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THE EMERGING CONCERN FOR TRANSCENDENT VALUES IN SPANISH AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

A study based upon an examination of the works of the leading philosophers of Mexico, Cuba, and Argentina, from colonial days to the present; with special reference to the contemporary philosophies of Antonio Caso, Jose Vasconcelos, Alejandro Korn and Francisco Romero.

by
Raymond A. Valenzuela

A Thesis
Submitted to the Division of Christian Interpretation in the Graduate School of Drew University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Madison, New Jersey

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Raymond A. Vclenzuela

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PREFACE

A very practical interest lies behind this investigation of Spanish American philosophy. Though born in Chile, the writer has spent all of his academic life from the age of eleven onward in the United States. Returning to Chile as a minister of the Methodist Church he found himself an almost complete stranger to the intellectual tradition of his native land, and of Spanish America.[1] At the same time he discovered, with disappointment and concern, that the Protestant movement in Spanish America, and particularly in Chile, has largely failed to gain the attention of intellectuals, or even a representative number of those who have finished secondary school. One of the basic reasons for this situation, he found, is that, by and large, Protestants have remained in ignorance of the cultural history of Spanish America, and have failed to relate themselves to its intellectual currents.[2]

It would seem clear that if the leaders of Protestantism are to reach the educated sector of the population of Spanish America, they must first become acquainted with the spiritual and cultural development of their respective countries. An adequate understanding of the philosophies which have been most prominent in Spanish America must be an essential part of that effort. Thus a personal and a professional interest have combined to suggest the subject of this inquiry. The ethical aspect of philosophy has been singled out for special attention because the ethical is the critical meeting point between religion and philosophy, as well as between ideology and practice.

Great difficulties have been encountered in this investigation, diffi-

culties which preclude the possibility of presenting what might, in any true sense, be called a definitive work. The first of these difficulties is the basic one of bibliography. There is as yet no general historical survey of, or bibliographical guide to Spanish American philosophy. The amazing resources of the New York Public Library, supplemented by those of Columbia University, provided this writer with an embarrassment of riches. Yet these libraries have significant gaps, lacking many important works from a number of countries. In recent years Cuba, Mexico, and Argentina have been reproducing the basic documents for the history of philosophy in each of these countries, and excellent historical surveys have been published. These documents and histories have become generally available to the major libraries, and are to be found in the ones mentioned above. But the basic documents for other countries are available only within each country. It is doubtful, therefore, whether any complete study of Spanish American philosophy can be produced without periods of research in each of the Spanish American nations. As Dr. José Gaos, of the University of Mexico, observes, "the mutual isolation of the countries of Spanish tongue, a fact as surprising as it is real, makes impossible for the present all pretense of exhaustive intellectual labor."[3].

Yet even if adequate documentation for each Spanish American country were available, the sheer bulk of past and present philosophical production makes it impossible to encompass it within the bounds of an academic dissertation. Bibliographical sources have multiplied in recent years. Summarizing five years of work as director of the philosophical section of the "Handbook of Latin American Studies", Dr. Risieri Frondizi states in the 1943 edition of the annual, "Since this section was initiated five years ago, every year more than one hundred publications have been listed, in

spite of the fact that works of small philosophic value and articles referring to the doctrines of other thinkers have been omitted." Since then production has increased rather than diminished. To be sure, many of these publications are in reviews and periodicals, but particularly in Spanish America such publications may not be disregarded since a large proportion of the works of the leading philosophers appears first in periodicals. Each of the published volumes of Francisco Romero, with one exception, for example, is a compilation of essays which have first appeared in various periodicals.

It has been necessary, therefore, to find ways of limiting the scope of the dissertation without abandoning the idea of a valid survey of the history of philosophy in Spanish America. Taking advantage of the accessibility as well as the adequacy of the sources available for Mexico, Cuba and Argentina, the attempt has been made to trace the evolution of thought up to the present century through the example of these countries. This has been supplemented by an exposition of certain trends and major figures in other countries. For the twentieth century, a brief general survey is presented, and then a more detailed study of four major figures: Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos, of Mexico, and Alejandro Korn and Francisco Romero of Argentina. The writer hopes that whatever may be lost in comprehensiveness by the selection of these three countries and the four major philosophers will be more than regained by the increase in depth and adequacy of treatment.

As far as possible this study centers attention on ethical theory, not only because of the special interest of the writer, but also as a way of limiting the scope of the report. The unity of life and thought, and

the unity of philosophical thought, however, renders it impossible narrowly to restrict consideration to one aspect of philosophical theory. A minimum of background historical information, and of reference to other aspects of philosophy, have been introduced, therefore, when this has been thought necessary to give the proper perspective to the presentation of ethical ideas. In the case of the four major figures treated in Part II, an attempt has been made to give a more comprehensive view of their philosophy, though still focusing interest on their ethical concepts.

Philosophical thought is not confined to academic treatises. This is particularly true in Spanish America, where men have seldom had the leisure to devote themselves exclusively to philosophy. It is to be found in the written works and addresses of statesmen, educators, poets, novelists, journalists, etc. This investigation, of necessity, and by design, has been limited almost exclusively to an examination of the works of men who are thought of primarily as philosophers, in the narrower sense of the term, though many of them have been active in other fields than philosophy. A broader study of the history of ideas in Spanish America, an inquiry in what is today being termed "view of the world" (weltanschaung) would have to include many other works not included in this investigation. The writer can affirm, however, as a broad generalization, though this is not the place to demonstrate it, that a broader inquiry would undoubtedly yield very similar results. Which is to say that philosophy in Spanish America has been both the reflection of the dominant spiritual attitudes and has helped to create those attitudes.

Consistent with the primary purpose of the investigation to obtain a better understanding of the development of ethical ideas in Spanish American

philosophy, the method followed in reporting the results of this inquiry has been primarily expository and historical, rather than critical. Evaluation and criticism, however, can hardly be avoided in a study of this kind, where the materials themselves raise critical, and in some cases, even acutely controversial issues. A particularly controversial question is that of the role played by the Roman Catholic Church in Spanish American culture. The author does not claim that he has been able to divest himself entirely of his Protestant Evangelical bias in judging that role, though he has tried not to let it influence his evaluations. Special care has been taken to document all adverse criticisms of the dominant Church from the writings of Spanish American philosophers themselves. In the case of the four major thinkers whose work is reviewed in Part II, the more comprehensive treatment of their work has made it possible to offer a more extensive criticism. Wherever brought to bear, the underlying critical assumptions of the writer are those of an existentialist, personalist, Evangelical Christian standpoint.

The writer wishes to acknowledge the help and encouragement received from his major professor, Dean Stanley R. Hopper, who has had the patience to review the work of many writers, whose work is virtually or completely unknown in this country, and who, in spite of not being acquainted with the field of Spanish American philosophy, helped the writer to bring the diffuse materials of this investigation into such focus as may have been achieved. The author also wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Alberto Rembao, distinguished Director of "La Nueva Democracia", of New York, for his gracious attention and helpfulness in discussing a number of problems related to this dissertation, and for the loan of a number of recent works

not yet available in the libraries.

A special word of gratitude must be reserved for the writer's wife, Mrs. Dorothy B. Valenzuela, without whose loving assistance and encouragement, in ways too numerous to recount, this study could not have been undertaken, much less completed; and for Arthur, David, Samuel and Alice, who have graciously deprived themselves of their father's company when they had a right to his companionship, in order that he might be able to devote himself to the work of this dissertation. A final word of gratitude must be expressed to the Board of Missions and Church Extension of the Methodist Church, whose financial assistance has made it possible to expend the time necessary to write this thesis.

INTRODUCTION

Authorities on Spanish American philosophy agree that no great original philosophy has yet appeared in Spanish America, comparable to the major systems of Western philosophy. Nevertheless, great progress has been made in philosophical studies. The period of purely slavish transmission of European philosophies is well past. Also past is the period characterized by the creative work of a few great pioneer thinkers, who, in the midst of other preoccupations, still found time to give themselves to philosophical reflection with a genuine sense of vocation. Today Spanish America is "philosophy conscious".[4] The teaching of philosophy in a number of universities has been brought to a degree of academic quality equal to these of any other university in the Western World. In the words of Professor Francisco Romero, generally recognized as one of the leading authorities on contemporary Spanish American philosophy, philosophical reflection "has been normalized." Though no great original philosophy has yet been produced, excellent philosophy is being written, and there is today the kind of "philosophical climate" from which a great and significant philosophy may emerge.[5]

Philosophy need not be original, however, to reflect the mind of a people, or to help create that mind. The dominant philosophy of a people is the reflective self-consciousness of that people. A particular philosophy may also become the world view of a people even if it is not the original creation of that people. Philosophy has fulfilled these roles in Spanish America in the past. A study of the leading trends of philosophical thought gives us an accurate clue to the dominant motifs of the culture prevailing in the various stages of Spanish American history. To understand

these trends, the better to comprehend the intellectual and spiritual development of Spanish America from colonial days to the present time is the primary purpose of this dissertation.

Philosophy in Spanish America has an ancient tradition. Professor Samuel Ramos in his "History of Philosophy in Mexico" (Historia de la Filosofía en México) begins his survey with a chapter devoted to the pre-colonial period. The Aztecs, he informs us, had a well defined cosmology, closely related to the study of astronomy by the priesthood. They "were monists, believing in the existence of a sole cause of which all others are manifestations." As for ethics: "In the Mexican culture there appear with all clarity a body of ethical norms which show a profound sentiment of human values."[6]. Attempts have been made in recent years, particularly in Mexico, to seek out these pre-Hispanic sources of culture, and to trace a continuity between the ancient culture and the present. As far as the history of philosophy, even as the story of successive world views, as contrasted with the history of general life attitudes, is concerned, however, it is permissible to disregard these attempts. Until these very recent attempts to recover contact with the ancient philosophies, reference to the Indian philosophies has been negligible in the philosophical writings of Spanish America. However their influence may have lingered in the attitudes and mores of the common people of Indian background, there is no academic or literary continuity between the pre-colonial concepts and those which prevailed after the conquest by Spain.

The Spanish conquest meant the deliberate suppression of the indigenous cultures and religions and their replacement with Spanish culture and Roman Catholicism. This attempt did not altogether succeed in the life of the

people. In the religious area, says Guillermo Francovich, the historian of philosophy in Bolivia and President of the University of Sucre, "primitive beliefs entered the field of Catholic superstitions." But Spain did succeed in transplanting its cultural life to the new world and making it the academic, culture of the Spanish colonies. Articulate Spanish American thought became a phase of the thought life of Spain. Later Spanish influence was replaced by French and other European influences. The influence of the pre-colonial cultures has not played a part in the history of philosophy to the present time. Whether it will do so or not in the future, is an open question, in view of the effort we have mentioned, particularly active in Mexico, to reestablish a sense of continuity with the pre-Hispanic culture. But for the purposes of this dissertation, the history of philosophy in Spanish America can be said to begin with the Spanish conquest.

The movement of Spanish American philosophy from colonial times to the present may be thought of as a four act drama played on the stage of history. The first act of this drama deals with the introduction of Spanish philosophy, a reformulation of medieval scholasticism, into all the dominions of His Spanish Majesty in the Americas; the dominance of this, the official philosophy of a theocratic state, in all areas of life and thought in the colonies; and the decline of its vitality as its propositions became sterile formulae instead of the rationale of a living faith.

The second act of this drama witnesses the transition from colonial scholasticism to positivism, the philosophy which became dominant by the middle of the nineteenth century. There are two phases in this transition. The first of these, which falls in the latter part of the eighteenth century, concerns the first attempts to replace the philosophy of scholasticism with

modern philosophies while retaining the scholastic theology and morals--an attempt known as eclecticism. By stressing freedom of thought in matters of reason, if not of faith, eclecticism helped to destroy the scholastic synthesis and thereby set the stage for the next scene in the transition from scholasticism to positivism, which saw the triumphal impact of various forms of modern philosophy. In this second stage, which coincides with the revolutionary movements for political independence from the Spanish Crown and extends through the early years of the new republics (roughly 1810 to 1850), a romantic interest in social and political philosophy comes to the center of the stage. This romanticism was more concerned to destroy than it was to construct. Academic philosophy was disrupted during the new revolutionary turmoil. When it reappeared in secularized schools it was to devote itself predominantly to the exposition of sensationalist psychology. In this phase, romantic and rationalist philosophies mingle, not in conflict but in confusion. Both, however, agree in rejecting scholastic theology as well as philosophy, and in the attempt to establish a "lay" morality.

The third act deals with the hegemony of positivism. After the negativism which characterized the revolutionary period men felt the need for a new constructive, unifying pattern of thought. A number of factors combined to make positivism the acceptable new pattern. In the first place, it was the dominant philosophy of Europe in the nineteenth century, and the young nations, freed from the influence of Spanish medievalism turned to a cultural dependence on the rest of Europe, chiefly France and England. But more than a borrowed philosophy, positivism was felt to answer the needs of the hour. People were still reacting against the colonial ideology as

continued in Roman Catholic teaching; positivism offered a scheme in which all questions were answered on the basis of "science", without recourse to theology. They were concerned for social, economic, and political progress; positivism offered them a faith in evolutionary progress as a part of the process of nature itself. This new philosophy came to have almost as complete an acceptance in intellectual circles as scholasticism had had in colonial days. In some countries, Mexico outstandingly, it virtually became the official philosophy of the government.

The fourth act of this drama is still being enacted. It is a new era of transition which began in the early part of the present century with the rejection of positivism by a number of thinkers who soon became the leading thinkers in their respective countries. This rejection also responded to European influences, but it was also felt as something personal, not merely imitative. The revolt came with the discovery of the incapacity of positivism to answer the deeper questions, needs, and longings of man, and of the error of its dogmatic mechanism as demonstrated by the newer physics. Positivism had rejected metaphysics as something outside of the field of scientific knowledge, and hence as outside of the practical concern of man. But questions about the ultimates of life and reality could not be stilled indefinitely, nor could men be satisfied with a purely mechanical view of human aspirations. When new currents of thought stemming from Europe, emphasizing the indeterminism present in the physical world, the irrationality of human thought and existence, and man's spiritual nature began to be disseminated, the sway of positivism was rather quickly broken.

As yet no one new philosophy has become dominant in present day Spanish America. Roman Catholic philosophy has regained influence, in large measure,

because of the high academic quality of the work of present day Catholic philosophers, most of them neo-Thomists. But most of today's philosophers still reject the philosophy of the dominant church and seek to formulate a non-religious ideology. Many thinkers are finding inspiration in the fertile field of contemporary German philosophy. French existentialism is receiving its share of attention. But it cannot truly be said that a new unified view has emerged. What is discernible after the rejection of positivism is a new CONCERN FOR TRANSCENDENT VALUES. It is from this emerging concern that we have taken the title of the present study.

The use of this dramatic analogy is unquestionably subject to the dangers of over-simplification. It is no worse in this respect than the comparison employed by the late Professor E. S. Brightman of Boston University, one of the few ranking North American philosophers who has taken a serious interest in Spanish American philosophy. Dr. Brightman employs the analogy of the Hegelian dialectic. Scholasticism is posited as the thesis; positivism is the antithesis. The thesis, he suggests, is "emerging in our day in the form of idealistic and personalistic thought."[7] The conclusions to be drawn from this analogy are in agreement with those we have set forth in the analogy of the historical drama. Yet neither analogy can suggest the diversity present in Spanish American thought since colonial times. The first period, the scholastic era, is marked by great uniformity, stemming from the common influence of the official and exclusive philosophy, scholasticism. With independence, however, the monolithic uniformity of the colonial period comes to an end. We may compare the course of Spanish American philosophy to a great stream which suddenly divides into many streams, each one of which now has its own twists and

turns which at times widely separates it from the others. On the whole, however, each of these new streams remains parallel to the others as they make their way to the sea. In the same way the dominant trends of thought in the various countries follows the same direction, in spite of diversities. This will become apparent in the examination of the thought of the three Spanish American countries which we have chosen as representative of the movement of philosophical thought in Spanish America, Mexico, Cuba, and Argentina.

This study roughly follows the outline suggested by the dramatic analogy which we have employed above. It has been divided into two parts. Part I comprises the history of Spanish American philosophy beginning with colonial days through the end of the positivist era at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It includes the following chapters: Chapter I, The Scholastic Era: Chapter II, From Scholasticism to Positivism, an Era of Transition: and Chapter III, The Positivist Era.

Part II deals with the contemporary period and includes five chapters. Chapter IV, Post-Positivism in Contemporary Spanish American Philosophy, contains a survey of the main trends and figures in post-positivist philosophy. The following chapters contain a more complete analysis of four thinkers generally considered the most outstanding Spanish American philosophers of the present century: Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos, of Mexico, and Alejandro Korn and Francisco Romero, of Argentina. Introductory summaries have been inserted at the beginning of each chapter of Part I in order to facilitate the task of the reader who may be introduced to many entirely unfamiliar figures, and to highlight the main course of the movement of thought. This has not been considered necessary for Part II.

As stated in the preface, an effort has been made throughout to give special attention to the study of ethical thought. The writer's personal interest has been the main factor behind this decision. It may be well to point out, however, that this choice of the ethical for special reference is not the choice of a secondary feature of Spanish American philosophy. Rather, the ethical may be considered the most central concern of Spanish American philosophers. The attitude of Professor Risieri Frondizi, of Argentina, may be taken as typical. "That philosophy which does not have its roots in an ethical concern and consciousness ends by converting itself into a game of wits, or an intellectual juggling act," declares Frondizi.[8] We may be confident that in undertaking this study of the development of Spanish American philosophy, and in selecting the ethical aspect of this philosophy for special consideration we shall enter into the inmost thoughts and deepest aspirations of the recognized leaders of thought in the lands South of the Rio Grande.

Footnotes

Preface and Introduction

1. The term "Spanish America" has been used throughout this study to designate the countries of the Western Hemisphere which were colonized by Spain, and which employ the Spanish language. No effort has been made to include Brazil in this inquiry. In the few references where the term "Latin America" has been employed by the author, this means that Brazil is also consciously included in the reference.

2. The work of the President John A. Mackay during the years in which he was a missionary in Latin America; of Dr. George P. Howard, often referred to as the "evangelist to the intellectuals", (now retired); of Dr. Gonzalo Baez-Camargo, of Mexico, who under the pseudonym of Pedro Gringoire has been director of the outstanding philosophical journal "Luminar", and is recognized as one of Mexico's leading intellectuals; and the publication "La Nueva Democracia," Dr. Alberto Rembao, Director, (sponsored by the Committee for Cooperation in Latin America,) must be mentioned as outstanding exceptions to this generalization. Fortunately, the capacity of Protestant nationals in South America to interpret their message to the intellectuals is significantly increasing year by year.

3. Gaos, José, "El Pensamiento Hispano Americano." Jornadas 12. México. El Colegio de México, 1944. p. 41.

4. Cf. Brightman, Edgar S., "South of the Border", reprint from Religion in Life, Spring, 1946. p. 3.

5. This analysis follows the indications of Professor Romero. Cf. article on Enrique José Varona, in Filósofos y Problemas. Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1947. pp 9-17.

6. Ramos, Samuel, Historia de la Filosofía en México, México. Imprenta Universitaria, 1943. pp. 14,16.

7. Brightman, op. cit., p. 6.

8. Frondizi, Risieri, "Panorama de la Filosofía Latinoamericana Contemporánea", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. I, No. 2. Buenos Aires, 1944.

CHAPTER I

THE SCHOLASTIC ERA

INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY

The earliest stage in the history of philosophy in Spanish America coincides with the colonial era, and extends from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth. This period may be called "The Scholastic Era" because of the prevalence of scholastic philosophy in all the universities and in the very patterns of colonial life.

From such a dating it can be seen that scholasticism persisted as the dominant philosophy in Spanish America long after its passing in Western Europe. Spain, however, was a notable exception. Scholasticism came to Spain in the late fifteenth century and became the dominant philosophy there at the very time of its disappearance in the rest of Europe. The Spanish colonies, in complete cultural as well as political dependence upon the mother country only reflect the condition prevailing in Spain.

Engaged in an 800 year struggle against the Muslim Moors, Spain had failed to enter into the intellectual aspects of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance. She became vitally aware of both the Medieval and the Renaissance philosophies after the final defeat of the Moors in 1492; but it was the Medieval philosophy which prevailed. The transcendentalism of the Middle Ages was better suited to a nation whose religious spirit had been forged and sharpened in the heat of struggle for its faith. Thus it

was that in the sixteenth century Spain entered creatively into the medieval culture. The philosophy of the Schoolmen was reconsidered and restated by scholars such as Vitoria, Suarez, and Molina. The mysticism of the Middle Ages received new expression with St. Theresa of Avila and St. John of the Cross. These intellectual and mystical movements are expressions of one of the most intense periods in the religious history of mankind. The zeal for the conversion of the heathen, which became one of the basic motives in the great colonizing efforts of the nation is another. This was the era of Spain's "golden age" in every realm of activity; in literature, art exploration, military achievement. In this period, Spain, which had born the brunt of the defense of Christendom against the Moslems assumed the defense of Catholicism against modernism and the Reformation. As a reward, the papacy granted the Crown of Spain the right of ecclesiastical appointment. Spain became, in effect, a Church-State, and the prevailing scholastic theology was made the basis not only of religious belief but also of the juridical procedures of the state, even to the most minute regulations.

The ethics of scholasticism embody the traditional standards of the Hebrew-Christian heritage, attached to a foundation of Thomistic-Aristotelian rationalism. In this system, all life is ordered on the principle that the chief end of man is that of an eternal happiness which can only be found in God. Eternal happiness is synonymous with the salvation of the soul. But the soul's eternal happiness, in theological dogma and practice, is also held to be dependent on participation on the sacramental means of grace assigned exclusively to the Church, and on the submission to the authority of the Church on all matters of doctrine and morals.

The Spanish Church-State developed the Inquisition on the theory that it is better to control men's minds even through punishment of their bodies, rather than to risk the eternal damnation of souls which is the inevitable consequence of heresy and disobedience. For the sake of men's eternal happiness, therefore, the Church-State felt justified in regulating all life in conformity with standards which true to scholastic philosophy it believed to be part, both of the supernatural order revealed in scripture, and of the natural order disclosed to the natural reason.

This theocratic scholastic structure was transplanted bodily to the colonies. If anything, it was intensified because of the greater isolation of the colonies from other cultures. But its very success was ultimately to prove its undoing. Convinced of the absolute rationality and correctness of the scholastic principles, and of the imperfectible expression which these had received in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and the other accepted exponents of scholasticism, students of theology and philosophy were condemned to the memorization and repetition of these principles. With the rational ordering of all thought and expression under the watchful eye of the Inquisition, life became more and more circumscribed, sterile, and inert. What had once been glowing convictions became mere traditional beliefs. The marks of religion became more and more those of conformity to ritual and to doctrine rather than those of life. Those who were powerful and those who were too insignificant to be noticed were permitted to evade the moral regulations with impunity. With the decline in the fires of devotion, efforts to christianize the native populations effectively were relaxed and a blend of pagan-christian superstitions were allowed to flourish.

The scholastic structure was unchallenged as long as the soundness and adequacy of its all-encompassing philosophy was not questioned. But with the questioning of its underlying principles, particularly its authority to regiment all thought, there began the gradual crumbling of the power of scholasticism, which is to say of the authority of the Roman Catholic Church in the lands of Spanish America.

A. THE INFLUENCE OF SPAIN

1. The Dominance of Scholasticism in Spain

The study of philosophy in Spanish America begins with the foundation of schools for higher education in the colonies established by the Spanish Crown. The philosophy taught in these schools during the colonial period was Scholasticism, the dominant philosophy of Spain. The history of philosophy in Spanish America during the colonial era is the history of the influence of Spain, virtually a chapter in Spanish philosophy.

Scholasticism as introduced by Spain, however, was no mere academic philosophy. It was the system of thought on which the government itself and every aspect of life was organized. The introduction of Scholasticism can thus be said to ante-date the foundation of even the earliest universities and to coincide with the conquest itself. The entire colonial period, dating from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth can therefore be called "The Scholastic Era."

Scholasticism is usually considered the philosophy of the Middle Ages. Its great century is the thirteenth; its greatest exponent, St. Thomas Aquinas, its center, Paris. The decline of scholasticism begins with the

challenge to the Summa initiated by Duns Scotus. Realism gives way before nominalism in the fourteenth century under the criticism of William of Occam. In the fifteenth century, Italy, under the spell of rediscovered classical Greek culture, turns to Plato, and "humanism", with Nicolas of Cusa, Ficinus, and Pico della Mirandola as the leaders of the new thought. In France, Montaigne revives the skepticism of Pyrrho in his celebrated essays. The sixteenth century ushers in the Protestant Reformation.

In spite of the challenge of the Renaissance to the very spirit of Scholasticism, the systems of the schoolmen linger on in their later forms as the academic philosophy of Europe, devitalized, until challenged and displaced by the "modern" philosophy inaugurated by Descartes. This philosophical revolution of the seventeenth century destroys the medieval synthesis of reason and revealed truth, in favor of the former. With the eighteenth century we come to the heydey of the "age of reason", the "century of lights". Parallel to and related to the philosophical revolution, which it antedates in some respects, is the scientific revolution wrought by Copernicus, Galileo, Francis Bacon and others, and culminating in the work of Newton in the eighteenth century.

Such a review, though cursory, reveals that "the Scholastic Era" which we have dated as extending from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth is truly a cultural anachronism.[1.] The reason for this great exception to the prevailing cultural trends of the western world lies in the absolute cultural and political dependence of the colonies upon Spain, the nation that stubbornly refused to enter into the triumphant march of modernism. An analysis of the relation of Spain

to the culture of the western world during the period of the conquest and colonial dominion of America sheds great light on the nature of the scholastic era in Spanish America.

The role of Spain is unique in the intellectual and spiritual history of Europe. Even though Averroes, of Arabian Córdova in the Iberian Peninsula served as one of the chief interpreters of Aristotle to medieval Christendom, the Spanish nation, at the time warring with the Moors,[2] did not participate in the medieval formulations of scholasticism. The one significant exception is Raymond Lull, the apostle to the Moslems. Warring Spain did not have the leisure for philosophical reflection. It met the challenge of Islam, not with ideas, but with the sword. In doing so it created a culture distinct from that of the rest of Europe. Angel Ganivet, brilliant interpreter of the mind and heart of Spain, writes in his "Ideario Español":

> "Spain was the nation which created the form of Christianity most personal and original, in so far as originality is possible within Christianity. The most original and fruitful creation of our religious spirit dates from the Moorish invasion. While in the schools of Europe, Christian philosophy was being beaten out into sterile and often ridiculous discussions, in our land it was being transformed into unending warfare. And as the truth was not born among pens and ink-wells, but amid the clang of arms and boiling blood, it is not to be found in library volumes but in our popular war poetry. Our theological and philosophical Summa is in our Romancero."[3]

In the heat of battle the religious temper of the Spanish people became more intense; devotion to the Roman Catholic tradition became synonymous with patriotism.[4]

At the end of the wars with the Moors Spain first came into vital contact with the Renaissance. A few prominent thinkers and writers were cap-

tured by the spirit of the Renaissance,[5] but the nation as a whole rejected it. The Renaissance humanism and this-worldliness were found to be incompatible with the prevailing religious zeal, the transcendentalist mood. With the Renaissance Spain rejected the Reformation, which reached the Iberian Peninsula in the Erasmian rather than the Lutheran form -- though the influence of Erasmus was not without significance, especially among the Franciscan. In any event, the Reformation failed to receive an impartial hearing from the people, accustomed to react with violence and passion against all that which was foreign to their religious tradition.[6]

But the challenge of the Renaissance and the Reformation could not be met with violence and passion alone. It had to be met with ideas. And so at the same time that it turned its back on the Renaissance, Spain began a creative reassimilation of the medieval philosophy, scholasticism. The reformulation of scholasticism became the great philosophical task of the sixteenth century. A brilliant line of philosophers, among whom stand out such names as Francisco de Vitoria (1473-1546) Luis de Molina (1535-1610), and Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) helped to write a new chapter in the history of the philosophy of the schoolmen, and in the process furnished Spain with the rationale for its rejection of the Renaissance and Reformation. Scholasticism became the official philosophy of Spain, the very basis of its organization.

Passion and intellect went together, however, in this recreation of medievalism. Mysticism reached new heights in St. John of the Cross and St. Theresa of Avila, while in the Company of Jesus a new order of remark-

able discipline and zeal emerged, to lead the Counter-Reformation throughout Europe. The most brilliant neo-scholastic philosophers came from the Jesuit order.

Dr. José Gaos, leading Spanish philosopher now teaching at the University of Mexico, has analyzed the development which we have been describing with unusual precision:

> "Spain had assumed a unique position in medieval christendom. While the center (of Europe) cooperated in the total collective task, that of developing Christianity as a principle of life, through scholastic theology and philosophy and mysticism, in which thought was directed to the same objects as life itself, the transcendent objects par excellence, to Spain fell the defense of Christianity toward the outside, against Islam. The participation of Spain in medieval scholasticism and mysticism is practically reduced to the great but solitary name of Lull. In return, Spain triumphed completely, definitively over Islam. But while she defended it (from attack)[7]. from the outside Christianity was decomposing internally. And just at the time when Spain was triumphing totally, definitively over Islam, the decomposition became decisively apparent. Spain had begun to incorporate modernism unto itself, incorporating itself in modernism. Also in the world of thought, she began to participate in Erasmianism, humanism, the philosophy of the Renaissance. But Spain did an about-face and assumed the defense, if not of Christianity, then of Roman Catholicism, within the European community; closing itself to modernism. An abortion, then, (took place) of that double incorporation. Likewise in the world of thought, blocked (colmado-literally, filled to the brim) with the failure to enter and to share in the creation of the modern sciences; yet (there took place) a natural and compensatory restoration of scholasticism and mysticism. Spain took these to well known summas or new heights, so that this portion of its thought is its greatest contribution to universal thought."[8].

The Argentine writer José Ingenieros (1877-1925) has described the same development in the following words:

> "Scholasticism, whose passing coincided in Europe with the Reformation, came to Spain as a counter-Reformation and took the character of catholic theology of Thomist base,

culminating with the illustrious Jesuit, Francisco Suárez. At the beginning this tendency was balanced by the genial Valencia, Luis Vives, and by other Erasmists, reformers and independents, but these were defeated. Orthodox Spain closed its doors to the scientific and philosophical renaissance, more than satisified with the dawn of its magnificent literary golden age."[9]

The sixteenth century became the golden age of Spain in every respect; in politics, philosophy, art, letters, exploration and colonization. The fierce energy of Spain during this period is one of the miracles of modern history. Argentina's Alejandro Korn (1860-1936) suggests that there is more than mere coincidence in the simultaneous fervent interest in explorations and conquests and the Spanish rejection of the Renaissance and Reformation. In Spain the craving for new experiences, so characteristic of Renaissance Europe, was satisfied in the discoveries of the explorers. Writes Korn, "If its navigators and explorers contributed, and in no small scale to satisfy the cupiditas rerum novarum, in the domain of ideas the Spanish people showed themselves little inclined toward novelty."[10] While true in the sense that the Spanish people showed little taste for heterodoxy, this statement would have to be modified by the recognition that scholasticism came to Spain with all the force of something new, all the more prized because of its enthusiastic acceptance by the Church as expressing the very essence of that Christianity, so long intensely felt and passionately defended.

2. Scholasticism as the Philosophy of the Spanish Empire, a Church-State

The strength of scholasticism in Spain and its colonies in America cannot be understood apart from the peculiar relationship between church and state which was established in the sixteenth century. As a reward for

its struggles on behalf of Christendom against the Moors, and in recognition of the intense Catholicism of its monarchs, the Papacy conceded the Spanish Crown the right of ecclesiastical patronage. The practical effect of this measure was to make the King the head of the Church of Spain, and all distinction between church and state was erased. A contemporary Spanish historian, Fernando de los Ríos states that the idea of complete identification of church and state "is the controlling idea of the church-state of Spain in the sixteenth century." After quoting this statement Dr. John Mackay adds:

> "The Roman Church was nationalized in the country, and became fused with the state in such a way that the juridical distinction between church and state disappeared. The throne and the altar, patriotism and religion became identified. As a logical consequence no minorities nor heretics could be tolerated within the borders of the state. The Spanish monarchs became priest-kings as the Egyptian Pharoahs had been. Ferdinand sought and was given the title of "Patriarch of the Indies'".[11].

With scholastic philosophy as the official philosophy of this church-state, adherence to this philosophy became a badge of patriotism and a sign of devotion to the King as well as to God. Hence the colonies felt the influence of scholasticism even before the founding of the first chairs of philosophy in the colonial schools and universities. Far more than a "school" philosophy, scholasticism inspired the very laws and procedures of the Spanish theocratic state. Alejandro Korn, in his brilliant and penetrating study of philosophical influences in Argentina, "Influencias Filosóficas en la Evolución Nacional", describes and illustrates this process in a passage which is worth quoting from in some detail:

> "As in the embryonic state of social organization, religion morality and law are here confused and undifferentiated. The

distinctions between the ethical concept and the juridical one do not exist for the legislator, who, interpreting a metaphysical doctrine, considers himself authorized to convert into law whatever he judges rational or right in order to subordinate human acts to a transcendent objective...."

"The state absorbed all and subjected everyone; with jealous suspicion it left no room for any spontaneous effort or even thought; within its system there was no room for individual initiative nor for collective action: no one could hold his own right before the authority of the superiors....The first concern of the legislation of the Indies is to maintain colonial society subjected to Catholic dogma. The entire first book of the Recopilación[12]. is given to fixing the religious bases of government and regulating worship, without omitting minor details, nor retreating before the elucidation of theological questions. The first law which, with intentional solemnity heads the code, in its ordaining clause says with precise finality:

> 'And we order all nations and Spaniards and whatever other Christians of various provinces and nations, residents or inhabitants in such aforesaid kingdoms and dominions, isles and territories of ours, who regenerated by the holy sacrament of baptism should have received the holy faith, that they firmly believe and simply confess the mystery of the most Holy Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, three persons and only one true God, the articles of Holy Faith and all that the Holy Mother Roman Catholic Church teaches, and if with obstinate and pertinacious spirit they err and die hardened not to love and believe what the Holy Mother Church holds and teaches, they may be punished with the penalties imposed by law, according to and in the cases in which therein contained.'"[13].

The logical outcome of such concepts is the establishment of a thought police and it was only natural that the Holy Office should be established in the colonies of His Spanish Majesty, along with the first governments and churches, to stand guard against the eruption of any improper ideas. The Inquisition became a characteristic feature of colonial society as well as of the mother country. Actually, however, the Inquisition was hardly needed in the face of the willing conformity of the colonists. As Korn points out:

> "In this case the organ created the function; in the quiet atmosphere of the colonies heresies did not prosper, and the tribunal, to justify its remunerated existence, had to limit itself to provoking conflicts with all authorities, ecclesiastical and lay, molesting members of the religious orders, punishing almost unconscious oaths and imprecations, delighted if some hysterical fanatical woman or some wandering stranger--English or Dutch--gave it occasion for a modest auto de fe."[14]

To be sure, neither the degree of rigidity in conformity nor the strictness of the Holy Office was uniform throughout the colonial period. Controls were considerably relaxed in the eighteenth century. But to a very high degree indeed the ideal of a rigid orthodoxy was achieved for centuries in the vast dominions of the King of Spain.

Unfortunately, other examples of scholastic legislation did not fare so well. Stemming from abstract theological considerations countless regulations were enacted for the purpose of protecting the native populations and to safeguard the morality of colonial life. Juan Augustin García of Argentina, author of the authoritative "La Ciudad Indiana," a description of colonial life, describes the inefficacy of these provisions:

> "The laws in theory were admirable for their charitable kindness, the royal decrees recommended good treatment, the education and conversion of the Indians. But unfortunately in all that refers to Spanish America the study of the written law is the least important and illustrative...One decree follows another without the assuaging of a single hurt or the reparation of a single wrong."[15]

The story of the exploitation of the Indians by the Spaniards is indeed a dark one, only partly relieved by the kindness of a few priests such as Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas "The Protector of the Indians." The cruelty and avariciousness of the conquerors frustrated one of the basic ideals of the conquest, that of truly converting the Indians to the Christian faith.[16]

This hiatus between theory and practice is by no means limited to Spanish colonialism, and in fairness cannot be traced to the teachers of scholasticism, many of whom were among the most ardent defenders and protectors of the Indians. But the failure of Spain to implement its lofty moral concepts in its relations with the native populations is worth noting at this point, because the later reaction against Spain makes a great deal of this failure and does not spare the theories in its criticism of the practices. Ingenieros, one of the bitterest critics of scholastic Spain and its colonial rule says ironically, "What was lacking in the Spanish conquest was morality, though there were friars galore and more than enough catechisms."[17]. Even today the colonial record of Spain is a live issue, and writers take sides vehemently for or against Spain, in an approval or disapproval which usually stands in direct relation to their attitude toward the Roman Catholic Church, its dogmas, and scholastic philosophy.

B. SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES OF SPAIN

1. The Teaching of Scholastic Philosophy in Colonial Universities

The foundations of the earliest schools for higher learning, and the introduction of teaching of scholastic philosophy in Spanish America was the work of the religious orders, "the cultural arms of the Empire."[18]. The principal orders in colonial Spanish America were the Franciscans, the Dominicans, the Augustinians, and the Jesuits. The most important teachers at first were the Dominicans and Augustinians, who dominated the teaching of theology and philosophy in the earliest period of the colonial universities. The Jesuits came later, but soon gained ascendancy over all the other orders. "The Company," writes the director of the philosophy studies section

of the Pan-American Union, Anibal Sánchez Reulet, "as the most modern vigorous order, ended by imposing an almost absolute cultural dominion whose heyday coincided with their expulsion."[19]. (in 1767). The Franciscan fathers took over from the Jesuits in a number of universities at that time, though they had not been so prominent as a teaching order. In the teaching of scholasticism, Dominicans and Augustinians taught by the texts of St. Thomas Aquinas, the latter often introducing slight modifications or additions inspired in St. Augustine. The Franciscans remained faithful to their greatest scholastic, Duns Scotus. The Jesuits guided themselves by the works of Francisco Suarez and others of their own order, but were more agile in combining references to other philosophers, including many of the moderns.

The first teacher of Scholasticism in the New World was Fr. Alonso de la Veracruz, (1504-1584), Fr. Alonso was born in Spain, and attended the University of Salamanca, where as a disciple of Vitoria, he received a thorough scholastic training. He came to Mexico in 1536, where he was received into the Augustinian order, and began the exposition of St. Thomas in 1537 in the Augustinian's school. In 1551 the Royal Pontifical University of Mexico was chartered, and when classes began Fr. Alonso becamethe first teacher of philosophy in the new University, continuing until his death in 1584. Fr. Alonso published three philosophical treatises: the "Recognitio Summularum," (1553), atreatise on logic; the "Dialectica Resolutio," (1554); and a "Physica Speculatio", a commentary on Aristotle's "De Anima". These works achieved the distinction of being reprinted in a number of European editions. Though not an original thinker, Fr. Alonso is remembered as a most able expositor of the great tradition of scholasticism, "a most faith-

ful disciple of the Thomist school of Salamanca."[21].

Very few of the colonial teachers of scholasticism are remembered today. Fr. Bartolomé de Ledesma, a Dominican, succeeded Fr. Alonso in the University of Mexico, but soon left to teach in the University of San Marcos, in Lima. Fr. Tomás Mercado excelled as a Greek scholar in the University of Mexico and prepared an excellent, though not complete, translation of Aristotles Logic. (1571). He became a great authority on the Scholastics, particularly noted for his commentaries on the philosophy of Pedro de Fonseca, (known as Pedro Hispano) the great teacher of the University of Coimbrá. Another teacher was the Jesuit, Fr. Antonio Rubio, who in 1688 published a commentary on Aristotle's Logic under the title "Logica Mexicana".[22]. Though there was nothing particularly Mexican about it, it was deemed worthy to become a text in the University of Alcalá in Spain.

2. Scholastic Ethics and the Holy Office.

As long as the teachers of philosophy in the colonial universities conceived it as their function to act simply as transmitters of the principles developed by St. Thomas and the great scholastics, there was little possibility that any of them should seek to innovate in any respect. The ethical ideas taught in the colonial era, therefore, were those typical of the scholastic philosophy. It is not necessary in this study to enter into a detailed description of scholastic ethics as such, since there is nothing peculiar to Spanish America in them. What is important to note, however, is the relation between the scholastic ethic and the development and procedures of the church-state as has been already described in the first part

of this chapter. For in Spanish American colonial society the logic of scholasticism was carried to its greatest practical extremes.

Scholastic ethics, as it is developed pre-eminently by St. Thomas Aquinas, is a rationalization of the concepts derived from the Hebrew-Christian revelation, with the aid of the philosophy of Aristotle. This rationalization is developed in such a way as to make the Aristotelian ontology primary and basic, with the Christian concepts accomodated to Aristotelianism. Beginning with the abstract notion of being, posited as a necessity of the reason, St. Thomas arrives at the definition of God alone as pure being, pure essence, (actus purus) and perfection. Being is identified with the good, and the good with that which is desirable. Since God alone is pure Being, and the summum bonum, it follows that God alone is supremely desirable. Every agent has to act according to an end. Considered immanently, the end of man is happiness, but since happiness cannot be found except in that which is supremely desirable, it follows that happiness can be found only in God. "Man only finds his end and the perfection of his being in the eternal possession of the Being of God."[23].

The significance of these concepts for Spanish America is that they were made the rational justification for the institution of the Holy Office. The Roman Church conceived of itself as the necessary intermediary in the movement of the soul toward God. Not only were the sacraments administered exclusively by the church, thought indispensable for the achievement of the highest good (eternal happiness in union with God), obedience to the Church as interpreter of the doctrines essential for the seeking of this highest good was also deemed necessary. Since heresy and disobedience were believed to endanger the chances of man's eternal happiness in God, it was

thought better to take all necessary steps to enforce the most drastic sanctions in order to ward off this danger. The conclusion was, therefore, it is better to regulate men's thoughts, even to the point of sacrificing their bodies, if need be, rather than to risk the chance of their not reaching the highest good, the salvation of the soul.[24] There is no doubt that the Inquisition was accepted as a necessary and useful institution by the vast majority of the people of Spain and the Americas until the time came when they began to question the principles on which it was based.

3. The Decline of Colonial Scholasticism

The vitality of scholasticism could not last indefinitely once the task of creative assimilation was completed and its teaching had become a routine. Revived for a time by the vigour of the Jesuit order it soon lapsed into a deadly and monotonous repetition, in which the main task of the students of philosophy wasthe memorization of the propositions stated by the great schoolmen. The seventeenth century became the age of impregnable but completely sterile orthodoxy. Neither teachers nor students dreamed of doubting the propositions, nor did they think they could improve on their expression; nothing was left but to learn them in as letter perfect a form as possible. An interesting testimony of the way in which the study of philosophy became a memory exercise has come to us in the annals of the University of Mexico. The account refers to three famous seventeenth century scholars, beginning with Don Pedro de Paz y Vasconcelos, a famous blind scholar:

> "He learned everything by ear; but with such perfection that given the opportunity he quoted authors, places, and even pages, and in contest won a chair of philosophy...Don Pedro de la Barreda promised and accomplished (the feat) of saying by memory any text

> which he might be asked for in all of canonical and civil law; giving the reasons for affirming and doubting the proposed text; or arguing impromptu against any conclusion which might be proposed to him....Fray Francisco Naranjo, before a vast audience, asked to be assigned texts in all of the Summa Tehologiae of St. Thomas; and having drawn by chance art. 5 of the a. 71 of the 1st 2. repeated it word for word (thought it is not short)[25] and commented on it verbo ad verbum, and afterward drew eight questions from it, on which he spoke with great erudition and mastery for the space of two hours. On another occasion he publicly proposed 154 points in the Master of Sentences, among which any four might be selected, on which he agreed to dictate to four amanuenses at one time."[26]

We can infer from the records which have come to us that the most celebrated teachers of this time were those who had the most prodigious memories.[27]

Dr. Sánchez Reulet, in common with most historians of scholasticism in Spanish America, attributes the decline of scholasticism in Spanish America to the rigidity which followed once it was considered a perfected system.

> "The living movement of the sixteenth century was converted by degrees into motionless inertia. Undoubtedly, the fact that the atmosphere of liberty was gradually stifled during the reign of Philip II contributed to this end, and the creative impulse was replaced by a rigid factory of ideas and beliefs. Intellectual orthodoxy prevented all metaphysical boldness, above all that greatest audacity of the seventeenth century, that man might find in himself and in his reason the first certainty and the ultimate security."[28. 29.]

Sanchez Reulet makes a brilliant observation when he suggests a direct connection between the dominance of this rigid scholasticism and the outbreak of the most extreme forms of the baroque in architecture, the arts and literature during this period.

> "All intellectual activity immobilized by the narrow prison of an official doctrine, the only outlet remaining was the baroque contortion of these same ideas. Thus may be explained the extraordinary development of the baroque in Spain. But the

> sincere attitudes were forms of desperation; stoic resignation, the skeptical complaint, the sarcastic sneer, with representatives in Cervantes, Grancían and Quevedo. There is in them a great deal of literary wrapping but at the same time a painful interior seriousness."30. 31.

The same phenomenon occurs in the colonies, where the excessive ornateness in architecture, art, and letters, the studied elegance and the extreme artificiality in manners and in speech serve to hide the intellectual and spiritual stagnation.

The most graphic description of the decline of scholasticism has been written by Spain's greatest critic, Menéndez y Pelayo, (1856-1912) whose devout Roman Catholicism, on the one hand, and scholarly competence on the other, cannot be questioned.

> "The principal vice of decadent scholasticism...consisted in that after having reached the heights in the Summa Theologiae (it) had gone to sleep on its laurels and lived off its own substance unfaithful to the principle of rational investigation, to which it owed its force, an obstacle now for all legitimate advance as if it had fixed forever the gates of Hercules in human thought, and as if it had found formulas that exhausted all the inexhaustible virtuality of being and of knowing, the eyes closed to the spectacle of the world drawing from itself the threads with which it wove its interminable and monotonous cloth.
>
> "The defect of scholasticism was not in what it taught wrongly but in what it did not teach; nor in its own doctrines, but in fencing in thought, so that it might never suspect that there could be anything beyond; not in conducing to error but in killing the germ of curiosity and with it many errors and many truths. They did not conceive, these degenerate scholastics, of science as a labor, which must engage individually the strength of each man in improving and rectifying it each day, rejoicing as much, at least in the rational exercise, per se, as in the result of the investigation, but they looked upon it as something definitive and perfect already acquired by the effort of our elders, or better still, as a closed field in which they could engage in infantile pastimes..."32.

This lengthy passage has been quoted from Menendez y Pelayo for its vivid and authoritative description of "decadent" scholasticism. Alejandro Korn, who cites this paragraph as an "orthodox" criticism of scholasticism goes on to suggest, however, that the fault lay in the system itself and not in its misuse, as Menendez y Pelayo seems to suggest. He does not criticize his eminent authority directly at the point of the statement that "the defect of scholasticism was...notin its own doctrines.." but clearly indicates in his own criticism of scholasticism that its doctrines must necessarily lead to just such a "degeneracy" as Menéndez y Pelayo deplored. For Korn the deadly defect of scholasticism lies in its rationalism. With penetrating insight he writes:

> "It has been said sometime that Catholicism requires of its adherents the sacrifice of the intellect. There may be some truth in this if we refer to modern man, but to the man of the middle ages the Church required not the sacrifice of the intellect but the sacrifice of the will. Thomism is within this current--reason it supposes is on its side and we can easily understand why it was adopted with such fervor by the order whose members first duty is the sacrifice of their own freedom of will. In an institutional system governed by such principles the sphere of action of man is narrowed and there is no room for the liberty of the subject who must consent to the casuistical regulation of his life, nor for the sovereign who cannot free himself from doctrinaire rigorism.
>
> "Rationalism, perforce, must always come to the same conclusions even when it liberates itself from religious dogmatism or invokes, in the place of the divine reason, natural law, the reason of state, the general will, or social justice. It always supposes itself the possessor of universal norms, always subordinates the individual to the collectivity, always stifles individual expansiveness in order to encase it within the common orientation. That is to say, it is always intolerant."[33]

Korn has put his finger on the central defect of scholasticism -- its deadly rationalism. Though Korn's reference in the above quotation is to the Jesuit order, we have seen how the Spanish Crown attempted to turn all its dominions into one vast institutional system answering Korn's

description. The attempt well nigh succeeded. But life is greater than reason, and the thrusting vitality of the colonial Spanish America could no more be contained within the narrow intellectual molds prescribed by its mentors, than its awakening political consciousness could be subjected indefinitely to the rigid forms of colonial absolutism. The result of the alliance between the church and the state was finally disastrous for the church. For when the drive for political emancipation finally comes, it tends to turn against the Church, its doctrines and philosophy, as well as against the political rulers.

The large share of influence maintained by the church after the independence of the Spanish colonies was due in large measure to the important part played by a number of liberal priests who espoused the cause of freedom. The existence of such priests in the colonies is evidence of the fact that the "Enlightenment" had at least partially arrived in Spanish America in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The decadence of scholasticism set the stage for the transition to modernism. This transition will be traced in the following chapter.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. Professor Louis Weckman, in a paper delivered before the Medieval Society of Boston, and reproduced in the organ "Filosofía y Letras" published by the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Mexico, January-June issue, 1952, pp.291-310 writes: "The Middle Ages found their last expression on this side of the Atlantic, where it was still possible to find, after the close of the medieval period in Europe, a climate propitious for the flowering of medieval ideals; this climate continued for a long time in the New Spain, while contemporaneously, in Europe, the religious Reformation and the (movement) designated as the Italian Renaissance were destroying the modes of life on which medieval Christendom had been established." (p.291) (The above quotation is a retranslation of the spanish version of this monograph.)

2. The wars of Spain with the Moors date from the invasion of Spain in the 8th Century to the final defeat of the Moors by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492.

3. Ganivet, Angel, Ideario Español. Santiago, Empresa Letras (no date) p.226.

4. Ferdinand and Isabella, "The Catholic Kings," are the embodiment of this trend.

5. Luis Vives, (1492-1540), is the most prominent Renaissance philosopher of Spain. An eclectic philosopher, he insisted on a clear distinction between logic and metaphysics, and advocated the empirical approach to nature. Most of his life as a philosopher was spent outside of Spain.

6. The Reformation made some converts in Spain, a few among the intellectual elite, (most prominent are the Valdéz brothers) but failed to gain a real hold among the common people. As Spain turned with violence against the Reformation, the Inquisition was able to stamp it out internally.

7. Parentheses inserted by writer to clarify translation.

8. Gaos, José, Antología del Pensamiento de Lengua Española en la Edad Contemporánea México, Editorial Séneca, 1945, pp.12-13.

9. Ingenieros, José, La Evalucion de las Ideas Argentinas. Buenos Aires, Editorial Problemas, 1946, Vol. 1, pp.25.

10. Korn, Alejandro, Obras Completas. Buenos Aires, Editorial Claridad, S.A. 1949, pp.45.

11. Mackay, John A., The Other Spanish Christ. New York, MacMillan 1932 pp.27.

12. Full Title: "Recopilación de las Leyes de las Indias."

13. Korn, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

14. Ibid., pp. 51.

15. Ibid., pp. 61.

16. Terán, Juan B., El Nacimiento de la América Española. Tucumán, Argentina, LaVelocidad Tucumán 1927. The author describes in a dispassionate but scathing fashion the darker aspects of the colonial record of Spain.

17. Ingenieros, op. cit., pp. 23.

18. Reulet, Anibal Sánchez, "Panorama de las Ideas Filosóficas en Hispano-América." Tierra Firme, Madrid, Año II, No. 2, pp.185, 1936.

19. Reulet, op. cit. pp. 185.

20. Francisco de Vitoria, one of the great renovators of scholasticism in the early sixteenth century, is famed as a founder of the concepts of international law. In the University of Salamanca he substituted the teaching of St. Thomas for the teaching of William of Occam.

21. Robles, Oswaldo, Filosóficos Méxicanos del Siglo XVI. Mexico City, Librería de Manuel Porrúa 1950. pp. 20.

22. Reulet, op. cit. pp. 186-187.

23. Derisi, octavio, Los Fundamentos Metafísicos del Orden Moral. Buenos Aires. Universidad de la Plata, 1948. pp. 399.

24. The writer has tried to paraphrase the way in which a Spanish Inquisitor might have tried to justify his office. To be sure, no reputable modern neo-scholastic philosopher would express himself in precisely this fashion; however, let us note the following from the recent lecture of an Argentine neo-Thomist: "Christian philosophy has always held that the light of the conscience is but the interpreter of eternal truth in the practical order, and that without the sovereign and immortal Legislator there cannot be sufficient reason for obligation and morality. For this reason the freedom of the Christian conscience is completely different from and opposed to what modern liberalism means by it (freedom); since the radical evil of liberalism consists in thinking that morality and freedom are possible amputated from the transcendent and divine order.

"For freedom to exist there suffices the sure conscience which apprehends the formal honest good, which every man of good will can reach. Freedom of conscience, however, is proportional and relative to metaphysical and theological understanding. How then shall not

24. (continued)

only the average man but humanity at large achieve it? It is necessary to admit a new source of moral knowledge; the authority of the learned and prudent, which is to say, of the true philosophers and great teachers, and from the supernatural standpoint, the infallible educational ministry of the teaching Church, without which there can be neither unity of doctrines nor sound and sure knowledge of the supernatural ends and means.

"The medieval Christian ethic is a science of fallen and redeemed man and proposes the sacramental activity of the church as a means of reaching freedom of conscience.

"The final end of christian man consists in the vision of God.. via purgativa, illuminativa, intuitiva..." (Excerpts from the article "La Libertad de Consciencia Según la Etica Cristiana Medieval", in Philosophiae Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Mendoza, Año IX, No. 16, Junio-Sept. 1952 by Humberto Mario Lucero).

25. This parenthesis belongs in the original.

26. Téllez, E. Valverdo, Father, Apuntaciones Históricas Sobre la Filosofía en México. Mexico, Hernero Hermanos, 1896. pp. 64 ff. Quoted by Father Téllez from the second edition of the Constitutions of the University of Mexico.

27. This inference is confirmed by a study of the place of Fr. Francisco Naranjo in Colonial scholasticism. Cf. monograph by this name, by Vergara, Alfonso Zahar, in Anuario de Filosofía del Seminario de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Universidad de México, 1943.

28. Reulet, op. cit., pp. 188.

29. This last statement seems to appose the rationalism of the modern philosophy to the religious orthodoxy of scholasticism as if the latter were strictly a faith system. As will be pointed out soon, the apposition is rather between two forms of rationalism.

30. Ibid., pp. 188.

31. Ramos, Samuel. Historia de la Filosofía en México. México, Imprenta Universitaria 1943. pp. 44. Ramos confirms the validity of this observation for Mexico. In Mexico the extreme baroque style in architecture is called "churrigueresco".

32. Quoted by Korn, op.cit., pp. 76-77.

33. Ibid., pp. 72-73.

CHAPTER II

FROM SCHOLASTICISM TO POSITIVISM

(A PERIOD OF TRANSITION)

INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY:

Scholasticism prevailed as the official and dominant philosophy of Spanish America until the end of the colonial regimes. But from the middle of the eighteenth century there began a gradual yet unmistakable decline in its influence. Thus began a period of transition which lasts until roughly the middle of the nineteenth century when the system of ideas known as positivism came to hold almost as complete a sway over the intellectual circles of Spanish America as scholasticism once had.

This period of transition may be divided into two main stages. The first is the period of the decline of scholasticism and the appearance of "eclecticism". This period coincides with the last years of the colonial regime. The second stage is that of the triumph of liberalism and the modern philosophies. This period coincides with the independence and the early years of the new republics.

The decline of scholasticism may be attributed to two main causes: the wide spread restlessness with the rigidity and oppressiveness of the scholastic structure (already mentioned in the first chapter), on the one hand, and the loss of confidence in the scholastic principles on the other. It was contact with the world of experimental science which first made apparent the inadequacy of the scholastic philosophy. The scholastics had attempted such a complete explanation of the universe that to accept the

premises of Descartes, Newton, and other modern thinkers now meant to turn one's back on Aristotle and St. Thomas. And to accept the empirical approach meant the repudiation of the deductive method for establishing truth, which was the very essence of scholasticism. The most alert thinkers of the period saw that it was impossible to be both a modern and a scholastic. Since open-minded men could no longer close their eyes to the progress of experimental science, the child of empiricism, they began to see the need of abandoning scholasticism as a system.

The first teachers to divulge the ideas of modern philosophers were the Jesuit fathers, but their influence for modernism is not clear and their banishment from all the dominions of the Spanish monarch (at the time, Charles III in 1767) removed them from all teaching positions. The most important influences in the growth of modern ideas throughout the colonies were those of the Spanish Benedictine monk, Benito Feijóo and of the "enlightenend" king of Spain, Charles III. Feijóo was a relentless foe of decadent scholasticism and a tireless propagandist of the virtues of experimental science. Charles III exercised a liberalizing influence throughout his dominions through the appointment of more progressive administrators, and by liberalizing trade, which permitted an increased contact with other cultures. Relaxation in the enforcement of the restrictions of the Holy Office and the contraband importation of prohibited books made possible the growing impact of the enlightenment upon the cultured class in every colony.

To take the place of scholasticism, the most progressive teachers of philosophy in the colonial schools, among whom Father Juan Benito Díaz de Gamarra, and Father José Augustín Caballero, of Cuba stand out, began to pro-

pose the philosophy of "eclecticism", by which they meant a philosophy ready to accept truth, wherever it might be found, without regard to philosophical authority or tradition, without following any one system. This assertion of the autonomy of the reason may be seen as the first step toward that double conquest of independence from the domination of Spain and of the Roman Catholic Church which takes place during the nineteenth century. With the entire structure of colonialism based on the foundation of scholasticism it was inevitable that the authority of this philosophy should suffer with the revolt against the colonial system. At the beginning, however, neither the authority of the King to rule over the colonies nor the right of the Church to dictate in matters of faith and morals is challenged. Following the example of Descartes, the thinkers who assert the autonomy of the reason in the realms of science and philosophy willingly assent to the authority of the Church in the realm of faith. Hence the term "eclecticism" in the philosophies of this period may be understood, not only as the freedom to "elect" truth wherever found, but also as an accomodation without real synthesis betweem the new claims of the modern philosophers and the ancient dogmas of the Church.

The second stage in this period of transition sees the dominance of the later and more extreme forms of modern philosophy. Whereas in the eclectic stage it is the thought of Bacon, Descartes and Newton which prevails, in this period it is the influence of the encyclopedists, (esp. of Rousseau, the romantic) of Condillac and Destutt de Tracy, the sensationalist philosophers, and others like them, which gains ascendancy. The romantic influence, with its emphasis on the "rights of man" and its immediate consequences in the social and political sphere was initially more important, but in its

long range effect the sensationalist empiricism of Condillac and de Tracy is no less significant, for it clears the way, even more than the romanticism of Rousseau, for the secularized and materialistic philosophies of the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Where the eclectic stage was one of "peaceful transition, this second stage coincides with the turmoil of the revolutionary struggles against Spain, and the bitter internecine conflicts of the early days in the new republics. The revolt against the scholastic universities was one phase of the revolt against the "ancien regime", and a number were destroyed in the process. New state-supported, secular universities were founded in some countries. The teaching of scholasticism was relegated to confessional schools and seminaries, isolated from the main streams of intellectual activity. Eclecticism was abandoned in outright revolt against the previously respected dogmas, and no effort was made to protect the realm of faith from the assault of reason. Only in Cuba can there be said to be a continuance of empiricist and christian ideas, but even here the leading philosopher in the middle of the century, José de la Luz y Caballero, was a christian more nearly in the evangelical than in the Thomist tradition.

In the field of ethics this period sees the separation of morals from religion, the attempt to establish a "lay" morality based on the natural powers of man. This change reflects the declining authority of the Roman Catholic church over the intellectuals. After enjoying a complete ascendancy over the religious life of Spanish America, it now faces opposition everywhere, the most violent being in Mexico. Mexico also develops the most extreme forms of sensationalist philosophy.

In Argentina the new university adopts the sensationalist philosophy, and forms an "ideologist" tradition which lasts until the government of the tyrant, Rosas, discontinues the support of the University.

A. THE RISE OF ECCLECTICISM

1. The Impact of Experimental Science on Colonial Scholasticism

The Scholastic Era in Spanish American philosophy has been dated as extending from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth, coinciding with the period of Spanish dominion over the present Spanish American republics. In the last half century of Spanish rule, however, the influence of scholasticism underwent a rapid decline, and a number of philosophers began to proclaim their rejection of the scholastic system in favor of what they called "eclecticism." Yet these philosophers were in the minority, and the dominance of scholasticism can be said to continue until the overthrow of the Spanish regimes brings with it a complete cultural revolution.

The first challenges to scholasticism did not come because of religious, moral, or political reasons; the first attacks were made on scientific and epistemological grounds. History was to show that the repudiation of scholastic science was only the beginning of a process in which all of scholasticism, and then the dogmas of the Church as well, would be brought into question.

Scholasticism had wedded itself so completely to the philosophy of Aristotle, that it was inevitable that it should suffer when Aristotelian science became discredited. Continuing the example of the medieval school-

men the colonial teachers of philosophy included physics as a branch of philosophy and taught it by the texts of Aristotle. The first defections from scholasticism came when teachers who had come in contact with the new empirical scientific thought associated with the name of Bacon, Copernicus, Descartes and Newton rejected these texts. From this point there was only a step to the acceptance of empiricism as a philosophical attitude and method and the consequent rejection of scholasticism as a whole.

The colonies of Spain in the New World which had followed the lead of the mother country and "closed their doors to the scientific and philosophical renaissance,"[1] now reduplicate the movement of European thought away from the middle ages into full-orbed participation in the modern age. In this movement the only thought at first was to accept the new ideas in science and philosophy without at the same time giving up the belief in the dogmas of the Church. It is from this attempted accomodation that this phase takes its name as the "eclectic era."

It is from its outcome rather than from its first manifestations that the initial break with scholasticism can be understood as a part of the rejection of the total medieval world-view and not merely as the rejection of the science of the schoolmen. Yet even while the attempt was being made to restrict the rejection of scholasticism to the field of science, the sense of liberation accompanying this rejection identifies it as of one piece with the European rejection of medievalism. Dr. Stanley Hopper has described this latter process and its underlying reasons in the following words:

"This new self-confidence (in man's own capacities) implied

> a rejection of something in the medieval view which was oppressive and, at bottom, destructive of the creative impulse. That something was the metaphysical foundation of the European world view, which contained all things in the aesthetic-mathematical unity of a Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian sphericity. This was, in the main a product of Greek rationalism. It produced the static culture and hierarchical rigidity of the medieval period. Its virtue was order. Its fault was a metaphysical regimentation of the spirit."[2]

This description applies with equal validity to Spanish American scholasticism as we have described it in the first chapter of this study. And as men begin to cast off the mantle of scholasticism and to declare themselves in favor of an entirely new mode of thought, the "eclectic", they do so with the sense of a new freedom, and of living in a new age. At the very beginning, however, attention is turned only to the scientific world. Because of the part it plays in the drift from scholasticism we must turn our attention to this process.

2. Jesuit Scientific Thinkers and Humanists

The first notable scientific thinker in Spanish America is Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora of Mexico (1645- ?), a man in many ways a century ahead of his age. Born in 1645 of a privileged family in Mexico City, he was educated by the Jesuits in the Colegio de Tepotzotlán. From his teachers he seems to have received his early start in mathematics and his love for the sciences, as well as his first acquaintance with Descartes. Siguenza, engaged in the earliest scientific controversies recorded in Spanish America as he tried to explain comets by natural causations and to refute the more common superstitions connected with astrology. In matters of religion and philosophy, however, he does not seem to venture to think independently, and according to Professor Ramos, "never ceased to

show a profound and sincere devotion to the teachings of the Church, and reverence for the theological doctrines, from which he did not depart on putting himself in contact with lay philosophers such as Descartes."[3].

The work of the Jesuit Order, whose influence on Sigüenza has been noted, deserves special mention in this account of the drift away from scholasticism. Paradoxically, the religious order which in its institutional form most completely embodied the authoritarian spirit of scholasticism was the very order responsible for the first teaching in Spanish America of the new scientific doctrines and the work of Descartes and other modern philosophers. The explanation is to be found in the fact that being the most vigorous and alert of the orders, it was most alive to the currents of the age and was the first to see the need for taking the modern philosophies into account and not simply ignoring them. Primarily loyal to the philosophers of their own order, outstandingly Suárez, the Jesuits were less bound to the medieval schoolmen and to Aristotle than the teachers of the other orders.

Sánchez Reulet has underscored the role of the Jesuits as propagators of modern ideas in Spanish America,[4]. while the recent studies published in Mexico by the Catholic scholars, G. Méndez Plancarte[5]. and Bernabé Navarro,[6]. portray the Jesuits of Mexico in the 18th century as men who pioneered in historical, scientific and linguistic researches, and were the first to introduce the teachings of modern philosophers in the New World colonies of Spain. Méndez Plancarte's is a pioneering work while Navarro's study, "La Introducción de la Filosofía Moderna en México," is a careful examination of all the available sources bearing on the work of the Jesuit fathers. In the course of his investigation Navarro discovered

a number of "lost" manuscripts.

Navarro stresses the activity of Fathers José Rafael Campoy (1723-1787), Francisco Javier Clavijero (1731-1777), Augusto Castro (1728-1790) and Diego José Abad (1727-1779) as true innovators. The teaching of these "modern" Jesuits in Mexico extended from 1748 to 1767, when the Jesuit order was banished from the empire, and they were forced to take refuge in Italy where they continued their intellectual activity. Father Campoy was the guide and mentor of the group, while Father Clavijero was the intellectual leader. Fathers Clavijero and Abad each published a "Cursus Philosophicus",[7] while Father Castro translated Bacon's "Novum Organum".

The innovations which these progressive Jesuits tried to introduce met with serious resistance. Their zeal for modern ideas, states Navarro, was "the cause of ill will, offenses, malevolous interpretations, and persecutions. First they were separated from their chairs or directional responsibilities, or like Clavijero, they felt inwardly obligated to separate themselves."[8] Father Juan Maneiro, the biographer of these Jesuit Fathers suggests that Clavijero was far more advanced than he dared to make known—"he loved modern philosophy with a furtive love, and cultivated it in his private studies."[9] Yet Navarro admits that though they were the earliest to introduce modern ideas, they were "fundamentally scholastics."[10] From these comments it is evident that the influence of these early devotees of modernism was not too far reaching, nor was their own attitude as advanced as the term "modern" would indicate. There is no evidence that they definitely and specifically rejected scholasticism, although they did place a new emphasis on experimentalism in the teaching of sciences. In any event, their banishment in 1767 virtually, though not entirely, removed

their influence in the philosophical development of this period. In this writer's opinion, the importance of the Jesuit fathers in the trend toward modernism is not as important as Méndez Plancarte and Navarro would indicate, for if it had been, it is inconceivable that the later work of Father Gamarra and Antonio Alzate (to be reviewed in a later section) should have appeared so revolutionary to their contemporaries.[11].

In a study of the influences which led the colonies away from scholasticism, we must stress the role of two men who never set foot in the New World. One of them is a Spanish Benedictine monk, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo (1676-1764), and the other the Spanish monarch, Charles III, of the House of Bourbon.

Feijóo is one of those remarkable men who undertakes single-handedly to change the thought habits of an entire nation; in this case, of an empire. Born in 1676 he lived a life of tireless and fruitful activity until his death in 1764. A devout Roman Catholic in matters of faith, (the great critic Menéndez y Pelayo speaks of his "stainless orthodoxy")[12]. Feijóo was converted to the methods of experimental science, and incensed at the backwardness of his compatriots set out to disabuse them of the many errors and superstitions which were prevalent at the time. Writes Alejandro Korn:

> "A gust of the new currents reached the cell of the good Benedictine: there is no fable or vulgar superstition but what he tries to drive it away, whether it be of simple ignorance, or of the use of magic, of elves or of demons, of vampires or witches. The need for distracting his time in such enterprise denounces the conditions of his hearers and explains the reason for the long and prolix dissertations, destined to divulge the system of Copernicus or the theories of Newton."[13].

When Feijóo finds the authority of Aristotle standing in the way of his crusade of enlightenment he does not hesitate to challenge that authority, though he always takes care to show the proper deference for the authority of the Church. He understands the value of irony and does not hesitate to use it.

> "It is impossible to relate the damage which philosophy has suffered in being oppressed for so many centuries under the yoke of authority. This was, in the way in which it was used, a cruel tyrant which had blinded human reason and tied its hands, for it forbade the use of reasoning or of experience. Those who called themselves philosophers spent almost two thousand years, knocking their brains, not in the study of nature, but in investigation of the mind of Aristotle."14.

Feijóos "Teatro Crítico Universal", a form of "Spectator" papers, and his "Cartas Eruditas y Curiosas" (curious and erudite letters), were the first acquaintance which many, in the colonies as well as in Spain, had with the names of Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and other modern thinkers, and with the notions of experimental science. No other single figure did more to awaken Spain and the colonies from the scholastic slumber.

Charles III is the unusual case of an "enlightened" king on the throne of the most conservative country of Europe. A scion of the House of Bourbon, which had been installed on the throne of Spain in the last of the wars of Louis the XIV, it is not surprising that Charles should not have shown the same aversion to things French as had the Spanish Hapsburgs. But Charles III, who rules Spain from 1759 to 1788 is more than a partisan of French culture; he is a devotee of the "enlightenment", a Spanish counterpart of Frederick the Great and Catherine the Great in his faith in 18th Century rationalism.

Even the King cannot do away with the Holy Office, or convert his subjects to the lights of reason from one day to the next. But Charles exerts

an enormous influence: patronizing scientific studies and expeditions, pressing on the universities to modernize their courses, appointing more liberal men to public and ecclesiastical office, protecting the exponents of new ideas. That his efforts encountered opposition from the entrenched forces of tradition is quite clear. In reply to the request of the government for the teaching of experimental sciences in the ancient University of Salamanca, the directors of the historic institution replied: "Newton does not teach one thing which makes good logicians or metaphysicians, and Gassendi and Descartes are not in as much accord as Aristotle with revealed truth."[15].

The influence of Charles the Third extended to his dominions in the Western Hemisphere mainly through a group of liberal administrators, among whom stand out the Viceroy Bucareli, of Mexico, and the Viceroy Vértiz, of the River Plate. During the administration of the Viceroys their colonies achieved new levels of progress and prosperity. Both men encouraged educational reforms in the schools and universities and exerted their influence against extreme restriction on freedom of thought.

b. Earliest Influences of the Enlightenment and the Encyclopedia

A most important influence in the movement away from scholasticism during this period is the enormous increase in the circulation of the works of modern philosophers, even though these works were still on the Index. This increase was made possible by the decrees of Charles III authorizing the colonies, which had hitherto been forced to trade only with Spain, to begin a restricted trade with other nations. This freer commerce facilitated the importation of French and English books, and scarcely a ship flying a foreign flag arrived in colonial harbors but what the works of

modern authors were smuggled into port.

Among the works of modern philosophers which are known to have circulated in the colonies during the latter part of the eighteenth century, more or less surreptitiously as the case might be,[16.] are those of Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Locke, Condillac, Gassendi, Malebranche, Leibniz, etc. At the turn of the century, though circulated in more clandestine fashion, we find the works of Voltaire, Rousseau, and the Encyclopedists. The works of the French authors were undoubtedly the most influential. "In the last fifty years of the colonial era," declares the American professor, Roland D. Hussey, "a reading knowledge of French and use of French books was common in the better class, and French ideas and ideals were warmly advocated or admired by many who know them only through intermediaries."[17.] The "logic" of Port Royal was translated into Spanish in 1759 and surely found its way into the new world, as did the "Traité des Sensations" of Condillac, which appeared in a Spanish version in 1784. A Portuguese, Verney, was one of the earliest exponents of sensationalism whose work circulated in Spanish America.

The circulation of all these books can only be explained by the great relaxation in the controls exercised by the Holy Office during this period. Monelisa Pérez Marchand, in a doctoral dissertation approved by the University of Mexico, summarizes the most exhaustive research yet made of the action of the Inquisition in the 18th century by calling the restrictions "de nomine rather than de facto."[18.] But it must not be thought that the actions of the Holy Office ceased altogether, as the numerous trials recorded in this period bear witness.

The effect of these new influences may be summarized by saying that the eighteenth century witnessed a gradual renovation of thought throughout Spanish America. The effect of this renovation has been summarized by Sánchez Reulet in the following words: "The principle of authority, and with it the authority of Aristotle, gradually lost importance during the eighteenth century. At the end of the century, many writers gave themselves the title of eclectics; to be eclectic was equivalent to having no prior system, to not accepting any authority."[19]. Professor John Tate Lanning, the leading authority in the United States on this period in the cultural history of Spanish America, has made an investigation of a large number of theses presented for academic degrees in various universities of the Spanish colonies during the period from 1750 to 1810. Many of them, he found, contain modern propositions expressed in scholastic style. The action of the Holy Office which was supposed to stand guard against just such developments he calls "essentially bureaucratic and ineffectual."[20].

