A JUNGIAN PSYCHOHISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GROWTH OF THE KOREAN PROTESTANT CHURCH: TRAUMA AND CULTURAL COMPLEX

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Division of Religion

Drew University in partial fulfillment of

The requirements for the degree,

Doctor of Philosophy

KwangYu Lee

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Madison, New Jersey

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ABSTRACT

A Jungian Psychohistorical Analysis of the Growth of the Korean Protestant Church: Trauma and Cultural Complex

Ph.D. Dissertation by

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This research aims at investigating the psychological reason of the rapid growth of the Korean Protestant Church in the past century at a collective level. Utilizing a Jungian psychohistorical methodology that considers the workings of unconsciousness, rather than of consciousness, as the main agents of history, it claims that what motivated up to one-fourth of S. Koreans to massively convert to Protestantism in the past century was their cultural, or collective, complex of inferiority – the unconscious workings of the paradoxical coexistence of self-humiliation, self-hate and excessive idealization of the other. To explain how the cultural complex pushed them to hold on to Protestantism in the form of a mass phenomenon, the research first offers a brief sketch of the Korean Protestant Church's history, introduces the Jungian psychohistorical theory, and investigates into Korea's traumatic history of the twentieth century in which a series of tragedies befell on them – such as Japanese Imperialism, the U.S. Military Government in Korea, the Korean War, and the Korean military governments. Last, a Jungian psychohistorical analysis that discovers how their cultural unconsciousness, traumatized by the tragic historical facts, influenced them to turn to Protestantism will be presented.

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When I began writing this dissertation, I wanted to believe that I was making a BIG contribution to the future of Korean Protestantism. Now when I finished the task, however, one Bible verse keeps coming to mind: "What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun. (NIV, Ecclesiastes 1:9)." Though different from with what the author really meant with it, the verse helped me to realize that there are a number of people I should sincerely appreciate. Throughout the process of writing, what, I thought, was my own thought was unexceptionally someone's. To complete the dissertation, I relied on a great number of scholars and used their original thoughts and insights whenever necessary—yes, there is nothing new in this dissertation. However, among them, there are a few people I must explicitly say thank you because without their help, I could have not written Acknowledgments.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF FIGURES

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

I. The Declining Korean Protestant Church[1]

For decades, the Korean Protestant Church (KPC) has been a symbol for the second heyday of Christianity. It is said that after its missionaries from the U.S. and other countries landed Korea, the KPC explosively grew within a century to the extent that out of the twenty-five largest churches in the world, fifteen are in S. Korea. From the 1960s to the 2000s, the number of Protestant churches dramatically increased, roughly speaking, from five thousands to sixty thousands. In parallel, the total number of Protestants also increased from about 600,000 to 8,760,300.[2] Except for the U.S., there is no country that annually sends more missionaries than S. Korea.

However, the KPC is facing its downfall. Korean scholars reported that from 1991 to 1994, its growth stagnated.[3] From 1995 to 2005, for the first time since the 1960s its believers decreased from 8,760,300 to 8,616,000.[4] In 2010, Won Gue Lee, a Korean

[1] By 'the Korean Protestant Church,' the author means all Protestant churches and Protestants in S. Korea (Korea from now on); the term does not include the Roman Catholic Church in Korea. For the sake of brevity and readability, the Korean Protestant Church is sometimes shortened into 'the KPC.' Additionally, by 'Korean Christianity,' the author refers to both Protestant churches and Roman Catholic churches in Korea.

[2] Won Gue Lee, *Jonggyuesahoihakjeok Kwanjeomeseo Bon Hanguk Gyoheoiui Uigiwa Heemang* [The Crisis and Hope of the Korean Protestant Church: from a sociological perspective of religion], (Seoul: Korean Methodist Church Publishing, 2010), 127.

[3] Sung-Ho Kim, "Rapid Modernisation and the Future of Korean Christianity," *Religion* 32 (2002): 27.

[4] Byung Joon Chung, "A Reflection on the Growth and Decline of the Korean Protestant Church," *International Review of Mission* 103, no. 2 (2014): 328; Gil-Soo Han, Joy J. Han, and Andrew Eungi Kim, "'Serving Two Masters': Protestant Churches in Korea and Money," *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* (2009): 334.

sociologist of religion speculated that its decrease was mainly caused by two factors – one is external while the other is internal.[5] First, the emergence of leisure industries that is quickly replacing Protestantism as an alternative religion and the democratization of S. Korea bolstered by an improved public welfare system are weakening S. Koreans' need for religion. Second, more and more S. Koreans are turning their backs on the KPC because they no longer consider it as an ideal to look up to let alone trust it. Three years later, the 2013 Global Research reported an analysis of the results of the survey on their concerns about the KPC, presenting three main causes of the decline – church-individualism, materialism, and exclusivism.[6] The three causes are helpful in understanding how and why S. Koreans came to turn their backs on it.

A. The Korean Protestant Church's Individualism

Gil-Soo Han and his colleagues, Korean sociologists, coined the term *church-individualism* to explain one general tendency among Korean Protestant churches that each is only concerned about its own growth and well-being.[7] The 2013 Global Research proved the observation true with various statistics, including that in 2012, about eighty-four percent of Korean Protestants thought that their tithes should be used only for their own church; fifty-five percent expected to use their offerings only for their churches'

[5] Lee, *Jonggyuesahoihakjeok Kwanjeomeseo Bon Hanguk Gyoheoiui Uigiwa Heemang* [The Crisis and Hope of the Korean Protestant Church: from a sociological perspective of religion], 118.

[6] Global Research, *Hanguk Gidokgyo Bunseok Report: Igongilsam Hangukinui Jonggyosaenghwalgwa Uisikjosa Bogoseo [An Analytical Report on Korean Christianity: Religious Life and Consciousness of Koreans in 2013]* (Seoul: UDR Press), 434, 440.

[7] Han et al., "'Serving Two Masters': Protestant Churches in Korea and Money," 341. They define church-individualism as "an approach or policy whereby an individual congregation sets its own goals and undertakes its own missions; and invests human and material resources in order to maintain and expand the individual congregation as an organization. (p. 341)"

sake.[8] To trace where it originates, Han and his colleagues draw attention to the Nevius Mission Plan – a missionary plan designed by John Livingstone Nevius, a pioneering American Protestant missionary in China.[9]

Initially, the Nevius' missionary plan aimed at fostering self-sufficient, self-propagating, and self-governmental local churches in China.[10] While missionaries in China were reluctant about the plan, missionaries in Korea lost no time in applying it to their local churches as soon as they heard it from Nevius. Introducing it to Korean Protestants, they urged them to take material offering as a religious duty to ensure the survival and vitality of their churches.[11] Given that Confucianism considered making money as inferior to learning, the plan's validation of making money as a religious behavior drew attention from commoners like merchants and farmers. It encouraged them to make more money in order to take care of their churches, giving a sense of autonomy and independence and at the same time a new perspective on money – money is not a contemptuous work as Confucianism claimed. The plan affirmed that making money and contributing it to church is part of Protestants' participation in God's work.[12]

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[8] Global Research, *Hanguk Gidokgyo Bunseok Report: Igongilsam Hangukinui Jonggyosaenghwalgwa Uisikjosa Bogoseo*, 105-108.

[9] Along with the Nevius Mission Plan, Han et al. present two more historical roots of the church-individualism in the KPC: Korea's traditional lifestyle – nomadic, agricultural, and patriarchal – and the KPC's bureaucratization that each church is likely to consider maximizing its own profits the most important purpose for its existence. For more information about them, read Han et al.'s "'Serving Two Masters': Protestant Churches in Korea and Money;" Chi-Jun Noh, "Hanguk Gyohoe-ui Gaegyohoe Juui-e Gwanhan Yeongu [A study of Individual-Churchism in the Korean Protestant Church], *Gidokgyo Sasang* [Christian thought] (1986); Global Research, *Hanguk Gidokgyo Bunseok Report [An Analytical Report on Korean Christianity]*, 363.

[10] Han and et al., "Serving Two Masters," 342.

[11] Albert L. Park, "A Sacred Economy of Value and Production: Capitalism and Protestantism in Early Modern Korea (1885-1919)" in Ed. Albert L. Park and David Y. Yoo, *Encountering Modernity: Christianity in East Asia and Asian America* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), 19.

[12] Ibid.

The missionaries accepted the plan in order for Korean local churches to be autonomously sustainable when they were expelled from Korea by the Japanese imperial government. However, while urging them to actively engage in commercial activities, they strongly recommended them to remain apolitical, with stress on the spiritual rather than the worldly. Moreover, they urged them to obey the government in power. Gil-Soo Han, an associate professor of Monash University, and his colleagues argue that the plan is self-contradictory, noting that while the plan planted in Korean Protestants a sense of independence, it also injected a strong sense of individualism, leaving churches' social concerns and actions for justice out of consideration. In summary, the plan worked like a two-edged sword for the KPC. On the one hand, it helped Korean Protestant local churches to become self-sufficient, self-propagating, and self-governmental. On the other hand, it became the root of the KPC's church-individualism.

B. The Korean Protestant Church's Materialism

When Korean scholars use the term *materialism* to criticize the KPC, what they mean by it is its "preoccupation with or stress upon material rather than intellectual or spiritual things."[13] To weigh how much the KPC is now materialized, there are two things to take into consideration – the churches' hereditary succession and the founding pastors' unethical handling of large or mega churches' property.

First, one of the most frequently mentioned manifestations of materialism in the KPC is the hereditary succession of a church from a founding pastor to his son – mostly

[13] Merriam-Webster English Dictionary, "materialism." accessed on November 5, 2018. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/materialism?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld

in the cases of large or mega churches. Koreans generally take a negative view on the phenomenon because it reminds them of the Korean *Chaebol*s' hereditary successions such as Hyundai, Samsung, etc. Considering the moral, social, and economic power of those churches in S. Korea, they are likely to identify the inheritance of those churches from the founding pastors to their sons with that of the *Chaebols*.[14] On July 15, 2007, *Christian Times,* a web magazine of the Korean Methodist Church, reported the result of a survey by the Christian Broadcasting System (CBS) as to how Christians – both Catholics and Protestants – viewed the church's hereditary succession. Sixty-four percent of all the respondents answered that they had an objection to it; 17.1 percent said that, if it happened to their church, they would find another church.[15] In July 2013, *Gaesingyo Yeonhabdanche Gyohoeseseub Bandaeundong* [the Protestant Federation for the Anti-movement to the Church Hereditary Succession] reported that, from 1977 when the founding pastor Chang-In Kim of Choonhynn Presbyterian Church handed over the senior pastorship of the church to his son Rev. Sung-Kwang Kim for the first time up to 2013, sixty-two churches in metropolitan areas had been handed over from the founding pastors to one of their sons and twenty-two churches were in the process.[16] On November 12, 2017, the founding pastor Sam-Whan Kim of Myungsung Presbyterian Church, one of the largest Presbyterian churches in the world, appointed his son Hana Kim as his

[14] The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the term *Chaebol* as 'a family-controlled industrial conglomerate in South Korea.' accessed on Oct. 30, 2018, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chaebol.

[15] Won Gue Lee, *Himnaera, Hangukgyohoe!* [Cheer Up, Korean Church!], (Seoul: Dong-Yeon Publishers, 2009), 45.

[16] Jun-Bong Shin, "*Sudokown Daehyeonggyohoe Poham 62 Got Gyoheo Seseub* [The 62 Churches including Large and Mega Churches in the Metropolitan Area Were succeeded Hereditarily]," *The JoongAng Ilbo*, July 4, 2013, http://news.joins.com/article/11977218, accessed on February 12, 2017.

successor.[17] Although the church stressed that the inheritance was decided by a reasonable and legal calling committee, Koreans, Christians as well as non-Christians, criticized that the process was identical with other mega-churches' hereditary succession. The controversy is still under way as of Feb. 2019.

Andrew Eungi Kim and others view the hereditary succession process as a clear sign of the corporatization and commercialization of the KPC like chaebols – Korean family-owned conglomerates.[18] For example, in the Korean Methodist Church there are three mega churches – Gwanglim, Geumlan, and Immanuel – that three brothers founded and grew each. They all bequeathed their senior pastorship to their own sons. Gwanglim completed the hereditary succession in 2001, Geumlan in 2006, and Immanuel in 2013. Moreover, Incheon Sungui Methodist church made a landmark in the KPC's history of the hereditary succession, completing a third-generation succession from the founding pastor, through his son, and then to his grandson in May 2008.[19]

In fact, the hereditary succession of a church is not unusual in the history of the Korean Protestant Church. Won Gue Lee, however, explains why the succession at present became a target of criticism in three points that is closely related to materialism manifested in the KPC. First, mostly the churches that went through that process are large or mega-churches that have significant social influence in Korea with various social welfare and cultural activities, drawing attention from people of all social strata. Second,

[17] Byeong-Wang Lee, "MyungSung Church, Beongaetbure Kong Guwo Meokdeut Seseum Wallyo [*MyungSung Church Completed Its Transmission by Heredity in an Instant*]," *Dang Dang News*, Nov. 14, 2017, http://www.dangdangnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=29328; Hyeon Jo, "MyungSung Church Damimmoksae Kimhana Moksa chwiim: 'Buja seseup' Wangyeol [*MyungSung Church's New Senior Pastor Is Hana Kim: the Completion of Its Transmission by Heredity*]," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, Nov. 13, 2017, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/religious/818733.html.

[18] Han and et al., "'Serving Two Masters': Protestant Churches in Korea and Money," 349.

[19] Ibid.

for the most part, successors of the large or mega churches contributed nothing to their birth and growth. Owing to that reason, people are likely to consider them as "free riders." Of course, there is a counterargument that the hereditary succession is legally possible in S. Korea – in fact, there is no social law to prevent the hereditary succession of a church. There are also large or mega-churches succeeded by pastors with no connection to the churches or their founding pastors.[20] However, it is important to remember that in many cases, those founding pastors continue to wield strong influence over the search committees for their successors. Third, the hereditary succession tends to work as a political tool for the founding pastors to keep their invincible authority over the churches' domestic affairs, even after retirement.[21]

Second, large and mega church leaders' unethical financial handling of church funds is also frequently mentioned as a yardstick to measure how much the KPC is saturated with materialism. For example, take two pastors of the worldly well-known mega churches. First, on August 14, 2003, the Eastern Branch of the Seoul District Public Prosecutors' Office placed in court custody Rev. Hong-Do Kim, the former Bishop of the Korean Methodist Church and the founder and former senior pastor of Guemlan Korean Methodist Church – the largest Methodist Church in the world – on the charges of malpractice and embezzlement of church funds. The prosecution reported that he used about 2,700,000 dollars in total for the settlement with a woman with whom he had an unethical sexual relationship, for the purchase of a vacation home in his wife's name, for the construction of a building for a church where his son worked as the lead pastor, and

[20] Newsnjoy, "Beautiful Examples of Passing Down Churches," *Newsnjoy*, April 2, 2001, http://www.newsnjoy.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1547, accessed on February 12, 2017.
[21] Lee, *Himnaera, Hangukgyohoe!* [Cheer Up, Korean Church!], 46-48.

for the preparation of another civil case against him.[22] On April 28, 2006, he was found guilty for all those cases.[23] Second, on August 21, 2014, the Seoul Central District Court sentenced Rev. David Yonggi Jo who, was prosecuted without detention for embezzlement of the property of the Yoido Full Gospel Church (YFGC), to two and a half years' imprisonment with four years of probation. When Rev. Jo bought 250,000 stocks from his son's company in 2002 with the church funds, he paid four times more their worth than the reasonable price of 21.62 dollars per share, causing a significant loss of about twelve million dollars.[24] To make matters worse, on February 26, 2016, thirty elders of the church reported him to the police for another embezzlement of seventy-two million dollars. They also argued that from 2004 to 2009, he spent fifty-four million dollars of the church budget for personal use and his retirement allowance of eighteen million dollars was unreasonably appropriated.[25]

Since the late 1990s, various agencies of public opinion in S. Korea have been openly criticizing the hereditary successions and privatization of churches through editorials and comments. On July 3, 2000, the editorial of *Hankyoreh Newspaper* keenly described the negative effects of the hereditary succession and privatization in Protestant

[22] Gi-Yeong Eom and Jong-Myeong Wang, "Rev. Hong-Do Kim Is Placed under Arrest for His Embezzlement of 2,700,000 Dollars from the Church Funds," *MBCNEWS*, August 14, 2003, http://imnews.imbc.com/20dbnews/history/2003/1907642_19578.html, accessed on February 27, 2017.

[23] OhmyNews, "Rev. Hong-Do Kim Convicted of the Embezzlement," *OhmyNews*, May 8, 2006, http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/view/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000329504, accessed on February 27, 2017; Newnjoy, "Hong-Do Kim, Guilty in the Court and Not-Guilty in the Church Court," *Newsnjoy*, December 22, 2006, http://www.newsnjoy.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=19572, accessed on February 27, 2017.

[24] Hee-Young Kim, "Rev. David Yonggi Jo's Embezzlement of $11,790,000 Ended in Probation," *Hanguk Gija Hyeobhoe* [Journalists Association of Korea], February 20, 2014, http://www.journalist.or.kr/news/article.html?no=32966, accessed on February 10, 2017; Hyeon-Ho Yeo, Rev. Yonggi Jo and His Son Convicted," *Hani Newspaper*, May 17, 2017, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/795060.html, accessed on June 10, 2017.

[25] Hong-Bae Kim, "Rev. David Yonggi Jo of the Yoido Full Gospel Church: Can We Winnow Truth from Falsehood about His Embezzlement of 72 million dollars," *Sisa Plus*, March 15, 2016, http://www.sisaplusnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=12383, accessed on February 10, 2017.

churches in Korea: "The unprecedented hypertrophy and corporatization of the KPC as a necessity resulted in the privatization of the Church. The hereditary succession was nothing other than a mere signal of it. If the hereditary succession and privatization accelerates the secularization of the Church, Koreans can only understand the Church and its pastors in a more secular way."[26] Their criticisms on the KPC's hereditary succession and privatization reveal that what really matters to the KPC is no longer its on-going growth; instead, how it handles its achieved growth in a way that S. Koreans view positively. Unfortunately, it falls short of doing that.

C. The Korean Protestant Church's Exclusivism

One common theme among anti-Christian campaigns in S. Korea is the exclusive attitude of Protestants toward other religions – the unshakable fundamental faith in God that other faiths even with slight differences are all considered as evil and satanic.[27] After researching a number of anti-Christian campaign websites, Jin-Gu Lee, a visiting professor of religion at Honam Theological University and Seminary, Korea, presents a list of the exclusive characteristics of the KPC: vandalism of other religions' properties such as Dangun statue – the legendary founding father of Korea – and statues of the Buddha, curse of other religions with the famous slogan, reading "Jesus, Heaven and all others, Hell!" collective slander and defamation of the evolutionary theory asserted, for instance, by the Korean Association for Creation Research, negation of the traditional Korean culture, and condemnation as 'pseudo-Christians'[28] of progressive Protestants and

[26] Ibid., 50.

[27] Jin-Gu Lee, "Korean Protestantism as Viewed by Netizens: A Focus on Recent Activities of Anti-Christian Sites," *Korean Journal* 44 (2004): 233.

[28] Ibid., 233-234.

Catholics, who are open-mined to embrace other religions and to mutually interact with them – to name a few. The 2013 *GidokgyoYunrisilcheonungdong* [the Korean Christian Ethics Movement] Report on the social reliability of Korean Protestantism states that one out of five respondents pick out its exclusivism as the reason why they cannot trust it.[29]

Furthermore, Korean Protestants' exclusivism gradually became tied to the political conservatism that radically opposes progressive and anti-democratic movements in the Korean society.[30] Kyuhoon Cho, a researcher at Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, brings into focus that Protestant leaders tend to stand at the head of the conservative movements, blaming progressive and democratic politicians and social activists like Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) as communist or Satan's pawns in religious language. For example, Rev. Kim Hong Do, the former senior pastor of Kumnan Methodist Church, delivered an 'interesting' sermon entitled 'What If Reunification Is Achieved under Communism?' on July 8, 2007 five months before the seventeenth presidential election of S. Korea:

> Do you know how many Reds are there in the National Assembly and among the cabinet members? [The Roh Moo-hyun government] has awarded medals and paid compensation to the spies and commies… The presidential election at the end of this year is the moment to decide the fate of this country. We have to pray that the lefties of the pro-communist, pro-North Korea and the anti-USA [factions] will not re-seize power… After standing against God and attempting to usurp the throne of God, the Red Dragon, Satan, is damned and thrown out of heaven to earth.[31]

[29] Yeol Jang, "*Gidokgyo Yunri Silcheon Undong: Hangukgyohoe Sahoejeok Sinroido Yeoron Josa* [Korean Christian Ethics Movement: A Survey of Public Opinion about the Social Reliability of the Korean Protestant Church]," *Korea Daily*, February 11, 2004, http://www.koreadaily.com/news/read.asp?art_id=2318714, accessed on October 30, 2018.

[30] Kyuhoon Cho, "Another Christian Right?: The Politicization of Korean Protestantism in Contemporary Global Society," *Social Compass* 6 (2014): 310.

[31] Ibid., 311.

With the sermon, Kim urged the congregation to vote for the conservative candidate Lee Myung-bak, associating Lee's possible loss of the election with the victory of Satan over God that could not be possible. To make matters worse, his political conservatism did not remain inside the church. He also organized or supported a series of conservative political rallies, along with other leaders of mega churches like Yonggi Cho, the former senior pastor of Yoido Full Gospel Church – the world's largest church. Luckily, their political activities accomplished their objectives, helping Lee to be elected as the fourteenth President of S. Korea. Because the KPC's conservative attitude toward progressive and democratic movements and obstinate exclusivism against Korea's traditional religions have received much publicity from the press, it is likely that S. Koreans think nothing of it. One interesting fact to point out is that the more people are leaving the Church, the more adamant its leaders – mainly from large or mega churches – seem to hold on to their conservative and exclusive religious doctrine. Now it is not too much to say that whether or not the KPC changes that attitude is closely related to its continuous growth in the future.

II. The Necessity of a Psychohistorical Approach to the History of the Korean Protestant Church

Given that church-individualism, materialism, and exclusivism are the three main causes of the KPC's current decline, it is necessary to ask if there is a possible factor that intertwines them with one another. The author argues that to find a common thread that weaves them together, a psychoanalytical reading of the KPC's history is needed. While researching to find psychologically feasible answers, one story captured the author's

attention. It is about Rev. Yonggi Cho, the founding pastor of Yoido Full Gospel Church, the history of which is considered as a miniature of the KPC's. Cho built the church with five members in 1958. Within three decades, the church became the world's largest church in 1992 – with more than 750,000 members.[32] In search of the church's dramatic growth, scholars frequently mention, as the most important cause, Cho's contextual theology of prosperity/bliss that tugged at the heartstrings of S. Koreans who were suffering from the aftermath of the Korean War. The theology introduced to them the Christian God who is eager to bless His/Her sons and daughters – materially (money), physically (health), and spiritually (eternal life). How to become God's sons and daughter is simple and easy – confessing God as the Lord from the heart. In doing so, a person can be reborn as a Christian, giving up one's past misery-stricken life and beginning a blissful life full of God's miracles. However, when it comes to how to experience God's blessings, Cho's explanation becomes problematic to some degree.

In an autobiographical record of his ministry entitled *The Fourth Dimension Vol. I*, Cho offers an exemplary story of how he experienced God's miracle by living and doing in the Christian way. When the Korean government, led by Syngman Rhee, planned to transform Yoido, an island of Seoul, into something like New York's Manhattan in the mid-1960s, it decided to pick one church to be built there and called for applications. Almost all religious organizations in S. Korea – Protestants, Roman Catholics, Buddhists, and even Confucianists – applied for that special land. Cho joined them and submitted his application. Soon after he knew that his application has been denied. However, the news did not quench his burning desire to take possession of the land – remember that Cho

[32] Wonsuk Ma, "*David Yonggi Cho's Theology of Blessing: Basis, Legitimacy, and Limitations*," *Evangelical Review of Theology* 35 (2011): 142.

considered a burning desire as a sign of strong faith. In accordance with his insistence on faith that real faith requires actions to make a dream come true, he lost no time in putting a strategy for that into action. First, knowing that the mother-in-law of the city's vice mayor in charge of the land project was a Protestant, he approached her and made her a member of his church. When she became a devout member, he asked her to bring her daughter to the church. Soon the vice-mayor's wife also became a member of the church. A little while later, Cho asked the vice-mayor's wife to bring her husband to the church. Eventually, the vice-mayor also became a member. One day the vice-mayor, who heard that his church was struggling to find a place to build a new church, came to Cho and said that he could be a help in finding a place for their new church. Soon the government arrived at a conclusion about which church would be built on the island and it was Cho who got the permission from the government. Cho concluded the story, noting that the entire process was a miracle under God's control for him and his church.

At first glance, his testimony seems to be about his strong faith in God, implicitly stating that when people convert to Protestantism, they all experience the same miracle – the completion of what they desire. However, Cho missed one point that he intentionally and systematically – perhaps illegally – intervened the government's decision-making process for his favor. In explaining how Christians can actualize and experience God's bliss, he justifies what he did to make his dream come true with the achieved desire. In this case, it is not difficult to recognize that the end justified the means. His religious logic that lies underneath the justification is likely that as long as a desire is strong enough and a believer is determined to make it happen, how to do it is not as important as what to accomplish. With the logic, Cho's theology of bliss/prosperity affirms, upholding

human desires and considering them as a way to prove one's faith in God, that an outcome justifying its process or an end is more important than its means. This is not to say that all Korean Protestants believe Cho's conviction to be true. However, it is still possible to assume that a majority, who strongly desired to have a new and better life in a new and strong nation, were attracted by the theology to a great degree.[33] Taking for granted that Cho's contextual theology of prosperity/bliss fit well with what a majority of S. Koreans desired in the past century, a following question would be: What are the origins of the S. Koreans' desires in the form of a 'materialistic' faith? It is no exaggeration to say that everyone desires to be financially stable and socially powerful in the aftermath. However, as far as the massive conversion of S. Koreans to Protestantism that took place intensively from the 1960s and 1980s is concerned, it is important to note that it needs to be considered as a mass phenomenon. Taken that once at least up to one-fourth of S. Koreans wanted to become Christians, is it too much to assume that many of them desired the faith to be actualized in their lives – even if its end justified its means?

Si-Min Rhyu, a Korean economist and journalist, presents an interesting opinion on how S. Koreans achieved the "Miracle on the Han River" – S. Korea's miraculously rapid economic development. Basing S. Korea's economic developmental-trajectory on Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs, Rhyu argues that S. Koreans, who suffered the after-effects of a series of traumatic events in the past, desperately desired to satisfy their physiological needs (homeostasis, food, water, sex, etc.) and safety needs (security of body, family, resources, etc.) more than any other needs (love, esteem, and self-

[33] Andrew Eungi Kim, "Christianity, Shamanism, and Modernization in South Korea," *Crosscurrents* 50 (2000): 117.

actualization).[34] After the Korean War, the first and foremost important issue that mattered to them was how to remain alive. Strengthened by a sense of inferiority, they were obsessed about their country's economic development. How strongly they desired it was, Rhyu claims, explained by that they willingly accepted the military dictatorships who promised a better future. His argument of what caused S. Korea's economic development is unique as compared to others because he presents S. Koreans' unstable psychological state to the fore as the central cause of it. In the past century, the psychological state of S. Koreans, stricken by those traumatic events that took place in succession, was so fragile that they could not think of any other needs except for physiological and safety needs, according to Maslow's hierarchy of needs.

Taking Rhyu's insight as a springboard, the author will investigate significant psychological reasons behind the KPC's rapid growth in the past century, particularly focusing on S. Koreans' traumas-stricken psychological state. A psychoanalytic interpretation of history – particularly some important events, both positive and negative – mainly focuses on the workings of unconsciousness over consciousness or feelings over thoughts. That is, psychohistory is a study on how individuals or groups' unconsciousness affects consciousness, causing them to 'change' the flow of history under the influences of unconscious conflicts, even if those unconscious conflicts are covered well by their determined conscious decisions or acts.

The main argument of the research is the cultural complex of inferiority S. Koreans suffered in the past century – a collective complex that a group or people

[34] Si-Min Rhyu, *Naui Hanguk Hyeondaesa: 1959-2014, Osip Onyeon Girok* [My Modern History of Korea: a Record of 55 years from 1959 to 2014] (Seoul: Dolbegae Publisher, 2014), 52-64.

unconsciously suffer without knowing that their thoughts and acts are in the complex's control – is one of the major forces behind their massive conversion to Protestantism. To be more specific, undergoing the past century tainted with a series of tragedies such as the collapse of their last dynasty *Joseon*, followed by Japanese Imperialism, the U.S. Military Government in Korea, the Korean War, and the Korean Military Governments that spearheaded the country's nationwide industrialization, S. Koreans had to suppress various unresolved internal pains such as anger, humiliation, helplessness, hopelessness, and haplessness for the sake of survival. Those suppressed feelings became a collective complex of inferiority as an autonomous psychic entity in their collective unconsciousness that affected their healthy adaptation to the rapidly changing circumstances. Oscillating between self-humiliation and excessive idealization of their colonizers, S. Koreans unconsciously desired to find a way to disconnect themselves from their miserable past and to become one of their colonizers at a collective level. Protestantism, introduced by westerners, satisfied those desires. In an innumerable number of revivals from mid-1960s to 1990s, its emphasis on the rebirth in Jesus Christ appeased their internal pains. On the other hand, its close connection to the U.S., along with the Korean military governments' active support of it to gain favor from the U.S. government that controlled S. Korea behind the curtain and its contextual theology of prosperity/bliss – a Korean theology anchored in the argument that God is ready to bless His/Her sons and daughters materialistically, physically, and spiritually – strengthened the imaginary tie between becoming Protestants and becoming Americanized in their minds. To know where this analysis comes from, it is necessary to delve into, to some

extent, psychohistory – a research methodology of history, interpreting historical materials from the viewpoints of psychoanalytic theories.

III. Methodology: Jungian Psychohistory

William Langer, an American historian and the President of the American Historical Association in 1957, was the first person to officially stress the importance of psychohistory – a combinational discipline of history and psychoanalysis – that applies psychoanalytic insights to interpreting historical records to investigate humans' motivations that are directly related to their decisions and actions that changed the flow of history. Given the accomplished remarkable advance of archeology in 1950s, in his 1957 presidential address, Langer demanded that psychoanalytic theories be utilized in order to deepen and diversify meanings of historical materials.[35] Relying on psychoanalytic theories that pay more attention to unconsciousness or internal conflicts than consciousness, psychohistory aims at unearthing the various motivations of humans, behind historical records, such as repression, identification, projection, replacement, and so forth.[36]

One year after Langer affirmed the usefulness of psychoanalytic theories in historical studies, Erik Erikson published a groundbreaking book entitled *Young Martin Luther* (1958) – the first psychohistorical analysis of an important individual's internal life-history. Psychoanalytically interpreting a variety of historical materials about the forerunner of the Reformation, Martin Luther's private life and his achievements, Erikson constructed how his psychological life unfolded – his lifelong internal conflicts, caused

[35] William L. Langer, "The Next Assignment," *The American Historical Review* 63 (1958): 284.
[36] Ibid., 287-288.

by the tragic relationship with his father, paved the way he took. Since the book's publication, many psychoanalysts and historians began utilizing various psychoanalytic theories in reviewing lives of historically important figures. In doing so, they gradually extended their subjects from individuals to groups – their 'abnormal' behaviors under the influence of significant – mainly traumatic – social events such as revolutions, wars, and epidemics became a subject.[37]

The main subject of this research is the psychological states of S. Koreans at a collective level impacted by those tragic events in succession in the past century on the premise that S. Koreans' unstable – probably traumatized – psychological states might be closely related to their massive conversion to Protestantism between 1960s and 1980s. When it comes to religion and its psychological effects on humans, however, the Freudian model is not useful enough to apply it to the case of S. Koreans. The main reason originates in its negative view on religion, that religious feelings are nothing other than repetition in the form of the wish-fulfillment of a powerless and psychologically not-fully developed child's dependency on his/her father to (re)gain a sense of comfort and stability. Though not firmly rejecting the beneficial role of religion for the psychological health of humans, Freud anticipated that when they fully matured – when their intelligence is fully developed – humans no longer need religion. Based on the perspective, it is quite simple to analyze the massive conversion of S. Koreans to Protestantism in the past century as nothing but their collective regression. However, granted that they had more than four traditional religions that harmoniously existed – shamanism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism – even before Christianity was

[37] Jacques Szaluta, *Psychohistory: Theory and Practice* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 188.

introduced, that simplistic analysis arrives at a dead road. For it does not explain why they flocked toward Protestantism, turning their backs on their traditional religions.

To probe why Protestantism drew more attention from S. Koreans than any other religions in the past century, the author chose a Jungian psychohistorical perspective as the main method for the research for two reasons. The first reason is that Jung is different from Freud in understanding religion. Jung positively views religion as a psychological tool to (re)integrate consciousness into unconsciousness. Note that the Latin term *religio*, from which the term religion comes, literally means 'reconnect' or 'retie.' For Jung, religion is not a passive and regressive behavior. It is an active and progressive behavior to pursue psychological health. The second reason is that in order to delve into the unstable psychological states of S. Koreans and how they caused them to massively convert to Protestantism at a collective level, Jung's concepts of the collective unconscious and complex are helpful. Jung defines the collective unconscious – the most fundamental psychical structure of humanity – as "a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals… in addition to our immediate consciousness, which is of a thoroughly personal nature and which we believe to be the only empirical psyche."[38] Later, Joseph L. Henderson, a Jungian psychoanalyst, developed the concept of the cultural unconscious that is surmised to exist somewhere between the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious, representing common psychological characteristics of a group or nation.

[38] C. G. Jung, *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, vol. 9 of *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), 43.

Next, Jung's concept of complex as an autonomous psychic entity existing in unconsciousness sheds new light on their massive conversion to Protestantism. June Singer, another Jungian psychoanalyst, defines a complex as "a certain constellation [in unconsciousness] of psychic elements (ideas, opinions, convictions, etc.) that are grouped around emotionally sensitive areas."[39] When we are confronted with distressing events the psychological impact of which is far beyond our ability to process them, we avoid facing them by repressing them into unconsciousness. Our repressed psychological pains, caused by those tragic experiences, constitute a psychological entity – what Jung calls a complex. Since constructed in unconsciousness, a complex becomes a barrier between what we will and what we act, constantly bothering our intellectual ability to think objectively and neutrally. Thomas Singer and Samuel L. Kimbles coined the term *cultural complex*, combining the cultural unconscious with complex – "an emotionally charged aggregate of historical memories, emotions, ideas, images, and behaviors that tend to cluster around an archetypal core that lives in the psyche of a group and is shared by individuals within that identified collective."[40] Like a personal complex, a cultural complex is also transmitted from generation to generation through the functions of "schools, communities, media, and all the other forms of cultural and group life."[41] Moreover, remaining unconscious like a personal complex, it causes highly charged emotional or affective reactions to what reminds them of the psychological impacts

[39] June Singer, *Boundaries of the Soul: the Practice of Jung's Psychology* (New York: Anchor Books, 1994), 43.

[40] Thomas Singer, "Introduction" in *Listening to Latin America: Exploring Cultural Complexes in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela*, ed. Pilar Amezaga et al. (New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2012), 1.

[41] Thomas Singer and Samuel L. Kimbles, "Introduction," in *The Cultural Complex: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives on Psyche and Society*, ed. Thomas Singer and Samuel L. Kimbles (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2004), 4.

bringing about the complex among the members of a group in its grip, reconstruct their lives around the complex, and alters their collective identity. Those two concepts help investigate the collective psychological states of S. Koreans and how they changed in the midst of a series of tragedies. In Chapters 3 and 4, how a cultural complex took shape in the cultural unconscious of S. Koreans and how it forced them to convert to Protestantism, giving up their traditional religions, will be explained.

IV. The Scope and Discussion of the Research

To support the main argument that one of the main forces that pushed up to one-fourth of S. Koreans to turn to Protestantism in the past century was their cultural complex of inferiority, the author takes four steps. In Chapter 2, the author attempts to provide a basic knowledge of Korean Protestantism from its beginning to the present that is a strong theoretical foundation for this research by doing three things. First, its brief historical sketch of its history will be made, dividing the time frame into three categories – the fall of Joseon, the Japanese colonial era, and since the liberation to the 1990s. Second, the three frequently mentioned causes of Korean Protestantism's rapid growth will be explained – Korean Protestantism as a new outlook for Koreans, S. Korea's rapid social changes as a seedbed for evangelism, and Korean Protestantism as a synthetic religion of Korean Shamanism and Western Protestantism. Last, with statistical data about when the KPC extensively grew, the author will suggest that its growth was not continuous throughout the past century; instead, its explosive growth concentrated on a certain period between the 1960s and 1990s.

In Chapter 3, a Jungian psychohistorical perspective applicable to the case of the KPC in four steps will be introduced. First, general information about psychohistory as a historical discipline is provided, paying attention to its origin and evolution. Second, the psychohistorical method's strengths, weaknesses, and contributions to historical studies are explained. Third, to make a theoretical bridge between psychohistory and Jungian psychology, the basic concepts of the psychology – the collective unconsciousness, psychopathology, dreaming and archetypes, and complex theory – are explained. Last, the theory of cultural complex – an extension of Jung's theory of the individual complex to a collective extent that a trauma befallen on a group can cause a collective complex in its cultural or collective unconsciousness – is introduced.

In Chapter 4, the author examines Korea's three important historical events in the past century that dramatically changed S. Koreans' psychological reality on a collective level – Japanese Imperialism, the Korean War, and the three Korean military governments – with a focus on how they were traumatic to them, in order to discover the origins of S. Koreans' cultural complex – collective inferiority – and explain how it gradually deteriorated. First, how Japanese imperialism psychologically influenced them is explained, paying attention to the psychological relationship between Koreans and the Japanese and how the relationship changed the national character of Koreans through implanting a collective sense of inferiority in them. Second, the psychological impacts of the Korean War on S. Koreans on a collective level is explored, along with the emergence of S. Korea's anticommunism backed by the U.S. Military Government in Korea. Last, how the three Korean military governments – Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-

hee, and Chun Doo-hwan – controlled S. Koreans both bodily and psychologically with the use of the anticommunism law in order to solidify their power.

In Chapter 5, the author will explain how the cultural complex of inferiority in S. Koreans motivated them to convert to Protestantism from a Jungian psychohistorical perspective in four steps. First, whether or not those historical events could be collectively traumatic to S. Koreans is examined, relying on collective trauma theorists. Second, a Jungian psychohistorical perspective is applied to S. Korea's traumatic events in the past century to see how the complex took shape and exacerbated in their minds as the traumatic events befell upon them in series. Third, the long hidden interdependent relationship between the Korean Protestant Church and the Korean military governments, in which the KPC religiously supported the governments in exchange for the various opportunities, provided by the governments, for it to miraculously grow, is explained. Lastly, taken all together, a Jungian psychohistorical analysis assembles all the theoretical pieces into one feasible interpretation of the KPC's growth – the cultural complex of inferiority lay at the heart of the unconsciousness of S. Koreans who made the KPC's unexpected growth possible.

