Men" elected in 1948 to represent mainland Chinese districts.<sup>305</sup>

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303. Marx, 66.

304. Ky, 156.

305. Marx, 184.

Contrasts remained between the view of the left and of the right regarding Taiwan's place in the political world. The Taiwanese system had firmly kept political opposition in check while tolerating other areas of expression, and trying to buy off the more vocal opposition.

Similarly, cultural freedoms were mixed. Artists from all over the world were permitted to perform. Education was a mixture of Confucian philosophical texts and scientific journals. Youth activities were conducted by the government through its New China Youth Movement; games, cooking, and swimming skills were promoted. Young people sent care packages to their oppressed brothers on the mainland. At its peak, "Eighty percent of young people between five and nineteen were involved in government run after school and youth programs."<sup>306</sup> Adults were helped toward correct social behavior through workplace liaison officers of the government, who monitored morale and transmitted helpful government directives. Since most social activities and benefits were given through the workplace, it was quite easy to keep the locals happy and nurtured through employment.

Taiwanese land reform increased employment in the agricultural field and took place on a nationwide scale beginning in 1966. Its purpose was to calm tension on the island as well as providing an outlet for the small number of mainland defectors. Sharecropping-style systems had concentrated ownership in an elite class of outsiders. Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo sought to make use of a four-stage progress to alter this dangerous concentration of wealth in small hands. First, interest-free loans repayable

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306. Ky, 109.

in fifteen years were authorized. As James Taylor remembers, “The loans were understood in the mind of the farmer to be a direct demonstration of the government’s paternal support for his welfare.”<sup>307</sup> Next, the 40 percent of the land that was owned directly by the state was leased at very attractive rates. Farmers’ contributions to the National Assistance Fund, the country’s social welfare benefits, were matched by the government. A law was passed in 1970 limiting the amount required as payment to outside land owners to 20 percent of the crops’ market value, half the amount required by the Japanese decades earlier. Finally, any owners of large scale homesteads, which were defined as more than one thousand acres, who voluntary sold their property to working-class families were to be paid by the government 30 percent above market value, tax free.

While traditional Chinese family values remained important, Taiwanese society was transformed through writing and entertainment. The Taiwanese emotionally embraced foreigners; for example, the visitor CIA agent Ray Cline became an adopted uncle to three generations of Kai-sheks. “The new Taiwanese society was based on an amalgamation of local freedoms and national unity, based on the older ideas of traditional Chinese moral values of the Imperial and War Lord Periods,” Taylor explains. Writings and all sorts of entertainment sought to transform the larger society, through catharsis. The press was “free on the local level and restricted on the national level.”<sup>308</sup> Emotional transformation was far more important in the long run. Sports, recreational trips to the West, concerts, and bonuses all came spilling out of the government’s pocket as they would from the pocket of an indulgent grandparent.

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307. Taylor, 238.

308. Colby, 220.

Commenting on this indulgence, Vice President Chen Yi said, ““Since we have not been able to restore the mainland from the Communist bandit traitors, it’s the government’s responsibility to make the lives of those under our flag and our care as pleasant and comfortable as possible.””<sup>309</sup>

U.S. Congressman Walter Judd, a long-time Taiwan supporter, took a month-long tour of the island to ascertain the genuine political, social, and economic needs of the people. Congressman Judd discussed his recommendations with Chiang Kai-shek personally in a number of meetings in 1966. The congressman felt there needed to be improvements in three areas, starting with the use of film, theater, and other forms of entertainment to promote exposure to the new disability inclusion programs. He also recommended a stronger promotion of sports activities for new defectors and their families and that the national image of Taiwan needed to be revamped and transformed.<sup>310</sup>

The first project recommended by Judd was easily brought to pass: writing contests were developed to link national identity and greater opportunity for acceptance of people with disabilities within the larger community. Beginning in January 1967, 150,000,000 Taiwanese dollars were allocated to what was known as the National Greatness Program. The national universities, the mass media, and theaters across the country were required to devote one hour weekly in classrooms, television broadcasts, and onstage to providing information about accessibility assistance.<sup>311</sup>

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309. Marx, 432.

310. Taylor, 107.

311. Joes, 140.

The second two projects for which Judd advocated went hand in hand. Taiwan used sports programs as a means of boosting the national image. As Margaret Sullivan points out, “Sports programs for adults were created through work centers, focusing on handball, track and golf. By 1972, Taiwanese teams were competing around the world.”<sup>312</sup> Additionally, Taiwan sought to revitalize its international image by giving assistance to other nations in need. This was different from the political involvement previously mentioned because this was not done for political reasons, but for the strengthening of national identity.

“Brotherly assistance teams were dispatched to rebuild damaged regions of Bangladesh and the Central African Republic” as part of Taiwan’s campaign.<sup>313</sup> This was an important coming of age for Taiwan, coming from a dependent position into a leadership position, able to give aid to others. Taiwanese entrepreneurs took dominant positions throughout Africa and South America.

During that same period, France inserted itself into the relationship between Taiwan and China. “The French sought to work with the Chinese in attempts to develop a modern infrastructure for the underdeveloped world. The business community sought to reestablish French influence in the developing world.”<sup>314</sup> Industrial leaders sought to encourage the developing world to adopt modern methods. “The two major French labor unions sought to become involved in the larger society, of which they saw Taiwan as impediment. It was in no way Communist supporting; rather it was an attempt to

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312. Sullivan, 139.

313. Taylor, 129.

314. Robert O. Paxton, *Guerrillas in Asia* (New York: Doubleday, 1974), 199.

persuade Nationalists and Communists to compromise to rebuild Asia.”<sup>315</sup> De Gaulle’s commitment to a multi-polar world outside of the American and Russian power blocks required a partnership between Taiwan and mainland China. Academic programs in Taiwan such as the Young China Movement desired to create a welcoming, modern method to reduce tension. These educational programs were financed by the French to improve relations between Taiwan and mainland China. By 1968, all Taiwanese educational institutions were committed to creating language classes that only taught Mandarin in order to foster peaceful ties with the mainland. France continued to nurture programs that sought to promote diplomatic dialogue between the two countries. This dialogue sometimes came to fruition via theatre.<sup>316</sup>

Dramatic presentations of new Chinese writing on old themes of national greatness and harmony were performed in schools and universities in Mandarin. The most prominent play was Li Yaun’s *Raise the White Lamp*, which featured a disabled, former Communist guerrilla. In the melodramatic script, he falls in love and finds a new life with his caregiver. The actual performer was a wheelchair user and hard of hearing. He was also an acclaimed star of the stage. There were numerous similar productions throughout the country, all with the same type of plot—each starring disabled actors in the lead roles.<sup>317</sup> Audiences were treated to autonomy on the stage; nevertheless, in real life, the quest for autonomy was divided and limited.

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315. Ibid., 201.

316. Ibid., 35.

317. Taylor, 532-33.

The nation possessed a legislature split between the Nationalist Party and the Young China Party, with most of the power in the hands of the Nationalists. The nation was considered flexible by third-world standards.<sup>318</sup> The Nationalist Party repeatedly sought to harness rather than listen to the indigenous population, many of whom had their own idea of what the country's future should be and had little to no interest in Chiang Kai-shek's dream of rejoining the mainland. Desires for non-Chinese independence, which were labeled as having wrong ideals, were punished by censorship, loss of work benefits, or exile to the port cities of Qumoy and Kaosiung. These cities were governed by the military, so they were regarded as unpleasant to live in. Future Democratic Progressive Party leaders were exiled en masse to Qumoy in 1965.<sup>319</sup> Their spokesman, Chen Pelan, referred to the six months he spent as "painful and boring."<sup>320</sup> The vital skills he learned would prove effective during the democratic era, but for right now, he truly had been isolated. The history of the Kuomintang shows beyond measure just how much of the priority went to mainlanders at all levels of life. The anonymously written book *Nationalist Party History* reveals: "As proved by events, the Communists have sold out our country and put our people in jeopardy. They have enslaved our compatriots on the mainland."<sup>321</sup> The ideal of returning to the mainland was emphasized at the exclusion of the larger, more relevant concept of building up the island. Improvements did take

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318. Joes, 190.

319. Thompson, *Make for the Hills*, 284.

320. Marx, 98.

321. *Nationalist Party History* (Tapei, Taiwan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1970), 305.

place economically and culturally, but as an afterthought to the larger issue. The idea was to break down local needs and replace them with a national vision. This is very similar to the French idea of national greatness. As referenced earlier, “De Gaulle’s effort to *acquits* French interests with those of the developing world sought to reunite China and Taiwan for a different reason, to promote interdependence, and non-hostility.”<sup>322</sup>

Whenever possible, former mainlanders and defectors were given priority for leadership positions. There were frequent attempts to reach out to the mainland with radio broadcasts, propaganda balloons, and even television beginning in 1963. The culmination of the outreach to mainland China took place in October 1966. October 10 is a national holiday in both Taiwan and China. It is the anniversary of the declaration of the Chinese Republic in 1912. It is also the birthday of Sun Yatsen, founder of the Republic of China, who is revered by Communists and Nationalists alike. The propaganda experts at the Taiwanese Ministry of Culture put on a display unparalleled in the nation’s history. Three recent defectors in bright blue uniforms were taken to Taipei and paraded in front of the Purple Robed Council of Grand Leaders, Taiwan’s High Court. After a ten-course luncheon, President Kai-shek; U.S. General Mark W. Clark; and defector Lei Yaun’s grandmother, who had fled in 1957, formally presented the three airmen with citizenship papers, keys to new homes, and 116 pounds of gold with about 2,000,000 new Taiwan dollars, valued as just under 100,000 U.S. dollars. This ceremony kicked off a ten-day propaganda explosion in which every aspect of the nation’s

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322. Paxton, *Guerrillas in Asia*, 345.

economic and political life was analyzed to be put in a most favorable light.<sup>323</sup> Political, economic, and religious leaders all gave their varied opinions on the nation's social progress.

President Kai-shek, still looking vigorous at seventy, gave a series of six-hour speeches for each of the next ten days. The most direct of these orations was published in booklet form in early 1967, as "Chang Kai-shek Talks to the Nation." This brightly colored booklet is full of cheerful photos of smiling children, aged parents being lovingly cared for, and other such standard images. In contrast, when the words in print are examined, a different meaning comes across. President Kai-shek was not just exhibiting Taiwan's happy fortune; he was also making a strong effort to share power on an unheard-of scale with the mainland. He scribed, "The Republic of China welcomes our abused mainland brothers and sisters with open arms. We are willing to abrogate all restrictions on political activities at a moment's notice. Martial law will be ended, and any existing Chinese officials will be confirmed in their posts with substantial raises."<sup>324</sup> This attempt to secure loyalty through common heritage was followed by a supportive series of nationwide television broadcasts from Taiwan to mainland China, which mimicked the common Communist technique of self-criticism in order to expose errors on the mainland. The famous beloved blind actor Chen Lait starred in many of these television productions, which were proudly broadcast in Technicolor in 1966.

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323. Taylor, 83-84.

324. Kai-shek, 44.

In that same year, in *Roads of Earth*, author Allen Drury described Communist China as “a nation in ‘psychotic break,’ even from its original Communist ideas.”<sup>325</sup> The Cultural Revolution, which deputized young Red Guards to take over the military, made use of a method of torture called a struggle session, in which every member of a cadre had to accuse every other of two socialist errors. These sessions left people emotional wrecks, shouting abuse at each other and sobbing for forgiveness, while terror erupted. Cable recounts, “Suicides and murders skyrocketed, as the entire population sought to protect itself by betraying each other. Fifty thousand arrests per month were taking place.”<sup>326</sup> Clearly, this harsh, secular approach would not do. There needed to be another way to express frustrations without violence and total societal disruption. “‘The kettle needed to let off steam,’ according to Chen Da Lock, police chief of Taipei.”<sup>327</sup> The focus was now on demonstrating flexibility and contrast between relatively relaxed Taiwan and its frenzied mainland replacement.

More serenely, The Nationalist Taiwanese elite decided to non-violently accuse themselves of not doing enough to welcome those on the other side. This was the difference between the two Chinas: “Mao purged. Chiang tried to convert.”<sup>328</sup> The Nationalists believed that an unprecedented gesture of self-effacing sympathy might free the mainland.

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325. Allen Drury, *Roads of Earth* (New York: Doubleday, 1984), 109.

326. Cable, *Conflict of Myths*, 46.

327. *Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Nationalist Party History* (Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971), 297.

328. Joes, 134.

On October 19, 1966, five Taiwanese Cabinet Members, the Military Governors of two provinces, Taipei's Catholic Archbishop, and three Mormon elders engaged in eighteen hours of self-criticism. Before the entire national elite, these men confessed voluntarily, begging the mainlanders to accept their abiding expression of loyalty and affection. By creating a forum of forgiveness, The Nationalist Party sought to provide the mainlanders with a contrast. People in Taiwan voluntarily announced their errors and were gently set right, while the Communist party used force to instill fear and subjugation.<sup>329</sup> "It is necessary to seduce and woo, rather than bully. The Nationalist leaders had acknowledged past errors. Had it devoted the same amount of energy to genuinely handling local issues, the alternative would have been even more clear."<sup>330</sup>

Returning to the propaganda booklet "Chiang Kai-shek Talks to the Nation," the leadership of Taiwan addressed its foes with fatherly nurturing: "You wanted to build a new China, so we did. We didn't understand how badly, so we didn't listen, and you followed Mao. No one can blame you."<sup>331</sup>

The evocative photos in this booklet also showed people with disabilities participating in political debates and sporting events, which strongly implied that all were welcome and included in Taiwanese society. "Justices of the Supreme Council were seen cooking with ordinary workers," as Marx explains. "A truly egalitarian system that made reality all of the high minded ideas the mainlanders and Russians talked about. In Red China, the average worker was starving while the elite lived in Roman Imperial style

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329. Kai-shek, 1-4.

330. Lawson, 110.

331. Kai-shek, 66.

splendor.”<sup>332</sup> Taiwanese propaganda covered a number of people who sought to unify with the mainland. Over and over again, this theme of racial and national unity was expressed through the genuine desire to improve a free anti-Communist China. Tibetan monks, undergoing torture on the mainland, were contrasted with their happy, well fed and joyous peers in Taiwan. To a person undergoing unbearable agony, the most ordinary attempt at individual or national improvements can truly seem majestic.

The booklet text continued: “Brothers, it is our only wish to see you under the White Sun, Blue Sky banner once again. Send word of how we can help.”<sup>333</sup>

Excellent words; however, the reality proved difficult. Six defections occurred over the next week, hardly enough to topple governments. While lavishing aid and power on defectors, local Taiwanese felt the government had no real concern for them. This type of situation can often prove disastrous, as loyal citizens see their own loyalty go unrewarded, while turncoats reap rich rewards. Joes describes the insidious effect such a situation can precipitate:

While quite properly seeking out the disaffected amongst the opposition, government must not neglect those who have stayed on the government side throughout the conflict. If those original supporters feel at all unappreciated, it will lead to another sense of betrayal, even more deadly, than the cause of the original war.<sup>334</sup>

The native Taiwanese tried to express grievances non-violently and were ignored. This was a result of disaffection between mainland exiles and the indigenous, local Taiwanese. The exiles seemed to regard locals as a well-meaning uncle, who might regard a teenage

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332. Marx, 247.