Professor Lanning states that it was Descartes "who shook the colonial man from his long lethargy,"[21]. to which Dr. Pérez Marchand observes: "this may be true in academic spheres, but for the average man and the new orientation imposed itself in its philosophical political character, and made its force felt above all through writers such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Condillac, Filangieri etc."[22]. She fully concurs, however, in Lanning's conclusion: "in reality the Americans did not so much receive the Enlightenment; they reproduced it from the sources upon which its exponents in Europe depended."[23]. That is to say, the development of modern ideas in Spanish America was not mere slavish imitation. Feeling the dissatisfaction with scholasticism as something personal, many of the leaders

of thought turned to the modern philosophers with creative interest. Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and the other founders of the modern philosophical thought became primary sources for a new way of thinking in Spanish America, just as they had in Europe. We can trace this development with greater precision by noting the rise of eclecticism in three of the colonies of Spain, Mexico, Cuba, and the River Plate.

4. Eclecticism in Mexico

Two figures best incarnate the new currents of thought in Mexico during this period, and exemplify trends which had their counterpart in every one of the other colonies of Spain. The first is a priest and teacher of philosophy, the other is a layman, a journalist and scientist who undertakes to duplicate in Mexico the work accomplished by Fr. Feijóo in Spain.

a. Juan Benito Díaz de Gamarra

Father Benito Díaz de Gamarra (1745-1783) is the first teacher of philosophy in Spanish America, whose philosophical works have been preserved, who makes a complete break with scholasticism as a system, even though he retains many of the notions of the schoolmen. Born in a provincial town of Mexico Father Gamarra early distinguished himself as a brilliant scholar of San Idelfonso in Mexico City. He entered the Order of the Oratory in 1764, and then travelled in Europe, obtaining his doctorate in the University of Pisa. He achieved the distinction of being made a member of the Academy of Bologna. In these travels he studied the modern philosophy and "became an ardent devotee of it."[24]. Returning to Mexico he was appointed professor

of philosophy and rector of the Colegio de San Miguel el Grande, a former Jesuit school whose studies had been modernized at the suggestion of the Viceroy Bucareli. Gamarra published a number of works the most famous of which are "Elementa Recentioris Philosophiae, "Academias Philosophiae" and a work which carries a Spanish title, "Errores del Entendimiento Humano."[25].

Gamarra boldly proclaimed his independence as a philosopher, proclaiming himself an eclectic, and repudiating the scholastics, or any other school of philosophy, for the freedom to accept truth wherever it might be found:

> "Whoever glories in the name of philosopher, whoever consecrates himself to the investigation of truth with ardent spirit will not confess to any sect: neither the peripatetec nor the platonist, nor the leibnizian nor the newtonian; he will follow truth without avowing to the word Master."[26].

Challenging the authority of St. Thomas Aquinas he was careful to praise him first as the greatest of all theologians, then proceeded to repudiate him as a philosopher:

> "If it is a question of St. Thomas, not as a theologian but simply as a philosopher, remember that it is not that Thomas of genius, light and adornment of the Church, but with a gentile philosopher (recently converted from impious to pious) by the name of Aristotle, with whom we have to deal; which is something far different."[27].

Philosophy he defined as "the knowledge of the true, the good and the honest, obtained by the sole light of nature and the reason derived therefrom."[28].

These statements were enough to make Gamarra appear extremely advanced in his views, and he was twice hailed before the Inquisition. The first time (1775) he was forced to resign his chair and his rectorship, though he was cleared by the Holy Office by producing a license issued by

Pope Clement the XIII, showing he had permission to read prohibited books. Five years later he was reinstated in his positions. In 1779 he was again denounced to the Holy Office and again cleared, but this did not save him from the troubles attendant on trial nor from being hounded by criticism until his early death at the age of thirty-eight.

Father Gamarra was wrongly accused, for he always made every possible effort to establish his complete adherence to the dogmas of the Church. He qualified his approval of empiricism by making clear that dogmas are not subject to question. Defining the eclectic position he states that it is "that in which we seek for truth only by reason," but adds, "this (the reason) directed by means of experience and the observation of the senses, the intimate conscience, the judgment, and by authority on those things which cannot be known through any other way."[29]. And to this he adds: "In natural science, we recommend, therefore that liberty which signifies no withdrawal whatsoever from the Church, no departure from its dogmas."[30]. If there is any conflict between an empirically obtained opinion and dogma the former must be sacrificed:

> "The true philosopher only admits in natural sciences that which neither reason nor experience dare to contradict, and shown of bias does not govern himself by a partisan spirit: he searches for truth; sets forth his opinion modestly, not as if it were a theorem of Euclid: discards it if ever he finds that it is contrary to catholic dogmas, to reason or experience, and is always ready to embrace the truth as soon as it becomes apparent."[31].

Gamarra felt himself to be a loyal child of the Church, and in rejecting the philosophy of St. Thomas he appealed to the eclectic position of the patristics Clement, Gregory and Lactantius.[32].

Reviewing the work of Gamarra, the scholastic historian of Mexican philosophy, Father E. Valverde Téllez (1864-) states, "In spite of some orations against the scholastics Father Gamarra does not greatly depart from the influence of this school."[33] Indeed, it is difficult to understand the bitter opposition which Gamarra had to face. Such opposition can only be explained on the premise that he was indeed an innovator, that most of his contemporaries still thought of scholastic philosophy as inseparable from dogma, and were not prepared for the outright repudiation of scholasticism. There is no doubt that Gamarra thought of himself as an innovator, for he wrote in a note to one of his books, published under a pseudonym: "There cannot be denied to this wise scholar the glory of having been the first of our compatriots who dared to combat the ancient method, giving us a philosophy accomodated to the taste of the most cultured in Europe."[34]

Perhaps it was the outspokenness of his opposition to Aristotelianism, his insistence that the teachers of scholasticism were behind the times, and only his eclectic philosophy was valid, rather than the novelty of his ideas, which drew upon Gamarra the suspicion and ire of his contemporaries. At the same time, it is his declaration of independence, his affirmation of modernism, which makes his work important. Though he always expressed his submission to dogma, his expressions of philosophic independence made more of an impression than his theological orthodoxy. His example of autonomy was widely influential. Surely Gamarra deserves credit as the first modern philosopher in Spanish America.

b. Antonio Alzate

Following the example of the Spanish monk, Feijóo, Antonio Alzate (? -1799) made the attempt to bring his countrymen up to date on matters of science and philosophy the driving motive of his life. His chief instrument was a journal, the "Gaceta de Literatura", which he published between 1788 and 1795. In this journal Alzate carried on a lively polemic against the dependence on the science of Aristotle, and in favor of the empirical philosophy. Alzate was not only a publicist, he was a scientist in his own right. So universal was his curiosity, however, that he did not go deeply into any one thing. Ramos calls him "the most universal spirit of his generation," and states that he "dealt in astronomy, physics, natural history, chemistry, applied arts, metereology."[35].

Alzate did not stand alone. He was the key figure among a group of men responsible for a remarkable scientific movement in Mexico at the end of the century. The men of this movement do not merely theorize: they carry on active scientific experiments; they investigate flora, fauna and geology; they delve into history and archaeology; they begin the study of Mexican ethnology. Alzate died in 1799, but the movement in which he had so prominent a part continued to excite the admiration of the famous German scientist Von Humboldt when he visited Mexico in 1803. These men thought scientifically. They were the living expression of the new thought which was flowering in Mexico.

The significance of this philosophical and scientific awakening represented by Gamarra and Alzate is aptly stressed by Professor Ramos as a background for the independence movement. Before men could desire to be

free politically they had to achieve a certain freedom in their minds:

> "The Mexicans would never have acquired the conscience that they had certain human rights, would never have understood the vices of Spain and its colonial regime, and the value of the new political concepts which came from France and the Anglo-Saxon countries if Gamarra had not taught them that, above all, the only legitimate authority is reason and that this, therefore, must be freely exercised... The philosophical and scientific work of Gamarra together with the entire generation of Alzate undoubtedly constitutes the first authoctonous intellectual movement in this part of America. It is not arbitrary to say that rationalism in that movement identified itself with the most intimate will of the Mexicans and was the first liberty which was conquered as a starting point to the revolution of independence."[36].

The foremost leader of the Mexican independence movement was a parish priest, Father Miguel Hidalgo. Hidalgo was a student of the Jesuits in the Colegio de San Nicolás, studying by the reformed methods of Father Clavijero, when the Jesuits were sent into exile. Though documents showing a direct connection are lacking, historians have seen relation between Hidalgo's early exposure to the Enlightenment and his libertarian sentiment.[37]. We may well go beyond Professor Ramos at this point, however, and stress the significance of the work of Gamarra, Alzate, and the other pioneers of modern thought in Mexico for the entire future development of thought in Mexico. For if the revolt from the civil domination of Spain cannot be understood without this previous intellectual emancipation, even less can the revolt which takes place in the nineteenth century from the Church which Spain established be understood without it. Even the boldest colonial thinkers did not venture to depart from the moral and religious precepts of scholasticism. (Hidalgo himself was a devoted Catholic who carried the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe into battle). But by the assertion of the right of the individual reason to search for truth without

regard for traditional systems of philosophy or established authority, the eclectic philosophers of the last years of the colonial era laid the foundations for the completely atheological philosophy and morality advocated by the most prominent thinkers of Mexico during the following century.

5. Eclecticism in Cuba -- José Augustín Caballero

The transition from scholasticism to eclecticism in Cuba is of particular interest because it marks the beginning of a philosophical tradition of greater excellence and continuity than that of any other country in Spanish America in the nineteenth century. Father José Agustín Caballero (176201835) who duplicates in Cuba the work of Gamarra in Mexico, is the first in a line of distinguished thinkers, formed also by Father Félix Varela (1788-1753), José de la Luz y Caballero (1800-1862), and Enrique José Varona (1849-1933) who give Cuban philosophy its high rank in Spanish American thought.

The son of a Spanish army officer, José Agustín Caballero became a scholarship student in the Seminario de San Carlos[38]. at the age of 12. It was to be his home for the rest of his life. In 1785, he began his career as a teacher of philosophy. In 1791 he was ordained to the priesthood, and in 1804 he became the professor of Scriptures and Moral Theology, a post he held until his death in 1835.

Caballero's training as a student was "completely scholastic".[39]. New intellectual currents were beginning to course through the island, however, and the young professor soon showed his sympathy with the new ideas. In 1791, on the initiative of the new Governor-General, Don Luis de las Casas,

a journal, "El Papel Periódico de la Habana" was founded with the purpose of stimulating social and cultural progress. This paper was patterned after Alzate's "Gaceta de Literatura" in Mexico, and the "Mercurio Peruano," of Lima. Caballero became the leading writer, though his contributions were never under his own name and it is impossible to identify them with complete accuracy. Articles attributed to Caballero began to appear soon after the founding of the paper criticizing the weakness of the scholastic teaching and advocating the introduction of the "new philosophy", by which was meant the teaching of the experimental sciences. In 1795, Caballero, though not connected with the University, presented a paper before the Havana "Patriotic Society" proposing a radical change in the program of studies of the University of Havana. Disdaining higher honors than those of priest and teacher, Caballero nevertheless had a strong interest in public affairs. In 1811 he proposed a plan for an autonomous government for Cuba for which he is celebrated as one of the founders of Cuban national consciousness. He kept up his journalistic interests most of his life, and through them he exerted a strong influence on the island.

In 1791 Father Caballero introduced a new course of philosophy which he entitled "Philosophia Electiva." It is on this course which his fame as an eclectic philosopher rests. Professor Roberto Agramonte, author of the definitive study of Caballero's life and work, states in his introduction to the edition of the "Philosophia Electiva" published in 1944 by the University of Havana: "If with the 'Discourse on Method' European philosophy enters into the modern age, then with the 'Philosophia Electiva' of Father José Agustin Caballero our philosophical thought becomes incorporated into western thought."40.

Caballero divided philosophy into four parts; Logic, Metaphysics, Physics and Ethics. Unfortunately we only have the manuscript of the "Logic". This section shows a great affinity with the works of Father Gamarra, of Mexico whose texts he is known to have consulted.[41]. He defines philosophy as "the accurate and evident knowledge of all things, according to their ultimate causes, obtained by the sole natural light."[42]. In his survey of the history of philosophy, like Gamarra, he lays stress on the Alexandrian eclectics.[43]. His own position is clearly defined by his choice of title for his course,[44]. and he clearly states, "It is much better for the philosopher, including the Christian, to follow various schools according to choice, than to elect only one as binding."[45].

In the "Logic" Caballero shows the strong influence of Descartes and of Locke, defending the notion of innate ideas. Thus he rejected extreme sensationalism, though it is known that in 1794, the "Patriotic Society" asked him to translate the introduction to Condillac's philosophical course. It is evident that Caballero set himself the task of strengthening religion through a strictly eclectic position in which science and philosophy could find their place, while leaving religious dogma completely untouched. Before beginning the expository part of his course he states: "But before I invoke the Supreme Maker and Giver of every good thing that He may not allow me to write anything outside of the Roman Church and its laws, and illumine me with his light so that I may guide you (the students) in the right path."[46].

Father Caballero lived on for thirty-eight years after the introduction of his new course, but as far as is known, he did not prepare any other systematic philosophical works. His influence lived on primarily through his

students. Father Felix Varela, who goes much farther than Caballero in the direction of philosophical reform, was his student, while his was the most important influence upon José de la Luz y Caballero, his grand-nephew, whose education was entrusted to his care. Luz called Father Caballero "padre mío en el espíritu" (my father in the spirit.)[47]. Varela states that "all the disciples of Caballero were eclectics."[48]. Undoubtedly the deep piety and the noble example of Father Caballero were as important as his philosophical teaching in the influence he had upon his pupils.

b. Eclecticism in the River Plate

A document has been preserved which clearly illustrates the emergence of the eclectic spirit in the Viceroyalty of the River Plate in this period. Shortly after the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767, a new school, the Colegio de San Carlos, was founded in Buenos Aires on the initiative of the Viceroy Vértiz. The report of the Metropolitan Ecclesiastical Council of Buenos Aires, recommending the program to be followed (thought to have been drafted by Canon Juan Baltazar Maciel) sets forth the following principles:

> "The professors will not be obliged to follow any determined system, especially in physics in which they may depart from Aristotle and teach by the principles of Cartesio (Descarte) or of Gasendo (Gassendi) or of Newton and of the other systematizers, or casting off all systems for the explanation of natural phenomena, following only the light of experience, and by the observation and experiments in which the modern academies labor so usefully. In ecclesiastical and dogmatic theology, however, the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas will be followed with exactitude, according to the intelligence of the students, trying to flee as much as posible from those purely abstract and speculative questions which serve little or nothing to establish the dogmas of our faith and the truth of our religion."[49].

This statement offers clear confirmation that the first deviations from the scholastic philosophy came because of the pressure of modern scientific

concepts. It also shows the reaction against the sterility of current scholasticism by its advocacy of the teaching of St. Augustine instead of the usual exclusive dependence on St. Thomas and the scholastics, (though the same report proposes that St. Thomas be made the "patron saint" of the school) and by its warning against the treatment of purely speculative questions.

The promise implied in this report was not fulfilled, as no outstanding teachers of philosophy developed in this school who might have taken advantage of the relative freedom offered by these principles.[50]

The outstanding representative of modern trends of thought in the River Plate area at the end of the colonial era is Dean Gregorio Funes. ( ) Funes' activities extend well into the independence era, and he was himself one of the leaders of the independence movement. Dean Funes travelled in Europe, graduating from the University of Alcalá in Spain, and was already well known for his modern ideas when he was called to the rectorship of the University of Córdoba in 1808. There he instituted the teaching of mathematics and experimental science, justifying this step with the statement that "microscopes, barometers, and thermometers are better instruments than syllogisms for discovering truth."[51] In the teaching of metaphysics, however, the Dean continued with the philosophy of St. Thomas. His eclectic position is quite apparent in the outline for the study plan of the University, which he submitted in 1813.

> "It is expedient to take advantage of all the good which the ancient scholastics left us, and of the lights of the modern age, to present our theses, without that tyrannical subjection to the stale, mysterious, and useless maxims of the peripatetics, but also without adhesion to any particular party, and with that moderate use of syllogistic forms which knows how to conciliate

the syllogism with the didactic and even the oratory style."[52]. Eclectic in his admittance of the value of the empirical method for the sciences, Dean Funes was essentially conservative in theological and ethical outlook, and in his social views. Active in the political life of the new republic, he stood against the extremist proposals of the new liberals. For this he has been seriously criticized by liberal historians, such as José Ingenieros, while defended by such a balanced critic as Alejandro Korn. Funes stood fast against the doctrines of the Encyclopedia, and firmly stated his conviction of the need for Christianity, that "dogmatic theology has been and is at all times the true science, and in the face of the growing incredulity we must avoid the extinction of the torch of revelation which guides mortal man on the ways which God has deigned to lead him."[53].

With the exception of the eclecticism of Dean Funes, the philosophies taught in academic circles in the River Plate were in the scholastic tradition. Yet modern ideas, including those of the Encyclopedia, steadily grew in influence. These were propagated chiefly outside the classrooms. The Inquisition had ceased to be an effective instrument. José Ingenieros, (who could not write without displaying his anti-scholastic bias), describes this situation in picturesque language.

> "The rigorous restrictions of prohibited books were violated, heresy filtered in through the numerous cracks of the rickety colonial frame. While professors of Monserrat and San Carlos dictated nonsensicalities in Latin, the students read French books, which exposed the ingenuous backwardness of their teachers."[54].

This interest of the students in the new French ideas had greater opportunity for satisfaction in Colonial Charcas, seat of the University of

Chuquisaca, in the region of Alto Perú (now Bolivia,) than in any other place in the Viceroyalty of La Plata. According to Guillermo Francovich, "the students read the encyclopedists, who were commented and discussed behind the back of the professors, who continued teaching the discredited scholastic traditions."[55]. In this the students had the encouragement of at least one influential figure, the Canon Matías Terrazas. Terrazas possessed the most famous library in Alto Perú, with numerous books which were prohibited to the general public but permitted to certain persons under license, and many prohibited altogether. Nevertheless Terrazas was willing to permit some of the students the use of his library, and the reading of the forbidden books. One of the students known to have read there was Mariano Moreno, who became the key figure in the movement for independence in Argentina. Korn and Francovich both emphasize the importance of the liberal influence of Chuquisaca for the independence movement in Argentina. According to Francovich, fourteen of the twenty-eight delegates to the Congress of Tucumán which proclaimed the complete severance of all the River Plate provinces from Spain, (1816) had studied there.[56]. Mariano Moreno's biographer, his brother Manuel, states that the leader of Argentine independence, in his student days at Chuquisaca, became acquainted with the writing of Bacon, the Jansenist, D'Aguesseau, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Raynal, among others.[57].

The dissemination of the revolutionary French ideas soon proved to be a factor of decisive importance in the historical events which took place beginning in 1810. When the triumph over Spain led the French Emperor to put his brother Joseph on the throne of the defeated Bourbon King Ferdinand VII, the Spanish colonies revolted in the name of the deposed sovereign,

refusing to accept Joseph's rule. Without the revolutionary ideas of freedom stemming from France (and the example of the French and American revolutions) the colonies might have consented to return to the rule of Ferdinand, after the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo resulted in his restoration. But inspired in the new libertarian ideals the colonies asserted their independence. With the movement for independence we enter the second stage in the transition from positivism to scholasticism.

B. THE TRIUMPH OF MODERNISM

With the growth of the influence of the French Encyclopedists we come to the threshold of the independence movement. In the latter part of the eighteenth century the chief problem for the leaders of thought in the colonies had been the accomodation to the new scientific thought of the Age of Rationalism. The great problem at the beginning of the nineteenth century was the adjustment to the new social and political ideas, which to the north had created an independent republic, and in France had overturned a dynasty. The latter adjustment was far more radical in its demands, for it could only lead to a double revolution; against the absolute rule of the King of Spain,[58] and against the static hierarchical order prevailing within the colonies. The acceptance of the ideas of the Encyclopedia, in other words, could only result in revolts and civil wars. To revolt against the rule of the Crown of Spain was a relatively simple thing, but the revolt against the colonial order, with its accompanying social, political, and economic privileges was a far more complicated process. The conservative forces were deeply entrenched within the life of the new nations, and the attempt to establish new patterns of thought and life met with resistance. This basic conflict between the old and the new now becomes the recurring pattern of Spanish American

history.[59]

1. Major French Influences in the Early Nineteenth Century

Amid the chaos and contradictions of the revolutionary period, what gradually triumphs is the influence of the French philosophers and historians. "So profound has been the influence of the Encyclopedists," writes Francovich, "that its spirit almost wholly dominated half of the nineteenth century."[60] Among the Encyclopedists, the influence of the Abbé Raynal, and that of Rousseau stands out above the others, although in the strictly philosophical field Condillac is more influential. Among later French philosophers, the chief influence is that of Destutt de Tracy, a disciple of Condillac.

a. The Abbé Raynal

The Abbé Raynal is today an unknown figure. His name does not appear today in the encyclopedias or the biographical dictionaries. Yet his impact on the minds of a number of the revolutionary leaders of Spanish America seems to havebeen second only to that of Rousseau. "The Philosophical and Political History of the Establishment and of the Commerce of Europeans in the Two Indies," was the imposing title of the most important work of this former Jesuit. Published in Holland in 1770 the history was prohibited in France as well as in Spain, nevertheless it found its way to the colonies, usually in the form of an abstract clandestinely printed in Spain. Like other works of the century, according to Alejandro Korn, (whose report regarding the influence of Raynal we follow at this point) it lacked in historical perspective. But to the restless and discontented spirits in the colonies it rang true! Korn has summarized its influence

in these words:

> "It was for our fathers the vehicle of the Voltairian spirit. All the ills of humanity--and especially those of Spain and its colonies--were derived from fanaticism and superstition. The hispano-phobic sentiment, so pervasive after the independence, fed itself with the arguments of Raynal: The Spaniards are an ignorant and fanatical race, which considers manual work degrading and dedicates its men to war, to monasteries, and to mendicancy; it tyrannizes the colonies with erroneous fiscal policies and with corrupt administration."[61].

No less impressive for those who dreamed of a new era in Spanish America than this scathing indictment of the action of Spain, however, was Raynal's bold prediction of a new day to come once the shackles of Spain were shaken off:

> "In these mountains there is being secretly regenerated a wholesome race, which someday, and soon perhaps, will reclaim its benefits, its rights and liberties, from the avid and cruel hands of the usurper of the New World. The hatred between the Spaniard and the creoles will bring about a revolution, and all the ills will be remedied with the development of agriculture, liberty of commerce, liberty of conscience and tolerance, and above all, with the suppression of the Holy Office, 'ce tribunal effroyable.' Commerce will cease being a monopoly, religion will cease being a superstition, the government will cease being a tyranny."[62].

Mariano Moreno's brother has written of the impression which the reading of Raynal in Canon Terraza's library produced on the revolutionary leader:

> "These pages of philosophical history fell as a sudden flash of light on his spirit. A horizon of light was opened to his eyes as he contemplated the erudite account of the prodigious development of the emancipated English colonies acquired under the impulse of a system of government and administration which had as its base the popular sovereignty."[63].

b. Jean Jacques Rousseau

Mariano Picón Salas, a Venezuelan historian, in a paper entitled "Rousseau in Venezuela," presented to the first Inter-American Congress of Philosophy at Yale University in 1943, has underscored the great importance of the influence of Rousseau at the beginning of the national existence of the Spanish American nations, as indeed all histories of this period have done. The early constitutions and constitutional projects, Picón Salas tells us, "were impregnated by a utopian moralism of strong Rousseaustic roots."[64]. One of the most interesting aspects of the influence of Rousseau was the propagation of the myth of a "virgin" America, whose "state of innocence" and "virtue" were reputed to be demonstration of the "natural goodness of man" corrupted by society. Picón Salas quotes the enraptured oration of a member of the Venezuela Congress of Independence who exclaimed:

> "The gothic edifice reared by our oppressors has tumbled and on its ruins there rises the mystic temple of fraternity, equality and social virtues. Venezuela has entered into the order of nature and the designs for which human nature was created."[65].

The influence of Rousseau on the youthful Simón Bolívar is well known. That influence was first received from his tutor, Simón Rodríguez. Rodriguez had drunk deeply from Rousseau and imbued his charge with his own enthusiasm. Rodríguez, one of the most interesting figures of the revolutionary era became more and more like a real life Don Quixote in his later years, even to the lean, cadaveric figure, and the passion for wild, idealistic schemes.[66].

Mariano Moreno was so deeply impressed by the "Social Contract", which he also read in the library of the Canon Terrazas, that it became the guiding light to all his political thinking. He made a translation of it and had it published in Buenos Aires in 1811, shortly after the first revolutionary government was established in 1810. Of the influence of the "Social Contract" Francovich says: "It was the breviary of the revolutionaries."[67].

c. The Abbé Condillac and Destutt de Tracy

In this period the philosophical interest in Spanish America, in so far as the theoretical problems of philosophy are concerned, turned particularly to the problem of the understanding, to the almost complete neglect of other aspects. In the eclectic phase Descartes and Locke had opened up a new view of the problem of knowledge. As the influence of the Encyclopedia becomes dominant at the turn of the century, the Abbé Condillac, a follower of Locke,[68]. but a much more extreme sensationalist, became the more influential, to be followed in turn by one of his disciples, Destutt de Tracy. According to Condillac and de Tracy, thought is but a reflection product of sensation. The rationalist and immanental conclusions to be drawn from this view were perfectly obvious to most of the American followers of this school, known as the "ideologists."[69]. Dr. Francovich writes of the influence of the "idôlogy" in Spanish America in the following words:

> "The influence of the philosophy of Destutt de Tracy among us is explainable, because the revolutionary movement which gave us our American nations independence was effected under the inspiration of the Encyclopedia. Though Destutt de Tracy was not one of them he followed their orientations. The "Ideology" was constructed on the great basic principles which sustained the Encyclopedia: the desire to place man on a worldly plane, with-

> in the laws of nature of which he forms a part; confidence in science, in philosophy, and human perfectibility; a passionate cult of reason; the desire to liberate men and society from the sway of religious conceptions."[70].

Drawing attention to the equation which Destutt de Tracy makes between thought and sense experience following Condillac, Francovich adds:

> "Hence the sensationalism, utilitarianism and the rationalism which animated the thought of Destutt de Tracy, making it so attractive to the Bolivians who had just fought a revolution in which they had tried to destroy all that was traditional, both in regard to institutions and in the mind."[71. 72.]

The texts of Destutt de Tracy became the study texts in a wide number of schools in the new republics. For a more detailed study of the influence of modernism we now turn to a consideration of developments in Mexico, Cuba, and Argentina.

1. Liberalism and Jacobinism in Mexico

With the beginning of the revolutionary period there came a serious decline in philosophical studies in Mexico. Interest turned to those subjects which had immediate social or political relevance. "There could not exist in those days of agitation, an interest in the theoretical problems of philosophy or pure science, "writes Professor Ramos. On the other hand, "the works of Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, circulated from hand to hand among the lawyers of the capital, provincial canons, the parish priests."[73].

With the coming of independence Mexico became engulfed in alternating periods of anarchy and dictatorship, punctuated with attempts to establish utopian constitutions. There was even a short lived attempt to establish a creole empire. Through it all a new idea was taking deep root; the idea of

political liberty for the individual. "A new faith had been born among the Mexicans, "writes Ramos, "faith in one of the values most particularly neglected in colonial life, human liberty. For them to give man liberty was to give him the means for his perfecting. Liberty and progress were the directing ideas of Mexican life during all of the nineteenth century."[74] Ramos follows Anibal Sánchez Reulet in calling this new faith liberalism. "The liberal", writes Sánchez Reulet "was the one who had ceased being servile, the one who had conquered his liberty." To which he adds, "Liberalism was also something more than the rhetorical exaltation of an abstract liberty; it was a political expression of the wordly modern faith, the belief in the immanental perfection of man."[75]

The chief apostle of liberalism in the early part of the nineteenth century in Mexico was Dr. José Luis Mora, who enjoyed a tremendous intellectual ascendancy. "Dr. Mora is the Rousseau of the Mexican liberals," says Mexico's leading twentieth century philosopher, Antonio Caso. "The same influence which the 'Citizen of Geneva' had over the French revolutionaries, Mora came to have over those of his party."[76] Dr. Mora was the leading philosopher of Mexico in the period immediately following the independence.[77] In 1833, during the presidency of Valentin Gómez Frías, himself an outstanding exponent of the new "liberal" thought, the ancient University of Mexico, which had opened its doors in 1553 as the "Universidad Real y Pontificia", was closed. In its place the government established the "Institute of Ideological and Humanistic Studies", and various unrelated schools for professional training. The Institute had a chair of "ideology", which was entrusted to Dr. Mora.

The liberal thought of Mexico soon took on a decidedly materialistic character. One of these materialistic expressions was phrenology. It was introduced by José Ramón Pacheco in 1835, not as a psychoanatomical curiosity as we now conceive it, but as the last word in philosophy to end all other philosophies! "The object of phrenology," wrote Pacheco, "is seen in its consequences, for it demolished the systems of philosophy which preceded it, demonstrates their uselessness, falsity and insufficiency, and rectifies or completes metaphysics, ideology and psychology."[78] That such statements could ever have been taken seriously now seems incredible, yet bitter and lengthy controversies raged for years as catholic writers sought to combat the influence of this materialism which seems not to have lacked numerous devoted proselytes.

Far more important than the influence of phrenology, however, was the belligerent materialism of the anti-clerical forces whose leader was Ignacio Ramírez (1818-1879), frequently called the "Voltaire of Mexico." Though standing at opposite poles ideologically, Antonio Caso praises Ramirez as one of Mexico's greatest heroes. "He had efficacy and boldness, constancy and love. He was great, one of the greatest and purest of Mexicans."[79] It would be difficult to understand the moral ascendancy of Ramírez apart from the follies of the Catholic party which repeatedly supported corrupt and sanguinary political and military leaders, seeking favor for the church. In contrast, the sincerity and absolute integrity of Ramírez lent conviction to his words. Ignacio Altamirano, disciple and biographer of Ramírez, who also became a great anti-clerical leader in Mexican history calls him "patriot without blemish, disinterested liberal, honest and upright administrator."[80]

Ramírez was a noted orator. His most famous speech is a lecture presented in 1836 before the academy of sciences and letters which had been formed in the Colegio de San Juan de Letrán. The proposition of his discourse was: "There is no God, natural beings sustain themselves." His proof was simple. Basing himself on the notion of the indestructibility of matter and consequent eternity, he concluded that there was no need either for creator or conserver.[81]. How easily impressed his hearers were by his display of "scientific" knowledge is shown by the statement of Altamirano: "Ramírez, backing up his thesis, let flow a torrent of science which astonished his hearers (and) which O'erleaping the walls of the academy, flooded the city and spilled over the country."[82].

Professor Caso has summarized the work of Ramírez in these words:

> "His entire work breathes a frank hatred against the European conquerors, against the Hispanic and the Catholic. He desired to remove the entrails of the fatherland in order to extirpate the blind faith in the foreign fetishes and the immaterial but most real submission to the Spanish regime. To close the Spanish past he wishes to substitute the catholic faith with the atheistic paganism which he himself professed."[83].

The anti-clerical movement inspired by Ramírez achieved tremendous political successes. Beginning with 1857, when the liberals gained the ascendancy, various measures were adopted whereby the Roman Catholic Church was not only disestablished, but all of its property confiscated. Again we turn to Caso's graphic prose, which suggests more accurately than less vivid words the passions involved in the struggle:

> "Jacobinism overthrew the altar, as the independence of the throne of Spain in America. It overthrew it physically and morally. It proposed to itself to level it with pickax

> and with law, with sword and with thought... Ramirez once, as a frenzied Lucifer, struck with strong hand over the sacred ornaments smashing the gems and making the pure gold of the chalices ring with pain. Our community broke decidedly the strong links of its traditional faith. For over half a century our Magna Carta displays the dogma of militant and triumphant Jacobinism. The Mexican state is and will be lay. The destructive ideology incorporated itself forever...thanks to the action of the congressmen of '57, into the national juridical organism."[84]

Thus did the balanced eclecticism, which Mexicans like Father Gamarra, who sought to reconcile their Catholicism with the ideas of the Enlightenment, give way before the rampant materialism and anti-clericalism which Caso has called Jacobinism. It could not be sustained in the face of the intransigence of the conservatives and the extremism of the modernists. Mexican society was divided into two sharply antagonistic groups, those favoring the Church and its teaching, and those opposed to it. But the action of Jacobinism, as Caso notes, was essentially negative. It contributed nothing positive to replace the ideas and institutions overthrown. This attempt belongs in the new era of the history of thought in Mexico, in which, conscious of their need, an effort is made to present a new system of thought as the basis for a new integration of society.

3. Christian Empiricists in Cuba

The development of philosophical thought in Cuba in the first part of the nineteenth century offers a decided contrast to that of Mexico. Although many dreamed of independence, Cuba did not sever its ties with Spain and enjoyed a stability not known in other parts of Spanish America during this period, though some of its ablest leaders were forced to live out their lives in exile because of their libertarian ideals. Under the aegis of a great liberal churchman, Bishop Espada of Havana, (1832), Cuba enjoyed

a flowering of culture at the beginning of the century. This distinguished prelate was the animating center of Cuba's social, economic, and intellectual progress. It is partly due to his influence that at the same time the leading thinkers of the insurgent colonies in other parts of Spanish America were accepting the extremes of the Encyclopedia, still colonial Cuba continued in the eclectic spirit which tried to reconcile faith and reason, religion and science. The foremost representatives of this effort were Father Félix Varela in the early part of the Century, and José de la Luz y Caballero at mid-century, though de la Luz placed himself outside of the Church.

a. Father Félix Varela (1788-1853)

Félix Varela was only twenty-two in 1811, when he was ordained to the priesthood and appointed professor of philosophy in Cuba's leading institution of higher learning, the Colegio Real de San Carlos. His triumph in the oppositions was not due solely to the sponsorship of the influential Bishop Espada; he was unquestionably the ablest thinker of his day in the colony.

Father Várela had been a pupil of Father Augustin Caballero, and upon assuming the chair of philosophy, carried out the educational reform which had been implicit in his teacher's rejection of scholasticism. This reform had three main aspects. The first and most radical innovation, since it was the first time it had been done in Spanish America, was the substitution of Spanish for Latin as the teaching language in philosophy. Secondly, he abandoned the traditional syllogistic form of exposition in favor of the development of his subject in the form of discourses. In the third place,

he separated physics from the philosophical curriculum, and established the teaching of physics and chemistry as experimental sciences.

Varela took his stand firmly in favor of eclecticism. In his first philosophical work, still expressed in the form of propositions, his initial proposition was: "the best of all philosophies is the eclectic." His second proposition is extremely interesting, not only for what it says but for what it explicitly denies: "the authority of the Holy Fathers in philosophical questions is the same as that of the philosophers whom they follow."[85].

Father Varela's "Lecciones de Filosofía," first published in 1817 and recently republished by the University of Havana, show the strong influence of eighteenth century rationalism. "All men" he begins stating, "have a desire to know and a natural light which indicates the way to secure this.[86]. He devotes a large section to a "Treatise on the Direction of the Understanding," which shows the strong influence of Destutt de Tracy, Condillac, Descartes, and Locke, whom he quotes extensively, though he does not consider himself bound by any of them. He follows the "Lecciones" with a "Treatise on Man" in which he includes a great deal of material which today would go under the heading of physiology and general psychology. The attempt to relate science and philosophy in this fashion is not only a lingering example of Aristotelianism, it is also the fore-runner of the positivist attempt to found the understanding of man as a chapter in the biological sciences.

The "Treatise on Man" contains his observations on morals. His description of conscience is most interesting and shows how completely he has fallen under the spell of rationalism. The operation of conscience he des-

cribes as:

> "The result of a syllogism whose major premise is the law, the minor is the deed, and the result is the sentence which we pronounce. Hence we have a 'good conscience when through the operation of the syllogism we find ourselves innocent, and "bad" when we deem ourselves guilty; and an upright (recta) conscience when we reason well, and erroneous when our reasoning is false."[87].

He introduces a curious blend of perfectionistic and utilitarian concepts when he says that "man calls good all that which causes a perfection in him and bad that which is contrary to his utility."[88].