CHAPTER TWO

A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE KOREAN PROTESTANT CHURCH'S GROWTH IN THE PAST CENTURY

Referring to the 1982 Korea Gallup Institute Report, the former Executive Secretary of the Asia Theological Association, Bong-Rin Ro said, "[T]he Christian population in South Korea (hereafter S. Korea) has increased to twenty percent including four percent Roman Catholics. Among the young adults (between age 18 to 24), thirty percent, including six percent Roman Catholics, claim to be Christians."[42] Merely 35,759 Christians (0.6 percent of the total population of 5,928,802) in 1904 grew to 20.15 million (41.4 percent of the total population of 50,423,955) in 2014.[43] The phenomenon of Korean Christianity is considered as one of the most useful examples to counter the secularization theory that, as a society develops through industrialization and urbanization, its religion loses its influence on human life.[44] A number of Western scholars focused on the history of Korean Christianity to find what made such a de-secularization process and its rapid growth possible within a century from various

[42] Bong-Rin Ro and Marlin L. Nelson, ed., *Korean Church Growth Explosion* (Seoul, S. Korea: Asia Theological Association, 1983), 3.

[43] Byung Joon Chung, "A Reflection on the Growth and Decline of the Korean Protestant Church," *International Review of Mission* 103 (2014): 140.

[44] One of the major advocates for the secularization theory throughout his scholarly life from the 1960s to the 1990s, Peter L. Berger changed his view on secularization by saying that, although modernization undermines taken-for-granted beliefs and values, modernity does not necessarily secularize; instead, it pluralizes and relativizes, and gives rise to massive urbanization along the way. Along with this, modernization brings a great amount of uncertainty into human life, owing to the loss of 'the' religion that worked as a "plausible structure" to provide people with what is right and wrong in terms of their actions and behavior in their society. For more information about him and his work, see "The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview" in *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, ed. Peter L. Berger et al. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 1-18; "Secularization Falsified," *First Things* (2008): 23-27; "Faith and Development," *Global Society* 46 (2009): 69-75.

perspectives. However, they do not consider that since 1995 the Korean Protestant Church stopped growing, stagnated for a while and eventually began declining since the new millennium.

This chapter aims to provide a general overview of the history of the Korean Protestant Church in the past century, presenting a summary of what has been examined and discussed about the miraculous growth of the KPC. To accomplish that goal, first, the author describes how Protestantism came to Korea and grew from a historical perspective. Second, three major interpretations – philosophical, sociological, and religious – about what caused the growth are explained. And then, the necessity of a psychohistorical interpretation of the growth will be emphasized.

I. The Miraculous Growth of Korean Christianity

In his article, "HanGuk Gyohoeui Seongjanggwa Geu Dunhwa Hyeonsangeui Gyohoeuisajeok Gochal [A Church-Historical Investigation of the Growth of the Korean Protestant Church and Its Slow-Down] (1997)," Man-yôl Yi, a Korean historian, points out that the Korean Protestant Church's miraculous growth took place as Koreans underwent a series of traumatic crises such as the Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945, the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, and Korean military governments from 1945 to 1987 – along with those governments-led rapid industrialization and urbanization from 1962 on. To explore how it happened, paying attention to what Korean Christianity did for Koreans, Yi divides the history into three periods: the closing period of the Joseon Dynasty (1882 to 1910), Japanese colonial rule (1910 to 1945), and on and after the liberation (1945 to present). For the sake of summarization, the author formulates Yi's

historical division as a basic framework on which the history of Korean Protestantism is examined because it helps navigate Korea's significant historical events and how Protestantism reacted to them.

A. The Fall of Joseon, Korea's Last Dynasty, and Christianity (1882 to 1910)

Korean (church) historians generally agree that Koreans encountered Christianity for the first time approximately between the 13th and mid-16th centuries because China had already accepted Christianity in the 13th century and there were already some 3,000 Christians in Japan in the mid-16th century.[45] Official documents of the Joseon dynasty, written in the early 17th century, report that Kwang-jong Yi, a Joseon Dynasty emissary to Beijing, brought to Korea a world atlas by Matteo Ricci, a Catholic missionary in Beijing and that Justice Minister Mong-in Yu wrote a critique of Ricci's *De Deo Verax Disputatio* [A True Disputation Concerning God; *Cheonjusilui*].[46] In 1795, there were some four thousand Christians in Korea and the number increased to about ten thousands by 1800.[47] In the beginning, Koreans accepted Christianity as a source of learning, not as a religion. For that reason, Christianity was known as *Seohak* [Western Learning]. First, liberal Confucianism scholars of that time showed a great interest in Western science and technology they encountered through missionaries. In particular, they were attracted by the Christian belief that God systematically created the universe so that the universe is observable, analyzable, and predictable. That view on the universe was dramatically

[45] Masakazu Asami and Jungwon Ahn, *Hanguk Gidokgyoneun Eotteoge Gukga Jonggyoga Doeeotteulka?* [How Did Korean Christianity Become a National Religion?], trans. Hyeon-Hye Yang (Seoul: Cum Libro, 2012), 78-84, 104-106.

[46] Ibid., 85-86.

[47] Han-Sik Kim, "The Influence of Christianity on Modern Korean Political Thought" in *Korean Journal* 23 (1983): 4-5.

different from their Confucian worldview that the universe is constantly in change and transition under the influence of the *yin*/*yang* principle.

As far as who laid the first foundation for Korean Christianity, John Ross of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland's Manchurian mission is remembered as the first Protestant missionary who was the forerunner of evangelizing Koreans. With the belief that the best method of evangelization is not by foreign missionaries but by converted natives, Ross began translating the Gospels of Luke and John with a group of Korean merchants working in Manchuria and completed it in 1882 – the entire New Testament as a single volume in 1887.[48] His belief was right. Within a couple of years, first Korean Christian communities – mostly the people of the lower classes – had been established in Manchuria.[49]

While Ross was working on the Bible translation, Horace N. Allen, the first Presbyterian missionary in Korea from the Northern Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., arrived at a central part of Korea in 1884. In the following year, the first Methodist missionary Henry G. Appenzeller from the Methodist Episcopal Church and Horace G. Underwood from the Northern Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. – several other missionaries almost immediately followed them. They began their mission work with medical care and education. By the end of the 1880s, a few modern Christian institutions

[48] Asami and Ahn, *Hanguk Gidokgyoneun Eotteoge Gukga Jonggyoga Doeeotteulka?* 117-118; Gi-Eun Chae, *Hanguk Gyohoesa* [The History of the Korean Church] (Seoul: Christian Literature Crusade, 2003), 36-37; James Huntley Grayson, "A Quarter-Millennium of Christianity in Korea" in *Christianity in Korea*, ed. Robert E. Buswell Jr. and Timothy S. Lee (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 12-13.

[49] Asami and Ahn, *Hanguk Gidokgyoneun Eotteoge Gukga Jonggyoga Doeeotteulka?*, 117-120; Grayson, "A Quarter-Millennium of Christianity in Korea, 13.

came into existence in Korea such as the Paichai Boy's School[50] and Ewha Girl's School[51]. According to Samuel H. Moffett's report, the number of Korean Protestants in Korea in 1890 was "17,577."[52] Considering that the Korea's total population of 1890 was 6,608,000,[53] it is not difficult to see how small influence Korean Protestants had on Korea back then - In 1890, Korean Protestants occupied less than 0.3 percent of the total population.

When Koreans established Christian communities – first in Manchuria in the middle of the 1880s and then in the northern areas of Korea in the latter part of the 1880s, the Joseon dynasty was sharply collapsing for three reasons. The first reason was the pressure of foreign powers such as the U.S., Japan, France, and Germany that were trying to nullify the dynasty's seclusion policy so as to colonize it. The second reason was the corruption of the ruling class who bought and sold their governmental positions for personal interests with no regard to the falling of their country. The third and last reason was that Korean Confucianism – the ruling ideology of the dynasty for the previous five years – came to lose its place as a religion-like national philosophy because of the armchair philosophizing of scholars who emphasized Confucian abstract ideals rather than realistic and political issues.

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[50] In *Hakguk Gyohoe Iyagi* [A Story of Korean Church] (2009), Deok-Ju Rhee notes that, when Emperor Gojong named the first school for boys that H. G. Appenzeller built on Feb. 21, 1887, Koreans finally began to recognize the school as a validated school by the Joseon dynasty. At first, many Koreans thought of going to the school as a shortcut for the rise of status by building up relationship with missionaries who were seemingly on good terms with high officials of the dynasty.

[51] By naming the first school for girls M. F. Scranton founded *ewha* [a pearl flower], the Empress Myeongseong showed that the Korea government trusted the missionaries in Korea.

[52] Boo-Woong Yoo, *Korean Pentecostalism: Its History and Theology* (New York: Verlag Peter Lang, 1987), 208.

[53] "The Increase and Distribution of the Population of Joseon Dynasty," *Uri Yeoksa Net* [Our History Net], accessed on Jan. 27, 2017, http://contents.history.go.kr/front/nh/view.do?levelId=nh_033_0020_0010_0010.

Historians, who pay attention to the social context of Joseon, generally agree that first generation Korean Protestants accepted Christianity as a new way of living, owing to its connection with Western civilization. Moreover, the concepts of equality, freedom, and nationality emphasized by Western missionaries taught Koreans through their warm treatment of the lowest class people of Koreans left a strong impression on them. They called male missionaries Nobles or Gentle-men – the Confucian term to refer to idealistic humans who have achieved the identity between their words and actions.[54] However, because of those positive impressions of Protestantism, the first generation of Korean Protestants could not see Christianity as a tool for Western imperialism. They simply thought that imperialism had to do only with Japan.

By the 1890s, missionaries began publishing Christian books and magazines in Korean such as Korean language textbooks in 1889, a Korean/English dictionary in 1890, *The Korean Repository* in 1892, Korean Hymnals in 1893, and *Pilgrim's Progress* in 1894. Those books helped many Koreans encounter the advance of Western civilization and Christianity. However, in that decade, the missionaries faced financial difficulties and conflicts with other missionaries who belonged to different denominations. To resolve the problems, all the missionaries in Korea got together for a discussion and came up with three solutions. First, they agreed to find a way to make churches in Korea financially independent, based on a mission plan proposed by a Presbyterian missionary in Shantung, China, John L. Nevius – later known the Nevius Mission Plan – that sought

[54] The Joseon Dynasty had a rigid caste system. There were four classes in the system: (a) *yangban* the loyalty, the nobility, and *hyangban* the country gentry, (b) *chungin* the middle folk including medical officers, interpreters, etc. and *soja* the illegitimate sons of the nobility, (c) *sangmin* the common people such as artisans, merchants, etc. and (d) *chonmin*, including the untouchable and humble folk performers, Buddhist monks, *kisaengs*, male and female servants, butchers, shamans, etc. The caste system was abolished in 1894 as part of the Gabo Reform issued by King Gojong. It must be remembered that Christianity greatly contributed to the abolition of the caste system.

self-supporting, self-propagating or-extending, and self-governing churches.[55] Second, to prevent unnecessary competitions and conflicts among the missionaries, they decided to divide the peninsula into several mission spheres so that one denomination continued its missionary work in an assigned area – with the exception of the Holy Church Anglicans. Third and last, they agreed to create one United Church of Christ in Korea. However, the plan quickly became useless because North American denominations opposed it.

In that social context – from 1900 to the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, the number of Protestants gradually increased. One of the most important historical events for that growth was the 1908 Great Revival in Pyongyang, the spiritual influence of which swept through the peninsula, breathing self-confidence into the minds of Koreans. Some church historians like Man-yôl Yi go so far as to argue that the religious experience stimulated Koreans to plan and execute the March First Independence Movement of 1919, stressing that sixteen of the thirty-three people who had made the Declaration were Protestants.[56] However, scholars are not slow to criticize that the revival pushed Korean Protestants to turn away from this worldly issue – Japan's aggressive colonization of Korea – and to overly concentrate on spiritual issues like salvation. Particularly, the missionaries, who planned the revival, taught Korean Protestants the

[55] Here it is also important to notice that some Korean scholars view the Nevius Mission Plan as one of the significant roots of the 'individualism' of the Korean Protestant Church. By 'individualsim,' the author means a strong tendency of a church to care only about its own financial stability and growth in the number of its own members. For more information about this, see Gil-Soo Han, Joy J. Han, and Andrew Eungi Kim's "'Serving Two Masters': Protestant Churches in Korea and Money," *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 9 (2009): 333-360; Myung-Hyuk Kim, "Korean Mission in the World Today and Its Problems" in *Korean Church Explosive Growth*, ed. Bong-Rin Ro and Marlin L. Nelson (Seoul: Word of Life Press, 1983), 127-134; Young-Jae Kim, "A Re-evaluation of the Mission Policies of Nevius," trans. Kwang-sun Cho, in *Korea and Christianity*, ed. Chai-shin Yu (Fremont: Asian Humanities Press, 2004), 73-85.

[56] Mahn-yôl Yi, "Hanguk Gyohoeui Seongjanggwa Geu Dunhwa Hyeonsangeui Gyohoeuisajeok Gochal [An Church-Historical Investigation of the Growth of the Korean Protestant Church and Its Slow-Down]," accessed on January 18, 2017, http://www.churchr.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=2836.

importance of the separation between state and church when they were threatened to comply with the Japanese colonial government. Taken together, it is paradoxical that, although the missionaries passed on to Koreans the concepts of freedom, equality and nationality, they did not want Korean Protestants to practice and live with them in the face of the Japanese government.

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the Great Revival was a foundational event for Protestants to more actively begin evangelizing their people. Deok-Ju Rhee, a historian of Korean Christianity, contends that the revival helped Protestants to recognize Christianity as a new ethical system that could replace their old Confucian ethics. In the revival meetings, Koreans confessed their traditional behaviors such as smoking, concubinage, slavery, ancestral rites, and incantation as being sinful and chose a new life in Christ.[57] Thus, to Koreans, Christianity became a symbol for a break with the past.[58] The revival's influence is easily discoverable in a remarkable increase of Korean Protestants in number from 31,356 in 1903 to 118,246 in 1909, and to 157,633 in 1919.[59]

However, other scholars like Chung-Shin Park point out the social context of Korea in the 1900s as a more important cause of the increase in the number of Korean Protestants. Park insists that the role of Protestant churches to offer Koreans a safe place during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) could directly contribute to the increase. During the wars, both Japan and Russia did not attack and invade Protestant churches in Korea to avoid any conflicts with the U.S. largely

[57] Deok-Ju Rhee, *Hanguk Gyohoeui Iyagi* [A Story of Korean Church] (Seoul: Sinangwa Jiseongsa, 2015), 152-153.

[58] Man-yôl Yi, "A Re-evaluation of the Mission Policies of Nevius" in *Korea and Christainity*, ed. Chai-shin Yu (Fremont: Asian Humanities Press, 2004), 39-72.

[59] Chung, "A Reflection on the Growth and Decline of the Korean Protestant Church," 322.

because those churches belonged to missionaries were the U.S.'s properties. By staying at Protestant churches, Koreans could save their lives when their country could not save them. That experience led to the thought that the U.S. is stronger than both Japan and Russia. Needless to say, some Koreans turned to Protestantism for safety.

In summary, while Joseon – the last dynasty of Korea – was declining by the tornado of colonialism, Christianity – mainly American Protestantism – was introduced to Koreans. At first, the ruling class of Joseon – mostly Confucian scholars – received Christianity not as a religion but as a way of learning. However, ordinary Koreans spread Christianity as a religion, undergoing the two tragic wars and the revival.

B. The Japanese Colonial Era (1910 to 1945)

The Empire of Japan took three steps to annex the Joseon dynasty as a colony. On February 26, 1876, Japan forced Joseon to sign the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876 (also known as Treaty of Ganghwa Island) with the bombardment of the Japanese gunboat *Un'yō* at Ganghwa Island. At first glance, the treaty seemed to end Joseon's status as a tributary state of the Qing Dynasty and established Joseon as an independent nation. However, it officially opened three ports of Korea to Japanese trade, and made Joseon gradually vulnerable to the influence of not only Japan but also other imperialistic powers. Following the victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Japan entered into the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 (also known as Eulsa Treaty or Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty) on November 17, 1905. The treaty allowed Japan to take full responsibility for Joseon's diplomatic issues and made Joseon a protectorate of Japan. Soon after the treaty was signed, Japan sent Itō Hirobumi to be the first Residency-General of Japan to Korea.

Lastly, on August 22, 1910, the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1910 (also known as Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty) – the final treaty that degenerated Joseon into a colony of the Japanese Empire – was completed. The first article of the Treaty reads, "His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes the complete and permanent cession to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea."[60]

In the Japanese colonial era, the number of Protestant Christians in Korea continued to increase. In 1914, there were 196,000 Christians that occupied 1.1 percent of the total population. By the end of the Japanese rule in 1945, the number increased to 740,000 that occupied over three percent of the population.[61] To the question of how the increase was made possible, church historians answer that the involvement of Christian churches in social and political activities against Japanese Imperialism drew attention from Koreans. To know specifics, it is necessary to examine the four important events that might have changed Koreans' perception of Christianity from being apolitical to being political as well as patriotic: the conspiracy trial of 1912, Japan's oppression of Christian churches, the March First Movement of 1919, and the Shinto Shrine Controversy.

First, in 1912, the Japanese colonial government made a false trial to suppress Protestants and their political acts against it. Right after annexation, the colonial government dispersed all political and social organizations or groups in Korea by force. However, they could not dissolve Christian churches to avoid unnecessary conflicts with the U.S. Soon, churches became safe places for Korean independence activists. In

[60] Committee Against Government Apologies to Korea, *A New Look at the Annexation of Korea* (*Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact*, 2010), 63.

[61] Grayson, "A Quarter-Millennium of Christianity in Korea," 15.

October 1911, the government arrested, without notice, about 600 Koreans and accused 123 – seventy percent were Christians – of attempting to assassinate the Japanese-general, Terauchi Masatake (1852-1919). Among those Protestants, core members of Sinminhoe – a Korean independence movement – such as Kim Gu, Cha Yi-Seok, and Yang Jeon-baek were included. On September 28, 1912, the government sentenced 105 Protestants guilty, inhumanly torturing them to get a confession.[62] Given that more and more Protestants got involved in independence movements against Japan during that period, Korean church historians think that the 1912 trial implanted in the minds of Koreans a link between Korean nationalism and Protestantism.

Second, the Japanese colonial government announced the First Educational Rules in 1911 that legalized Japanese as the only national language to be used in all public institutions – an intention to speed up the process of Japanizing Koreans. To suppress Korean Protestant churches, it prohibited Christian worship in missionary-built schools such as Sungsil College (Union Christian College) in Pyongyang, Ewha Woman's College, and Yonhui College (Chosen Christian College) in Seoul. On top of this, it also deprived Koreans of all opportunities for higher education, which resulted in that "From 1911 to 1945, the literacy rate of Koreans almost reached 80%."[63] Deok Ju Rhee argues that Korean Protestants perceived Japan's assimilation policy of Korea into Japan as not

[62] Chae, *Hanguk Gyohoesa*, 84-86; Rhee, *Hanguk Gyohoeui Iyagi*, 189-192; Asami, *Hanguk Gidokgyoneun Eotteoge Gukga Jonggyoga Doeeotteulka?*, 142-143. Additionally, in October, 1913, the government changed its former sentence and released ninety nine out of one hundred five Christians, sentencing only six Christians to five years' imprisonment. Two years later, however, the six Christians were also released on the pretext of a coronation ceremony for Emperor Taishō.

[63] Changyeong Park and Hoil Jeong, *Hyeondaesareul Bora! Ilje Gangjeomgiwa Hyeondae* [Look at the History of Korea!: Japanese Era and Modern Korea] (Seoul: Liber, 2013), 53.

only a national suffering but also a religious persecution.[64] Thus, the policy caused more Korean Protestants to participate in independent movements.

Third, on March 1, 1919, an event that became the birthplace of the nationhood of modern Korea took place in the form of a nation-wide independence movement – later called the March First Movement of 1919. Initially, the movement was designed by a group of thirty-three people as a private nonviolence activity that read the Declaration of Independence they wrote with a group discussion. After citing the Declaration, they all surrendered to the Japanese police. However, their symbolic act ignited the desire of Koreans who longed for independence. Soon a series of independence movements took place on a national scale. The Japanese police brutally suppressed the movement with the use of armed forces despite that the participants were unarmed. A few missionaries rushed to China and cabled what happened on that day in Korea to their mission boards.[65] Most foreign Christians officially took the side of the Korean people and condemned the Japanese oppression and cruelties. The Movement became a chance to consolidate the perception among Koreans that Protestant Christians were patriotic supporters of Korean nationalism and anti-imperialism.

Lastly, the Shinto – literally meaning "ways of the gods" – Shrine Controversy of 1925 contributed to the increase of Korean Protestants in the opposite way the Japanese government originally planned. Shintoism is a Japanese traditional religion that worships a variety of Japanese traditional gods and spirits, including the past emperors. As part of the assimilation policy of Korea into Japan, the Japanese government built a shrine of

[64] Rhee, *Hanguk Gyyohoeui Iyagi*, 192.
[65] Grayson, "A Quarter-Millennium of Christianity in Korea," 16.

their religion in Korea in 1925, demanding all Koreans attend Shinto worship on a daily basis. It required every Christian church in Korea to have a *kamidana* (meaning "god-shelf") – a miniature household altar – for the Shinto religion in its sanctuary. Protestant churches were not an exception. The government placed the national flag of Japan in the sanctuary of every church and ordered Protestants to bow to the flag as well as the direction of the Japanese royal place. It also required the Japanese national epic, *The Tale of the Heike* to be recited before any religious worship or meeting begins.

The majority of Korean Protestants considered the order as an idolatrous act and rejected it continually. To make them obey it, in 1938 the government coerced the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church to pass a resolution that shrine worship had nothing to do with the Christian faith. Shortly thereafter, all other denominations followed the same step, except for a minority of Presbyterians.[66] To efface missionaries' opposition, it deported all missionaries in Korea and changed forms of Christian liturgies, prohibiting the reading of the Old Testament and the Book of Revelation that contained prophecies of God's condemnation of the powers. What is worse, in July 1945, it dissolved all Korean denominations, combining them into one union – called the Joseon Denomination of the Japanese Union Church. From 1939 to 1942, 1,200 of five thousand churches were closed and the number of the baptized decreased from 134,000 in 1939 to 110,002 in 1942. Nevertheless, all in all, the total number of Christians during the Japanese occupation continued to increased from 177,692 in 1910 to 245,000 in 1942.[67]

[66] Chae, *Hanguk Gyohoesa*, 111-112.
[67] Chung, "A Reflection on the Growth and Decline of the Korean Protestant Church," 324.

In summary, the Japanese colonial era played the role of fertile soil for Korean Protestantism to prepare a springboard for its rapid growth from the 1945 liberation onward. The Japanese cultural and religious suppression of Koreans to eliminate their national cultural identity ironically strengthend their perception about a link between Protestantism and patriotism. Under Japanese rule, Christianity – mainly Protestantism – transformed from a foreign religion that the ruling class took for their education to a national – patriotic and liberative – religion that common people took to save their country.

C. Since the Liberation of 1945

After Korea regained liberation from the Empire of Japan, Protestant churches in S. Korea faced two historical questions. The first was about whether or not to continue the Japanese-created unified church and the second was how to deal with pastors who submitted Shinto worship.[68] In late 1945, a group of Methodists decided to redesign the Korean Methodist Church structure. Shortly after, other denominations took the same step. However, conflicts over attendance at the Shinto rituals were not easy to resolve because most of the pastors did it. In 1946, a group of Presbyterians, who had been in prison due to their bold resistance to Shinto rituals, formed a denomination named the Koryo Group to emphasize their religious purity and legitimacy – without knowing that that division was later recorded as the origin of the unending schism in the Korean Protestant Church among church historians. In spite of the religious conflict, however, the number of Protestants in S. Korea kept increasing at a moderate rate because of the inflow into S. Korea of a number of Protestants in North Korea (hereafter N. Korea) who

[68] Grayson, "A Quarter-Millennium of Christianity in Korea," 20.

fled from the persecution of Christians by N. Korea's communist government. Unfortunately, the moderate growth was stopped by the Korean War in 1950.

The Korean War is an 'unended,' and still continuing war. The war did not bring about any victorious countries, but only many defeated countries.[69] Who started the war between N. and S. Korea remains a controversy even now because any clear conclusion about its origins has not been made. Even though more than sixteen countries participated in the first and last war ignited by the ideological conflicts between capitalism and communism, more often the war is called as a civil war between two Koreas.[70] Nevertheless, there is one unchangeable truth: Koreans suffered – and are still suffering – from the war. It caused "a total of more than four million casualties, of which at least two million were civilians – a higher percentage than in World War II or Vietnam,"[71] causing 200 thousand widows, 100 thousand orphans, 2 million separated families.[72] It damaged or destroyed approximately eighty percent of industrial facilities, seventy-five percent of governmental buildings, and more than half an inhabitable area of Korea.[73]

It is not difficult to suppose that the survivors were traumatized, suffering extreme psychological pains throughout their lifetimes. A group of Korean scholars and journalists insist that for S. Koreans, the trauma of the war is still being inherited from generation to generation in S. Korea as an internalized reflex-terror of N. Koreans.[74]

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[69] Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: The Modern Library, 2011), xv.

[70] Tae-Gyun Park, *Hangukjeonjaeng* [The Korean War] (Seoul: Com Libro, 2005), 38-51. In addition, the Korean War as an ideological war brought about a series of genocides – pro-Americans killed anti-Americans and vice versa, before, during, and after it.

[71] Ibid., 35.

[72] Park and Jeong, *Hanguksareul Bora! Ilje Gangjeomgiwa Hyeondae*, 210.

[73] Ibid., 210-211.

[74] Jun-Man Kang et al., *Red Complex: Kwanggigak Namjin Ahobgaeui Chosang [Red Complex: Nine Portraits Madness Left Behind]* (Seoul: Samin Publisher, 1997); Additionally, in *SeoJungseokui*

Jungseok Seo and other historians claim that the S. Korean militant governments employed the terror to suppress those who stood against them by labeling them communists – national betrayers – and their harsh treatment of those betrayers as patriotic acts.[75] With this background knowledge of the social context of S. Korea in the 1950s, now let us turn to the Korean Protestant Church in the aftermath of the war, focusing on its growth.

To recover from the tragic ruin of the nation by the Korean War, S. Korea had to heavily rely on economic aid from foreign countries. Among various social organizations, churches and church-related aid organizations took the lead, providing Koreans with housing, clothing, food, transportation and emergency medical aid. S. Korea's war-stricken circumstances helped various Protestant denominations across the world easily come to S. Korea and began their missionary work with little sanctions from the government. For example, the Assembly of God arrived in 1953; Churches of Christ, Church of the Nazarene, and the Bible Baptist Church in 1954; the Lutheran Church in 1958; and the Pentecostal Church, Church of God, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and Jehovah's Witnesses in 1965. Such a rapid influx of diverse Protestant denominations established a foothold for a very competitive market of religion to emerge

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Hyeondaesa Iyagi 2: Hangukjeonjaenggwa Minganin Jibdan Haksal [Jung-seok Seo's Story of the Modern History of Korea 2: The Korean War and Massacre] (2015), Jung-seok Seo argues that, different from the internalization of Red Complex, the war also positively influenced the modernization of Korea within half a century in several points. First, the war completely abolished the Korean caste system of the Joseon Dynasty even in everyday life. Second, it extended women's rights. Third, the war gave rise to the famous Korean educational enthusiasm. Fourth, the war contributed to strengthening the Korean governmental power during the period of the national reconstruction.

[75] Jung-Seok Seo, *SeoJungseokui Hyeondaesa Iyagi 2: Hangukjeonjaenggwa Minganin Jibdan Haksal [Jungseok Seo's Story of the Modern History of Korea 2: The Korean War and Massacre]* (Seoul: maybooks, 2015), 137-139; Hong-Gu Han, *Hanhongguui Yeoksa Iyagi: Daehanminguksa from 386 sedae to The Korea-US FTA [Hong-gu Han's Story of Korean Modern History: from 386 Generation to the Korea-US FTA]* (Seoul: Hanibook Publisher, 2006), 50-124.

since the 1960s.[76] However, it is worth pointing that even though the KPC continued to grow in numbers after the war, the percentage of Protestants remained at fewer than three percent of the total population in the late 1950s.[77]

The KPC's explosive growth started from the late 1960s. The number of the churches significantly increased from 5,011 in 1960 to 33,897 in 1996.[78] The number of Protestants also significantly increased from 623,072 in 1960 to 8,760,000 in 1995[79] and represented almost 26 percent of the total population – Protestants (19.7%) and Catholics (6.6%).[80] Between the late 1960s and the early 1990s, nearly four hundred large churches and the fifteen largest mega-churches of the world were built in S. Korea.[81] When the KPC became financially independent in 1980s, it quickly turned to overseas mission work and began sending missionaries abroad. In 1998, the KPC sent nearly eight thousand missionaries abroad – 4,700 ordained ministers and 3,200 lay evangelists, which was the third highest representation in the world,[82] making a strong statement that the KPC is one of the most successful and dynamic Christianities in the world in the twentieth century.

[76] Yi, "Hanguk Gyohoeui Seongjanggwa Geu Dunhwa Hyeonsangeui Gyohoeuisajeok Gochal."
[77] Chung, "A Reflection on the Growth and Decline of the Korean Protestant Church," 328.
[78] Young-gi Hong, "The Background and Characteristics of the Charismatic Mega-Churches in Korea," *AJPS* 3 (2000): 99.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Hartford Institute for Religion Research defines the term, megachurch, as "any Protestant Christian congregation with a sustained average weekly attendance of 2,000 persons or more in its worship services, counting all adults and children at all its worship locations," accessed on Jan. 22, 2017, http://www.hartfordinstitute.org/megachurch/definition.html.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Andrew Eungi Kim, "The Rise of Protestantism in Contemporary S. Korea: Non-Religious Factors in Conversion," *Review of Korean Studies* 5 (2002): 12.

II. The Three Main Reasons for the Rapid Growth

As to how the Korean Protestant Church could accomplish the seemingly impossible growth in a century, scholars generally agree with three plausible explanations. The first is that Protestantism offered S. Koreans a new outlook that could replace their traditional ones that failed to explain the meanings of their country's modern history. The second is that S. Korea's rapid social changes were a seedbed for the explosive growth of the KPC. The third and last is that S. Koreans transformed Western Christianity into a Koreanized, or Shamanized, Christianity that fit well with both their traditional religious-consciousness and their desires after the Korean War. Let us examine the three explanation in detail.

A. Protestantism as New Outlooks on Life

Since its introduction to Korea, Protestantism transformed Koreans' perceptions about themselves and their country. Granted that Korea was religiously a pluralistic society before Protestantism was introduced, it is worthwhile to ask how Protestantism could secure a main position in Korea in the past century. Andrew Eungi Kim, a sociology professor of Korean University, argues that one of the key reasons for the rapid growth of the KPC in the past century is that the religious worldview and value system of Protestantism was able to make sense of Koreans' harsh realities while Korean traditional religions such as Shamanism and Buddhism were unable.[83] To capture the role of Protestantism for Koreans, it is necessary to look into what outlooks on life it offered Koreans. To do so, the author divides Korea's past century into four categories – the

[83] Kim, "The Rise of Protestantism in Contemporary S. Korea: Non-religious Factors in Conversion," 15.

early years of Christianity in Korea (before 1910), Japanese imperial era (1910 to 1945), the aftermath of the Korean War (1953 to 1960), and the massive industrialization and urbanization era (1968 to 1990).

First, when Protestantism was introduced to Koreans, it brought, along with the Word of God, a set of Western social ethics such as freedom, equality, and human rights. Don Baker, a historian of Asian Christianity, points out that Protestantism considerably changed Korea's family- and community-oriented traditional ethics based on its traditional religions.[84] While Korea's traditional religions largely emphasized patriarchal collectivism, Protestantism stressed individualism anchored in its theology focusing on a believer's 'individual' relationship with God. Owing to that difference, at first Koreans perceived Christianity as a religion that demanded a break from their traditional society and considered it as a threat to their traditional value system. However, the concepts such as freedom and equality gradually drew attention from Koreans – particularly, the underprivileged, providing them with a new way of looking at life and the world.

Second, when Japan made Korea one of its colonies in 1910 and began to persecute Korean Protestants, Christian moral concepts were linked with the patriotic spirit of Koreans who participated in independence movements to regain sovereignty. Japan responded to it with severe punishment. Unexpectedly, it caused more and more Protestants to join the movements in various ways such as attending worship and prayer meetings, refusing to pay taxes, and assassinating Japanese chief instigators. At the end of its colonial rule, the Japanese government prohibited all Protestant church gatherings. However, Protestants who carried on independence movements did not flinch from that.

[84] Don Baker, *Korean Spirituality* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 9-15.

Their firm resolution and sacrifice for the nation implanted in the minds of Koreans a definite connection between their faith in God and the independence movement. During the Japanese Colonial era, therefore, Protestantism approached Koreans not only as a religion but also as a political act to liberate their country.[85]

Third, after Korea had regained independence from Japan in 1945, Protestantism quickly became a religion of the privileged in S. Korea. Under the umbrella of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (hereafter the U.S. military government), Syngman Rhee, First President of the Republic of Korea who was a Protestant, wanted to make S. Korea a Christian country.[86] To do so, he systematically suppressed Korea's traditional religions with the use of his political power. Masakazu Asami, a Japanese historian of Korean Christianity, and others offer some evidence for that. During the Rhee government, about forty percent of the position in public office were Protestants – during the U.S. military government, about fifty percent were Protestants.[87] Moreover, out of the twenty-one members of the Rhee's Cabinet, nine were Protestants who had studied in the U.S.[88] To estimate how privileged Protestants were during those periods, simply note that in 1953, the number of Protestants in S. Korea merely occupied 0.52 percent of the nation's population.[89] Taken all together, it is assumable that after the 1945 liberation, Protestantism became a religion of power with the patronage of the U.S. military government and the Rhee government. Seeing that a minority of Protestants occupied the

[85] Mahn-yôl Yi, "The Birth of the National Spirit of the Christians" in *Korea and Christianity*, ed. Chai-shin Yu (Fremont: Asian Humanities Press, 2004), 39-72.

[86] In-Cheol Kang, "Daehanminguk Chodaejeongbuui Gidokgyojeok Seonggyeok [Syngman Rhee's Government as a Pro-Protestant Regime]," *The History of Christianity in Korea* 30 (2009): 91-122.

[87] Asami and Ahn, *Hanguk Gidokgyoneun Eotteoge Gukga Jonggyoga Doeeotteulka?*, 158.

[88] Kang, "Daehanminguk Chodaejeongbuui Gidokgyojeok Seonggyeok," 95-97.

[89] Seong-Ho Kang, *Hanguk Gidokgyoui Heukyeoksa: Yeol Du Gaji Jujeoro Boneun Hanguk Gaesingyo Seukaendeul* [The Dark History of Korean Christianity] (Seoul: Jidda Publishers, 2016), 211-240.

key posts of the government, ordinary Koreans might consider Protestantism as a religion of the privileged. To climb a social ladder easily and quickly, they would convert to Protestantism.

Last, the KPC effectively responded to S. Koreans' desire to have a better life and country, validating the desire with its theology of prosperity/bliss that contends that God will bless His believers materially, bodily, and psychologically.[90] The explosive growth of the KPC began in the late 1960s when Park Chung-hee put into action his ambition to radically transform S. Korea into a new nation fully equipped with industrialization and urbanization after he had come to power with a military coup. It is difficult to figure out which caused which – did S. Korea's economic development trigger the KPC's growth or vice versa? Won Gue Lee, a Korean sociologist of religion, argues that the two elements were interdependent on each other, bringing about a synergy effect between the growth of the KPC and Korea's economic development. While the desire of S. Koreans to live better was religiously motivated by the Protestant work ethic that emphasizes diligence, frugality, and diligence, the desire for success and development was validated and

[90] The KPC created another contextual theology in that period – *Minjung* (common people) theology as a self-reflective critique of the theology of prosperity/bliss that justified social injustice such as the rich and the poor and violation of human rights. S. Korea's rapid and miraculous industrialization was based on excessive exploitation of workers and laborers to some degree. *Minjung* theology aimed to recover social justice for the underprivileged, leading and supporting labor movements that eventually led to S. Korea's democratization. However, it is important to note that a majority of Korean Protestants preferred the theology of Prosperity to that of *Minjung* because the former fitted well with what they desired. For more information about the social condition, see George E. Ogle's *S. Korea: Dissent within the Economic Miracle* (1990); Bruce Cumings' *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (2005); Si-min Ryu's *Naui Hanguk Kyeondaesa: 1959-2014, 55 Nyeonui Girok* [My Story of the Modern Korea History: 55 Years from 1959 to 2014] (2014). In addition, for more information about the theology of prosperity/bliss, see Allan Anderson's "The Contribution of David Yonggi Cho to a Contextual Theology in Korea (2003)"; Andrew Eungi Kim's "Characteristics of Religious Life in S. Korea: A Sociological Survey (2001);" Harvey Cox's "Mammon and the Culture of the Market: A Socio-Theological Critique (2002);" Wonsuk Ma's "David Yonggi Cho's Theology of Blessing: Basis, Legitimacy, and Limitations (2011);" David Hazzan, "Christianity and Korea: How Religion Become so Apparently Prevalent in S. Korea (2016).

encouraged by the former.[91] The KPC made possible the co-growth of its size and country's economic development with the theology of prosperity/bliss – a theology describing God as a provider of various blessings for His/Her believers. The theology could easily pull attention from S. Koreans most of whom suffered poverty. To be blessed or better off, they thought of going to church as a way to take. In tandem with the success of the Korean military governments' national economic development plans that Protestant pastors interpreted as God's response to Protestants, more and more S. Koreans converted to Protestantism. In this sense, it is arguable that the growth of the KPC contributed – to some degree – to the rise of the Christian middle class in S. Korea.[92]

In summary, when S. Koreans had to go through a series of tragedies in the past century, Korean Protestantism offered them new worldviews with which to make sense of the realities. For Koreans living in the declining Joseon Dynasty, it became a symbol for enlightenment – individualism, equality, freedom, etc. During the Japanese occupation, it became a patriotic religion to save their country from the grip of the Empire of Japan. When industrialization and urbanization took place in every corner of S. Korea, it validated and encouraged S. Koreans' desperate desire to be better off with its theology of prosperity/bliss. Such worldviews must have helped many of them decide to convert to Protestantism.

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[91] Won Gue Lee, *Himnaera, Hangukgyohwi! [Cheer Up Korean Church!]* (Seoul, Dong-Yeon Publishers, 2009), 102-104; *Jonggyosahwihakjeok Gwanjeomeseo Bon Hangukgyohwiui Wigiwa Huimang* [The Crisis and Hope of Korean Church: From a Sociological Perspective of Religion] (Seoul: Korean Methodist Church Press, 2010), 166-168.

[92] Mahn-yôl Yi, "Haebang 50 Nyeon, Hanguk Goyhwisa Eotteoge Bolgeotinga? [50 Years Since the Liberation, How to See the History of Korean Church]," *Hangukgidokgyowa Yeoksa* [Korean Christianity and History] 4 (1995):11-12; Lee, *Himnaera, Hangukgyohwi! [Cheer Up Korean Church!]*, 102-106.