333. Kai-shek, 116.

334. Joes, 222.

niece with love, but also with a determination to exercise control. This manifested in the case of native Taiwanese, who took local control over a group of exiles, whom residents did not regard as worthy of full involvement in national life.<sup>335</sup> Indeed, distracted with “retaking” the mainland, the Nationalist elite inflamed its own locals for reasons that were an equal mixture of survival and its outmoded understanding of the population’s capabilities. On a smaller scale, Taiwan made the same error that the Zimbabweans made regarding the loyal African population. “Any sector of population, ‘protected’ from full participation in a society, which claims to be democratic, will in time become the most dangerous group within that nation,” Joes asserts.<sup>336</sup>

Success was garnered, in part, because the leadership allowed full religious freedom, substantial economic support, and a willingness to overlook political activities after 1965 by the local population. The population was kept busy and distracted, while the larger issues were decided in Taipei by the national government. Repeatedly, local needs and choices were only partially fulfilled.<sup>337</sup>

In further exploration of the partial victory in Taiwan, it is important to briefly look at the willingness of the other three nations to share power. Vietnam dropped Diem’s paternalism for three years of military coups and counter coups before getting some degree of popular government in 1967.<sup>338</sup> The Zimbabweans gave full democracy to whites while keeping most Africans out of national power in favor of using

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335. Thompson, *Peace is Not at Hand*, 177.

336. Joes, 229.

337. Stubbs, 34.

338. Colby, 126.

manageable tribal chiefs for far too long.<sup>339</sup> Only the Malaysians understood that acknowledging the will of the people as expressed through the ballot box makes a country stronger.

I would assert that voting rights were the supreme factor in all four counter-insurgencies. The reluctance to loosen tight control in authoritarian regimes can have both a positive and negative impact on the regime's survival. Some societies tend to desire westernization and democracy; others are satisfied with good economic benefits and the right to decide more individual issues like family life and employment, while leaving political matters in the hands of the government. Noted anti-guerrilla writer David Halberstam talks about non-democratic societies demonstrating a lack of desire for popular government in the face of other issues: "A hungry man would rather be fed than free. Sometimes democracy can seem like a luxury when it is set against the daily needs of a population unaware of how to secure its daily needs."<sup>340</sup> Out of desperation, people often support anyone who appears to offer both a solution and an enemy to blame for the current troubles. Leaders unencumbered by democratic principles in the short term are able to get things done, which applies to dictators.

Drury's writings spend some time on the reluctance of established elites to protect themselves from outsiders by fully sharing the fates of the countries they rule with non-favored groups. In *The Roads of Earth*, he reflects, "Taiwan was also dominated by a single party, its society outwardly relaxed, but underneath, as rigid and ruthless toward

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339. Ibid., 129.

340. David Halberstam, *The Powers That Be* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 112.

dissent as its fellow China on the mainland.”<sup>341</sup> This paternalistic control was designed by the mainlanders to create a unified national identity; however, it almost caused the nation to collapse.

With the offer of troops to fight in Vietnam gently denied, with its relationship with Australia shattered by the Labor Party coming to power in 1971, and with the United States under Nixon courting the hated Mao, the Nationalist Chinese returned to domestic protection and local concerns: maintaining Taiwan’s own borders, keeping the native population in line with bigger bribes, and slowly reconciling the nation to the distasteful reality that reunification, if it came at all, would not be coming for a long time. Yet, there was no cause for despair. The beautiful island of Taiwan had been saved, if not entirely free in the Western sense.<sup>342</sup>

Many veterans had once felt that too much importance had been placed on reconquering the mainland. They believed that local needs had been overlooked, specifically provision of government services for veterans, as well as indigenous defense. However, by the adoption of democracy and not uniting with the mainland, those circumstances changed for the better. Furthermore, the occupants of Taiwan, inclusive of veterans, could worship and own land as they pleased, participating in an economy “which was the third largest in Asia by 1975.”<sup>343</sup>

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341. Drury, *The Roads of Earth*, 77.

342. Joes, 208-11.

343. United Nations, *The Statesmen’s Yearbook 1978* (New York: United Nations Printing Office, 1978), 129.

The political democratization that some had long hoped for came between 1979 and 1993. Today, Taiwan sits peacefully and prosperously, in one of those ironies brought about by history. Today, Nationalists and Communists both seek the One China policy, while the opposition Taiwanese, led by the democratic Progressive Party, no longer care.<sup>344</sup> One can easily envision Great Helmsman Mao Tse-Tung and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek seated on their thrones in the afterlife, having a good laugh about that. The fiscal reforms and booms that mainland China has had since 1980 make use of Nationalist ideas without giving them any credit. Even the legal improvements which have made the nation looser without democratizing it come from the Nationalist Era. “No man could have undone the humiliation of a century in a decade, but the Nanking [Nationalist] regime made a stab,” Joes comments.<sup>345</sup> The Period of the Warlords, as the 1930s is known in China’s historical framework, laid the foundation for the nation’s politics and economy up through the end of the counter-insurgency.

Timothy Gibbs remarks: “China in both its incarnations sought to fulfill its purpose to give its civilization to the rest of the world.”<sup>346</sup> The French effort to work with Communist China was an awareness of the political reality that had to be recognized; the dream of the Nationalists of re-liberating the mainland was completely unrealistic. Conflict between the United States and France dominated the 1960s over the

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344. Taylor, 68.

345. Joes, 387.

346. Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela's Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites and Apartheid's First Bantustan* (Oxford, United Kingdom: James Currey, 2014), 198.

issue of mainland China's role in the larger world. Robert Paxton's *De Gaulle and the United States* covers the issue brilliantly. "President de Gaulle felt United States' involvement in Vietnam and China was both wrong and wasteful," he notes.<sup>347</sup>

Paxton went on to quote Senator Fullbright, who was in agreement: "'The real interest of the West should be in defending the Middle East, Japan, and Europe.'"<sup>348</sup> Had de Gaulle not retired a few months after Nixon became President, he could have been a great mediator for mainland China and Taiwan. If that had been the situation, perhaps the United States would have been able to recognize that France and the U.S. could disagree with each other, even on important issues, and maintain mutual respect, which is an important lesson for autonomous people engaged in politics today.

Despite international and internal desires to unite with the mainland, democracy in Taiwan prevailed, albeit as an island nation, not as a Chinese superpower. Thus, Taiwan's counterinsurgency was a partial success.

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347. Robert O. Paxton, *De Gaulle and the United States* (New York: Viking Press, 1994), 178.

348. *Ibid.*, 98.

## **Chapter Five: Reasons for Partial Failure in Vietnam**

This dissertation has explored two outcomes: total victory in Malaysia and partial victory in Taiwan. It is now time to explore partial defeat in Vietnam. This area of history is far more extensive and documented than that of the other nations investigated; plus, I have added new information about Vietnam, especially in regard to ethnic conflict, economic development, as well as the wide-ranging involvement of people with disabilities and the arts.

To differentiate between the notions of partial victory and partial defeat, Taiwan was a partial victory because the nation itself has thrived democratically. Its economic policies combined the social justice of a welfare state with the opportunity for advancement and employment found through capitalism. It remains only a partial victory because mainland China, although adopting a flexible, free market economy, remains Communist politically.

Partial defeat took place in Vietnam because despite 58,000 dead, ten years of divisiveness, and the destruction of two American presidencies, the United States was never officially vanquished in battle. Instead, it was defeated on a far greater scale. Its own self confidence was severely damaged, and its standing as a moral leader in the anti-Communist struggle throughout the world was first questioned and then abandoned until after the Cold War under President Ronald Reagan.<sup>349</sup>

For a time, Vietnam was forsaken by those on the left, who judged the cause illegitimate or at best ill served, while being simultaneously forsaken by those on the right, who were frustrated because an enemy had not been obliterated. As such, both

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349. Colby, 17.

sides deplored unity and chose to denigrate Vietnam. This denigration can be best analyzed as a complete lack of respect. Thomas Bass explains: “The United States never understood the people, the desires, of the culture of Vietnam. South Vietnam was to be remade in America’s image. Terraincognita preceded Terranova.”<sup>350</sup> In contrast, the Soviet and Chinese leaders understood how to repackage and adapt their ideological code to the fears, prides, and prejudices of loyal and local elites throughout the developing world. Throughout the entire Cold War, the non-democratic nations seemed to possess or learn an instinct of just how to appeal to those who felt themselves neglected or lacked access to power. A kind overlord can be seen as a better alternative to democratic reality.

This bit of guerrilla wisdom is found in Timothy Zahn’s *Choices of One*, a science fiction book that can be applied to the real world: “Multiple species with multiple viewpoints and racial philosophies cannot hold power together for long. The dominant voice must certainly be wise enough to adopt ideas and methods from its allies. But there must be a dominant voice, or there is only chaos.”<sup>351</sup>

This proved a pattern throughout South Vietnam’s existence: disorder, imposed stability, concern, and vacillation. Marshall Ky refers to this anomaly when he reveals with sorrow the new free press being manipulated for blackmail: “A number of reporters planted false stories, and then asked for presents to avoid printing them. I didn’t want to censor the media, but I felt a need to make sure differences didn’t lead to

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350. Bass, 8.

351. Timothy Zahn, *Choices of One* (New York: Lucasfilm Publications, 2011), 435.

intimidation.”<sup>352</sup> Again and again, the need for unity and order clashed with the need to present a more open alternative to make all the high rhetoric about freedom mean something.

These sentiments occurred at the end of the Vietnam War, and are plausible in retrospect; however, even at the start of the conflict, there existed a lack of unity.

Thompson asserts in *Defeating Communist Insurgency*:

After the partition of Vietnam in 1954 and the declaration of the republic the following year, the struggle [of internecine guerrillas] against other, internal enemies, the gangs, the private army of the Cao Dai sect, various other warlords unsatisfied with their share of the patronage, took up five years. It is estimated that one hundred thousand Vietnamese died 1955-1960. As horrible as that figure is, it's actually a revised figure since the original figures numbered closer to one million according to the Concerned Clergy about Vietnam Committee.<sup>353</sup>

In the same book, Thompson dismissed this large figure put forth by the Concerned Clergy since, as he said, the “corpses would have littered the streets.”<sup>354</sup> Thompson had left Malaysia to become a freelance consultant in Vietnam. He believed in the Vietnamese cause so much that he refused any salary, asking only for a residence stocked with brandy.

Diem's reputation as a dictator came not so much from his direct approval of cruelty, as from his general isolation, real or imagined, from the day-to-day business of governing. This Mandarin style seemed a product of his monastic youth. “He would sit in the Presidential palace for hours, praying his rosary, and drinking gallons of water, while his sister and brothers went on with the business of rulership. He would have made

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352. Ky, 25.

353. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 109.

354. Ibid., 116.

a fine monk, but South Vietnam needed a warrior.”<sup>355</sup> His inability to grasp the difference between what he wanted to believe and what happened proved fatal, leading to his overthrow.

Simultaneously, the first efforts to provide support for people with disabilities and the arts began in late 1962. Dance companies were created for wheelchair users and the blind. Professors were financed to discover and broadcast updated versions of national fairy tales, which featured disabled performers. The first sign language academy was created. Hard of hearing performers entertained the president and the troops before Diem’s overthrow.<sup>356</sup>

Diem’s family always used far more force than necessary and seemed to almost revel in cruelty and incompetence put together. Madam Nhu, Diem’s sister, responded to the news of a monk setting himself on fire in protest against anti-Buddhist measures with laughter and a dismissive sneer, which derided the entire moving martyrdom as a publicity stunt. Buddhist pagodas were raided and monks imprisoned. Diem’s brother combined momentary flashes of insight with self-defeating greed and shortsighted thinking. Colonel Nhu, Diem’s brother, demonstrated his stupidity most directly at the battle of Ap Bac in June 1963. This battle featured the first large scale use of helicopters. It also shows the disastrous effect of ego in battle. The battle proved a failure, because the elite commanders were more interested in pleasing their patrons than fighting the battle. Nhu, in one of his rare flashes of insight, had inserted himself into the ranks to, in

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355. Andrade, 103.

356. Thompson, *Make for the Hills*, 150.

his own words, “Find out what in blazes was going on!”<sup>357</sup> An excellent idea, but he could not restrain himself. Jumping into the front ranks, he exposed himself to enemy fire and distracted Colonel Biem, who had successfully rallied the main units of the army, the so-called Presidential Guard. The result was a rout: “three hundred Vietnamese soldiers were wounded and one hundred killed because a ‘sheltered ambitious whelp,’ as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Fredrick Nolting called Nhu, ‘couldn’t stay in the rear where he belonged.’”<sup>358</sup>

John Paul Vann, U.S. Chief Advisor to the Central Highlands, lost his army commission for exposing the incompetence of U.S. strategy in this period. On return, he would later serve as a chief consultant to pacification head Robert Komer, but for now, Vann’s biting, brilliant advice was gone.

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the only institution capable of siphoning off the best talent in the country, the only true core of national identity, had had enough of Diem’s mystical oppression. Led by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, high-level members of the U.S. government managed to convince President Kennedy to refrain from saving Diem from himself. On November 1, 1963, the army acted. Diem and his brother were overthrown, and refusing exile, were taken to a Catholic Church while the coup directors, four army generals led by Ngyuen Minh, known as “Big Minh” because his five-foot-eight form, which was considered tall by Asian standards, wondered just what Diem’s fate should be. Ambassador Nolting offered safe passage to Japan, which the President’s sense of honor refused to accept. Twelve hours later, President Diem, Col

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357. Ky, 100.

358. Sheehan, 142.

Nhu, and two aides were stripped of their valuables and shot in front of the entrance where communion was kept. These deaths, observed Chinese Communist field officer Buh Bui, were a gift from heaven.<sup>359</sup> They touched off three years of chaos. “People began to seek power merely to get rich,” Hershberg observes. “There was no longer a bad set of ideas, there were no ideas, at all.”<sup>360</sup> Six military coups and at least three other potential coups took place in just thirty-two months. The government began to resemble a game show, where political offices were handed out as consolation prizes. Every loud mouth with a following, got his turn in the chairs of power, with no long term plans.