In spite of the influence of sensationalism, however, we find in Varela no slavish following of Destutt de Tracy, such as we find among thinkers in other Spanish American countries. His metaphysics is still scholastic, and though his psychology is greatly influenced by the sensationalists, he retains the scholastic concept of soul. One of the clearest evidences of his continuing dependence on Aquinas is found in his concept of Law. In his exposition of law we find these definitions:

> "According to their origin laws are divided into human and divine, into natural and positive. Eternal divine law is named that which is considered in the mind of God, natural law is an emanation of this, promulgated by the law of nature. Positive (law) is that which is established in time, and this is either divine, contained in the sacred scriptures, or human, established by man. The human (law) is ecclesiastical or canonical, pertaining to the regime of the church or civil, pertaining to the entire body of society."[89. 90].

These principles are taken almost verbatim from St. Thomas.[91]. Nor does Varela show any originality in the treatment of the virtues. He accepts the four classic virtues of justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude and presents them in the traditional manner.

Father Varela is also influenced by the Thomist rationalism in his emphasis on natural religion, but his thought at this point reflects more directly the notion of "lux naturalis" as it is developed by Locke rather than by St. Thomas. To this notion of a "natural light" Varela adds distinctly utilitarian notions in his discussion of morals:

> "No one can deny that among men there is a love of the good and a knowledge of this good in the general relations of individuals... In every case there may be observed a natural light manifesting that which is favorable (lo que conviene) and that which repels (lo que repugna); but the reason of one individual by itself is not the basis of human operations, it must be the judgment of the majority of men which forms this norm."92.

An even clearer statement of a rational utilitarianism is his statement that there is "a natural light which prescribes our 'ought to be' to the advantage, first of ourselves, and then of our community," to which he adds, "The love of self must be superior to that which man has for his neighbors... reason dictates that between two things, one of them one's own and the other belonging to someone else, we should incline to what is one's own."93.

The closing chapter of Father Varela's "Lessons" is entitled "The Knowledge Which Man Has of His Creator and His Obligations Toward Him." "Man," he declares, "recognizes naturally that he owes everything to God, and in consequence offers him homages and submits his spirit to his divine mandates--this is the natural religion which must be one alone."94. He makes no attempt to reconcile this statement, with its clear recognition of the authority of the gospel commandment, with his previous statement that "the love of self must be superior", with its implied rejection of the command to "love your neighbor as yourself." This contradiction, however, is unusual in Varela. He was ever careful not to challenge the explicit

doctrinal and moral teachings of the Church. Indeed, it might well be said that Varela at heart remained a scholastic. His modernism consisted chiefly in departing from the routine of scholastic teaching methods and in bringing the discussions of philosophical matters more nearly up to date by incorporating certain ideas from the modern philosophers, beginning with Bacon and Descartes. Again, as in the case of Father Gamarra, in Mexico, his importance lies not so much in the intrinsic worth of his "modern" ideas, as in the example of his display of independence from traditional authority. "He was," wrote his successor as the leader of philosophical thought in Cuba, José de la Luz y Caballero, "our true Descartes (Cartesio) by virtue of destroying the principle of authority and of having as a consequence introduced freedom of philosophical thought."[95].

Varela ends his Lessons expressing the fervent hope that they may "contribute in some way to separate youth both from ridiculous fanaticism and from disastrous irreligiosity," and "inspire them with love for a religion which will make them happy, and for a country which founds on them...all its hope."[96]. The motive of his work is clear from this statement. He tried to come to terms with modern philosophy, not because his deepest interest was in philosophy as such, but rather that through philosophy he might defend the faith. He had become aware of the folly of trying to combat irreligion with mere scholastic repetitions, as if the entire development of thought from Bacon onward could be ignored. In the process of coming to terms with modern philosophy he was greatly influenced by it, and conceded substantially to sensationalism and utilitarianism,[97]. even while attempting to hold fast to all the tenets of the Church. But his purpose, at the same time that he was declaring his independence on questions of phi-

losophy, was to remain submissive and loyal on all matters of faith.

In 1821 Father Varela was elected a deputy to the Spanish Cortes (parliament). He sailed for Spain never to return to Cuba. In the Cortes, he introduced a project to grant autonomy to Cuba. But his political career was short lived. As a result of his vote favoring the deposition of the Spanish Monarch, Ferdinand VII, he was forced to flee from Spain when the King's forces defeated the parliamentary troops, and parliament was dissolved. Varela settled in the United States where he had a distinguished ecclesiastical career, contributing frequently to the Catholic Expositer. He continued, especially in the early years of his exile, to work for Cuban freedom, and remained in constant touch with his friends and followers in Cuba. His philosophical influence lingered through the use of his works as texts of philosophy in many schools, not only in Cuba but in other Spanish American countries, and through extensive correspondence with the leaders of thought in Cuba. He died in St. Augustine, Florida, in 1853.

b. José de la Luz y Caballero (1800-1862)

José de la Luz y Caballero, ablest of Father Varela's pupils in the Seminary of San Carlos and ward of Father Caballero, brilliantly carried forward the empiricist tradition in Cuba. Cuba remained under Spanish rule until 1895, but cultural and political conditions in Spain had determined the downfall of scholasticism, and a new freedom of philosophical inquiry was now possible throughout the Spanish dominion. Luz shows an even greater independence of thought than Varela, showing a complete freedom from scholastic influence.

Revered by Cubans since his own life time as the country's greatest educator, until recently Luz has been relatively unknown outside of Cuba. With the recent publication of his writing, heretofore largely scattered in private hands and in the periodicals of his day, his stature as one of the foremost thinkers in the history of Spanish America is increasingly being recognized.

1.) A Biographical note

José de la Luz y Caballero was born in Havana in 1800. A member of a distinguished Cuban family, son of a favorite niece of Father Caballero, Luz obtained his earliest education from the Franciscans. He entered the Seminary of San Carlos at the age of sixteen where he studied under both Varela and Caballero, taking work at the University at the same time. He entered minor orders, but stopped short of regular ordination; just why is not fully disclosed. In 1824 he became professor of philosophy at this Seminary of San Carlos, succeeding Varela's successor and his close friend José Antonio Saco. (Saco lived in exile most of his life. In Cuban philosphy his doctrinal position closely parallels that of Luz in its empirical aspects). In 1820 Luz was forced to give up his teaching at San Carlos because of ill health. He spent the next few years in the attempt to regain his health (he was never entirely well) and travelling abroad. In 1834 he became the Director of the Colegio San Cristobal and taught the university level philosophy course. As an educator Luz found his true vocation, but he was again forced to give up his position because of ill health. From 1838 to 1840, while teaching philosophy in the Convent of St. Francis he engaged in a series of polemics in the newspapers of Havana, in which he defended empiricism and attacked the "eclecticism" of Victor Cousin against

the followers of the French philosopher. It is on these polemical writings that his fame as a philosopher chiefly rests.

In 1848 Luz founded his own school, el Colegio del Salvador, which he directed until his death in 1862. Under his leadership El Salvador became the foremost school in Cuba. In this institute many of Cuba's greatest men and leaders in the struggle for independence were trained. To them Luz was "the Master of El Salvador".

The most tragic event in the life of Luz was the loss of his only child, a daughter. This tragedy had a profound effect on his thought and character, intensifying his religious bent.

2.) Luz y Caballero as an Educator and Moral Leader

Few men have been as conscious of the solemn responsibility of the teaching profession as Luz. "This ministry of teaching is sacred," he exclaims in his aphorisms, "teaching is a contract with God rather than with men."[98]. He conceived of his responsibility as an opportunity to moralize an entire nation. Chafing under Spanish rule, he deliberately renounced the path of agitation and revolution in order to prepare a generation which might be ready for the responsibilities of self-government. Replying to a friend who asked for his cooperation in a military insurrection he wrote: "Cuba is not prepared to enjoy independence; in order that it may be, I am a school teacher."[99].

Luz was a great teacher and universally recognized as the most erudite man in Cuba, but what impressed his students most deeply was his greatness of character. José Manuel Mestre,[100]. one of his pupils and himself one of

Cuba's great figures only voiced a general sentiment when he called him "the wisest, the most virtuous, the best among Cubans."[101]. A master in all subjects, Luz taught philosophy in El Salvador, and substituted in any of the other courses. But "his real chair," to use the expression of Professor Vitier,[102]. was outside of the academic program. "It was in the Saturday devotional addresses, when the master "would appear silently, illumined by the meditation, with a copy of the New Testament in his hand." He would take a verse from the Gospels or St. Paul for his subject, and speak to pupils and faculty "not with the coldness of the exegete, but with the fervor of the believer."[103]. Luz firmly believed in "the necessity of strong religious education to form men who will be men."[104]. By this he did not mean the memorization of the catechism. At various times he expressed the belief that "there could be no better course on morals than one in which, not catechism, but the gospel itself, just as it is written is taken for text."[105]. These Saturday talks were the example of what he meant by "strong religious education." As time went on their memory became hallowed in the mind of his students.

3.) The Polemical Empiricism of Luz

Luz y Caballero unequivocally took his stand as an empiricist in philosophy. He considered Locke, whose "Essay on the Human Understanding" is his constant point of reference, as the truest interpreter of the origin of knowledge, and it was in defense of Locke's ideas that he embarked on the polemics which stirred the intellectual atmosphere of Havana with a philosophical interest evidenced nowhere else in Spanish America. The main critics of Locke in Havana at this time were the followers of Victor Cousin. For a period of almost three years, beginning in May of 1838, Luz engaged

in a series of five heated controversies impugning Cousin's eclecticism and defending the superiority of empiricism. The leading representatives of the forces of Cousin were Manuel Gonzalez del Valle (1802- ?) professor of philosophy in the University of Havana for more than thirty years, together with his brother José Zacarías (1820-1851). Manuel had also been a pupil of Varela, and he shows his awareness of the modern trends, but alarmed by the extremisms of the ultra-sensationalist followers of Locke he took refuge in Cousin's eclecticism, repudiating Locke as well. Luz also rejected the positions of the extreme sensationalist, but vigorously opposed Cousin and took his stand on Locke.

Professor José Gaos has attributed a basic political intention to Luz's opposition to Cousin, "because such a philosophy was, as its antecedent the Hegelian, an optimistic philosophy tending to justify as rational all that was real---and established, and to conserve it: such a philosophy would be changed if need be by means of revolution or war against the metropolis."[106] There is undoubtedly a core of truth in Gaos' observation, although no documentary evidence is available to show that his political intention was uppermost.[107] Writing to a friend he states that he "had impugned some doctrines of Cousin because they seemed to me to be harmful to the progress of the sciences."[108] But whatever the ulterior motive, there was in Luz inner compulsion to do battle for what he conceived to be the truth. "You know to what an extent and with what delirium I love truth!"[109] he exclaims in the same letter. He felt Cousin's eclecticism to be a dangerous philosophy, but even more so, a false one. "The eclecticism of the new French school," he states in the first proposition written for the philos-

ophy course he taught at the Franciscan Convent in 1839, is not only a false system, but an impossible one."[110].

As an empiricist, Luz took his stand squarely on Locke's dictum that all our knowledge is derived from experience. This principle, he declared, does not mean that knowledge and sensation are the same thing, and that the mind is only the passive recipient of sense impression. "Who has said that sensationalism holds that all is sensation?" he challenged. The only thing that this doctrine affirms is that the point of departure for all our knowledge is to found in experience, without pretending for one moment to deny the activity of the soul. Each thing in its place; objects furnish us the materials, the senses serve as the vehicles, the soul is the agent which understands and wills."[111]. His interpretation of Locke's "tabula rasa" is that there are no innate ideas, in the understanding, but that this does not mean a purely passive role for the soul: "the soul would be purely passive only if it had no faculties."[112]. Luz believed in the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul, which he called "facts demonstrated by science,"[113]. and insisted that he had yet to be shown that from Locke's "most innocent principle" there is any "necessary deduction of materialism."[114]. On the other hand, to deny the sensate origin of knowledge was for him a denial of the validity of the empirical approach, and a retreat into obscurantism and superstition.

4.) The Moral Thought of Luz y Caballero

Luz did not produce any systematical philosophical works. His views on moral theory, as on other subjects, must be gleaned from his aphorisms and from statements made in the polemics where the question of morals was

an important theme. Luz was a moderate empiricist in ethics as in psychology. He denied that the field of morals is outside of the range of empirical investigation and believed that the knowledge to be gained from science could be of great help to mankind in understanding human behavior and in the quest for a better life. But he tried to make a distinction between the precepts of morality and theorizing as to the why of these precepts. The basic principles on which human conduct must be based, he felt, are one and the same for mankind: "there are certain principles which are and must be universal,"[115]. but the applications of these principles varies from one age to another, and with circumstances, and moral theory varies just as views on metaphysics may vary.

The great problem in Luz's day with regard to moral theory was the validity of the utilitarian ethic. Luz made his opposition to a narrowly conceived utilitarianism absolutely clear. Condemning what he called the morality of (self) interest he declared: "The morality of interest opens before an abyss of evils; these are its necessary consequences: First, the forgetfullness of our duties; second the pretension of satisfying man only with physical pleasures; third, the degradation of national character."[116]. But in discussing utilitarianism as a moral theory he spoke in favor of the conception of the "general good",[117]. a term he preferred to the word utility, which he considered ambiguous. "Useful is a railroad, but more useful is justice,"[118]. he said, illustrating this ambiguity. José Zacarías Gonzalez del Valle had written: "I believe that morality is based on the ancient maxim of fulfilling our duties, hence that man is good who complies with it without regard to consequences."[119]. Referring to himself as a man who "lives and dies under the inflexible law of duty,"[120]. Luz replied that

there could be no essential contradiction between what is done from a sense of duty, rightly understood, and that which is done for the general good; indeed that a notion of the general good is needed in order to illumine the content of duty. "Is it not evident," he asked, "that nature itself forces us to test duty in the crucible of the general good? Hence, the law of duty, far from being opposed to the principle of the greatest usefulness finds in it its most solid support."[121].

If Luz saw no conflict between formalism and utilitarian theory, neither did he see any conflict between an empirical morality and the gospel morality. He believed that no better moral instruction could be found than that contained in the Gospels, and as we have already seen, he made them his moral textbook. It is not strange, therefore, to find that his most profound reflections on the subject of morals comes not from his readings in philosophy but from his inspiration in the New Testament. Luz clearly understood that evil resides in man himself and not merely in his external circumstances. "Alas," he exclaims in one of his aphorisms, "that men should have to operate under the influence of the penal code."[122]. "Institutions," he declares, "cannot be good and perfect while men are not good and perfect."[123]. But as a Christian he does not wholly despair of man, "The Christian moralists are those who both most trust and distrust in human nature."[124]. And as a Christian he sees in Christianity, not an abstract ideal or a sterile norm but the power which man needs for his perfecting: "Christianity is not an end (un término), but a seed fecund in fruits without end for the betterment of humanity."[125].

5.) Luz y Caballero as a Religious Thinker

Luz y Caballero is unique among the recognizedly great thinkers of

Spanish America in the intensity of his religious sentiments and in the way in which he combined an independent, empirical philosophical position with a great Christian faith. Only Antonio Caso, of Mexico, in the present century, can be compared with him in this respect. Religious faith was the greatest force in Luz's life. This is most evident in his aphorisms, where he opened his heart as did Pascal in his celebrated "Pensées". Rafael García Báreena in the prologue to the University of Havana edition of his aphorisms states:

> "The most distinct characteristic in the thought and attitude of Luz y Caballero is his intimate and essential religiousness... His primary, fundamental attitude before the things of this world in which he is immersed is not the cognitive, nor the active, it is not the aesthetic, nor even the ethical, but the purely religious."[126].

"Religion is the soul of the soul,"[127]. declares Luz. He could not conceive of life without faith: "What is life without faith? It is not life: it is hell in life. To live it is necessary to believe without seeing."[128]. In a thought reminiscent of Pascal he exclaims: "We are at sea, faith and forward."[129].

For Luz there was no essential difference between religion and philosophy. As José Ferrater Mora in his justly famed "Dictionary of Philosophy" states: "The coincidence of religious truth and philosophy is not the product of a forced assimilation and conciliation of doctrines, but the manifestation of two aspects of reality which have their ultimate foundation in the truth of God."[130]. But the man of faith had ascendancy over the man of reason. With the irreparable loss of his only child, this faith was tried to its depths: "The day, a dark blot without end for my soul; the night, the same as the day," he cries.[131]. Remembering the words "Come unto

me all ye that suffer and are heavy laden," he responds, "I do nothing but come with my bleating to the call of the Shepherd, of that good shepherd who gives his life for his sheep."[132].

An excellent case can be made for the thesis that Luz y Caballero was essentially a "Protestant" thinker, though he never spoke against the Roman Church and there is no record that he had any relation to a Protestant church. He was Protestant, not in any ecclesiastical sense, but in the sense that being a deeply Christian thinker, he was nevertheless sturdily independent in mind and spirit. He stood for freedom of inquiry, not only in philosophy, but also in religion. We have noted his "protestant" emphasis on the superiority of the gospels over the catechism or any other text for the teaching of Christian morality. He drew his own inspiration directly from the Bible.

The clearest evidence for his independent Christianity lies in the manner of his death. One of his pupils and biographers, Manuel Sanguilly, tells the story of Luz y Caballero's last moments on earth with the authority of personal witness. As he lay dying, Don Pepe, as he was affectionately called by his friends, was urged to summon a priest for the last rites of the Roman Catholic Church in order that he might "get right with God." The dying man quietly but firmly refused saying, "Always, during all my life, my son, I have been right with God."[133].

6.) A Final Estimate

The nineteenth century in Spanish American thought is the century of reaction away from the Church and from Christianity. In moral philosophy the universal tendency of those thinkers who left the tutelage of the Church

was to propose a "lay", that is, an irreligious morality or to reinterpret Christianity in terms pure humanitarianism. Luz y Caballero is the great exception. Though carried away in his enthusiasm for sensationalism to a dangerous degree, as when he states, "physiology is the foundation of all psychology, and hence of all rational and moral philosophy,"[134]. Luz stood firm on what he believed to be the great Christian essentials. St. Paul he considered, "the first philosopher of Christendom,"[135]. (first in the sense of greatest) and he never lost the dimension of transcendence in his thought. The cross was for him the "ladder between heaven and earth."[136].

Perhaps Luz himself is largely responsible for the fact that as a Christian thinker he left no significant followers. His synthesis of empirical and religious thought was not explicit and coherent but essentially personal. He left no systematic body of thought to oppose to the growing secular optimism of his century, with its naive faith in science and evolution. Though immensely revered in his person, his philosophical writings were neglected by his countrymen, not to be rescued until our own day. Even yet, to this writer's knowledge, there has been no really adequate interpretation of Luz y Caballero as a Christian thinker. As Spanish American thinkers seek to find a more profound basis for the new sense of moral values which is stirring Spanish American philosophy, and to relate it to the Spanish American tradition, they will do well to look into the Christian thought of Luz y Caballero.

None of the immediate disciples of this Cuban philosopher is worthy to rank beside him as a philosopher. It is left for Enrique José Varona, a boy of thirteen in the provincial city of Camaguey when Luz died to pick up his mantle. Varona, from his earliest writings ascribes to Luz a deep

influence in his philosophical formation, but it is evident that only the empiricist and not the Christian trend in the thought of Luz made any impression on Varona. For Varona is a thorough going positivist, who nowhere manifests anything except contempt for Christianity. It is not what Luz y Caballero hoped for from his example.

4. Ideologists in Argentina[137].

a. Juan Crisóstomo Lafinur (1797-1835)

After the final expulsion of the Spanish forces from the River Plate, in 1819, a new school was founded in Buenos Aires, "El Colegio de la Union del Sud." In open competition, a young man of twenty-two, who did not even possess a university degree obtained the chair of Philosophy. Juan Crisóstomo Lafinur became the first teacher of philosophy in Argentina who was a layman, the first to teach in the Spanish language, rather than in Latin, and the first altogether to abandon the scholasticism as a system. In place of scholasticism Lafinur began teaching the philosophy of the French sensationalists, thereby initiating an "ideological tradition" which was carried forward after him by Fernandez de Aguero, and Diego de Alcorta.[137].

For the student of philosophy, Lafinur's work has a purely historical interest. He was undoubtedly a brilliant young man, but he had the faults of immaturity and the shortcomings of the self-trained mind, for he never knew the discipline of systematic studies under able instructors. We turn to him, therefore, for illustration of the way in which the ideas of the French philosophers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century were transplanted to Argentina, and for his significance as the spokesman for the new modes of thought being divulged after the independence.

Lafinur was born in San Luis in 1797. He studied at the old colonial school of Monserrat, in Rosario. His real acquaintance with the French philosophers, however, seems to have come through the influence of Jean Dauxion Lvoysée, the director of the academy of mathematics in the revolutionary army of General Belgrano which Lafinur joined at the age of seventeen.

Lafinur's course opens with a two page survey of the history of philosophy, in which Newton is placed as the pinnacle and crown of the entire history of thought. As we read on, the influence of the French sensationalists becomes quickly manifest. "All ideas are derived from sensation," he states categorically in the section on Logic.[138]. In metaphysics, however, he attempts to retain an eclectic viewpoint, declaring: "A simple gaze at the admirable order which reigns in nature convinces us that there is an eternal motor, a supreme intelligence,"...[139]. "not the world alone preaches the existence of creative Being, we ourselves had him engraved in our souls with indelible characters."[140]. The influence of Savoyard Vicar becomes apparent in this statement: "There are two things which philosophy must respect, Jean Jacques Rousseau frequently declared, God and the spirituality of the soul. These great objects are the support of all morality and the foundation of public and private happiness."[141]. Raising the question of the immortality of the soul, Lafinur concludes: "It is more than probable. Nothing more is needed than to add the promises of revelation in order to constitute a complete certainty regarding it."[142]. Lafinur also follows Rousseau in considering man's highest quality to be his freedom, but he follows the example of Voltaire and other French philosophers in accepting Locke's definition of liberty as "the power to execute or will

and to act according to our wishes."[143].

Sra. Chioldi observes that the moral interest is uppermost in Lafinur and calls his "the first organic effort realized in this country to establish the bases of a lay morality."[144]. Lafinur attempts to get away from supernatural sanctions and to found morality within the human conscience itself. The concluding section of his course is an expression of complete confidence in the capacity of man to transcend the animal level and to move toward moral well being, though he makes no attempt to explain how such a conclusion can be justified on the basis of a purely sensationalist theory of knowledge.

How strong conservative influences remained in the new republic is shown by the fact that conservative forces drove Lafinur from his chair after only two years of teaching. He was forced to flee from Buenos Aires, finding temporary refuge in Mendoza, where he was able to teach only a few months before the conservatives again forced him to escape. This time he found refuge in Chile, where he died at the early age of twenty-seven.

b. J. M. Fernandez de Agüero (1772-1840)

Lafinur's successor, J. M. Fernandez de Agüero proved to be much more radical in his philosophical positions. A much older man, Fernandez was a priest who had taught philosophy in the Colegio de San Carlos from 1805-1807 at which time he seems to have confined his teaching to the traditional scholasticism. During the years of struggle for independence he became a convert to the ideas of the French sensationalists. A new government came into office in Buenos Aires, whose leading spirit was Bernardino Rivadavia as

minister of state. In 1824 Rivadavia became president. Rivadavia was completely devoted to the modern ideas. He had travelled widely in Europe, was on intimate terms with Destutt de Tracy and carried on an active correspondence with Bentham. One of the first actions of Rivadavia as minister was the founding of the University of Buenos Aires, to take the place of the Colegio de la Union del Sud. Fernandez de Agüero became the professor of philosophy in the new university. He was more fortunate than Lafinur, for he enjoyed the protection of the government, and all efforts to oust him were unsuccessful until after the downfall of Rivadavia's regime in 1827 when Fernandez resigned.

As a teacher Fernandez is a far abler and more systematic expositor than Lafinur. He criticized his predecessor because "to a confessed sensationalism he united a traditional metaphysic," and says of Lafinur that he had no "metaphysical mentality--only fervor."[145]. In addition to the common influence of Condillac and Destutt de Tracy, Fernandez de Agüero shows the deep influence of the French physician-philosopher, Cabanis,[146]. whom he follows to the point of denying the immateriality of the soul, though still affirming the existence of an animating principle which he identifies with God.[147]. It is not strange that after identifying the psychical with the physiological he should declare that "the moral is nothing but the physical considered under another aspect,"[148]. and that "it is necessary to consult the physiologists and abandon the theologians."[149]. In religious thought Fernández carries his heterodoxy so far as to deny the divinity of Jesus whom he calls "the philosopher of Nazareth."

"Fernández de Agüero's ethics are a curious blend of rationalism and utilitarianism as exemplified in this paragraph.

> "...We cannot destroy in ourselves the sentiment of self-interest as the precise condition of our existence; on the contrary, we must satisfy it as much as possible, taking care to avoid, also from self-interest, having it drag us to troublesome consequences and precipitating us into painful conditions. We have only one means to this end, and that is to subordinate it to the voice of justice and reason when they demand its sacrifice. There, as we conceive it, is the art of being happy."[150].

Fernandez asserts that the "physiological" principle of sympathy is the basis of all morality. In favor of this principle he calls on the "philosopher of Nazareth", paraphrasing the commandments to say: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy inmost heart, with all the strength of thy soul, and according to the lights of thy reason; and thy neighbors with the same kind of love with which thou dost love thyself."[151]. Sympathy he believes is natural, the basis of the natural goodness of man. "Who could doubt," he challenges, "that there surely exists in human nature that need to sympathize, that natural goodness."[152]. (bondad,--often rendered kindness).

c. Diego de Alcorta (-1842)

Following the retirement of Fernandez de Aguero in 1828, Diego de Alcorta, a physician, succeeded to the chair of philosophy, which he occupied until his death in 1842. Alcorta is also a follower of Condillac, de Tracy, and Cabanis, but he limits himself with utter circumspection to the strict analysis of the problem of the understanding.[153]. "His concise exposition avoids digressions and polemics and no sectarian whim alters his equanimity", declares Alejandro Korn.[154]. As the leading physician of Buenos Aires and universally respected because of his irreproachable character, he was above all controversies, and even in the dark days of the

tyrant Juan Manuel de Rosas, he seems to have gone imperturbably about his teaching. The only exception to this strict confinement to the epistemological issue was his interest in the ethical. Korn quotes Alcorta as stating:

> "There is merit and lack of merit in our actions. This principle, which no one can deny, whatever his physiological viewpoints may be supposes the consciousness of moral liberty in man. This is for us a truth of the sentiment, of which we are certain by our own experience and which, as a simple sentiment cannot and need not be defined."155.

"One might say," observes Korn with admirable irony, "that the statue of Condillac had leaped." Korn indicates, however, that Alcorta failed to follow up this insight for in his analysis of the factors which make up character he lists only external influences and makes no place for the inner and autonomous personal factor, the "energy (which) imposes itself on the environment, not to receive, but to exercise and influence."156. Alcorta, however, was a finer person by far than his principles, and his memory was deeply revered by his students.

d. Estéban Echeverría and the "Asociación de Mayo"

Even while Alcorta was still teaching in the University a new generation of Argentine leaders was being formed, who came to positions of power and influence after the fall of the dictator, Rosas, and helped set the course of the ideological development of the nation for the next three quarters of a century. Their earliest leader was a romantic poet and utopian thinker, named Estéban Echeverria, (1805-1851) who travelled in France in the early days of the monarchy of Louis Philippe, and came under the spell of the nineteenth century French Romantics, especially Saint Simon, Lamennais,

and Pierre Leroux. Echevarría was a rebel, who represents a renewal of the spirit of Mariano Moreno, the revolutionary leader inspired by Rousseau. Echeverría's most famous work is entitled "El Dogma Socialista". The Saint-Simonian inspiration is evident in the title; in content, Korn calls it "a copy of the "Paroles d'un Croyant," of Lamennais.[157]

Together with Juan Bautista Alberdi, who became Argentina's foremost social philosopher, Vicente Fidel López, Argentina's leading nineteenth century historian, Bartolomé Mitre, future great president of the country, and others Echeverría formed a secret society which was called "Joven Argentina," but which soon came to be known as the "Asociación de Mayo."[158] For discussion in one of the earliest meetings of the group, Echeverría presented a paper entitled, "Código o Declaraciones de los Principios Sociales que Constituyen la Creencia Social de la Republica Argentina." In this study Echeverría speaks of the need for religion, then expresses the thought that natural religion is superior to supernatural, and that Christianity is the greatest positive religion "because it is nothing other than the revelation of the moral instincts of humanity."[159]

For a time in Argentina, it seemed as if the colonial absolutism had been restored in an even more virulent form than under the rule of Spain. In 1835 Juan Manual de Rosas seized the government, to begin a tyrannical regime of eighteen years. Known in Argentine history as "the restoration," the government of Rosas succeeded in obtaining the ecclesiastical patronage formerly held by the Crown of Spain, and in turn reestablished the privileges and prerogatives of the church, including the Index. The works of Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Destutt de Tracy, Bentham and many others were prescribed by action of the government. But the price the Church had to pay

for the restoration of its privileges and the renewing of what Koran calls, "the partnership of absolutism with the church," was to serve as one of the instruments of the tyranny. With the fall of Rosas, it was inevitable that the Church should suffer as well, but unlike Mexico, which did not have the influence of a movement of liberal religious such as that inspired by Lamennais in Argentina, the opposition to the Church did not reach the extremes we have observed in the Aztec republic. In the new constitution adopted in 1853, written under the influence of Alberdi, the Church retained its status as a State Church, while all other cults were granted complete toleration. It is clear, however, that this position was accorded to the Church on the grounds of expediency, for the attitude of Alberdi and the rest of the members of the "Asociación de Mayo" to official Catholicism was anything but friendly. But there was none of that indiscriminate rejection of religion and desire to uproot the past manifested in the Jacobinism of Mexico.

The action of the members of the Asociación de Mayo as leaders of government, however, belongs to the next stage in our study. During this period, most of them knew the bitterness of exile, banished by the tyrant. In exile, their spirits became tempered and their youthful passions became harnessed to great convictions. They gained perspective and maturity, as they prepared themselves for the responsibilities which were to fall upon them. Echeverría did not share the triumph of his colleagues, for he died in 1851, but in his friends, his influence lived on. We cite the words of Ingenieros:

"The Saint-Simonian generation gave the country its most

> illustrious statesmen and thinkers. Casting off juvenile romanticisms they adapted themselves to political reality, and in various ways transfused the liberal and revolutionary spirit of Moreno, Dorrego, and Rivadavia to the struggles for the organization of the nation which occupied the rest of the nineteenth century."[160].

The story of the action of this "Saint-Simonian generation" in Argentina after the fall of Rosas is the story of the triumph of Positivism.

6. FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

1. Cf. Chapter I, p. 5

2. Hopper, Stanley R., The Crisis of Faith. Nashville-Abingdon-Cokesbury, 194 F.

3. Ramos, Samuel, Historia de la Filosofía en México. México, Imprenta Universitaria, 1943. p. 49.

4. Sanchez, Reulet, op.cit., p. 190

5. Mendez Plancarte, Gabriel, Humanistas del Siglo XVIII. México. Universidad Nacional Autónoma. 1941.

6. Navarro, Bernabé, La Introducción de la Filosofía Moderna en México. Mexico, 1948. El Colegio de México.

7. Of Clavijero's course, only the "Physica" has been found.

8. Ibid., p. 64.

9. Quoted by Navarro, op. cit., p. 229.

10. Ibid., p. 200.

11. Cf. "The very recent discovery of the philosophical works of Abad and Clavijero, and of others and the knowledge of their doctrines and attitudes has considerably changed the estimate of Gamarra. For this first modernity and modernization which in large measure was attributed to Gamarra is being moved backward, to rest principally upon these Jesuits." Ibid., p. 41. As the later section on Gamarra will emphasize, it is he and not the Jesuits who must be considered the key figure in the introduction of modernism in Mexico.

12. Korn, op. cit., p. 93

13. Ibid., p. 93-94.

14. Ibid., p. 94.

15. Quoted by Ramos, op. cit., p. 56

16. All books were not universally prohibited. Special licenses were granted for the reading of certain books. These licenses varied in the degree of liberty permitted.

17. Whittaker, A. P. (editor) Latin America and the Enlightenment. New York. Appleton Century Co., 1942. p. 35.

18. Perez Marchand, Monelisa, Dos Etapas Ideológicas del Siglo XVIII en México a través de los Papeles de la Inquisición. México, El Colegio de México, 1945. p. 24.

19. Sanchez, op. cit., p. 190

20. Whittaker, op. cit., p. 72.

21. Lanning, John T. Academic Culture in the Spanish Colonies. New York. Oxford University Press, 1940. p. 74.

22. Perez Marchand, op. cit., p. 26.

23. Whittaker, op. cit., p. 90.

24. Ramos, op. cit., p. 77.

25. A translation into Spanish of the chief writings of Gamarro was published by the University of Mexico in 1947 under the title Tratados, including the entire Elementa Recentioris Philosophiae. The selections quoted are taken from this edition.

26. Diaz de Gamarra, Juan B. Tratados México, Universidad Nacional Autónona, 1947.

27. Ibid., p. 153.

28. Ibid., p. 163

29. Ibid., p. 163

30. Ibid., p. 165

31. Ibid., p. 44

32. In taking the "eclectic" position, Gamarra echoes these words of Clement of Alexandria: "I do not call philosophy either the stoic or the platonic, the epicurean or the Aristotelian, but whatever is well said in any of these sects, if they teach justice and science accompanied by piety. All this, selected and joined together, I call philosophy." Quoted by José Gaos, Ibid., p. XI. (The above quotation is translated from the Spanish, as quoted by Gaos.)

33. Téllez, Valverde E., Apuntaciones Históricas Sobre la Filosofiá Méxicana. México, Herrero Hermanos, 1896. p. 151.

34. Caso, Antonio. "Juan Benito Diaz de Gamarra - Un Filósofo Méxicano Discípulo de Descartes," Revista de Literatura Méxicana, No. 2 p. 212.

35. Ramos, op. cit., p. 92.
The Peruvian philosopher and critic, Francisco García Calderón, states that the "Mercurio Peruano" was disseminating new philosophical and scientific concepts in Lima at the end of the century.

36. Ramos, op. cit., p. 92.

37. Ibid., p. 103-104.

38. The University of Habana was in a decadent state at the time, and the Seminario de San Carlos was the leading center of philosophical studies for a long period.

39. Agramonte, Roberto, José Augustin Caballero. La Habana. Universidad de La Habana, 1952. p. 36.

40. Caballero, José Augustin, Philosophia Electiva. La Habana, Editorial de la Universidad de la Habana, 1944. p. LV.

41. Vitier, Medardo, La Filosofiá en Cuba. México. Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1948. p. 52.

42. Caballero, op. cit., p. 9

43. Ibid., p. 19.

44. The form "electiva" is the Latin equivalent for the Greek chosen out.

45. Ibid., 209.

46. Ibid., p. 5.

47. Quoted by: Agramonte, op. cit., p. X.

48. Quoted by: Vitier, Medardo, Las Ideas en Cuba. La Habana. Editorial Trópico, 2 Vols. 1938. Vol. II. p. 80.

49. Quoted by: Korn, op. cit., p. 100 and Ingenieros, op. cit., p. 129.

50. The chair of philosophy at San Carlos was held for the greater part of this period, and until the independence, by Dr. J. Chorroarín, whose teaching Korn calls "a conventional expression of anachronistic doctrines." Ibid., p. 105.

51. Quoted by Korn. Op. cit., p. 107.

52. Ibid., p. 109.

53. Ibid., p. 107

54. Ingenieros, op. cit., p. 151.

55. Francovich, Guillerno, La Filosofía in Bolívia. Buenos Aires. Editorial Lozado, 1941. p. 61.

56. Ibid., p. 62

57. Korn, op. cit. p. 112.

58. A word of caution is in order at this point. The influence of Rousseau and the Encyclopedists is not to be understood as the sole, or even the predominant influence in the movement for independence in the Spanish American colonies. "Careful students of the history of Spanish America, are not able to explain that movement as chemists explain a reaction, by a formula," writes W. Spence Robertson, author of "The Rise of the Spanish American Republics" and leading authority on the American independence movement. The most important cause in the revolution he terms "the conviction that the burdens of the colonial regime were unendurable,--the oppressive fiscal system of Spain was particularly detestable." (Robertson, The Rise of the Spanish American Republics, p. 315). The independence movement is a vast and complex development, extending for more than eighteen years, from the time of the first revolutionary attempt of Francisco Miranda, in Venezuela, in 1806 to the final triumph of General Sucre in the battle of Ayacucho, Perú in 1824. It involves a great number of leaders in a vast continent; men who acted under the most varied motivations. It is clear that some of the most important of these leaders, such as Miranda, Bolivar, Salas, and Moreno, found in the ideas of the French Revolution the ideals by which they wished to remake the colonies. But the first step had to be independence from the crown of Spain.