B. Rapid Social Changes as a Seedbed for Evangelism

In search of what caused the rapid growth of the Korean Protestant Church, many scholars using the lens of sociology heed a series of traumatic events – the Japanese occupation, the Korean War, and Korean military governments along with industrialization and urbanization – Koreans underwent in the past century. They argue that those tragic events caused in the minds of Koreans a sense of insecurity, anxiety and fear, which induced them to turn to Protestantism. Such an interpretation is based on the argument that Korean Protestantism was psychologically beneficial for Koreans – particularly S. Koreans – in the past century,[93] and had provided "a means of psychological relief from deep-seated discontent and despair over personal tragedies and social crises."[94] To figure out how Protestantism specifically did so, it is necessary to look into social circumstances that brought about those psychological pains: the anomie arising from rapid industrialization and urbanization after the Korean War, and the abject poverty for a considerable segment of the population that brought about the profound sense of deprivation among the underprivileged.[95]

First, when it comes to what caused the explosive growth of the KPC from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, it is important to note that the growth went hand in hand with rapid industrialization and urbanization that gave rise to S. Korea's remarkable economic

[93] Sociologists of religion developed such views on the psychological role of religion for believers into a theory named the deprivation-compensatory theory. Mainly supported by Weber and Marx, the theory insists that the popularity of religious beliefs is in proportion to the degree of deprivation believers suffer. Poverty, economic insecurity, political instability, oppression, etc. cause people willingly to receive religious or political ideas and action. When the causes of frustration are beyond the control of the deprived, their religious responses to deprivation are very likely to emerge.

[94] Kim, "The Rise of Protestantism in Contemporary S. Korea: Non-Religious Factors in Conversion," 15.

[95] Ibid. In the article, Kim provides a cogent interpretation of the social circumstances with the use of various reliable sources. For the outline of this section, the author draws on the article.

growth. Some Korean sociologists of religion agree that the rapid transition from a war-stricken nation to a highly modernized nation in such a short period was not possible without causing a certain kind of social chaos.[96] Andrew E. Kim, a professor in the Division of International Studies at Korea University, claims that there were three causes of that chaos: the breakdown of traditional values owing to rapid modernization, the wide spread of anxiety due to constant social changes, and the sense of deprivation experienced by the underprivileged in constant poverty and economic disparity.[97]

To be more specific, industrialization caused an enormous migration from impoverished rural areas to urban or suburban areas of S. Korea, resulting in rapid urbanization. This rapid social transition implanted into the minds of S. Koreans a great deal of anxiety and stress caused by "unemployment, competition, avarice, residential congestion, and moral disorder" in urban and suburban areas.[98] Moreover, the transition dissolved their traditional family structure – the extended family system that was the core of stability and communal life in rural areas. In addition, the psychological scars the Korean War left behind were not easily cured. The incessant invasion-threats from N. Korea – regardless of being real, imagined, or fabricated by Korean military governments – intensified their psychological instability. Until the early 1990s, a full-scale air raid rehearsal continued on the fifteenth of every month. To make matters worse, the Korean

[96] In "The Rise of Protestantism in Contemporary S. Korea," Kim put together opinions of a few Korean sociologists about the anomie theory. For more information about the theory from Korean perspectives, see Wan-sang Han's "Sociological Study of the Rapid Growth of Churches (1981);" Byong-suh Kim's "The Explosive Growth of the Korean Church Today: A Sociological Analysis (1985);" Won Gue Lee's *Hanguk Gyohoeui Sahoehakjeok Ihae* [A Sociological Interpretation of the Korean Church] (1992); Young-Gi Hong's "The Backgrounds and Characteristics of the Charismatic Mega Chruches in Korea (2000)."

[97] Kim, "The Rise of Protestantism in Contemporary S. Korea: Non-Religious Factors in Conversion," 18.

[98] Ibid.

military governments harshly punished those who got involved in anti-government activities, labeling them commies or anarchists.

Taken together, it is feasible to surmise that the collective feeling of insecurity of many S. Koreans, caused by the tensional political-atmosphere and the urban anxiety about survival, brought about a hunger in them for something to emotionally rely on. In connection with this, it is important to remember that one of the key missionary strategies of the KPC during that period was small group meetings where strangers could temporarily regain a sense of belongingness. Korean sociologists of religion prove it right, noting that a network of communal support from churches considerably alleviated the degree of their psychological anxiety.[99]

Second, Korean sociologists of religion point out that the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, induced by rapid industrialization, caused the underprivileged suffering from a deep sense of deprivation to turn to Protestantism.[100] S. Korea's remarkable economic development from the 1960s to 1980s was based on export-oriented and labor-intensive industries such as manufacturing, shipbuilding, and textile. Since the success of those industries largely relied on keeping wages low, the military

[99] Kim, "The Rise of Protestantism in Contemporary S. Korea," 18-21. For more information about the psychological influences of industrialization and urbanization on Koreans, see Young-Gi Hong, "The Backgrounds and Characteristics of the Charismatic Mega Chruches in Korea," *Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies* (2000): 106; Gil-Soo Han, Joy J. Han, and Andrew Eungi Kim, "Serving Two Masters': Protestant Churches in Korea and Money," *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* (2009): *336*-337; Byong-suh Kim, "Modernization and the Explosive Growth and Decline of Korean Protestant Religiosity" in *Christianity in Korea*, ed. Robert E. Buswell Jr. and Timothy S. Lee (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 309-329.

[100] Won Gue Lee, *Jonggyuesahoihakjeok Kwanjeomeseo Bon Hanguk Gyoheoiui Uigiwa Heemang* [The Crisis and Hope of the Korean Protestant Church: from a sociological perspective of religion] (Seoul: Korean Methodist Church Publishing, 2010), 166-168; "A Sociological Study on the Factors of Church Growth and Decline in Korea," *Korean Journal* (1999): 241-242; Kim; "The Rise of Protestantism in Contemporary S. Korea," 22-25; Kim, "Modernization and the Explosive Growth and Decline of Korean Protestant Religiosity," 320-321; Sukman Jang, "Historical Currents and Characteristics of Korean Protestantism after Liberation," *Korean Journal* (2004): 140-141.

governments systematically controlled labor forces, prohibiting all kinds of labor movements – when necessary, suppressing them by forces of arms. The government-controlled economic plans won success, generally improving the quality of S. Koreans' lives to a remarkable degree. However, the success at the same time widened the gap between the rich and the poor because the governments' preferential treatments of a handful of companies that later grew into *Chaebols* – Korean Conglomerates[101] that are mainly responsible for the polarization of wealth in Korea.

A Korean sociologist of religion, Won Gue Lee reports that in 1989, the richest five percent of the total population owned 65.2 percent of all private land whereas the poorest three-fourths owned only 9.2 percent.[102] Land speculation and the residential congestion inflated the price of all urban land. For the underprivileged, it is almost impossible to own their own house in urban areas.[103] In addition, until the early 1990s there was no welfare system in Korea. Before the 1990s, being poor meant to endure the deprivation of medical care, education, social benefits, etc. In those days, it was not uncommon that teenagers of poor families quit school and began working at factories as daily workers. Under these circumstances, it is not strange that the underprivileged felt a sense of relative deprivation, severe insecurity, and discontent.

Taken that many Koreans in both urban and suburban areas struggled to make ends meet during S. Korea's industrialization, it is interesting that more than half of Mega churches in Korea – like Youido Full Gospel Church with about 700,000 members – had

[101] Lee, *Himnaera, Hangukgyohwi!*, 104-105.
[102] Won Gue Lee, *Hanguk Gyoheoiui Sahwihakjeok Ihae* [A Sociological Understanding of the Korean Church] (Seoul: Seonseo Yeongusa, 1992), 22.
[103] Kim, "The Rise of Protestantism in Contemporary S. Korea," 23.

their beginnings in urban areas.[104] Korean sociologists of religion argue that Koreans who hopelessly competed for survival during that period were more likely to take Protestantism – a new religion – as a psychological as well as materialistic compensation. Andrew E. Kim points out that most of the newly converted Protestants' testimonials, without exception, revolved around three themes – poverty, concomitant hardships and God's bliss."[105] To overcome the sense of relative deprivation, S. Koreans turned to Protestantism, believing – or desiring to believe – that God would bless them with the theology of prosperity/bliss.

In summary, sociologists of religion interpret the cause of the rapid growth of Korean Protestantism, focusing on the social circumstances of S. Korea after the Korean War. Their concerns about the cause are boiled down to two things. The first concern is about the psychological impacts of S. Korea's rapid industrialization and urbanization on S. Koreans. The rapid transition of S. Korea from a war-stricken country to a developed country was possible by destroying the country's traditional family system and lifestyle tremendously, causing a great degree of anxiety in the minds of the people who migrated into urban areas. For them, Protestant churches became a so-called second home where they found their religious families. The second concern is about the psychological impact of the polarization of wealth in S. Korea on its people – relative deprivation. For those who still suffered poverty after migrating to urban or suburban areas, the KPC offered hopes with the theology of prosperity/bliss.

[104] It is wrong to say that all the Korean mega churches grew out of urban slums. There are exceptions such as Somang, Gwanglim, Younglak, Choonghyun and Myungsung that were not founded in urban slums. In addition, out of the twenty-five largest churches in the world fifteen are in S. Korea.

[105] Kim, "The Rise of Protestantism in Contemporary S. Korea," 24.

C. Korean Protestantism: a Synthesis of Korean Shamanism and Western Protestantism

Asked about the causes of the rapid growth of Korean Protestantism, scholars who have expertise in religious studies pay attention to the traditional religiosity of Koreans. For example, James Huntley Grayson, a British missionary as well as an anthropologist, is particularly concerned about how Protestantism has mixed with Korean traditional religions – shamanism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism – to become 'Korean' Protestantism. Grayson's main thesis is that to become one of the religions of Koreans, Western Protestantism had to adapt to Koreans' religious needs and accommodated their religious atmosphere.[106] Most discussions about the successful adaptation of Western Protestantism to S. Koreans' religiosity is based on one premise, that it is (Korean) Shamanism that made possible the successful hybrid of S. Koreans' religiosity and Western Protestantism. Thus, in this section, the author will examine how Western Protestantism became intermixed with Shamanism. For doing so, it is important to begin with a general understanding of shamanism.

First, the term shamanism was coined by Mircea Eliade, a historian of religion. In *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy* (1951), Eliade coined the term to define the most archaic religious behavior of humans he encountered in Siberia and Central Asia[107] in which there were no clear boundaries among mysticism, magic, philosophy, and religion – a worldview before an official religion was established. A shaman is a religious

[106] James Huntley Grayson, "Cultural Encounter: Korean Protestantism and Other Religious Traditions," *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* (2001): 66-72, "Elements of Protestant Accommodation to Korean Religious Culture: A Personal Ethnographic Perspective," *Missiology: An International Review* 23 (1995): 43-59.

[107] Mircea Eliade, *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 4.

practitioner who has the special ability, gained through a series of hard trainings and initiations, to intentionally reach altered state of consciousness. Owing to the ability, s/he is considered to be able to commune with a spiritual world that controls the world of mortals. In that worldview, hardships, illnesses, and ill fates were believed to be caused by disharmony between the two worlds. When disharmony took place, a shaman was asked to play the role of an intermediary and messenger between the two worlds. What s/he does through various shamanic rituals is to regain and maintain the balance between the two worlds for humans' health and well-being.[108] Stressing that such a religious hope is found in almost every religion, Eliade considers shamanism to be "the most essential elements of an immemorial religious tradition."[109] Shamanism is not a primitive religious act as compared to officialized religions such as Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism. Rather, it is the most basic element for all other religions. In the face of uncertainty, all humans tend to rely on what is supernatural, believing that the supernatural would help and guide them. With this general understanding of shamanism in mind, now let us discuss about hybridity between Western Protestantism and shamanism.

Second, when it comes to characteristics of Korean Protestantism, most scholars in various fields point out that it is not difficult to notice traces of Korean shamanism in Korean Protestantism – particularly its theology of prosperity/bliss.[110] They agree that the

[108] The spiritual world does not connote a world that human imagination creates and so does not exist. To people who could not arm themselves with what we call science, it is likely that everything in the world seemed mysterious and threatening. Even now, however, we are facing an innumerable number of the unknowable. In old days, people left the unknowable spiritual. In our time, we unendingly challenge the unknowable to make it knowable.

[109] Eliade, *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*, 12.

[110] As to the origin of the Korean religiosity that seeking for material bless in this world, the dominant theory is that Korean Shamanism, the oldest religion of Koreans, still has effects on the mind of Koreans and has changed Western Christianity to fit into the need of Koreans. For more information, see David Hazzen's "Christianity and Korea (2016)"; Andrew Eungi Kim's "Characteristics of Religious Life

theology's emphasis on God's experiential blessings for Christians in this world can be found in the shamanistic worldview of Koreans. To know why it is so, it is helpful to look into the religious consciousness of Koreans.

Tong-Shik Ryu, a Korean theologian, argues that it is not easy to pick one among Korean traditional religions as the national religion because, religiously taken, Korea was a pluralistic society.[111] Before the introduction of Christianity, four different religions – shamanism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism – coexisted harmoniously. Ryu thinks that the religious consciousness of Koreans can be understood like a set of four sedimentary layers. At the bottom is located shamanism as their oldest religiosity. On shamanism, Taoism introduced around 1,100 CE is located. On Taoism, there is Mahayana Buddhism introduced around 688 CE. Neo-Confucianism was put on Buddhism around 1,392 CE. With this imagery in mind, Ryu claims that a talk about Korean Protestantism and its effects on Koreans is not possible without an understanding of its interactions with the four older religions in the religious consciousness.[112] Homer B. Hulbert, one of the earliest American missionaries, excellently explained what the religious consciousness of Koreans looks like: "As a general thing, we may say that the

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in S. Korea: A Sociological Survey (2002)" and "Christianity, Shamanism, and Modernization in S. Korea (2000)"; James Huntley Grayson's "Cultural Encounter: Korean Protestantism and Other Religious Traditions (2001)" and "Elements of Protestant Accommodation to Korean Religious Culture: A Personal Ethnographic Perspective (1995)"; Alexandre Guillemoz's "The Religious Spirit of the Korean People (1973)"; Kim T'ae-gon's "Components of Korean Shamanism (1972)"

[111] Tong-Shik Ryu, *Hanguk Mugyoui Yeoksawa Gujo* [The History and Structure of the Korean Shamanism] (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1983), 14. For more information about how the four Korean traditional religions interacted with Christianity, see Alexandre Guillemoz's "The Religious Spirit of the Korean People (1973); James Huntley's "Elements of Protestant Accommodation to Korean Religious Culture: A Personal Ethnographic Perspective (1995)," "Cultural Encounter: Korean Protestantism and Other Religious Traditions (2002)," and *Korea: A Religious History* (2002).

[112] Dong-Sik Ryu, *Hanguk Mugyoui Yeoksawa Gujo* [The History and Structure of the Korean Shamanism], 14-15. To emphasize the co-existence of the different religions without conflicts with one another in the mind of Koreans, Ryu goes on to say that a Korean can be a shamanist biologically, Taoist emotionally, Buddhist philosophically, Confucian socially, and Christian volitionally – at the same time.

all-round Korean will be a Confucianist when in society, a Buddhist when he philosophizes, and a spirit-worshipper [a shaman] when he is in trouble."[113] Many scholars about Korean religions have little hesitation noting that shamanism glues those religions together – including Protestantism. Boo-Woong Yoo, a Korean scholar of Korean Pentecostalism, explains that shamanism's lack of a system of doctrine helped it successfully adapt to changing circumstances along with the introduction of new religions.[114] Sun-Deuk Oak, a Korean professor of the Department of Asian Languages & Cultures at University of California, supports Yoo's argument, saying that in the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910), even though all domestic ancestral veneration and official governmental ceremonies were performed in Confucianism, shamanism was "the authoritative religious tradition within the home of the common Korean."[115] With this information, let us turn to the hybridization of Western Protestantism and Korean shamanism in detail.

David Martin, a scholar of global Pentecostal movements, provides an interesting interpretation of the hybridization of shamanism and Protestantism in Korea in *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America* (1990). First, Martin draws attention to a correlation between the world of New Testament Christianity, where demons and spirits coexisted with humans, and the Korean shamanism's conception of life that the spiritual world is in control of human life. His assumption is that when missionaries taught Koreans stories about Jesus' healing miracles by expelling a demon

[113] Homer B. Hulbert, *The Passing of Korea* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1906), 403-404.

[114] Boo-Woong Yoo, "Response to Korean Shamanism by the Pentecostal Church," *International Review of Mission* 75 (1986): 72.

[115] Ibid., 97.

out of the body in the New Testament, Koreans did not have much difficulty grasping the divine healing in the biblical worldview, because shamanism is full of similar stories.[116] Second, Martin emphasizes a series of traumatic events that took place in Korea – more specifically, S. Korea – in the past century. Struck by those tragedies, S. Koreans could not help but obsess about how to survive. For them, how to remain in harmony with the course of nature (Taoism), how to attain enlightenment (Buddhism), and how to make a harmonious life (Confucianism) seemed a life of luxury. In the aftermath of the Korean War, they wanted something that seemingly could provide an instant solution for their harsh lives. Third and last, Martin argues that in the past century, S. Koreans needed a new religion that could correspond to their social circumstances and emotional needs. In resolving their physical and emotional pains caused by that series of tragedies and seeking for a better life, they chose Protestantism and adapted it to their social circumstances by synthesizing it with their traditional religiosity. In this regard, Martin likens Korean Protestantism to a hybrid of Western Protestantism and Korean shamanism – a mixture of modernity and the traditional religiosity of Koreans.[117]

In summary, scholars of religions, who attempt to analyze how Korean Protestantism in Korea, for instance, rapidly grew in the past century, argue that Western Protestantism became intermixed with Korean traditional religions, particularly

[116] David Martin, *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 145-146. On page 146, he notes: "By 1982 Pentecostal churches made up the third largest Protestant body in Korea with nearly half a million members, compared to 885,650 Methodists and 4,302,950 Presbyterians. They had experienced a decadal growth rate of 742 percent compared to a Presbyterian growth rate of 135 percent and a Methodist growth rate of 130 percent."

[117] For more information about how Western Protestantism and Korean Shamanism interacted with each other in Korea since the end of the 19th century, see David Martin's *Tongues of Fire (1990)*, Sung-Deuk Oak's "Healing and Exorcism: Christian Encounters with Shamanism in Early Modern Korea (2010);" Boo-Yoong Yoo's *Korean Pentecostalism: Its History and Theology* (1987); and Andre Eungi Kim's "Christianity, Shamanism, and Modernization in S. Korea (2000)."

shamanism, to fit into what Koreans desired in the post-war era. In that adaptation, Western Protestantism became Koreanized (or Shamanized), emphasizing the shamanic elements of Protestantism such as the resemblance between shamans and Jesus and the control of the spiritual world over the humanly world. By converting to Korean Protestantism, S. Koreans could take modernity, but simultaneously maintain their traditional religiosity.

III. The Miraculous Growth of the KPC: Gradual or Sudden?

When it comes to the KPC's rapid growth in the past century, it is commonly thought that the KPC has gradually increased since its introduction owing to those three reasons discussed earlier. Interestingly, however, its explosive growth did not begin until the mid-1960s. For example, in 1910 three years after the famous 1907 great revival movement of Pyongyang, the spiritual influence of which, scholars argue, swept across the peninsula, the total number of Protestants in Korea was 177,692 – about 1.4 percent of the total population (13,128,780) of that year.[118] Even in 1960, seven years after the Korean War, the number of Korean Protestants was 623,072 – only 2.5 percent of the total population of 21,012,374.[119] In "A Reflection on the Growth and Decline of the Korean Protestant Church," Byung Joon Chung provides a few concise charts showing how the KPC

[118] Chung, "A Reflection on the Growth and Decline of the Korean Protestant Church," 322.

[119] Ibid., 328; Korean Statistical Information Service, http://kosis.kr/visual/populationKorea/PopulationByNumber/PopulationByNumberMain.do?mb=N&menuId=M_1_1&themaId=A01; *e-Narajipyo* [e-Indicators of Korea], http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1009, accessed February 1, 2018.

increased in numbers since its introduction.[120] Based on Chung's charts, we can make a table that presents a bird's eye view of its growth in the past century as follows:

Korean Protestant Church Growth			
Year	Members	Growth Rate	Ratio to Total Population
1900	20,914		
1910	177,692		
1920	319,359		
1930	315,534		
1942	245,000		
1950	500,198		2.4%
1960	632,072	24.6%	2.5%
1966	905,000	45.3%	3.1%
1970	3,192,600	252.8%	10.2%
1975	4,019,000	25.9%	11.6%
1980	5,337,000	32.8%	14.3%
1985	6,489,300	21.6%	16.1%
1991	8,037,500	23.9%	18.5%
1995	8,760,300	9.0%	19.7%
2005	8,616,000	-1.4%	18.3%

Table 1 The KPC's Growth in the Past Century

The chart indicates two significant points. First, in the past century the KPC did not increase gradually. Rather, its growth was largely concentrated in between the late-1960s and the early 1980s – when a series of massive evangelical campaigns and a series of economic development plans concurrently took place on a national scale.[121] Second, the table shows that from the mid-1980s, the growth rate of the KPC began decreasing[122] and in 2005, the KPC faced a decrease in the number of its members since 1950. Even though it is not possible to completely trust that information without reservation,[123] at

[120] Chung, "A Reflection on the Growth and Decline of the Korean Protestant Church," 322, 324, 328.

[121] Ibid. In addition, considering all Korean Christianities (Catholic churches, Protestant churches and various Christian cults fused with Korean traditional religions) – non-official Christian denominations – that year, some Korean scholars such as Won Gue Lee argue that the growth rate of the Korean Protestant Church in the 1970s could be more than 400 percent.

[122] Han et al., "'Serving Two Masters': Protestant Churches in Korea and Money," 334.

[123] The reason is twofold. The first is the general tendency of Korean Protestant churches to consider the number of their 'registered' church members as the total number of their congregation – not

least the table clearly indicates that the KPC's growth in the past century was not gradual, but sudden and unexpected, and limited to a certain period, while offering S. Koreans new worldviews appropriate to the rapidly changing society, a sense of comfort, stability and community that the society in rapid transition could not offer, and a new hybrid religion of Western civilization and Korean traditional religious-consciousness.

However, though such interpretations make sense of the KPC's growth from a macroscopic perspective, they cannot properly explain why only the KPC had dramatically increased as compared with Korea's traditional religions – during that time, not only Protestantism but also Korea's traditional religions also increased. Moreover, uniformly pointing to the traumatic events as an important cause of the growth, they did not carefully examine what the traumatized psychological state of S. Koreans looked like and how the state caused them to massively convert to Protestantism – as if a national campaign – between the 1960s and 1980s. In order to find out how the traumatic experiences influenced the KPC's growth, it is important investigate what they were, why they were traumatic, and what psychological impacts they had – still have – on S. Koreans. Therefore, from now this dissertation attempts to build a theoretical bridge between the KPC's growth and S. Koreans' psychological reactions to their traumatic experiences in the past century.

IV. Conclusion

This chapter has examined three issues. First, it provided a general view on the history of the Korean Protestant Church with a focus on its growth in the twentieth century. The

the total number of their regular worship attendees – whereas the second is that non-Protestant churches identify themselves as Protestant churches in replying surveys of religion.

historical analysis makes it clear that the KPC's rapid growth took place hand in hand with S. Korea's rapid economic development. Just as S. Korea, one of the poorest countries on earth, became one of the most well developed countries in Asia, so the KPC, the smallest religion in Korea, became one of the three major religions. Second, the chapter provided a summary of what motivated Koreans – mainly S. Koreans – to massively convert to Protestantism in the past century: (a) Korean Protestantism provided S. Koreans with new worldviews that could replace their traditional religions and their outlooks; (b) the KPC offered a psychological sanctuary to S. Koreans who struggled to find a sense of comfort and belongingness under the Korean militant governments who forced them to go through massive industrialization and urbanization; and (c) as a hybrid of Korean religious-consciousness and Western Protestantism, Korean Protestantism – Koreanized or shamanized – could satisfy S. Koreans' needs in the aftermath of the Korean War. Third, the chapter brought into focus the importance of a psychohistorical interpretation of the KPC's growth in the past century, emphasizing the historical fact that the growth mainly took place between the 1960s and 1980s.

When examining what caused the KPC's explosive growth, S. Korea' unique social circumstances right after the Korean War stands out. Most studies on the social context are anchored in the assumption that S. Koreans needed Protestantism and Protestantism changed S. Korea and its people considerably. By extension, the assumption implies that the KPC's rapid growth had to do with S. Koreans' traumatized minds by that series of tragic events that befell on them in the past century. However, it is difficult to find a study that focuses on the psychodynamics of S. Koreans in their massive conversion to Protestantism, paying close attention to the trauma they struggled

with and its psychological impacts on their collective turn to Protestantism. Thus, with the historical background of the KPC as a starting point, the author will now attempt to make a psychohistorical analysis of the KPC's miraculous growth in the past. The following chapter will explain psychohistory – a combinatory study of history and psychoanalysis that aims at interpreting historical materials from psychoanalytic perspectives – and develop a Jungian psychohistorical perspective that is useful for discovering what motivated S. Koreans to turn to Protestantism as a nationwide phenomenon in the past century.

CHAPTER THREE

A JUNGIAN PSYCHOHISTORICAL THEORY:

AN INTERPRETIVE TOOL

This chapter purports to investigate a Jungian psychohistorical theory that is useful for analyzing the psychodynamics of the Korean Protestants in S. Korea who contributed to the rapid growth of the Korean Protestant Church in the twentieth century – possibly as well as its gradual decline. To achieve that goal, the author first introduces psychohistory – its history, traits, along with its strong and weak points. Second, a Jungian psychohistorical theory, chosen to analyze the psychological interactions between Koreans – mainly S. Koreans – and the KPC, is explained with a focus on a few important concepts of Jung's analytical psychology such as his understanding of the unconscious and the collective unconscious, his theory of dreams, archetypes, and complexes. Third, a Jungian psychohistorical theory will be explained with emphasis on how it is developed as a combination of Jung's theory of complexes and the concept of the cultural unconscious, first suggested by a Jungian psychologist Joseph L. Henderson, – a sort of unconsciousness that exists between the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious. Last, to help understand how the Jungian psychohistorical theory is useful in psychoanalyzing the workings of the collective psyche of a group, two exemplary psychohistorical studies are presented. The first is Frantz Fanon's *lactification*, the unconscious tendency of blacks to highly idealize whites and desire to identify them owing to their colonial experience. The second is Jacqueline Gerson's *malinchismo* – a

cultural complex of Mexicans that collectively devalue themselves including their culture and language and idealize what is foreign.

I. Psychohistory: Its Origin and Evolution

A. The Emergence of Psychohistory

It is William L. Langer, an American historian who for the first time, publicly announced the necessity of historians to be equipped with psychoanalytical insights for studying history despite the fact that the majority of historians in the 1950s were suspicious about the emergence of psychohistory as a study and negative about its interference in the traditional field of history. In his 1957 presidential address to the American Historical Association, Langer stated that "the newest history [psychohistory] will be more intensive and probably less extensive."[124] By saying this, Langer put stress on the necessity of psychological theories for further studies of history. Considering the academic context of history Langer delivered the speech that historians could easily get access to a great amount of historical information, what mattered to Langer was no longer how to attain historical facts but how to analyze and interpret them in hand.[125] To discover new historical insights out of given historical sources, he stressed the important role of psychoanalysis as a new method of history. He believed that as a theory basic to the study of human behavior, psychoanalysis could help investigate more carefully humans' various motivations behind historical records, such as repression, identification, projection, reaction formation, substitution, displacement, and sublimation.[126] Langer

[124] William L. Langer, "The Next Assignment," *The American Historical Review* 63 (1958): 284.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid., 287-288.

expected that the introduction of psychoanalysis to history could provide more varied and deeper interpretations of the historical events in the lives of individuals and groups.

B. Erik H. Erikson and Young Man Luther

One year after Langer's prophetic address on psychohistory, the psychoanalyst, Erik Erikson, published a monumental psychohistorical study on an individual entitled *Young Man Luther.* After collecting various fragmented-historical records of Martin Luther's life, Erikson re-constructed a psychological life-history of Luther, from childhood to old age, from his psychoanalytic perspective of 'identity formation.'[127] In accord with Langer's emphasis on the important role of psychohistory in analyzing human motivations hidden in events, Erikson's major concern was what 'motivated' Luther to become a forerunner of the Reformation, not about what he 'did' for the Reformation. That is, Erikson psychohistoricized the life of Luther chronologically, concentrating on how Luther as a young man psychologically transformed himself into the reformer, Martin Luther. In doing so, Erikson psychoanalyzed Luther's childhood, adolescence, and adulthood with a focus on his personal interactions with people such as his parents, teachers, and friends who had influenced him psychologically.

Erikson's psychoanalytical approach to the life-history of Martin Luther shed new light on Luther's one particular behavior that continually repeated itself. Throughout his life, Luther went through a series of life crises that were biological, psychological, and

[127] The importance of Erik Erikson's identity theory lies in his discovery that a human's life unfolds through unending interactions among his/her biological (libido), psychological (ego), and sociological (superego) traits. A healthy life of an individual relies on how s/he can continue keeping harmony among them. Erikson named these unending bio-psycho-social interactions as identity formation. The importance of his identity formation theory in the history of psychoanalysis is the fact that he expanded the Freudian bio-psycho understanding of a human life to include the societal realm.

sociological, at the same time, and in each crisis, he took a certain period to resolve them by distancing himself from his daily life activities. Erikson called such a momentary escape from reality a psychosocial moratorium where an individual figures out how to adapt to the changing world s/he lives in. His psychoanalysis of the historical sources of the religious hero revealed that Luther periodically needed a psychosocial moratorium owing to his chronic sense of guilt, inferiority, self-hate, and self-doubt. Emphasizing Luther's inner conflicts, Erikson claimed that Luther did not initially intend to undertake a Reformation of the Christian Church. Rather, he wanted to resolve his inner conflicts through his religious life over and over again. His trial-and-error process finally made him realize that salvation comes only from faith, not by actions.

In fact, the enlightenment soothed his inner instability to some degree. Moreover, his personal healing process also helped his contemporaries handle their own internal conflicts. To be more specific, Erikson carefully investigated the life condition where Luther lived with a focus on how it influenced Luther's psychological life. Erikson explained that Luther's era was almost completely under the control of the Roman Church. Against humanism impregnated by the Renaissance, the Roman Catholic Church bureaucratized its priesthood and ritualized its religious activities in minute detail in order to maintain its hold over the common people. Such an intensive religious binding-force gave rise to the negative conscience, that is, "Freud's conceptualization of the pressure put by the superego on the ego"[128] in the mind of the common people. Erikson argued that Luther's new interpretation of "The righteous will live by faith (NIV, Romans 1:17)" helped him to regain the initiative of his ego. He convinced himself that a sense of

[128] Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1962), 214.

righteousness comes from within, not from without. Erikson analyzed that Luther's conviction about himself as a righteous human with faith in Jesus Christ encouraged him to present a new religious ideology that where a human can meet with God is not through religious activities or rituals but one's inner conviction through self-reflection.[129] In this way, Luther's religious realization touched the hearts of his contemporaries who were also religiously educated to repress their inner feelings and instincts in order to gain salvation. Thus, Erikson's conclusion is that understanding psychosocial issues of a great human, in depth, and in a given time and place, helps one to understand what the masses around her/him suffered psychosocially.

After the publication of *Young Man Luther*, however, a number of historians brought forward suspicions and doubts about the reliability of Erikson's psychohistorical interpretation of Luther. It became clear that Erikson had intentionally made use of some historical resources of Luther that, he thought, might fit well with and support his argument. Nonetheless, it is an undeniable fact that Erikson's psychohistorical approach to a study of Martin Luther paved a new way for historians to sharpen their historical scholarship with psychological insights into human nature. For these reasons, *Young Man Luther* is remembered as the first groundbreaking book of psychohistory.

C. Psychohistory: from Individuals to Groups

While Erikson focused on individuals' life-history and their respective psychological struggles to adapt to their given life conditions, psychohistorians after him

[129] Erikson compared Luther's theological advance with a psychological maturation every human must take. What his religious experiment achieved for his psychological health is well summarized as follows: "the internalization of the father-son relationship; the concomitant crystallization of conscience; the safe establishment of an identity as a worker and a man; and the concomitant reaffirmation of basic trust. (Ibid., 213)"

stretched psychohistory to the extent that it could be utilized for psychoanalyzing collective behaviors of a group of people. Whereas psychohistorians studying individuals are mainly concerned about important life events that individuals privately experienced and suffered, psychohistorians studying groups are more concerned about the psychological impacts of significant social events on a group on a collective level and about the psychological dynamics of their actions to deal with them on a collective level. Here significant social events mean "traumatic experiences such as revolutions, wars, and epidemics, all of which cause mass hysteria."[130] Thus, psychohistorical studies of groups aim to understand "the collective motivations for [a group's] common actions and feelings" [131] – how they are shaped by the psychological interactions between historical circumstances and groups' reactions to them.

For example, in his "The Next Assignment (1958)," William L. Langer offers a psychohistorical investigation of the psychological impacts of the Black Death over people in general in the Middle Ages. Historical sources brings into focus that as a haunting terror, the Black Death gave rise to an upsurge of not only penitential exercises, but also an obsession with drunkenness and sexual immorality.[132] Tracing the psychological roots of those two antisocial behaviors, Langer speculates that they came from the same origin of an inner conflict – "a mood of misery, depression, and anxiety, and a general sense of impending doom."[133] Although they look like two completely different behaviors that seemingly have none in common, their psychological roots are the same apprehension about the imminent death. His psychohistorical approach

[130] Jacques Szaluta, *Psychohistory: Theory and Practice* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 188.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Langer, "The Next Assignment," 295-296.
[133] Ibid., 297.

concludes that preoccupied by the fear of death, medieval people endeavored to attain a sense of eternity in one way or another. Some devoted themselves to the religious realm. Others gave themselves to the sensual pleasure. As Langer's psychoanalytic observation shows the hidden motivations of medieval people's questionable behaviors, psychohistory of group behaviors aims to find what causes or motivates unusual behaviors of groups in history, interpreting them from psychoanalytic perspective.

II. Psychohistory's Strengths, Weaknesses, and Contributions to Historical Studies

A. Freudian Psychology at the Heart of Psychohistory

From its outset, psychohistory came out of Freudian psychology. Although since Erik Erikson's *Young Man Luther*, a number of psychohistorians tried to develop their own psychoanalytic views on history, the majority still rely on it. Thus, to discuss about psychohistory's strengths and weaknesses as a historical discipline, it is necessary to grasp a glimpse of the Freudian psychology that consists of the backbone of psychohistory.

The birth of Freud's psychology came from his observation of the psychological conflicts, i.e., neurosis, of some middle-aged women whom he regularly met in psychoanalytic settings in the late nineteenth century. His observation of their inner conflicts led to one fundamental foundation of his psychoanalysis: ambivalence, a psychological state in which love and hate coexist, conflicting with each other. With certainty, he universalized the psychological tendency of ambivalence by coining the

term, "Oedipus complex."[134] Often the Oedipus complex theory is criticized because of its hasty generalization based on the belief that what a relatively small number of Freud's patients personally felt in their relationship with parents can be applied to all humans. However, it is necessary to remember that the complex theory cast significant doubt on the preconception that what we consciously think is identical with what we unconsciously feel. That is, even if we consciously think that we love our parents, it is not impossible that, in fact, unconsciously we hate them.

Later, in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), Freud went as far as to argue that the psychological origin of civilization relies on how to handle the ambivalent nature of humanity. Freud viewed human nature in essence as aggressive and egoistic. Taking this view as a springboard, Freud surmised that from its outset, the existence and continuation of civilization depends on how to curb, control, and prohibit the human nature of aggression and egoism. His psychoanalytical hypothesis was that it is culture that represses and controls the human nature by internalizing the sense of guilt. Of course, his universalization of the complex is not scientifically or anthropologically validated; instead, clearly it was none other than an imaginative product of his speculation from a psychoanalytical perspective. Nonetheless, it cannot be instantly disregarded that the Oedipus complex brought to light one universal psychological mechanism that humans in civilization suffer: repression of instincts.

[134] Initially, Freud discovered ambivalence in the psychical conflicts of middle-aged women. When he tried to theorize it as the Oedipus complex, however, he considered its birthplace in the psyche of not a girl, but a boy who hates, yet, at the same time, idealizes his father in order to keep his first love object (mother) in hand. Even though the son wants to take possession of his mother solely, he knows that he is not able to compete with his father. So, instead of trying to eliminate his father, the boy idealizes him and attempts to be like him. Figuratively speaking, Freud made use of the Oedipus complex in describing a basic structure of the human psyche. In the psychical structure, the son takes the role of *ego*, the mother *id*, and the father *superego*.

On top of that, it is also important to remember that along with the theory of the human nature of ambivalence, aggression, and egoism, Freud made a groundbreaking discovery of the unconsciousness where repressed instincts and emotions gather and act upon consciousness in various ways such as dreams, fantasies, slips of the tongue, and so forth. In this way, Freud discovered the control of unconsciousness over consciousness while consciousness is unaware of its function on itself.

B. Psychohistory's Strengths: the Unconscious and a Psychotherapeutical Approach to History

When it comes to the uniqueness of psychohistory, psychohistorians such as Lloyd deMause, William L. Langer, etc. agree that there are normally two characteristics of psychohistory at stake. While the first is the presumption of psychohistorians that it is the unconscious, rather than the conscious, that causes humans to make historical events that need to be commemorated, the second is the convention that psychohistorians handle historical resources as an analyst analyzes his/her analysand in a private session.[135] Let us examine such dynamics in detail.

First, as far as what motivates historically important events is concerned, it can be argued that psychohistory is founded on "a belief that the unconscious [a bundle of

[135] For more information about the two characteristics of psychohistory from different psychohistorical perspectives, see Bruce Mazlish, "The Past and Future of Psychohistory," *Annual of Psychoanalysis* 31 (2003): 259-261; Peter Loewenberg, *Decoding the Past: The Psychohistorical Approach* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 15-16; William L. Langer, "The Next Assignment," *The American Historical Review* 63 (1958): 299-300; Lloyd deMause, "The Independence of Psychohistory," in *The New Psychohistory*, ed. Lloyd deMause (New York: The Psychohistory Press, 1975), 7-10; Jacob A. Belzen, "Religion as an Object of Empirical Research: Psychohistory as Exemplary Interdisciplinary Approach," in *Psychohistory in Psychology of Religion: Interdisciplinary Studies*, ed. Jacob A. Belzen (Atlanta: Rodopi Publisher, 1994), 9-10; Jacques Szaluta, *Psychohistory: Theory and Practice* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 1-3; Saul Friedländer, *History and Psychoanalysis*, trans. Susan Suleiman (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1978), 9-15.

repressed emotions and instincts in the Freudian model] of past epochs has left behind visible traces, and a conviction that these traces are decipherable."[136] Recognizing the role of the unconscious in history means accepting that psychic reality has influence on material reality as much as material reality influences psychic reality. Here, psychic reality means various emotional states such as fear, anger, sadness, etc. in the inner world and material reality indicates their manifestations in the outer world. Psychohistory takes for granted that human thought and actions are subject to human emotions and social conditions. Given that history is a collective effort to remember what happened in the past, one could insist that while history focuses on what happened in a given period, psychohistory focuses on human motivations that may have influenced what happened. To discover some hidden psychological conflicts, which seemed to bring about significant events, among individuals and groups, psychohistorians make use of psychoanalytic theories as hermeneutical tools that penetrate rationalization and justification in order to detect the control of emotionality over rationality and that of the unconscious over consciousness.