One group of political leaders, comprised of both civilian and military personnel, overthrew each other on the average of every three months. These self-chosen leaders possessed all of Diem’s faults and none of his virtues. Political parties, manifestos, plans, and long posters came and went, as the country descended into total collapse. Just three weeks after Diem’s death, President Kennedy was struck down in Dallas. Just as film Director Oliver Stone’s blockbuster movie *JFK* depicts, some have believed that Kennedy would have withdrawn the sixteen thousand advisors following his almost certain reelection in 1964. Others just as forcefully believe that Kennedy was committed to the Vietnam Struggle, if not necessarily willing to commit large numbers of American ground forces, as his successor would choose to do. Political scholar, Jonah Goldberg, notes in his treatise, *Liberal Fascism* that “Kennedy ordered sixty percent of the domestic budget to be spent on defense.”<sup>361</sup> “The idea that he would have withdrawn from the

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359. Ibid., 3.

360. Hershberg, 149.

361. Jonah Goldberg, *Liberal Fascism* (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 100.

most critical garrison in the Cold War is wishful thinking. The Kennedy, whom ultra-left writers today idolize, had little to do with the actual, liberal, but realistic man who inhabited the White House.”<sup>362</sup>

In August 1964, two U.S. naval destroyers, *The Maddox* and *The Turner Joy*, were assaulted by North Vietnamese patrol boats. In later years, the account of the assault would be disputed, but at the time, it was taken as absolute truth. President Johnson saw a need to demonstrate America’s commitment to anti-Communism in Asia, and he asked for and received congressional approval for offensive air sorties in response. The document of congressional approval became known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Air power by itself proved ineffectual. Focused on domestic concerns, civil rights, The War on Poverty, and a small insurgency in the Dominican Republic, President Johnson was content to avoid large scale commitment for the next eight months.<sup>363</sup>

Singers of the Civil Rights Movement not only desired President Johnson to postpone a large scale commitment, they also wanted to circumvent war altogether. Folk singers like Bob Dylan (who was deaf in one ear); Pete Seeger; Joan Baez; The Kingston Trio; Peter, Paul, & Mary; Simon & Garfunkel; Crosby, Stills, & Nash; and Buffalo Springfield’s Dewey Martin (who had cerebral palsy) wrote and performed formidable, legendary songs of peace against U.S. involvement in Vietnam.<sup>364</sup> Musicians repeatedly advocated for peace.

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362. Ibid., 154.

363. Thompson, *Make for the Hills*, 78.

364. Thomas Hadyen, *The Struggle* (Chicago: Freedom Press, 1976), 5-14.

The singers and songs also focused on the desolate issue of veterans, both American and native Vietnamese. For native veterans of the Vietnam Conflict, their plight was religiously oriented. Buddhists felt that the government favored Christians. The followers of local religions rightfully believed that their needs were not valued. The result was dreadful internal conflict.<sup>365</sup> This is compelling because it demonstrates that native Vietnam veterans were treated intolerably in their country of origin, just as American Vietnam veterans were treated abysmally in the United States. In both circumstances, jobs, community support, and good medical care were sparse. “Community support tended to be greater when those veterans had family assistance, those completely on their own tended to drift and be left to their own devices. Every criminal who created the unstable veteran myth had once been a soldier.”<sup>366</sup> Vietnam itself was drifting, seemingly unable to think about long-term goals during the 1963 to 1966 period. Moderate and left-wing populations in the U.S. continued to protest against the war.

Protest against the war in Vietnam also came from the far right. In the video *If You Want the Truth*, the ultra-conservative John Birch Society head, Robert Welch, denounced the U.S. government’s effort to fight in Vietnam. He believed that U.S. war efforts should be aimed at reconquering mainland China. He opined: “In the way the war was conducted, American patriotism was completely and thoroughly discredited. The American people really want to liberate China. Chiang Kai-shek is begging to enter the war in Vietnam on our side.”

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365. Ibid., 18.

366, Robert Blackburn, *Mercenaries and the Search for More Flags* (New York: Doubleday, 1998), 29.

Furthermore in the John Birch Society's film, *If You Want the Truth*, Welch declared that Chiang wanted Taiwan to engage in battle in order to bring democracy to Vietnam; therefore, Taiwan would successfully regain mainland China. In accordance with Chiang's desire, Welch maintained the U.S. should get out of the Vietnam War and allow Taiwan do the fighting.

Despite protests from moderate, left-wing, and right-wing groups against the war, U.S. involvement in Vietnam continued. A group of Marines, inclusive of returning veterans, had been sent to guard Pleiku Air Force Base. In response to recurrent assaults, army troops and more marines were dispatched in April 1965, bringing the entire active combat commitment to forty thousand troops.<sup>367</sup> Australia, then led by Johnson's personal friend Prime Minister Harold Holt dispatched its own forces, numbering twelve thousand with an additional five thousand airmen, as well as psychological warfare experts.<sup>368</sup>

It was my privilege in 2006 to work and speak with two Australian experts on psychological, non-conventional warfare, Captain Derrick De Herr as well as Professor Ashley Eakins. Building on Australia's successful efforts in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Aden, the battle-hardened men from "down under" had a more subtle and effective method of fighting the Vietnamese enemy by taking the focus away from firepower and aiming toward intelligence. "We didn't learn anything from our orientations at the warfare school at Fort Benning," Professor Eakins remarked to me on August 20, 2006, continuing:

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367. Bass, 96.

368. Ashley Eakins, interview by Sean Dineen, August 20, 2006.

We had already learned what we needed to know. Our commanders would have us make broadcasts with recently turned Bushmen Scouts, calling upon cadres to ‘Rally’ as it was called. The Scouts would speak directly with friends on the other side, assuring them of good treatment. We showed a new way of life was possible. In addition to promising money, we promised a new family.

In my interview with Captain Derrick De Herr, a military historian, on August 18, 2006, he explained how his forces made eerie tape recordings of ancestors speaking from beyond the grave to denounce Chairman Ho and his Chinese puppet masters. He remarked, “We caused an entire unit [of Vietnamese guerillas] to defect that way. Rewards were promptly paid. Brigadier Saraong set the example by doubling a government reward out of his own pocket.” These tactics to turn the enemy were quite successful.

Additionally, South Korean allies who were in Vietnam seemed to take very well to the task of turning guerrillas. It was rumored that their incentives were much bigger than those of other pro-Western countries and their threats more terrifying. This approach was demonstrated in the case of Cheng Thraug, the chief Viet Cong courier for the Laotian border. “In 1969, after fifteen years on the job, he was unmasked by a hoi chanah and captured. An Australian colonel promised Thraug 100,000 dollars, a Mercedes and a villa, if he rallied. On refusing, two South Korean military police began beating him, his leg was crushed.”<sup>369</sup>

Abuses took place on both sides. The problem was that the South Vietnamese had a free press, a multi-party congress, and an eager media. The North had absolute power, censorship, and an entire network of prison camps and interrogation centers. The

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369. Bass, 175.

manner in which newly transformed young men and women were treated proved very important in determining how useful they might be.<sup>370</sup> US allies understood how to make effective use of defectors, throughout the war.

Australian and New Zealand forces kept many defectors (ralliers) integrated directly with their own units and out of prison, as opposed to sending them to Chieu Hoi detention centers. This created a sense of unit pride and camaraderie. Nevertheless, American forces sent thousands of defectors to Chieu Hoi. Initially, the Chieu Hoi program was well intentioned, but it suffered from many flaws during its first years of operation. Rewards promised to defectors were not often paid promptly, and vocational training lagged at three of the eight major centers.<sup>371</sup> Noted guerrilla scholar Daniel Yergin talks about the trouble created by delay: “People just hung around. The rewards needed to be paid, officials needed clearer guidance, or everything would collapse.”<sup>372</sup>

Robert Komer, “Blow Torch Bob” to his rivals, came in to shake up the entire pacification movement. He had President Johnson’s ear and did not like what he saw. Komer had a genius for taking very difficult problems and finding solutions. His solutions were not elegant and needed refining over time, but he galvanized everyone around him into rapid action.<sup>373</sup> This was demonstrated by the fate of an anonymous

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370. David Fitz, *Motivation and Morale: The Strange Case of Chieu Hoi* (New York: Rand Corporation, 1970), 40-43.

371. Lawson, 39.

372. Daniel Yergin, *The Prize - An Epic Quest for Oil; Money & Power* (WGBH, Boston, 1991), 286.

373. Thompson, *No Exit from Vietnam*, 67.

former Northern Vietnamese soldier, who switched sides in January 1966, and was quoted by Jonah Goldberg in *Liberal Fascism*:

‘This is a good program. I had joined Uncle Ho’s army because my father was whipped in one of Diem’s prisons. I was pleased to learn about the role I could play in the New Vietnam. However, I have stayed here for six months because I have not had an exit meeting. I don’t know what job opportunities are available, whether or not I will be able to vote for this new assembly they are talking about. I am bored to tears here.’<sup>374</sup>

The idea of giving defectors a new way of life was well conceived, but actually bringing this to fruition proved to be challenging. As Bass asserts, “It took the arrival of Robert Komer to dramatically alter and rebuild the Chieu Hoi Program to make it what it was truly designed to be. Even Vietnamese Communist spy, Phaung An, gave credit for that.”<sup>375</sup> Nevertheless, the Allies of the United States in this divisive war seemed to understand Asian realities better.

Australian and New Zealand forces possessed a better knowledge of conditions among Vietnamese peasants than the U.S. military. Vietnam veteran and author Ian Mac Neil writes this in his book, *To the End*:

Five guerrillas had switched sides. Standard procedure would have been to enroll them in a sixth-month Chieu Hoi course. Major Dawels [Mac Neil’s commanding officer] took them to a clinic, had their wounds treated, brought them dinner and then put them on the radio for the South Vietnamese government. Within twenty-four hours, these men were productive again.<sup>376</sup>

Throughout the entire defection process, non-American allies repeatedly showed their superiority in genuinely connecting with former Viet Cong, who wished to change.

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374, Goldberg, 227.

375. Bass, 46.

376. Mac Neil, 97.

“Rather than isolating hoi chanah, the Thais and South Koreans also rapidly found out what was wanted, gave it to them, and sought to at least begin the project of creating a new life.”<sup>377</sup>

The United States was not so productive. Sixty thousand Viet Cong and Northern army members sat and waited to learn the answer to the question: what on earth to do with my remaining years now? This happened over and over again throughout the war. People’s sensitivities, needs, and choices were ignored for the larger picture; the Communist forces appeared sympathetic, but they committed their unsavory atrocities far from newspapers’ prying eyes and television cameras. Dictatorships tend to have a propaganda advantage because they can strictly control information.

One way this propaganda advantage was brought to fruition was via the Revolutionary Development Program, which gave disabled children access to comprehensive drama and poetry programs. These programs formed a bond between the government and previously isolated young people and their extended families. On the surface, the Revolutionary Development Program seemed fully altruistic, but they were essentially a way to harness the loyalty of multitudes of families and friends of the disabled children in a government-approved manner. Actually, this propaganda practice was employed by both sides.<sup>378</sup>

In *A Better War*, author Louis Sorley discloses that the democratic South Vietnamese government organized The National Welcoming Party, which was a national attempt to recruit a thousand Viet Cong to turn and subsequently join the Chieu Hoi

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377. Chandler, 78.

378. Ibid., 139.

Program. The Welcoming Party consisted of a nation-wide painting contest, as well as a popular dance competition. Although the artistic atmosphere was celebratory, this counterinsurgency effort was eventually unsuccessful. Interestingly, the few that were recruited all had disabilities.

One young man behind these initially somewhat successful propaganda operations was Nguyen Cao Ky, a colorful, democratic South Vietnamese leader, who was an ostentatious air force pilot, armed with a purple scarf, Pattonesque pearl pistols, and an ego to match. Nguyen Cao Ky was about to make his move. Thirty-two years old and divorced twice, Ky, aided by his future rival, General Van Thieu, took over the Vietnamese government. His first duty was to restore the moribund legislature. The experience of writing a constitution would, Ky strongly believed, be an immersion in democratic thinking and taking responsibility for just how the nation would solve problems.<sup>379</sup>

Ky ordered a constitutional assembly to meet, but the only room they could rent was a former brothel in the downtown business district. His autobiography *Buddha's Child* describes with nostalgic humor the events of July 1966:

I had departed to Vientiane for a meeting with the King of Laos, and then out to Taiwan. My co-pilot (I had always flown alone before) informed me of a message from Captain Loan that the assembly was meeting downtown in what had been Bien Xyuen's most prestigious house of ill virtue, in Bao Dai's time. He feared my reaction. I slapped him on the shoulder, and told him to order a case of beer sent in my name and at my expense.<sup>380</sup>

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379. Ky, Chapter Three.

380. Ibid., 109.

By this time, American troop strength reached 200,000, with fifteen thousand dead. War costs were starting to cut into the general prosperity of the United States and the Great Society Programs. Lyndon Johnson, as the ultimate political bargainer, simply could not comprehend that Ho was not going to settle for anything less than unification on Communist terms with himself in absolute total control. Johnson's ambivalence is demonstrated to his young protégé, Doris Kearns Goodwin, in her magnum opus publication, written with the input of the President, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream*: "I knew that a lot of people, who didn't like my domestic programs, would use funding the war as an excuse to cut them. But I feared what might happen if I cut and ran, I would be blamed for betraying John Kennedy, and another right winger would rise to power."<sup>381</sup> This may not have been true, but Johnson believed it to be.

As devastating as defeat was in 1975, defeat ten years earlier might have led to the loss of all of Asia. Mark Moyar believes, "The decision to undertake a full commitment was not made lightly and the conflict between advisers was developed in some detail. It was understood that the active exercise of American power, both politically and militarily, was to fight dictatorship around the world."<sup>382</sup> Opposition to the Vietnam War caused the general reassessment of the U.S. commitment to specific leaders who were American allies throughout Southeast Asia.

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<sup>381</sup>, Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 59.

<sup>382</sup>. Moyar, 15.

*In Peace is Not at Hand*, Thompson writes, “Ky was neither the first nor the last in a number of American allies to be stroked and forgotten about.”<sup>383</sup>

The U.S. plan of action to secure its position vis-à-vis Vietnam continued to be widely debated. President Johnson sought to cut a middle path between a precipitant withdrawal and the right-wing Goldwater Republicans, who sought to widen the conflict, inclusive of not ruling out the use of atomic weapons.<sup>384</sup>

Senator Stennis felt that victory at all costs was the most important factor for the United States. “If this war means anything, we have to be prepared to do whatever is necessary to secure South East Asia. Domestic concerns must wait.”<sup>385</sup> Justice Thurgood Marshall, a Johnson confidante, believed that domestic concerns and the war demanded equal attention.

Juan Williams’s biography of Justice Marshall, *American Revolutionary*, details this civil rights leader’s view. Marshall believed that the South Vietnamese could have been saved, if the entire nation had been mobilized, but a combination of over confidence, bad strategy, and a lack of media savvy by the pro-Western leaders lead to chaos. Williams quoted Marshall: “That was the military’s fault. The military got McNamara in a box, and the generals fed him bad advice, and Mac parroted it to Johnson.”<sup>386</sup>

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383. Thompson, *Peace is Not at Hand*, 199.