    It is also necessary to remember that the proportion of the population of Spanish America possessed of the new ideas was exceedingly small. Most of the population did not possess a definite ideology of any kind, and many of the intellectuals remained loyal to the older ideas.

59. This is still the basic explanation of the changing political scene in Spanish America. In an article entitled, "Una Interpretación de las Dictaduras Latinoaméricanas", published in the excellent Mexican review, "Cuadernos Américanos", September-October, P. 954, Alberto Rangel Analyzes the present rash of Latin-American dictatorships saying: "In our geographical setting, feudalism, inherited from the colonies, is carrying on its war against the rising forms of modern organization." This is a cultural as well as a political, economic, and social struggle. In the varied panorama of twenty-one Latin American (19 Spanish American) countries, however, this struggle is more complex than ever before, and broad generalizations would have to be qualified for each country.

60. Francovich, op. cit., p. 62.

61. Korn, op. cit., p. 112.

62. Ibid., p. 113.

63. Quoted by Francovich, op. cit., p. 61.

64. Reprinted in "La Nueva Democracia", Vol. XXV. April, 1943, p. 6.

65. Ibid., p. 6.

66. When Bolívar was made president of the newly founded Republic of Bolivia in 1825 he appointed his old tutor director of public education. His efforts to put the ideas of Rousseau's "Emile" into practice, however, were much too impractical, and he did not last long in office.

67. Francovich, op.cit., p. 62.

68. Alfred Weber in the "History of Philosophy" calls Condillac "an original follower, the founder of absolute sensationalism: Locke distinguishes two sources of ideas, sensation and reflection, while Condillac, in his "Traité des Sensations' recognizes but one, making reflection a product of sensibility." (Weber, Alfred. History of Philosophy. p. 399).

69. De Tracy used the word "idea" in a purely technical sense to mean "the image of things." Thought is but the "image" of sensation. Hence the science of thought is "ideology".

70. Francovich, op. cit., p. 69.

71. Ibid., pp. 69-70.

72. How widespread the influence of De Tracy became in Bolivia is brought out by Francovich, who states that in 1827, by decree of Marshal Sucre, then governing the country, the teaching of de Tracy became obligatory in all the secondary schools of the republic. The same decrees ordered the teaching of the "Universal Morality" of Baron D'Holbach, and the legal theories of Bentham. Weber calls D'Holbach's system "a complete theory of ontological and psychological materialism." (Weber. op. cit., p. 414).

73. Ramos, op. cit., p. 103.

74. Ibid., p. 107.

75. Sánchez Reulet, op. cit., p. 197.

76. Caso, Antonio, México, Apuntaciones de Cultura Patria. México D. F. Imprenta Universitaria, 1943. p. 147.

77. While Dr. Mora is clearly in the line of sensationalist psychology and was resolutely anti-clerical he did not share the atheism of many of his political allies. A recent study discloses that he was a great lover of the Scriptures and for many years served with admirable loyalty and self-sacrifice as the unpaid Secretary of the British and Foreign Bible Society in Mexico. In his letters to the Society Mora explains his interest in disseminating the Scriptures as a result of his belief in their moralizing influence. In this labor of love he was the subject of bitter criticism both from the Roman Catholic hierarchy and from the free thinkers who were enemies of

77. (continued)

all religion. It has been suggested that Mora embraced Protestantism, but there is no conclusive evidence that Mora was ever anything but a liberal Catholic who believed in religious freedom and was at odds with the hierarchy. (Cf. the interesting study "El Protestantismo del Dr. Mora." by Pedro Gringoire (pen name of Gonzalo Báez-Camargo, Mexico's outstanding Protestant leader of today) in Historia Méxicana, Vol. III, No. 3, Enero-Marzo, 1954.

78. Quoted by Valverde Tellez, op. cit., p. 72.

79. Caso, op. cit., p. 72.

80. Altamirano, Ignacio, Biografía de Ignacio Ramirez. México D. F. oficina Topográfica de la Secretaría de Fomento. 1889. P. III

81. Ibid., p. XIV.

82. Ibid., p. XVI.

83. Caso, op. cit., p. 71.

84. Caso, Antonio, El Problema de México y la Ideologiá Nacional. México D. F. Editorial Cultura, 1924. p. 56.

85. Quoted by José Rodriguez, Vida del Presbítero Felix Varela. La Habana. Avellano y Cía. 1944. p. 13.

86. Varela, Felix, Lecciones de Filosofiá. Biblioteca de la Universidad de la Habana - ed. of Filadelphia, 1824. - Published 1940. p. II.

87. Ibid., pp. 260-261.

88. Ibid., p. 241.

89. Ibid., p. 287.

90. The derivation of these definitions from St. Thomas is clearly shown by reference to propositions 90-97 in the Summa, I-II. Father Octavio Nicolás Derisi of Artentina, in his exposition of Thomist Ethics, "Los Fundamentos Metafísicos del orden Moral", citing his source in the above propositions states: "From its immediate author the law may be divine and human. From its base and promulgation it may be natural and positive. Positive law is subdivided into human and divine, and this into civil and ecclesiastical. Derisi, Nicolás, Los Fundamentos Metafísicos del Orden Moral. Buenos Aires. Universidad de la Plata.

91. Ibid.,

92. Varela, op. cit., p. 243.

93. Ibid., p. 251.

94. Ibid., p. 298.

95. Luz y Caballero, José de la, La Polémica Filosófica, Vol. III, La Habana. Universidad de la Habana, 1945. p. 381.

96. Varela, op. cit., p. 311.

97. Varela reacted strongly against extreme sensationalism and exerted his influence against it. In 1840, writing to José de la Luz from New York he chides him: "I perceive that you have turned very medical and that you establish almost everything on physiology. I believe we are on sandy ground. You will have to dig a great deal to establish sound foundations... What I do not understand is how you want to make religion physiological. A physiological God! Even in morals, I am sure that all the physiologists of the world will not teach a sounder morality than the church fathers, and none of them was of physiologists, nor may God permit that morality should have physiologists for teachers, who do not understand themselves and change their science almost every year." (quoted by Manuel I. Mesa Rodriguez, Don José de la Luz y Caballero, La Habana, Edición de la Logia Realidad No. 8, p. 86-87.

98. Luz y Caballero, José, Aforismos y apuntaciones. La Habana. Editorial de la Universidad de la Habana, 1945. pp. 355, 358.

99. Mesa Rodriguez, Manuel I., Don José de la Luz y Caballero. La Habana. Edicion de la Logia Realidad. 1947. p. 283.

100. Jose Manuel Mestre (1832-1885). Professor Vitier in his La Filosofía en Cuba calls him "the most distinguished professor of philosophy in the period between the death of Luz and the beginning of Varona's courses in 1880," p. 31.

101. Sanguilly, Manuel, José de la Luz y Caballero - Estudio Crítico. La Habana. Establecimiento Tipagráfico O'Reilly, 1890. p. 8.

102. Vitier, Medardo, Las Ideas en Cuba, 2 vols. La Habana. Editorial Trópico. 1938, p. 87.

103. Ibid., p. 87.

104. Luz y Caballero, op. cit., p. 361.

105. Luz y Caballero, José, La Polémica Filosófica. Vol. 1. La Habana. Editorial de La Universidad de la Habana. 1946. p. 277.

106. Gaos, José, El Pensamiento de Lengua Española, México. Editorial Stylo. 1945. pp. 70-71.

107. If Luz did not have such a political intention he could not make it overt. That the political consequences of Cousimism were in his mind seems evident from the third proposition of his 1839 course: "One of the reasons why eclecticism found an echo in France was the applica-

107. (continued)

tion which was made of it to politics. To a people tired of the conflict of opinions, to speak to it of conciliation was to mislead it with a pain-killer. (La Polémica Filosófica. Vol. 4, p. 140.) Elsewhere he speaks of the defenders of Cousin as "that political-philosophical party" (La Polémica Filosófica, Vol. 5, p. 246.

108. Luz y Caballero, José, De la Vida Intima Vol. I La Habana Editorial de la Universidad de la Habana, 1945, p. 246.

109. Ibid., p. 253.

110. Luz y Caballero, La Polemica Filosofica Vol. 4, p. 140.

111. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 97-98.

112. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 83.

113. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 94.

114. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 35.

115. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 318.

116. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 188.

117. Ibid., p. 189.

118. Ibid., p. 189.

119. Ibid., p. 167.

120. Ibid., p. 183.

121. Ibid., p. 190.

122. Luz y Caballero, Aforisims y Apuntaciones, p. 200.

123. La Polemica Filosófica Vol. I, p. XVIII.

124. Aforisimos y Apuntaciones, p. 342.

125. La Polemica Filosófica Vol. I, p. 318.

126. Aforismos y Apuntaciones, p. XVII.

127. Ibid., p. 259.

128. Ibid., p. 269.

129. Ibid., p. 152.

130. Mora, José Ferrater, Diccionario de Filosofiá. Editorial Sudamerica. Buenos Aires, 1951. p. 571.

131. Luz y Caballero, De La Vida Intima. p. 311

132. Ibid., p. 328.

133. Sanguilly, Manuel, op. cit., p. 93. An earlier biographer, José Ignacio Rodriguez, included a death-bed confession and last rites in his narrative. Sanguilly denied it, with authoritative evidence. Professor Vitier states: "Everything seems to corroborate Sanguilly's denial...." La Filosofía en Cuba, p. 90.

134. La Polemica Filosófica, Vol. V. p. 35.

135. Aforismos y Apuntaciones, p. 95.

136. Ibid., p. 272.

137. Under the sponsorship of the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Buenos Aires, the texts of the courses taught by Lafinur and Fernandez de Aguero have been reproduced, accompanied by an excellent introduction written by Delfina Varela Dominguez de Chioldi. Her introduction contains an extensive study of the "ideologist" philosophy in France and its introduction into Argentina.

138. Lafinur, Juan, Curso Filosófico. Buenos Aires. Instituto Filosófico, 1938. p. 64.

139. Ibid., p. 115.

140. Ibid., p. 117.

141. Ibid., p. 118 (It is interesting to note here a similar influence of Rousseau on a truly great philosopher, Immanuel Kant.)

142. Ibid., p. 124.

143. Ibid., p. 140.

144. Ibid., p. 37.

145. Fernandez de Aguero, J. M. Principio de Ideologiá. Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1940. p. 114.

146. Ibid., p. 106.

147. Ibid., p. 107.

148. Ibid., p. 185.

149. Ibid., p. 197

150. Ibid., p. 146.

151. Ibid., p. 148.

152. Ibid., p. 145.

153. Al Corta's philosophical course has not been published and we follow the indications of Alejandro Korn in this section.

154. Korn, op. cit., p. 133.

155. Ibid., p. 133.

156. Ibid., pp. 133-134.

157. Ibid., p. 136.

158. The title recalls the "May Revolution" of 1810, led by Mariano Moreno, with its Rousseauistic ideals.

159. Quoted by Ingenieros, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 265.

160. Ingenieros, La Evolución de las Ideas Argentinas. p. 399.

CHAPTER III

THE POSITIVIST ERA

INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY

The period extending from the middle of the nineteenth century to the early years of the twentieth century in the history of Spanish American thought is known as "The Positivist Era." In this period the ascendancy of ideas supposedly derived from the "positive" results of modern science is so great throughout Spanish America that the philosophical culture once again shows a high degree of uniformity, though not, to be sure, the monolithic uniformity of colonial days.

The ascendancy of positivism in Spanish America can be understood as the result of the influence of positivist ideas stemming from Europe being welcomed because existing cultural, social, political, and economic conditions made them highly acceptable. The principal European influences are: first, the positivism of Comte and his followers; and secondly, the utilitarianism and evolutionism of John Stuart Mill, Spencer, and Darwin. The reception of the ideas of the European philosophers was prepared by the prevailing rejection of the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, and the widely felt need for a new pattern of thought to take the place of the Catholic ideology. Spanish American philosophers were not prepared to substitute an original thought system, and European positivism was eagerly accepted, for it seemed to offer "scientific" authority in place of the rejected ecclesiastical and theological authority, and at the same time focused its emphasis on the problems of man and his progress in this world. This is precisely what the Spanish American thinkers, concerned for the

colonial backwardness of their countries were seeking.

Positivism in Spanish America thus appears under the double aspect of a "struggle against the Catholic Weltanschaung"[1]. and the attempt to replace it with a new faith in "science", and the "lessons of social experience," divorced from any supernatural reference. The anti-catholic writings of Juan Montalvo, of Ecuador, Francisco Bilbao and José V. Lastarria, and of Manuel Gónzalea Prada, of Peru, play an important part in this, struggle. Partly counteracting their influence, we find the great Venezuelan philosopher, Andres Bello, who stood for a more sympathetic attitude toward the Spanish heritage and a moderate positivism. Eugenio Maria de Hostos, a Puerto Rican, produced a noteworthy moral philosophy which he attempted to place in the positivist ideology, though it has greater affinity with the stoic tradition. (The work of these writers will be given special attention in the Appendix).

In the more detailed study of the development of ideas in Mexico, Cuba, and Argentina we find items of great interest. Positivism achieved its greatest triumph in Mexico, where it virtually became the official philosophy of the government during the thirty year dictatorship of General Porfirio Díaz. Dr. Gabino Barreda, a physician, introduced Comtian positivism into the schools of Mexico in 1767, and then made of the principal secondary school in the country, which he personally directed, the experimental ground for indoctrination in positivism. In Cuba, the tradition of Christian empiricism which had dominated in the first part of the century with Father Felix Varela and José de la Luz y Caballero came to an end with the emergence of Enrique José Varona as the leading philosopher. Varona

rejected all religious reference and developed a strong positivist philosophy, but in the English tradition rather than the Comtian. In Argentina an "indigenous" form of positivism emerged based on the concern for the material progress of the Argentine nation. The leading philosophers of this early positivism were Juan B. Alberdi, and Domingo F. Sarmiento, both of whom found in the English positivists their favored rationale. Both were "social philosophers" rather than academic philosophers, and their thinking runs parallel to that of the English positivists rather than being directly dependent upon it. Later Argentine positivism becomes more expressly materialistic, and comes to a late climax with the work of the physician-scientist, José Ingenieros, who, in the first quarter of the present century proposed a new metaphysical orientation, and a romantic moralism, in a positivist framework.

The positivist experiment in the thought of Spanish America comes to an end in the first part of this century as new philosophers become aware of its cultural sterility and of the inadequacy of its scientific, moral, and metaphysical premises. New currents from Europe began to exert their influence, and positivism was almost universally discarded. No new system of thought in particular can yet be said to have taken its place.

A. MAIN FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EMERGENCE OF POSITIVISM IN SPANISH AMERICA.

1. European Backgrounds

The dominance of positivism throughout Spanish America in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the early part of the twentieth is not the result of inter-communication between the republics. It is rather a

parallel development which is to be explained by the similarity of condition facing each nation, and by the common inspirations received from Europe, primarily France and England, the intellectual guides of the republics during this period.

Positivism is a term which entered philosophy through Auguste Comte, who held that mankind, having passed through the stages of theological and metaphysical thinking had now entered the final or positivist stage in which it would be guided solely by the data obtained from the investigation of the positive or actual facts; that is, by the results of experimental science. The highest science Comte declared to be the study of society, or sociology, a term which he also introduced. In this new era the highest ideal of man must be that of social progress. Comte attributed to men a quality of "altruism", his own term for humanitarian sympathy, on which he based his belief in the inevitability of social progress.

These ideas of Comte made a tremendous impact in Spanish America, an impact which has been well characterized by Professor E. S. Brightman in the following words:

> "The ideas of Comte were exported from France to Latin America and in a diluted form, became widely popular. Positivism made more appeal to the intellectuals than did Protestantism. Its ideas favored the new democratic trends; they encouraged the growth of science; they liberated men, not only from political and religious tyranny, but from all religious authority: in short, they promised freedom, and they were welcomed in Latin America as a sort of non-Christian reformation."[2].

Followers of Comte rose to positions of prominence in almost all of the Spanish American republics, particularly in Mexico and Chile. Many accepted Comtian positivism as a new religion, and attempted to establish

the Comtian "religion of humanity" as well.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, the vogue of Comtian positivism waned, and the influence of the English positivist philosophers became more important. In contrast to Comte, who, in developing the idea of the "religion of humanity", cut himself off from strictly empirical ground, the great masters of nineteenth century English philosophy refrained from metaphysical flights of fancy. Their careful analyses, purporting to describe all aspects of human thought and experience from an empirical standpoint, and the "scientific" prestige which they gained through this approach, made a tremendous impression on Spanish American thinkers. John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer gained adherents among many of the statesmen and leading educators in various countries. Darwin's "Origin of Species", with its doctrine of organic evolution was considered to have furnished the needed key for the explanation of all biological phenomena, as well as physical, on the basis of a universal system of mechanical causation. At the same time it supplied what was thought to be the infallible scientific ground for an optimistic view of history, in which progress is a law of the natural universe.

In its most extreme forms, positivism becomes an outright metaphysical materialism. The German philosophers, Louis Buchner and Theodore Haeckel, are the outstanding representatives of this rampant materialism in their influence in Spanish America. They had many followers among the intellectuals, but not among the major representatives of philosophical thought.

2. Factors Favoring the Spread of Positivism in Spanish America

Professor Risieri Frondizi has stressed the significance of positivism as a "struggle against the Catholic Weltanschaung",[3] a struggle which takes place on a wide front, not only in the realm of ideas but also in politics, education, social customs, etc. This negative attitude toward all aspects of the influence of the Roman Catholic Church could be extensively documented from the writings of prominent figures in each of the Spanish American countries during the nineteenth century. The Church was condemned as a force of reaction, standing in the way of progress, democracy, and freedom. The Spanish heritage was pictured as a calamitous influence which needed to be overcome. Two Chilean writers, Francisco Bilbao and José Victorino Lastarria, the Ecuadoran poet and essayist, Juan Montalvo, and the Peruvian critic Manuel González Prada stand out among the enemies of Catholicism.[4] A statement from Lastarria may be taken as typical of the criticism which was levied against the Church and the Spanish heritage. Typical also in this statement is the effort to separate the criticism of the Church from the criticism of Christianity.

> "The Christian religion is saintly, who doubts it; it is the expression of modern civilization and carries within it the seeds of democracy. But in the religion and in the idiom which Spain taught America there is none of that, only slavery, fanaticism, and a somnolent civilization, which lives on the ignorance of society, on the nullity of the individual, on orthodoxy and puerile credulity, on the hatred of truth and progress, and on the lie on which is founded the civil and spiritual power which dominates all. Religion was nothing more than an instrument of domination and its ministers played no other role than that of partners of the civil power in the exploitation of the colony. America owes to Spain, not its civilization, but its backwardness and doubleness, disastrous social vices which prevent the consolidation of order and of new institutions. This Catholicism never was Christianity, but superstition and fanaticism placed at the service of Power and of Greed."[5]

The importance of this revolt against Catholicism as a pre-disposing factor in the reception of new ideas totally unrelated to the traditional religion can hardly be exaggerated. For men soon realized that a purely negative attitude is not sufficient, and they felt the need for a new philosophy to take the place of the rejected ideology of the church. They recognized the truth of Comte's affirmation that nothing is destroyed unless it is replaced. Positivism appeared offering all the qualities desired in a new system of thought to serve as a substitute for Catholicism. The brilliant Peruvian critic, Francisco García Calderón writes:

> "Positivism was to conquer America more than any other philosophical doctrine. It symbolized the cult of science, the supremacy of reason, the extremes of laicism of which these young nations were enamoured. The way had been prepared not only by the disgust with the official doctrines, but also by a materialism which reigned openly in all scientific studies."6.

The establishment of completely secularized schools and universities is a part of this attempt to free thought from the influence of the Church as well as a recognition of the government's responsibility for education. Even in countries like Argentina, where Catholicism remained the religion of the State, the government schools became the vehicles for the transmission of a lay ideology.

B. INTEREST IN SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ISSUES

A second factor of great importance in pre-disposing the Spanish American countries to the acceptance of positivism was their absorbing concern with the serious problems they were facing as independent states. For such a situation, positivism was "made to order". "From its inception," writes Alejandro Korn, "positivism sees in the social problems the ultimate

and essential object of its philosophical conception."[7]. Obsessed with concern for the "positive" facts, completely this-worldly in its orientation, positivism had no logical room nor interest in metaphysical speculation or for the consideration of anything which was clearly outside of the empirical field. This very characteristic helped to make positivism attractive to Spanish American thinkers. Writes Professor Frondizi: "We have to remember that Latin American countries were by that time still fighting against heavy economic and social problems. And it is a fact that when man has insecurity in every-day life he is not much given to philosophical speculation."[8].

Hopeful, as well as concerned, for the future of their countries, Spanish American intellectuals were also drawn to positivism because of its dogmatic emphasis on progress. There is in positivism an implicit confidence that progress is an inherent principle in the universe and that through the advance of science and education, man's increasing welfare is inevitable. Having repudiated their past, Spanish Americans found a satisfying compensation in the prospect of a future of infinite brightness in the promise of positivism. Such a view seemed to correspond to the feverish progress they were witnessing in their own countries with the establishment of public schools, the introduction of railroads, telegraphs, factories, and all the other features of modern industrial civilization. Not even the political instability, or relapse into despotism, which many of the countries were experiencing could nullify these evidences of progress.

B. Main Characteristics and Important Figures of Spanish American Positivism

The factors mentioned above as favoring the triumph of positivism in

Spanish America also determined the main characteristics of positivism in these lands. From the beginning the new ideology was made an instrument in the struggle against Catholicism, and was made to serve as the rationale for the program of social, economic, cultural, and political action sponsored by the liberal elements in society. The close correspondence we have observed between the tenets of positivism and the felt need of Spanish American intellectuals gave positivism the character of an almost authoctonous creation. This feature is particularly apparent in a study of the Argentine positivist movement.

Conscious of the need for new principles to guide conduct once the tutelage of the Church was abandoned, the philosophers of Spanish American positivism gave special attention to the problems of moral thought. In our review of the course of positivism in Mexico, Cuba, and Argentina we shall examine the positions of Gabino Barreda, Enrique José Varona, and José Ingenieros, respectively, in this phase. Moral philosophy was also the dominant concern of the great Porto Rican educator and philosopher, Eugenio María de Hostes (1839-1903),[9] and of other less important essayists and publicists, who did not produce systematic works on moral philosophy but who tried to interpret the significance of moral attitudes and concepts on the social and economic conditions of the Spanish American nations.

Perhaps the greatest of all the Spanish American philosophers in the nineteenth century was Andrés Bello, (1781-1865) who only partially fits into the positivist mold. The life of this great Venezuelan who became the leading citizen of Chile falls mainly in the period covered in the previous chapter. His main work and influence, however, extends from 1842

until the time of his death, i.e. from the time of his appointment as the Rector-founder of the University of Chile. Though Bello remained a Catholic, his thought shows the preponderant influence of the English utilitarians. Bello was characterized by balance and judgment. When Lastarria, a professor in the University of Chile anathematized the legacy of Spain in America, Bello answered, admitting many of the errors of Spanish colonial policy and practice, but pointing out the positive values in this heritage. Moderate in his positivism, almost to the point of eclectism, Bello, nevertheless is much closer to the positivist school than to scholasticism.[10].

C. POSITIVISM IN MEXICO

1. Gabino Barreda (1820-1881) "The Positivist Messiah"

It is in Mexico where positivism achieved its greatest triumph in Spanish America, for there it became the official philosophy of a regime which ruled the nation for more than thirty years, the regime of General Porfirio Díaz. Indeed the official triumph of positivism may be said to date from the triumph of president Benito Juarez over the forces of the unfortunate Austrian prince Maximilian. Very soon after the defeat of Maximilian in 1867 Juarez appointed a commission to reform the educational system of Mexico in order to bring education into harmony with the anti-catholic and "liberal" principles of his administration. In that commission was a physician named Gabino Barreda, who became the author of the report of the commission and thus the founder of positivist education in Mexico, and the acknowledged leader of the positivistic movement in the nation. "He was," declares Antonio Caso, "our positivist Messiah."[11].

Barreda, as so many other leaders of Hispanic American thought, had begun studies for the priesthood but turned away from the study of theology to the study of the law and then to medicine. He was thirty-three years of age when he went to France to complete his medical studies, not too old apparently to avoid coming under the spell of August Comte who completely captivated his mind. Barreda became a fervent and loyal disciple, and returning to Mexico he devoted the rest of his life to the attempt to put into effect a reform of Mexican thought and society in line with the teachings of his master. His great opportunity came with his appointment to the commission whose recommendations became law on the second of December of 1867.

Among other provisions, the education law called for compulsory education, an ideal which Mexico is still short of realizing because of the insufficiency of schools. One of the most significant recommendations, which was carried out, provided for the establishment of a national secondary school, preparatory for the liberal professions which was named "La Escuela Preparatoria." The direction of the school was entrusted to Dr. Barreda. It was the peculiar curriculum introduced by Barreda which made it notable. For the broad program of humanities which had characterized previous programs of secondary education Barreda substituted a complete cycle of scientific and mathematical studies, following very closely the classification of Comte. These were imposed on all students regardless of their future vocational intention.[12] In taking this step Barreda was acting in conformity with a very definite educational philosophy which was a part of his social philosophy. He believed that the anarchy of Mexican society could be attributed to the anarchy prevailing in the world of ideas.

The revolutionary, the Jacobin ideology had been purely destructive and this underlay the chaos and confusion. Since it was unthinkable to him that Mexico should return to the colonial pattern which he called a design for "the indefinite prolongation of a domination and of a continuous exploitation,"[13]. Barreda proposed the ideas of Comte, the faith in experimental science as the great new binding factor in Mexican life. In a remarkable letter to the Governor of the State of Mexico, Don Mariano Riva Palacios, Barreda explained the reasoning behind the educational reform:

> "In order that practical conduct may be, as far as possible sufficiently harmonious with the real needs of society, it is necessary to have a common store of truths from which we proceed, more or less deliberately, but in a constant manner...." "The intellectual order which this education tends to establish is the key to the moral and social order which we so greatly need."[14].

It was this emphasis on the need for a "common store of truths" which, to Barreda's mind could only be the "positive" truths of science, and which dictated the policy of universal obligatory scientific education in the Escuela Preparatoria. Just as the colonial society had trusted in the unifying and moralizing influence of scholastic theology, the new society envisioned by Barreda would be based on the certain and dependable truths of science.

Though the positivist educational scheme abandoned the teaching of philosophy and religion it greatly emphasized the teaching of "logic"[15] and "morals". This is true not only of Barreda's educational reform, but of all the positivist educational schemes throughout Latin-America. Barreda's moral ideas have been very concisely stated in an essay he entitled "De la

Educación Moral" (Concerning Moral Education). He begins the essay denying that there is any necessary relation between religion and morality, and demonstrating his point by holding that there are many differing religious beliefs in the world, some of them utterly contradictory, while moral ideas are essentially the same throughout the world and have remained thus through the centuries. He quotes with approval the words of Condorcet:

> "The similarity between the moral precepts of all the religious and all the philosophical sects should be enough to prove that these are of a truth which is independent of the dogmas of these religions and of the principles of these sects, and that the origin of these ideas of justice and of virtue and the foundation of duties must be sought in the moral constitution of man."[16].

This "foundation in the constitution of man" is made possible, Barreda holds by the teachings of Gall, the founder of phrenology, who "demonstrated with irrefragable arguments" that man has "innate tendencies" toward good as well as toward evil. These tendencies Gall had shown "have their origin in the cerebral mass."[17].

On this basis the task of moral education seems perfectly obvious to Barreda. "To secure the moral perfecting of the individual and even of the race," it is necessary, "to develop the organs which govern good inclinations and to diminish as much as possible those which govern the evil ones." How can this be done? This also seems obvious to Barreda,--"by exercise." And so he proposes what he calls, in all seriousness, a "moral gymnastic," whose aim is "to make the suggestions of the good instincts prevail to such an extent that love shall always be the irresistible guide of our actions."[18]. (Barreda does not quote the authority of Aristotle at this point, but his idea here does not seem too remote from Aristotle's principle of "habituation.")

Barreda dreams of establishing this morality on a truly scientific base. He writes:

> "Nothing seems more natural than that science, which is the only one which has succeeded in realizing what all religions have attempted in vain, that is, to form beliefs which are truly universal (underlined words italicized by Barreda) should seize this field definitely and should attempt to make of it something similar to astronomy and to physics, which at one time it also wrested from the domain of theology."[19].

He has no doubt that success will follow from such a "scientific" organization of moral education, for "the heart will always love that which it thinks good and reject that which it thinks evil without ever being able to avoid this happy fatality."[20]. The only problem lies in making sure that the heart will know that which is good. The freedom of the will is not a problem; it does not exist. "Liberty consists in every phenomenon, organic as well as inorganic, submitting itself with completeness to the laws which determine it."[21]. But he recognizes that there is a problem where the good is not adequately perceived. The solution in this event, however, simply depends on the proper education:

> "Say what they will about free will, metaphysicians will never be able to prove that it is possible to love or hate arbitrarily--all that can happen is that that which is not good may present itself to the spirit as good and preferable, whether it be by virtue of the habitual prevalence of evil inclinations, or by strength of some passion which prevents us from judging things rightly, which is precisely where the influence of a good education, operating to nullify the former, and to rectify the judgment, brings about the solution."[22].

Barreda stands here on the familiar ground of rationalist ethics, which equates knowledge with virtue. The good being defined as that which is desirable, the only problem in moral education is to communicate a correct instruction as to what is desirable. Barreda indicates that he is not

altogether unaware of the difficulties involved in this program when he speaks of the "habitual prevalence of evil inclinations" and of a "passion which prevents us from judging things rightly," but as a rationalist he rejects the possibility that man may not wish to be corrected in his understanding of what is desirable, or that knowing what is good, he may yet be inclined to do evil. The solution in rationalist ethics is always "education", on the assumption that with the proper understanding of what constitutes self-interest the right conduct will automatically follow. The experience of Mexico with this positivist education was to show that Barreda's optimism was quite unjustified. He was sure that with his program the moral and the material greatness of the nation was assured: "What matters it," he exclaimed, if it takes ten, fifteen, or twenty years."23. A half century later, however, Antonio Caso, Mexico's greatest philosopher, was to pronounce the verdict of resounding failure. "The failure of mexican positivism has been demonstrated. It is one of the direct causes of the tremendous moral crisis which afflicts the Republic."24.

2. Positivism as the Official Philosophy of Mexico

It is doubtful whether Barreda would ever have exercised such influence in Mexico had not positivism become the accepted doctrine of a government which became politically all powerful in the life of the nation until its downfall in 1910. Leopoldo Zea, in his massive study of positivism in Mexico, a doctoral dissertation in the University of Mexico, has shown how close were the ties of the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz with the chief spokesmen of the positivist philosophy beginning with Barreda. Díaz had come to power at the end of a long period of internal strife. Antonio Caso has described the mood of the country at the beginning of the age of Diaz:

"The entire republic clamored for peace after the bloody epoch of unleashed and irreconcilable passions. It was the time for constructive reactions, for organic progress, for social stability."[25].

Positivism with its motto of "order and progress" was seen to furnish the justification for a "strong regime". Positivism was thus made indigenous to the Mexican situation and became the rationale for the dictatorial administration. That this was not such a fundamental change from Catholicism after all is implied by Caso who says:

> "Comtism, as Huxley has stated, is a catholicism without christianity, (author's italics) i.e. something which by its external form, by its despotic hierarchization, was adaptable to a people which has had nothing of the christian but truly much of the idolater; which had lived during centuries constrained in the regular, tyrannical, and regular mold of Spanish catholicism. The substitution of the ancient catholic fetishes by the new Comtian fetishes could be a simple thing."[26].

Internal peace and material progress were the great concerns of the Diaz administration. It was a great era of railroad building, of mining and industrial development. Surrounding the dictator there grew up a party who called themselves "los científicos" who pretended to govern the country in scientific fashion. The leaders of the group, the most prominent of whom was Diaz's perennial minister of finance, José Yves de Limantour, needless to say, were graduates of the Escuela Preparatoria. The regime was a highly profitable one for all those who were able to benefit from the concessions extended to foreign entrepreneurs and Mexican capitalists. Leopoldo Zea declares that, "The Cientificos substituted the English positivists for Comte because Comte subordinated the interests of the individual while British thinkers justified economic liberalism."[27].

3. Catholic Reaction Against Positivism - José María Vigil

It must not be thought that the positivist philosophy did not meet with resistance. A number of vigorous Roman Catholic thinkers tried to combat positivism. To this end a group of them founded a journal known as the "Revista Filosófica". Their leader was José María Vigil, who carried on a lively polemic with Porfirio Parra, (1855-1916) a professor in the Escuela Preparatoria who had succeeded Barreda as the intellectual leader of the positivists after the death of the founder. Barreda had studiously refused to accept the Comtian "religion of humanity" as a program for Mexico and insisted on the neutrality on religious matters of the scientific education which he had imposed in the Escuela Preparatoria, as he did not wish unnecessarily to antagonize the powerful catholic interests in Mexico. Vigil claimed that the neutrality the positivists pretended toward religion in reality did not exist, that "an education which has no other base than empiricism and sensationalism is an education which imposes one criterion, the materialist, as formerly the older education imposed one criterion, the theological."[28]. Striking directly at the positivist morality Vigil attacked it as hedonistic and stated that all it does is to give the pupil "great dexterity in avoiding physical ill and a fine astuteness in nullifying the disagreeable consequences of an evil action."[29]. He concluded his fiercest attack saying: "We can thus demonstrate that positivism, as all sensationalist doctrines, degrades man, levelling him with the brute, and necessarily leads to skepticism, materialism, egoism and despotism."[30].

Reading the controversy today it would seem that Vigil had quite the best of the argument, Parra's replies being the purely conventional ones of the positivist position. But no matter how much reason might be on their

side, the hour of triumph for the anti-positivist forces did not come during Vigil's day. His criticisms, and those of all the other foes of positivism in Mexico were of no avail in challenging the sway of positivism in the official spheres at that time. Barreda had done his work well and the pupils of the Escuela Preparatoria were too firmly entrenched in the key positions of the government.

4. A Qualified Positivism - Justo Sierra (1848-1912)

One of these pupils, Justo Sierra, the minister of education in the last Díaz cabinet testified to Barreda's influence when in 1908, in a great public meeting held to honor the memory of the founder, he declared, "The Escuela Preparatoria is the cornerstone of the Mexican mentality."31.

Strangely enough, however, Justo Sierra, whom Zea has called the chief apologist for the Díaz regime because of his political writings is the first prominent intellectual leader of Mexico to question the dogmas of Barreda, though within the framework of his boundless veneration for the master. Sierra is the chief figure in the transition from positivism to the post-positivist era, violently initiated in 1910 with the onset of the Mexican revolution which overthrew the dictator Díaz and kept the country bathed in blood for ten years. Antonio Caso, the chief figure in the cultural struggle against positivism revered Sierra to the end of his days, and compiled a selection of his writings as a labor of love. Sierra was really a positivist, but he was a man of deep esthetic sensibility, of genuine idealism. He is one of Mexico's greatest writers. It was Sierra's sensitivity and honesty which made him alert to the exaggerations of Barreda. In the very address in which he eulogized Barreda, referring to the founders

belief that science could give certainty and peace beyond all doubt and controversy, Sierra says "let us doubt it."[32] Affected by the influences of the indeterminate concepts of the "new physics" Sierra asks, "if science is nothing more than the systematic knowledge of the relative, if objects in themselves cannot be known, if we can only know its constant relations, how can it help but be in perpetual evolution, in perpetual struggle?"

It was Sierra, who, as minister of education, re-established the University of Mexico, perhaps the most appreciated act today of the Diaz administration. In his eloquent address at the opening of the University Sierra makes it very clear that the reopening of the University does not mean going back to the scholastic era, by stressing the great difference between the concept of the scholastic university and that of the university being founded.