Second, psychohistorians consider psychohistory as an extension of psychotherapy. From the birth of psychohistory, such an argument remains controversial between psychohistorians and psychoanalysts. The reason is that, considering a psychoanalytic situation where a psychoanalyst actually meets an analysand, it is doubtful to say that psychohistorians' investigations of historical resources are also similar to psychoanalytic work. In fact, a psyhohistorical analysis takes place mainly in an imaginary encounter in which a psychohistorian assumes given historical resources as

[136] George M. Kren and Leon H. Rappoport, *Varieties of Psychohistory* (New York: Springer, 1976), 56.

an analysand. Because of the lack of mutual interaction between a psychohistorian and historical resources, it is possible that a psychohistorian could arbitrarily give more weight to his/her preferential resources than others. Moreover, there is also the risk of countertransference that like a psychoanalyst in a psychoanalytic setting, a psychohistorian is not free from his/her own emotional reactions that occur while dealing with certain individuals or events. For example, a psychohistorian who once fell prey to sexual abuse in childhood might have more difficulties in psychoanalyzing historical sources about sexual abuse than others. That is why many psychohistorians in harmony emphasize that to do an effective psychohistorical analysis, psychohistorians are required to receive psychoanalytic training in order to develop the psychoanalytic capacity to recognize, observe, and distance their emotional reactions to the historical figures or events they encounter, when investigating historical resources. Thus, the statement that psychohistory is an academic extension of psychotherapy means that an insightful psychohistorical analysis can be done usually by a historian who, versed in clinical experience in psychoanalysis, can handle historical documents, while keeping his/her emotional reactions in check with caution.[137]

C. Psychohistory's Weaknesses: Psychologization, Reductionism, Arbitrariness, and Determinism

About a decade after the emergence of psychohistory, a historian, Jacques Barzun combined various criticism against psychohistory into one book entitled *Clio and the Doctors: Psycho-History, Quanto-History & History* (1972) in order to defend the academic area of history from psychohistory. Barzun raises four questions about the

[137] Lloyd deMause, ed., *The New Psychohistory* (New York: The Psychohistory Press, 1975), 13.

psychohistorical methodologies – the unconscious and a psychotherapeutic approach to history.

First, calling the substance of psychohistory into question, Barzun argues that psychohistory tends to transmute history into "subliminal mental states of humans."[138] In the process of psychoanalyzing, historical events caused by both human thoughts and acts are too often simply psychologized. In a moment of time, what humans did and how they did give way to 'why' they did. Psychologized, humans and events "lose their individuality and become illustrations of certain automatism."[139] That is, human acts and thoughts merely become various psychohistorical subjects to be analyzed from various psychoanalytic perspectives. Taking Erikson's *Young Man Luther* as an example, it is arguable that psychohistory transmutes Luther's life into a series of psychological processes to resolve his identity confusion in which his psychological life takes priority over his physical life. Even though Erikson tried to do justice to the historical studies of Luther's life condition while concentrating on his identity formation, he could not help overemphasizing Luther's psychological factors at the expense of the historical and social factors of Luther's era.

Second, Barzun makes objections to the reductionism-oriented method of psychohistory. Taking for granted that psychohistory is essentially based on psychoanalytic theories of individuals, he claims that in applying individual psychology to a group, psychohistory limits its psychological dynamics by not doing due justice to the complexity of relationships among individuals. For example, as far as the origin of

[138] Jacques Barzun, *Clio and Doctors: Psycho-History, Quanto-History & History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 17.
[139] Ibid., 23.

the Third Reich is concerned, a theoretical way of psychohistoricizing it is to focus on Adolf Hitler and his psychological influence over his followers rather than his innumerable interactions with innumerable people in life. Likewise, the hasty reductionism of psychohistory tends not to take into consideration the complexity of the workings of various relationships.

Third, Barzun expresses doubt on the appropriateness of how psychohistory makes use of historical records to support its argument. He points out that sometimes psychohistorians arbitrarily select certain parts of well-known historical facts to validate their psychological deterministic conclusions. As an example, Barzun took Freud's *Leonardo Da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood* (1910) in which Freud attempted to find the psychological cause of Da Vinci's homosexuality. Out of innumerable possible causes for the emergence of Da Vinci's homosexuality, Freud picked one experience that Da Vinci had in early childhood. When Da Vinci was in infancy, his biological father abandoned him and his mother. From this fact, Freud surmised that the absence of his father from his early life had a significant influence on the development of Da Vinci's one-sided relationship. On this basis, Freud went on to argue that in that situation, Da Vinci's excessive identification with his mother and the lack of the Oedipus complex in his life resulted in his homosexuality. As to this farfetched interpretation, Barzun mentions that Freud made an error in selecting historical resources of Da Vinci's life at his will in order to justify his subjective psychoanalytic observation of Da Vinci.

Finally, Barzun presents a more general problem inherent in psychohistory: a somewhat obsessive chase after determinism along with the logic of cause and effect. Founded on the Freudian belief that one's psychological life is determined by his/her

childhood experiences before the age of three to four and his/her psychological life in adulthood is nothing but a repetition of his/her childhood experiences, psychohistory is apt to assume that in every human act, we can find its psychological reasons when we trace it back to the person's infancy and early childhood. In this sense, when analyzing a given subject, psychohistorians are likely to take an omnipresent and omniscient viewpoint in which there is no place for contingencies. Stressing that there are no 'complete' historical resources about individuals, groups or events that we can attain by any means, Barzun likens a psychohistorian to "a laboratory scientist working within a closed system"[140] and states that a human life can never be confined to a laboratory, even if psychohistorians may want to believe it is so.[141] After Barzun, there were other historians who brought forth their thoughts on fallacies of psychohistory in terms of methodology. In general, they fall into Barzun's four-question categories. Thus, it is possible to understand Barzun's four questions of psychohistory to be the basis of these four main criticisms of psychohistory.

D. Psychohistory's Contributions to Historical Studies

Jacques Barzun's four criticisms of psychohistory make clear the four limitations of the methodology of psychohistory. Interestingly, psychohistorians - Lloyd deMause, William L. Langer, Bruce Mazlish, Saul Friedländer, etc. – did not reject them. Accepting their method's limits, they simply want to re-emphasize what psychohistory

[140] Ibid., 71.

[141] With *Clio and Doctors*, Barzun made clear that history is a much broader arena than psychohistory. His belief in history is well-described in his definition of history on page 95: "History, like a vast river, propels logs, vegetation, rafts, and debris; it is full of live and dead things, some destined for resurrection; it mingles many waters and holds in solution invisible stolen from distant soils. Anything may become part of it; that is why it can be an image of the continuity of mankind."

can contribute to the development of historical studies. Their arguments revolve around two contributions psychohistory can make for history.

First, psychohistorians do not assert the superiority of psychohistory to history. Instead, they stress that with the use of psychoanalytic theories, psychohistory can deepen – but not complete – the meaning of history through analyzing the important workings of the unconscious – humans' emotional reactions to given various personal or social situations – in historical resources. In a speech "The New Assignment (1958)," William L. Langer clearly stated, "We cannot hope ever to have complete evidence on any historical problem; it seems unlikely that we shall ever have definite answers."[142] What we hope with psychoanalytic theories in hand is not a "final historical explanation, but only deeper, more complicated problems of historical explanation"[143] or "a fuller, more rounded view of life in the past."[144] Taking into consideration the emotional conflicts of humans such as narcissism, humiliation, grandiosity, and inferiority, psychohistory can discover how humans reacted psychologically in the midst of historical events such as a natural disaster, national bankruptcy, war, and so forth. Psychohistory does not attempt to replace history. Its aim is to deepen the achievement of historical studies.

Second, knowing that psychohistory is simply one of many historical studies, psychohistorians insist that it can offer history various psychological lens to interpret historical events in various ways. In *History and Psychoanalysis* (1978), Saul Friedländer made it clear by arguing, "There is no such thing as *one* generally accepted paradigm for

[142] Langer, "The Next Assignment," 302.

[143] Bruce Mazlish, "What Is Psycho-history?" in *Varieties of Psychohistory*, eds. George M. Kren and Leon H. Rappoport (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1976), 24.

[144] Peter Loewenberg, *Decoding the Past: The Psychohistorical Approach* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 14.

the application of psychoanalytic theory to historical research."[145] Along with the argument, he also claimed that psychohistory is not a reductive methodology of history that psychologizes human actions and thoughts. That is, as there are many psychoanalytical theories, psychohistorians interpret historical resources from various perspectives. For example, Friedländer notes that when it comes to the life cycle of an individual, Freudian psychology is inadequate for dealing with the latter part of the life of an individual who has more or less resolved his/her material problems and begins to search for the meaning of his/her existence.[146] In this case, Jungian psychology is better because its major theme of individuation is about how an individual can integrate the first half of life with the second half psychologically. It is obvious that psychohistory is a historical study designed to psychologize historical resources. The point is that there are many ways to psychologize just as there are many psychoanalytical theories.

With this general understanding of psychohistory in mind, now let us turn to grasping a Jungian psychohistorical theory that is more appropriate for psychoanalyzing the history of the Korean Protestant Church in the past century, thanks to its concepts of the collective unconscious.

III. Jung's Analytical Psychology: the Basics

To apply Jung's psychology to the growth of the Korean Protestant Church in the past century, the first thing to do is to become familiar with it. In this section, therefore, the

[145] Saul Friedländer, *History and Psychoanalysis*, trans. Susan Suleiman (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1978), 29.
[146] Ibid., 17.

author focuses on the fundamental concepts of Jung's psychology such as the collective unconscious, psychopathology, dreams, and archetypes.

A. The Collective Unconscious

Different from Freud who views the unconscious as a reservoir of oppressed – mainly sexual – instincts, Jung grasps it as the earliest stage of the human psyche in the process of evolution. Although he bases his own psychology on Freud's argument that the psychological life of humans is under repression from both the *superego* and *id*, he has a clearly different opinion on humans and their psychological life. For Jung, humans have a higher innate desire to seek more than the satisfaction of sexual desire.[147] When it comes to how one has a healthy life, Jung claims that we, civilized humans, need to pay attention to what the unconscious signals to us through dreams, fantasies, and imagination. The reason is that civilization's emphasis on the role of consciousness caused the separation of consciousness from the unconscious. Why the separation is such a big problem is understood when we comprehend the origin of consciousness in Jung's psychology.

In accordance with the evolutionary theory that all human races evolved from one ancestor, Jung speculates that the history of human consciousness experienced the same evolutionary process. The earliest evolutionary stage of consciousness is, according to Jung, the collective unconscious.[148] Evolutionarily speaking, consciousness comes from

[147] To make this instinct clear, Jung relies on religious language such as spirit and spirituality. To understand Jung's terminology correctly, it is important to grasp spirit as a part of a human's striving and spirituality as a biological condition of a human.

[148] In *Jung in the 21st Century Vol. 1: Evolution and Archetype* (2011), John Ryan Haule introduces the opinion of a practicing military psychiatrist, Erik D. Goodwyn, that the unconscious, earlier

the personal unconscious and the personal unconscious comes from the collective unconscious. The evolutionary process of consciousness is, however, like a two-edged sword. The emergence of consciousness requires us to adapt to what we call reality by emphasizing rationality more than emotionality. To be a civilized human, our consciousness (rationality) could not help but be disconnected from our personal unconscious and further the collective unconscious.[149] Thus, Jung assumes that in the collective unconscious, there is what consciousness lost, but needs to be regained. Here, it is useful to take a look at Jung's definition of the collective unconsciousness directly.

> The unconscious is the psyche that reaches down from the daylight of mentally and morally lucid consciousness into the nervous system that for ages has been known as the "sympathetic." This does not govern perception and muscular activity like the cerebrospinal system, and thus control the environment; but, though functioning without sense organs, it maintains the balance of life and, through the mysterious paths of sympathetic excitation, not only gives us knowledge of the innermost life of other beings but also has an inner effect upon them."[150]

The collective unconscious exists in our nervous system that came into existence prior to our consciousness. As we cannot control our uncontrolled reflexes, we cannot control the workings of the collective unconscious for consciousness. As the nervous system evolved to protect our body, the collective unconscious evolved to protect our psychological health and is genetically passed on from generation to generation. In this respect, Jung argues that the psyche of a newborn baby is not a *tabula rosa*. The

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evolutionary stages of our conscious psyche, play the role of a core human psyche that takes charge of "the ancient affective emotional and motivational brain systems shared with other animals (p. 18)."

[149] As to the scientific validity of Jung's evolutionary theory of consciousness, it is worth noting that the notion of consciousness came into existence very recently and that, in accordance with Jung's speculation about the function of the unconscious, neurobiology researchers discovered that the bodily functions essential for life such as seeing, smelling, behaving, feeling, speaking and thinking, and imagining are controlled by the unconscious operations of the brain.

[150] C. G. Jung, *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious,* 19.

collective unconscious is in the psyche of a newborn baby and waits to support and to be reconnected to the consciousness in order to regain its original wholeness.

B. Psychopathology

When it comes to psychopathology, Freud points out the vulnerable condition of the *ego* oppressed by both the *superego* and the *id* as its main reason. To relieve the psychological conflicts of neurosis, Freud suggests two solutions: making the unconscious (repressed instincts and emotions) conscious and sublimated through work and love. Turning to Jung, we can see quite a different view on psychopathology. Because of his evolutionary speculation about the human psyche, Jung considers the human psyche as "a self-regulating system in which consciousness and the unconscious are related in a compensatory way."[151] The unconscious originally evolved to balance, adjust, and supplement consciousness. Civilization, which too often emphasizes rationality rather than emotionality, however, gave rise to the separation of consciousness from the unconscious, personal and collective, and that separation is the starting point of all psychosomatic illnesses.

To be more specific, Jung explained that in the process of our adaptation to a civilized society, we overly focused on *directed thinking*, objective or logical thinking in words. *Directed thinking* was attained at the expense of our biological capacity for non-directed thinking, that is, subjective or illogical thinking in dreams and fantasies. To be able to think logically and objectively, we could not help but lose the capacity for

[151] Singer, *Boundaries of the Soul*, 14; Additionally, in *Jung in the 21st Century Vol. 1: Evolution and Archetype* (2011), John Ryan Haule provides one of the latest discoveries from leading neurobiologists that consciousness emerged as a tool to select out of the unconscious what matters and what to do for that and that in this process, it is constantly influencing and being influenced by the unconscious, 102.

dreaming and fantasizing as a way of thinking. As a result, we are forced to overlook "the subjective variety of an individual life."[152] For Jung, thus, psychopathology is not caused by the repression of instinct. Instead, it is caused by the loss of the connection of our consciousness with the unconscious. In this regard, Jung's psychological therapy aims at re-connecting the consciousness to the unconsciousness or reintegrating the unconscious into consciousness. What is important to remember is that Jung argues that such a psychological therapeutic process demands a lifetime because the separation of consciousness from the unconscious is not a private problem, but a problem of our time.[153] By making the ultimate goal of his analytic psychology, Jung names this psychological endeavor individuation. Now it is necessary to discuss how consciousness can gain access to the unconscious.

C. Dreaming and Archetypes

It is well known that Jung's psychology made itself different from the Freudian psychology over the issue of how to understand and interpret dreams. For Freud, the role of dreams for the human psyche is simple; in dreaming, we discharge or wish-fulfill our tabooed sexual impulses. On the contrary, in *Symbols of Transformation* (1967) and *Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche* (1969) Jung insists that dreams reveal more than they hide. Dreams are a natural expression of our psychological life that makes use of the

[152] C. G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, ed. Aniela Jaffe and trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston (New York: Vintage, 1965), 3; Additionally, in *Jung in the 21st Century Vol. 1: Evolution and Archetype* (2011), John Ryan Haule introduces an interesting biological discovery. Up to six-months in the gestation period, a human embryo spends nearly twenty-four hours a day dreaming (in the REM state). By the time of its birth, however, such a dreaming state declines to twelve to sixteen hours a day. As an infant matures after birth, constant dreaming gives way to its extraverted sensory and motor operations to orient it to the outer world, 113.

[153] In this sense, Jung considers psychological illnesses such as neurosis and depression as signals from the collective unconscious that consciousness needs to be balanced by reconnecting to the unconscious.

most straightforward language at our disposal: mythic narrative or subjective (illogical) thinking. The Jungian psychology views the role of dreams as integrating the unconscious with the conscious in order to make psychological wholeness called 'individuation.'[154]

To be more specific, in Jung's psychology, dreams represent images of a dreamer's unconscious psychic situation that "call us to investigate the inevitable tensions that arise between the reflective process of the ego and the organismic process of self."[155] Jung thinks "all inner experience springs from the unconscious, over which we have no control."[156] When we are careless about our subjective feelings and repress our natural sensations in the face of stressful and emotionally challenging situations, the amount of our dreaming increases. Through dreams, the unconscious sends consciousness a signal that consciousness needs to pay attention to its neglected state. With a scientific investigation of the function of dreaming, Rutgers anthropologist, Robin Fox reports, that in dreaming (particularly during REM), we assess and evaluate our recent personal events and their psychosomatic impacts upon us and that this dream process is inherited from generation to generation with our DNA.[157] In a similar vein, Jung suggests that as an

[154] To write Jung's thought on dreams for the dissertation, the author mainly relied on *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, particularly, *Freud & Psychoanalysis* (1961), *Practice of Psychotherapy* (1966), *Symbols of Transformation* (1967), *Psychology and Alchemy* (1968), and *Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche* (1969). In Sep. 2010, Princeton University Press published a collection of Jung's thought on dream from *The Collected Works* as a book titled *Dreams*. For more information about Jung's dream theories, please refer to *Dreams.*

[155] John Ryan Haule, *Jung in the 21st Century Vol. 1: Evolution and Archetype* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 107.

[156] C. G. Jung, *Symbols of Transformation: An Analysis of the Prelude to a Case of Schizophrenia*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, vol. 5 of *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), 62.

[157] Haule, *Jung in the 21st Century Vol. 1: Evolution and Archetype*, 111.

evolutionary product, dreaming is a way of the unconscious to engage in dialogue with consciousness by which the mind speaks exclusively to itself.

Jung's discovery of the similar themes and patterns between what his patients told him that they saw in a fantasy and what mythologies tell, extended his concern about dreams to fantasies and mythologies. His comparative studies on symbols and imageries in world religions and myths convinced him to argue that, in the collective unconscious, there might be a psychical structure that gives rise to the fantasy-lives of individuals and the mythologies of peoples. Jung thought that the psychological structure exists prior to the development of our rational faculty and reveals itself to the conscious through the medium of fantasies and dreams. To define the biologically inherited and so frequently repetitive psychological activities of the human psyche from the immemorial past, Jung used the term *primordial images* at first and later switched it with *archetypes*.

It is not easy to figure out what Jung really meant by archetype partly because it is acts of the unconscious that lacks solid content and partly because as he developed his analytical psychology, he kept modifying and improving his definition of it. However, there are some unchanged characteristics of it. First, the archetype is "the introspectively recognizable form of a *priori* psychic orderedness."[158] An archetype such as mother, father, child, and the like is a psychological influence that all humans share almost biologically. Thus, its themes and patterns are universally noticeable on earth beyond the limit of space, time, or person.[159] Second, Jung described the archetype as "a living

[158] C. G. Jung, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, vol. 8 of The Collected Works of C. G. Jung (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 516.

[159] C. G. Jung, "The Conjuction," in *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, vol. 13 of *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung: Alchemical Studies* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 505.

system of reactions and aptitudes that determine the individual's life in invisible ways – all the more effective because invisible."[160] As a manifestation of the unconscious through fantasies and dreams to consciousness, the archetype is characteristic of being emotional rather than rational, being spontaneous rather than deliberate, and being natural rather than unnatural. Third, when it comes to the relation of the archetype to instinct, Jung noted that "[i]nstincts are typical modes of action"[161] whereas "archetypes are typical modes of apprehension."[162] Put it differently, while instincts are related to our behavior patterns, archetypes are associated with our psychical patterns in cognition and understanding.[163] In a word, archetypes are like our psychical unconditioned reflex responses to our experiences of the outer world. We do not create them. Simply, we can acknowledge them when they take place biologically in the psyche.

To help understand Jung's concept of archetypes more clearly, it is useful to see the evolutionary process of the human brain. Evolutionarily considered, the human brain can be divided into three sections: the reptilian complex, the limbic system, and the neocortex. The reptilian complex, the most primitive part of the human brain that is already formulated when we are born, is responsible for "all the things that newborn babies can do: eat, sleep, wake, cry, breathe; feel temperature, hunger, wetness, and pain; and rid the body of toxins by urinating and defecating."[164] The limbic system, also known

[160] C. G. Jung, "The Structure of the Psyche," in *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, vol. 8 of *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 157.

[161] Jung, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, 135.

[162] Ibid., 137.

[163] Because Jung's concept of archetypes is not directly related to the author's psychohistorical analysis of the Korean Protestant Church in the last century, the author briefly introduces it. For further information regarding the theory, refer to *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* (1969).

[164] Bessel A. van der Kolk, *The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma* (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 56.

as the mammalian brain, located right above the reptilian brain, is "the seat of the emotions, the monitor of danger, the judge of what is pleasurable or scary, the arbiter of what is or is not important for survival purposes.[165] Lastly, the neocortex, if properly developed, allows us "to plan and reflect, to imagine and play out future scenarios…, to predict what will happen if we take one action (like applying for a new job) or neglect other (not paying the rent)"[166] with the use of language and abstract thought. When it comes to Jung's archetype theory in connection with the human brain, two psychiatrists Bessel A. van der Kolk and Erik D. Goodwyn suggest that archetypes take place at the heart of the central nervous system where the reptilian complex and the limbic system interact with each other for survival.[167] In this respect, an archetype can be viewed as "the instinct's recognition of appropriate conditions and goals. Subjectively, it manifests as a powerful emotional charge that invests what we see with overwhelming significance."[168] Archetypes are, thus, Jung's conceptualization of our universal instinctual-feelings on which our higher cognitive processes rest. The concept of the archetype indicates that thinking in an image is older than thinking in language and that images are an important foundation for rational and logical thinking.

D. Complex Theory

Jung's complex theory originates from his word association experiment at Burghölzli Mental hospital.[169] In the experiment, Jung read a list of one hundred words to a subject who was asked to say the first thing springing to mind as soon as s/he heard

[165] Ibid., 56.
[166] Ibid., 58.
[167] Ibid., 57; Erik D. Goodwyn, *The Neurobiology of the Gods: How Brain Physiology Shapes the Recurrent Imagery of Myth and Dreams* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 33.
[168] Haule, *Jung in the 21st Century Vol. 1: Evolution and Archetype*, 14-15.
[169] C. G. Jung, "The Association Method," *American Journal of Psychology* 31 (1901): 219-269.

each word. Jung measured the subject's reaction time in fifths of a second. The experiment revealed that certain words would produce a prolonged interval before the response and some words would bring about a complete blank from the subject. Given that each subject had an intention to respond to given words, Jung discovered that certain words interrupted their attention and sometimes such interruption brought about unusual behaviors such as change in facial expression, hesitation, tremble, laugh, cough, a slip of tongue, and so on. Jung became curious about what gave rise to those unusual reactions.[170]

In "The Psychology of Dementia Praecos (1907)," Jung explains how a complex takes shape in mind. Certain events – mainly traumatic – in life leaves a deep, shocking, and threatening impression on us. They are so painful that our consciousness cannot endure it for long. When our bodily and psychical memories about them are not properly treated, they are generally repressed into the unconscious. When they remain in the unconscious without any outlet provided, they become a complex – a "certain constellation of psychic elements (ideas, opinions, convictions, etc.) that are grouped around emotionally sensitive areas."[171]

For example, there is a woman who had a long history of sexual abuse, particularly by her father, suffers a father-related complex throughout life. Her unresolved bodily and psychological memories about her father remain intact. Even though she already left her father, the haunting memories – bodily as well as psychical – are likely to come back to her as real whenever she encounters situations and people who

[170] Ibid., 224-225.
[171] Singer, *Boundaries of the Soul*, 43.

reminds her of the father and his abuse. Psychodynamically taken, the repressed memories in the unconscious can get bigger, making links with her new haunting experiences associated with the original shock.

At the heart of a complex, there is an unbearable emotional pain that acts as a magnet that attracts various associations in relation to the initial traumatic experience. Because the initial emotional pain becomes unconscious in the form of a complex, interestingly we can only feel its irritating effects on us, yet don't know what they really mean to us and what causes the irritating pain. When a complex takes place in the unconscious, "the peaceful egocentric idea is constantly interrupted by ideas with a strong feeling-tone, that is, by affects."[172] When a complex takes possession of us, we feel a barrier between what we will and what we act because the complex impedes the intention of our will, disturbs our memory, and plays all kind of tricks against our consciousness. Staying as a separate and independent entity in the dark realm of the unconscious, a complex is always ready to hinder or reinforce the function of consciousness. Jung describes how a complex fails the proper workings of consciousness in detail as follows:

> It [a complex] has a sort of body, a certain amount of its own physiology. It can upset the stomach. It upsets the breathing, it disturbs the heart – in short, it behaves like a partial personality. For instance, when you want to say or do something and unfortunately a complex interferes with this intention, then you say or do something different from what you intended. You are simply interrupted, and your best intention gets upset by the complex, exactly as if you had been interfered with by a human being or by circumstances from

[172] C. G. Jung, "The Psychology of Dementia Praecos," in *The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, vol. 3 of *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 41. In addition, Jung is of the opinion that hallucinations, visions, and fantasies are symptomatic of a complex. For more information, refer to "The Psychological Foundations of the Belief in Spirits" in *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche* (C. W. 8), 311.

> outside. Under those conditions we really are forced to speak of the tendencies of complexes to act as if they were characterized by a certain amount of will-power.[173]

The existence of a complex in the unconscious and its influences over consciousness shake the naïve belief that consciousness is a unified structure functioning in an orderly manner. A complex constantly bothers our intellectual ability to think objectively and neutrally. Because a complex is likely to take some part of our psyche away from us, Jung notes that under the influence of a complex, we "experience a sense of loss."[174] We do not feel ourselves as whole because a complex makes some part of our psyche paralyzed. What is worse, on top of this, Jung presents an opinion that complex is indispensable to our psychical life. The reason is that Jung considered consciousness itself as a complex. At first glance, it seems strange. However, taking into consideration how Jung understands the birth of consciousness out of the unconscious, it becomes to make sense. Evolutionarily considered, the emergence of consciousness was possible by its own separation from the unconscious. Our emphasis on consciousness (rationality and objectivity), thus, can be understood as our denial of the potentiality of the unconscious. That is, adaptation to reality requires us to use a great amount of psychical energy in developing what we call consciousness. The birth of consciousness is actually the outset of a complex. In this sense, Jung called the psychical state of consciousness an *ego complex*, "a complex of ideas which constitutes the center of my field of

[173] C. G. Jung, *The Symbolic Life: Miscellaneous Writing*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, vol. 18 of *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1977), 72.

[174] C. G. Jung, "The Psychological Foundations of the Belief in Spirits," in *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, 311.

consciousness."[175] That is, self-consciousness is a bundle of complexes that avoids any interaction with the unconscious in its normal state. The point to note here is that when a complex takes possession of an individual, his/her life is restructured around the complex and from that moment on, the complex controls his/her life even though s/he is not conscious of it.

IV. A Jungian Psychohistory: Cultural Complex

Thus far the basic concepts of Jung's analytical psychology have been investigated and discussed. Jung is mostly concerned about the psychological health of an individual. Thus, here we face a problem of how to extend his individual psychology to a group psychology. In particular, is it possible to stretch his complex theory to the degree that it can be applied to a group's collective complex that its members together suffer from? A group of Jungian psychologists has developed a concept of collective complex, calling it cultural complex. The concept is made by combining Joseph L. Henderson's 'cultural' unconscious – a sort of unconsciousness that exists between the individual unconscious the collective unconscious – and Thomas Singer and Samuel L. Kimbles' cultural complex – a theory that a group can collectively suffer a complex. Let us first examine them in detail. And then, with an explanation of the projection mechanism that lies at the core of complex(es), the author presents two examples of Jungian psychohistorical analysis.

[175] C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types*, trans. R. F C Hull, vol. 6 of *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1971), 425; In addition, it is important to note that Jung uses the term, *self*, to refer to the state of the total and holistic psyche.

A. The Cultural Unconscious

Believing the existence of the unconscious, Jung thought of an individual human being as "a tiny dot that rides just above the surface of the oceanic depths of the evolutionary development of the human psyche."[176] Jung believed that in the psyche of an individual, traces of the history of life's evolution from humans to Primates, and to animals remain, even although we are no longer aware of them.[177] Unfortunately, Jung did not develop such an idea further. Therefore, his concentration on conceptualizing and classifying the field of the unconscious could not avoid broadening the gap between the conscious and the collective unconscious. It is Joseph L. Henderson who attempted to explore and theorize a potential arena in the human psyche that connects the individual conscious with the collective unconscious. Henderson named the potential psychical-field the cultural unconscious. In "The Cultural Unconscious (1988)," he defines it as follows:

> The cultural unconscious … is an area of historical memory that lies between the collective unconscious and the manifest culture pattern. It may include both those modalities, conscious and unconscious, but it has some kind of identity arising from the archetypes of the collective unconscious, which assists in the formation of myth and ritual and also promotes the process of development in individuals.[178]

To grasp fully what Henderson means by the cultural unconscious, it is necessary to briefly revisit Jung's original thought of the evolutionary history of the human psyche once again. Jung speculated that the unconscious of an individual is biologically connected to that of his/her families. The unconscious of his/her families again might be

[176] Thomas Singer, "Introduction" in *Listening to Latin America*, 2.

[177] C. G. Jung, *Analytical Psychology: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1925*, ed. W. McGuire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 41-42.

[178] Joseph L. Henderson, *Shadow and Self: Selected Papers in Analytical Psychology* (Wilmette: Chiron Publications, 1990), 103. His first definition of the cultural unconscious can be found in the article, "The Cultural Unconscious" in *Quadrant* 21 (1988).

connected to that of his/her clan, and which is also possibly connected to that of his society and country. Furthermore, according to Jung, a people's unconsciousness might be connected to that of larger groups such as that of Asia or Europe. To make a step further, Jung believed that such a biological and psychological connection traces back to that moment when the first life occurred on earth for the first time. On this basis, Henderson tries to formulate a kind of the unconscious that plays the role of a conceptual bridge between the individual unconscious and the collective unconscious.

The cultural unconscious is an area of historical memory representing "a kind of continuity between past and present at the level of the group unconscious."[179] As far as the collective unconscious (the most fundamental foundation of the psychological history of humanity) is concerned, it is feasible to argue that all humans on earth are psychologically homogenous. However, when it comes to differences in race, ethnicity and culture, we are different and have developed different ways of being – different languages, food, clothing, etc. Owing to those differences, each group or nation has a unique symbol-making system in its collective unconsciousness. Here, the concept of God can be a good example. Jung defines the psychical power of what we call God as "the name for a complex of ideas, grouped around a powerful feeling"[180] or "a real but subjective phenomenon."[181] When it comes to how to experience it and how to articulate that experience, however, each culture has its own way to understand the psychical power. That is why Asians are more likely to understand the concept of the Western God through their concept of Tao. In a word, Henderson coined the term cultural unconscious to

[179] Sam Kimbles, "Joe Henderson and the Cultural Unconscious," *The San Francisco Jung Institute Library Journal* 22 (2003): 55.
[180] Jung, "Symbols of Transformation: One," in *Symbols of Transformation*, 85.
[181] Ibid.

articulate other layers of the unconscious between the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious such as the family, tribal, ethnic, and national unconscious.[182]

B. Cultural Complex(es)

The theory of cultural complex is founded upon the cultural unconscious. Considering the cultural unconscious seriously, two Jungian psychoanalysts, Thomas Singer and Samuel L. Kimbles, speculated the possibility of a collective complex a group or people cannot collectively handle properly and psychologically suffer from together. They explain that a cultural complex is "an emotionally charged aggregate of historical memories, emotions, ideas, images, and behaviors that tend to cluster around an archetypal core that lives in the psyche of a group and is shared by individuals within that identified collective"[183] or "emotionally charged aggregates of ideas and images that tend to cluster around an archetypal core and are shared by individuals within an identified collective."[184] How a cultural complex takes place in the minds of a group is identical with the emergence of an individual complex. When collectively shocked by a tragic event the psychological impacts of which their consciousness cannot process appropriately, a group's memories, emotions, ideas, and images related to that event are repressed into its cultural unconsciousness and give rise to cultural complex(es). In a similar psychological process of how a personal complex expands its influence on the person in its grip, a cultural complex expands its influence on the collective psyche of a group, causing them to regress, think and behave irrationally. Additionally, a cultural

[182] Thomas Singer, "Introduction," in *Listening to Latin America*, 1-4.
[183] Ibid., 5.
[184] Thomas Singer and Catherine Kaplinsky, "Cultural Complexes in Analysis" in *Jungian Psychoanalysis: Working in the Spirit of C. G. Jung*, ed. Murray Stein (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 2010), 26.

complex can be transmitted from generation to generation through the functions of "schools, communities, media, and all the other forms of cultural and group life."[185] Take, for example, the traumatic psychological impacts of the Holocaust on Jews. Even if more than half a century passed since the trauma took place, post-holocaust generation Jews see their tragic past very sensitively and strictly educate their descendants the unforgettable memories.

In "The Cultural Complex (2012)," Thomas Singer points out six major characteristics of a cultural complex.[186] First, a cultural complex is largely expressed in powerful moods, repetitive behaviors, and highly charged emotional or affective reactions. Like an individual complex, a cultural complex is likely to paralyze the function of the conscious of a group psyche and emphasize emotional (more natural) reactions in face of what is uncomfortable and unexpected. Second, it remains unconscious. A group possessed by a cultural complex is not able to be aware of its existence unless it manifests itself through group behaviors, mostly negative. Third, it accumulates certain experiences to justify their distorted viewpoints in the grip of it. Like an individual who avoids facing and recognizing her own complex, a group under the influence of a cultural complex unconsciously or consciously refrains from recognizing its existence in its own psyche. Fourth, it affirms a simplistic or dualistic point of view in opposition to more ambiguous and uncertain perspectives with the use of various defensive mechanisms, particularly projection. Like an individual grasped by a complex who takes her complex at the center of her being and thinking, a cultural complex

[185] Thomas Singer and Samuel L. Kimbles, "Introduction," in *The Cultural Complex: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives on Psyche and Society*, 4.

[186] Thomas Singer, "Introduction," in *Listening to Latin America*, 5-6.

prevents a group from thinking of a problem in various ways. Fifth, a cultural complex is intermixed with the repressed basic feelings such as anger, disgust and fear with no outlets for them – it is very hard to resist, reflect upon, and discriminate them.[187] Sixth and last, a cultural complex could alter a cultural identity or national character because as in the case of a personal complex, a cultural complex forces a group to restructure their daily life by putting the complex at the heart of the collective psychological life. In doing so, they change their act and thought to justify their being prey to the highly charged emotional contents of the complex. In return, their altered worldview by a cultural complex provides them with a feeling of belonging with a specific group identity altered by their cultural complex.

Considering all those characteristics of a cultural complex, Singer claims that a cultural complex can be "the fundamental building blocks of an inner sociology"[188] because a cultural complex can grasp "the imagination, the behavior and the emotions of [the collective psyche of a group] and unleash tremendously irrational forces in the name of their "logic."[189] Agreeing with Thomas Singer on the influence of a cultural complex, June Singer makes a step further by arguing that "[a]ll social movements could be understood from the standpoint of the factor which Jung called: the autonomous complex arising out of the collective unconscious.'"[190] Harkening back to Jung's argument that we are all subject to a complex one way or another, it is possible to conjecture that all group psyches are under cultural complexes in some way. Just as we all have personal

[187] Thomas Singer, "The Cultural Complex," in *Psychotherapy and Politics International* 4 (2006): 203; "Introduction," in *Listening to Latin America*, 4-6.
[188] Ibid.
[189] Singer and Kimbles, "Introduction," *The Cultural Complex*, 7.
[190] Singer, *Boundaries of the Soul*, 90.

complexes to a certain degree, all groups, familial, regional, and national, can also have cultural complexes to varying degrees. In this respect, it is arguable that to understand the psychological characteristics of a group, it is worth paying attention to what cultural complex(es) they suffer unconsciously because what matters is not what kind of complexes we have, but what we unconsciously do in their grip.[191]

C. Projection: the Central Element of Complex

Generally speaking, projection is "the attribution of one's own ideas, feelings, or attributes to other people or to objects; especially, the externalization of blame, guilt, or responsibility as a defense against anxiety."[192] When we feel uncomfortable, we normally repress our uncomfortable feelings as a temporary and quick resolution. Jung's theory of projection explains how we resolve our inner conflict caused by the habitual avoidance of our emotions. When we repress bothersome feelings into the unconscious, we isolate ourselves from those natural feelings with the aid of intensified consciousness known as rationalization. Repressed into the unconscious, those feelings split from us form a complex. As a complex, those uncomfortable feelings gain autonomy and begin interfering with the proper workings of our consciousness. One principal way for a complex to intrude on consciousness is projection – an unconscious transfer of what an individual feels uncomfortable onto an outer subject that triggers those uneasy feelings. That is, with the use of projection, we are able to get rid of our painful conflict, once and for all, by shifting the responsibility for it onto another person.[193]

[191] Jung, "The Travistock Lecture," in *The Symbolic Life*, 84.

[192] Merriam-Webster English Dictionary, "projection," accessed on October 12, 2017. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/projection

[193] Jung, "Symbols of Transformation: One," in *Symbols of Transformation*, 59.

With the general knowledge about projection, now let us turn to how Jung understand it. In the "Definitions" in *Psychological Types* (1921), Jung defines the projection mechanism as follows:

> Projection means the expulsion of a subjective content into an object; it is the opposite of introjection. Accordingly, it is a process of dissimilation, by which a subjective content becomes alienated from the subject and is, so to speak, embodied in the object. The subject gets rid of painful, incompatible contents by projecting them.[194]

With the definition, Jung makes clear that projection is one of our most frequently used defensive mechanisms to relieve our psychological pains quickly. When we feel uneasy and stressful in a relationship with others, often unconsciously we make use of projection not to face and recognize the real causes inside us of those feelings. By simply thinking that we do not have any problem but they have, we justify our innocence and blame them for our psychological uneasiness. On this basis, Jung goes so far as to pronounce that "[a]ll human relationships swarm with these projections."[195] To understand his intention with the sentence, simply think how good we are at defending ourselves and blaming others to keep our psychological homeostasis. In this sense, it is undeniable that as a complex is part of our life, the occurrence of the projection mechanism is also natural in the psychic life of an individual or a group. What is worse, in many cases we do not even realize that we are using projection for the sake of our psychological health.

There is, moreover, a possibility that a complex can get intensified to a point that it becomes pathological so that our projection also can be pathological. When we overly

[194] Jung, "Definitions," in *Psychological Types*, 783.
[195] Ibid.

deny that we unconsciously project the feelings we do not feel comfortable with onto a person we do not like, "we cannot do anything else but be naïvely convinced that it really does belong to the object"[196] and "we always see our own unavowed mistakes in our opponent."[197] Given that owing to the intensified projection mechanism, that is, we cannot see the world as it is, Jung claims that "the effect of projection is to isolate the subject from his environment, since instead of a real relation to it there is now only an illusory one."[198] Like an individual who suffers a personal complex and restructures his/her life around the complex, a group or people with a cultural complex is limited psychologically to the extent that they can only see the world under the influence of the complex and the world they construct on the basis of their projection mechanism.