384. Robert Blackburn, *Mercenaries and the Search for More Flags* (New York: Doubleday, 1998), 48.

385. Moyer, 59.

386. Juan Williams, *Thurgood Marshall American Revolutionary* (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 309.

Nevertheless, President Johnson also listened to the ideas of other Supreme Court judges. I was very surprised to hear Justice Abe Fortas had actively worked on the Canadian attempts for a peace initiative, while encouraging greater roles for the community of people with disabilities. ““We have just got to find a way to get the handicapped folks into national life,”” he remarked. ““They are the greatest untapped resource the country has got.””<sup>387</sup>

It was Justice Fortas who lent an unofficial, but friendly ear to Canadian efforts at cooling the emotional temperature, after the initial decision to escalate the Vietnam War. ““Our Ottawa allies weren’t made use of at all,”” Fortas articulated. ““They appeared to have a solution.””<sup>388</sup> Canada wanted to remove U.S. troops and replace them with a force from the United Nations, which he supported in the spirit of peace.

United Kingdom Foreign Secretary George Brown sought to defuse tension by a peace offer in 1968 between the United States and Vietnam. The United States was partially willing to accept; the North Vietnamese were not.<sup>389</sup> In order to fully understand just why the peace process failed, it is necessary to look at just how the full-fledged commitment to military action took place.

The film *Path to War* details a debate in Johnson’s inner circle between technocrats like Robert McNamara and old-school politicians like Clark Clifford, who understood that the mood of the country had changed. The movie, directed by John Frankenheimer and starring Donald Sutherland and Alec Baldwin, demonstrated

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387. Goodwin, 44.

388. Hershberg, 109.

389. Ibid, 120.

President Johnson's fear of being perceived as weak. He also understood that the public's support was disappearing precisely because of the way in which the media was negatively covering every single casualty of the war.

With the latter in mind, Johnson made several attempts to mediate a compromise by using bombing pauses to bring about negotiations, using British Prime Minister Harold Wilson as a go-between. The strongest of these pauses took place in 1967. The various attempts at mediation of the conflict usually involved one ally or another of each side trying to find a middle ground. Prime Minister Wilson, as a representative of a nation supportive of U.S. policy but not involved in the fighting, tried two major mediation efforts. One was in June 1965 and again two years later, jointly with Soviet Premier Kosygin and Yugoslavian President Tito, a Communist leader respected by all sides, who also desired compromise. The first effort failed because of a second coup in South Vietnam. The second effort failed because "hawks" on both sides desired victory without conditions.<sup>390</sup> Wilson, having successfully dodged the issue of United Kingdom membership in the European Union (then called the Common Market), needed to defuse his left wing, while retaining U.S. friendship. In *Ten Years at Number Ten*, he wrote:

I truly believed the second effort was successful. Kosygin, trying to consolidate against Brezhnev, had told Ho to withdraw the NLF and leave Laos in stable neutrality. I couldn't get Lyndon to understand that bombing halts had to be coupled with immediate withdrawals, as he agreed later, but at the time he wouldn't—so two hundred thousand more went, thirty thousand more died, and five years were wasted.<sup>391</sup>

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390. Colby, 400.

391. Harold Wilson, *Ten Years at Number Ten* (London: Somerset Press, 1975), 87.

The Swedish and Indian governments also sought mutual disengagement. Ironically, in the *New York Times*, the Indian Ambassador publicly called for unconditional withdrawal by the United States, while trying, off the record and under the surface, to negotiate a better deal than categorical departure: “For the sake of his reputation back home, the Ambassador had to appear pliant, in reality he was clever enough to try to find a reasonable middle ground for both sides to follow.”<sup>392</sup>

Both sides employed intermediaries, the Communist Vietnamese and Chinese negotiating through Poland, and the Western powers relying on Italy and Canada. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, Sr., labored unceasingly and came close to an agreement several times. Hershberg discusses the Martin Plan:

Martin was fed up with serving as an errand boy for United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk, but had a strong desire to promote peace. The Martin Plan sought to address the fears of both sides, thus hopefully calming extreme actions, and ultimately leading to cooperation if not concord. The Martin Plan linked United States withdrawal with an international guarantee of neutrality of Laos and Cambodia.<sup>393</sup>

Respected Polish diplomat Jerry Gronouski attempted to persuade the Eastern Bloc to relax also. Of all the countries behind the Iron Curtain, Poland had the most freedom due to the Catholic Church and its solid industrial base, producing products the Soviet Union needed. So the Polish leaders sought to work with Italian Minister Amintore Fanfani, known as “The Little Engine of Rome.” Signore Fanfani understood that the intentions of the West were honorable. He believed too much concern for reputation was inhibiting real action for peace. Past doubts seemed to make true reconciliation nearly impossible. This concern over honesty would lead to defections on both sides during the last three

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392. Moyar, 12.

393. Hershberg, 468.

years of the war. Unity became the strongest desire at any cost. This fear of the war continuing lead diplomats to exaggerate success to trick both sides into making some sort of peace treaty

Secretary Rusk had doubted the sincerity of any peace offer. The Poles meant well, but he felt that the reality was sadly more painful. It would be necessary to look for true neutrals, most likely Sweden, in order to begin real negotiations. Attempts to convene a second conference under Swedish guidance failed in early 1968. He lamented: “We tried everyone from Pope Paul to the king of Afghanistan and back, with no success.”<sup>394</sup>

In the essay, “The ASPEN Channel and the Problem of the Bombing,” Fredrik Logevall gives a strong assessment of other attempts to end the Vietnam Conflict not covered in Rusk or Hershberg’s work. Sweden, Japan, and West Germany took up the almost impossible task. The Japanese served an intermediary role in late 1966. Prime Minister Sato encouraged officials of his Foreign Ministry to focus on a large scale aid program for Southeast Asia. On September 15, 1966, Logevall wrote:

Foreign Minister Takeo Miki offered North Vietnam’s ambassador to the Soviet Union an American and Japanese aid program of 10,000,000,000 dollars, for North Vietnam, as well as areas of the south. Communist candidates would be allowed to register as a legal political party in exchange for a written promise to cease invading the south and a withdrawal within two years.<sup>395</sup>

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394. Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It* (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 88.

395. Fredrik Logevall, “The ASPEN Channel and the Problem of the Bombing,” *The Search for Peace in Vietnam 1964-1968* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 157.

Despite promising noises from The Kremlin and the Vietnamese, nothing came of this venture. Swedish Defense Minister and future leader Olaf Palme received an informal understanding from American Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that U.S. and South Korean forces would agree to leave all of Southeast Asia including Thailand if the Vietnamese agreed to stop backing their Laotian and Cambodian allies. This also did not come to fruition.

With the failure of the peace initiatives, the war continued to escalate, as Thompson would call it, “Doubling effort and squaring the error.”<sup>396</sup> Many young people, frightened of the draft, watching their friends’ names on nightly casualty lists, turned against the war. Many protested; some fled to Canada. Martin Luther King, Jr. had turned against the conflict. In his speech “Beyond Violence” on April 4, 1967, he called the U.S. government’s involvement in Vietnam the “greatest purveyor of violence on the world stage.” During this time, President Johnson pressured the South Vietnamese government to restore civilian rule. Nguyen Thieu, who had served as Head of State, desired to be legitimately elected, but he also wanted more opportunities for bribes that an elected office might bring. Cao Vien, the former head of the elite Red Berets paratroops, had thought about taking power during the Denang Crisis a year earlier to defuse national tension, but he decided to work with Marshall Ky. The new constitution forged by the military would result in the most democratic period in South Vietnam’s twenty-year history.<sup>397</sup>

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396. Thompson, *Peace is Not at Hand*, 199.

397. Thompson, *Make for the Hills*, 147.

In September 1967, the most open election through the nation's twenty-year history took place with eleven viable candidates. It was as if the United States had a presidential election in which Colin Powell, George W. Bush, Hillary Clinton, Al Gore, Condoleezza Rice, John Edwards, Robert Byrd, Ross Perot, Bill Richardson, Dick Cheney, and John McCain all ran at the same time. Some form of coalition had to be brought to fruition. Against his better judgment, Marshall Ky agreed to step down and run as General Thieu's running mate. With thirty-five percent of the vote, Ky and Thieu won. Noted civil rights leaders Whitney Young and Roy Wilkins served on a committee that asserted that the election had been fair.<sup>398</sup>

Wilkins had worked to develop artistic programs for South Vietnamese veterans, utilizing the talents of soldiers who had lost limbs.<sup>399</sup> Through interactive drama techniques, the veterans were able to reach a catharsis in dealing with their psychological post-war difficulties, much later termed and aptly recognized as an actual disability, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, which I have referenced previously.

In October 1967, William Colby was appointed the U.S. deputy director of pacification. He employed these aforementioned dramatic techniques for U.S. personnel in similar situations. Colby believed that such educational programs were possible in South Vietnam due to the fair elections. In *Lost Victory*, he avowed, "These techniques were allowing traumatized soldiers to regain their self-worth. It was required to adopt a democratic approach to all aspects of Vietnamese life."<sup>400</sup>

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398. Penniman, 111-13.

399. Hagen, 27.

400. Colby, 152.

As a political extension of the dramatic curriculum, the elections, and the pacification effort as a whole, he insisted on hiring John Paul Vann as liaison, over the protest of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Colby's boss, Robert Komer, ordered full payment of all outstanding rewards for rallied Viet Cong.<sup>401</sup> Komer immediately set to work on reorganizing the South Vietnamese propaganda system. Television series were developed and put under the control of the Armed Forces as six special programs especially geared for six audience demographics. The television networks were explicitly designed to provide a better image for the military, as well as to sell the war effort. The counterinsurgency efforts of the military were promoted through a series of television broadcasts, which showed South Vietnamese soldiers and multiple allies engaging in acts of benevolence. Every ally was given a specific task. Buddhist Tai soldiers took responsibility for feeding nuns and monks.<sup>402</sup> Chandler mentions that "New Zealanders, repeating their role in Malaysia, reintegrated the turned Viet Cong."<sup>403</sup> South Koreans helped find employment for widows of lost soldiers. Australians ran the broadcasts, which beamed out to the other side, assuring them of forgiveness. Canadians served as translators and social workers for newly assimilating Chieu Hoi members. Every night, the television network ended with shots of U.S. commanders running sick-call, known as medevac, Marine Medical Services.<sup>404</sup> In a predecessor to Habitat for Humanity, the Marines helped to find homes for war refugees. The Marines were also shown carrying

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401. Chandler, 132.

402. Bass, 90-97.

403. Chandler, 187.

404. Gaffen, 209.

paralyzed vets in and out of therapy pools. These television shows were seen not only by the South Vietnamese, but by some U.S. audiences, as well. In some populations, this strengthened the desire for a democratic brotherhood of peace.<sup>405</sup>

While 100,000 young men fled the United States for Canada to escape the draft, ten thousand Canadian soldiers served in the U.S. Army, Marines, and Navy in exchange for dual citizenship. This news was telecast throughout South Vietnam. Fred Gaffen's *Unknown Warriors* details the vital Canadian contribution to the counterinsurgency:

Beginning in 1969, South Vietnam's television network began broadcasting Canada's contribution to the inclusion of veterans with disabilities in Vietnamese social and political life. For example, five blind veterans were trained as pastry chefs for government officials. In 1970, the Canadian government financed national accessibility programs designed and directed for wheelchair users throughout Vietnam.<sup>406</sup>

On the other side of the conflict, author and Vietnamese Commander-in-Chief Vo Giap correctly viewed the arts as propaganda for his intentions. He wanted people with disabilities to fully participate in society. He highly praised the use of amputees in dance programs that touted Communism. There were annual sculptural contests, also in support of the Communist regime. In addition, a popular company of actors with disabilities was funded by the government. This ensemble traveled the globe, proclaiming the marvelous assets of Vietnam. The company was greeted with open arms throughout the developing world.<sup>407</sup> After more than a decade, the troupe was embraced by Western nations, despite being a source of Communist advertising. The United States and other Western countries

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405. Chandler, 50-52.

406. Gaffen, 62.

407. Giap, *People's War*, 76.

accepted the troupe because it was a meaningful method of inclusion—six years before *The Americans with Disabilities Act*. It was very ironic that a dictatorship of the harshest kind, saw the need for full inclusion first.

*The Inclusion Act* was passed in Communist Vietnam. This was a broad-ranging, national arts and education program for people with disabilities.<sup>408</sup> In Robert Chandler's *War of Ideas*, he reveals that this was the initial step in a number of agendas, which included land grants for ordinary citizens with and without disabilities, as well as government recreation activities like sports and other forms of socialization. The arts were part of these endeavors, which incorporated sculpture, painting, and music. This propaganda was robust and successful.

Inexpensive medical care was another advantage of *The Inclusion Act*. Medical care for native veterans was exceptional. The Soviet Union and Communist China worked together to launch and oversee this enterprise. The health care was outstanding because veterans were considered to be part of the national elite. A captain with paraplegia was treated in the Soviet Union and became a world-famous para-Olympian. The head of the Vietnamese Navy was the first Asian to receive a cochlear implant. A quadruple amputee became the director of the national arts program for people with disabilities. Such success stories were not limited to these three individuals. In sharp contrast to the U.S. medical treatment for its veterans, returning native soldiers throughout Vietnam were given the best medical treatment possible. However, this did not apply to American and other counterinsurgent prisoners of war.<sup>409</sup>

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408. Blackburn, 40.

409. Andrew and Mitrokhin, 55.

Difficulties with the U.S. involvement in Vietnam continued to materialize. Ironically, democratic success on the battlefield was realized at the very time that U.S. public opinion was turning against this war. Besides casualties, three major events occurred, causing the American public to demand change with U.S. Forces now numbering over 530,000. Senator Morse and Senator Fulbright led the opposition in the Senate to greater expansion. A new strategy was designed to put things under the control of the Vietnamese themselves.<sup>410</sup> Gaiduk noted the importance of public perception of the U.S. role in the conflict: “It was necessary to remove the illusion that Australia and the United States would be able or willing to do everything.”<sup>411</sup> This transition from direction to subtle guidance was called Vietnamization.

The first event was that South Vietnamese National Police had been placed under the command of Nguyen Ngoc Loan, a former fellow student with Cao Ky in the Hanoi Lycee (high school) in the late 1940s. Loan, a brilliant, hot-tempered organizer, had transformed his men from a bunch of incompetent amateurs to what Laotian General Vang Pao called “the blood transfusion of free government.”<sup>412</sup> The other side both feared and respected him. Ho Chi Minh said, “Loan is the only puppet officer who is a man, not a stooge. I’d send my whole army home just to win him over.”<sup>413</sup> Unfortunately, in a series of negative events for Loan, in January 1968, he was told of the capture of Commissar Nguyen Van Lem. He executed him on the spot, producing the

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410. Thompson, *No Exit from Vietnam*, Chapter Four.