> "The founders of the university of yore said, 'the truth is defined, teach it.' We say to the universitarians of today: 'the truth is being defined, search it.' They said, 'you are a select group charged with imposing a political and religious ideal resumed in the words "God and King"'. We say: "You are a group in constant process of being selected within the body popular, and you are entrusted with the realization of a social and political ideal which is resumed thus, "democracy and liberty."[33]

Such words constituted an implied criticism, not only of the colonial university but also of the educational ideal of Barreda, and the philosophy of the Diaz regime with its emphasis on "order and progress" rather than on "democracy and liberty". Positivism had had no place for the teaching of philosophy, save logic and morals; Sierra provided for the teaching of the history of philosophy in the new university. "An imploring figure," he said in the address, "has been wandering for some time in the serene

temples of our official education, philosophy, nothing more respectable nor more beautiful..."[34]. He promised that now philosophy would have an honored place, with all schools of thought fairly represented. But perhaps the greatest importance of Sierra in the movement away from positivism was not his own in his own writings as much as in the encouragement which he, with his immense prestige, gave to the younger men who were preparing a sweeping revolt against the sway of positivism.

Another person whose work begins as a positivist thinker in the era of Diaz but who became sympathetic to the reaction against positivism is Exequiel Chávez. In 1894 Chávez published an abstract of Spencer's Ethics, which went through several printings. It was he who was responsible for the adaptation of the Logic of John Stuart Mill which became the text in logic at the Escuela Preparatoria. As a professor of psychology in that school he also translated the "Elements of Psychology" of Titchener. In the post-positivist period Chávez has come to occupy a broadly personalistic position.

5. The Revolt Against Positivism - El Ateneo de la Juventud

But it is not the influence of Chávez or of Sierra which is responsible for the destruction of the imposing edifice of positivism in Mexico. This was the work of a group of young men who were students of the school of law in Mexico City at the beginning of the twentieth century. The story of this group and of their war against positivism is one of the most fascinating stories in the intellectual history of Latin-America.

The parallel which Antonio Caso has drawn between Comtism and catholicism, though illustrated with the authority of Huxley, is taken from his

own experience and conviction. What had happened in positivist Mexico, ruled by the new dogmas of science interpreted by the "científicos" and policed by the omnipresent forces of the dictator was strangely similar to what had occurred in the colonial era, ruled by scholasticism and the Inquisition! The scorn of metaphysics and religion had acted as a curb to the freedom of thought. The atmosphere had become stifling and restless souls sought for freer air. The most brilliant of the students of the school of law felt this oppression. Bound together by their restlessness and their eagerness to explore other modes of thought than those imparted in the classrooms they met in the evenings in the library of Antonio Caso, the central figure of the group. In the group was José Vasconcelos, destined to share with Caso the distinction of becoming Mexico's greatest philosopher, and Alfonso Reyes who has had a distinguished literary career and is Mexico's leading humanist. On Caso's desk was a little statue of Minerva, and on the mantelpiece a bust of Goethe! Together they read Plato in the Jowett edition. They discussed, among others, the works of Zeller, Windelband, and Weber. Vasconcelos, already interested in oriental mysticism brought the text of Max Muller.[35] But the most profound impressions were those produced by the reading of Kant, of Schopenhauer, and then Boutroux and Bergson. Commenting on the influence of Kant, Caso states: "The revelation of Kant produced its indubitable effect: the liberation from all empiricism."[36] Vasconcelos stresses the influence of Schopenhauer above all others, and then of Nietzsche. The fact is that the members of the group were ready for influences which would challenge the assumptions of positivism. "The Mexican positivism" writes Alfonso Reyes in a reminiscent article "El Pasado Inmediato," written in 1939, "had become a pedagogical routine, and was losing prestige in our

eyes. We felt the intellectual oppression together with the political and economic oppression. We could see that the official philosophy was too systematic, too definitive not to err."[37]. Vasconcelos goes further, "The new mode of thinking," he says, "was brought to us by our own desperation, the silent pain of contemplating life without nobility and without hope."[38].

But the emancipation from positivism was not a sudden nor a simple thing. In 1909, some years after the study circle had first met, Caso gave a series of lectures in the Escuela Preparatoria on the subject of positivism. In these lectures, though he directed certain criticisms at positivism, according to another member of the group, Pedro Henriquez Ureña, the great Dominican critic, he still, "made positivism appear as the climax of modern philosophical evolution."[39]. The great novelty of his lectures was his emphasis on the importance of metaphysics in philosophy and his profession of faith in idealism in epistemology. Alfonso Reyes stresses the great personal influence of Henriquez Ureña within the group. Henriquez belonged to the most prominent family in the intellectual circles of the republic of Santo Domingo, and it is he who seems to have had the clearest concept of the fallacies of positivism. "Of all," says Reyes, "he was the only mature writer, although not the oldest. He taught (us) to hear, to see, to think, and stimulated a genuine reform in culture."[40].

It was in 1908 that the group which met in Caso's study became the nucleus of a cultural association known as the "Ateneo de la Juventud". It was the purpose of these young men to renew the interest in culture which they felt to be at a low ebb in Mexico, and even more, to endeavor to lift the moral tone of the nation. Various specialties were represented in the

group, but all were writers--some were poets, others critics, etc. "Within the variety of objects to which each dedicated himself," says Samuel Ramos, there was a common intention, "to moralize."41. The method they followed in order to reach the nation with their message was that of public lectures. In 1910 these lectures were published at the "Conferencias del Ateneo." They marked an epoch in Mexican history signalizing the challenge to the dominance of positivism in the culture of the nation. Their appearance took place in the year of the downfall of the positivist regime of General Díaz. In that downfall Vasconcelos shared as a conspirator. He was to play an active political role throughout the revolution and become minister of education after peace was restored. Caso, by nature more conservative, feared the anarchy that might follow the downfall of the dictator and stood by Díaz to the last. "But," says Vasconcelos "ideologically Caso continued as chief of a rebellion more important than that initiated by maderism. (the movement of Francisco Madero, leader of the revolt against Diaz). In the hands of Caso there was still being wielded the pick-ax that was to demolish positivism. Without founding clubs, the work of Caso was more transcendental than that of any militant politician."42.

In the lectures of 1910 the repudiation of positivism is clear cut. The most important of these lectures from a philosophical standpoint are, as might be expected, those of Caso and Vasconcelos. Caso took as his subject, at the suggestion of Pedro Henríquez Ureña, the moral ideas of the great Porto Rican Eugenio María de Hostos while Vasconcelos took as his subject Gabino Barreda. Caso shows a deep appreciation of the nobility which shines through the work of Hostos, but he forthrightly rejects the notion that a sound morality can be based on the tenets of science. He concludes

his criticism saying:

> "One must not let himself be seduced by those who think of building morality on scientific bases, however worthy and conscientious may be their purposes: science cannot offer anything except relative results, never norms necessary for action; and only by virtue of necessary principles can beings possessed of reason such as man be obligated."[43].

Vasconcelos criticizes the scientific dogmatism of Barreda, but makes it clear he feels the nation owes a debt of gratitude to the one who "planted among us a system of thought different from that which had prevailed in the centuries of Spanish domination and of catholicism." He then affirms that "the poetic sense, which Comte called theological, continues performing the most useful services to the unfolding of civilization in all that is most positive and fundamental in its development."[44]. In this observation, we may observe in passing, Vasconcelos presages his system in which he fuses the esthetic and the religious.

A few years later, in the midst of the struggles of the Mexican revolution Caso wrote an essay entitled "Catholicism, Jacobinism, and Positivism" in which he attempts to draw up a balance sheet of the moral history of Mexico. Of positivism he said:

> "Positivism formed a generation of men avid for material welfare, jealous of their economic prosperity, who during thirty years collaborated in the political labors of Porfirio Díaz.... The failure of Mexican positivism is manifest. It is one of the direct causes of the tremendous moral crisis which the Republic suffers."[45].

By this time Caso had come to be considered the foremost philosopher in Mexico. His judgment marks the degree to which the fortunes of positivism had declined in Mexico.

D. POSITIVISM IN CUBA

1. From Empiricism to Positivism

In the previous chapter we have noted that with Father Varela and Luz y Caballero philosophical thought in Cuba maintained a Christian orientation in the first half of the nineteenth century, even while scholasticism was superseded by empirical philosophies. In the latter part of the century, however, Enrique José Varona emerges as Cuba's (and Spanish America's) leading philosopher, and with him the empirical trend becomes completely positivistic, while the Christian elements disappear.

Less important figures, such as José Manuel Mestre and Teófilo Martínez Escobar retain a spiritual trend; Manuel Mestre in the tradition of Luz, and Martínez in the new panentheistic school of the German philosopher Christian Krause. Mestre deserves more than a passing reference. Not as vigorous or original a thinker as Luz, he was able to see the weakness in the near-physiologism of Luz. Writing on the relations between physiology and psychology he states: "The two sciences are separated by a profound mystery, they stretch out their hands to each other in the darkness, but do not succeed in joining. The extremes are too far apart."[46]. Involved in the struggle for Cuban independence, Mestre was forced to subordinate his concern for philosophy. One may well wonder what his contribution might have been if he had been able to dedicate himself to it.

But it is Varona who dominates Cuban thought from the time of his first lectures in 1880, and into the twentieth century, and with him Cuba joins the rest of Spanish America in the Positivist Era.

2. Enrique José Varona y Pera (1849-1927)

Enrique José Varona y Pera is generally recognized as the ablest exponent of positivism in Spanish American philosophy.[48] In 1949, on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of his birth numerous lectures were delivered and many articles honoring him were written throughout Spanish America, and particularly, as might be expected, in his home country. The most important of these lectures and articles, together with the best monographs previously published about Varona, have all been published by the Cuban government in two large volumes which have been widely distributed. These celebrations have thus served to put the spotlight on the thinker who has made the most brilliant contribution to the positivist literature of the nineteenth century in Spanish America and whose austere and dedicated life serves as an unending source of inspiration for later generations."[49]

a. Varona: Scholar, Philosopher, Statesman

Enrique José Varona was born in the provincial but culturally alert city of Camaguey, Cuba. Though he later attended courses in the University of Havana his intellectual development essentially took place in Camaguey. Among all Spanish American philosophers there is none who more richly deserves our admiration for the brilliance of his intellectual accomplishments. We must ascribe to the youthful Varona, however, not only insight and intense intellectual curiosity, but also an amazing capacity for disciplined study. His earliest philosophical and critical essays, prepared while he was living in Camaguey display an amazing erudition for one who was largely self-instructed.

With the beginning of the revolution against Spain, Varona, known for his libertarian sentiments was forced to flee to New York. While there he wrote, justifying the cause of the rebellion, a pamphlet entitled "The Crime of Cuba," the most complete and damning indictment of Spain's colonial record in the Island. Returning to Cuba with the triumph of the revolution, Varona was placed in charge of the educational system of the country under the American administration. With the establishment of the Republic, he continued to hold high positions, including the Vice-Presidency of the nation, until his voluntary retirement from political life. This retirement was dictated chiefly by his unwillingness to become involved in the corruption which had come to characterize the conduct of public affairs. As years went by his disillusionment with the achievements of independence and his pessimism regarding the future became progressively deeper. Through these years and until his death in 1927 he continued writing, until his bibliography came to number 1880 different items, the majority being short journalistic comments on literature and life, a form in which he had become a recognized master.

b. Earliest Philosophical Writings

There are two distinct phases to the literary work of Varona. One of them, to use the words of Professor Agramonte is "academic, systematic, organic, optimistic;" the other is "vital, fragmentary, critical, skeptical."[50] These phases belong to two different periods of his life. The first belongs to the early years and includes the three lecture courses delivered from 1880 to 1882. The latter belongs to his later years, years of intensive journalistic and public activity, but in which he seems to have lost the desire for systematic expression and records his thoughts in brief articles

and aphorisms.

In his earliest philosophical writings Varona is deeply conscious of continuing in the tradition of Father Varela and José de la Luz y Caballero. His first volume of essays and speeches, published in 1883 under the title "Estudios Literarios y Filósoficos", contains deeply moving eulogies to both of them---orations presented at memorial festivities for these great masters of Cuban thought. It is the empirical and not the Christian trend in the thought of Varela and of Luz which appeals to Varona, however, and it soon becomes evident that he is not continuing the philosophical tradition of Varela and Luz, but incorporating himself fully into the positivist movement then dominant in Europe, and more particularly into the English expression of this movement. This early volume, in addition to the above-mentioned eulogies contains a number of excellent essays of literary criticism, and a number of philosophical articles. Most of these were written before Varona moved to Havana and they clearly reveal the main trends of his thought in this period of his life.

The main philosophical ideas present in this volume can be summarized in a few sentences: Varona is a convinced positivist in the English rather than the Comtian tradition. He is a confirmed evolutionist who finds in the principle of evolution the key to every phase of human development. Consistent with these positions he opposes all metaphysical conclusions, materialist as well as idealist.

This volume contains Varona's clearest statement of his relation to positivism. A cuban naturalist, André Poey, had become a convinced disciple of Comte, and had written, in French, an exposition of his system:

"Le Positivisme". In his criticism of Poey's book, (written in 1787) Varona expresses complete adherence to "the purpose of incorporating science into philosophy,"[51] and to the objective method advocated by Comte. At the same time he completely repudiates the notion of a religion of humanity and the utopian ideas of Comte's sociocracy. Varona states that it was not until after reading Comte that he had become acquainted with the works of the English positivists. He expresses his delight in them: "I found myself in a new world. The English school was unquestionably positivistic but without having gone through Comte."[52] In other words, Varona discovered in English positivism all the virtues of Comte with none of his defects. "Studying its most eminent exponents," he adds, "I travelled as on a wide ocean, leaving behind (Comte) as a lighthouse which illumines shores to which one is not going to return."[53] Among the English positivists, it becomes clear from Varona's later works, his preference is for Spencer, John Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, and of course, Charles Darwin.

Another essay in this same volume, however, shows that Varona has a far greater quarrel with the metaphysical position of Christian F. Krause and the ethics of Kant than he does with Comte. The philosophy of Krause had become the vogue in Spain through the influence of one of his disciples, Julián Sanz del Río. Dr. Teófilo Martínez Escobar, a Cuban follower of Krause and Sanz had instituted the teaching of Krause's metaphysics in the University of Havana. The ethical position he presented roughly corresponded to Kant's. According to Weber's "History of Philosophy", "Krause substituted for pantheism, or the doctrine of the immanency of all things in God, considered as a transcendent personality and yet united in substance with the creature."[54] Varona's criticism of Martínez's teaching is sharply

polemical. He accuses him and all followers of the critical school "through an unfortunate and anti-philosophical sequence," of accepting "by creed what they rejected by intelligence."[55]. His remarks on the Kantian ethics reveal his anti-religious bent:

> "To found morals on the existence of a supernatural legislator is not only to give a hypothetical base to the science which is developed, but also to make them more obscure and complex."[56].

Another criticism of Kant from a different angle, however, is shrewd and to the point:

> "Kantians believe that it is enough to announce a duty in order for it to be fulfilled. The practical philosopher cannot remain fixed on that chimerical idea of a universal morality, a sterile precept is not enough to modify and ennoble (man)."[57].

Varona sets forth his own view of achieving morality in contrast to the Kantian ethic:

> "Man is not moralized with imperatives; let the natural and social environment in which he develops be refined, and customs will be refined, and his intelligence will be the reflection of more humane and consequently more moral sentiment. This is the great teaching of the inductive morality."[58].

He fails to explain, however, how "customs will be refined." As if anticipating a rebuttal by Martínez, because of his criticisms, in which he would be accused of materialism Varona seeks to clear himself on this point insisting that his is a consistently scientific position in the refusal to come to any metaphysical conclusion whatsoever. "Materialism," he observes, "affirming the reality of matter accepts a noumen, it is a completely metaphysical school." "The most important feature" of the experimental approach is "the refusal to transcend the sphere of the

phenomenon."[59].

Of particular interest in this early volume is an essay on "Morals in Evolution". Refuting a writer in the "Revista de Cuba" who had said that morality is a purely individual matter, Varona's great argument is that such a concept is contrary to the evolutionary principle, which "illumines all sciences."[60]. He then proceeds to show how this principle applies in the development of morals.

The lectures Varona presented in the hall of the Havana newspaper "El Triunfo" from 1880 to 1882 represented at the time the most ambitious effort by a Hispanic American philosopher up to that moment. The very choice of subjects for these series discloses the positivistic premises of the author, Logic, Psychology, and Morals. Varona intended the lectures to be a scientific interpretation of something the scholastic philosophy had always regarded as a part of philosophy. The omission of metaphysics is an expression of the positivist rejection of this field as a suitable subject of inquiry.

In the "Logic" Varona sets forth the epistemology of an empiricist. Knowledge is restricted to that which can be demonstrated; hence his counsel is "to place the spirit again in relation to the object and suffer resignedly the yoke which our own nature imposes on us: always, experience."[61]. "These recommendations," observes Francisco Romero, "are unimpeachable; the only point at which the present philosophy differs is...in the notion of experience, limited "by Varona) to the area of the sensible and with manifest preference for the corporeal---while the later thought prefers a much wider and more complex notion of the experiential."[62]. The greater

part of the "Logic" is given over to an analysis of inductive reasoning. A brilliant feature of this analysis is exposition of the opposing views of Alexander Bain and J. Stuart Mill with regard to the legitimacy of generalizations based on inductive premises. Varona rejects both of the English philosophers at this point and proposes his own solution. This solution is based on the principle of the least effort, a solution, observes Romero, which is virtually identical with that proposed by Avenarius in 1876 and which Varona was not acquainted with, and with that advocated later by Mach and Husserl.[63].

The "Psychology" of Varona is an attempt to find in biology and physiology the organic basis for mental phenomena. True to his agnostic premises, he again refuses, however, to move forward to an outright materialism which might be inferred from such a foundation.

The full title of Varona's lectures on "morals" is "Conferencias Sobre el Fundamento de la Moral". Varona states clearly in the introduction to the definitive edition of these lectures that they are not meant to be a treatise on morals. His purpose is to attempt a descriptive and scientific account of the origin of morals. As we have seen from his earlier essay on "Morals in Evolution", Varona finds the key to the development of moral standards in the process of evolution. The basis of morality lies in man's developing experience as a social being. Even the higher animals who live socially have their rudimentary mores. He traces the development of man's institutions and the gradual development of codes through the necessities of life in families, clans, tribes, and states. He stresses the importance of language and religion in this development. Varona summarizes the results of man's social experience for the development of morals in

these words: "Man lives in society; life in society determines the production and the evolution of a class of sentiments which are favorable to it, the moral. Man is a social being and therefore moral."[64]. The cardinal moral principle for Varona is the principle of social solidarity. "Whatever violates social solidarity is immoral; whatever favors it is moral."[65]. From this principle he draws these maxims "which contain all of morality:" "Not to harm; to cooperate; to do good". "These", he adds, "are the precepts which in one form or another solidarity dictates."[66]. Consistent with this emphasis on the social nature of morality Varona denies the possibility of a duty toward oneself, "I do not conceive of man obligated toward himself," he says.[67].

In taking the sociological approach to the analysis of the origin of morals Varona is very conscious of the distance which separates him from Kant. "It is impossible," says he, "to place oneself on a point more diametrically opposed to ours than the one Kant and his disciples accept.."[68]. "Obligation does not surge in any mysterious way in the intimacy of our conscience; it is not the voice of any revelation which communicates us with a supra-sensible world; it is the adaptation of our personality to the unavoidable conditions of social life."[69].

At the same time, and this, in our opinion, constitutes the great strength of Varona among positivist analysts of morals, he tries to do justice to the fact of conscience. It might almost be said that Varona anticipates the notion of super-ego developed later by Freud. Conscience for him is the internalizing of the standards developed by society. After analyzing the role of social approval and disapproval in the formation of individual codes Varona concludes:

> "Moral precepts acquire repressive or impulsive force. This is what constitutes their specific character; and that is why moral conscience is not only the sum of moral precepts, nor the sentiment of the impulses which lead to moral precepts, but the totality of the precepts which move our moral sentiments. In the full moral conscience we see realized all its work of solidarity; for there is where it manifests itself with the character of judgment in order to censure, of obligation in order to impel, and of sanction in order to repress."[70].

Varona prides himself in the notion that without any other recourse than the empirical data of man's social experience, without any notion of a priori "categorial imperative" or divine revelation he has been able to give an adequate explanation of the origins of conscience.

The lectures on morals, believes Romero, are, of the three series, the ones which have the greatest permanent value.[71]. Within their positivist outlook, they are indeed an outstanding achievement, worthy to stand with the most celebrated works of the positivist literature. If these lectures had been published in England and the United States, it is safe to say that they would have brought widespread acclaim to their author. But as Romero observes, while the lectures are a valuable contribution to the "sociology of ethics"[72]. they do not deal with ethics itself. Says Romero:

> "Ethics is above all and its very essence the domain of what ought to be; and there is not the slightest possibility of elevating oneself to what ought to be through the analysis of that which is, has been, or will be."[73].

It has already been indicated that Varona's early works, including the lectures, manifest an undercurrent of optimism. This optimism is based upon his implicit belief in the notion that the process of evolution is working toward the betterment of mankind. In the essay "Morals in Evolution" he goes so far as to suggest the notion that evolution has led to the in-

crease in the frontal area of the brain, and that this has made possible the capacity for reflection, and hence the capacity for moral judgments. In the same essay he speaks of a "moral preordering (pre-ordenación) which makes us more and more moral" (italicized by Varona) and states that "by education we receive all the fruits of this prior organization and become more and more apt to transmute it to our own descendants."[74]

It is strange after reading these optimistic utterances to turn to Varona's later works, and particularly to the aphorisms, to find some of the most skeptical and pessimistic utterances in all literature. One of his closest friends, José Varela Zequeira, states that in his later years Montaigne and Anatole France were his favorite authors. But though Varona repudiates the optimism of his earlier years he never outwardly repudiated the radical empiricism he then advocated. On the contrary, his insistence on demonstration as a condition of belief grew with the passing years. With the waning of his youthful exuberance, and his disillusionment in the face of the corruption which he saw all around him came the substitution of pessimism for optimism. He ceased being comforted by the hypothetical perfections of the future, eyes too widely opened to the sordid realities of the present. Here is his own explanation for the pessimism which overtook him as it is found in the introduction to the aphorisms:

> "These brief paragraphs are the sparks of a soul wounded by surrounding realities. They contain nothing else. Their value is not transcendent. (They are) Concentric circles whose axes are in my tired heart.
>
> "There will be no lack, if any should stop to read, of those who will call me a pessimist. Others will call me a skeptic. It is all there, but these conditions of spirit are nothing new for me. Early life shook me with its customary roughness. I felt the rendings as subtle wounds and my poor

eyes, too perspicacious, saw far beyond the mere surface of things. Should I have lied to myself?"75.

These aphorisms of Varona were written over a period of years. They do not represent an occasional pessimism but the settled attitude of his later years. Any account of the philosophical ideas of Varona is incomplete without a consideration of the message of the aphorisms.

Some of these aphorisms express Varona's pessimism toward life itself:

"Admirable order and admirable order that of our human life! A man begins to sense its meaning as he approaches its end.

"Tell me, old man, what meaning do you discover in life?
"That it has no meaning."76.

"Educators are remarkably blind men. They pursue their chimeras heedless of the inevitable disillusionment. Life is radically evil, necessarily evil, and they try to change it to good. For this they have their alchemy, which before was called pedagogy, and now paidology."77.

Other aphorisms express his philosophical pessimism and skepticism:

"In the cruel experience of life the most powerful lesson is that which teaches us the radical instability of all that surrounds us. Everything disintegrates, even that which seems most solid, laws, institutions, systems, beliefs. Nothing persists, not even life."78.

"The most penetrating words, the decisive ones on all discussions and their substance were pronounced by Hamlet: "words, words, words."79.

"With proud humility the Ancient exclaimed: I only know that I do not know. Happy was he at least, as for me, after so many centuries of science passed through retorts and alembics, I am not even able to know if I can know anything."80.

Still others express his disdain for religion in general and for Christianity in particular:

"Religion is not truth. It is consolation."[81].

"Faith according to theology; the capacity to digest the absurd."[82].

"God--the battered cushion of our ignorance."[83].

"Supernatural. Great word, quite hollow and quite sonorous. Resounding cymbal on which the hokum of the learned plays gravely, in order to congregate open-mouthed fools."[84].

You see Christianity on one side, and it looks pretty fine; turn it around and you will see its feet of clay.[85]. (literally its goat feet).

"Three singularities place Jesus on a unique plane: a virgin mother, no father, and two geneaologies.

Perpetual commentary: "CREDO QUAE ABSURDUM."[86].

Perhaps most striking however, in view of his earlier writings on the same subject are his aphoristic expressions on morals, utterly contradicting previous positions:

"The simple-minded Spencer believed that moral conduct would become as natural to us as for the thirsty man to drink a glass of water. Alas! we do not yet see any indication that such a happy evolution has begun or is even on the drafting board."[87].

"Morality? Each one cuts it to his own measure. Some, the majority very wide; others very narrow. And to everyone, what his neighbor wears seems wrong."[88].

"Society: a universal company for mutual deceit."[89].

In the hundreds of aphorisms contained in "Con el Eslabón," there is not a single one that varies the note of skepticism. At times there is a note of wistfulness:

"When I think of the profound disquisitions of the metaphysicians, from Plato, the eagle, to Bergson, the lynx, there resounds within me, with insistence, this impertinent expression: mere words. But then I rectify, and I add tranquilly: mere words, but sublime."[90].

It becomes clear in reading these aphorisms that with him this pessimism is profound and sincere, not a pose. And the testimony of his life is that Varona was not rationalizing for his own moral failures in this deep questioning of all values. Rather it would seem that the depth of his disillusionment is the measure of his real idealism. He is one who has seen the depths of the evil inherent in mankind, a modern Ecclesiastes who has discovered that "all is vanity." And because he has no faith in a superhuman source of redemption, his only possible conclusion is despair. "Shipwrecked on the sea of time," he writes, "we seek a rock, a board, an oar, or even a splinter to which to cling. And whatever we grasp with clutching fingers is viscous, and the hand slips, and we writhe convulsively in a gesture of desperation."[91]. The only positive word in the entire volume is his counsel of unyielding self reliance: "All morality can be reduced to this thrice categorical imperative: Be a man..."[92]. "A sturdy spirit (ánimo fuerte): the only unbreakable shield in the struggles for existence."[93].

The writers who have delved seriously into this skeptical vein of Varona's[94-95] seem at a loss to explain it and can only attribute it a personal idiosyncracy. They fail to see that the most adequate explanation is to be found in the valiant honesty of Varona, who presses his extreme agnosticism to its only logical conclusion--despair. The one common feature between the earlier Varona and the later is their radical empiricism. But whereas the younger Varona is buoyed up by an unconscious metaphysic, an implicit faith in the beneficial processes of evolution and in the meliorative powers of science, the older man, having lost his illusions is delivered to the bleakness of life without hope or promise. There is some-

thing admirable in the naked honesty of Varona in refusing to let himself be optimistic when he knows his premises do not support this attitude. "Someone has said," observes professor Medardo Vitier, "that there is in that attitude of mind, in that intellectual seriousness, an ethical element of high value. On that score we have to credit Varona with a great service."[96]. It is also, we may add, a tribute to his intellectual acumen, for others, particularly the great Puerto Rican philosopher Hostos, with as great apparent sincerity maintain their optimism to the end. Likewise, we must note with admiration for Varona, the fact that even after the loss of all apparent ideals, his public and personal life remained unimpeachable.[97].

At the same time it is necessary to observe that Varona was unable to sustain the position of radical agnosticism. His became a faith; the faith of no faith. The aphorisms disclose a metaphysic of disbelief, in no way systematic but none the less definite:

> "Believers place their phantoms in a recondite region which they call faith. Their roots are sunk in the heart, not in the ingelligence. Sweet chimeras, but chimeras. As above discussion as unreal."[98].

> "Religion is not truth. It is consolation."[99].

At the end Varona was not sufficiently empirical. He persuaded himself that religion is a mere illusion, a falsehood. Unlike Montaigne, who remained a true skeptic, unwilling to go beyond the question "Que sais je?", Varona moved into outright negation.

We have dealt at some length with this pessimistic phase of the thought of Varona because he is the only Hispanic American philosopher who really follows through the logic of his skeptical theory of knowledge to what is

essentially a nihilistic position. There is a somewhat similar pessimism in Manuel Gonzalez Prada of Perú, but it is not so clear or pronounced. To be sure, Varona does not make a banner of nihilism. There is no doubt that he mourns for the ideals he has lost. He nevertheless expresses his complete loss of faith in values, even as the result of social experience.

Professor Vitier, the leading authority on the history of philosophy in Cuba states that Varona's philosophical influence in the island was "very slight."[100]. His explanation for this is that positivism, having no interest in the deeper problems of philosophy, choked off rather than stimulated philosophical interest. He recognizes that Varona "has been an animator in literature and politics, (but) not in philosophy."[101]. "With Varona," he states, "scientific disciplines profit and the philosophical spirit languishes."[102]. But in minimizing Varona's influence Vitier fails to see that even a negative influence is nevertheless an influence. Varona was for many years a professor in the University of Havana. His courses on Morals, Logic, and Psychology served as textbooks there for many generations of students. He was universally recognized as the most erudite and intellectual man in Cuba. It is impossible to discount the influence he had in the island, especially in those years when the dominant philosophy in Europe itself was positivism. It is a measure of the influence of Varona if during the time of this influence philosophical interest withers rather than flourishes in Cuba.

There is no doubt that the influence of Varona's exemplary conduct was a very real one. At the same time the conclusion is unavoidable that with his teachings Varona helped to contribute to the growing loss of respect for transcendent values; those values Varona mourned even though he did not believe in them.

There is today a new interest in philosophy in Cuba, and the island is once again moving to the forefront among the leaders in philosophical studies in Latin-America. But though Vitier, Agramonte, Elias Entralgo, and other Cuban scholars have in recent years made intensive studies of Varona seeking to establish contacts with Cuba's philosophical tradition not one of them acknowledges himself to be a follower of this master of positivism. Positivism has been outgrown in Cuba as it has in other Hispanic American lands. Varona, whose long life extended until 1933, really outlived the period of his influence.

c. Epilogue

It is impossible to refrain from adding a brief epilogue to this study of Varona. The figure of Pascal had a peculiar fascination for the Cuban thinker. A number of his aphorisms refer to the great French scientist and Christian thinker, Pascal. In one of these aphorisms Varona exclaims: "Pascal was a great man, a great sage, a great thinker. He proposed to himself the insoluble enigma of the human condition; failing to solve it, he ran to throw himself into the bottomless sea of revelation. A fatal leap for acrobats of lesser stature!"[103]. It is evident that Varona was fascinated by the thought of a leap of faith. But having lived too long with the idea that a man must be able to see before he can believe, he was unable to make such a leap. In the end, completely distrusting his fellow men, that "company for mutual deceit" he felt the "dark sea of time" closing about him. The tragedy of Varona is the tragedy of life without faith. And the tragedy of Varona is also the tragedy of Cuba and of Spanish America,--that one of its greatest men and leading philosophers should be an apostle of the destruction of faith.

For only faith can give the power to advance on the "dark sea of time," to say with Luz y Caballero: "We are at sea, faith, and forward."[104] As present day students of philosophy in Spanish America re-examine the thought of Cuba's greatest thinkers, Enrique José Varona, and José de la Luz y Caballero, they may well ponder the presence of faith in the Christian thinker, Luz, and the bleak despair of the follower who accepted his empiricism, but disdained his religion.

E. Positivism in Argentina

1. Roots of Argentine Positivism

The course of positivism takes a much broader channel in Argentina than it does in Mexico or Cuba. Where in Mexico it stems directly from the influence of Comte on Gabino Barreda and becomes an "official" philosophy, in Argentina it emerges from the reflection of a group of powerful thinkers and in Cuba it is dominated by the personality of Varona. These thinkers had experienced the influences of the empiricism of Locke and the social ideas of the Encyclopedia, but had come to hold the basic ideas of positivism before they became acquainted with their systematic expression in the writings of Comte and Spencer. Alejandro Korn describes Argentine positivism as an indigenous achievement, "the most authentic creation of the Argentine spirit."[105] Analyzing its development he recognizes its ultimate sources in European influences and mentions "saxon utilitarianism, French encyclopedism, Spanish regalism, German romanticism,"[106] But these, he claims, were secondary in importance. Argentine positivism was essentially an original achievement, the product of realistic reflection upon the basic needs of the Argentine nation.

The founders of Argentine positivism were the members of the "Asociación de Mayo", which has been described in the previous chapter. Exiled during the tyranny of Rosas they had an opportunity to meditate seriously and with greater perspective than had been possible within the national situation. To that group must be added the great name of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, who as a provincial never belonged to the organization, but who shared their basic ideology and was to exercise a greater influence than any other. Korn finds the characteristic feature of positivism to be the rejection of metaphysical speculation and the exclusive concentration upon social problems.[107] We may add that the solution to these problems is held by positivist writers to lie in the application of experimental science to moral questions, in education along scientific lines, and in the advancements of industry and technology.

The founders of Argentine positivism belonged to the first generation to come to maturity after the independence. Their student days were spent in the University of Rivadavia, with its emphasis on the teachings of Bentham and Condillac. They were also influenced, as we have seen, by the romanticism of Saint-Simon and Leroux, and by Lamenais. As they returned to Argentina after the fall of Rosas their interest turned very largely to the economic development of the country.

These men were not philosophers in the truest sense of the word. At the most they may be called "social philosophers". They were men absorbed with the practical and immediate needs of their day. Yet in their practical interest they acted in accordance with a definite, if not always explicit philosophy. Juan B. Alberdi was the member of the group who had the clearest ideas regarding this social philosophy. "He was not the creator of this

body of ideas," says Korn, "but its most outstanding expositor and the one who gave it philosophical expression."[108].

2. Juan B. Alberdi (1810-1811)

Alberdi is best known by his greatest work, "Bases y punto de partida para la organización de la Conferación Argentina." (Bases and points of departure for the organization of the Argentine Confederation). This was an attempt to set forth the principles which should govern the new constitution which Argentina urgently needed after the long dictatorship. Though Alberdi was not a member of the Constitutional convention of 1853, his book was in the hands of the delegates and the model constitution which he included in the book did actually become the basis for the new constitution.[109].

The clearest statement of Alberdi's philosophical position, however, is to be found in a brief essay written in 1842 while in exile in Montevideo. It is an essay in which he sets forth the ideas which he believes should guide a person who is to present a course on contemporary philosophy in America. He wrote it for his own guidance in the preparation of such a course to be given in a Liceo of Montevideo.[110]. Alberdi holds that there can be no such thing as a universal philosophy, that each philosophy must be an expression of the peculiar needs of a people.[111]. Philosophy in America, he predicts, will not be a speculative philosophy concerned with abstract ideas, but a "philosophy applied to social political and moral institutions."[112]. The lingering influences of Rousseau and the French revolution may be seen in the emphasis Alberdi gives to the ideas of liberty and popular sovereignty. Seeking for the principles on which the nation must be built he appeals to the traditions of the independence movement. "The

liberty of man," he declares, "is the fountain source of our social organization (sociabilidad). It is because men are free that they are equal and all have a right to leadership of the collectivity...Liberty, equality, association, behold here the great foundations of the moral philosophy."[113].

Concerned with the immediate needs of the country Alberdi came to devote his greatest emphasis to the economic factor. "Alberdi," says Korn, "without knowing Marx arrives at the same conclusions."[114]. He attributed to the economic factor the preponderant role in the development of Argentine history, and held that the solution to the problems of Argentina must be along economic lines. It is in this context that Alberdi's famous maxim, "to govern is to populate" must be understood. Argentina was weak, he felt, because it was grossly underpopulated. Able to support a vast population on its fertile plains it was a virtually desert country. To build up the strength of the nation it was necessary to build up the population. This could only be done rapidly through a great immigration. His reasoning led him not only to favor a liberal immigration policy, it also led him to favor a liberal religious policy. Catholicism as the traditional religion of the country should be considered as the national religion, but all cults must be tolerated, otherwise it would be impossible to expect the immigration of non-catholic people, who Alberdi thought were a fine element.[115]. This toleration should extend to the public schools which should offer a completely lay instruction so as not to give offense to any creed. Hence moral instruction should be completely separated from religious teaching.

Alberdi had little patience with creeds or with the idea that morality must necessarily be based on religious faith. "A hard working man," he said, "is the most edifying catechism."[116]. He insisted that the greatest

moralizing agency is hard work and would have relied on an industrial education to bring about the moral improvements he desired. "Industry," he declared, "is the only means of directing youth to order...Industry is the great tranquilizer. It leads mankind through prosperity and wealth to order, and through order to liberty."[117].