To help understand how a cultural complex influences and alters the psychical structure of a group or people and to also get a glimpse of how Jungian psychological theories (the cultural complex and projection) can be applied to the history of the Korean Protestantism in the last century, here the author presents two examples that point to an collective inferiority complex usually formulated in a people's cultural unconsciousness through colonial experience. The first example is Frantz Fanon's Jungian psychoanalytical analysis of the cultural complex of Africans named *lactification* – the negative impacts of racism on the cultural unconscious of Africans that was caused by the cultural colonization of Whites. The second is Jacqueline Gerson's Jungian psychoanalysis of the cultural complex of Mexicans, named *malinchismo* – the

[196] Jung, "General Aspects of Dream Psychology," in *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, 507.

[197] Ibid., 507-508.

[198] C. G. Jung, "The Shadow," in *Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self*, trans. R. F. C. Hull, vol. 9 of *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1959), 9.

unconscious tendency of Mexicans to reject their original and genetically inherited ethnic identity.

D. Two Examples of the Jungian Psychohistorical Analysis: Frantz Fanon and Jacqueline Gerson

In 1957, a Martinique-born Afro-Caribbean psychiatrist, Frantz Fanon, published *Black Skins, White Masks*, one of the first psychohistorical books on racism as a cultural complex. In this book, Fanon examines the psychological nature of colonialism and racism and its psychological damages to the collective psyche of both the colonized and the colonizing. Firmly based on his personal experience of being raised as a black man in a society where whites invaded and dominated by force, Fanon contends that the concept of Blackness is a socially and psychologically constructed concept in opposition to that of Whiteness. To support his argument, he endeavors to explain psychological reasons for the dichotomy with Jung's theories of projection and complex.[199]

First, Fanon lays down a well-known supposition that colonialism is made possible with "the myths of progress, civilization, liberalism, education, enlightenment, and refinement."[200] Second, he explains the psychological influences of colonization. Modernization justifying colonization put an emphasis on consciousness, and that required repression of the bodily senses of whites to a degree. Third, taking for granted that in Jung's analytical psychology, the repressed bodily senses (feelings) into the

[199] In his article, "Notes on White Supremacy: Essaying an Archetypal Account of Historical Events (1986)," James Hillman, a Jungian psychoanalyst, examines the opposites between white and black as one of the archetypal conceptions that have existed in the human psyche since the dawn of history. He points out that the archetypal concept of opposites is almost biologically universal and so inherited from generation to generation.

[200] Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 170-171.

unconscious form a complex that seeks expression in consciousness in any way, he surmises that whites project their immoral instincts and unmentionable desires onto blacks as a quick and simple resolution to handle their inner conflicts.[201] Fourth, he argues that such a projection mechanism produces an illusory worldview that while Whiteness means purity, beauty, goodness, brightness, and morality, Blackness indicates impurity, ugliness, sin, darkness, and immorality. In this regard, he points out that physiologically considered, Blackness has nothing to do with blacks. Blackness is more like the result of a psychological projection whites used to hastily eliminate their inner conflicts – in Jung's terms, it is the shadow of Whiteness. Through that projection, whites attribute what they hate and avoid in themselves to the concept of Blackness and regain their psychological homeostasis. Fifth, he explains how the projection mechanism of whites alters the psyche of blacks negatively. In a white-dominant society, blacks, as the colonized, slowly and stealthily internalize the dualistic concept of whites vs. blacks through various social media such as books, newspapers, school texts, advertisements, and movies.[202] This social process gives birth to a new identity of blacks – Blackness means being undeveloped, uncultivated, impure, ugly, and immoral and both explicitly and implicitly forces blacks to internalize a sense of inferiority at a collective level. Sixth and last, he argues that such a social phenomenon becomes pathological for both the colonizing and colonized. As racial dualism penetrates into the colonizing and the colonized equally, the colonizing become more obsessive about white superiority and hesitate to face what they avoid in themselves with the use of a constant projection mechanism. On the contrary, the colonized become more obsessive about their

[201] Ibid., 167.
[202] Ibid., 131.

internalized sense of inferiority which in return causes them to crave whites' approval of their 'inferior' existence.[203]

Despite that Fanon's pioneering psychohistorical analysis of colonialism and racism is more like a personal defense for his 'inferiorized' cultural identity, his analysis provides an important insight into the psychological life of the colonized under the influence of the colonizing. That is, at the heart of the colonized's hunger for the colonizing's approval and reassurance of their existence, there is hidden a sense of their self-contempt and self-hate. To repress or forget the miserably painful feeling, blacks begin hating their genetic and biological characteristics – Blackness – and compulsively attempt to identify with Whiteness which is another illusory concept. Fanon's psychohistorical study on a people with colonial experience made a conceptual legacy: *lactification* – a psychological process in which the colonized eliminate their biological and cultural characteristics to be like the colonizing people. Though Fanon coined the term to describe the psychological relationship between whites and blacks, it is possible to apply it to analyzing a cultural complex that alters the psychic life of a people as far as that colonial experience is a collective tragedy is concerned.

Next, Jacqueline Gerson's article "*Malinchismo*: Betraying One's Own" presents a closer look at how a cultural complex prevents the continuous growth of a people's collective psyche. In the article, Gerson calls into question the national identity of Mexicans after the Mexican Conquest that took place in the beginning of the sixteenth century. To theorize how the traumatic event still haunts the collective psyche of Mexicans, she coined the term, the *malinchismo* complex: ""disliking" one's own and

[203] Ibid., 171.

preferring the other – giving oneself to the foreigner and abandoning and betraying one's own."[204] To explain the origin of the complex, she tells a story of a native Mexican woman who lived during the Conquest.

In the beginning of the sixteenth century, there was an Aztec Indian princess named Malintzin (later known as La Malinche or Doña Marina) in an Aztec village. Because the village lord was her father, she was educated well until her father's death. Sometime later, her mother married a man and soon bore him her half-brother. With the ambition to make her son succeed her late husband's lordship, instead of Malinche's daughter, she secretly turned over Malinche to some passing traders. The traders sold her as a slave in Tabasco, one of the southern states where Malinche began learning several local languages while working as a slave. When she was fourteen years old, she was given as a present to Hernando Cortés, the Mexican conqueror. One day Cortés knew that Malinche was multilingual and used her as an interpreter to conquer more areas of Mexico. Since then Malinche closely worked with the Conqueror and eventually became his loyal mistress who bore him a son, Don Martín Cortés who succeeded to the crown.

Gerson points out that from the story, generally Mexicans pulled two points and associated them with their national identity. First, they consider Malinche as the 'symbolic' mother of the *mestizo* – someone who has one Spanish parent and one Native American parent. By 'symbolic,' Gerson means that, even though actually Malinche was not the only Indian woman who was forced to marry a Spanish man and gave a birth to a child of mixed race, Mexicans symbolically regard her as the first mother of a mixed-

[204] Jacqueline Gerson, "*Malinchismo*: Betraying One's Own," in *The Cultural Complex: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives on Psyche and Society*, 35.

blood *mestizo*. Second, because Malinches betrayed her nation by helping Hernando Cortés and which polluted the ethnic authenticity of her people by giving birth to Cortés' son, Mexicans consider her a national betrayer. To generalize their antipathy to her existence, Mexicans coined a word *malinchista* to refer to "individuals who turn their back on their own culture."[205] Taking the general ambivalent attitude of Mexicans toward Malinches as a foundation, Gerson discovers a cultural complex of Mexicans who unconsciously reject their own culture and tradition and the term *malinchismo* to refer to that psychological phenomenon.

One day Gerson found herself also rejecting her country's culture and tradition. That self-discovery came from a pair of shoes she bought in a department store in the U.S. She bought them, thinking that they are American. When she realized that they were originally made in Mexico and exported to the U.S., however, she could not reject an ambivalent feeling about them. Her realization that they were not American but Mexican led her to wonder their quality. If she had known that the shoes were made in Mexico at the U.S. department store, she would not have purchased them. Recognizing that she unconsciously devalued what is Mexican without a second thought led her to ask if there is a sort of psychological mechanism working in connection with that tendency. She turned around and observed how Mexicans react differently to what is American and what is Mexican. Her ambivalence is not her own issue. In general, Mexicans tend to value imported articles such as shoes, clothing, toys and foods from other countries more highly than articles made in their country. In making a name for a restaurant or a store, and even to a newborn baby, they also prefer other languages, particularly English, to

[205] Ibid., 37.

Mexican. Gerson analyzes that the ambivalent attitude of Mexicans toward their own culture, customs, and language is a manifestation of a cultural complex, named *malinchismo*, in the grip of which they are. To figure out how *malinchismo* is internalized into and still controls the cultural unconscious of Mexicans, she revisits the story of Malinche from a Jungian psychohistorical perspective.

Mexicans remember the Spanish Conquest of the Aztec Empire as one of the most traumatic events in their history because it shook their nationality entirely with the destruction of the Aztec Empire, the colonization of native Mexicans, and the emergence of a new race *el mestizo*. To explain the psychological shock native Mexicans suffered in the midst of the historical storm, Gerson makes use of the concept of 'betrayal' as presented by James Hillman, a Jungian psychoanalyst. In his article, "Betrayal (1965)," Hillman introduces five psychological defensive mechanisms to betrayal: revenge, denial, cynicism, self-betrayal, and paranoid.[206] Before examining those defensive mechanisms, it is necessary to grasp what Hillman means by 'betrayal' because he uses the term to indicate an archetypal psychological-influence of that experience on the psyche that is different from *Webster-Merriam Dictionary*'s – 'violation of a person's trust or confidence, of a moral standard, etc.' Assuming that the archetypal betrayal is the loss of the Garden of Eden where the purest and primal trust between Adam and God is possible, Hillman claims that when betrayed, we re-experience the falling of the safe and trustful world we construct with our desire to trust and to be trusted. It is extremely painful because it reminds us that there is no one to genuinely rely on in the world and we are totally alone. To resolve our inner pains and conflicts, we choose revenge, avoiding that

[206] James Hillman, "Betrayal" (A paper presented at Guild Lecture No. 128 of the Guild of Pastoral Psychology, 1964).

experience's deeper meaning – eye for eye, evil for evil, and pain for pain. Or we decide to deny our experience of betrayal – denying the value of the other person and betrayal itself. Our third defensive mechanism to betrayal is cynicism – moving beyond denial, we assume the world as a place full of cheaters, liars, and deceivers. When cynicism cannot relieve our inner pains in an instance, we choose to betray ourselves by consciously pretending that nothing like betrayal happened to us or acting against our own intentions and value system. However, the most dangerous defensive mechanism is paranoid. To protect ourselves against ever being betrayed again, we desire to build a 'perfect' relationship that demands a loyalty oath to exclude any risk. Applying Hillman's psychological analysis of betrayal to Mexicans who underwent the Spanish Conquest of the Aztec Empire and the colonial era, it becomes clear that Mexicans consider those traumatic events as betrayal – the loss of their safe and trustful world they can rely on.

Focusing on the notion that Mexicans had difficulty expressing their discontent and anger directly to the Spaniards as a way for them to deal with a national betrayal experience, Gerson picks 'self-betrayal' as the supposedly most common defensive mechanism the majority of Mexicans used in order to handle their inner conflicts. In a situation where they were not allowed to blame the Spaniards for their suffering, they turned themselves against their own experience. Rather than blaming the Spaniards for their suffering, they blamed themselves for that. In this psychological process, they repressed their emotional reactions against their colonizers into their cultural unconscious where the repressed emotional pains became *malinchismo* – the cultural complex of Mexicans. In the grip of the complex, they had to construct a new world they all could share. For doing this, they no longer relied on their traditional worldview to understand

what was happening. Their projection of frustration, anger, and sadness onto themselves made them think that the main cause of that suffering was their existence – their traditional way of being, doing, and thinking. In front of their colonizers, such a realization gave rise to a sense of inferiority at a collective level. To regain a sense of self-confidence, they had no other option but to desperately hold on to the alien value systems of the Spaniards, taking it as a better and newer worldview that more justifies the value of their existence than their traditional one.

However, their self-betrayal did not calm the inner conflicts completely. They needed something or someone onto which they could project them easily. Gerson explains that here we can discover the psychological reason for why Mexicans ambivalently consider Malinche, a savior and betrayal of their nationality. For Mexicans, Malinche is, psychologically speaking, a paradoxical object to idealize and criticize at the same time. Thus, Mexicans' self-betrayal along with their criticism against Malinche is nothing other than a manifestation of *malinchismo*, their cultural complex. The complex has been inherited from generation to generation. In the grip of *malinchismo*, Mexicans still distrust their nationality, believing that what is Mexican is inferior to what is Western. The complex still has its momentum in the cultural unconscious of Mexicans, forcing them believe that "we have no eyes, no heart, no mind for our own cruelty or for our own beauty, our value, and selves."[207] The cultural complex of *malinchismo* paralyzed the psychological ability of Mexicans to evaluate their historical experiences

[207] Jacqueline Gerson, "*Malinchismo*: Betraying One's Own," in *The Cultural Complex: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives on Psyche and Society*, 38.

and traditional worldview fairly and objectively.[208] That is why Gerson concludes her article, saying that in a sense, the collective psyche of Mexicans may still live in 'the era of the Conquest.'

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter, the Jungian theory of psychohistory, which will be applied to the KPC's rapid growth in the past century in Chapter 3, was introduced. In doing so, a general understanding of psychohistory, the theory of Jung's psychology, the theory of the cultural complex, and two examples of the Jungian psychohistorical analysis were scrutinized.

First, the author has presented an introduction to psychohistory that consists of its characteristics, including its strengths and weaknesses. There are two important characteristics of psychohistory to remember: (1) psychohistory is a study about the why question of history rather than the what question of it, by placing a premium on the influence of the unconscious over consciousness and (2) it considers historical resources as analysands for a psychohistorian to psychoanalyze. Various criticisms of psychohistory are summarized into four points: (1) psychohistory psychologizes history; (2) it tends to reduce history into psychological activity; (3) it arbitrarily uses historical resources to justify its arguments; and (4) it seems somewhat obsessive about the logic of cause and effect. In opposition to these four criticisms, psychohistorians re-emphasized the usefulness of psychohistory on three points: (1) psychohistory is nothing but one

[208] In the case of La Malinche and what she did for her people and nation, Gerson claims that Malinche created a new race, *el mestizo*, to make a way for Mexicans to survive, even if in doing so, she could not help but contribute to the extinction of the pure Indian blood in Mexicans to a degree. Jugian-psychohistorically considered, the *malincismo* complex prevents Mexicans from integrating these two opposing worldviews into one.

additional theoretical method for historical studies, (2) it can contribute to history with its various psychoanalytic theories that can be various perspectives, and (3) psychohistory does not attempt to complete historical studies; instead it tries to 'deepen' the meaning of history from its psychoanalytical perspectives.

Second, on the basis of the general knowledge about psychohistory needed for this study, the author provides a brief introduction to Jung's analytical psychology. Because most psychohistorical theories are generally founded on Freud's psychology, to explain a Jungian theory of psychohistory, the author examined some major concepts of Jung's psychology such as the collective unconscious, psychopathology, dreams and archetypes, as well as complexes. One clear difference between Freudian and Jungian psychohistory is that while Freudian psychohistory regards repression as the key psychic element of human-made historical events, Jungian psychohistory regards complex (or the separation of consciousness from the unconscious) as the key psychic element.

Third, to stretch Jung's analytical psychology to the degree that it can be applied to psychoanalyzing the collective psyche of a group, the author has introduced two additional concepts of Jungian psychology: Henderson's concept of the cultural unconscious and Thomas Singer and Samuel L. Kimbles' concept of the cultural complex. Henderson theorizes another layer of the unconscious that exists between the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious. This concept paves the way for us to psychoanalyze the collective psyche of a group or people; in our case, the psychodynamics of the Korean people who converted to Christianity in the last century. Basing Jung's theory of complex on the collective unconscious, Singer and Kimbles theorized the concept of the cultural complex. They argued that just as a personal

complex is a psychological defensive-mechanism of an individual, a cultural complex can be a psychological defensive-mechanism of a group.

Last, before psychoanalyzing the history of the KPC in the last century, with the use of the Jungian psychohistorical perspective, the author introduces two examples of a cultural complex: *lactification* and *malinchismo*. With *lactification*, Frantz Fanon psychoanalyzed how Blackness was socially and psychologically constructed and internalized into the collective psyche of blacks under the colonial control of whites. With *malinchismo*, Jacqueline Gerson investigates how a cultural complex has long hindered the psychological growth of Mexicans.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE TRAUMATIC 20TH CENTURY OF KOREA: JAPANESE IMPERIALISM, THE KOREAN WAR, AND THE KOREAN MILITARY GOVERNMENTS

The primary goal of this chapter is to provide a new historical perspective, which has been hidden for a long time, on what might motivate S. Koreans to convert to Protestantism in large numbers in the past century, finding a correlation between their traumatic experiences and their massive conversion to Protestantism. Its main argument is that a series of the traumatic events such as the Japanese occupation, the Korean War, and the massive industrialization and urbanization of Korean military governments might cause a certain psychological state of South Koreans – a collective inferiority complex – that helped them to choose Protestantism as their new religion.[209] To support this, first, the author will examine the traumatic experiences of Koreans during the Japanese colonial era that disrupted Korea's traditional identity considerably by its industrial revolution of the Korean Peninsula. Second, an almost endlessly continuing series of massacres of Koreans during the Korean War will be discussed, stressing that memories of those tragedies became an involuntary fear and anxiety about North Korea and communism. Third and last, the chapter will examine how the S. Korean military governments controlled their people – bodily as well as psychologically – for about thirty years to maintain power.

[209] While an inferiority complex refers to a sense of unworthiness and helplessness an individual feels about him/herself, a collective complex indicates a sense of unworthiness and helplessness members of a group, society, or nation feel together. How the collective inferiority complex had to do with the rapid growth of the KPC will be examined in detail in chapter 4.

I. Japanese Imperialism and the Loss of the Old Korea

Although Japan was not the first established diplomatic relations with Korea (Joseon at that time) among such imperial powers as the U.S., Germany, and the Britan, it is Japan that changed Korea's history and the lives of Koreans irreversibly. In *Korea's Place in the Sun* (2005), Bruce Cumings, an American historian of East Asia, professor, lecturer and author, summarizes into one sentence how Japan changed Korea not only in its politics, economy, and culture, but in its people's traditional outlook on the world: "Japanese imperialism stuck a knife in old Korea and twisted it, and that wound has gnawed at the Korean national identity ever since."[210] After the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty was officially ratified in 1910, Japan started grand-scale national reform in Korea to create a colony as a useful bridgehead to expand into East Asia. For doing so, it replaced the Korean *yangban* scholar-officials who handled matters of state with Japanese elites, most of whom were military officers. It changed the Korean traditional educational system, based on the Confucian classics, into Japanese modern education. It "built Japanese capital and expertise in place of the incipient Korean versions, Japanese talent for Korean talent."[211] In 1937, when the policy to obliterate Korean culture and language in the populace through forced Japanization was determined, Japan began prohibiting Koreans from using their language, forced them to learn Japanese, and even mandated them to change their names to Japanese names.

In order to exploit Korea and its people for the sake of the expansion of its empire into the Greater East Asia, Japan began Korea's first modernization by industrializing the

[210] Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005), 140.
[211] Ibid., 141.

peninsula. Focusing on Japan's unpardonable atrocities against Koreans such as comfort women (enforced sex slaves) and the work and military forced draft, it might be surprising that by 1945, Japan transformed Korea into the most developed country with a strong infrastructure in transportation and communication in East Asia, except for itself.[212] For example, Japan connected Korea to Europe through a railway system. Before 1939, travelers could board "an express train in Pusan and travel all the way to Europe – through old P'yŏngyang, across the Yalu, into Harbin, thence via the Trans-Siberian railway on to Moscow, a day in Leningrad, on to Prague, Berlin, and then Paris."[213] In addition, Japan built roads in Korea where formerly there had been only small roads for mass transportation. By 1945, Korea had "53,000 kilometers of auto and country roads, compared with perhaps 100,000 kilometers of "serviceable" roads in all China."[214] The road and railroad network brought an unprecedented change to Korea that replaced Korea's traditional carrying implements such as the A-frame carrier and oxcart and meandering paths with the most up-to-date conveyances. In addition, Japan located heavy industries in the northern areas of Korea such as steel mills, auto plants, petrochemical complexes, and hydroelectric facilities.[215] Along with them, "[a]ll kinds of new lines of activity opened up at home and abroad for entertaining and idealistic young Koreans: urban commerce, journalism, study abroad, and political organizing."[216] Some Koreans began "going to the movies, listening to the radio, buying cosmetics, and

[212] Ibid., 167.
[213] Ibid., 166.
[214] Ibid., 167; V. T. Zaichikov, *Geography of Korea*, trans. Albert Parry (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952), 82-83.
[215] Ibid., 175.
[216] Ibid., 170.

dressing in the latest fashions."[217] In a word, Japanese imperialism accelerated the collapse of Korea's traditional social-structure with its industrial revolution and a number of Western social activities.[218]

However, the social benefits of Westernization Japan brought to Korea had a downside. Japan changed Korea's national identity so rapidly that Koreans had difficulties making themselves accustomed to their fast-changing circumstances. Imagine a nation with an agricultural lifestyle for more than five thousand years going through a massive industrial revolution within less than forty years. What was worse, Japan forced its colony's populace to be displaced at its will. For example, Japan installed the highly developed transportation and heavy-industry infrastructures in Korea to maximize its exploitation of Korea – its natural resources as well as its people. Since the "heavy industry accounted for 28 percent of [its] total industrial production" [219] in Korea, "more than half a million Koreans were employed in industry."[220] The industrialization of the peninsula, struck by the depression in the 1930s, caused a massive migration of Koreans from their hometowns to cities and industries in search of job opportunities. When Japan started a war in North China in 1937 and thereafter, it sought to organize "every aspect of Korean life to serve the war effort."[221] As human capital, Korean laborers were drafted, conscripted, and moved to Japan and its other colonies, according to the National General

[217] Ibid., 173.

[218] It is during the Japanese period that, along with the emergence of a working class for the first time in Korea, the first Korean *chaebols* (zaibatsu, or conglomerate) were born. Most of them were landlords who lived in the southeastern areas of Korea. They became entrepreneurs with the use of their capital, inherited from their ancestors and their personal connections to the in-residence Japanese who ruled Korea.

[219] Ibid., 169.

[220] Ibid., 169.

[221] Ibid., 176.

Mobilization Law.[222] Thus, "in 1941 some 1.4 million Koreans were in Japan, of whom 770,000 were in the labor force: 220,000 were in construction work, 208,000 in manufacturing, 94,000 in mining, and the remainder in agriculture."[223] Thereafter, Japan brought at least half a million more Koreans to its land. By 1945, one-third of the industrial labor force in Japan was Koreans.[224]

Bruce Cumings notes the severity of Japan's displacement of Koreans from their homes to new and unfamiliar places as follows:

> By 1944 fully 11.6 percent of all Koreans were residing outside Korea. About 20 percent of all Koreans were either abroad or in provinces other than those in which they were born; when we learn that most of these were in the fifteen-to-forty age group, it may mean that 40 percent of the adult population was part of this uprooting.[225]

Taking Cumings' explanation into consideration, it is not difficult to see that in 1945, when Korea regained sovereignty, at least forty percent of the adult population of Korea were not in their hometowns, causing a number of separated families. Koreans were unable to restore their traditional lifestyle and family (social) structure as they were before the emergence of Japan imperialism. Even if some of them came back to where they belonged before 1909, they were no longer psychologically the same. They had changed. Their life circumstances had changed. Their country had changed. To make

[222] By that time, Japan allowed Koreans to join the Japanese military to resolve the shortage of its troops. At the same time, the bureaucratic positions, originally allowed only to the Japanese were also available to Koreans. For more information about this social change, see the pages 176-177 of Cumings' *Korea's Place in the Sun*.

[223] Ibid., 177.

[224] Ibid.

[225] Ibid., 175; Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korea War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 53-55; Glenn Trewartha and Wilbur Zelinsky, "Population Distribution and Change in Korea, 1925-1949," *Geographical Review* 45, no. 1 (1955): 14.

matters worse, in the vortex of the changing circumstances, they could not see another human-made disaster lying in wait for the right time to emerge.

II. S. Korea's Anticommunism and the Korean War: a Series of Massacres

When asked about the most tragic historical event in their history, Koreans mostly tend to choose the Korean War. It is because the war, in which brothers killed their brothers, put Koreans into the most traumatic tragedy in their national history, causing "a total of more than four million casualties, of which at least two million were civilians – a higher percentage than in World War II or Vietnam."[226] In addition, the war caused about 200 thousand widows, 100 thousand orphans, and 2 million separated families to be included to the number of casualties.[227] It also damaged or destroyed approximately 80 percent of industrial facilities in Korea, 75 percent of governmental buildings and more than half an inhabitable area of Korea.[228] Considering such destructive impacts of the war, some scholars such as Bruce Cumings suggest that the war made Koreans realize how weak and incompetent they were, pushing them to discover themselves incapable of handling their national problem, and sought help from other countries. As a result, S. Korea relied on the Allied Forces led by the U.S. and N. Korea the Soviet Union and China. However, Korean historians and war survivors such as Jungseok Seo argue that what really made Koreans remember the war as the most tragic event in their history was an innumerable, but mostly unrecorded, number of massacres that took place throughout the Korean Peninsula during the war.[229] Taking this view seriously, one can ask, who massacred

[226] Cumings, *The Korean War*, 35.
[227] Park and Jeong, *Hanguksareul Bora! Ilje Gangjeomgiwa Hyeondae*, 210.
[228] Ibid., 210-211.
[229] Seo, *Seojungseokui Hyeondaesa Iyagi 2*, 111-113.

whom? It is well known that N. Koreans – identified as communists – massacred S. Koreans who collaborated the S. Korean government, calling them capitalists. It is also well known that occasionally South Koreans massacred North Koreans, calling them communists. However, it is largely unknown that the S. Korean government led by Syngman Rhee systematically massacred its own people, simply labeling them "communists." It is also largely unknown that U.S. Armed Forces massacred Koreans as part of its indispensable military strategy to win the war. Formerly secret American documents reveal that the U.S. Air Force continued air attacks into N. Korea from the beginning of the war until the last minute – 10 PM on July 27, 1953 – when the armistice agreement became effective.[230] To understand how tragic the war was to Koreans, it is significant to examine the reality of those unrecorded massacres in the war. For doing so, first the author will examine how the Rhee government massacred S. Koreans and then how the U.S armed forces massacred Koreans.

A. The Rhee Government's Anticommunism

To examine how the S. Korean militant government systematically massacred its own people during the war, it is important to know the theoretical ground the Rhee government drew on in order to justify its inhumane brutality. Not long after Korea regained sovereignty in August, 1945, the United States Army Military Government (hereafter the U.S. military government) occupied the southern area of Korea. On September 8, 1945, it immediately took four steps to effectively control Koreans in the South: "first, to build up an army to defend the thirty-eight parallel; second, to buttress the Korean National Police (KNP) as the primary political weapon for pacifying the

[230] Tae-Woo Kim, *Poggyeog* [Bombardment] (Seoul: Changbi Publishers, 2013), 335-338.

South; third, to strengthen the alliance with rightist parties; and fourth, to suppress Koreans who did not like such policies."[231]

What is important to note at this point is that when the U.S. military government arrived at the southern part of Korea, S. Koreans effectively maintained public peace and order under the leadership of the Council of People's Committee Korean independence activists had organized a week before the day of liberation. As a self-governing community, the Council held Southern Korea under control through its nationwide network. The government, however, rejected the Council's existence, considering it as an anti-American organization. To strengthen its own policing force – the Korean National Police, the government hired Koreans who had served for the Japanese force in large numbers, with hopes that they would work hard for them because they had done that earlier for the Japanese government.[232] The decision was completely against the shared desire of Koreans who believed that *chinilpa* – pro-Japanese collaborators – must be purged from their egoistic and unpatriotic acts.[233]

On the other hand, to the pro-Japanese collaborators, the government's friendly reception was an opportunity to regain their strength. To win the government's favor, they chose anticommunism as their political foundation, raising their voices against North

[231] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 200.

[232] Jung-Seok Seo, *SeoJung-Seokui Hyeondaesa Iyagi 1: Haebanggwa Boonan* [Seo Jung-Seok's Story of the Korean Modern History 1: Liberation and Division] (Seoul, Korea: MayBook Publisher, 2015), 280.

[233] The National Institute of Korean Language defines *chinilpa* [Pro-Japanese collaborators] as 'those Koreans who supported, stood up for, and followed the Japanese's invasion and plunder of Korea and its people in collusion with Japanese imperialism during the period of Japanese colonial rule (translated by the author), http://stdweb2.korean.go.kr/search/List_dic.jsp, accessed on March 6, 2018.

Korea.[234] In doing so, they cunningly shifted their wrongdoings during the Japanese era to communists and North Korea and instigated antipathy among South Koreans toward North Korea. When they gained enough political power under the patronage of the government, they established a political party named *Minjukukmindang* [Democratic Nationalist Party], Syngamn Rhee – First President of the Republic of Korea – was its member, supporting the establishment of a single government in S. Korea. Since then, the pro-Americans – formerly pro-Japanese – took the lead of locating and punishing any Communist sympathizers in S. Korea. Ironically, many S. Koreans' antipathy to their government that systemically arrested those who were against it by randomly labeling them communists led them to support communism. Their approval of communism became a way to express their hatred of and anger toward the pro-Americans who were traitors, although pretending to be patriots.[235]

Korean historians such as Hong-Gu Han point out that the U.S. military government's unreasonable policy gave birth to the Korean government-led anticommunist movement, which dramatically changed the flow of Korean history from 1945 on. While in Japan and Germany, the U.S. government endeavored to entirely change their political structures right after World War II, strangely enough, in S. Korea, it

[234] Jung-Seok Seo and Deok-Ryeon Kim, *Seojungseokui Hyeondaesa Iyagi 1: Haebanggwa Bundan, Chinilpyeon [Seo, Jung-Seok's Story of the Korean Modern History 1:Liberation and Separation, Pro-Japanese Group*s (Seoul: Maybook Publisher, 2015), 83. Additionally, to understand this political alliance between U.S. politicians and South Korean politicians after 1945, it is important to note the direct as well indirect influence over S. Korea of the American anti-communism known as McCarthyism – the nationwide systematic search for and removal from public employment of all those believed to be Communists, which was carried out under Senator Joseph McCarthy. Its roots can be found in the period of the U.S. called as the *Second Red Scare*, lasting roughly from 1947 to 1956 and characterized by an extensive national campaign against the Communist influence on American institutions and Soviet agents' espionage. For more information, read Ellen W. Schrecker and Phillip Deery's *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents* (2016) and M. Stanton Evans' *Blacklisted by History: The Untold Story of Senator Joe McCarthy and His Fight Against America's Enemies* (2009).

[235] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 203.

attempted to maintain what Japan left behind. On top of that, they repeatedly emphasized the dangers of North Korea and the necessity of anticommunism as political propaganda. Considering the twists and turns of Korean history immediately following World War II, it is possible to speculate that with the manipulative use of anticommunism, those traitors changed themselves from traitors into patriots while purifying and justifying themselves with pro-Americanism. Thus, to those pro-Americans – the former Japanese collaborators, anticommunism was not merely a political campaign. Rather, it was the theoretical ground of their existence. With the basic knowledge of the origin of anticommunism, let us investigate what the Rhee government did to their people, utilizing anticommunism at their will.

B. The National Bodo League: An Example of the Rhee Government's Massacres for the Birth of Anticommunism

As soon as Syngman Rhee came to power, his government established the "National Security Act"[236] against North Korea and organized, as part of its implementation, the *Kukmin Bodo Yeonmaeng* – the National Bodo League) or the National Rehabilitation and Guidance League – to reeducate suspected communists in S. Korea. The government announced that any communists, collaborators or sympathizers join the league and that in doing so, their past political faults be pardoned without punishment. However, to fill up the required number of 300,000, the government forced

[236] *Korea Ministry of Government Legislation* states that a South Korean law has been enforced since 1948 to secure the security of the State and the subsistence and freedom of nationals, by regulating any anticipated activities compromising the safety of the State. Because of its serious misuses against Korean civilians, a majority of Koreans frequently proposed the necessity of its abrogation. But the government maintained it through revisions, emphasizing the dangers of the North Korea's direct and indirect invasion, http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=116750&efYd=20120701#0000, accessed on March 8, 2018.

not only real communists or sympathizers but also members of opposition parties, and even civilians with no relation to communism to join the league, and later put them in various prisons in S. Korea.[237] Surprisingly, however, it was revealed that about eighty percent of the enrolled members of the league were innocent Korean civilians who even did not know what the Right (capitalism) and the Left (communism) meant[238] – a majority simply enrolled in to win favor from the government.[239] Approximately three-hundred thousand members in total did not know what would fall upon them in 1950.[240] On June 27, 1950, two days after the outbreak of the Korean War, Rhee ordered the execution of all the league members in S. Korea, worrying that they could cooperate with N. Koreans. The order was quickly carried out nationwide in S. Korea – there were no trials or sentencing because, under martial law, jurisdiction belonged to the military.[241] The mass execution continued for a period of three weeks in early July. Twenty eyewitnesses, who lived in a village nearby a prison where *Bodo* members were confined, testified how the military executed them as follows: "political prisoners were trucked in and executed, both by bullets to the head and decapitation by sword, and then layered on top of one another in the pits like sardines… The witness said that two jeeps with American officers observed the killings."[242]

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[237] Hamish McDonald, "South Korea Owns Up to Brutal Past," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, Nov. 15, 2008, https://www.smh.com.au/news/world/south-korea-owns-up-to-brutal-past/2008/11/14/1226318928410.html, accessed on March 8, 2018; "Waiting for the Truth," *Hankyoreh*, June 25, 2007, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/218141.html, accessed on March 8, 2018; Jo-sook Bae, "Gov't Killed 3,400 Civilians During War," *The Korean Times*, March 2, 2009, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/03/117_40555.html, accessed on March 8, 2018.

[238] Hyeon-Yeon Jo, *Hanguk Hyeondae Jeongchiui Akmong* [The Nightmare of the Korean Modern Politics] (Seoul: Chaeksesang Publishers, 2007), 58.

[239] Ibid.

[240] Ibid., 58.

[241] Ibid., 57.

[242] Cumings, *The Korean War*, 175.

However, a worse situation occurred when the North Korean People's Army occupied areas of S. Korea. Exactly in the opposite way, the army hunted down those who had associated with the Rhee government and openly executed them, hoping that the execution might prevent S. Koreans from helping and cooperating with the Allied Forces. Because such tragic executions were only known and recorded by oral testimonies of survivors, it is impossible to estimate how many S. Koreans as well as N. Koreans were slaughtered by the two governments during the war. The two governments justified their brutal acts as the only way to protect 'their' people. It is not too much to say that during the war, a considerable number of both S. and N. Koreans were exposed to those executions.

Jung-Seok Seo, a Korean historian, along with other scholars such as Chan-Seung Park, Im-Ha Lee, and Hong-Gu Han claim that those government-led massacres during the war terrified a great number of S. Koreans because it is self-evident that the executions were carried out systematically across the nation.[243] Seo points out that those executions largely aimed to exterminate the entire family of a communist – his/her spouse, parents, and children to eliminate all communists from the earth.[244] Thus, those mass executions quickly forced S. Koreans to internalize the terror of communism and communists. By extension, they implanted into their minds a fear of the Rhee

[243] Jung-Seok Seo and Deok-Ryeon Kim, *SeongJung-Seokui Hyeondaesa Iyagi 2: Hangukjeonjaenggwa Minganin Jibdanhagsal* [Seojung-seok's Story of the Korean Modern History 2: the Korean War and Massacres] (Seoul: Maybook Publishers, 2015), 153-156; Chan-Seung Park, *Maeullo Gan Hangukjeonjaeng* [The Korean War in Towns] (Paju: Dolbegae Publisher, 2015), 19-20; Im-Ha Lee, "Hangukjeonjaenggi Buyeokjacheobeol [The Issue of Punishing Collaborators During the Korean War]," in *Jeonjaeng Sogui Tto Dareun Jeonjaeng: Miguk Munseoro Bon Hangukjeonjaenggwa Haksal* [Another War in A War: The Korean War and Genocide in the U.S. Government Documents], ed. Jung-Seok Seo et al. (Seoul: Suninbook, 2014), 129-172; Hong-Gu Han, *Hanhongguui Yeoksa Iyagi 1: Danguneseo Gimduhankkaji* [Hong-Gu Han's Story of Korean History 1: From Dangun to Kim Du-han] (Seoul: Hanibook, 2003), 123-125.

[244] Ibid., 156.

government because it was the government that decided who was a communist or not. Terrified by its absolute power, family survivors of the massacres could not tell their posterity about the massacres because they thought only silence could help their children survive – without the danger of being labeled as a communist and its brutal consequences. In *Hanguk Hyeondae Jeongchiui Agmong* [The Nightmare of the Korea's Modern Politics] (2007), Hyeonyeon Jo summaries the psychological impacts of the massacres of S. Koreans by the Rhee government as follows:

> With the brutality and cruelty of the massacres, the Rhee government became an embodiment of salvation and an objection of devotion. It distorted and concealed its butcheries by justifying them as military operations, executions, and reprisals. Finally, anticommunism became one of its political ideologies after the war.[245] (translated by the author)

Here we face the origins of a Korean social pathology called the *Red Complex* – a socially constructed psychological tendency of the South Koreans to simultaneously fear and abominate anything related to North Korea or its people (communists).[246] While S. Koreans struggled to survive the war that made their daily lives complete pandemonium, their government killed any possible communists with no hesitation, identifying them as the real cause of the hardship. S. Koreans wanted to survive, hoping not to be identified as communists. In the end, they feared their government more than communism. Considering this traumatic experience, Si-min Rhyu, a Korean journalist, argues that the social pathology is closely tied to S. Koreans' survival instinct in face of the Korean

[245] Jo, *Hanguk Hyeondae Jeongchiui Akmong*, 65.

[246] Jun-man Kang et al., *Redeu Kompeullekseu: Gwanggiga Namgin Ahom Gaeui Chosang* [Red Complex: Nine Portraits Madness Left Behind] (Seoul: Samin Publishers, 1997), 7; Jo, *Hanguk Hyeondae Jeongchiui Akmong*, 19, 24.

War.[247] To survive, they had to trust their government and hate communism without doubt. In doing so, N. Korea – communism – became the internal object of an eternal enemy in their minds.