411. Gaiduk, 89.

412. Ky, 145.

413. Vo Giap, *Spring Victory* (Hanoi: People's Publishing House, 1976), 97.

famous photo taken by Associated Press photographer Edward Abrams, an act Mr. Abrams referred to as the worst mistake of his life. The reasons proposed for this apparently unjust act of violence and barbarism vary. South Vietnamese Vice President Treiku said, “Commissar Lem had been caught raping three female soldiers, and had murdered their husbands and children in cold blood.”<sup>414</sup> One hot-headed act, that being Loan’s murder of Lem, wiped out in the mind of the people of the United States a lifetime of service, dedication and courage.

There are many versions of just what happened; they are far more complex than a photograph could depict. American Civil Affairs officer Captain Leslie Kaan said, “Lem had murdered Loan’s female cousin and assaulted her body. The General just snapped.”<sup>415</sup> This represented one of the difficulties that a more open society has in fighting a less open one. All of the weaknesses, corruptions, and injustices of this government are exposed, and dictators bury and forget their errors. The American public saw one of the Asians on “our” side do something horribly immoral. This turned American citizens even more against the war in Vietnam.

The second event responsible for the partial failure was the Tet Offensive of January 1968. Tet, a combination Christmas and New Year celebration had always been a time of truce. Saigon was invaded. The proposed general uprising did not take place, and the attack was repulsed. Walter Cronkite saw the events as demonstrating America’s inability to win. As President Johnson said, “If I have lost Cronkite, I’ve lost the

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414. Ky, 149.

415. Colby, 185.

nation.”<sup>416</sup> On March 31, 1968, the U.S. government called a halt to offensive operations, and Johnson announced his refusal to run for a second term. New leadership was needed.

The third major contributor to the partial failure in Vietnam was the election of Richard Nixon in November 1968. This came about as a large result of popular disaffection with both the Vietnam War and the youth culture protests against it. Nixon had established himself as a proponent of peace. Additionally, Nixon combined an understanding of foreign policy with a harsh, almost paranoid search for enemies and determination to enforce his own vision.<sup>417</sup> Rejecting the calls for both withdrawal and further escalation, he decided on a three-stage strategy. Negotiations would continue. The Paris Peace Talks had been delayed for three months over an argument over the shape of the table—since a round table would imply acceptance of the National Liberation Front, also known as the Viet Cong, as an equal entity with The Democratic Republic, North Vietnam, as well as The Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam, who had been against each other to begin with. A square table was selected, but it took four years to garner a peace treaty.<sup>418</sup>

American troops would gradually be withdrawn, and South Vietnamese troops were to be trained to take primary responsibility for the war; this was known as Vietnamization. Finally, supply areas in neighboring countries Laos and Cambodia would be taken out through air power. In order to defuse world tensions, a new

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416. Goodwin, 147.

417. Kissinger, 110.

418. Hershberg, 105-07.

relationship would be sought between Communist China and the US, as well as The Soviet Union. This triangular diplomacy would lead to a balance of power, which, hopefully, would avoid nuclear catastrophe.<sup>419</sup>

Ian Mac Neil writes, “Not understanding an opponent’s intentions is a recipe for Disaster. ... All the guns in the world can’t unlock what an enemy really wants.”<sup>420</sup> Diplomacy appeared to be the next best step.

The triangular diplomacy was artistically represented by a three-headed sculpture, which toured the United States. It had been crafted by a blind political science major from Oklahoma. He, his devoted patrons, and much of the rest of the country hoped that these triangular negotiations would be productive, but the three-tiered approach proved to be difficult to achieve.<sup>421</sup>

The first part of the three-portion plan went well. The negotiations continued: American National Security Advisor, the dynamic Henry Kissinger, bypassing Secretary of State William Rogers, engaged in an elaborate discussion with Northern Politburo Deputy, Chairman Le Duc Tho. With Ho Chin Minh having died in 1969, the leadership of North Vietnam was now in the hands of a troika, specifically Defense Minister Vo Giap; Workers Party Chairman Nguyen Phu Trong; and State Council President Truong Chinh. “Agreement was made on a tentative withdrawal plan in 1970, but the Northern government insisted on the right to maintain ‘fraternal assistance’ to the Cambodian

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419. Bass, 68.

420. Mac Neil, 87.

421. Hagen, Chapter Three.

Khymer Rouge and the Laotian Panthet Lao.”<sup>422</sup> The United States conceded that point in January 1971. The US’s southern allies, feeling vulnerable, were raising their own concerns. President Nixon gave a series of private assurances to worried President Thieu of robust air intervention, if the peace treaty were to be violated.

The second portion of the plan, Vietnamization, began in June 1969 with the withdrawal of 25,000 troops. By the following year, 280,000 had departed. The problem became that the more troops were withdrawn, the greater the demand became for total withdrawal. “The Chieu Hoi Program was also proving much more effective,” Sullivan notes, “as ten thousand Viet Cong a month were switching sides.”<sup>423</sup>

The third portion of the plan was the opening to China. This required a reestablishment of credibility, which is discussed in Oliver Stone’s luminous 1995 film, *Nixon*. In the movie, the President has made a decision to bomb Cambodia in May 1970, thereby cutting off Northern Vietnamese and Viet Cong supplies. The movement of U.S. troops into Cambodia set off the largest protests yet, most noticeably, the famous Kent State Protests, in which Ohio Governor James Rhodes, labeling young protesters “storm troopers,” sent in the National Guard, which resulted in an unprovoked-shooting of four innocent students. Famed fiction writer, the much-respected James Michener, wrote that all sides overreacted and panic led to death and another nail in the coffin of trust Americans had placed in their society.<sup>424</sup> Oliver Stone’s films *Nixon*, *Any Given Sunday*, and *W* dramatically portray Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, and George W. Bush, for good

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422. Thompson, *Peace is Not at Hand*, 229.

423. Sullivan, 67.

424. James Michener, *Kent State: What Happened and Why* (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 99.

or bad, believing they had all the answers. In the movie *Nixon*, the President's attempt to exploit divisions within the Communist bloc is shown throughout 1970. The film shows all of the tension as only Stone can.

In what is generally accepted as truth, in another scene from the film, Nixon explained his long-term strategy. "If Cambodia doesn't work, I'll bomb Hanoi. If we keep our heads, we will win this thing." When John Ehrlichman asked if he meant to invade the North, Nixon's response summed up his whole methodology:

'No, but what we can do is drive a stake through the Communist alliance. Henry is getting signals from the Chinese. They fear the Vietnamese more than the Russians and are worried about uniting too fast. If we stick it out, we'll end up negotiating with both the Chinese and the Soviets. That is triangular diplomacy, gentlemen.'

In real life and in the movie, the new relationship began to pay off. A meeting between Nixon and Chairman Mao took the better part of a year to arrange. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan served as go-between. In one of those ironies that history seems to find amusing, a right wing Pakistani field marshal, thrust into Khan's presidency because his predecessor had died in an earthquake, would serve as intermediary between a Marxist fanatic (Mao) and his most virulent opponent (Nixon). Khan happened to be the only one with whom both sides had enough of a relationship to trust. Khan had been a loyal U.S. ally for years, his son having served as a cadet at the United States Air Force Academy. Khan had also been friends with the Chinese, ever since India had allied with the Soviets in 1967. President Khan took Henry Kissinger on a hidden trip to China on a junket in 1971. At that time, Kissinger met with foreign minister, Zhou Enlai. Enlai agreed that Mao would be more willing to allow a meeting because he was suffering his own troubles with his former heir Lin Biao, who tried to ally China with the Soviets once again. Lin

Biao, having gathered support in the army, would mysteriously disappear on a flight to the Soviet Union that December. Once the preliminaries were set up through Khan, the announcement was made that Nixon would visit China as a state guest in June 1972. Meanwhile, thirty thousand more troops went home, and the Chinese, for their part, recalled forty thousand troops aiding the North Vietnamese.

The role of Pakistan, and that of Khan in particular, was appreciated by parties on all sides of the conflict, and as a result many tried to influence Pakistan's behavior. "The Soviet Intelligence office," for example, Andrew and Mitrokhin note, "tried to woo Khan away from the Chinese through a combination of paranoid disinformation and future promises of aide."<sup>425</sup> The Pakistan government rejected all attempts to buy or bluster its alliance with both the United States and mainland China. Michael Lind's book *Vietnam: The Necessary War* seeks to explore other viewpoints on a lot of these issues. Lind explains, "The hidden role played by countries in Asia is vital to understanding just how the peace process came to pass. The new relationship between the United States and China could not have happened without Pakistan and Algeria's help."<sup>426</sup>

As an interesting aside, Khan had also agreed to ship oil to Ian Smith's Rhodesian government as an incentive to keep that enigmatic leader at the bargaining table with moderate African leaders. Smith stated, "Khan was smuggling oil through Omar Bongo in Togo, in defiance of the United Nations' oil embargo. It was nice to know we had a

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425. Andrew and Mitrokhin, 58.

426. Michael Lind, *Vietnam: The Necessary War* (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 114.

few friends in the Middle East.”<sup>427</sup> Pakistan, indeed, had its hands in many third-world conflicts during this period. They took a western alliance, since India was protected by the Soviets.

Again referring to Oliver Stone’s film, *Nixon*, the stage is brilliantly set: Nixon shakes Mao’s hand, as both American and Chinese anthems play. Nixon says, “I know what a risk you have taken in inviting us here.” Mao replies, “I take no risk. I am too old to be afraid of what anyone thinks. Vietnamese are like Russians, both are dogs.” Says Nixon, “Mr. Chairman, there is an old saying in my country; the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” This new friendship would pay off. The Chinese gently encouraged the North Vietnamese to accept peace terms.

The United States initiated its final campaign, the 1972 Christmas bombing. This massive expression of air power brought the North Vietnamese to accept peace. All U.S. Armed Forces withdrew in January 1973, and prisoners of war, including future U.S. presidential candidate John McCain returned home.<sup>428</sup>

Using U.S. airpower and a combination of Southern Vietnamese and Laotian troops, South Vietnam had successfully repelled a Northern invasion in November 1972. These factors led both sides to agree to the January 27, 1973, peace treaty. On the surface, all was well, but the people on both sides knew that merely a decent interval was in place in order to allow the northern forces to re-supply and gain further Soviet assistance.<sup>429</sup>

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427. Smith, 97.

428. Colby, 156-58.

429. Andrade, 429.

Within another year, President Nixon's misdeeds in Watergate would force him to resign. When the North Vietnamese tore up the treaty in December 1974 and launched its final successful invasion, President Thieu tried to retrench to defend his most valuable northern provinces, but without U.S. help, his army crumbled.<sup>430</sup>

Joes comments: "The retrenchment was the correct move militarily, but it came far too late. Had it been done six months earlier, the South Vietnamese nation would have survived in enclaves. But men whose families are trying to evacuate don't fight well."<sup>431</sup>

Thieu tried to hold out, but even he could not fight completely alone. He resigned on April 15, 1975, and turned the government over to Van Minh, who waited in vain for the U.S. help—economic or military. In actuality, President Ford could no longer deliver, which was what many Americans wanted at that moment in history.<sup>432</sup>

On April 30, 1975, President Van Minh was captured by North Vietnamese commandos, and announced: "I have come to surrender and transfer power." The arrogant Northern Field Captain snapped back, "You cannot transfer what you don't have!"<sup>433</sup> Then, it was all over. American leaders' dogged refusal to level with the public had cost support, and once that moral edge was lost, the American people had had enough.

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430. Joes, 503.

431. Ibid., 220.

432. Colby, 159.

433. Giap, *People's War*, 437.

At that point, the situation was also bleak for veterans in Vietnam. In *Spring Victory* by Vo Giap, he demonstrates that there was an unambiguous split between Vietnamese, Communist veterans and Vietnamese pro-Western veterans. The victorious Communist veterans were compensated abundantly with money and powerful positions like control over the economy in businesses that had belonged to pro-Western Vietnamese. The veterans who had been pro-Western were put in prison camps. Ten thousand were murdered by firing squads. The remainder were exiled to Australia and the United States. In Australia, they were welcomed as refugees and received government assistance.<sup>434</sup> Many “Boat People” who sought to go to America either died in transit in rickety boats or were initially shunned by American citizens.<sup>435</sup> “A more welcoming attitude began to immerge after the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia,” Goldberg notes. “It is estimated that 675,000 fled their new unified country.”<sup>436</sup>

A large number of officials within the South Vietnamese government were, in fact, Northern spies. They influenced the ultimate collapse of the pro-Western government in Vietnam. Due to this collapse, General Giap declared that his spies within Saigon were worth more than an army division. The most obvious were *Time* reporter Phan X An and Father James Nga, a top graduate of the Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow. Nga, a second cousin of trusted Thieu nephew Nguyen Cha Nga, reported the comings and goings of the South Vietnamese leader to his Russian bosses. The

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434. Venith, Chapter Seven.

435. Allen Drury, *A Very Strange Society* (New York: Trident Press, 1967), 303.

436. Goldberg, 44.

Soviet Union and Algeria financed more radical antiwar groups like the Weather Underground.<sup>437</sup> “The irony was as the rest of America adopted the movement’s look, the movement was coming apart.”<sup>438</sup> As the war ended, pro-Western Vietnamese faced imprisonment, forced labor, and death.

Veterans of the Vietnam Conflict, who had been pro-Western, engaged in heroic efforts to build new lives elsewhere. The few remaining pro-Western countries in Southeast Asia welcomed veterans. Moyar explains:

Indonesia, which had just successfully defeated its own insurgency, welcomed fifteen thousand Vietnam veterans. Thailand turned over its air force to the joint command of two pilots, one South Vietnamese, and one Australian. India welcomed five hundred United States veterans to set up a Peace Ashram in New Delhi.<sup>439</sup>

Unlike these fortuitous circumstances, as previously discussed, many veterans in the U.S. were disrespected and discarded. This was a woeful footnote to the failure of democratic counterinsurgency in Vietnam, although it was only a partial failure.

In the next country examined, Zimbabwe, democratic counterinsurgency was a complete failure.

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437. Bass, Chapter Eight.

438. Burroughs, 66.

439. Moyar, 44.

## **Chapter Six: Reasons for Failure in Zimbabwe**

The Zimbabwean/Rhodesian struggle represents a fundamental misuse of power, as well as the waste of many years and a vast multitude of people. This multitude had talents that could have been harvested for the good of the nation to find a reasonable compromise, which, in turn, would have prevented direct racism and the kind of internecine ethnic conflicts many developing nations fell into when colonialism ended. Additionally, Zimbabwe did not utilize the arts and people with disabilities as effusively as had the formerly explored nations of Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. This lack of comprehensive inclusion, especially the art of indigenous, minority populations with disabilities, demonstrated a lack of vision and an averseness to change. The white majority definitely wanted the country to remain white-dominated with all minorities deep in the background of society.<sup>440</sup> This was a combination of fear and outmoded imperialism.