Alberdi must not be thought of as a crass positivist. Even though he shared in the utilitarian rejection of metaphysics he repudiated the utilitarianism of Bentham. In one of his early essays he declared that "the useful is a means and not an end," and he condemned the sensationalism of the followers of Condillac because he felt that it led to ethical materialism. In his later writings, however, he did not follow up these earlier insights and by his exclusive concentration on the economic factor and his insistence on "positive" solutions he prepared the way for the more rigid positivism of the later generations who felt themselves to be continuers of Alberdi. Assessing the influence of Alberdi, Korn says,

> "The knowledge of the philosophical systems of Europe came (thirty or forty years later) to complete the authoctonous creation, giving us new elements which broadened the horizon of ideas already rooted among us. That is why in no country did the positivist currents take hold like in ours, nor did the repudiation of metaphysical speculation or the indifference before religious problems manifest itself as clearly nor the profound faith in the development of scientific truth affirm itself so categorically."[118].

That is to say, Korn feels, that it was the deep influence of Alberdi which made possible the dominance which positivism came to have in Argentine.

The strength of Alberdi lies in his originality and in his courage to think through for himself the solutions which he felt the country needed. His weakness lies in his ignoring the spiritual elements which underlie the

the moral and economic conditions, and the consequent one-sidedness of his solutions.

3. Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1811-1888)

Sarmiento must be considered one of the great geniuses of America. Born in poverty in a small town on the foothills of the Andes, a self-taught journalist and wandering school teacher, he rose, by sheer force of intellect and personality to be the greatest president in the history of Argentina and the greatest literary figure in Hispanic American letters. Egotistical, truculent, opinionated, he nevertheless had a boundless faith in the future of America and an enormous drive and vision. Such a man is far removed from the professional philosopher, yet such is the power of his influence even today that no account of the movement of Hispanic American thought could be considered complete without him.

The dominant passion of Sarmiento's life was to "civilize" his nation. The great foes of progress he felt to be the ignorance of the people, the barbarities of the gaucho heritage. The crudities of the gaucho, the Argentine country-man, he attributed to his life in the wide open space, deserted and forlorn. His remedies were education and technology--i.e. essentially the same as Alberdi's. The great open spaces should be bridged by the railroads and the distances shortened by the telegraph. Sarmiento was a passionate foe of tyranny, but he saw that tyrannies were inevitable in the pampas where order could only be established by ruthless caudillos unless the people were educated. His formula for democracy, therefore, was to "educate the sovereign," i.e. the people.

Commissioned by the Chilean government Sarmiento travelled through Europe looking into the educational systems, but he was not favorably impressed by what he found in the old world. It was education in the United States which gained his admiration, in particular, the work of Horace Mann. He became a close friend of the Mann family. It is evident that the admiration of Sarmiento for the Manns was reciprocated for Mrs. Horace Mann translated Sarmiento's great study of the Argentine gaucho leader Facundo Quiroga, "Civilización o Barbarie" into English. When Sarmiento came to preside over the Argentine nation he tried to duplicate the educational reforms of Horace Mann.

Sarmiento shared in the hostility toward Roman Catholicism. He was greatly impressed with the movement of liberal religion in the United States which he thought was best exemplified in the Unitarian churches. Yet even Unitarianism still had too much of the traditional cult form to please him altogether. His ideal seems to have been the development of a humanitarian morality without external religious observances. At the same time the unconscious Catholic within him called for uniformity in spite of his great praise for tolerance. Noting the evolution of puritanism in the direction of Unitarianism in the United States he observes:

> "I conclude...that the good yankees are marching straight toward the unity of beliefs and that in a day not far removed the Union will present to the world the spectacle of a devout people without apparent religious form, philosophical without abjuring of Christianity, just as the Chinese have ended by having a religion without cults. If this should happen, and it must, how great and beneficial for humanity shall be the experiment which shall result in the dignifying of man by the equality of rights, (and) the elevation of morals by the disappearance of the sects which today divide that people...!"[119].

Sarmiento was a prolific writer. His works comprise fifty-two packed

volumes; a number of them, however, consisting of collected letters and speeches. In his writing he had a great deal to say about civilization and morals. It is clear, however, that when he speaks of civilization he is thinking chiefly of dominion over nature and material achievement, and that when he speaks of moral he means principally the capacity for self-control and integrated action in the individual and for orderly self-rule in society. "The civilization of a people" he states in one of his numerous remarks on this subject, "can only be characterized by the most extensive appropriation of the products of the earth; the use of all the powers of intelligence and of all material forces for the comfort, the pleasure and the moral elevation of the greatest number of individuals."[120]. And again;

> "The power, the wealth and the strength of a nation depend upon the industrial moral and intellectual capacity of the individuals which comprise it, and public education should have no other end than to increase these forces of production and direction ever increasing the number of individuals that possess them. The dignity of the state and the glory of a nation can no longer be founded except in the dignity of the condition of its subjects; and this dignity cannot be obtained except by elevating the moral character, developing the intelligence, and predisposing it to the orderly and legitimate action of all the faculties of man."[121].

Sarmiento was above all the man of action. He had no time or patience for the theoretical problems of philosophy. His interest in science was always directed to its practical applications. But if he had little to say about positivism, he may be said to have incarnated its very spirit. When he became acquainted with the works of Spencer he was an elderly man, his major work already behind him. "Spencer and I understand each other," he is reported to have said, "because we are traveling the same road."[122].

In the development of positivism in Argentina, Sarmiento's must be accounted as one of the greatest influences. Alejandro Korn has judged the thought of Sarmiento in the following words:

> "The concept of civilization for Sarmiento is purely utilitarian and positive. In the fifty volumes of his collected works one cannot find an abstract definition of the term. He always defines it by description. Civilization is to establish the government of law and of constituted authority, to educate the masses, to open ports and rivers to universal commerce, to build roads and railroads, to encourage the settlement of new colonists, to remove obstacles, moral and natural to the free expansion of the economic forces."[123].

It was not because of his philosophical speculations that he came to exercise such influence. It was because the ideals of his age were utilitarian and Sarmiento, more than any other man in his century in Latin-America, helped to realize them. With his restless and dynamic energy he actually did the things the positivist philosophy tended to set forth as the supreme needs of society. He actually educated and built schools, he introduced railroads and systems of communication, he fought for democracy as a soldier, writer, and statesman; without sparing himself he devoted his life to what he believed were the most pressing needs of his day. "He was, states W. Rex Crawford, "the man who found strength within himself to pursue single-mindedly a single ideal, that of creating a civilization, educating a people, leaving the indelible imprint of his personality and work on the institutions of his country. Echeverría and Alberdi believed in ideals; Sarmiento brought his to life."[124].

4. The Decline of Argentine Positivism

The positivism which was a creative achievement in the first generation of Argentine positivists became more and more an imitative and rigid

attitude in the later generations. Those who came after Alberdi, Sarmiento and Mitre and tried to follow in their footsteps read Comte, Spencer, and other European positivists and found there the detailed rationale for the ideas which had underlaid the thought of their great national leaders. Positivism then became the new orthodoxy, buttressed not by the enforcement of a Holy Office but by the prestige of the most renowned thinkers of Europe and the most revered statesmen of the nation.

Alejandro Korn observes that although the nation prospered economically during this positivist period there was a distinct decline in cultural achievements. The cause of this decline he attributes to the prevalence of the positivist ideology with its one-sided preoccupation with social and scientific questions. There was the same scorn of metaphysics which we have observed in Mexico. Even esthetics were proscribed. The chief interest became the sociological. "This generation," writes Korn, referring to the positivists who are known in Argentine history as the 'generation of '80's', "preferred the sociological theme to all others, not in its abstract form but applied to the phenomena of the national life in their historical or political aspects."[125]. "Positivism," he adds, "sees in the social problems the ultimate and essential object of its philosophical conception."[126].

Among the positivist sociologists of this generation the most eminent are the brothers Francisco and José María Ramos Mejía. Francisco was the elder and the pioneer. Deeply influenced by Spencer and the concepts of evolution, he found in biology the key to the interpretation of society. Francisco Ramos Mejía had a great influence in his later days on a young physician who was to become Argentina's greatest positivist philosopher

and man of science, José Ingenieros.

The great stronghold of positivism in Argentina at the end of the nineteenth century was the normal school at Paraná, founded by Sarmiento in 1870. From this school the influence of positivism radiated to the whole nation, particularly in the field of education. The philosophy of Comte was the object of special study at Paraná, but it was the "positivism" of New England, as incarnated in Horace Mann rather than the positivism of Comte which was felt as the chief influence there. J. Alfredo Ferreira (1863-1938) the leading representative of the Paraná school, has described the institution as "a Boston school transplanted to the wilderness of South America."[127]. Alejandro Korn has described the action of the educators of Paraná in the following terms:

> "In its own sphere (education) they realized a great work. They took to the provinces of the interior, together with the secular schools, emancipation from the narrow dogmatism of the sacristies. They formed our excellent female teaching corps and initiated the economic and spiritual emancipation of the Argentine woman. They organized the primary school."[128].

Professor Francisco Romero has written with great appreciation of Dr. Ferreira, lamenting that the inaccessibility of his works, scattered in various periodicals, has contributed to the neglect of one of the most important leaders of Argentine positivism. Occupying the highest places in the government educational system Ferreira dedicated himself with timeless devotion to the cause of the advancement of education in the nation. This education, he believed, "should be based on direct observation" of all that surrounded the students. "Education," was his formula, "must be experimental, positive, relevant."[129]. A follower of Comte, he nevertheless

believed that Comte should be interpreted with freedom: "The great edifice of Comte must be adapted, not immobilized..."[130].

Positivism for Ferreira, as for Sarmiento, was a complete philosophy of life, a program of action. His definition of positivism was: "science spiritualized, naturalized, generalized."[131]. His adherence to Comtian positivism went so far as to accept Comte's religion of humanity, although this phase, according to Romero, was a very secondary consideration with him.

At the same time that the Escuela de Paraná was exerting its great influence, the University of Buenos Aires was completely given over to the positivist orientation. According to Korn, the entire generation of those who emerged from the University in this period were committed to the doctrines of positivism, and in particular to the dogma of evolution in which there was thought to be a key to unlock all the secrets of the universe. Not only biological, but also political, moral, social, economic, and all other phenemona were interpreted in the pattern of evolution.[132]. To this period also, belongs the foundation of the University of La Plata, known as "the positivist university," the work of Joaquín V. Gonzalez. The basic idea of the university was to serve as a base for scientific investigation, and for the application of the experimental method in all teaching, an aspiration which was only partially carried out.[133].

The great idol of this age was "science." Even though positivism theoretically rejected all metaphysics, for many the faith in science became itself a new metaphysics of a materialistic cast. Coriolano Alberini, who, with Alejandro Korn led the struggle against positivism in Argentina

in the early part of this century[134] has characterized this trend in the following words:

> "Some of those attached to positivism, the more dogmatic ones have attached themselves to the metaphysical interpretation of Darwinian biology, in the manner of Haeckel. One result was the brief creed of Ameghinio, the great Argentine paleontologist who in that work makes a bold profession of philosophical faith on the basis of a materialistic cosmology."[135]

With this development, of course, positivism went beyond the dependence on science as an empirical method and became an explicit faith. Professor Romero believes that a clear distinction should be made between positivism as such and this metaphysical positivism which he labels scientism: (cientifismo):

> "From strict positivism it is necessary to distinguish, among us, as everywhere, scientism. These two attitudes coincide in time and are related in various ways; there are positivists and pure scientists, but the cases in which both attitudes are combined in the same person, with varying proportions of each ingredient, are very frequent. Positivism, the more critical of the two, rejected outrightly all metaphysics. Scientism, with an absolute faith in the science of its epoch, did not hesitate to draw a metaphysic from it. Among men of science and the devotees of science the customary thing was scientism."[136]

While this distinction is helpful to our understanding of the variety of attitudes to be found in the Positivist epoch in Argentina, and Spanish America, it would be misleading to press the distinction too greatly. For positivism contains an implicit materialistic metaphysic even when it disavows any metaphysical conclusions. It is a point to which we shall have to return in our final estimate of positivism in Spanish America.

In the early years of the Twentiety Century, positivism in Argentina

was already a movement in decline. As a reaction against the barrenness of the positivist culture a Faculty of Philosophy and Letters was founded in the University of Buenos Aires in 1896, a step which was not realized without first overcoming considerable opposition. For the first time in the history of Argentina a chair in Ethics and Metaphysics was established in a secular university. This chair was occupied by Dr. Rodolfo Rivarola, a lawyer. Rivarola broadly accepted the positivist position. In the early years of his course he took Spencer's "First Principles" as his textbook in metaphysics. But he was also deeply influenced by Kant, defining ethics as "the science of what ought to be, not that which is"; a definition completely opposed to the positivist concept of ethics. Unfortunately, Rivarola never followed up this Kantian insight, and never ventured to attack the positivists clearly and openly. Hence the most that can be said of his work is, to use the words of Francisco Romero, that "he prepared the ground" for the anti-positivist labor of Korn and Alberini.[137].

Far more influential than Rivarola in the River Plate region in undermining the influence of positivism at the beginning of the century is the Uruguayan essayist José Enrique Rodó. A follower of Renan, Rodó attacked positivism on behalf of an aesthetic concept of life symbolized in the figure of "Ariel". In 1907, the Peruvian critic Francisco García Calderon presented a paper at an international congress of philosophy in Heidelberg on philosophical currents in Spanish America at which he reported that positivism was "slowly provoking an idealist reaction, and this tends to predominate now in America."[138]. In this reaction García Calderón notes in particular the influence of Rodó.

Yet, as far as Argentina is concerned, the remarks of García Calderon

regarding the passing of positivism are premature. Coriolano Alberini, writing in 1925, and Alejandro Korn, in 1927, both of them feel the nation to be still under its sway. The citadel of positivism did not yield so easily.

The main factors in the declining influence of positivism in Argentina during this period are the same as those we have noted in Mexico, namely: the impact of new philosophical currents stemming from Europe, and the dissatisfaction with the spiritual barrenness and the lack of moral elevation inherent in positivism. Alejandro Korn, who lived through this period, and who as a physician and psychiatrist experienced the full strength of positivism, and turned away from it, has described both of these factors with unusual precision and eloquence:

> "Slowly, with delays, reticenses, and misunderstandings the news of a new intellectual orientation also reached our ears. With surprise and curiosity we learn: positivism is exhausted, its heirs, pragmatism and scientism are about to follow; a new rhythm of philosophical evolution again posits forgotten issues. Thus we learned of Renouvier, of Boutroux, of Bergson, of Croce, of a multitude of vague and crepuscular names. These novelties did not penetrate easily in our midst. They found a tense atmosphere, a decided reluctance to abandon the old mental habits. They also found the widely diffused conviction that a certain materialist degeneracy in national life, the exclusive dominance of economic ends, the neglect of ethical norms, demanded the corrective of a higher and more spiritual culture."[139].

In the midst of this atmosphere of "reluctance to abandon old mental habits," the visit of José Ortega y Gasset to Buenos Aires in 1916 was an event which shook the intellectual atmosphere. Both Alejandro Korn and Francisco Romero stress the significance of this visit in lowering the prestige of positivism. Ortega y Gasset, a master expositor, gave a series of public lectures before large audiences. He also led a series of

study seminars for a selected number of persons among whom were numbered Korn and Rivarola, the latter at the time, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in the University of Buenos Aires. "In his classes," states Romero, "Ortega assumed a forthright anti-positivist attitude." "His coming," he adds, "had great repercussions and exercised a notable influence."[140]. "From that time," declares Korn "the love of study increased and the dominance of positivism was relaxed."[141].

It is evident, however, that the influence of Ortega y Gasset was strongest among a small circle of the intellectual elite who were able to perceive the exhaustion of positivism. For the greater number, positivism continued to be the dominant view. That the influence of positivism remained for so long in Argentina is in large measure due to the powerful personality of José Ingenieros, whose work we must now consider in greater detail.

5. José Ingenieros (1877-1925)

a. The Unique Popularity of Ingenieros

In the writings of José Ingenieros positivism achieves the peak of its popular influence in Spanish America in general, and in Argentina in particular. It is difficult today to understand the tremendous popularity which Ingenieros enjoyed in his lifetime. His books went through edition after edition, breaking all records for non-fiction works. He was the popular idol of secondary and university students everywhere, tumultuously acclaimed whenever he addressed them. No other Spanish American intellectual has enjoyed such acclaim.

Ingenieros was a romantic figure, and knew how to popularize his ideas in exuberant rhetoric. But these qualities only partially explain his fame. His popularity is an illustration of the way in which positivist ideals had permeated the atmosphere. As the recognized leader and symbol of the new scientific age, Ingenieros received in his person the homage paid at the shrine of science. The most enthusiastic homage came from youth, to whom he consciously addressed himself and whom he hailed as the promise of the new age.

But if Ingenieros owed his immense popularity to the prevailing cult of science, his rightful place as the leader of positivist thought in the twentieth century and his influence in extending the sway of positivism cannot be denied. Alejandro Korn declares: "He was able to infuse a new vigor and to prolong for twenty years the life of decadent positivism."[142]. Romero calls him, "the most important and the most interesting figure of all our period of doctrinaire positivism, the most robust philosophical mentality which has emerged in the country after that of Alejandro Korn."[143].

b. The Intense Life of Ingenieros

José Ingenieros was born in Buenos Aires in 1877, the son of an Italian immigrant who had been the publisher of a socialist paper in Italy and a founder of the First Socialist International. He thus inherited the tradition of a social non-conformist. At the age of fifteen he was publishing a socialist journal, and still in secondary school he participated in the riots attending the first struggles for worker's rights in Argentina. In 1895, as a delegate of the school of medicine, he became one of the founders of the socialist party in Argentina. Forced to repeat a year because

of the distractions of his political activities, Ingenieros turned his interest to scientific research and though never losing interest in politics, abandoned active political life. Only in the last years of his life, inspired by the success of the Russian revolution did he return to politics.

Following his graduation from medical school Ingenieros became associated with Francisco Ramos Mejía, a psychiatrist as well as a sociologist. Ramos Mejía made him the head of his clinic. Appointed director of psychiatric observation in the Buenos Aires police force, he soon made a name for himself as the country's leading criminologist and alienist. By virtue of his brilliant participation in the International Congress of Psychology in Rome in 1905, and the great number of monographs which he published in European journals at that time,[145] he became, according to W. Rex Crawford, "the first Latin American scientist with a European reputation."[146]

But Ingenieros could not restrict his interest to a narrow specialty. His restless mind extended to the fields of historical, sociological and philosophical interpretation. Volume after volume poured from his pen to the total of forty-seven major titles, with 484 shorter works to his credit. All this before he died in 1925 at the age of forty-eight![147] His most famous historical work is the four-volume "Evolución de las Ideas Argentinas," one of the sources employed in this dissertation. In it Ingenieros flays the colonial past, the Roman Catholic Church, and all conservative influences and persons, and praises every attempt to restrict the power of the church and aristocracy and to institute reforms of a social and democratic character. In 1915 he founded a journal devoted to the dissemination of positivist ideas, "Revista de Filosofía," "from the pages of which", says Crawford, "he pontificated as the acknowledged leader"[148] of the

positivists throughout Latin America.

c. The Romantic Moralism of Ingenieros

Among his many interests, the one closest to the heart of Ingenieros was his interest in moral philosophy---perhaps it would be more accurate to say moral exhortation. His philosophical preoccupation centered in the moral problem, and only in his later years did he turn to consider the question of metaphysics, per se, though there is ever present in his moral theorizing an implicit metaphysic.

A study of the writings of Ingenieros in the field of moral ideas reveals a curious blend of two essentially contradictory elements, the positivist and the romantic. He consciously tried to found morality on positivist principles, but when he began to moralize, his thought and expression always became romantic. To employ the distinction made by Luz y Caballero of Cuba, his moral theory was positivist, his moral precepts were romantic.

His positivist outlook is best revealed in his work "Principles of Psychology," a volume better described by its original title, "Principles of Biological Psychology." Summarizing the ethical position of Ingenieros in this work, W. Rex Crawford declares: "the scientist regards moral systems as products of evolution and necessarily relative."[148]. "Morality, as John Dewey once said, 'for all practical purposes means 'customs,'" adds Crawford in explanation.[149]. This relativist standpoint is well exemplified by Ingenieros in his explanation of the origin of law: "In every period and place, the laws in force are those that are most useful to the group which imposes them in the name of the social class or party; they prevail only by

reason of the force that is behind them."[150].

It is strange, after the rather cynical and coldly analytical statements of the "Psychology" to turn to the three volumes which Ingenieros presented as the expression of his moral philosophy to find, side by side with typical positivist statements, passages of romantic moralism expressed with tropical exuberance. These three volumes are, employing their English title: "The Mediocre Man," "Towards a Morality without Dogmas," and "The Moral Forces." The second of these volumes is a series of lectures which he presented as the guest professor in Dr. Rivarola's chair of Ethics and Metaphysics in the University of Buenos Aires. It is the only one which is written in a restrained, philosophical style. Professor Romero, deploring particularly what he calls the "tropicalism" of "The Mediocre Man" and the questionable taste of Ingeniero's purple prose would have us look for his moral philosophy primarily in the academic volume.[151]. This is to overlook the fact, however, that Ingenieros himself spoke of the three volumes as a trilogy, and referred to all three of them as the expression of his ethical thought.

The basic thesis of his moral philosophy is stated in the introduction to "The Mediocre Man", the "Morality of Idealists":

> "In the ethic of the future there will flower a moral idealism independent of the religious dogmas and metaphysical aprioris: the ideals of perfection founded on social experience and evolving in the same manner will constitute the inner core of a doctrine of indefinite perfectibility, favorable to all the possibilities of human betterment."[152].

He vehemently insists that all men may be idealists, no matter what their philosophy. Theological and metaphysical systems are outworn. This does

not mean that the concept of duty is outdated. On the contrary, the concept of obligation emerges more clearly than ever as the result of man's experience in social living. On empirical premises he condemns hedonism as a moral philosophy, but he heartily approves of stoicism as a doctrine in which "moral experimentalism finds its perfect molds."[153] But stoicism is not a philosophy for youth. Experimental idealism in youth takes the form of a romantic idealism. "The perfect idealist would be a romantic at twenty and a stoic at fifty; stoicism is as abnormal in youth as romanticism in maturity. What at first awakens passion must afterward crystallize itself in supreme dignity; that is the logic of its temperament."[154] Only the introduction of this volume deals with moral theory. The body of it is given over to a series of moral homilies, excessively hortatory in tone, romantic in expression, whose content is well suggested by the subtitle of the volume: "A moral essay about human mediocrity as a cause of routine, hypocrisy, and domesticity, in contemporary societies, with useful reflections of EXPERIMENTAL IDEALISM (capitalized by Ingenieros); so that youth may endeavor to avoid it, freely educating its ingenuity, virtue, and dignity."[155]

The second volume of the trilogy, "Towards a Morality without Dogmas", is really an elaboration of the thesis expressed in "The Mediocre Man" as set forth above. Ingenieros claims to find support for his thesis that "morality is natural and human, independent of all religious dogma and all metaphysical speculation," in the moral ideas of Ralph Waldo Emerson and in the theories and practices of the Societies for Ethical Culture in the United States and in England. The greater part of the volume is given over to an exposition of the thought of Emerson, and to a description of the Societies of Ethical Culture, largely depending for the latter on

Sarmiento's impressions gathered fifty years before.

In the advocacy of a "morality without dogmas" Ingenieros defines a dogma as "an immutable and imperfectible opinion imposed upon men by an authority which is prior to their own experience."[157]. "An ethic founded on theology," he adds, "is by definition dogmatic."[158]. His specific objection to a morality based on a theology is that to his mind such a morality must always be static and arbitrary. "The supernatural character of the obligation and of the sanction excludes from religious ethics the possibility of their own perfectioning,"[159]. since, presumably, they are already perfect. This rigidity "leaves the believer without the slightest liberty or initiative."[160]. The rationalist dogma as the basis of morality, exemplified in the ethic of Kant, is more to his liking than theological dogma. His main objection to rationalism is that it is too intellectual; it has not come out of life but out of the academic cloister. It has power only over a limited number of individual consciences. "It is hard to conceive," says Ingenieros, "that all men should be capable of directing their conduct toward the good without receiving some impulse from without their own personal reason."[161]. Moreover, rationalist philosophers also tend "to attribute to their principles of ethics the same characteristics... of eternity, immutability."[162].

The logical alternative for Ingenieros is a morality based on social experience, and he boldly restates his belief that "morality is a natural result of life in society."[163]. In his repudiation of morality based on "dogma" he wants to make it clear that he has no intention of repudiating morality as well. "What we desire," he insists, "is precisely the contrary."[164]. He knows that life cannot be lived without moral controls, and

he asserts that "life in society requires the individual acceptance of duty, as a social obligation, and the collective accomplishment of justice, as a social sanction."[165]. Here Ingenieros strikes a note which is characteristic of the positivist moral theories, a note which Varona, of Cuba, states most succinctly when he declared that "man is a social being, and therefore moral."[166]. At the end, however, Ingenieros does not seem quite sure that morality will result "naturally" from life in society or "without dogmas". For he concludes this volume with the admission that there is a danger in this counsel of morality without dogmas, since men "are exposed to relax the springs of their private and civic conduct (because of) the baleful habit of associating their morality with their abandoned religion." After which he feels impelled to exhort his hearers:

> "The man who abandons his religious dogmas is obligated to intensify his moral practice, to be a better son, a better father, a better friend and better husband, a better worker and better citizen. The social obligation is not less than the theological or the metaphysical; the social sanction is just as severe as the divine or the rational."[167].

The third volume, "The Moral Forces," is called by Ingenieros a series of "lay sermons", and a "deontology of morality." Its object, he states, is to "complete the panoramic vision of a functional ethic" begun in the previous volumes. The chapter Headings give a good idea of the contents of this volume. There are discourses on "youth, enthusiasm energy; will, initiative, work; sympathy, justice, solidarity; truth, science, ideal; firmness dignity, duty; goodness, morals, religion; etc." Under these headings he repeats many of the ideas already encountered in the first two volumes of the trilogy. His remarks on each word are developed in the form of propositions. For example, under the heading of the word "morals" he states

three propositions: "Morality renews itself as social experience. Dogmas are obstacles to progress toward moral perfection. In each renewal there appear the seeds of a new morality."[168].

On critical examination it becomes evident that the basic contradiction between the positivist basis and the romantic precepts in the moral philosophy of Ingenieros renders his whole position logically untenable. His starting point is that of the "ideals of perfection based on social experience," and he appeals to the "social sanction" as the safeguard for the new morality. But in his homilies he derides the "mediocre man", whom he identifies as one who is moved by the desire for social approval or the fear of social disapproval. This "mediocre man" he also calls the "honest man",[169]. and he opposes honesty to virtue:

> "Virtue rises above the current morality, it implies certain aristocracy of the heart, proper to moral talent; the virtuous man anticipates some form of future perfection and sacrifices to it the automatisms which have been consolidated by habit...Honesty is an imitation; virtue is something original...To be honest is to submit oneself to current convention; to be virtuous frequently means to go against them, exposing oneself to passing as an enemy of all morality, being only that of certain inferior prejudices.. To do as everyone else does may imply to adjust oneself to what is unworthy; moral progress has as its condition the resistance to the common tendency to moral decline, and the anticipation of one's time, as any other progress."[170].

These are noble words, and Ingenieros' recognition of the fact that true virtue may sometimes mean defiance of "current convention" is a wholesome note. It is evident that Ingenieros was seeking a higher standard of morality than that of the crowd. But it simply does not follow from his original positivist premises. Morals, he had said to begin with, must be based on social experience, but then he counselled those who would be "superior"

to live, not by the standards of today but by the perfections of tomorrow--by an experience which had not yet taken place--whatever that might be! At this point he has abandoned positivism in favor of a romantic moralism which is empty of content. There is a revealing paragraph in "The Mediocre Man" in which Ingenieros calls the roll of the heroes of what he calls "romantic idealism." "A romanticism is involved," he writes, "in everything perfectible; its orientations vary with the times and with temperaments." "(It)...burns in open rebellion against all that minimizes and domesticates the individual, as in Emerson, Stirner, Guyau, Ibsen, and Nietzsche."[171].

The most interesting chapter of this volume, however, is the introductory one from which the volume gets its name. It is this chapter which best reveals the romantic strain in Ingenieros, reveals the fact that in spite of his strictures against metaphysics he has a hidden metaphysic which underlies his moral optimism. The chapter breathes a mystic faith in the "moral forces." A rather lengthy quotation is necessary to show the spirit of this chapter; the words themselves hardly matter: The proposition which heads the chapter reads, "They (the moral forces) transmute themselves without ceasing in humanity."

> "In the perpetual flow of the universe nothing is and all becomes asthe obscure Efesian Heraclitus declared. Together with the cosmic the human lives in eternal movement; social experience is incessant renewal of concepts, norms, and values. The moral forces are plastic, changeable, as are customs and institutions. They are not tangible nor measurable, but humanity feels their impulse. They magnetize hearts and fertilize minds. They give eloquence to the apostles when he proclaims his creed, even though few may listen and none may follow; they give heroism to the martyr when he affirms his faith, though he may be badgered by scribes and pharisees. They sustain the philosopher when he meditates long sleepless

> hours, the poet who sings a song or breathes a hope, the sage who lights a spark in his crucible, a utopianist who pursues an illusory perfection. They seduce the one who succeeds in hearing their siren song, they confuse the one who pretends in vain not to hear. They are a supreme tribunal which transmits to the future the best of the present, that which dignifies and beautifies life. All rank is transitory without their sanction, from which there is no appeal. Their dominion is superior to coercion and to violence. They are feared by the powerful and they make tyrants tremble. Their herculean strength, sooner or later, conquers Injustice, hydra breeder of social immorality."[172]

Such a paragraph is far removed indeed from the cold observation that "the laws in force are those that are most useful to the group which imposes them in the name of a social class or party and prevail only by reason of the force that is behind them." This apotheosis of "the moral forces" conviction is not the result of a posteriori observation, but an expression of a faith that there "is a power which makes for righteousness" implicit in the universe itself. He posits these moral forces, not as a scientist, which he cannot do, for "they are not tangible nor measurable," but as a man of faith. There are a number of other passages in both "The Mediocre Man," and "The Moral Forces" where Ingenieros shows his inclination for extreme individualism. Indeed, one may conclude that the "superior" man of Ingenieros had far more in common with the "superman" of Nietzsche than with the social man of positivism.

Yet this "superior man" of Ingenieros was not to defy convention for the sake of pleasure or personal profit, but in anticipation of the higher standards of the future. Ingenieros sensed the existence of a moral order in the universe and the presence of a power active on behalf of righteousness. In his search for these "moral forces" Ingenieros transcended his positivist base. But unable to link the existence of these moral forces to the power

of the living God, or to some kind of transcendent moral order, his thought mired in rhetorical verboseness preaching a vague romantic idealism.

d. Scientism in Search of a Metaphysic

In 1918 Ingenieros published a small volume entitled "Propositions Relative to the Future of Philosophy." Ingenieros, in common with the other representatives of positivism, had railed against metaphysics as a useless form of speculation. Now, however, he enters the field of metaphysical discussion offering ten meticulously phrased propositions which he presents as the basic principles for the metaphysic of the Twenty-First Century. Celebrating Ingenieros' venture into the field of metaphysical inquiry Alejandro Korn declares, "In effect, Ingenieros has the courage to tell us that philosophy is metaphysics and that we cannot dispense with it. With this he frees himself from all positivist contamination."[173]. The latter is a touch of irony on Korn's part, for he soon proceeds to criticize the exaggerated dependence on science in the propositions.

The metaphysic which Ingenieros proposes in this "Propositions" is not the metaphysic which is implicit in "The Mediocre Man" and "The Moral Forces". It is a far more cautious, less romantic construction. In making an official place for metaphysics in his philosophy Ingenieros did so recognizing that there are fields of thought to which the human mind must venture, where science, limited to that which can be tested and demonstrated experimentally cannot reach. Coining a new word he calls these areas "the inexperiential".[174]. The role of metaphysics is to formulate hypotheses regarding the inexperiential. Since there is no foreseeable future in which there will not be a "residuum of the inexperiential",[175]. the need

for metaphysics is likely to be a permanent one.

Ingenieros offers as the basic guiding principle for the formulation of these hypotheses concerning the inexperiential the proposition that a hypothesis "must always be conditioned by its concordance with the least doubtful results in the experimental field surpassed by this hypothesis."[176]. No hypothesis can be considered firm and unchangeable, since every hypothesis must be continually revised in the light of the advances of science in the field of the experiential. In accord with this basic principle he declares that the methods of mysticism and of dialectics are both illegitimate; mysticism wishing to solve the problems through supposed revelations, guesses, or intuitions, and dialectics through subtleties of reasoning. All metaphysics based on mysticism or dialectics he called "paleo-metaphysics,"[177]. to indicate their obsoleteness.

In the final proposition Ingenieros again refers to "ideals" and sententiously declares:

> "Human ideals are inexperiential hypotheses conditioned by experience and varying according to the function of the experiential medium. Their value for man depends upon their legitimacy. Most legitimate are those which accord with the becoming of experience, anticipating themselves hypothetically to what shall be the experiential reality in the future."[178].

It might be said that this appeal to "the becoming of experience," is the official retraction of his earlier position in the introduction to "The Mediocre Man" where he stated that "all effective morality is a natural result of social experience"..."experience which has been acted upon, lived, felt by men."[179]. Just what these "legitimate" ideals are, and how one can hypothetically anticipate the experiential reality of the future, Ingenieros

does not say. At the end of this brief volume, having already closed the discussion of the propositions, Ingenieros feels impelled to express his romantic faith again, and venturing far beyond the position outlined in the propositions he proclaims his "optimistic faith in the incessant perfectibility of man", and the confidence that "every future time shall be a better one."[180].

Alejandro Korn, with his usual penetration, has seen the flaw in the "Propositions" of Ingenieros. Referring to the fundamental proposition that the legitimacy of a metaphysical hypothesis must be "conditioned by its concordance with the least doubtful results in the experiential field surpassed by this hypothesis," Korn asks: "Who is to be the judge of the concordance? Does not the author of the most extravagant metaphysic suppose himself to be in accord with reality and with its scientific expression?" To which he adds, with delightful irony: "In the commerce with philosophy we have a pronounced inclination to consider legitimate the children we attribute to ourselves, and bastard the other; candor is a good thing for philosophers."[181]. In the last analysis, Korn is suggesting, every metaphysical position involves a personal decision. Once we have ventured beyond that which is strictly experiential we have entered a realm of subjectivity. It is impossible to carry over into this subjective realm the same scientific authority which it is possible to secure in the world of the experimental. There is no really secure transition from the experiential to the inexperiential, and every metaphysical assertion involves a venture of faith.

It is a commendable step in Ingenieros when he abandons the positivist disdain of metaphysics and openly embarks on the search for a metaphysic.

He did not recognize that all the while he had possessed a materialistic metaphysic. Denying the validity of a morality based on a divine reference he had declared: "Theological and rational dogmas appear to us as simply explanations invented by certain men, in order to subordinate moral experience to determined metaphysical hypotheses,"[182]. (underlined by present writer) a statement which could only be made from the standpoint of a disbelief in revelation, or of a communicable spiritual reality. In his strictures against the "paleo-metaphysics" in the "Propositions", he continues projecting his thought from this same materialistic base.

e. Critical Estimate of the Work and Influence of Ingenieros

As we seek to assess the significance of Ingenieros, we can observe in his work the same double action which characterizes positivism as a whole, the negative and polemical attitude toward the influence of the Roman Catholic Church and toward all authoritarian ideologies, and the attempt to replace the dependence on religious belief with a faith in human reason and the power of science. Ingenieros went far beyond the conventional positivist position in admitting the need for a metaphysic and in proposing a new metaphysic, though he had been no more successful than the other positivist thinkers in not having a metaphysic even before his venture into the field of metaphysical speculation. He endeavored to construct his explicit metaphysic on a scientific basis but this attempt was foredoomed to failure. Science, by definition, deals only with that which can be tested and measured by instruments of precision, while a metaphysic is a judgment concerning the nature of ultimate reality and as such stands outside of the field of quantitative analysis. Attempting to create a "scientific" metaphysic, Ingenieros only succeeded in falling into scientism. As Korn notes: "Attempting to reject the

dogmatism of mystical superstition he surrendered to the dogmatism of the natural sciences."[183].

In his ethical thought Ingenieros also went far beyond the strictly positivist position. His starting point was safely positivist: "all effective morality is a natural result of social experience," But when he counselled to action, he called on men to live by the moral ideals of the future. His critically reflective words spoke of a "social obligation" and a "social sanction," but his enthusiastic words, with which he inspired youth called for a social non-conformity as the mark of the "superior man." He preached a vague romantic idealism, a living by the standards of the future whose contents he never specified. In so doing he helped to cut youth away from the already tenuous hold of Christian morality, only to set them adrift in the sea of life with neither North nor rudder.