C. The U.S. Armed Forces and Their Military 'Operational' Massacres

When it comes to the Korean War, S. Koreans generally think that the U.S. saved them from N. Korea and protected their democratic and capitalistic society, sacrificing many of its young soldiers. However, many Koreans do not know that the U.S. massacred Korean civilians in countless numbers in order to win their first ideological war against communist nations. The main agent was the U.S. Air Force. From the beginning to the end of the war, it consistently made air raids on the entire Korean Peninsula with an aim "to wipe out all life in tactical locality and save the lives of our soldiers."[248]

The U.S. Air Force's air attacks began early in the war. At first, learning from its war against Japan, it chose war tactics to only destroy the ground forces of N. Korea and their supporting facilities such as factories and railways and to minimize civilian casualties.[249] From the list of military targets to attack, places in N. Korea close to China and Russia were excluded in order to avoid any conflict with them. In *Poggyeog: Migonggoonui Gongjoongpoggyeog Girokeuro Ingeun Hangukjeonjaeng* [The Air Attack: the Korean War Read Through the Lens of the U.S. Air Force's Records of Its Air Attacks during the War] (2013), Tae-woo Kim, a Korean war historian, however, argues that those strategic bombings existed only in the U.S. air force's war records and reports

[247] Rhyu, *Naui Hangung Hyeondaesa: 1944-2014, 55 Nyeonui Girok*, 359.
[248] Cumings, *The Korean War*, 153.
[249] Kim, *Poggyeog*, 101-105.

because the reality of the U.S. Air Force's bombardment was more like blind bombing. To support the argument, Kim presents one technical reason associated with the Boeing B-29 Superfortress (hereafter B-29) – the U.S. Air Force's main bomber in the war. The B-29 was infamous for its low accuracy rate since World War II. An evaluation paper, written by the U.S. Air Force during the war, says that, to blow up a Korean bridge with bombs, a B-29 attacked 13.3 times on average, dropping four bombs each time.[250] In addition, considering the poor radar technology in the early 1950s, it is not surprising that precision bombing with B-29s during the war was rarely possible. In fact, some veterans who piloted B-29s in the war confessed that they mainly relied on their hunches (or sixth sense) more than on their plane radars to find and identify any military targets.[251] Taken together, it is painfully reasonable to see that what the U.S. Air Force recorded as precision bombings were, for the most part, close to indiscriminate or even blind bombings that undoubtedly caused civilian casualties – a civilian massacre – in each attack.

According to Tae-woo Kim's thorough comparative research on the U.S. Air Force's reports about the Korean War, the U.S. quickly intervened in the war, air-attacking N. Korea's militarily important cities such as Wonsan (a major port and industrial city), Pyongyang (the political and economic center), and Hungnam (a major transportation city) from July 13, 1950 through November 6, 1950. Those air attacks were massive enough to make the cities' facilities for the war useless overnight.[252] The air attacks terrified Kim Il-sung and North Koreans greatly because they killed an

[250] Ibid., 145-146.
[251] Ibid., 110, 205-221.
[252] Ibid., 108-147.

innumerable number of civilians – even though N. Korea's army advanced every day southward with victory after victory, occupying almost ninety percent of the Korean Peninsula. Owing to the great loss of lives, Kim Il-sung changed his war strategies considerably, commanding his army to stay out of sight of the U.S. reconnaissance planes during the daytime, to move and carry out operations only at night or in deteriorating weather conditions preventing the U.S. bombers from taking off. In addition, the air attacks also changed Kim's war-target from the Rhee government to the U.S.[253]

While a ceasefire negotiation was under way from July 1951 through July 27, 1953, the U.S. Air Force's attacks were all the more intensified. To engage some psychological attacks on N. Koreans, the U.S. added all visible villages, huts, power plants and reservoirs in N. Korea to the list of primary targets to attack.[254] They called the indiscriminate air raid an 'air pressure strategy,' utilizing air power as a political means to gain an advantage in the negotiation.[255] The two-year sustained carpet-bombings from early July, 1951 to July 27, 1953 –dropping large numbers of bombs so as to cause uniform devastation over a given area – obliterated "at least 50 percent of eighteen out of the North's twenty-two major cities."[256] Tibor Meray, a Hungarian writer, who had worked as a correspondent in N. Korea during the war, described how brutal the air attacks were: "I saw destruction and horrible things committed by the American forces. Everything which moved in North Korea was a military target, peasants in the field often were machine gunned by pilots who, this was my impression, amused themselves to

[253] Ibid., 154.
[254] Ibid., 357-363; Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 294.
[255] Kim, *Poggyeog*, 359.
[256] Cuming, *The Korean War*, 160.

shoot the targets which moved."[257] In a similar vein, George Barrett, a reporter of *The New York Times*, testifies what he saw after an air attack to a village: "The inhabitants throughout the village and in the fields were caught and killed and kept the exact postures they held when the napalm struck – a man about to get on his bicycle, fifty boys and girls playing in an orphanage, a housewife strangely unmarked, holding in her hand a page torn from a Sears-Roebuck catalogue."[258]

To make matters worse, S. Koreans were also not safe from the U.S. Air Force's air attacks. It is obvious that at the beginning of the war, the U.S. Air Force did not consider attacking S. Koreans for their military operations. However, both Cumings and Kim make it clear that, as soon as the U.S. armed forces noticed the guerrilla tactic of the N. Korean army who hid themselves among refugees until they approached the U.S. army within a distance they could suddenly attack, they began thinking that any Korean might be a potential enemy. That thought became an unshakable conviction to justify their indiscriminate mass shooting to Korean civilians and burning villages[259] John Osborne, a reporter of *Life* who witnessed those massacres, recollected them as follows:

> [The war] was not the usual, inevitable savagery of combat in the field but savagery in detail – the blotting out of villages where the enemy *may* be hiding; the shelling of refugees who *may* include North Koreans in the anonymous white clothing of the Korean countryside, or who *may* be screening an enemy march upon our positions, or who *may* be carrying broken-down rifles or ammunition clips or walkie-talkie parts in their packs and under their trousers or skirts.[260]

[257] Ibid., 158; Thames Television, transcript from the fifth seminar for *Korea: The Unknown War* (November 1986); Thames interview with Tibor Meray (1986).
[258] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 295.
[259] Ibid., 269.
[260] John Osborne, "Report from the Orient – Guns Are Not Enough," *Life*, August 21, 1950, 77.

In the face of imminent air attacks, Korean refugees fled in all haste to Protestant churches, hoping that the U.S. – "the Christian nation" – would protect Christians. Nonetheless, those churches were erased from the U.S. Air Force's operational maps along with those Koreans who became ashes. At other times, they waved their white upper garments or the national flags of their country to signal the bombers within sight that they were S. Koreans – not communists. It was useless too. The military aircrafts did not stop dropping bombs on them nor stopped machine-gunning them.

It is impossible to figure out how many Korean civilians were killed by the indiscriminate air raids because the U.S. did not leave any record about those massacres.[261] The only information available to us at this point to speculate the severity of it is that the war used the biggest amount of bombs dropped per square mile in the entire history of war. For three years, the U.S. Air Force dropped 635,000 tons of bombs in Korea – excluding 32,557 tons of napalm – while it dropped 503,000 tons in the entire Pacific area in World War II.[262] It is estimated that the war caused more than four million casualties about half of which were civilians – approximately one million for each Korea, which indicates that at least one-tenth of Koreans on the peninsula were killed.[263] Additionally, Tae-woo Kim stresses that the current anti-Americanism of N. Koreans and the famous underground industrial facilities partly originated in the U.S. air attacks.[264]

What psychological impacts did the U.S. air attacks leave on S. Koreans? As mentioned in "The Rhee Government's Anticommunism," S. Koreans' terror of N. Korea

[261] Kim, *Poggyeog*, 385.
[262] Cumings, *The Korean War*, 159.
[263] Ibid., 35; *Korean Statistical Information Service*, http://kosis.kr/statisticsList/statisticsListIndex.do?menuId=M_01_01&vwcd=MT_ZTITLE&parmTabId=M_01_01#SelectStatsBoxDiv, accessed On March 7, 2018.
[264] Kim, *Poggyeog*, 385-388.

and communism was intensified by the war experience. What was worse, the Rhee government supported the U.S. air attacks as an effective way to wipe out communists in S. Korea. When a NBC reporter asked Syngaman Rhee about the U.S. Air Forces' air attacks of Korean civilians, he replied, "It is a terrible thing to see that their houses are destroyed by those attacks. However, I think that they do not want to live in a communist nation. That is why they silently accept the destruction as a way of keeping freedom. (translated by the author)"[265] Thus, it is feasible to conclude that just as N. Koreans took the U.S. as an inner object to project their anger and fury caused by the war, so S. Koreans internalized anticommunism, trying to believe that all tragedies were caused by N. Korea or communism. They, both in S. and N. Korea, did not know that their traumatic war-experiences could be utilized by the governments that followed in order to solidify their power, oppressing and controlling their people physically as well as psychologically.

III. The Korean Governments with the Politics of Terror and Anxiety

When the Korean War was 'temporarily' over in 1953, S. Korea was one of the poorest nations in the word. Given that from 1945 to 1965 about 12 billion dollars of the American treasury went into S. Korea, it is not an exaggeration to say that the American "aid funds alone amounted to 100 percent of the ROK government budgets in the 1950s."[266] To grasp how Koreans struggled during the aftermath of the war, Cuming notes:

[265] *The Dong-A Daily News*, March 16, 1951, 1.
[266] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 306.

> South Korea in the 1950s was a terribly depressing place, where extreme privation and degradation touched everyone. Cadres of orphans ran through the streets, forming little protective and predatory bands of ten or fifteen; beggars with every affliction or war injury importuned anyone with a wallet, often traveling in bunches of maimed or starved adults holding children or babies; half-ton trucks full of pathetic women careened onto military bases for the weekend, so they could sell whatever services they had. Even twenty years after the war ended Felliniesque residues of this tragedy remained, in the dreadful slums of Ch'ŏnggyech'ŏn in the downtown Seoul or the packs of orphans who still begged in the streets or traveled in boxcars on the trains.[267]

Unfortunately, S. Korean political leaders intentionally made use of their country's war-stricken circumstances and their people's poverty-afflicted psychological state in order to strengthen and solidify their power. As one of the ways to do so, they uniformly pointed to the unstable relationship between S. Korea and N. Korea – stirring an automatic response of fear and anxiety from them – and justified their brutal control over them with various anticommunist policies, commenting on the gravity of national security. To understand how it was possible, it is necessary to examine S. Korea's three former presidents and their brutal treatment of S. Koreans: Syngman Rhee (1948 to 1960), Chung-hee Park (1961 to 1979), and Doo-hwan Chun (1980 to 1988).

A. Syngman Rhee and the National Security Law for Anticommunism

From the beginning of his political life in Korea, Syngman Rhee shrewdly utilized anticommunism as a political platform first to get favor from the U.S. military government and later, to become the first president of the Republic of Korea in August 1948.[268] To strengthen his political footing of anticommunism, four months later, Rhee enacted the National Security Law – a special law based on the Japanese Special

[267] Ibid., 303.

[268] Chung-shin Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 205.

Measures for Rebellious Acts to maintain public order in Korea during the Japanese colonial era.[269] The law's principal purpose was "to guard the security of the State and the subsistence and freedom of nationals, by regulating any anticipated activities compromising the safety of the State."[270] At that time, no one could anticipate that the law could terrify South Koreans with its far-reaching applicability owing to its loosened definition of what anti-government activists could be. As time went by, however, Rhee began utilizing it to purge his political opponents, blaming them as "*Ppalgaengi* [communists]" – the most dangerous entity in the world to those who survived the Korean War. How arbitrarily Rhee used the law to solidify his power is easily noted. In 1949, 118,621 Koreans were arrested with the label of communists – about eighty percent of the total inmates in Korea in that year were identified as communists.[271] Because of the versatility of the law in arresting people, it was well known among people that whether individuals broke the law depended on how the government saw it.

However, Koreans were particularly terrified that the prosecution had unconditional power to decide whether the accused were connected with communism. In a situation where no evidence for the accused's connection to communism was available, the prosecution simply made use of the accused's 'confession' made by a series of irresistible threats, tortures, and beatings. In addition, Rhee applied to the accused's families *Yeonjwaje* – a sort of Collective punishment program that deprived them of any social benefits and social mobility by putting their names on the list of subjects for the

[269] Hong-Gu Han, *Hanhongguui yeoksa iyagi 4: 386 Sedaeeseo Hanmi FTA Kkaji* [Han Hong-Gu's Story of Korean History 3: From the 286 Generation to U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement] (Seoul: Hanibook, 2006), 64.

[270] *Ministry of Government Legislation,* http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=116750&efYd=20120701#0000, accessed on March 20, 2018.

[271] Han, *Hanhongguui yeoksa iyagi 4*, 67.

governmental special surveillance – which continued until 1980. Later Rhee more frequently utilized the law for his selfish interests to continually seize power. For example, on May 26, 1952, Rhee arrested and jailed a group of politicians who opposed his bill for a constitutional amendment for a direct presidential election system. In a national speech, Rhee falsely claimed that those politicians were members of the Communist International (Comintern).

As Rhee's arbitrary enforcement of the law intensified, more Koreans stood up against him. To suppress them, Rhee amended the National Security Law, officially emphasizing the threat of an invasion from the North. The amendments were passed in a three-minute session of the assembly on December 19, 1958 while the legislators, who opposed them, were barricaded in a basement restaurant of the Congress. The amended law authorized the Rhee government to attain a more extensive legal binding force to put in jail anyone who "knowingly disseminate false information or who distort facts and disseminate such facts to benefit enemy [North Korea]."[272] With the law, Rhee was able to govern his people's way of thinking. Any anti-governmental remarks and thoughts could be considered illegal and against the law.

Rhee's dictatorial government came to an end on April 19, 1960 when the April 19 Revolution – a nationwide civilian uprising led by mainly labor and student groups – overthrew the government. The Rhee government reigned over its people for twelve years, causing them to suffer unending anxiety that anyone, anytime, anywhere could be labeled as a communist and arrested under the National Security Law. After the Rhee government fell, unfortunately, the law survived the revolution. Moreover, it became a

[272] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 348.

useful tool for its followers to control S. Korea, even until now as the law remains in effect today. With the arbitrary law, Rhee forced his people to internalize the terror of communism and communists. Under the government, being labeled as a communist was not an individual matter, but a familial and collective matter. As much as S. Koreans feared N. Korea, they had to fear their government, avoiding anything related to communism.

B. Park Chung-hee and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA)

Major General Chung-hee Park mounted a military coup to seize power on May 16, 1961.[273] On the following day, his junta closed the National Assembly and banned all political activity in S. Korea. The Supreme Council of National Reconstruction – a revolutionary committee made of a group of the colonels and junior generals who led the coup under Park's leadership – issued "a [political] platform calling for the eradication of all corruption and social evil and the creation of a new national spirit,"[274] highlighting the significance of anticommunism and re-emphasizing the necessity of keeping close ties with the United States for the sake of national security. Within a few weeks, as a way of demonstration, the junta arrested more than two thousand politicians and 13,300 civil servants and military officers, accusing them of anti-government activities supposedly related to N. Korea.[275] The effect of demonstration naturally led the Park government to strengthen the National Security Law with the Anticommunist Law that defined all

[273] When the Korean War was temporarily halted in 1953, in S. Korea, the Korean military was the most well-structured and strongest social organization in Korea. One U.S. intelligence agency made a report, called Colon, that expressed worry about the possibility of a military coup in Korea. On page 302 of *Korea's Place in the Sun*, Cumings notes that at the time the Korean military was "the strongest, most cohesive, best-organized institution in Korean life, and it would soon make its political power felt."

[274] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 353; Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 183.

[275] Ibid., 355.

socialist countries as enemy states to S. Korea in June 1961. In March 1962, based on the Anticommunist Law, the Park government banned 4,367 politicians from politicking for six years and closed forty-nine out of the sixty-four daily newspapers in Seoul that made an objection to it.[276]

At the outset of the military government, Park promised South Koreans that his revolutionary committee would hand over political power to a civilian government after it accomplished three urgent critical missions for S. Korea: the establishment of a genuine democratic society, the achievement of its economic development, and the organization of stronger anticommunism law and its policies.[277] In order to achieve those three urgent missions, Park called for a military government – what he called "administrative democracy"[278] or "a Koreanized form of welfare democracy."[279] To justify his insistence, Park re-emphasized Japan's colonial view of Korean history, that Koreans are ethnically inferior to the Japanese, making it necessary for the Japanese to govern and educate Koreans. In *Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction* (1970), Park reiterated the ethnic inferiority of Koreans as compared with Westerners. He argued that, because of their ethnic defects such as being indolent, maliciously selfish, conservative, and greedy along with the lack of sound judgment, Koreans were too late to develop their

[276] Ibid., 356.

[277] Chung-hee Park, *Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Recontrustion* (Seoul: Holly Corporation Publishers, 1970), viii-ix; Jung-Seok Seo, *SeongJung-Seokui Hyeondaesa Iyagi 2*, 239.

[278] Chung-hee Park, *Our Nation's Path*, 198. Throughout the book, Park never explains what he means by the term 'administrative democracy.' Reading between lines, it is possible to assume that Park considered his government to administrate a certain form of democracy in S. Korea

[279] Ibid., ix. Park never explained what he meant by the term 'a Koreanized form of welfare democracy.' However, Park did not think that the Western democracy worked for S. Korea in his time and that S. Korea needed a different form of democracy that might effectively work for S. Korea struggling with poverty and economic underdevelopment.

country like Western countries.[280] Moreover, he went so far as to claim that at the heart of those ethnic defects, Koreans' lacked a sense of aggressiveness throughout history that mainly caused the miserable colonial experience and the fratricidal war. His solution for these problems was the necessity of a revolutionary and military government that was able to repair the assumed inferior ethnicity of Koreans by increasing a sense of aggressiveness. To do this, the Park government, under the guidelines and influence of American authorities, established Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) – an extralegal institution modeled after both the FBI and CIA of the U.S.[281]

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency was founded on June 13, 1961 by Jong-pil Kim, a nephew of Chung-hee Park by marriage and the mastermind of the 1961 coup d'état.[282] Originally, the agency was supposed to supervise and coordinate both international and domestic intelligence activities and criminal investigations by all government intelligence agencies. However, its real mission was to censor all aspects of S. Koreans' daily lives in politics, economy, the press, publication, literature, art, education, religion, etc. and to track down any 'suspicious' anti-government or pro-North Korea activities such as student protests and human rights movements.[283] In 1962, Park revised the National Security Law to obtain a more arbitrary judicial power that could impose death sentences on those in opposition to their military government – by falsely

[280] Ibid., 80-87.
[281] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 368.
[282] Jung-seok Seo and Deok-ryeon Kim, *Seo Jung-Seok's Hyeondaesa Iyagi 6: Bakjeonghuiwa Baesinui Jeongchi, Geokkuro Doen 'Hyeongmyeong'gwa Je 3 Gonghwaguk* [Jung-Seok Seo's Story of the Korean Modern History 6: Park Chung Hee and a Politics of Betrayal, the Degenerated 'Revolution' and the 3rd Republic] (Seoul: MayBook Publisher, 2016), 27.
[283] Im-Ha Yu, *Hangung Soseorui Bundan Iyagi* [*Korean Novels about Korea as a Divided Nation*] (Seoul: Chaekseosang, 2006), 40.

charging them with communist-related activities.[284] The new National Security Law gave the KCIA virtually unlimited and unchecked power in arresting and detaining any person on any charge for the sake of anticommunism.[285] They did not need a piece of evidence because they could easily make one based on the confession of the accused who had been under excruciating torture for several days.[286] George E. Ogle, an American missionary who worked for the Urban Industrial Mission in Korea from 1960 to 1971, described the KCIA as "a master of inciting fear"[287] in terms of inflicting pain through torture.

When S. Koreans actively stood up against Park's ambition for lifetime seizure of power in 1971, the KCIA fabricated spy cases to distract their attention from the government's illegality and corruption.[288] Okshin Han, a former public prosecutor and congressman, commented that, during the Park government, the mass media always headlined spy cases without fail when presidential election times came, when pro-democracy movements became intense, or when the government was in trouble. The fabricated spy cases aimed to regenerate the extreme terror and anxiety from the Korean War in the minds of S. Koreans, repeatedly reemphasizing the atrocities of N. Korea.[289]

[284] According to the newly-amended law, those who had been found guilty of previously violating the law before could be put to death if they again violated the law again within five years.

[285] Jung-Seok Seo and Deok-Ryeon Kim, *Seojungseogui Hyeondaesa Iyagi 5: Jeigonghwagukgwa 5.16 Kudeta, Migugeun Wae Kudetae Nun Gamanna?* [Jung-Seok Seo's Story of the Korean Modern History 5: The 2nd Republic and the 5.16 coup: Why Did the U.S. Turn a Blind Eye to the 5.16 Coup?] (Seoul: MayBook Publisher, 2016), 242.

[286] Hong-Gu Han, *Hanhongguui Yeoksa Iyagi 3: Yaseukuniui Angmongeseo Gancheobui Chueokkkaji* [Hong-Gu Han's Story of Korean History 3: From the Nightmare of Yasukuni to Memoir about Spies] (Seoul: Hanibook, 2005), 211-213.

[287] George E. Ogle, *South Korea: Dissent within the Economic Miracle* (Atlantic Highlands: Zed Books Ltd, 1990), 61.

[288] Rhyu, *Naui Hangung Hyeondaesa, 368-383; Han, Hanhongguui Yeoksa Iyagi 3, 203-231.*

[289] *Han, Hanhongguui Yeoksa Iyagi 3*, 208; Seo, *SeongJung-Seokui Hyeondaesa Iyagi 2*, 224.

They were not founded on any reasonable evidence – except for the traumatic experiences of Koreans.[290]

In October 1972, Park made his military dictatorship perpetual with the *Yushin* system – a legal government – by having his scribes write a new constitution that removed all limits on his tenure in office and gave him power "to appoint and dismiss the cabinet and even the prime minister, to designate one-third of the National Assembly, to suspend or destroy civil liberties, and to issue decrees for whatever powers the *Yushin* framers forgot to include."[291] In that political system, even a work stoppage was considered illegal and anti-governmental because it could contribute to the rise of anticommunism by tackling the nation's economic development in competition with N. Korea.

The KCIA kept pace with the Park's *Yushin* system.[292] Under the pretext that all possible threats of communism must be detected, the KCIA built a nationwide surveillance network in S. Korea along with some other countries where Koreans lived. "Its agents were everywhere, not just in all potentially oppositional political groups but in newspaper offices, radio and TV station, company unions, college classrooms in Korea –

[290] Seo, *SeongJung-Seokui Hyeondaesa Iyagi 2*, 224; Yu, *Hangung Soseorui Bundan Iyagi*, *52, 67;* Jo, *Hanguk Hyeondae Jeongchiui Akmong*, 24-30; Han, *Hanhongguui Yeoksa Iyagi 3*, 210-213.

[291] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun,* 363.

[292] As time went by, the influence of the KCIA on S. Korea gradually increased. On page 264 of *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (1968), Gregory Henderson makes a comprehensive summary of the major functions of the KCIA under the Park regime: "The [K]CIA replaced ancient vagueness with modern secrecy and added investigation, arrest, terror, censorship, massive files, and the U.S.'s agents, stool pigeons, and spies both at home and abroad to its council powers…. In history's most sensational expansion of council function, it broadly advised and inspected the government, did much of its planning, produced many of its legislative ideas and most of the research on which they were based, recruited for government companies, shook down millionaires, watched over and organized students, netted over $40 million by manipulating the Korean stock market through cover brokers, and supported theaters, dance groups, an orchestra, and a great tourist center."

even in college classrooms in the United States."[293] The KCIA kept Koreans under surveillance on the condition that all Koreans were potential enemies against the government. In 1973, a *New York Times* reporter wrote this about the KCIA: "The agents watch everything and everyone everywhere. . . . [T]he agency once put a telephone call through from Seoul to a noodle restaurant in the remote countryside where a foreign visitor had wandered on a holiday without telling anyone."[294] To deal with the agency's intensive surveillance, S. Koreans "believed that the best way to deal with KCIA surveillance was not to talk about anything at all to anybody, even to members of one's family."[295] In doing so, they had no other choice but to struggle with terror, a victim mentality, and a sense of helplessness.[296] To make matters worse, their silence about the government's despotism psychologically transformed them into 'obedient' subjects, involuntarily sympathizing with it.[297]

C. Chun Doo-hwan and His Brutal Discipline of S. Koreans

Park Chung-hee's military government collapsed on October 26, 1979 when Chae-gyu Kim, the KCIA director, shot and killed him in a private meeting. Pandemonium broke out in S. Korea. Worried about the internal political disintegration of S. Korea and the military threat from N. Korea, the Carter administration of the U.S. immediately sent an aircraft carrier to Korean waters. It was through the chaotic situation that Major General Chun Doo-hwan took power. Working as head of the investigation committee of the assassination, Chun initiated a military coup on December 12, 1979 and

[293] Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 370.
[294] *The New York Times*, Aug. 20, 1973.
[295] Ibid.; Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 371.
[296] Seo, *SeongJung-Seokui Hyeondaesa Iyagi 6*, 65.
[297] Yu, *Hangung Soseorui Bundan Iyagi*, 40.

became chief of the Defense Security Command. A few months later, when a group of miners took a small town near the east coast to appeal a wage increase, Chun defined them as a group of armed communist guerrillas and used the incident as a pretext to make himself head of the KCIA. Korean civilians, mainly students and opposition parties, took to the streets all over the country to demonstrate against him. By mid-May 1980, tens of thousands of common people joined those students. Considering the nationwide demonstration against him as a state of national emergency, on May 17, Chun "declared martial law, closed the universities, dissolved the legislature, banned all political activity, and arrested thousands of political leaders and dissidents in the midnight hours of May 17-18."[298]

On May 18, about five hundred people in Kwangju protested on the streets, demanding the repeal of martial law. To suppress them, Chun sent elite paratroopers to Kwangju, commanding them to indiscriminately murder students, women, and children – anyone who got in their way. To grasp how cruelly and brutally those paratroopers attacked Koreans in Kwangju, it is helpful to read a testimony told by a survivor: "One woman student was pilloried near the town square, where a paratrooper attacked her breasts with his bayonet. Other students had their faces erased with flamethrowers."[299] Witnessing the government's atrocities to their neighbors who were unarmed during demonstration, more Kwangju people joined the demonstration and, by May 2, drove the troopers out of the city. As a response, Chun completely isolated Kwangju from other areas in Korea, blocking all roads and highways to the city. Outside Kwangju, there was

[298] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 381-382.

[299] Ibid., 382. In addition, it is widely thought that those paratroopers were mostly out of their minds under the influence of some kind of drug. It is said that, to maximize their aggressiveness, they were forced to fast and were prohibited from sleeping for a few days.

no way to know what was happening in Kwangju except for the Korean mass media that worked for the government, twisting the truth as they were commanded.[300] In an official statement to the nation, Hui-seong Lee, the Martial Law Commander, reported the existence of a group of armed communists, gangsters, hoodlums, and mobs who instigated a rebellion in Kwangju, confirming that N. Korea was behind the rioters.[301] On May 27, Chun sent in the Twentieth Division of the Korean Army. It quickly secured the city, killing scores of more people. How many people were killed in Kwangju still remains unanswered. Various statistical reports indicated the range from 2,300 to 4,900 deaths.[302]

Although Chun completed his coup with his 'successful' suppression of the Kwangju civilians, S. Koreans – especially, college students and workers[303] – continued to stand against him. To control civilian uprisings more effectively, Chun invented two oppressive tools. The first was a Korean-style Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, named *Paekkol* – literally meaning 'white skull strikebreakers.' The team was made up of young men well-trained in the martial arts. Wearing padded clothing and white motorcycle helmets, they waded into protesters, breaking heads ruthlessly in order to disperse demonstrators in a brief amount of time. When they finished dealing with

[300] In spite of the strict censorship of the Chun regime, there were dozens of people who carefully recorded what was happening in Kwangju during the period. Owing to their brave acts, now we know the tragic side of the Kwangju Uprising. For more information, watch an excellent Korean movie released in 2017, *A Taxi Driver*.

[301] Hong-Gu Han, *Yushin: Ojig Han Sarameul Wihan Sidae* [The Yushin System: The Period Only for One Person] (Seoul: Hankyoreh Publishers, 2014), 418.

[302] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 383. The Kwangju massacre forced Koreans to realize the unjust political system that committed the mass killings. The fact that Korean soldiers killed Korean civilians indicated that behind them there was the Korean government. Then, who stood behind the Korean government? Koreans thought that it was the U.S. government. The realization gave rise to anti-Americanism in Korea in the 1980s.

[303] In the early 1980s, workers arrested under the National Security Law made up one-third of all political prisoners.

protesters, Chun increased the number of paramilitary riot police to around 150,000 in the mid-1980s. Armed with various apparatuses specially designed for attacking unarmed protesters, those two strikebreaker-teams became a symbol for the Chun government's brutality to its people.[304]

The second thing the Chun government invented to oppress its people who were against him was the establishment of "purification camps" in remote and isolated mountain areas. With the social purification committee, Chun announced that persons of "impure [anti-governmental]" thought or character should undergo purification education.[305] Upon his presidential inauguration in February 1981, Chun began an extensive purge or proscription of "the political activities of 800 politicians and 8,000 officials in government and business" and threw "some 37,000 journalists, students, teachers, labor organizers, and civil servants into "purification camps."[306] Terrified by the camp programs such as "intense physical exercise, spartan existence, self-criticisms and moral exhortations,"[307] the inmates could not help but confess their wrongdoings in opposition to the government and earnestly promised to be pro-governmental for release. Here is one survivor's testimony to help catch a glimpse of what purification camps looked like:

> Right before supper we were beaten out of our minds and at suppertime we were given 3 spoonfuls of barley rice. Even though we offered thanksgiving for this, we were beaten again. For one laugh – 80 lashings. In the morning there is a marching song period which is called a screaming time but we were so hungry we couldn't shout then they beat us with clubs until we screamed. One friend of mine, a Mr. Chai, could not scream because of a throat infection

[304] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 386.
[305] Ogle, *South Korea*, 98.
[306] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 384.
[307] Ogle, *South Korea*, 55.

> and therefore, he was beaten to death. Another person, a Mr. Lee, was also beaten to death. Two out of the eleven in our group were killed. They asked those who were experiencing pain to come forward for treatment and I went forward also, and they beat us again.[308]

What Chun aimed to accomplish with its two control organs was more than a total surveillance that Park sought. Being identified as an "impure" element of S. Korea by the government meant that the person's life must be remodeled through the national purification campaign designed to brainwash those who opposed to the government. To remain safe under the government's control, out of terror and anxiety, S. Koreans largely had to avoid any behavior that could call for the governmental agents' attention as much as possible. When it failed, they desperately attempted to prove their purity that had nothing to do with anti-government activities – e.g. communism. Myeon-in Kim, a reporter of *The Hankyoreh 21* – one of S. Korea's major newspapers – who underwent the purification campaign, confessed: "Frankly, the threat of North Korea was less intimidating than a number of the government's manipulated discourses on the national states of emergency, caused by the 'non-existent' spies North Korea sent. The government(s) existed, only relying on those rumors and overstating them (translated by the author)."[309]

Inheriting the military- or police-oriented government of his two predecessors, Chun ruled his people with terror and anxiety. What is more, utilizing the Agency for National Security Planning – formerly KCIA, his government made all S. Korea's newspapers feature Chun's photo every day and all Korean broadcasting news begin with

[308] Ibid., 55.

[309] Myeong-in Kim, "*Gancheobui Chueok* [A Recollection of the Spies]," *The Hankyoreh 21*, Vol. 49, Feb. 18, 2004, http://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society general/10311.html, accessed on March 20, 2018.

a feature of Chun's daily life each day during the 1980s, making it impossible to find major newspapers with an critical article about his government for that period.

Nevertheless, the Chun government collapsed in 1987, beginning with his determination to "handpick his successor and continue to hold power behind the scenes."[310] South Korean citizens and college students demonstrated as one against him. On January 14, 1980, an event took place that changed the course of history. A college student named Jong-Cheol Park, who took part in a demonstration against the government, was tortured to death by the Korean police. The government covered up the homicide, claiming it as an accident. On May 18, 1987, a group of social activists – consisting of Catholic priests, Protestant pastors, and college students – uncovered the truth for S. Koreans. A series of massive protests ensued in spite of the government's violent repressions. By June, those protests evolved into a nationwide pro-democracy movement. Eventually, Chun gave in to S. Koreans, promising to guarantee a direct presidential election system, human rights expansion, protection of the freedom of speech, and so forth.

V. Conclusion

The main goal of this chapter is to explain the historical context of S. Korea in which the KPC's miraculous growth was made from a more historically-oriented perspective that concentrated on social changes. First, the author has examined the Japanese colonial era, stressing the psychological influence of Japan-led industrialization over the minds of Koreans – especially the massive displacement of the Korean populace that radically

[310] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 391.

changed Korea's traditional lifestyle and national identity within forty years. Second, taking the Korean War as the most tragic experience in the national history of Korea, the author has brought into focus what Koreans have – consciously or unconsciously – ignored or avoided in their memories of the war, highlighting the innumerable mass killings in the South, by the Rhee government and U.S. armed forces and S. Koreans' internalization of the fear and terror at a collective level. Third, the author has shed light on the lives of S. Koreans under the three governments after the war, explaining how the governments controlled their people's minds and bodies with the use of various means of control and emphasizing that what they had in common was the terror of N. Korea or communism that justified violation of human rights for the pretext of national security.

Taken all together, it is more than likely that those three tragic events traumatized S. Koreans to varying degrees. Japan dramatically altered their national-identity within a few decades. Unfortunately, Koreans did not have enough time to heal the damage to their nationality, owing to the division that happened within a couple of months after the 1945 liberation. What is worse, the division was followed by the Korean War in which mass killings continued under the name of military operational tactics by the U.S. military forces. The ceasefire in 1953 did not put an end to the miserable life of S. Koreans. The three consecutive military governments came to power, utilizing S. Koreans' horrible memories of the civil war as a political and psychological measure to control their minds and bodies with emphasis on the imminent invasion of N. Korea whenever necessary.

Lastly, when putting the KPC's growth into the historical context of S. Korea in the past century, it becomes clear that its explosive growth happened while S. Koreans

were struggling to find a way out from the oppressive control of the governments. In the next chapter, the Jungian psychohistorical theory developed in Chapter 2 will be applied to analyzing one of the motivations of up to one-fourth of them who converted to Protestantism, paying attention to their traumatized psychological state that could give rise to a cultural complex from the Jungian psychological perspective.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE GROWTH OF THE KPC FROM A JUNGIAN PSYCHOHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: TRAUMA, COMPLEX, THE THEOLOGY OF PROSPERITY, AND THE GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT

In Chapter 3, we investigated three traumatic events Koreans, revealing how traumatic they were to S. Koreans. With that historical understanding, this chapter aims to analyze what made it possible for the KPC to grow explosively from a Jungian psychohistorical perspective, calling attention to the psychological state of S. Koreans' collective unconsciousness under the influences of those traumas. The analysis will concentrate on the interactions, which contributed to the growth, among four psychohistorical elements – trauma, a cultural complex, the governments' favoritism toward the KPC, and the theology of prosperity/bliss – that pushed up to one-fourth of S. Koreans to convert to Protestantism.

First, the author will examine the concept of collective trauma to see whether S. Koreans were traumatized by those traumatic events in the past century. Second, the possibility of applying the concept of cultural complex to S. Koreans will be scrutinized. Third, the governments' favoritism toward the KPC will be examined as circumstances in which S. Koreans were unconsciously forced to consider Protestantism superior to their other religions. Fourth, the logic of the theology of prosperity/bliss – the KPC's contextual theology for S. Koreans who lived in the past century – will be examined to demonstrate how it gratified the psychological needs of S. Koreans. Fifth and last, a

Jungian psychohistorical analysis will be presented that explains the psychodynamics of S. Koreans who converted to Protestantism out of their struggles with a collective inferiority complex.

I. The 'Traumatized' Psychological States of South Koreans

It is not easy to figure out the psychological state of S. Koreans who had undergone a series of traumatic events in about a century because there is no scientifically validated criteria for diagnosing a people's collective psychological-state. However, various scholars, who have studied trauma and its psychological impacts on a collective level, argue that when traumatized, a group often loses their collective identity and tends to accept simplistic interpretations of what caused the trauma. Moreover, when not treated properly, the trauma can be transmitted from generation to generation. Let us examine them in detail.

First, in *Everything in Its Path* (1976), Kai T. Erikson, a sociologist who investigated how a breakdown of a community changed the collective psychological state of its members as a whole, argues that a trauma can destroy the spirit of a community to a degree that its recovery is no longer possible. As a lawyer who closely interacted with the victims of the human-made Buffalo Creek flood in 1972 that demolished a village, he discovered that the villagers continued to live with the trauma several years after the incident. To explain the psychological impacts of a trauma upon a group at a collective level, he coined the term *collective trauma* – "a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of

communality [the community spirit]."[311] The psychological impacts of collective trauma penetrate into the core of a community, tearing apart its tradition and culture that maintained its "uniformity of thought and action."[312] Destroying the communality – "a cushion for pain, a context for intimacy, and the repository for biding traditions,"[313] collective trauma caused its members to suffer "a sense of cultural disorientation, a feeling of powerlessness, a dulled apathy, and a generalized fear about the condition of the universe."[314] How to interact with each other also changes – "paranoid substitutes for trust; aggression replaces nurturance and support."[315] Therefore, collectively traumatized, members of a group are likely to lose confidence in the self, but also in their community and religions, and sometimes in life in general.[316]

Second, when traumatized collectively, members of a group instinctively become busy in finding some causes of it to avoid a sense of unpredictability and chaos and to make their lives look more manageable.[317] In doing so, they tend to engage incomprehensive reasoning based on incomplete, exaggerated, or contradictory

[311] Kai T. Erikson, *Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buffalo Creek Flood* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976), 154. On the same page, he also provides his definition of individual trauma – "a blow to the psyche that breaks through one's defense so suddenly and with such brutal force that one cannot react to it effectively."

[312] Ibd., 81. In addition, on the same page, Erikson offers his definition of culture in detail: "elements that help shape human behavior – the inhibitions that govern it from the inside, the rules that control it from the outside, the languages and philosophies that serve to edit a people's experience of life, the customs and rituals that help define how one person should relate to another."

[313] Kai T. Erikson, "Notes on Trauma and Community," in *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 188.

[314] Erikson, *Everything in Its Path*, 258.

[315] Marten W. DeVaries, "Trauma in Cultural Perspective," in *Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming Experience on Mind, Body, and Society*, ed. Bessel A. van der Kolk, Alexander C. McFarlane, and Lars Weisaeth (New York: The Guilford Press, 1996), 408.

[316] Ibid., 198.

[317] Arthur G. Neal, *National Trauma and Collective Memory: Extraordinary Events in the American Experience* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), 14.

information about themselves, relying on political parties or religious sects[318] – to protect them against feelings of helplessness and meaninglessness while alleviating mental instability.[319] Take, for example, Hitler's sudden rise to power in Germany after World War I. To the Germans who suffered poverty and low self-esteem caused by the war defeat, Hitler spoke that the lack of his nation's territory was one of the major causes for that problem. He presented two solutions to solve it: to begin another war and to wipe out all Jews on earth, along with consistently emphasizing the superiority of German ethnicity over all other ethnicities. What is interesting to note is that his nonsensical arguments successfully drew attention from his people who desired to find a way out of their miseries.

Third, collective trauma untreated properly can be inherited from generation to generation.[320] Rachel Yehuda, a neuropsychologist and an expert on trauma discovered that trauma survivors tend to produce less cortisol, which causes "several stress-related psychiatric disorders, including PTSD, chronic pain syndrome, and chronic fatigue syndrome."[321] Bruce Lipton, a biologist insists that the unstable psychological state of a trauma survivor can be inherited 'biochemically' from generation to generation.[322] He notes, when a pregnant woman experiences acute or chronic stress, "her body will manufacture stress hormones (including adrenaline and nonadrenaline) that travel through her bloodstream to the womb, inducing the same *stressful states* in the unborn

[318] DeVaries, "Trauma in Cultural Perspectives," 411.

[319] Alexander C. McFarlane and Bessel A. van der Kolk, "Trauma and Its Challenges to Society," in *Traumatic Stress*, 24, 26.

[320] Mark Wolynn, *It Didn't Start With You: How Inherited Family Trauma Shapes Who We Are and How to End the Cycle* (New York: Viking, 2016), 40-41.