The white, right wing Rhodesian Front Party was made up of men and women who had grown up as part of the British Empire and were horrified to see it go. The Central African Federation had shown them what they believed to be the perils of allowing people with a different set of values too close to the seats of power. Tragically, these leaders had kept themselves away from the rising generation of Africans who at the beginning at least sought only a larger scale of access to government power, not total power for themselves. “We seek only to be a part of being in control of our country,”

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440. Muzorewa, 20.

said Joshua Nkomo in 1963.<sup>441</sup> Moderate concessions should have taken place earlier. Any degree of flexibility would have prevented the armed uprising and destruction of the following fifteen years.

The men around Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith, mostly agricultural leaders, had from earliest childhood been surrounded by Africans, who had survived by telling the whites what they wanted to hear. The people in the so-called tribal trust lands, like Bantustan leaders in South Africa, attached themselves to white patrons in exchange for being allowed to distribute crumbs to keep their followers in line. The attitude is summed up in Allen Drury's *A Very Strange Society*. He is referring to Transkei Chief Kazier Mantazima, but the words equally apply to his Zimbabwean counterparts: "Mantanzima is persuasive and on the suffice erratic, but actually carefully planned plan of alternating good with naughty behavior, which has the white government over a barrel."<sup>442</sup> There were improvements even within a paternalist system that took place mostly in the agricultural regions near Mozambique.

The chiefs in the tribal areas quietly went about trying to give their followers education, access to higher paying jobs, and a greater stake in the country's affairs. Meanwhile, they were playing the game, reassuring their paternalistic overlords that all they wanted was whatever "The Baas" wished to benevolently bestow. In order to justify Ian Smith's unilateral Declaration of Independence, each segment of the population had been consulted in an "appropriate manner," according Ian Smith. The white and mixed-

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441. Kenneth Flower, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 97.

442. Drury, *A Very Strange Society*, 108.

raced population had participated in a referendum, which had voted for independence nearly four to one.<sup>443</sup> Businesspeople felt independence would lower taxes and quickly end strife. In the eventual end, these predictions came true as greater opportunities were created for local businesses because of international boycotts.

The Asian business community had put forth its agreement by a series of meetings with Native Affairs Minister William Halper, who had agreed to permit Asians full access to the secondary schools in Bulawayo. Previously, they had been under a limited quota. These were separate schools; integration would not happen until 1973. This privilege (only for Asians, not for Africans) was considered by Halper to be a reward for agreeing to cooperate with the white-dominated government on the matter. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson saw the current situation as unworkable and tried to find a middle ground. His frustration was clearly demonstrated in a series of meetings in May 1965: "I have seen the chiefs. They can by no stretch of the imagination be said to represent the vast majority of Africans. The African people want the same sort of involvement in political affairs Europeans take for granted."<sup>444</sup> However, for the settlers of English descent, reality did not matter; the appearance of support would be enough. Their well-fed servants, grateful to be spared economic limitations of the type South Africans faced, would collaborate with conservative, responsible leaders. These thankful servants wanted to work for an independence that the white leadership could accept. In referencing this indebted population, author Douglas Reed wrote: "We are fighting a holding action against the breakdown of universal principles. This is not a racial war. We

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443. Smith, Chapter 19.

444. Wilson, 277.

fight shoulder to shoulder with Africans who are suffering worse than the white population.”<sup>445</sup> Isolation led to bad decisions that alienated pro-Western Africa and increased support for the guerillas.

Condescending attitudes like Reed’s and Halper’s permeated the entire society. Every attempt at improving African lives was presented as a reward for appropriate behavior. The Ministry of Home Affairs sought to encourage a larger role for docile Africans by linking greater payment of income tax and further armed service to qualifying for the privilege of voting, business loans, and access to the media.<sup>446</sup> Halper reiterated his racist arrogance: “Participation in the administration of our free society is a privilege not a right, and contingent on cooperation and good behavior.”<sup>447</sup>

In *Africa Since 1800*, Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore relate that this arrogant, unethical attitude was also held by some native Africans, pre-dating colonialism: “A number of African rulers during the first few decades of independence were autocratic, corrupt, and tribally based.”<sup>448</sup> Concern over corruption led to some Africans being willing to cooperate with white leaders. This happened with frequency during the early years of the Zimbabwean struggle. Pomposity and racism were present in manifold populations.

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445. Reed, 100.

446. Moore, *The White Tribe*, 167.

447. Grant, 56.

448. Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, *Africa Since 1800* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Syndicate of University of Cambridge, 2005), 338.

Traditional Africans who supported white guidance held a grand meeting of tribal chiefs and headmen called an Indaba (from The Mdebele word for “gathering”). The Dushowa Indaba, as it became known, gave its support for independence from the United Kingdom since most of the chieftains, Mdebele and Shona alike, were on the Zimbabwean government payroll. The urbanized Africans were ignored. As a result, the government propaganda machine could claim that all responsible leaders favored their course. A few westernized Mdebele people gained benefits from serving in the army.<sup>449</sup> As armed guerrilla resistance began, mostly consisting of the Shona-led, Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU:

The two Zimbabwean guerrilla movements received support from the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Future President Robert Mugabe described himself as a Marxist Leninist of Maoist thought. President Mugabe thus won for himself funding, guidance and weaponry from mainland China. The Soviet Union shifted in support to Bourgeois Nationalist Joshua Knomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union. Knomo had the support of the Mdebele Tribe, and funding from the West as well. His group sought to secure bases in sympathetic countries and recruit among urban workers, including sympathetic whites, while Mugabe punished African sellouts and supporters of Chief Jeremiah Chiaru.<sup>450</sup>

Nevertheless, a significant number of Africans opposed these dynamic guerrillas. The white-dominated government isolated loyal Africans, who were desirous to be at the front of military counterinsurgency activities. Had their advice been heeded, the war would have had a totally different outcome, but the government lost a world that no longer existed and failed to undertake any of the positive aspects of counterinsurgency than its Taiwanese, Vietnamese, and Malaysian counterparts had. They saw segregation as a

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449. Reed, 18-19.

450. Andrew and Mitrokhin, 471-72.

necessary tool to ensure stability. “The key of our policy of separate development was based around the idea to avoid friction by avoiding excessive contact between people at different levels of development,” recounts Reed.<sup>451</sup> The government would not consider anyone’s judgment but its own, so African concepts to win over the disaffected were rejected on the grounds of excessive racial mixing or lowering of standards. The military, many units of which were staffed by people of Australian and New Zealander descent who had served as Malaysian veterans twenty years earlier, had a far greater understanding of what was needed. Sheer firepower alone can never calm a restless population.

Government-sponsored arts groups began a series of concerts and performances that celebrated the loyalty of conservative African leaders. This proved somewhat ineffective because the performances were segregated, as the government delineated them: Black, White, Disabled, and Non-disabled. Without intending to do so, the performances underscored divisions.<sup>452</sup>

The African population as of 1966 could be divided into several groups: the urbanized population, approximately half who desired an increase in African participation in government but resisted guerrilla warfare; 15 percent who were perfectly happy just as the whites said they were in the tribal trust areas; and 35 percent who had no more patience and had taken to the guerrilla training camps in Zambia.<sup>453</sup> Guerrillas could be split into two groups: the earlier-referenced Shona controlled ZANU, which

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451. Reed, 189.

452. Sithole, 12.

453. Muzorewa, 48.

used forcible recruitment and Maoist style warfare, and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, ZAPU, which was Mdebele led by Joshua Nkomo and financed by Sweden and The Soviet Union.<sup>454</sup>

Government policy was well depicted as developing to demonstrate “the civilizing effect of White Rule” in the film *Rhodes*, directed by James Wahl. This paternalism caused a great deal of discontent, which created both non-violent and violent protests.

ZAPU concentrated on urban warfare, made up of voluntary recruits. It used its firepower more against the white government, where Ndabaningi Sithole’s ZANU concentrated more upon punishing African “sellouts.” Since the governments themselves could not defeat the guerrillas, but neither could the guerrillas defeat the government using only military force, much would depend on which side could win over the urbanized Africans.<sup>455</sup> While the hardliners were picking out weapons and beginning low-level armed attacks, other Africans were seeking less violent solutions. The bare-knuckles, hard-nosed modalities would not work because these men and women had understood that mere confrontation was in and of itself pointless.

There also remained a smaller number which sought to use civil disobedience. They were led by Zimbabwean Methodist Bishop, Abel T. Muzorewa. Muzorewa’s followers made an alliance with respected Mdebele Chief Jerimah Chirau beginning in 1968. Chirau had won his first victory by convincing the city of Bulawayo to integrate its major shopping center. He had accomplished this by persuading 2,500 African

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454. Abbott and Botham, 6.

455. Crocker, 113.

policemen, educators, doctors, and broadcasters to boycott the segregated lunch counters, cinemas, and swimming pools. Since segregation in advanced urban areas was more by custom than by formal statute, shopkeepers could voluntarily integrate and did so, when faced with the loss of African trade and armies of children sobbing because they had not been permitted to use the better seats in the theater. Businessmen, now for their own sake, understood the need for the change the government was not ready for.<sup>456</sup>

As the operator of the Woolworth's in Salisbury told Douglas Reed, "'I see things differently now. What on earth does keeping families out of restaurants have to do with upholding Western civilization?'"<sup>457</sup>

Angered by what he saw as terrorism, Ian Smith had put two hundred African leaders in preventive detention in 1967 and encouraged businessmen to limit racial friction. Some had taken that as an excuse to maintain or even introduce separation between the races in economic areas. Fortunately, there were those who did not feel this way. Mixed-race moderates were vital intermediaries between white and African society, and it was the business community that actually convinced Ian Smith and William Harper not to restrict Muzorewa, as they had with the other African leaders.<sup>458</sup>

Muzorewa's counterpart in the Catholic community, Archbishop Dennis Lemont, had gone to college with Clifford Dupont, the country's first president. Although largely a ceremonial figure, Lemont convinced Dupont to keep channels open with African moderates. This would pay off later, at least, in part. Rising fears of an out-and-out

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456. Muzorewa, 118.

457. Reed, 49.

458. James Conyers, interview by Sean Dineen, August 15, 2008.

Communist takeover would convince first the army and then the political establishment to demand a modernization of government with greater flexibility, as well as full participation by all groups in governing the nation.<sup>459</sup> This idea was a non-violent partnership, a rarity at a time when African nations suffered from colonialism, apartheid, or African rule that favored one particular ethnic group. Muzorewa was able to use his status as a clergyman to get around restrictions on his movements: “If I needed to go talk to one of my advisors, we found a wedding or baptism I could perform in the same area. After I had finished with my spiritual duties, there would be a party, and I would put on my political hat there.”<sup>460</sup>

The parties featured indigenous dance, music, costumes, and skits, which advocated the benefits of a more integrated society, inclusive of people with disabilities. These parties proved to be very popular because they were seen to be authentic.<sup>461</sup>

This sort of political action, non-violent partnership and performances, displeased a large group of Methodist conservatives, who foolishly did not realize that Africans committed to democracy were far more valuable in maintaining the country’s enviable living standard than were traditional tribal chiefs, who could be discredited.<sup>462</sup> While the internal aspects of Zimbabwean society were stumbling toward some ultimate solution, there remained the prospect of trying to negotiate with the outside world, most notably

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459. *Proposal for a New Constitution* (Bulawayo: Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1968), 10-20.

460. Muzorewa, 226.

461. Weinrich, 40.

462. Moore, *The White Tribe*, 55.

the United Kingdom. In order to get Liberal and Conservative Party support to bring the United Kingdom into the European Economic Community, Harold Wilson had agreed to require an ultimate commitment to majority African rule.<sup>463</sup>

The first negotiations were held in 1966 aboard the royal Navy ship *HMS Tiger*. Ian Smith agreed to drop the requirement for rural Africans to carry passes and decided to totally integrate the mixed race community. The number of African seats in the Zimbabwean Parliament would rise from ten to seventeen; there would also be a removal of restrictions on gun ownership and military promotions.<sup>464</sup> Prime Minister Wilson agreed to drop United Kingdom sanctions, ask the United Nations to end their sanctions, and try to bring the country into the Western mainstream. However, he wanted the government to tear up its Declaration of Independence and allow a British governor to take charge for a year. This was too much, and Ian Smith refused. Two years later, the agreement was stalled over how many Asians to appoint to the new Cabinet.<sup>465</sup>

Although the basic power structure would have remained unaltered, the details seemed too much for sensitive Rhodesian whites, who would have to share power on a national level. Ian Smith deeply resented the so-called “return to legality,” failing to realize his best chance was to settle quickly before the passions were allowed to rise. “I wasn’t going to fire my friends to make way for those I didn’t know,” Smith recalls.<sup>466</sup> Moderates pleaded for greater involvement and were basically sent back to their kraals,

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463. Wilson, 309.

464. Smith, 188.

465. Sithole, 71.

466. Smith, 29.

otherwise known as their community centers. A reward program was undertaken in 1968, but funds for turned-in bullets for money never quite came to fruition. Insightful Intelligence Chief Kenneth Flower summed it up: “The White government sought to adopt the course of the South African United Party, which rejected both apartheid as unfair and integration as impractical.”<sup>467</sup> United Party leaders embraced the Zimbabwean solution as a way to avoid discontent. The right kind of Africans would get increased access and power, but at a pace the white and mixed-race communities would not feel threatened by. The United Party believed in integration with the mixed-race community only. Africans would become involved slowly, probably over twenty years or so.

Their philosophy was known as “White Leadership with Justice,” advocating economic integration, social separation, and a race federation.<sup>468</sup>

The well-meaning United Party Chairman, Sir Devillars Graaf, sought to avoid the fear generated by too-rapid integration and the injustice from “separate development,” the politically correct name for apartheid. As with all groups, the work of finding common ground was thankless.

The United Party wanted to abolish the Pass Laws and job reservations, equal pay, and equalized separate schools. Political power would be largely in white hands, but people of African descent would have the right to elect eight members to the House of Assembly. These members would have to be white. Africans themselves could be elected to an Advisory Council and provincial offices. The police and military would be integrated along with a replacement of so-called homelands by a federal interior council.<sup>469</sup>

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467. Flower, 192.

468. Divillars Graaf, *The United Party Talks to the Nation* (Cape Town: United Party Publishers, 1970), 12-13.

469. Ibid., 98.

They were adopting the best part of the Zimbabwean system, while retaining “civilized” white and mixed-race leaders in real political power. It was necessary to seduce people into rejecting the guerrilla groups. Change had to happen, but the old-line political leadership was terrified of things happening too rapidly and bringing the wrong sort into power too fast. Sir Devillars Graaf seemed to be of two minds: “Those seeking a majority ruled Africa will find no support here, but a partnership is a completely different matter.”<sup>470</sup> Despite the uncertainty about how to move forward, many recognized that change was necessary and imminent: “The men in the field understood the old order couldn’t last. The men in political power thought that they could control the pace of change. They were treating the African people like pets, not valued equal members of a modern Western society.”<sup>471</sup>

The United Nations’ sanctions intensified. South African aid, an estimated 100,000,000 rand (120,000,000 dollars a year), was the only thing that kept the economy from total collapse. The Shah of Iran also made a gift of a large amount of crude oil in exchange for permitting 35 members of the Ministry of Development to take up residence in Iran and train members of his Literacy Corps.<sup>472</sup> Sanctions busters smuggled goods and kept business alive. “Many non-Rhodesians got rich,” Smith notes. “It was estimated half the new millionaires in Australia and The UK had made their money

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470. Ibid., 95.

471. Reed, 157.

472. Sera Miles, interview by Sean Dineen, November 19, 2016.

helping keep our land alive.”<sup>473</sup> Political change seemed to come and go as everyone tried to pretend the inevitable could be avoided. No one seemed to know what to do, in or outside of the country.

In 1969, a new constitution made the country a republic. In its bizarre example of taking one step forward and one back, the government increased the number of African seats to sixteen and the percentage of eligible voters from ten to twenty, while at the same time declaring that the ultimate goal was racial parity over 35 years, which was hardly anything to cheer moderates. “Proposal for a New Constitution,” published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, explained: “The idea of racially separate voting districts and seats proved acceptable to many responsible politicians and leaders on all sides.”<sup>474</sup> In this respect, responsible African leaders meant those who were subservient to the white leaders in government.

There was a strong attempt to reward loyal Africans with improvements in their access to military and civilian offices. Interest free loans were offered to ‘civilized Africans’ from the white government. Removal of anti-drinking laws was seen as an incentive for ‘Proper’ behaviors. The slogan was: ‘Every good act rewarded, every bad act properly dealt with.’<sup>475</sup>

This was considered a good example of social control. Africans were kept in their place. Whites stayed in power. Anything that Africans did by themselves socially was vehemently scrutinized. Africans who were not subservient were treated brutally. “Three villages were demolished in public, homes destroyed, families forced to relocate; cattle

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473. Smith, 667.

474. *Proposal for a New Constitution* (Bulawayo: Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1968), 76.

475. Moore, *The White Tribe*, 18.

were seized in the dozens. This was considered punishment for the attempt to set up a house of ill repute in Bulawayo and Salisbury.”<sup>476</sup> In 1971, as a reward for African volunteers in the Armed Forces, the government appointed the first African officers to rise beyond lieutenant. Later that year, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas Hume, on behalf of new Prime Minister Edward Heath, came to Salisbury and got an actual signed agreement. Majority rule would happen in twelve years, three Africans would be appointed to the Cabinet at once, and all fighting would cease. The number of African voters would be doubled by removing the clause requiring property ownership in order to vote. Instead, the British government decided to hold a test of acceptability.

Throughout Rhodesia, which was simultaneously known as Zimbabwe in the 1970s, plays and musical concerts heralded and supported peace and independence. Although these artistic endeavors were colorful and well-attended, they were largely ineffective. The Pearce Commission mentions a strong desire for a time frame for majority rule, not what Shona leaders called offering “an aspirin to a man with cancer.”<sup>477</sup> Strong-willed Deputy Chairman Lord Donald Horlock believed the terms could have satisfied all, but there was not enough bending by either side. The British government sought to be rid of the whole business as soon as was humanly possible. The white government sought to protect as much of its position as was practical, and the African population sought to build a new life without the trials of newly freed nations throughout the continent of Africa.

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476. Ibid., 48.

477. Edward Pearce, *The Commission on Rhodesian Independence* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1972), 12.

In *Bantustan*, author Paul Giniewski reveals that the government of Zimbabwe also structured a national employment contest. Any business hiring more than three veterans would be exempt from federal sales tax. This situation was good for returning veterans because it cut their unemployment rate by 50 percent. After decades of unemployment and vile discrimination, veterans were thrilled with this new program. Nevertheless, this did not stop the eventual collapse of the democratic white dominated government.

In January 1972, Lord Pearce dispatched his commission. White and mixed-raced people eagerly told tales of how badly they needed independence, but the African majority felt otherwise. Africans used this moment to protest and stand up for immediate change. Guerrilla fighters and pacifists alike rejected this gentler subservience.<sup>478</sup> International support for rapid change, had encouraged Africans to struggle both nonviolently and through taking up arms for their just rights.

With the terms rejected, the Zimbabwean government sought to crush its guerrilla opponents through resettlement in Protected Villages. Unlike Malaysian New Life Villages or Vietnamese strategic Hamlets, some of these were set up in a ramshackle fashion. As Sithole notes, “The tribesmen themselves were expected to pay for the upkeep of the new home most didn’t want anyway. Some in the capitol had modern conveniences, others in the Darwin region, were glorified mud huts.”<sup>479</sup> This resettlement was conducted by force without much of the gentle persuasion that had worked so well in the other countries. In addition, some clever person had thought of

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478. Muzorewa, 130-31.

479. Sithole, 147.

using traditional spiritual beliefs, so mediums and witch doctors were encouraged to write letters from the afterlife in the name of the ancestors. This did not work, because as Shona Chief Maklan said, “Spirits do not have typewriters!”<sup>480</sup>

Nonetheless, intelligence matters were handled properly. The main Zimbabwean intelligence agency, the self-styled Special Branch, had informers everywhere. These Africans were treated well and paid better. Named the Selous Scouts, this elite, anti-guerrilla unit was skilled at putting on false flag operations to discredit guerrillas. Turned terrorists were often offered high positions and paid to create factionalism: “The recruitment of informants was the most successful activity of the white government. Thousands of Africans, Indians and Mixed- Race Coloureds worked with the older more conservative leaders of politics, business and religions.”<sup>481</sup> There were factions within factions, all armed with guns and ideas, trying to reshape the world.

Brilliant ZANU Commander Josiah Torgena did not know it, but he was surrounded by those of divided loyalties. His cooks were all on the white government’s informant lists. Torgena’s community liaison and girlfriend had been turned by famed American counterinsurgency guru Robin Moore director of the film *Green Berets*. She arranged the assassination of Herbert Chripto, the liaison between ZANU and the African National Congress in South Africa. This period had many pseudo operations, which promoted functionalism and feuding within guerrilla groups throughout Africa.<sup>482</sup>

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480. Reed, 93.

481. Abbott and Botham, 15.

482. Sithole, 200-05.

In another arena, popular television broadcasts showed special branch detectives as heroes. The most admired domestic program was directly written by Minister of Justice P.K. Bleancheard. It detailed the building of Protected Villages by the hard-working cadres of Internal Affairs and their African assistant commissioners who carried out assignments.<sup>483</sup> Because of the tales of Kraal Valley, the white population saw Africans as cute, gladly willing to abandon their homes to help fight Marxist guerrillas. The television broadcasts soundly underscored this notion by presenting life in the Protected Villages as idyllic, which it was not. It was what the white community thought Africans wanted—simple, standardized housing without personal choice or variety.<sup>484</sup>

Robin Moore warned the white majority: “Resettlement cannot be undertaken haphazardly. It requires the gentleness and attention to detail of a birth.”<sup>485</sup> This astute advice was not heeded.

Although 40,000 Africans were resettled out of the fire zones in 1973, they continued to endure discrimination. On April 3, 1974, 100,000 leaflets were dropped over the Mount Darwin and Centenary areas. The following is a broadsided example:

A warning to all Terrorist helpers: Government is victorious on all fronts! Those of you, who wish to save your lives, will have the sense to rally to government police barracks and clinics by Aug. 1, 1974. Any who surrender prior to this time will be welcomed! After that time, they will risk their lives. The Godless Communists will no longer be allowed to manipulate our Natives! They shall be kept safe at all costs. Surrender or be taken.<sup>486</sup>

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483. Hunt, 264.

484. Flower, 333.

485. Moore, *The White Tribe*, 11.

486. Smith, 442.

The government financed large scale public appearances by religious leaders within the traditionalist community. The witchdoctors of New Fyfe held a three-day carnival to persuade fence sitters to yield to the wisdom of the Native Affairs Ministry and the ancestors. It was estimated, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs, that eight hundred men and women had formed a pseudo force loyal to the government, made up of Shona and Indian guerrilla fighters. The false movement sought to make use of former guerrillas through a combination of military force and huge financial rewards, which were far beyond what ordinary soldiers had on either side. These troops were recruited into the so-called Security Force Auxiliaries after 1976.<sup>487</sup> The auxiliaries, “half honor guard and half army,” to quote ex-President Clifford Dupont, were vital in winning over some of the uncommitted. This would lead to an upsurge in defections, which might transform the larger society. Sithole’s eventual decision to defect to the government stemmed from both a spiritual awakening and factionalism within the movement. As Diane Lyle reminded me in my November 12, 2011, interview with her: “African politicians don’t get into shouting matches on television. Things are very often settled with a gun.” The intensity of the violence increased.

With the “good” Africans out of the way, the security forces and ZANU alike fought a bitter no-holds-barred campaign. The government troops, which had been trained by the South Africans, were let loose. Kraals were suspected of collaboration with either the enemy or the white government, and they were violently destroyed. More

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487. Abbott and Botham, 106.

killing happened on both sides in 1974 than in the previous five years.<sup>488</sup> The mixed-race community were particularly effected, as the city of Bulawayo had one shopping center taken over by government troops, and another bombed by Komo's airforce.

Ndabaningi Sithole, having lost control of ZANU to Robert Mugabe, went home and agreed to unify his forces with the government's. This process would take two years, as 1,890 of the ten thousand ZANU guerrillas would change sides. Sithole would also persuade the government to put former guerrillas on television to explain the new policy. Propaganda through this new medium proved somewhat useful.<sup>489</sup> In 1974, with limited success, national servicemen draftees were rewarded with television sets that were quite expensive in return for completing their eighteen months on the border. "The Quinslet Commission allowed for a large scale cash reward system for rural peoples many of whom had several wives each and rather large families. This commission would spend the next two years fighting racism."<sup>490</sup>

The government launched a second amnesty, along with a removal of broader restrictions. White rule was slowly being chipped away. Asians and mixed race, although not Africans yet, were being integrated into white schools. African participation in Parliament had now risen to twenty-two seats. Eleven were elected directly by African voters choosing from their own, three whites elected only by mixed races and Africans,

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488. Benjamin Pogrund, *Sobukwe and Apartheid* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1991), 274-76.

489. Muzorewa, 60-63.

490. *Ibid.*, 39.

and eight by the tribal chiefs in a block.<sup>491</sup> When Portuguese Angola fell to Marxists, and South African Prime Minister Vorster began exerting pressure, Ian Smith and new President John Wathrall knew the days of white rule were numbered. South African economic aid to Zimbabwe, as it was now called, was severely cut. An all-party conference failed.<sup>492</sup>

During the aftermath of the conference, major decisions were made as to the treatment of veterans. White and mixed race veterans were treated in rehabilitation centers in the major cities, as well as in South Africa. African veterans were sent back to the rural, traditional kraals, on the outskirts of the cities. Psychological improvements led to greater openness to political change. The Quinslet Commission sought to give decent Africans “something to come home to.” They desired a moderate peaceful, developed society. Constitutional reform finally came to fruition.<sup>493</sup>

In June 1977, the government committed itself to majority rule in exchange for a guarantee that white property rights would be inviolate. Jerimah Chirau, Abel Muzorewa, and Ndabaningi Sithole agreed to sit on a four-person Council of State with Ian Smith. Every cabinet department had two ministers: one African, one white. All schools were immediately integrated, and former guerrillas were given their own branch of the army to control. Half of the armed guerrillas surrendered.<sup>494</sup> On January 1, 1979, Abel Muzorewa was elected as Zimbabwe’s first African Prime Minister. The

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491. Reed, 22-25.

492. Smith, 347.

493. Moore, *The White Tribe*, 94-96.

494. Abbott and Botham, 106.

presidency, with expanded powers, went to Josiah Zion Gulumke, Ian Smith's former stock foreman. All seemed well, but the world community did not recognize the elections, so within a year, other elections were held that gave power to ZANU chief, Robert Mugabe, who has kept it until this day. A great opportunity to build a civilization in partnership had vanished. It seemed so tragic, as all persons expressed a love for their country, which should have allowed them to work together in harmony. With alarming frequency, men and women, who had known and loved each other for years, found themselves fighting bitterly against their comrades and friends.<sup>495</sup>

Former Intelligence Chief Kenneth Flower had served as godfather to Ambrose Jacobson, his ZAPU counterpart. Chief ZAPU Communications Director, Bradley Kalafrona, had grown up on a farm owned by Native Affairs Minister Harper. Revealed Bradley: "It seemed like one week, I was his son's playmate, and the next, I was another native to be held down and kept quiet at all possibilities, kept away from any say in my country's future."<sup>496</sup> The true horror is that both sides, had they had a real understanding of each other, could have avoided bloodshed; however, as so often happens when passion prevails over reason, men of goodwill on both sides are drowned in a sea of vitriolic criticism, and compromise is scorned as weakness.

With the exception of Malaysia, every one of the political nation states that I have examined failed to one degree or another because they did not understand the thought process of their enemy and how to defeat or at least compromise with it.

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495. Diane Lyle, interview by Sean Dineen, December 8, 2010.

496. Sithole, 128.

It seems that Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe had a collective moment in which certain choices were made for good or evil toward true harmony, or down the path of bloodshed. Drury aptly describes this in *A Very Strange Society*, wherein he writes primarily about Africa, but it applies to the four nation states I have examined:

This is a great country; [South Africa] has accomplished great things, and has still greater in it if stability is ensured, and yet there is a loosening, which will allow all its peoples to work and live in harmony. Africa will enter on a fabulous era. But if the world continues to come at it with the crude spitefulness of little boys, Rhodesia will turn away and go back to the laager, and the only way to take it out will be to blast it out. Its people will die first and take as much of Africa with them as possible.<sup>497</sup>

Clearly, some other solution for Zimbabwe had to be found, but what? Majority rule in 1974 was relatively gentle, as portrayed by the Victory Concerts that exalted stability and everyone united. However, six years later, majority rule became violent.

There remain only two more questions to answer. Was the violent outcome unavoidable? Why did the Zimbabwean government fail? It failed because it insisted on ignoring the signs of the times. Any great political leader must move outside of his immediate objectives toward the future. Ian Smith could not bring himself to do that. His greatest strength, strong-willed determination toward the needs of his own people, was also his greatest weakness regarding the urban African community, which was no longer willing to live where and how he wished them to. He did not want to use South African-style coercion, but he refused to accept the reality that his beloved natives had come into their adulthood and could no longer be held back.<sup>498</sup> He recalls: “The so-called nationalists didn’t know how to build, only tear down. If I had accepted the Compromise

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497. Drury, *A Very Strange Society*, 440.