[321] Ibid., 19.

[322] Wolynn, *It Didn't Start With You*, 27; Bruce H. Lipton, "Maternal Emotions and Human Development," *Birth Psychology*, https://llbirthpsychology.com/free-article/maternal-emotions-and-human-development, accessed on April 2, 2018.

child."[323] These discoveries indicate that the traumatized could reject or suppress their trauma-stricken memories by reason, but could not eliminate those frightening feelings, imprinted in the body.[324]

When we apply those theories of trauma to South Koreans in the past century, it is feasible to suggest that the series of collective traumas could damage their tradition and culture that had promoted the uniformity of their thoughts and acts. Additionally, their loss of tradition and culture might cause Koreans to suffer from "a sense of cultural disorientation, a feeling of powerlessness, a culled apathy, and a generalized fear about the condition of the universe."[325] The effects could make their lives unpredictable along with "conservative impulses (ethnicity, etc.) at the group level, and psychopathological reactions (depression, paranoia, and aggression) at the individual level."[326] Thinking of the psychological influence of those traumatic experiences over Koreans, historian Bruce Cumings brings into question why it is difficult to find Korean historical books that honestly handle Korea's modern history tainted with those traumatic experiences. Although earlier mentioned military governments played an important role by distorting history for the sake of their dictatorship, as Cumings argues, it is important to note that, like the Japanese, South Koreans chose 'silence' as a way to deal with their painful and haunting memories about the past century.[327] Psychoanalytically, their memories about the past century and their repressed memories might be pushed into their cultural unconsciousness through individually or socially intended forgetfulness. Considering this

[323] Wolynn, *It Didn't Start With You*, 28.
[324] Akiko Hashimoto, *The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 41.
[325] Erikson, *Everything in Its Path*, 258.
[326] DeVaries, "Trauma in Cultural Perspectives," 411.
[327] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 139-141, 158.

as one theory of possibility and remembering that trauma could be transmitted from those who are actually exposed to a traumatic event to their children who do not experience it directly, it might be possible to surmise that the post-trauma generation of South Koreans, who did not directly experience those traumatic events, struggle with their ancestors' emotional disturbances to some degree.

Jungian psychohistory, developed in Chapter 2, presents the case that collective traumatic experiences of a group could give birth to a cultural complex in their minds. Did the traumatic experiences of S. Koreans give rise to a cultural complex in their minds? That is what we examine in the following section.

II. S. Koreans' Cultural Complex: Collective Inferiority Complex

The cultural complex S. Koreans suffered was a collective inferiority complex – unconscious feelings of unworthiness and insignificance in a group, society, or nation. To make a theoretical bridge between the concept and S. Koreans' lives in the past century, our first task is to look into its meaning and characteristics in detail. After that, we will observe how the complex came into existence in the minds of S. Koreans.

A. Collective Inferiority Complex: Its Meanings and Characteristics

The *Merriam-Wester Dictionary* defines the term *inferiority complex* as "an acute sense of personal inferiority often resulting either in timidity or through overcompensation in exaggerated aggressiveness."[328] Stretched further psychoanalytically, it indicates the unconscious psychological-state of an individual who

[328] The *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inferiority%20complex?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld, accessed March 24, 2018.

constantly suffers from the lack of self-worth, a doubt and uncertainty about herself. The complex occurs when a feeling of inferiority intensifies to a point that consciousness can no longer handle it properly. While considering inferiority as part of our normal psychical life, Jung argued that inferiority complex is pathological because it prevents us from experiencing a sense of wholeness. Captivated by the complex, most of us tend to avoid what make us feel it or to cover it up by attaining some special skills and positions that offers a 'pseudo' sense of superiority. In doing so, we repress the painful feelings deeper into the unconscious. Alfred Adler stretches Jung's theory of individual inferiority complex to a social or collective extent. He speculates that, like an individual, a group or nation in the grip of the complex can develop certain collective behaviors or attitudes that aim to avoid the sense of inferiority. When they repressed those feelings into the cultural unconscious, they could develop into a collective inferiority complex. One difference between individual and collective complex to be noticed is while individual complex, for the most part, remains in an individual's life, cultural or collective complex could bring about conflicts between groups or nations such as national hatreds, class struggles, and even wars through the projection mechanism.[329] With the knowledge of cultural complex, now let us examine how a collective inferiority complex took root in S. Koreans and affected their massive conversion to Protestantism, with particular attention to the social circumstances of S. Koreans in the past century along with their psychological relationships with the two colonizers – Japan and the U.S. – and their military governments.

[329] Alfred Adler, *The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler*, ed. Hein L. Ansbacher and Rowena R. Ansbacher (New York: Basic Books, 1956), 446-459.

B. The Psychological Origins of South Korean's Collective Inferiority Complex

In the section "Japanese Imperialism and the Loss of the Old Korea" in Chapter 2, the author mentioned that Korea's first industrial revolution by Japan dramatically transformed Korea from an agricultural country into the second-best industrialized country in East Asia in the early 1940s. The revolution, however, had its downside. It quickly deconstructed Korea's traditional culture and social structure to a great degree through the massive uprooting of the populace and the strict Japanization of Koreans. In general, Koreans did not like rapid social changes. However, their antipathy was, in a sense, counterbalanced by the so-called Western civilization that the revolution brought in. In fact, political and religious leaders, who first tasted Western civilization's fruits and idealized them, frequently urged Koreans to follow the example of Japan. Although we cannot know how many Koreans complied with them, James S. Gale, the Canadian Presbyterian missionary who loved Korea and its people from the heart, lamented the lineaments of the time as follows:

> Whereas the Korean of thirty years ago was a scholar, the young Korean of today is in many respects an ignoramus. He has a smattering of western knowledge [introduced by Japan], and some little idea of his own tongue; but his knowledge of the ancient literature of his people is practically non-existent. Therein lies a great danger. That literature contains all the idealism of his race.[330]

His remark indicates that during the Japanese colonial period, Koreans quickly discarded their tradition, social customs, and culture and replaced them with the western ideologies, believing that what is Korean is inferior to what is western. To know the origin of their motivation, it is useful to examine the relationship between Japan and Korea as a

[330] James Scarth Gale, *History of the Korean People* (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, 1972), 67.

relationship between a colonizer and his/her colony. Here, Frantz Fanon's concept of *lactification* can be effectively used as an interpretive lens.

In *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), Frantz Fanon developed a theory of the psychological relationship between the colonizers and the colonized. To justify their dominion over the subjugated, the colonizers often indoctrinate them with the illusion that the colonizing are, ethnically taken, more progressive, civilized, liberal, educated, enlightened, and refined"[331] than the colonized. When the colonized are brainwashed by the illusion, they slowly begin idealizing and attempting to imitate the colonizers. The idealization requires them to hate themselves in varying degrees and redefine who they are in accordance with the colonizing's indoctrination. What is at stake is that the colonized cannot idealize their colonizers without developing a collective inferiority complex accompanied by a sense of self-contempt and self-hate. However, here is an inevitable tragic aspect of the complex that the more obsessively the colonizing want to be like the colonizers, the worse their self-contempt and self-hate become. Fanon coined the term *lactification* to identify the vicious circle of the psychological relationship between whites and blacks in which blacks – consciously as well as unconsciously – attempt to eliminate their ethnic characteristics as much as possible to be like the whites.

It is feasible to apply Fanon's concept of *lactification* to the psychological interactions between the Japanese as the colonizing and Koreans as the colonized. Like the whites, the Japanese systematically brainwashed, with their cultural policies, education, and violence, Koreans believing that they are biologically inferior to their colonizers and that it is reasonable for the Japanese to control them. In fact, the Japanese

[331] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 170-171.

officially categorized Koreans as second-class citizens to utilize them as material resources at their will – using Korean women as sex slaves to gratify their soldiers is one of many examples. To justify the classification, they developed a historical theory named *Singminsagwan* – meaning the Japanese colonial view of Korean history.

The *Singminsagwan* was developed by a group of Japanese historians who received western education in 1890s. The theory was founded upon social Darwinism that applied Darwin's evolutionary thoughts such as natural selection and survival of the fittest to societies and nations. To prove that the Japanese were biologically superior to Koreans and justify their invasion into Korea, the historians arbitrarily distorted archeological data about Korean history – particularly its ancient history. Its arguments are summarized into four points.[332] First, in the beginning, Korea was a dependent state of Japan or that Koreans are the posterity of the Japanese. Thus, the annexation is not against the flow of nature. Second, traditionally Koreans are a people who throughout history, have relied on foreign powers to handle their own issues. Thus, Japan's control of Korea will be beneficial to them. Third, according to the evolutionary theory of civilizations that views history as an evolutionary process from tribal society or primitive communism, to ancient slavery society, to feudal or estate property, to capitalism, and to communism, Korea still remains an uncivilized nation with ancient slavery. Thus, Japan will accelerate Korea's evolution as a nation. Fourth and last, Koreans are ethnically characteristic of preferring division or conflict to harmony or reconciliation and are

[332] Sun-Jong Hwang, *Singminsagwanui Gamchwojin Maeneolgul* [The Hidden Truth of the Japanese Colonial View of Korean History] (Seoul: Mangwondang, 2014), 11-45; Deog-Il Lee, *Uri Anui Singminsagwan: Haebangdoeji Mothan Yeoksa, Geudeureun Eotteoke Urireul Jibaehaetneunga* [The Japanese Colonial View of Korean History within Us: the Not-Liberated History, How Did They Control Us?] (Seoul: Mangwondang, 2018), 253-263.

abnormally obsessed with blood ties, old school ties, and native place ties. To put such bad ethnic traits to an end, Koreans need to learn from the Japanese.

In *Saranghaji Malja!* [Don't Love in the Western Way!], Korean philosopher and historian Young-oak Kim points out one chronic psychological impact of colonial views on Koreans. Kim argues that the colonial view justified the historical determinism that Korea is destined to collapse from its beginning owing to the ethnic defects of its peoples and rationalized Japan's colonization of Korea as a good opportunity for Koreans to overcome those defects under Japan's guidance – as a result, it caused Koreans to lose independence and autonomy and to become dependent on their colonizers.[333] In conjunction with Fanon's psychological insight that the colonized attempted to be like their colonizers out of an inferiority complex, it is possible to think that Koreans, who were brainwashed into the colonial view, might go through the same process in their relationship with the Japanese.

When applying Fanon's insight into the psychological relationship between the colonizers and the colonized, along with the psychological impacts of the Japanese colonial view of Korean history on Koreans to the cultural unconscious of Koreans, it is possible to speculate that just as the black-colonized unconsciously desired to be like the white-colonizers, so too did Koreans, the colonized, want to be like the Japanese, the colonizers – though it is likely that they consciously hated them. Unfortunately, the 1945 liberation of Korea could not heal from the complex properly owing to the emergence of

[333] Young-Oak Kim, *Saranghaji Malja* [Don't Love in the Western Way] (Seoul: Tongnamu, 2012), 91-96.

another colonizer whose psychological impacts on Koreans – mainly S. Koreans – were much more powerful.

C. The U.S. Military Government and S. Koreans' Desire to be like Americans

Koreans did not regain their independence from Japan on their own. It befell on them unexpectedly, owing to Japan's sudden and unlimited submission to the Allied Force on August 15, 1945. At that time, Koreans had not yet formed a government except for a nationwide committee. This is one of the reasons why the U.S. military government took over Korea in the South without serious armed conflicts while the Soviet Union took over the North. One important point to note is that the Koreans, who survived the Japanese colonial era, viewed the U.S. as a more powerful country than their former colonizer and their savior. The view was based on the reality that the U.S. defeated Japan with two atomic bombs. Thus, it is thinkable that S. Koreans adapted to the new colonizers more easily than Japan.

To consider what the adaptation looked like, it is worth reading British missionary Vyvyan Holt's comment on the pervasive influence of the U.S. on S. Korea five years after the 1945 liberation. Exactly a couple of weeks before the Korean War broke out, Holt made a note as follows:

> Americans kept the government, the army, the economy, the railroads, the airports, the mines, and the factories going, supplying money, electricity, expertise, and psychological succor. American gasoline fueled every motor vehicle in the country. American cultural influence was "exceedingly strong," ranging from scholarship to study in the United States, to several strong missionary denominations, to "a score of traveling cinemas" and theaters that played mostly American films, to the Voice of America, to big-league

> baseball: "America is the dream-land" to thousands if not millions of Koreans.[334]

From Holt's remark, we can pull some important historical information about S. Korea under the control of the U.S. First, the U.S. took over the industrial revolution Japan created in Korea. Second, granted that the U.S. controlled S. Korea for less than five years in contrast to the Japanese' control of thirty-five years, it is surprising to realize that it took less than five years for Americanization to have permeated into the minds of S. Koreans – S. Korea was quickly Americanized in various areas. As compared with Japanization that failed – even if Japan forced them to follow by the bayonet for about twenty years, Americanization was accepted by them with not much antipathy. Psychologically taken, it can be said that many – of course, not all – S. Koreans really wanted to be like Americans. What differentiates their Japanization from Americanization is their motivations behind them. While they idealized the Japanese out of their desire to be equal to and overcome them – keeping the psychological boundary clear between them, they idealized Americans to be like them, willingly giving up who they were.

Jungian psychology's inferiority complex theory teaches us that a sense of excessive idealization of the other from self-humiliation and self-hate mostly comes with a sense of inferiority to a painful degree. Whether the sense of inferiority develops into a complex or not mainly relies on the psychological state of a person or a group who suffers it. The psychology contends that under stable and safe circumstances, it can be a motivation for development or growth. Turning to the case of S. Koreans who

[334] Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 255.

collectively suffered a sense of inferiority under the Japanese imperial government and the U.S. military government, it becomes obvious that they did not have any stable and safe social structure that changed that inferiority into a positive motivation for them to move forward. Instead, a more tragic event befell onto them.

D. The Korean War and Its Aftermath: The Emergence of S. Koreans' Cultural Complex of Inferiority

As explained in the section, "S. Korea's Anticommunism and the Korean War: a Series of Massacres," the Korean War left indelible scars on the cultural unconscious of Koreans. Particularly, the Rhee and U.S.'s systematic massacres of Koreans – regardless of whether the southern or the northern in the name of national security or inevitable military operations – traumatized them to a great degree. To make matters worse, after the 1953 truce agreement, S. Koreans had to rely on Americans who had delivered them from Japan's grip and who simultaneously had been their colonizer and slaughterer, in order to survive and economic reconstruction in the aftermath, with no other options.[335] In fact, from 1953 to the mid-1960s, the national economy of S. Korea completely depended on the U.S. In doing so, even if vividly remembering the atrocities of the U.S. armed forces, S. Koreans had to suppress their biological reactions – such as terror, anger, and rage – to Americans. Instead, they groveled to Americans for financial, economic,

[335] In *Napalm: An American Biography*, Robert M. Neer introduces a part of the former five-star General Douglas Macarthur's testimony of the brutality of the Korean War to Congress in May 1951: "The war in Korea has already almost destroyed that nation of 20,000,000 people. I have never seen such devastation. I have seen, I guess, as much blood and disaster as any living man, and it just curdled my stomach, the last time I was there. After I looked at that wreckage and those thousands of women and children and everything, I vomited. If you go on indefinitely, you are perpetuating a slaughter such as I have never heard of in the history of mankind (p.100)."

medical, and military assistance, only blaming their incapability to protect themselves, their families, and their country from danger.

The ambivalent inner conflicts could be resolved – although only temporarily – by consciously attempting to forget what they saw and heard about Americans during the war. The suppressed various feelings were easily attached to the 'original' collective inferiority complex existing in their cultural unconscious, aggravating its degree. As noted in Chapter 2, Fanon and Gerson insisted that the degree of self-hate and self-contempt of a group in the grip of a collective inferiority complex is in direct proportion to the degree of their idealization of an object that caused the complex. Bruce Cumings offers a historical account of how desperately S. Koreans wanted to be or idealized Americans during the postwar era as follows:

> Americans of modest income could amass fortunes just by trading cigarette cartons for Koryŏ celadon vases or Yi dynasty mahogany chests. Koreans therefore attached themselves to Americans by any means necessary, hoping against hope to get to America – uniformly conceived as a country where the streets were paved with gold, a fabulous PX [Post Exchange] in the sky. This is by no means an exaggeration, since the American post exchanges were the main supply line for the Korean black market and since the American military commander controlled the entire U.S. aid program from 1951 to 1959.[336]

Hearkening back to Holt's description of how the U.S. influenced S. Koreans in various areas – socially, culturally, and economically, Cumings makes it clear how desperately S. Koreans desired to be attached to and depended on the U.S. much more than ever. The Jungian psychological perspective casts a light on that S. Koreans' excessive idealization of Americans was counterbalanced by their excessive – probably pathological – self-

[336] Cuming, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 304. Additionally, to get a glimpse of how South Koreans led their daily lives during the period, see a Korean novelist and translator Junghyo Ahn's autobiographical novel *White Badge*, particularly page 54 where Ahn describes how his family had a feast one evening with a bunch of chicken legs that the American soldiers dumped.

contempt and self-humiliation, doubled by self-helplessness and worthlessness. Considering that this psychological state was common in a majority of S. Koreans,[337] it is right to say that their pathological idealization of Americans was their unhealthy defensive mechanism caused by the collective inferiority complex. However, the defensive mechanism was not beneficial to their cultural unconsciousness because the complex made them live in accordance with the expectations of Americans. The destination of their lives, captured by the complex, seems clear – the harder they tried to be like Americans, the clearer they realized over and again that they were inferior to their colonizers. Struggling with the complex, the colonized had no other choice but to be trapped in the psychological cycle of excessive idealization and intolerable self-humiliation.

What the life of an ordinary S. Korean in the grip of the complex during the postwar era looked like is well portrayed in an autobiographical novel *Geu Sani Jeongmal Geogi Isseosseulkka?* [Was the Mountain Really There?]. Wan-suh Park, a Korean woman novelist, who lived through the twentieth century once worked as a clerk at a U.S. Army post exchange in Seoul right after the war. She defined her life at that time as a life of duplicity. By duplicity, she means her unstable psychological state that constantly alternated between a sense of superiority toward other Koreans who did not have the chance to work for Americans and a sense of inferiority toward Americans on which she relied as if a parasite. Working for Americans that guaranteed a better life for her family, she felt superior to other Koreans, satisfied with her life relatively more

[337] Many S. Korean novels about the postwar era describe S. Koreans' ambivalent feelings for the U.S. and themselves. Both their excessive idealization of the U.S. and their irresistible sense of humiliation from their incompetence constantly revolve around the inferiority complex.

Americanized. Simultaneously, however, she suffered an irresistible sense of inferiority to Americans, recognizing that her family and country had to be faithful to the U.S. for survival.[338] She confessed that to avoid the internal conflict, she habitually projected her complex feelings onto other Koreans who did exactly the same thing she did, defensively blaming their duplicitous and opportunistic traits.

Taken all together, now it is clear that the traumatic experiences Korean underwent in the twentieth century might cause a cultural complex in the minds of Koreans, mainly S. Koreans. Their collective inferiority complex originated in the colonial experience of Japan, was solidified and aggravated by the Korean War and its aftermath. However, it is difficult to simply argue that the complex had to do with the explosive growth of the KPC. To make a link, it is important to examine two more elements that accelerated the growth. They are the Korean military governments' active support for the KPC and the KPC's contextual theology which tugged at the heartstrings of S. Koreans who collectively suffered from the complex.

III. The Growth of the Korean Protestant Church and the Complex

As stated in Chapter 1, it is frequently argued that since its introduction, the KPC's social and political involvements increasingly called for attention from Koreans – mainly during the Japanese colonial era and the Korean military governmental era. However, in recent years, Korean scholars such as Jung-Min Seo and Seong-Ho Kang pay more attention to an interdependent relationship between Christian churches and the Korean ruling class as

[338] Wan-suh Park, *Geu Sani Jeongmal Geogi Isseosseulkka?* [Was the Mountain Really There?] (Seoul: Segyesa Publishers, 2012), 255-257.

a major contribution to the KPC's rapid growth.[339] To examine how the relationship was established and gradually improved, it is necessary first to look into Koreans' general understanding of Protestantism when they first experienced it and then to examine Korea's three military governments' – the Rhee, Park, and Chun regimes – preferential treatment of the KPC. Lastly, it is also important to understand how the KPC captivated S. Koreans with its contextual theology – particularly its psychological mechanisms.

A. Koreans' General Understanding of Protestantism in the Japan's Colonial Era

It is well known that the Japanese colonial government's persecution of Protestants, who participated in independence movement, unexpectedly contributed to the growth of Protestantism. However, what is more important to note is that who popularized Protestantism during that period were Korean Protestant intellectuals - mostly descendants of the Confucian scholars. The point is that those intellectuals were more likely to take Protestantism as a tool to transform their country and people. Their attitude towards Protestantism is easily noticeable in various daily newspapers published with the help of western missionaries.

For example, *Daehanmaeilsinbo* [The Korean Daily News], was one of the most influential newspapers during that colonial era.[340] Once recognized as the most popular newspaper among common people, it mainly concentrated on the mass education to raise

[339] Such a historical view is a fairly new perspective on the historical studies of the KPC that is more increasingly calling for attention among Koreans. The new perspective was introduced in the early 2000s when the KPC stagnated after its miraculous growth. For more information about the historical perspective, see Jung-Hyeon Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo: Jonggyoneun Eotteoke Gwollyeogi Doeeonneun-ga*? [President and Religion: How Did Religion Become Powerful?] and Seong-Ho Kang, *Hanguk Gidokgyo Heugyeoksa: Yeoldu Gaji Jujero Boneun Hanguk Gaesingyo Seukaendeul* [The Dark History of the Korean Protestant Church: The KPC Scandals Viewed from Twelve Themes].

[340] *Daehanmaeilsinbo* was published – Korean and English separately – by a British journalist Ernest Thomas Bethel in collaboration with Korean independence activists such as Gi-tak Yang, Chae-ho Shin, Eun-sik Park, and Chang-ho Ahn.

patriotism and national traits among Koreans. Interestingly, its mass education was based on one Christian theme that to be liberated from Japan and build a better nation, Koreans should convert to Protestantism, stressing that Protestantism is a superior religion as compared with Korea's traditional religions. In 1908, the newspaper ran a special feature, in serial form lasting for fourteen days, on enlightenment, national power, and military power titled "Seohomundap [Questions and Answers]." Its main argument was Koreans must convert to Protestantism. The conclusion of its last article reads as follows:

> Jesus Christ is the Son of God and the King of the kings. He came to us to save the world. When he was nailed on the cross to death, he atoned for all sins of humanity; our people's sins were also redeemed at that moment. The loss of our country was the result of our disobedience to God and His Will. Therefore, we have to believe in God devoutly in order to receive forgiveness of our sins and made efforts to save others; this is how to show our love for them…. When we convert to Protestantism, our country will become stronger. When we take God as our Lord, accept Jesus as our Savior, use the Holy Spirit as our Sword, and shield ourselves with faith, who could resist us armed with Protestantism? Consider the advanced glory of the United Kingdom and the United States whose religion is Protestantism! If you are envious of them, it would be better to convert to Protestantism (translated by the author).[341]

The conclusion reveals how Koreans – both the intellectuals and the common Koreans they wanted to cultivate – understood Protestantism. For Koreans under Japan's control, Protestantism was more than a religion. As they idealized western missionaries, they also idealized their religion.

[341] Mi-suk Go, *Hangugui Geundaeseong, Geu Giwoneul Chajaseo - Minjok, Seksyueolliti, and Byeongnihak* [In Search of the Origin of Korea's Modernity - Ethnicity, Sexuality, and Pathology] (Seoul: Chaeksesang, 2015), 46-47; "Seohomundap [Questions and Answers]," *Daehanmaeilsinbo* [The Korean Daily News], March 18, 1908.

B. The Reciprocal Relationship between Protestantism and the Korean Military Governments

Under the U.S. military government, Korean Protestantism remarkably became a religion of the privileged in South Korea. Upon his arrival in Seoul on September 9, 1945, Commander General John R. Hodge, the military governor of South Korea, began considering measures to efficiently control the Southern part of Korea. At that time, he knew almost nothing about Korea. Naturally, his thoughts ran on the American missionaries who had been deported from Korea by Japan. He sent an official letter to American Protestant denominations to ask them to resend their missionaries who once worked in Korea. Soon, an official agreement was made among them and their missionary works in Korea resumed.[342] Hodge cleverly made use of missionaries to control S. Korea. For example, he appointed Horace H. Underwood who once taught physics and chemistry at Gwanghyewon in Seoul – the first modern hospital of Korea – as a military advisor and an administrator of property by the U.S. military government.

American missionaries were more intimate with Koreans than the U.S. military officers. However, they were also in need of help from Koreans to handle practical affairs onsite. In hiring, they preferred Protestants who could communicate in English with them – at that time churches were the only place Koreans could learn English. Missionaries inevitably gave Korean Protestants special treatment. For example, in handling state-reverted property from Japan, missionaries in charge of it transferred Japan's religious

[342] Jung-Hyeon Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo: Jonggyoneun Eotteoke Gwollyeogi Doeeonneun-ga*? [President and Religion: How Did Religion Become Powerful?] (Seoul: Inmulgwa Sasangsa, 2014), 24.

property – not only Protestantism's but also other religions' – mainly to the KPC.[343] For example, the government gave all buildings of *Cheondogyo* [Religion of the Heavenly Way], a Korean syncretic religion of Confucianism and Korean Shamanism, to a group of Protestant pastors, who worked for Joseon Seminary (now Hanshin University),[344] such as Kyung-Chik Han, the founder of Youngnak Presbyterian Church, Chang-Geun Song, the founder of Seoul Seongnam Presbyterian Church, and Jae-Jun Kim, the founder of Kyungdong Presbyterian Church.[345] Considering this, it is clear that the rumor going around during that era – "If you are a Protestant and can speak English, getting a house from the Americans is not a big deal (translated by the author)"[346] – were not empty words.

In addition, the U.S. military government preferred Protestants in politics. Out of its nineteen department managers, eleven were Protestants.[347] Out of the fifty Koreans occupying top positions in the government, thirty-five were Protestants.[348] The total number of Christians – both Protestants and Catholics – in S. Korea in the late 1940s occupied less than five percent of its population[349] and again deepens the conviction that under the umbrella of the U.S. military government, the KPC could prepare a meteoric rise.

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[343] The U.S. military government's policy about distributing Japan's religious property was that a Japan's religious property would be given to its counterpart in Korea. For example, if a building belonged to Japan's Buddhism, it was supposed to be given to Korean Buddhism.

[344] Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo*, 26; Kang, *Hanguk Gidokgyo Heugyeoksa: Yeoldu Gaji Jujero Boneun Hanguk Gaesingyo Seukaendeul*, 212-214.

[345] Kang, *Hanguk Gidokgyo Heugyeoksa*, 214.

[346] "Bihwahan sedae [A Behind-the-Scenes-Story of Our Time] (224)," *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, September 29, 1977.

[347] "Gidoro Sijakdoen Daetongnyeong Seongeo [The Presidential Election Began with a Prayer]," *The Christian Messenger*, August 18, 1952.

[348] Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo*, 26; Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*, 174.

[349] Chung, "A Reflection on the Growth and Decline of the Korean Protestant Church," 324, 328; Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*, 6.

C. Syngman Rhee's Favoritism toward the Korean Protestant Church

It is well-known that, while studying in the U.S., Syngman Rhee thought of Protestantism as an ideological foundation to help westernize Korea quickly. Soon it led to his determination to make Korea a Protestant nation.[350] When elected as the first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Rhee publicly revealed his determination in the presidential inaugural address. He took an oath of office with his hand on the Bible for the first time in Korean history and began the first session of the National Assembly with a prayer by Yunyeong Lee a Protestant pastor.[351] Rhee lost no time in translating his conviction into action, governmentally supporting Protestantism while persecuting other religions. In 1949, his government designated Christmas a holiday even when Buddha's birthday was not.[352] A couple of months after the Korean War took place in 1950, it established a chaplaincy for the ROK armed forces, making Protestant chaplains occupy 87.8 percent of the total number.[353]

Rhee also increased the KPC's political power. For example, among the twenty-one departmental heads of the National Assembly, nine were Protestants – two out of the nine were pastors. In the 1948 election for the National Assembly, Protestants comprised 21.2 percent of the elected two hundred eight congressmen.[354] From 1952 to 1962, out of the two hundred ninety-eight high-ranking public officials about forty were Protestants.[355] Furthermore, during the Rhee government, the KPC was unparalleled in

[350] Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo*, 39.
[351] Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*, 6, 173; Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo*, 39.
[352] Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*, 6; Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo*, 48.
[353] Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo*, 46.
[354] Ibid, 52.
[355] Ibid, 52. Buddhists occupied 16.2 percent, followed by Catholics (7.4 percent) and Cheondogyo (0.3 percent) (p. 52).

the educational world. Founded upon the U.S. military government's Board of Education,[356] the KPC under Rhee's protection grew into a matchless educational organization with ten universities, one nursing school, fifty-seven middle-and high schools across the country.[357] The KPC also exerted enormous influence over the Korean economy in the aftermath with its social welfare organizations – combined into the Korea Association of Voluntary Agencies in 1952. Most of the fifty-one aid agencies were closely tied to the KPC because at that time the KPC was the only means of communicating with Christian aid organizations abroad.[358] Considering that in 1960, the total number of Protestants in South Korea was merely 2.5 percent of the total population, it is not an exaggeration to say that S. Koreans might perceive Protestantism as not only a special religion but also a nation-wide political and social organization with power and authority.

D. The Korean Protestant Church's Support of the Korean Governments

The Korean military governments did not support the KPC's growth for nothing. First, the KPC actively supported the Rhee government to continue receiving its preferential treatment. In particular, it firmly stood by Rhee in his 1952 controversial presidential-campaigns in which Rhee abused governmental authority to restrict his competitors. Ten days before the Election Day, the National Christian Council hurriedly made a special committee to call for attention from Protestants. The committee soon issued a religious manifesto urging all Protestants across the country to vote for Rhee

[356] Among eleven members, six were Protestants such as Sang-Yun Hyon, the first president of Korea University, Eoggyeom Yu, the former vice president of Yonsei University, and Hwal-ran (Helen) Kim, the first president of Ewha Womans University.
[357] Ibid, 54.
[358] Ibid, 56.

through an editorial titled "Dear Korean Protestants" of its *The Korean Christian Newspaper*, arguing: "Let us help Dr. Syngman Rhee to win the election perfectly. To do so, this Sunday on August 3, 1952, all Christians must pray for our President and vice president. All pastors at each and every church need to remind Christians of this so that they can vote for Dr. Rhee for our President without becoming nonvoters (translated by the author)."[359] In 1956 when Rhee tried to be re-elected as President, the KPC organized another election committee and actively helped Rhee to stay in power, deeply participating in Rhee's illegal election campaigns.

Second, when Park Chung-hee came to power through a military coup, the interdependent relationship between the KPC and Park government became consolidated. It is because, considering that S. Korea heavily relied on the U.S. in the aftermath, Park took Protestantism as a political tool to make the relation between his government and the U.S. run smoothly. In doing so, they conciliated Protestant pastors who had close connections with the U.S. military governmental officers.[360] Pro-governmental Protestant pastors did not let the government down.

For example, when Park violently cracked down on pro-democratic activists opposing his elimination of the presidential term limit in 1974 and 1975, the KPC held religious assemblies on a national scale, placing emphasis on a correlation among

[359] "Dear Korean Protestants," *The Korean Christian News*, August 3, 1952; Kang, *Hanguk Gidokgyo Heugyeoksa*, 135-136.

[360] One of the most shocking stories about such a back-scratching relationship between the Korean regimes and Korean Protestant pastors is Jim Stentzel's *Sojourner* article titled "The Anti-Communist Captivity of the Church" in which Stentzel describes how President Park and a Korean Protestant pastor Jun-Gon Kim mutually helped each other. While Kim bridged a relationship between Park and the U.S. government by actively leading an anti-communism movement, Park guaranteed him a future of wealth and power. For more information, see the article.

salvation, national security, and anticommunism.[361] Regardless of their religious impacts upon S. Koreans, they effectively turned the attention of Koreans from the government's inhumane treatment of its people to the terror of communism and national insecurity. Guest speakers for those revivals meetings, without exception, stirred up a sense of crisis, stressing another immediate invasion of N. Korea, and restressed the importance of national security for the spiritual salvation of S. Koreans, implicitly validating Park's dictatorship.[362] Additionally, when Park announced a plan to send its armed forces to Vietnam in 1964, the KPC came to the fore to support the decision, describing the forces as "crusaders for freedom and democracy" and calling on God's protection for them.

In return, like his predecessor, the Park government also treated the KPC preferentially. For example, in 1976, it launched *Jeongun Sipjahwa Undong*, a government-led nationwide military evangelical-movement that aimed to make all soldiers in the Korean armed forces convert to Christianity.[363] It also buttressed the KPC's far-famed national revival movements such as the "Thirty Million to Christ" revival movement in 1965, the "Korea '73 Billy Graham Crusade (also called Fifty Million to Christ)" in 1973, where 3.2 million Koreans attended and forty-four thousands of them converted to Protestantism,[364] and the Explo '74 in 1974, where about 6,550,000 Koreans attended and 272,000 became Protestants.[365] How the government helped them needs to be explained. For the Billy Graham Crusade in 1973, it gave the KPC special permission to use the *Yoido* plaza, temporarily rescheduled the bus routes in *Yoido*, lifted

[361] Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*, 185-186.
[362] Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo*, 82.
[363] Ibid., 89.
[364] Ibid., 90; Timothy S. Lee, *Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea* (Honolulu: University Hawaii Press, 2010), 93-95.
[365] Lee, *Born Again*, 96-97.

the curfew for about a week, and even sent its army construction corps to build the choir stalls for a 6,000 member-interdenominational choir.[366]

Third, Chun Doo-hwan, another president who seized power through a military coup, also set his mind on keeping the cozy-relation with the U.S. What differentiated Chun from Park is that Chun used a carrot-and-stick policy in utilizing the KPC to stay in power. Right after the bloody massacre of innocent civilians in Kwangju city in 1980, he asked two major religions in S. Korea – Buddhism and Protestantism – to announce a religious statement to support and sanctify him. Korean Buddhism turned down his request. Instead, it sent a fact-finding committee to Kwangju. Chun lost no time in dispatching thirty-two thousand military and police forces to Buddhist temples across the country, under the pretext that it was to root out corruption in the Korean Buddhism. That brutal action caused an instant response from Korean Buddhists – its total number declined sharply from 1.29 million in 1977 to 540,000 in 1982.[367]

The KPC took a different step. On August 6, 1980, a group of influential Korean Protestant pastors gathered for the National Breakfast Prayer Meeting[368] – a prayer meeting for Chun and his government. During the meeting, Chun again claimed that behind the Kwangju rebellion (now called the Kwangju Pro-democracy Uprising), there were communists and agents from North Korea. On behalf of the KPC, Pastor Jun-gon Kim officially gave his appreciation to Chun for his efforts to eliminate 'impure elements'

[366] Lee, *Born Again*, 95; Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo*, 91.
[367] Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo*, 120-123.
[368] The first breakfast prayer meeting of the KPC was held for Park Chung-hee on February 27, 1965. Its original name was "the National Assembly Breakfast Prayer Meeting." Next year, it was changed to "the Breakfast Prayer Meeting for Our President." In 1976, the title became "the National Breakfast Meeting."

from South Korea.[369] On September 30, 1980, the KPC held another special national prayer meeting to celebrate Chun's victory in the presidential election.

In return, Chun continued to support the KPC's consecutive revivals in the 1980s, including the '80 World Evangelization Crusade from August 12 to 15, 1980, where 17.25 million attended and 700 thousand converted to Protestantism.[370] Under martial law that banned all kinds of assemblies and associations, the Chun government made an exception for the KPC to hold the 1980 crusade and other national religious meetings and financially helped the KPC by advertising them through the government-controlled mass media.[371] Such political and financial support from the Korean governments for the KPC continued until the last national religious gathering, the '88 World Evangelization Crusade in 1988. On February 25, 1988, Chun gave his presidency to his heir, Tae-woo Roh, who was elected by a direct presidential election.

Considering that in 1950, there were merely 500,198 Protestants that occupied 2.4 percent of the total population and during the Korean military governments, the number increased to 8,037,000 by 1991 that occupied 18.5 percent of the total population,[372] it is apparent that the KPC's miraculous growth in the past century was not possible without Rhee's political favoritism and Park and Chon's active governmental support, along with S. Koreans' cultural complex. However, to put the puzzle together, there is one more thing left to examine – how the KPC appealed to S. Koreans, striking a cord in their

[369] Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*, 184; Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo*, 120; Gi-chun Song, "Gukga Jochangidohoeui Heonbeopjeok Munje [The Constitutional Problem of the National Morning Prayer Meeting]," *Heonbeopag Yeongu* [Study of the Constitution], 2012:18, 69.

[370] Lee, *Born Again*, 109-110.

[371] Baek, *Daetongnyeonggwa Jonggyo*, 125.

[372] Chung, "A Reflection on the Growth and Decline of the Korean Protestant Church," 322, 324, 328.

hearts. The KPC's contextual theology of prosperity/bliss ideally fitted well with what S. Koreans mostly desired in the aftermath.

E. The Theology of Prosperity/Bliss: Its Psychological Dynamics

Timothy S. Lee, an associate professor of the History of Christianity at the Brite Divinity School who carefully examined the KPC revivals from 1885 to 1988, claims that all the revival meetings held in S. Korea in the past century revolved around one Christian concept: rebirth.[373] Guest speakers for the meetings harmoniously stressed that converting to Christianity allowed S. Koreans to have a new life – spiritually as well as physically. The remarkable success of those revivals reveals that at least twenty-five percent of them were deeply touched by the discourse on rebirth. To examine how or why it was possible, along with a focus on the unique social circumstances of S. Korea, it is important to examine the psychological effects of the KPC's theology based on the concept – the theology of prosperity/bliss.[374]

Yong-gi Cho, the founder of the Yoido Full Gospel Church (Assemblies of God), the world's largest single congregation with a claimed membership of 800,000 (as of 2016),[375] notes that he made the theology of prosperity/bliss to cheer up his people

[373] Lee, *Born Again*, 112; Park, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*, 179, 183-184.

[374] The author chose the theology of prosperity/bliss as one of the essential elements for the KPC's rapid growth in the past century, rather than the theology of *Minjung* – another Korean contextual theology concerned about social justice and human rights that came into existence concurrently with the theology of prosperity/bliss. It is because the majority of Korean Protestant churches in that period were heavily anchored in the prosperity/bliss theology and most Protestants desired prosperity/bliss more than social justice and human rights.

[375] Ma, "David Yonggi Cho's Theology of Blessing: Basis, Legitimacy, and Limitations," 142; Warren Bird, "The World's Largest Church: A Country-By-Country List of Global Churches," accessed December 31, 2018, http://leadnet.org/world/.

captured by despair, helplessness, sickness, and poverty.[376] Based on 3 John 2: "Beloved, I pray that all may go well with you and that you may be in good health, just as it is well with your soul (NRSV)," the theology proclaims that "God desires for all Christians to prosper in body, soul, and spirit,"[377] portraying God as willing to offer His children three blessings: material prosperity, physical and psychological health, and eternal life.[378] At the heart of Cho's theology, there lies his unshakable conviction that Christians – Protestants – are destined to have a victorious life.[379]

In *The Fourth Dimension* Vol. I (1979), Cho describes how practically one receives the three blessings from God in detail.[380] In order to receive and experience God's providence in one's daily life, there are four things Protestants should put into action. First, in asking God for help, they have to specifically know what they want. For example, instead of merely asking God for a car, we have to know what car we really want concretely – what maker, what model, what year, what color, and so forth. Second, when a specific goal is set, they have to literally desire it under whatever circumstances – Cho urged that that desire makes what is impossible possible. Here it is important to pinpoint that the theology affirmed whatever Protestants desires, considering desire as if it is God's gift.[381] Third, they have to regularly attend religious gatherings until they get it.

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[376] Yonggi Cho, *The Holy Spirit, My Senior Partner: Understanding the Holy Spirit and His Gifts* (Altamonte Springs: Creation House, 1989), 8.

[377] Yonggi Cho, *The Fourth Dimension* Vol. 2 (Alachua: Bridge-Logos Publishers, 1983), 73.

[378] Anderson, "The Contribution of David Yonggi Cho to a Contextual Theology in Korea," 101-102; Kim, "Christianity, Shamanism, and Modernization in South Korea," *Cross Currents* (2000): 118; Ma, "David Yonggi Cho's Theology of Blessing: Basis, Legitimacy, and Limitations," 143.

[379] Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, ""March Forward to Hope": Yonggi Cho's Pentecostal Theology of Hope," *PNEUMA: The Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies* (2006): 255.

[380] Yonggi Cho, *The Fourth Dimension* Vol. 1 (Alachua: Bridge-Logos Publishers, 1979), 3-24.

[381] In addition, the justification of human desire of Cho's prosperity/bliss theology is one of the main reasons why his Pentecostalism is criticized as a hybrid of Western Christianity (God) and Korean Shamanism (material wishes). For more information about the connection, see Andrew Eungi Kim's "Christianity, Shamanism, and Modernization in South Korea (2000)," "Characteristics of Religious Life in

Collective church activities such as worship, praise, prayer, and so on were designed to eliminate their self-doubt and strengthen their confidence and sense of belonging through religious ecstatic-experiences. Fourth and last, they have to live as if they already got what they desire. Cho called that attitude evidence of faith that is interchangeable with optimism. By evidence of faith, he meant 'positive' thinking, 'positive' speaking, and 'positive' acting. Furthermore, he was likely to equate a faithful life with a life of optimism. Taken all together, Cho urged his followers to arm themselves with optimism in order to experience God's blessings as follows:

> Renew your mind. Constantly think in terms of success, in terms of victory, and in terms of abundance. When you have completely renewed your thinking process, then you will receive the *rhema* [an utterance or thing said] of God. Boldly assimilate the Word of God into your thinking life. Through prayer produce faith, and through faith you will be able to lift your chin up high.[382]

Thus, what differentiates Christians from churchgoers, according to Cho, boils down to one thing – whether or not s/he attains the tendency to be positive about anything.

As far as the biblical evidence of Cho's theology of prosperity/bliss is concerned, it remains controversial. However, as far as its psychological help for S. Koreans who suffered dire poverty is concerned, it is undeniable that the theology encouraged at least twenty-five percent of them to overcome the apathy, helplessness, depression, and inferiority. For S. Koreans who desperately desired a better life but did not know what to do, it offered a simple and convincing solution: to become a Protestant by changing

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South Korea: A Sociological Survey (2002);" Harvey Cox, *Fire from Heaven: The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the Reshaping of Religion in the Twenty-first Century* (1994); David Martin, *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America* (1990); Don Baker, *Korean Spirituality* (2008); Walter J. Hollenweger, *Pentecostalism: Origins and Developments Worldwide* (1997).

[382] Cho, *The Fourth Dimension* Vol. 1, 123.

"thinking attitude from that of a negative attitude to that of a positive one"[383] and by consistently training to think "in terms of miracles."[384] Thus, the theology's emphasis on rebirth – by believing Jesus as Christ – provided them with the long-hoped chance to live a new life that would guarantee God's blessings in both this world and the world after death.

IV. A Psychohistorical Analysis of the Korean Protestant Church's Growth

So far we have discussed the four elements that contributed to the KPC's rapid growth in the past century – the psychological state of the collectively traumatized S. Koreans, their cultural complex of collective inferiority, the three S. Korean governments' active support of the KPC as a political tactic to solidify power, and the Korean contextual theology of prosperity/bliss. Now it is the time to complete the puzzle by putting them together with a Jungian psychohistorical analysis. Pivoting on the workings of the cultural unconscious of S. Koreans that seem to be directly related to the miraculous growth of the KPC in the past century, the analysis will explain two things. First, it will explain how the inferiority complex of S. Koreans – the unconscious desire to be like their colonizers, devaluing their past – pushed them to convert to Protestantism massively within a relatively short period of time. Second, it also sheds light on how the Korean governments and the KPC's theology stimulated and affirmed the collective conversion. With this in mind, let us begin assembling all the pieces together.

First, the analysis is concretely based on the assumption that the twentieth-century history of Korea was traumatic to a collective degree so that Koreans – primarily S.

[383] Ibid., 98.
[384] Ibid., 102.

Koreans – could not avoid the emergence of the cultural complex of inferiority in the cultural unconsciousness. The Japanese and the Americans played important roles in giving rise to the complex. The Japanese's systematic policies to obliterate Koreans terrified them astonishingly. The degree of its psychological impacts on Koreans is in proportion to that of their hatred, hostility, and mistrust about the Japanese, even today. For example, S. Koreans unconsciously – sometimes compulsively – think that in international sports games, they can lose to any other countries, but not to Japan, because losing to Japan is like a repetition of the humiliation they had to cope with under the Japanese rule.

Turning to the U.S. government and its reign over S. Korea, however, it does not take long to notice an interesting tendency S. Koreans collectively share toward the Americans. Though vividly remembering how the U.S. treated them during the Korean War, they are likely to consider the U.S. as their savior rather than as their enemy and respect – in a sense, admire – the Americans, desiring to be like them.[385]

How can we understand the collective psychological idiosyncrasy of Koreans and their contradictory attitudes toward the U.S. and Japan? To help answer that question, Jungian psychology brings into focus the concept of projection. According to the

[385] One of the most remarkable examples for this tendency is noticeable in their obsession-like passion for studying (American) English. In an article titled "The English Fever in South Korea: Focusing on the Problem of Early English Education," Bok-Rae Kim, a professor of Andong National University in S. Korea, argues that the ability to use English fluently in S. Korea is an important social capital to attain higher social status and power. He points S. Koreans' excessive idealization of the American as the main cause of the obsession. For more information about S. Koreans' obsession about becoming like the American, see Jong-Hwa Lee, Min-Wha Ha, and Raymie E. McKerrow, "English or perish: how contemporary South Korea received, accommodated, and internalized English and American modernity," *Language and Intercultural Communication* 10, no. 4 (2010): 333-357; Seon Won Park, "The Present and Future of Americanization in South Korea," *Journal of Futures Studies 14* (2009): 51 (51-66); Bok-Rae Kim, "The English Fever in South Korea: Focusing on the Problem of Early English Education," *Journal of Education & Social Policy* 2 (2015): 117-124.

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, projection means "the attribution of one's own ideas, feelings, or attributes to other people or to objects; especially, the externalization of blame, guilt, or responsibility as a defense against anxiety."[386] When we are anxious, we normally tend to repress it, avoiding facing what caused the anxiety. When we are no longer able to repress our bothersome feelings into the unconscious – either before they develop into a complex that autonomously manipulates the workings of consciousness or after, we tend to transfer the causes of the uncomfortable feelings onto an object, believing it is the root cause of the anxiety.[387]

What is at stake is that like any other psychological defenses, projection can be one of many ways to temporarily avoid a complex – a "certain constellation of psychic elements (ideas, opinions, convictions, etc.) that are grouped around emotionally sensitive areas."[388] When a complex in the unconscious takes control of consciousness, the complex-driven behavior could become a habit – "an acquired mode of behavior that has become nearly or completely involuntary."[389] Jungian psychology explains that the idiosyncratic co-existence of S. Koreans' hate of the Japanese and love of the Americans can be explained with the projection mechanism. To love the Americans, relying on them during the aftermath of the war, Koreans had to project their repressed excruciating feelings on the Japanese, their first and most brutal colonizer. The more they relied on the Americans, the more they hated the Japanese. Moreover, pro-Japanese Koreans, who quickly changed their masks to be pro-American in 1945 when the Empire of Japan

[386] Merriam-Webster English Dictionary, "projection," accessed on October 12, 2017. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/projection

[387] Jung, "Symbols of Transformation: One," in *Symbols of Transformation*, 59; Jung, "Definitions," in *Psychological Types*, 783.

[388] Singer, *Boundaries of the Soul*, 43.

[389] Merriam-Webster English Dictionary, "habit," accessed on October 13, 2018. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/habit

collapsed, intentionally made an 'imaginary' object to provoke S. Koreans into more willingly projecting their excruciating feelings. When the Japanese were no longer available as a psychological object, like during the Park regime, the Korean military governments consistently fabricated stories about the imminent invasion of N. Korea and the infiltration of its spies that terrified S. Koreans.[390] Thus, Jungian psychology sheds light on how S. Koreans continued loving the Americans, yet hating the Japanese and N. Korea or communists.

Second, the explosive growth of the KPC is related to S. Koreans' cultural complex of inferiority that caused them to unconsciously idealize the Americans. Within a couple of months after Korea was liberated from Japan, the U.S. took Japan's place, becoming a psychological colonizers of S. Koreans. The U.S. did not enter southern Korea as an ally, but as an occupation force. Since then the psychological effects of the U.S. on S. Korea remains intact. One historical continuity is that since July 14, 1950, when former president Syngman Rhee handed the operational command authority over to General MacArthur, the U.S. keeps the authority. When a war breaks out on the peninsula, it is not S. Korea's President who leads S. Korea's armed forces - the U.S.'s President would. Even though S. Korea's standard of living has greatly improved as compared with that of the 1950s, S. Koreans' anxiety out of the incapacity to protect themselves remains the same.

When the U.S. was in control of S. Korea, S. Koreans' attitude toward the U.S. was ambivalent between a liberator and a colonizer. Because of the quick transition from Korea's liberation from Japan to the U.S.' occupation of the southern part of Korea, S.

[390] Han, *Hanhongguui Yeoksa Iyagi 3*, 200-231.

Koreans were not able to regain a sense of independence and autonomy that has been lost for thirty five years. Moreover, they could not have enough time to heal their cultural complex of inferiority the Japanese rule gave birth to. Although their former colonizer was gone, its psychological influences remained and they were gradually tied to the U.S.

The Korean War and its aftermath strongly demanded S. Koreans realize how weak and small they were as compared with the U.S. Completely relying on the U.S. for the postwar recovery almost in all areas – such as food, shelter, and medical treatment, S. Koreans began looking up to the U.S., desiring to follow and imitate it. However, here it must be noted that the more desperately they desired to be like the Americans, the more clearly they realized that they could not do it, and which, in return, exacerbated their cultural complex of inferiority. Their sense of inferiority, bolstered by their failure to be like the U.S., kept intensifying to a degree that their cultural unconsciousness could no longer hold it. As a defensive mechanism, they projected those unresolvable feelings onto communism and N. Korea. It is because they needed outer objects onto which to pour out the torturing sense of inferiority although they knew the fear of N. Korea and communism was considerably fabricated by the Korean military governments in solidifying power. When the projection did not temporarily soothe them any longer, they found a new object to blame. Unfortunately, this time the object was themselves, considering their country 'undeveloped' and their traditional way of being and living 'uncivilized' from the perspective of Americans. Coincidentally, by that time the Park government had launched the massive transformation of the 'undeveloped' and 'uncivilized' country into an industrialized one, emphasizing the importance of forgetting the miserable past to construct a new country and people. Many S. Koreans aggressively

joined the nationwide economic development plans, implicitly agreeing to their government's suppression of social justice and human rights movements. They believed or wanted to believe their government's promise that the nation's transformation to be like the U.S. and the Americans could solve all social problems they were struggling with.

Third, considering S. Koreans' cultural complex of inferiority and their projections onto N. Korea and later themselves as a soothing mechanism that helped them pour out their conflicting feelings and inner pains, the Korean governments' active support for the KPC pushed them to perceive Protestantism as not only the 'great' religion of Americans imported, but also the religion of power and privilege their military governments handled at will. For example, the governments systematically induced the religious influences of other religions, which did not cooperate with them, to decline while helping the KPC's consecutive nationwide-revivals. Although it is obvious that they made use of Protestantism as a method to control anti-governmental movement, their support for the KPC inspired into the minds of S. Koreans the perception that Protestantism was a new religion their governments adopted. Supporting the governments and religiously validating their national transformation plans, the KPC consistently urged S. Koreans to be reborn as Christians, arguing that the tragedies of the past century were caused by their idolatry lifestyle such as worshiping foreign gods instead the Christian God, and not living like Christians whom Koreans mostly equate with the Americans. The KPC also set up a specific action plan for Koreans to become Christians – to be crucified with Christ and make only Christ live in oneself (Galatians 2:20). To be Christians meant to bury their past spotted with tragedies and despair into oblivion, once and for all. Through the conversion experience, S. Koreans could forget their cultural

complex of inferiority. However, the oblivion was not free. The senses of self-hate and self-humiliation aggravated then more and more.

Fourth, Korean Protestantism's theology of prosperity/bliss in the past century played the role of a psychological soothing mechanism for S. Koreans who suffered from the cultural complex of inferiority. When the Korean governments demanded that S. Koreans not remember their trauma-stricken history but work hard as much as they could, the KPC inspired hope into them with the theology of prosperity/bliss, describing God as willing to bless Christians bodily, materially, and even eternally and help their country to become a well-developed and rich nation. While the governments labeled those who tried to look back or cast a doubt on their future-oriented plans as communists and punished them, the theology called them unbelievers who would be cursed by God in the end, stubbornly proclaiming "Jesus, heaven! All others, hell!" The logic of the theology – being a Christian means being positive and optimistic in every thought and act– helped S. Koreans, who converted to Protestantism, to be relieved from the haunting memories of the past century and focus on the governments' future-oriented national policies for economic development. In a sense, the doctrine was close to an illusion in Freud's terminology that development and growth can solve all problems and obstacles they were struggling with. In retrospect, obviously it worked well. However, the psychological collaboration between S. Korea's miraculous economic development and the KPC's explosive growth during the past century could not heal the cultural complex, although it pushed S. Koreans to move forward compulsively and eventually created a new country that is technologically well-developed, keeping its tragic modern history in check.

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter, the author has attempted to disclose what motivated up to a fourth of S. Koreans to massively convert to Korean Protestantism in the past century with the use of a Jungian psychohistorical perspective that carefully focuses on the workings of their cultural unconsciousness under the influence of the cultural complex of inferiority in that nationwide conversion movement.

First, the author has examined the concept of collective trauma and its applicability to S. Koreans. Second, the historical roots and growth of S. Koreans' cultural complex of inferiority have been investigated. Third, the two major elements that directly caused the KPC's rapid growth – the reciprocal relationship between the Korean military regimes and the KPC and the KPC's theology of prosperity/bliss – have been reviewed. Last, taken all together, the author made a Jungian psychohistorical analysis of the KPC's rapid growth that although the KPC helped S. Koreans to avoid facing their cultural complex by drawing their attention to a new life, as a Christian, of development and growth, it failed to heal the complex.

All in all, the KPC's rapid growth from the 1960s to the 1980s can be a representation of the unconscious workings of S. Koreans' cultural complex of inferiority that devalued their traditional culture, religion, and themselves while idealizing Protestantism highly, the religion of their colonizer. The Korean governments' active support of the KPC's nationwide revivals provided a fourth of South Koreans with a temporarily soothing mechanism to keep the complex in the cultural unconscious while obsessively working hard toward development and growth at an individual and social

level. However, the religious movements of prosperity/bliss could not heal the collective inferiority complex of South Koreans. Its emphasis on development and growth as one way of God's bliss helped South Koreans to temporarily cope with their haunting memories and inner pains while obsessively clinging to the concept of remodeling themselves and their country.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

This chapter aims to accomplish three things. First, the author will summarize the main points of all the previous chapters. Second, four practical implications resulting from the findings of the research will be laid out. Last, possible future works about the KPC and S. Koreans' psychological health based on the research will be suggested.

I. Summary

This research has aimed to discover psychological causes of the KPC's miraculous growth in the past century, concentrating on how the workings of S. Koreans' cultural unconsciousness stimulated the massive religious phenomenon.

A. A Historical Sketch of the Korean Protestant Church's Growth in the Past Century

In Chapter One, the author has attempted three things – a brief sketch of the history of Protestantism in Korea, the major three causes of the KPC's growth, and the necessity of a psychohistorical analysis of the growth to see if it was a byproduct of S. Koreans' unconscious reactions to their traumatic experiences of the last century.

First, when Western missionaries brought Protestantism to the Korean peninsula, Joseon – Korea's last dynasty – was quickly falling apart in the vortex of the power games among colonial powers such as Russia, the U.S., Germany, the U.K., Japan and China. Carrying those colonial powers on its back, Western Protestantism first

approached the Korean ruling class as a way of enlightenment, westernization and modernization. However, common people took Protestantism as a way to break with the past because its doctrines of freedom, equality and justice helped them to discover a new world. Among the colonial powers, Japan stood out to prey on Joseon, winning the wars against China (1895) and Russia (1905). During the Japanese colonial era (1910-1945), many Korean Protestants participated in social and political activities against Japan. It made, in the minds of Koreans, a link between Korean Protestantism and nationalism, and which brought more Koreans to churches. Five years after the Korea's liberation of 1945, the Korean War – the most tragic event of Korea's history – took place. In the aftermath, the KPC's social influence on S. Korea was second to none, owing to its close connection with missionary-related aid organizations across the globe. S. Korea had to rely on the KPC for housing, clothing, food, transportation and emergency medical aid for its people, and which paved the way for Korean Protestantism to expand its influence into society. When the Korean military governments led the massive industrialization and urbanization of S. Korea from the 1960s to 1980s, the KPC grew explosively, creating two contextual theologies – the theology of prosperity/bliss that fitted well with what S. Koreans normally hoped for and that of *Minjung* that represented the underprivileged, emphasizing human rights and social justice.

Second, the author explained the three major reasons for the KPC's rapid growth scholars have so far suggested. The first reason is that Protestantism offered Koreans – only S. Koreans since 1953 – new outlooks on life: (1) freedom, equality and human rights when it was introduced to Koreans for the first time; (2) nationalism and patriotism during the Japanese colonial era; (3) a religion of the privileged from the aftermath of the

war; and (4) a religion of prosperity/bliss during S. Korea's industrialization and urbanization. The second reason is that for S. Koreans, who were perplexed in the midst of the rapid social changes that broke down their traditional values, generated a great degree of anxiety, and increased the gap between the rich and the poor, Korean Protestant churches became a second home, where they could regain a sense of security, belongingness and peace – even though temporarily. The third and last reason is that some forms of Korean Protestantism are a synthesis of Korean Shamanism and Western Protestantism – Korean shamanized Protestantism or Protestant shamanism that easily appealed to S. Koreans. What made the synthesis possible is twofold: (1) owing to its lack of a system of religious doctrines, as compared with other Korean religions – Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism – Shamanism was easy to be grafted onto Western Protestantism; and (2) Protestantism offered an Biblical interpretation of Koreans' tragic history of the past century that all the miseries took place in accordance with God's providence, likening them to the Israelites who were saved by God in the grip of Egypt.

Third, offering the table of changes in the number of Korean Protestants in the past century, the author pointed out that the KPC's explosive growth took place as a mass phenomenon in a limited period from the mid-1960s and the late 1980s. Moreover, it is also pointed that the well-known three reasons of the growth cannot make sense of why the KPC's growth was concentrated on that period, and which requires a new approach to that issue is also noted. As a probable approach, the author suggests a psychohistorical interpretation of the KPC's growth that concretely focuses on the psychological state of S. Koreans and how it had to do with the growth.

B. A Jungian Psychohistorical Theory: an Interpretive Tool

In Chapter Two, the author developed a Jungian psychohistorical perspective, examining four things in turn – a general explanation of its origin and development, its strengths, weakness and applicability, the basic concepts of Jung's analytical psychology and a Jungian psychohistorical perspective.

First, the author explained that psychohistory as a discipline evolved with the conviction that it is unconsciousness or emotionality that changed the flow of history rather than consciousness or intelligence. In his 1957 presidential address, William L. Langer, an American historian who served the American Historical Association as its president, stressed the importance of psychoanalysis in historical studies. He argued that psychoanalysis can help interpret historical materials in a new way that focuses on the control of unconsciousness over consciousness in human behaviors. Erik Erikson made the first psychohistorical analysis of the life of an individual. In *Young Martin Luther* (1958), Erikson made a groundbreaking investigation of how Luther's personal psychological issues were closely tied to his pioneering work for the Reformation, repetitively emphasizing his lifelong conflicts with his father or father-figures. Since then, a number of psychohistorical books were published, taking important historical figures as subjects to psychoanalyze in their historical contexts. Later psychohistory extended its scope of study to memorable social events like wars or crimes.

Second, as a study, psychohistory's strengths, weaknesses and its contribution to historical studies were examined. Psychohistory's strengths are boiled down to two points: (1) as far as individuals or social events are concerned, psychohistory takes as its primary

theoretical foundation that human behaviors are more influenced by unconsciousness than consciousness – emotionality is stronger than intelligence when it comes to how humans behave; and (2) as an extension of psychotherapy, psychohistory considers historical materials as an object to psychoanalyze which helps psychohistorians discover what historians normally miss or disregard by focusing on unconscious intensions of human behaviors hidden in their various defensive mechanisms such as their slips of the tongue and somatic illnesses. Psychohistory's weaknesses are summarized into four points: (1) psychologization – psychohistory tends to consider all human behavior recorded in historical materials as pathological; (2) reductionism – psychohistory is likely to ascribe all unusual human behaviors to their childhood or earlier experiences; (3) arbitrariness – psychohistory treats historical materials arbitrarily for the sake of its psychoanalytical interpretation; and (4) determinism – psychohistory examines historical events, based on the law of causation insisting that all human acts cannot be explained without considering some psychological issues underneath them. However, psychohistory contributes to historical studies at the least in two points: (1) discovering in given historical events deeper and more complicated psychological issues caused by human relationships – mostly emotionally-charged human interactions, it can help make a fuller, more rounded view of humans' lives or social phenomena in the past; and (2) as a study that investigates historical sources from various psychoanalytical perspectives, it can add one more historical hermeneutic to existing historical studies.

Third, the basic concepts of Jung's analytical psychology were explained – such as the collective unconscious, psychopathology, dreams and archetypes, and complex. Jung does not consider the unconscious as a reservoir of repressed drives or instincts. For

him, the unconscious is like a reservoir of potentiality consciousness disconnected from itself in its evolutionary process or adaptation to what is called reality. To stretch out that concept, Jung developed the collective unconscious, a layer of phylogenetic unconsciousness all humans shared throughout the evolutionary history. Jung believed that our psychological health relies on the degree of how much our consciousness is well connected with the (collective) unconscious, despite that reality consistently requires us to use consciousness, repressing the unconscious. In Jung's psychology, various pathologies are caused by the separation between consciousness and the unconscious. That separation normally is the birthplace of a complex – one of Jung's major contributions to the psychological discourses on psychopathology. A complex is a constellation of some 'repressed' unconscious feelings usually about traumatic events that consciousness is no longer able to keep in check. As an independent psychical entity in the unconscious, a complex interrupts the workings of consciousness whenever a physical situation, which reminds its causal feeling, is encountered, taking control of consciousness. To heal pathologies, it is important to reconnect consciousness with the unconscious through genuinely experiencing those traumatic feelings consciousness is repressing for the sake of reality. Luckily, the unconscious continually attempts to be in touch with consciousness through archetypal dreams. By archetypes, Jung means our shared fundamental psychical reality in relation to our experiences of the outer world such as life and death, identity formation, and the midlife crisis.

Fourth and last, on the basis of the general understanding of psychohistory and the explanation of Jung's analytical psychology, a Jungian psychohistorical perspective developed that considers viable the existence of the cultural unconscious – a layer of the

unconscious (of an ethnic group) that exists between the personal unconscious (of an individual) and the collective unconscious, along with cultural complex – a complex that rules the cultural unconscious of an ethnic group and causes abnormal behaviors among them at a collective level. To help understand how a cultural complex works in reality, the author offers two examples of the cultural complex – Frantz Fanon's *lactification* and Gerson's *Malinchismo*. Those two terms indicate a cultural complex of inferiority both Africans and Mexicans have in common in their relationship to whites as their colonizers. Struggling in the complex's grip, they unconsciously tend to highly idealize whatever the whites do and have and at the same time, look down on and give up their own ethnic characteristics. However, the harder they endeavor to be like their colonizers, the higher the degree of their sense of self-hate and self-humiliation become. Their increasing idealization of the colonizers more strongly demands them to face the reality that they can never be like them.

C. The Traumatic 20th Century of Korea: Japanese Imperialism, the Korean War, and the Korean Military Governments

In Chapter Three, the author attempted to reveal some hidden history of Korea in the past century that traumatized S. Koreans, chronologically examining how Japanese Imperialism, the U.S. Military Government in Korea, the Korean War, and the Korean military governments psychologically changed them.

First, when it comes to Japanese Imperialism, it is important to note that the Japanese literally tried to do an ethnic cleansing of Koreans with various cultural and political measures. Putting aside their cultural policies to prohibit Koreans from using

their mother language and changing their names from Korean to Japanese, what was really at stake was their introduction of the first nationwide industrialization to Korea, with hopes of making the country a logistics base to invade other countries such China and Russia. The Japan-led industrialization of Korea severely disconnected Koreans from their traditional life that was agricultural and family-centered for the first time in their history, specifically with the massive displacement of its populace from Korea to Japan and other countries. Although that sudden social change was more than traumatic, historical records of that period reveal that many Koreans enjoyed and blindly followed the civilization Japan brought, neglecting their tradition and customs.

Second, the psychological impact of the Korean War on Koreans was examined, bringing into focus a series of massacres during the war. The war caused more than four million causalities in total – about two million were civilians, destroying eighty percent of industrial facilities in Korea, seventy-five percent of governmental buildings and more than half of an inhabitable area of Korea. However, what really terrified the war survivors were a series of incessant massacres on Koreans by their governments – both North and South – and by the U.S. armed forces. The Rhee government ruthlessly killed its people on the pretext that they were associated with communists before, during, and after the war. For three years, the U.S. armed forces indiscriminately murdered Koreans with the justification that because there was no clear-cut discriminance between N. and S. Koreans, it was unavoidable for the sake of their military operations. Those terrifying experiences implanted in Koreans – particularly S. Koreans – a knee jerk reaction-like terror of N. Korea, their governments and the U.S.

Third and last, how the Korean military governments controlled S. Koreans from 1953 to 1988 was examined, paying attention to their politics of terror and anxiety about N. Korea and communism to manipulate the people. The Rhee government enacted the National Security Law in 1948 that aimed to oust all S. Koreans who are N. Korea or communism sympathizers. With that law, however, what Rhee really wanted to do was to expel his opponents across the nation. When he simply labeled them communists or N. Korea's secret agents, he got the right to either put them in prison or to execute them. After rising to power through a coup, Park Chung-hee established a special policing agency that took full charge of hunting communists, along with the Anticommunist Law – an upgraded version of Rhee's National Security Law. Park maximized the controlling power of his government, using the agency with a network of agents that covered all parts of the country, in order to eliminate almost all anti-government activists. Whenever things did not go well for him, he terrified his people with the false information that N. Korea was ready to wage another war against S. Korea. Each time the propaganda worked in favor of the Park government because it reminded S. Koreans of what they had to undergo during the war. Chun Doo-hwan, the other of the two presidents of S. Korea who came to power through a coup, solidified his political footing with a mass murder of his people in Kwangju city who had opposed his military-based reign. On top of that, he invented two more tools to control his people. One was the creation of armies of strikebreakers and of the paramilitary riot police whose primary work was to suppress any anti-government activities or meetings by force. The other was the establishment of the so-called purification camps where anti-government activists labeled as communists

or N. Korea sympathizers were tortured and brainwashed until they confessed that they would support the government.

With those three historical descriptions, the author made clear that what S. Koreans underwent in the past century requires due consideration because the psychological impacts on them must be at the least 'traumatic.' Taking for granted that the KPC's miraculous growth in the past century took place while S. Koreans survived – psychologically speaking – in the chaotic vortices, it is important to consider the growth in those social contexts, giving due weight to their traumatized psychological state.

D. A Jungian Psychohistorical Analysis: the Korean Protestant Church's Growth in Line with S. Koreans' Cultural Complex of Inferiority in the Past Century

In Chapter Four, the author analyzed what motivated up to one-fourth of S. Koreans to collectively convert to Protestantism in the past century from a Jungian psychohistorical perspective that takes seriously the cultural complex of S. Koreans – a collective complex of inferiority. For doing so, the author first examined whether or not their past century was traumatic to a degree that it deteriorated into a collective trauma in their cultural unconsciousness. Various trauma theorists helped to confirm that what S. Koreans underwent in the past century can be considered collectively traumatic so that it might deconstruct their community spirit, cause abnormal behaviors like joining religious cults or radical political parties as a temporary soothing method, and its psychosomatic effects, if not treated properly, could be inherited from generation to generation.

Second, the emergence of the cultural complex and how it was exacerbated in terms of S. Koreans' psychological relationship with their colonizers – the Japanese,

Americans, and their three military governments – was scrutinized. The root of S. Koreans' cultural complex lies in their first colonial experience under Japanese Imperialism which attempted to culturally eliminate their ethnicity. Facing the danger of extinction, the painful colonial experience changed their anger and antipathy toward the Japanese into an idealization that forced them to look up to their colonizer while despising their ethnicity more harshly. This resulted in the coexistence of self-humiliation and excessive idealization of an outer object and was clear evidence of the inferiority complex, according to Jung. The U.S. took the place of the psychological role of Japan in their minds in 1945. Owing to the ambiguity of how they perceived the U.S. – savior or another colonizer, their sense of inferiority worsened and by contrast, their desire to idealize the U.S. intensified. To make matters worse, the Korean War spread the sense of collective inferiority to almost all Koreans who had little choice but to face their helplessness, hopelessness, and haplessness in the midst of the nationwide incessant massacres by their two-divided governments and the U.S. armed forces. During the aftermath and thereafter, their cultural complex of inferiority was more exacerbated due to the paradoxical condition that even though they vividly remembered how the U.S. and their own governments murdered them, they could not publicly blame them for their atrocities. To survive, they had to desperately rely on them, suppressing all their negative feelings toward them. In doing so, their sense of self-hate and self-humiliation was more aggravated in proportion as their idealization of the U.S. continued to deepen.

Third, the author explained the reciprocal relationship between the Korean military governments and the KPC between the mid-1960s to the late 1980s and how it stimulated S. Koreans to massively convert to Protestantism. Throughout their reigns, the

Korean military governments paid attention to how to keep a smooth relationship with the U.S. partly because their national economy substantially relied on aid from the U.S. and partly because the legitimacy of their government came from the U.S.' approval. For them, Protestantism was an important political tool. By providing the KPC with various opportunities to grow, they utilized its leaders who had good relationships with Americans in power in order to solidify their power. In return for preferential treatment, the KPC backed the governments, religiously endorsing them and urging S. Koreans to obey them. At the same time, the KPC helped the governments' national economic development plans with a contextual theology of prosperity/bliss. When the governments urged S. Koreans to be armed with a militant spirit to build a modern nation, eliminating traces of their tradition as much as possible, the KPC presented S. Koreans with a theology describing God as an unlimited provider of bliss for those who are reborn in Jesus Christ. That relationship implanted in S. Koreans an unconscious thought that Protestantism was a special religion that both their governments and the U.S. looked up to and that would guarantee a better life full of God's miracles.

Fourth and last, a Jungian psychohistorical analysis that explains what motivated up to one-fourth of S. Koreans to convert to Protestantism between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s was made. At the core of their massive conversion to Protestantism, there lied – probably still lies – the cultural complex of inferiority. Throughout the past century, the traumatic events they underwent one after another exacerbated the complex. Owing to the unconscious workings of the complex, they gradually idealized their colonizers, the Japanese and the Americans, concurrently hating and humiliating themselves to the degree that they turned their back on their past, hoping for a new life that had nothing to

do with who they were. In the vortex of the combination of the governments-led national economic development plans and of the governments-supported nationwide revival meetings, they came to believe that Protestantism could be a way to actualize their desires to be reborn and to be blessed – materially, physically, and spiritually.

II. Implications

The findings from the research offer four practical implications. First, the research suggested a psychohistorical view on the KPC's explosive growth with a particular focus on the traumatized psychological state of S. Koreans that gave birth to the cultural complex of inferiority in their unconsciousness. In doing so, it presented the cultural complex as one important reason for the growth, along with the other well-known reasons such as Protestantism as a new worldview, a link to nationalism, and a synthetic religion of Korean shamanism and Western Protestantism. The analysis also exaplains why or how S. Koreans coped with the despotism of their military governments for about thirty years while unbelievably diligently and intensely working hard, in the hope of building a nation like the U.S. – unconsciously, despising their weak nation and themselves.

Second, the research sheds new light on historical studies of S. Korea in the past century, bringing to the fore S. Korea's traumatic history of the past century – particularly, the psychological impacts of Japanese Imperialism on S. Koreans, the U.S. military government, the Korean War, and the Korean military governments. It also uncovered how the reciprocal relationship between the KPC and the Korean military governments contributed to the KPC's explosive growth, along with the contextual theology of prosperity/bliss that provided S. Koreans with a religious and psychological

way to run away from their past and themselves. The unveiling history implicates that the KPC's rapid growth in the past century was not a pure miracle made by God; instead, it was more likely to be growth well organized and planned by the governments and the KPC in cooperation under the rapidly changing circumstances that generated a great amount of anxiety and uncertainty.

Third, the research suggested the importance of taking into consideration the current psychological condition of S. Koreans on a collective level. The Jungian psychohistorical analysis claims that the past century was so traumatic to S. Koreans that the cultural complex of inferiority took shape in their unconsciousness and prevented their consciousness from working properly. Until now, they have neglected – or unconsciously have avoided facing – their traumatic histories, overly emphasizing their achievements – the "Miracle on the Han River" and the KPC's explosive growth. However, linking their traumatized psychological state with the two achievements, the analysis put stress on the necessity of taking care of their inner pains and scars.

Last, the research has one theological implication. Since the theology of prosperity/bliss and its counterpart, the theology of *Minjung*, emerged during in the 1960s, there has not been a new theology that takes their places to fit well with what S. Koreans need currently. Taking into consideration how the theology of prosperity/bliss psychologically pushed S. Koreans, who were suffering from the cultural complex of inferiority, to make a step forward while intentionally neglecting the causes of their suffering, it is important to realize that the KPC needs to develop a new contextual theology that can touch their hearts and guide them to a better stage of psychological health and spiritual growth. For doing so, it is imperative for the new theology to wrestle

with their cultural complex while still pushing them to compulsively go bigger, higher, and better.

III. Future Work

Although the research accomplished its aim to add one additional interpretation of the KPC's explosive growth in the past century with the use of the Jungian psychohistorical perspective, it has its own limitations that require further scholarly works in order for the study to become more comprehensive. For the sake of brevity, here the author lays out three works to be done in the future.

First, when it comes to how those traumatic events influenced the KPC's rapid growth during the past century, future works are needed that more carefully examine each of them, concentrating on what really happened, how traumatic it was and still is, and how Koreans reacted to it – fight, flight, or frozen. As Cumings mentions in *Korea's Place in the Sun*, it is still difficult to find historically impartial books that objectively cover the twentieth-century history of S. Korea. It is because the Korean military governments strictly prohibited historians and scholars from researching that period to conceal their illegal and inhumane acts against their people. However, this research suggests that under S. Koreans' lack of historical consciousness, there lies their cultural complex of inferiority hidden, implying not only that their governments restricted access to the modern history of Korea but also that they unconsciously avoid facing it in which they have to face their incapacity to protect themselves and their country in the past. Thus, a more comprehensive historical knowledge about how they suffered in each tragic event will help to make a clearer understanding of how their psychological state gradually

became unstable and fragile to an extent that the cultural complex of inferiority took roots in their cultural unconsciousness.

Second, the Jungian psychohistorical perspective points out that S. Koreans might still suffer from the cultural complex to a certain degree. Taking seriously that Koreans are likely to worship American culture such as its language, movies, and dramas to name a few, it might not be an exaggeration to say that they still idealize what is American and by contrast, despise what is Korean. Given that the complex originates in their traumatic experiences, it is important to find a way to collectively and properly treat their traumatized psychological state – not all of them, but many of them. For doing so, the lessons from Holocaust survivors are helpful. What they have done so far and will continue doing are summed up into three points: recognition, remembrance, and commemoration. They do not avoid their tragic past even though it is really difficult to face and accept it as what really happened to them. This contrasts sharply with S. Koreans who still seem to hesitate to actively handle their past like the issue of Korean comfort women – Korean sex-slaves for the Japanese army during World War II. Moreover, the survivors do not remain frozen, facing the horrible reality. They are continuously making efforts on a collective level to unearth more of the hidden tragic history and simultaneously the amazing human resilience that conquered the indescribable inhumanity in various ways. Lastly, they annually commemorate their tragic past. Psychiatrically taken, the three processes aim at helping them to safely re-experience, not only bodily but also psychologically, what they unconsciously repressed into their cultural unconsciousness in order to avoid those traumatic pains. The Jungian psychological perspective views the processes as a way to reintegrate their ‘separated’

cultural unconsciousness into collective unconsciousness – some Jungian scholars call this collective psychological process a 'collective individuation.'

Last, the concept of the cultural complex of inferiority working in the minds of S. Koreans suggests the necessity of future works that can link the complex to the current declining phenomenon of the KPC. Angella M. Park Son, associate professor of Psychology and Religion at Drew University, recently claims that the "moral failures of Christians"[391] in S. Korea like inconsistencies between their words and actions should be considered as one important reason for the decline, along with secularism.[392] Because Church leaders' unethical and corrupt behaviors have been too often exposed to the public, ironically those issues no longer draw attention from S. Koreans. It seems reasonable to consider true Son's argument that though Protestants astonishingly grew in number in S. Korea, their psychological and moral growth does not correspond to the numerical increase. Jung Eun Jang, a professor of Ewha Womans University, explains the same issue from Heinz Kohut's self-psychological perspective. He claims that the KPC's decline began when Korean Protestantism no longer played for them the role of *selfobject* – a psychologically ideal object that not only soothes their inner pains but also guide their psychological development through mirroring, idealizing, and twinship/we-ness experience.[393] Taken together, future works in psychology of religion need to explore how the complex brought about Korean Protestants' psychological immaturity on a

[391] Angella Son, "Crisis of Church Decline in and Revitalization of Korean Churches," *Pastoral Psychology* 67 (2018): 573.

[392] Ibid., 574.

[393] Jung Eun Jang, *Religious Experience and Self-Psychology: Korean Christianity and the 1907 Revival Movement* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 121-124. In addition, by 'mirroring' Kohut means others' affirmation of one's existence to satisfy one's narcissistic desire; by 'idealizing' he means others' proper role to become an object for one to imitate and idealize; by 'twinship/we-ness' he means a psychological state in which one feels oneness with others.

collective level and why the KPC's contextual theology of prosperity/bliss no longer seems to soothe S. Koreans in relation to the complex. To do so, it requires other psychological theories such as objects relation, self-psychology, trauma theories, and social psychologies.

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