498. Pogrand, 164-66.

of 1971, we wouldn't be in this mess."<sup>499</sup> True regret, and even a sense of affection, seemed present. Had the Africans, Indians, and whites compromised and worked together, they could have accomplished radical social changes.

In *Bantustan*, Giniewski reveals that the government was not making developmental use of the dynamic aptitudes of nearly 85 percent of its inhabitants. This arose from divisive racial issues. He further discloses that the business community desired to change these strategies of racial prejudice, but was unable to do so. Failure was omnipresent. In that respect, it is understandable why violence erupted, although that is never the best choice.

In years to come, Ministry of Internal Affairs' personnel lamented the shoddy workmanship. They discovered that when putting together many Protected Villages, "the economic well-being of our Shona peoples was cast aside. It was assumed they would build a new society for themselves. How was that supposed to happen during a war?"<sup>500</sup>

Sithole, in a sense, laid the groundwork for future, non-Zimbabwean, African leaders like Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela, to embrace the therapeutic healing concept of non-violence, after first being forced to use military methods to fight for their existence and their national independence. Nyerere and Mandela championed racial tolerance and integration, although that quest was largely unrealized until after the Cold War, when Mandela became South Africa's first, fully democratically elected President.<sup>501</sup>

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499. Smith, 198.

500. Sithole, 56.

501. Conyers, interview.

With regard to the arts and disability in Zimbabwe, the United Party (the White Opposition Party) wanted to use television to educate people with disabilities about the greater opportunities in Western society; however, the United Party was not allowed to do this because the Nationalist Party refused to allow informative television broadcasts in the 1960s and 70s.<sup>502</sup> The non-Communist United and Nationalist Parties bickered over the use of television, while Communist dictatorship prevailed as Marxist ideas overtook the country's media coverage, inclusive of the arts and disabled populations. An extremely popular Communist television anchor was a guerilla who used a wheelchair. Furthermore, the Communists employed poetry contests as well as other creative celebrations with sculpture, dance, and dramatic presentations that often-featured artists with disabilities.<sup>503</sup> Gibbs elucidates: "Pices Maqukueza [a blind dancer] created the 'Liberation Joy Troupe.' They served with the Zimbabwe African National Union in New Fyfe."<sup>504</sup> Conversely, non-Communist leaders failed to intelligently utilize the arts and people with disabilities to demonstrate the value of a free society. This was a missed opportunity and part of the failed democratic counterinsurgency.

In conclusion, Zimbabwe went from an incorruptible, old British-style, paternalistic paradigm to a Marxist dictatorship dominated by the harsh Shona tribe, which continued well beyond the Cold War into the Twenty-First Century.

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502. Graaf, 56.

503. Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013), 67.

504. Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela's Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites and Apartheid's First Bantustan* (Oxford, United Kingdom: James Currey, 2014), 214.

## **Chapter Seven: Conclusion**

Each of the nations I have examined had success or failure based on the collective willingness to harness the entire population to defeat the armed rebels and build a peaceful democratic society. The challenges varied from nation to nation. As an overview, these challenges included Malaysia's economic difficulties, Taiwan's unrealistic dreams of retaking mainland China, Vietnam's battle between freedom and order, and Zimbabwe's outmoded racial discrimination. Each nation pursued democracy via counterinsurgency, and, as demonstrated, each country had varying levels of achievement. The artistic programs developed for and by people with disabilities played a significant role in each counterinsurgency's victory or failure.

Returning to Malaysia, it was like a blessed beacon between its Marxist and militarized neighbors. In summation, it prospered because the entire society seemed to undergo a national baptism. Enduring and rising above past struggles together, Malaysians recognized that they all needed each other. This resulted in a unified nation. Malaysian counterinsurgency was fully successful because it converted dissatisfied populations with much-desired political freedom, economic progress, and opportunities for self-fulfillment. The world was improved because Malaysian methods were universalized, which led to a peaceful outcome in the developing world. In the arts and daily life, people with disabilities were welcomed, and their unique world-view welcomed. This dedication to full inclusion made democracy flourish and created a progressive peaceful country where massively-disruptive conflict had been present before.

Taiwan used its economic prowess to promote stability and serve as a less regimented alternative to the mainland. The Taiwanese successfully focused on defectors but did not strongly focus on the general population. That is why Taiwan's success was complicated. Taiwan emerged as an independent nation—but without mainland China. Completely successful counterinsurgency demands focus on defectors as well as loyal citizens, who help to create the government. Nevertheless, today Taiwan stands as a proud democratic country with neighboring Asian nations like South Korea, The Philippines, and Indonesia—all of which achieved democracy after the role-model of Taiwan. Additionally, Taiwan achieved its partial success as a democracy once its artistic programs utilizing people with disabilities became more focused on reality and less tied to the return to mainland China.

Vietnam went from bumbling, stumbling military leaders trying to build a new society in the midst of chaos to organized yet arcane Mandarin-like Communist cadres, who knew how to destroy, but not how to build. Additionally, although the U.S. was not militarily defeated in Vietnam, the world was altered because the Vietnam Conflict was a political defeat for the U.S. Indeed, the Vietnam Conflict shattered the myth of the military perfection of the United States. That is why the counterinsurgency is considered a partial failure. Moreover, the artistic programs of non-Communist South Vietnam were limited because they did not present one unifying message the way the Marxists did.

History shows that democracy works best in a society in which general core values, whatever they are, spring from a larger code. Often, populations which are suddenly thrown from a state of childlike protection and dependence can through no fault of their own, look for simplistic solutions. As Ky put it, so many third-world leaders

found it so easy to use force on any problem at the expense of a larger goal. “The Communists won, not merely because they kicked my tail out, but they won because they were able to inspire the people, and ideas are more powerful than guns.”<sup>505</sup> The ideal in their case was a unified, Communist Vietnam, free from uncomfortable choices, unified by leaders who, whether they realized it or not, harkened back to ancient ideas about hierarchy that arose well before the kindred philosophies of Marx and Lenin. Although it is true that Vietnam showcased the talents of its citizens with disabilities in the arts and daily life, the non-Communists had a limited arts program, while the Communists imposed their more successful, government-controlled arts program featuring people with disabilities.

An over attachment to a white-dominated past triggered the failure of Zimbabwe’s attempt at democracy. African moderates were paternalistically ignored, and the needs of the people went unmet, politically and economically. The outmoded racism led to the failure of the counterinsurgency.

The main problem with the Zimbabwean arts programs was that the criteria were focused entirely on a white colonial point of view. Genuine artistic expression in the African community of people with disabilities was almost non-existent. When such programs came to fruition, they were channeled into “acceptable” productions designed to promote paternalism and a comfortable isolation during the great upheaval caused by the war. White and mixed-race artists had government support in the media, while African art was encouraged to remain within the so-called tribal trust lands overseen by selected tribal chiefs who were content to follow directions. The white minority managed

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505. Ky, 128.

to remain in charge despite cultural shifts. Society cannot thrive when fifteen percent of the adult population tries to maintain control over the remaining majority. The result is chaos controlled by a non-representative force.

In aggregate, it was necessary to explore the needs of all communities to avoid violence and pursue more peaceful counterinsurgency; that is why Malaysia is a success story, and there are elements of defeat in Taiwan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

Government must not only function, it must be seen to function. As an active participant in improving the lives of ordinary citizens, there can be no substitute for social welfare and effective, often peaceful counterinsurgency as incentives. “The public must be wooed, not bullied,” Moyar asserts.<sup>506</sup>

Additionally, In *War of Ideas*, Chandler declares that the four conflicts herein and their associated counterinsurgencies gave Western nations exposure to the development of lands and governments outside their traditional frameworks. I fully agree with his statement. The United States came to understand that it was impossible to impose American values on the entire world. In an extensive, unexpected manner, this eventually resulted in the development of a more multicultural perspective in Western countries in the subsequent decades. Meyer characterizes today’s Western worldview in this way: “The new modern world view, which the West now subscribes to, is no wholesale rejection of formerly valued ideas but rather an attempt to restate and update them.”<sup>507</sup>

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506. Moyar, 212.

507. Meyer, 110.

All groups within society should be brought into the national, political and economic structure at a pace they feel comfortable with, but excessive delay can serve as a recruiting ground for rebels. It is cheaper and more morally acceptable to convert an enemy than to kill him. People who are silenced out of fear remain dangerous. Personal honesty, in terms of propaganda, proves more worthwhile than inflated lies. A good leader must never make the mistake of assuming that military power is not vital, but without a political framework, one dictator is replaced by another. Political societies should try to accommodate cultural diversity because rebels will gladly do so instead, if only for propaganda purposes. When societies wisely pursue multiculturalism, Cable says the following is necessary: “A completely new way of thinking must somehow be created. A way that breaks down national concepts into intellectual, bite-sized pieces, which the public can both understand and accept.”<sup>508</sup>

While pursuing a fresh way of thinking, force must not be used. Genuine incentives should be offered in order to alleviate fears and be inclusive of everyone. Force only breeds hatred and is often counterproductive. Many times throughout history, the arts in all disciplines have supported positive social change, often pervasively and non-forcefully. This was specifically exemplified in creative programs in Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and to a far lesser extent in Zimbabwe. These innovative programs often featured marginalized populations along racial lines, as well as people with multifaceted disabilities and abilities. “It will not do merely to find pet projects for a chosen few among the formerly kept down group,” Hagen explains. “A demonstration of good

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508. Cable, *Conflict of Myths*, 215.

faith must be undertaken without consideration of ego and expense.”<sup>509</sup> It is vitally important that ideas be kept simple by the ruling elite so that they are understandable to the masses

When a sizable portion of the population is isolated, it is seen as immoral and wasteful. Waiting too long to integrate former enemies can prove catastrophic, even with military and economic superiority. The imperial approach must be entirely discontinued in favor of nurturing flexible, self-directed concern. Mistakes will most likely be made, but honest errors are more often forgiven if openly arrived at and compensated for, without any amateurish attempt to cover them up. The willingness to accept responsibility and make a truly honest attempt to change is vital to real progress.

In the spirit of flexible ideology, I hope that the counterinsurgencies examined herein will prove to be thought-provoking to historians, as well as to a population of new readers. I believe this historical outlook is indeed timely. Counterinsurgency is vital to today’s world, in tandem with progressive, modern inclusion of people with disabilities and the arts. With warring parties continuously developing around the globe, it is incumbent on the United States and its allies to employ vigorous, non-violent counterinsurgency diplomacies. A successful non-violent approach must include a positive psychological aspect so that long-standing results are considered. Commenting on twentieth century counterinsurgency, Moyer emphasizes, “It was no longer necessary merely to act, it was vital to figure out a psychological basis for every long-term action.”<sup>510</sup> This also applies to today’s world. In modern counterinsurgency, it is

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509. Hagen, 421.

510. Moyer, 444.

necessary to provide a progressive bracing for actions, a meaningful purpose, and an all-encompassing, projected outcome. Otherwise, any attempts at gaining support will pathetically fail.

I truly have been enraptured by the process of conducting research for and writing this dissertation, and I learned a great deal. The Cold War was far more nuanced than I thought. The wars I looked at had far more subtlety and differences than I had believed possible. I have learned that the Western world-view is not so much incorrect, as incomplete. The peoples under study were not the characters so beloved of cartoons and television.

To my great pleasure, I was able to take a larger look at all four of these conflicts. The non-American wars are something most populations in the Western World, who are not directly in the history field, know nothing about. I believe that I am a better professor and human being as a result of this grand undertaking.

My experiences were varied, arduous, and joyous. I had the opportunity to see places that I would not have seen under any other circumstances. A number of challenges and great experiences took place at the same time. An in-depth session with Prince Buthelzi's aide, the earlier referenced Honourable Benjamin Skosana, transformed my entire perspective on the Zimbabwean conflict. By talking with him, as well as with my many other interviewees over the last eleven years of research and writing, the history of the four counterinsurgencies came alive for me. The in-person experiences were thrilling. Surely, books, other texts, and films provided magnanimous contributions to my dissertation, but the dynamism of speaking with living historians is something I will long remember and treasure.

I was awed, terrified and transformed by “getting out of my comfort zone,” as the saying goes, by flying to and traveling in distant lands. Although most of my memories are uplifting, I shall never forget my absolute fear when the Senegalese Secret Police ordered me to stand up, when we had a brief layover, before proceeding to Johannesburg. Fortunately, my traveling companions were able to make them understand that I have paraplegia and could not stand up. Immediately, after being relieved that they understood and had put their guns away, I experienced increased awe at the positive achievements by persons with disabilities throughout the counterinsurgencies examined, all of whom had faced more fearsome events than I.

Indigenous art at the compound where I enjoyed an African safari was stimulating to behold. The Aboriginal musicians at the Sydney Harbor uniquely played didgeridus. They were spine-tingling to listen to and observe. The architecture of the Sydney Opera House and its famous bridge were breathtaking. The Sydney Bridge was accessible for wheelchair users to climb to the very top, and everything was accessible in South Africa, including my safari and modern hut with a bed adorned with mosquito netting. On the safari, I was lucky indeed to see “The Big Five”: elephants that were blocking our path, lions, leopards, water buffalo, and a rhinoceros family. I also experienced a tribal, artistic and spiritual event around a big, night-time fire. This was called a “Braai.” The welcoming accessibility I experienced in South Africa and Australia, as well as enjoying many aspects of the arts, was exhilarating. Of course, the libraries and archives which housed materials for my research, were also stimulating at multiple levels – intellectually and emotionally.

Happily rolling in my wheelchair, I toured the South African Parliament and beheld three 350 years of history in art and historical resources there. In Sydney, I visited the tremendous archives at the Imperial War Museum. In those dense and marvelous museum archives, I read about fifty books dealing with my dissertation topic. At the time, I could not afford to buy the books or copy pages, so, fortunately, I am a fast and fervent reader. Reading all those books was a complete joy! (Later, I was able to buy them or get them from various libraries.) After enjoying Sydney, I visited Canberra, one of the Australian capitals, and observed many of the world embassies located there.

Without question, the information I gathered over the years during my research was remarkable to amass. This comprised expansive details of existing information, as well as discovering brand-new material on the development of the counterinsurgencies in the four nation states investigated. The information on the utilization in these counterinsurgencies of people with disabilities and the arts was, in large part, newly unearthed material.

This experience has made me a person with more depth and greater understanding. As an American, I believe that we truly need to engage in an analysis of the rest of the world's needs, desires, and moral values. It is critical to include the arts and people with disabilities in such an exploration because they represent an essential part of the planet's requirements, aspirations, and ethical principles. This type of broad investigation is a key part of human progress.

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