It is doubtful whether Ingenieros, who died in the prime of life knowing himself to be the most popular and quoted author in Latin America ever realized that the ideals he represented were already losing ground in Argentina and the rest of Latin America, just as they had in Mexico. While Ingenieros enjoyed the plaudits of the multitude, Alejandro Korn, a true philosopher and scholar besides whom Ingenieros seems like a dilletante, had quietly captured the attention of the most brilliant younger students of philosophy in Argentina. With the death of Ingenieros it suddenly became evident that the real leader of Argentine philosophy was Korn, a follower of Kant and the enemy of positivism. Seconding the influence of Korn against positivism, Coriolano Alberini, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters at the University of Buenos Aires, carried forward a brilliant polemic ridiculing the inconsistencies and dogmatisms of the positiv-

ists.[184].

It is one of the ironies of the cultural history of Spanish America that the death of the writer who experienced the greatest popular following as a positivist, who felt most confident of the all conquering march of science, even to the point of proposing the philosophy for the Twenty-first Century, should really mark the most convenient place at which to date the end of the positivist era in the continent. And it is the irony of the personal fate of Ingenieros, who despised the mediocre minds, that his influence today should linger chiefly among the mediocre.

6. EVALUATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF POSITIVISM IN SPANISH AMERICA

More than a quarter of a century has now passed since the death of the last great leader of positivism in Spanish America. Though the posthumous influence of positivism continues, it is no longer a living movement and it is possible to evaluate it with a certain degree of historical perspective. Many of the issues which it raised, however, are still with us, and can only be answered from the standpoint of our personal perspective.

First of all, we can appreciate how completely positivist theory corresponded to the dominant mood of Spanish America in the period of its history comprehended in the nineteenth century. Until the end of the colonial period Spanish America had remained under the influence of medieval scholasticism. With political independence there ensued a revolt against all the legacy of the colonial past. Rejecting its dependence on Roman Catholic philosophy Spanish America placed itself directly under the philosophical influence of the Western World whose dominant philosophy at the time was

positivism. But its adoption of positivism was not the mere imitation of a foreign mode of thought. Positivism was, Alejandro Korn reminds us, "a spiritual attitude common to the entire occidental world, born and diffused under the dominance of a common historical situation." The common denominator in this common historical situation was the new prestige and power of science, and the universal belief in the infinite progress of mankind as the inevitable result of its application to all aspects of life. Spanish America accepted positivism with particular enthusiasm, for it found in its theories the promise of progress toward political democracy and economic prosperity which were its chief desires, together with freedom from the theological authoritarianism from which it had revolted. It is not strange that the leading thinkers of Spanish America felt that they were positivists even before they had become acquainted with the theories of the masters of positivist philosophy in the western world.

In the second place we can recognize that Spanish America owes a great debt to positivism. Through its influence men achieved freedom of philosophical inquiry. "Since the advent of positivism a free examination of any question is possible in Latin America,"[185]. writes Frondizi. "Positivism," declares Francisco Romero, "was the school where we learned to philosophize."[186]. This freedom of inquiry extended to the religious field as well; the freedom of worship today enjoyed in Spanish America is one of the creative results of the positivist era. Another lasting contribution of positivism is the interest it awakened in science. "Positivism having disappeared the scientific interest remains, as a stimulus to research and as a general concern..."[187].

But the adoption of positivism did not bring to Spanish America the

true progress and welfare which its leaders expected would follow in its wake. Positivist philosophers succeeded in replacing the theological and metaphysical dogmas against which Spanish America had revolted with new orientations supposedly derived from experimental science. They pretended to dispense with metaphysics altogether (until the advent of Ingenieros with his qualified acceptance) as a useless form of speculation. In reality, they sought, perhaps unconsciously, to impose a new metaphysical outlook. For in so far as they rejected the validity of all religious beliefs as "mere explanations invented by men," and denied the existence of a transcendent moral order interpreting all morality as simply the result of social experience they "sought to impose one criterion, the materialist." Many of the later positivists openly acknowledge a belief in "Science" as a substitute for religious faith.

Today the basic inadequacy of the orientation positivism sought to impart is widely recognized. Positivism removed all sense of transcendent obligation and geared morality to utilitarian considerations. It denied the freedom of the will, and hence responsibility. It disclaimed concern for ultimate realities and consequently reduced life to primarily a matter of getting and begetting. Evaluating the world view of positivism Alejandro Korn has written:

> "(Its) deterministic and pseudo-scientific conception converts the universe into a mechanism, conceives only of a utilitarian morality, confuses culture with techniques, and equates the historical process with the natural. We cannot accept a philosophy which nullifies human personality, reduces its dignity to a biological phenomenon, denies it the right to forge its values and ideals, and forbids it to transcend with thought the limits of empirical existence."188.

This philosophy could not furnish the moral and spiritual guidance the nations

of Spanish America needed. The leaders of positivist thought were themselves men of unimpeachable character; but their followers were men of lesser stature. Alejandro Korn and Antonio Caso, Argentina and Mexico's greatest philosophers, have seen a direct relationship between the positivist teaching and the moral decline of their countries at the end of the positivist era. "It is one of the direct conditions of the tremendous moral crisis which the Republic suffers," wrote Caso in Mexico.[189]. "They (the positivists) carried the nation to its most profound moral crisis,"[190]. declared Korn in Argentina. With these judgments the writer fully concurs. It is not strange that a people taught that its moral standards were only the result of the conventions and conveniences of the dominant social class, with no transcendent importance, should have manifested little respect for those standards.

"Positivism was welcomed in Latin America as a sort of non-Christian reformation,"[191]. Dr. E. S. Brightman has aptly declared. But the reformation of positivism was a tragic misadventure. What the nations needed was a true Christian reformation. Now that positivism has been abandoned as the dominant philosophy a new concern for transcendent values is apparent among contemporary Spanish American thinkers. To the present time, no new philosophy can be said to have gained ascendancy. As the philosophers of present day Spanish America seek to formulate a new structure of values which can bring a new moral elevation to their nations, they will do well to consider the truth and the power that is in Christ. Not the wrongly labeled "Christian truth" which is encased in theological formulae thought to be the monopoly of a particular sect, but the existential Truth of Him who said, "I am the Truth, the Way, and the Life."

C. Footnotes

Chapter III

1. Frondizi, Risieri, "Contemporary Argentine Philosophy" Philosophical Phenomenological Research. 180 Papers and Discussions of the First Inter-American Congress of Philosophy. December 1943. p.36.

2. Brightman, Edgar S. "South of the Border". Reprint from Religion in Life, Spring 1946. p. 10.

3. Frondizi, op.cit., p. 36.

4. A special section is devoted to these writers in Appendix A.

5. Gaos, José. Antología del Pensamiento de Lengua Española en la Edad Contemporánea, México. Editorial Séneca, 1945. pp. 437-438.

6. García Calderón, Francisco, Ideas e Impresiones. Madrid. Editorial América, 1919. p. 49.

7. Korn, op.cit., p. 175.

8. Frondizi, op.cit., p. 36.

9. For a fuller exposition of the philosophy of Hostos, see Appendix C.

10. For a fuller exposition of the work of Bello, see Appendix B.

11. Caso, México, Apuntaciones de Cultura Patria, P. 76.

12. Note: This phase of the curriculum of Barreda did not last long in its original form. Various modifications were made to it exempting some of the students from parts of the requirements. The Comtian and scientific spirit which animated the school persisted into the twentieth century, however, as may be seen from the remarks of José Vasconcelos in his autobiography regarding his experiences there as a school boy.

13. Gaos, Antología del Pensamiento Hispano Americano, p. 451.

14. Barreda, Gabrino, Estudios, Selección y Prólogo de José Fuentes Mares. México. Edición de la Universidad Antónoma, 1941.

15. Note: The text of Logic which was adopted in the Escuela Preparatoria was an adaptation of the Logic of the English Positivist, Alexander Bain. In 1880 conservative influences attempted to substitute the text of the Spanish catholic philosopher Jaime Balmes, but unable to do so did succeed in substituting the text of the German philosopher Tiberghien, representative of a "spiritualist" school. Before too long, however, positivist forces eliminated Tiberghien in favor of an adaptation of the Logic of John Stuart Mill.

16. Barreda, Op. Cit. p. 115.

17. Ibid p. 117.

18. Ibid., pp. 118-120.

19. Ibid., p. 124.

20. Ibid., p. 121.

21. Ibid., pp. 120-121.

22. Ibid., pp. 121-122.

23. Ibid., p. 15.

24. Caso, Antonio, Discurso a la Nación Mexicana. México D. F. Librería de Porrúa Hnos., 1922. p. 71.

25. Ibid., p. 67.

26. Ibid., p. 67.

27. Zea, Leopoldo. El Positivismo en México. Vol. II. México D. F. El Colegio de México, 1944. p. 203.

28. Ibid., p. 179.

29. Ibid., p. 189.

30. Ibid., p. 193.

31. Gaos, op. cit., p. 803.

32. Ibid., p. 801.

33. Sierra, Prosas. Prólogo y Selección de Antonio Caso. México D. F. Editorial de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma, 1939. p. 191.

34. Ibid., p. 195.

35. Vasconcelos, José. Ulises Criollo - La Vida del Autor escrito por el mismo. 9th ed. México D. F. Ediciones Botas, 1945. p. 262.

36. Caso, México, Apuntamientos de Cultura Patria. p. 92.

37. Reyes, Alfonso, El Pasado Inmediato y Otros Ensayos. México. El Colegio de México, 1943. p. 33.

38. Quoted by Ramos, op. cit., p. 137.

39. Quoted by Ramos, op. cit., p. 130.

40. Reyes, op. cit., p. 48.

41. Ramos, op. cit., p. 134.

42. Vasconcelos, op. cit., pp. 327-328.

43. Caso, Discursos a la Nación Mexicana, p. 192.

44. Quoted by Leopoldo Zea, Apogeo y Decadencia del Positivismo en México. México D. F. El Colegio de México. 1944. p. 292.

45. Caso, op. cit., p. 71.

46. Quoted by Vitier, Las Ideas en Cuba, p. 137.

47. The outstanding commentary on Varona from a strictly philosophical standpoint is that written by Professor Francisco Romero, of Argentina. It may be found in the volume: Filósofos y Problemas. Buenos Aires. Editorial Lozada, 1947. pp. 7-48.

48. Cf. Romero, Sobre la Filosofía en Ibero América, p. 12.

49. Homenaje a Enrique José Varona en el Centenario de su Natalicio. Two volumes. La Habana, Publicaciones del Ministerio de Educación, Dirección de Cultura, 1951.

50. Varona y Pera, Enrique José, Obras Vol. I. La Habana. Edición oficial, 1937. p. 77.

51. Varona y Pera, Enrique José, Estudios Literarios y Filosóficos. La Habana. Editor Anselmo Alarcia. 1883. p. 281.

52. Ibid., p. 283.

53. Ibid., p. 284.

54. Weber, Alfred, History of Philosophy. New York. Charles Scribners' Sons, 1925. p. 588.

55. Varona, op. cit., p. 312.

56. Ibid., p. 332.

57. Ibid., p. 333.

58. Ibid., p. 334.

59. Ibid., p. 337.

60. Ibid., p. 251.

61. Quoted by Romero, Filósofos y Problemas. p. 32.

62. Ibid., p. 33.

63. Ibid., p. 35.

64. Varona y Pera, Enrique José, Conferencias Sobre el Fundamento de la Moral. New York. Appleton and Co. 1903. p. 179.

65. Ibid., p. 178.

66. Ibid., pp. 233-234.

67. Ibid., p. 234.

68. Ibid., p. 191.

69. Ibid., p. 203.

70. Ibid., p. 209-210.

71. Romero, op. cit., p. 43.

72. Ibid., p. 44.

73. Ibid., p. 41.

74. Varona, Estudios Literarios y Filosóficas. p. 262.

75. Varona y Pera Enrique José. Con El Eslabón. Manzanillo, Cuba. Biblioteca Marto, 1927. p. 5.

76. Ibid., p. 93.

77. Ibid., p. 135.

78. Ibid., p. 82.

79. Ibid., p. 110.

80. Ibid., p. 146

81. Ibid., p. 11.

82. Ibid., p. 106.

83. Ibid., p. 107.

84. Ibid., p. 186.

85. Ibid., p. 203.

86. Ibid., p. 66.

87. Ibid., p. 207.

88. Ibid., p. 112.

89. Ibid., p. 136.

90. Ibid., p. 19.

91. Ibid., p. 19.

92. Ibid., p. 78.

93. Ibid., p. 79.

94. Ibid., p. 63.

95. Note: Cf. the studies by José Varela Zequeira and Roberto Agramonte. Zequeira, José V. La Figura de Enrique José Verona, Su Influencia y Su Escepticismo. (Private Edition)

Agramonte, Roberto. "Varona, Filósofo del Escepticismo Creador". Cuadernos Americanos, Año VIII, 1949. Marzo-Abril 2p. 206.

96. Vitier, Medardo. Varona Maestro de Juventudes. Havana. Editorial Trópico, 1936. p. 70.

97. Professor Romero remarks: "We might say that Varona, like other great theorists of empirical and relativistic ethics, contradicts himself and in effect converts himself into a critic and denier of its supreme postulates. For what his entire life affirms and demonstrates, and what his whole conduct illustrates, is that above and beyond any utilitarian regime of morality, extracted from our biological or social nature and hence based on the moving sand of empirical data (los hechos), there are norms and principles of undoubted sovereign validity, which command to every just soul what ought to be done and what ought not to be done." (Filósofos y Problemas, p. 45)

98. Varona, op. cit., p. 187.

99. Ibid., p. 11.

100. Vitier, op. cit., p. 225.

101. Vitier, Las Ideas en Cuba, p. 161.

102. Ibid., p. 157.

103. Varona, op. cit., p. 209.

104. cf. footnote 151, Chapter II.

105. Korn, Obras Completas, p. 30.

106. Ibid., p. 30.

107. Ibid., p. 147.

108. Ibid., p. 499.

109. Note: "The Bases and Points of Departure for the Organization of the Argentine Republic", writes E. S. Brightman, (the word Alberdi used was Confederation) "fared better than Plato's Republic for it actually became the foundation of the country's new constitution--but worse than The Federalist, since the new constitution lasted only seven years in Argentina." (Brightman, op. cit. p. 9). As a matter of fact the later constitution continued in the main the principles of the constitution of 1853. The present regime of General Perón has been the first which has made it a point seriously to depart from the principles of Alberdi.

110. The full title of this essay is "Ideas to Guide in the Preparation of the Course on Contemporary Philosophy in the College of Humanities."

111. Gaos, op. cit., p. 302. It is worth noting that at this point Alberdi clearly anticipates the "circumstantialist" philosophy advocated by the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset and divulged in Hispanic America by José Gaos, a point of view in which Ortega is inspired by Dilthey's historicism.

112. Ibid., p. 305.

113. Ibid., p. 310.

114. Korn, op. cit., p. 197.

115. The present Argentine regime is deliberately trying to foster immigration of Catholic peoples, especially from Italy.

116. Quoted by Korn, op. cit., p. 156.

117. Alberdi, Juan B. Bases y Puntos de Partida Para La Organización Politica de la Republica Argentina. Buenos Aires. W. M. Jackson, Inc. 1914. p. 64.

118. Korn, op. cit. p. 157

119. Ingenieros, Jose, Hacia Una Moral Sin Dogmas. Buenos Aires. L. J. Rosso, 1919. pp. 60-61. José Ingenieros employs Sarmiento's observations regarding the religious situation in New England in the days of Horace Mann and Emerson with his favorable remarks regarding the trend of this book toward a deistic morality "without cults" in the historical foundation.

120. Sarmiento, Domingo, El Pensamiento Vivo. Buenos Aires. Editorial Lozado, 1944. P. 62.

121. Ibid., p. 211.

122. Quoted by Korn, op.cit., p. 164.

123. Korn, op. cit., pp. 161-162.

124. Crawford, Rex W. A Century of Latin American Thought. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press. 1944. p. 38.

125. Korn, op. cit., p. 175.

126. Ibid., p. 175.

127. Quoted by Romero, Francisco. Sobre la Filosofía en América. Buenos Aires. Editorial Raigal, 1952. p. 30. (cf. pp. 25-31).

128. Korn, op. cit., p. 178.

129. Quoted by Zea, Leopoldo. Dos Etapas del Pensamiento en Hispano América. México D. F. El Colegio de México. 1949. p. 272.

130. Ibid., p. 276.

131. Romero, op.cit., p. 30.

132. Korn, op. cit., p. 173.

133. States Korn: "His ideals did not materialize." Ibid., p. 177.

134. Coriolano Alberini became a professor of the University of Buenos Aires in 1923, teaching introduction to philosophy. He contributed numerous articles to various journals, but published no volumes.

135. Albernini, Coriolano. "Contemporary Philosophical Problems in South America with Special Reference to Argentina." The Monist. July, 1927. Vol. IXI. p. 330.

136. Romero, op. cit., p. 32.

137. Ibid., p. 15.

138. Calderon, García. Ideas e Impresiones. Madrid. Editorial América, 1919. p. 51.

139. Korn, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

140. Romero, op.cit., p. 44.

141. Korn, op. cit., p. 33.

142. Korn, op. cit., p. 31.

143. Romero, op. cit., p. 34.

144. Crawford, op. cit., p. 118: "The unbelievable product of his year and a half in Europe included five books, forty travel articles, thirty scientific articles published in Buenos Aires' papers, and over sixty articles in European journals."

145. Ibid., p. 116.

146. Note: Francisco Romero has written of the early death of Ingenieros in a passage which is profoundly suggestive; "Enamoured of life he did not conceive it except under the sign of youth. Many of his acts were the affirmation of a youthfulness which accepted no shrinking, at times, perhaps, the affectation of that youthfulness. He feared old age more than he feared death. He died a natural death; but his will to live was already broken when illness attacked him, and there was in him a kind of prior consent of the end, the perhaps not necessarily inevitable end if his attachment to life had remained energetic and vigilant. Though the illness may have killed him, I am willing to risk the opinion that it would not be foolish to liken him to the series of great Argentine suicides, of the men who in full maturity have felt that they lacked the basis of subsistence and a reason for living, between the abandon and solitude produced by an ethos which was crumbling and a society which was breaking apart." Romero, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

147. Crawford, op. cit., p. 119.

148. Ibid., p. 116.

149. Ibid., p. 120.

150 Ingenieros

151. Remero, op.cit., p. 36.

152. Ingenieros, José, El Hombre Mediocre. Buenos Aires. L. J. Rosso, 1925 (?) p. 12.

153. Ibid., p. 33.

154. Ibid., p. 26.

155. Ibid., Title Page

156. Ingenieros, José, Hacia una Moral Sin Dogmas. p. 197.

157. Ibid., p. 12.

158. Ibid., p. 15.

159. Ibid., p. 16.

160. Ibid., p. 41.

161. Ibid., p. 21.

162. Ibid., p. 20.

163. Ibid., p. 23.

164. Ibid., p. 31.

165. Ibid., p. 12.

166. Varona, Conferencias Sobre el Fundamento de la Moral, p. 179.

167. Ingenieros, op. cit., p. 201.

168. Ingenieros, José, Las Fuerzas Morales. Buenos Aires. L. J. Rosso, 1926. p. 15.

169. The word "honesto" in certain contexts can have the connotation of the safe, unimaginative man.

170. Ingenieros, El Hombre Mediocre. pp. 96-105.

171. Ibid., p. 29.

172. Ibid., p. 19.

173. Korn, op. cit., p. 593.

174. Ingenieros, José, Proposiciones Relativas al Porvenir de la Filosofía. Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, 1945. p. 39.

175. Ibid., p. 42.

176. Ibid., p. 88.

177. Ibid., p. 79.

178. Ibid., p. 121.

179. Ingenieros, El Hombre Mediocre, p. 22.

180. Ingenieros, Propositiones Relativas al Porvenir de la Filosofía. pp pp. 162-163.

181. Korn, op. cit., p. 596.

182. Ingenieros, Hacia Una Moral Sin Dogmas. p. 21.

183. Korn, op. cit., p. 31.

184. A sentence from one of the articles of Alberini, published in "The Monist" in July, 1927 gives an idea of the kind of irony which he turned against positivism. "A noisy and decrepit Haeckelian senility found in its ranks educational scientists and literary psychiatrists, whose pamphlets on the 'future of philosophy' constitute valuable documents for the future historians of the philosophical dilettanteism in the coast of the Plata".

185. Frondizi, op. cit., p. 30.

186. Romero, op. cit., p. 63.

187. Ibid., pp. 30-39.

188. Korn, op. cit., p. 41.

189. cf. Footnote No. 45.

190. Korn, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

191. Brightman, op. cit., p. 6.

PART II

CHAPTER IV

POST POSITIVISM IN CONTEMPORARY SPANISH AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

A. INTRODUCTION

The North American student of philosophy who undertakes to examine present day philosophy in Spanish America is certain to be surprised by the extent and the quality of philosophical productivity in the various countries comprising this area. The late Dr. E. S. Brightman is authority for the statement that "The Latin American public is 'philosophy conscious' as the North American is not. The number of cheaply priced philosophical classics, translation from foreign languages, and new books that are printed in Mexico and Argentina far exceeds what appears in the United States in the same category."[1] This interest is not a new phenomenon, but with the abandonment of positivism there has taken place a heightened interest in all phases of philosophical thought. The teaching of philosophy has been greatly strengthened, (predominantly in the University of Mexico, which may now well be considered one of the leading centers for philosophical study in the world,)[2] and the writing of original works of philosophical content has greatly increased. Spanish American philosophers now feel that there is a "philosophical climate" in which they can work and study as there was not before; that creative work is understood and appreciated. "Philosophical effort," states Professor Francisco Romero, acknowledged leader of Spanish American philosophers,[3] "has become normalized."[4]

The great number and variety of philosophical productions appearing in recent years, scattered in many periodicals and publications in various

countries, makes it extremely difficult if not virtually impossible for any one writer to make an exhaustive study of contemporary Spanish American philosophy. It becomes necessary, therefore, to depend largely upon secondary sources except for the work of the most prominent philosophers. This writer has selected for special consideration the work of the four thinkers who, by almost universal consent, are the four most prominent Spanish American philosophers in the present century, Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos, of Mexico, and Alejandro Korn and Francisco Romero, of Argentina. Before beginning a study of their thought, however, it will be well for us to have a panoramic view of the main trends in Spanish American philosophy in the period extending from the close of the survey contained in Part I of this study to the year 1954.

The contemporary period, for want of a better designation, is called in this study, "Post-Positivism". Professor Patrick Romanell, in his recent volume "The Making of the Mexican Mind," calls the present stage "Anti-Positivism".5. But this designation accurately describes only the earliest phase of the present period which was one of active polemic against positivism. But the present tendency in Spanish American philosophy is to regard positivism as a logical stage in the development of philosophical attitudes which, together with many undesirable aspects, had certain positive values of permanent significance. Positivism is no longer considered a live issue and a continuing polemic against positivism is considered in the nature of flaying a dead horse. Writes Francisco Romero, "Positivism having been conquered as a philosophy, the echoes of the polemic, frequently bitter which accompanied its loss of prestige and decline having died down, it is now necessary to do justice for what it represented as a tremendous civilizing

influence."[6]. Surely such an attitude cannot be subsumed under the heading of "anti-positivism." On the other hand, no new philosophical trend has come to take the place of positivism as the dominant current in Spanish American philosophy. This is undoubtedly a reflection of the contemporary situation in the western world where no generally held philosophical attitude comparable to the positivism of the nineteenth century or the rationalism of the eighteenth can be said to prevail. Every major contemporary philosophical school has its adherents in Spanish America, without any one of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. There is a preference on the part of today's philosophers for the existentialist currents of thought, but not in a sufficiently well defined way to call this "the existentialist period"---nor does this term in itself indicate a sufficiently precise content.

The one common denominator in the new philosophies which are now bidding for the attention of Spanish America is that they are offered as substitutes for the discredited positivism. As a reaction against the mechanistic explanations of the past era these philosophies express a new regard for the spiritual nature of man. Professor José Gaos of the University of Mexico speaks of the general orientation of Spanish and Spanish American thought since Unamuno and Ortega in Spain, and the abandonment of positivism in America, as that "orientation which sees in man and the human something which cannot be reduced to nature and the natural and contrasts in this (Spanish) America with the naturalistic orientation still general in the Saxon America." "This anti-naturalist orientation," he adds, "is common to the philosophies of life, existentialist and historicist with the strictly personalist..."[7]. But there is no one term known to this writer which

describes this new orientation. Perhaps at a later time, when it is possible to have a better perspective on this period, it will be possible to find a better description for this era. But for the present the term "post-positivist", with its implication that positivism has been superseded but not yet really replaced seems the most convenient designation.

B. STAGES IN POST-POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHY IN SPANISH AMERICA

More than forty years have now passed since the first important revolt against positivism in Spanish America, the lectures of the "Ateneo de la Juventud" in Mexico in 1908; and more than a quarter of a century since the death of José Ingenieros, the last great positivist thinker, in 1925. With the perspective which the intervening years afford us it is possible to recognize three stages in the development of post-positivist philosophy up to the present time. The first of these is the stage which we can call that of "the founders," a term introduced by Francisco Romero.[8]. This is a stage in which philosophical thought in the various countries is dominated by one or two outstanding thinkers who stimulate interest in philosophical study, and are the real creators of a new philosophical consciousness. Romero includes among "the founders," two philosophers whose work has already been considered in this study, Enrique José Varona of Cuba, and José Ingenieros, of Argentina. Concerning the others he says that they "emerge as the adversaries of positivism."[9]. It is with the latter we are concerned at this time. Among these there stand out the names of Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos of Mexico, Alejandro Deustúa of Perú, Alejandro Korn of Argentina, Carlos Vaz Ferreria of Uruguay, and Enrique Molina, of Chile. These men are all educators as well as writers of philosophy and have exercised a great influence as mentors of their nations. In their common reaction from positivism

the influence of Henri Bergson is a striking factor.

The second stage in post-positivism in Spanish America is that in which the students of "the founders" come into prominence. Mexico and Argentina are the two leading nations in this period and are at present far ahead of all the other countries in philosophical vitality. Antonio Caso and Alejandro Korn are the two pioneers whose influence proves most seminal. In Mexico various students of Caso carry philosophical study forward to new heights, although none of them with the originality and profundity of the master. In Argentina Francisco Romero takes the torch of the search for truth from Korn and carries philosophy to a new height of maturity and distinction, becoming the foremost contemporary exponent of philosophical thought in all Spanish America. The students of the founders are not satisfied merely to repeat the emphases of their teachers. Whereas a Bergsonian anti-positivism was the chief orientation of the founders, in this stage the influence of the great contemporary German philosophers, notably Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler, and N. Hartmann comes to the fore with the posthumous influence of Dilthey perhaps exceeding that of any of the others. To be sure, some of the pioneers, especially Caso, share in this interest in German philosophy and help to disseminate the thought of the great German thinkers. The greatest single influence directing attention to the Germans, however, is the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, through the journal "Revista de Occidente", which not only presented critical studies but also published translations of a number of the most important works. Ortega's own circumstancialist position becomes one of the leading influences.

We are now in the third generation of thinkers of the post-positivist era. In this period the leadership of Mexico in Spanish American philosophy

has become more pronounced. Francisco Romero is still gaining in continental prestige but recent political events in Argentina have disrupted the normalcy of philosophical study. Romero has given up his teaching positions in the state universities, and two of the outstanding "third generation" philosophers, Risieri Frondizi and Aníbal Sánchez Reulet, students of Romero, are now working in Puerto Rico and Washington, D. C. respectively. Mexico, on the other hand, has been able to count not only with a number of Caso's students who have become leading philosophers, but it has also experienced in the last sixteen years the profound revitalizing influence of a number of great Spanish thinkers who were forced to leave Spain during the civil war, and were welcomed into Mexico. Outstanding among these Spanish teachers has been a disciple of Ortega y Gasset, José Gaos, whose most brilliant student, Leopoldo Zea is now the leader of Mexico's newest and most dynamic philosophical movement.

C. THE FOUNDERS

Except for the unique personalities of Varona of Cuba, and Hostos, of Puerto Rico, philosophical study was largely neglected in Spanish America in the second half of the nineteenth century, and even with these thinkers, philosophical reflection was largely confined to psychology, sociology, and morals. In the early part of the twentieth century, however, a number of outstanding thinkers emerge who give themselves to every aspect of philosophical reflection and who manifest a profound sense of philosophical vocation. Now that the study of philosophy has become "normalized," these thinkers are looked upon as the real founders of the present philosophical concern in their respective countries. Antonio Caso, José Vasconcelos, and Alejandro Korn are to be considered in separate chapters. We shall very briefly refer in this

section to the work of Alejandro Deustúa, Enrique Molina, and Carlos Vaz Ferreira. Before doing so, however, it is well to note the profound influence of Bergson on these founders.

1. Influence of Bergson on the Founders

For a generation sensitive to the shortcomings of positivism, yet unwilling to return to the older theological and metaphysical rationalisms, Bergson had a unique significance. He exercised a decisive influence because he defeated positivism on its own grounds,---he appealed to experience. Where positivism had defined experientialism solely in terms of inductive reasoning, Bergson added the intuition as a valid form of experiential knowledge. The older philosophies before positivism had presented the intuition as the culmination of a process of metaphysical and mystical reflection. Bergson redefined the intuition as a direct apprehension of truth which is a first step, not a last step, in the knowing process, and an inherent capacity of man. Alejandro Korn has summarized Bergson's concept in the following words: "In the course of biological evolution...man saves remnants of another capacity for knowledge in which not analysis but the direct apprehension of and penetration into reality prevails. This is the intuition."[10].

The exclusive dependence on inductive reasoning implies a reliance on the notion of cause and effect as the only key which can unlock the secrets of the universe; it is based on a mechanistic understanding of reality. By positing a form of knowledge which breaks through to a direct perception of reality, Bergson, in the understanding of the Spanish American philosophers, delivered thought from bondage to the causal chain. He was, says Korn, "the thinker who has delivered us from the oppression of mechanistic theories

who revalidated the concept of liberty."[11]. Bergson's concept of intuition provided the insight which enabled them to see the universe as a creative process, not a mechanism, and man himself as a free being. Bergson did not deny the validity of the empirical method in reasoning, but he delivered it from dogmatic rigidity and added the intuition as a valid form of experience. This wider concept of experience and reality was reinforced by the influence of Emile Boutroux and Emile Meyerson who employed the concepts of the new physics in the argumentation against the mechanistic conceptions of reality.

2. Alejandro Deustúa (1849-1945)

Alejandro Deustúa has been called by Romero the "master and patriarch" of philosophy in Perú. Still a young man Deustúa was appointed professor of Esthetics in the University of San Marcos in Lima. As Deustúa sought to develop his own theory of esthetics, he was inspired by Christian F. Krause and his dictum that "freedom is of the essence of grace." "I asked myself," Deustúa related, "if it is also the essence of all beauty. My later studies, directed to the solution of this problem, he adds, "made me conceive and develop an esthetic based on the principle of freedom."[12]. As he meditated on the significance of freedom, Deustúa also perceived the importance of order. This notion is basic not only for his esthetics but also for his ethics. He conceives of freedom as the dynamic, creative principle. Order is freedom in repose, in its static forms. "The esthetic order," defines Deustúa, "is the ideal created by the spirit in the exercise of its freedom."[13]. The ethical order rests on the esthetic order since "the moral order has its base in the esthetic order, because only the esthetic order is a creation. (It) presupposes the existence of an ideal of perfection, which it dogmatizes and imposes on the will in its relation with other wills."[14].

Deustúa early discovered the philosophy of Bergson. He introduced it into Perú and incorporated its concepts into his own philosophy. Centering his thought on the idea of freedom, he vigorously opposed the positivism which prevailed when he first started teaching philosophy. He lived long enough to see the eclipse of positivism in his own country and throughout Spanish America. In this struggle, this patriarch of Peruvian philosophy added his personal influence as the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, Rector of the University of San Marcos, etc., to the influence of his writings.

3. Carlos Vaz Ferreira (1873-)

Carlos Vaz Ferreira occupies in Uruguay a very similar position to that of Deustúa in Perú. Trained as a lawyer, Vaz Ferreira had a great love for philosophy and at the age of twenty-five he won the contest for the Chair of Philosophy in the University of Montevideo. His lectures became so popular that he was named "lecturer at large" with the title of "maestro de conferencias." From this unique chair he became the intellectual guide of the nation, lecturing on whatever subject he happened to be interested in. He has also served as the Rector of the University and Director of the Faculty of Humanities. Though Vaz Ferreira published few works, he has been fortunate in having his most important philosophical essays published recently as a part of the philosophical library of the Editorial Losada, which has helped to make his work widely known and appreciated throughout Spanish America.

The title of Vaz Ferreira's most important work "Lógica Viva" gives us a clue to his emphasis. He does not believe that life or thought can be imprisoned by narrow rules, nor that metaphysics can be pressed into formulas

of mathematical precision. Vaz Ferreira's thought is not systematic but is rather the expression of personal reflection which has a unity in his own mind rather than in outward form. His writings contain many reflections on ethics. The one book he dedicates to the subject, however, is disappointing. In the "Moral para Intelectuales" he considers the practical ethical problems faced in a series of professions. Nowhere does he come to grips with the basic problems of moral theory, being content withthe casuistical analysis of the problems faced by each profession and questioning the possibility of elucidating valid guiding principles. He expresses doubt of the moral value of religion, willing only to grant that it may have a consolatory value for simple-minded people. He also questions the value of metaphysical morals because of their conjectural character. So in the end he seems to favor a positivist approach. But he accuses positivist theories of being a closed system and thereby leading to false solutions. "What it (positivism) ought to do," he states, "is to leave the problem open, and meanwhile to give only an approximation."[15]. "The morality of each person, more than a system, ought to be a living state," he adds.[16].

4. Enrique Molina (1871-)

Chile's leading philosopher is Enrique Molina, founder in 1919, and still president of the University of Concepción. He is the one prominent Spanish American philosopher whom the writer, as a resident of Concepción, has come to know personally. In conversation with the writer "Don Enrique" as he is affectionately called by friends and admirers, expressed that his interest in philosophy has been attempt to work out his own solution to the problems of existence, since he "had not had the fortune to have faith." In his most important volume, "De lo Espiritual en la Vida Humana," he gives

his own answer to the question of what it is that gives meaning to human life. Molina is still sufficiently influenced by positivism to answer this question by saying "the idea of progress." In other respects, however, as the very title of his work indicates, he parts company with positivism. Molina believes that the greatness of man resides in his spiritual capacity. He defines spirit, however, in terms of reason and esthetic sensibility, and cannot conceive of spirit outside of man.

Molina believes that the most satisfying metaphysical position which has been worked out by any philosopher is that of Spinoza. Seemingly unaware of the impossibility of accepting Spinoza's metaphysic and at the same time rejecting his determinism, however, Molina argues for the reedom of man. This emphasis on man's freedom has been a central conviction with the gentle philosopher of Chile. The university which he founded bears the motto, "For the free development of the spirit."

The interest in ethics has been predominant in Molina. One of his earliest volumes is entitled "The Moral Heritage of Greek Philosophy." He takes his stand on a strongly ethicist non-theistic humanism. In the subduing of passion under the control of reason he finds one of the clearest expressions of the spirit in man.

D. AFTER THE FOUNDERS

1. The Disciples of Caso in Mexico

The great work of the founders was to break the hold of positivism, with its narrow concentration on social and economic problems, and to initiate a new era in which philosophical interest extends to every phase of philosophy,

and its study is given a new importance in the institutions of higher learning. The founders are also profound thinkers who "think on their own", often anticipating insights of the leaders of western philosophy. Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos have already been named as the Mexican representatives in the group we have called the founders. Both Caso and Vasconcelos were trained as lawyers, and entered philosophy from a peculiar sense of vocation. But only Caso gave up all other interests in order to dedicate his entire life to philosophy, becoming professor of philosophy in the University of Mexico. Vasconcelos has had a varied career as a lawyer, and a politician, and only in recent years has turned his major attention to philosophy. He has been a lonely thinker, a genius who has developed his "esthetic monism" in relative isolation. Caso, on the other hand, has been at the very center of philosophical study in Mexico, until his death in 1946, and as the professor of philosophy in the University was the forger of a new generation of Mexican thinkers.

Caso's students have not followed in the Christian personalism of their teacher, although all of them acknowledge their great debt to the master. The University of Mexico now has paralled chairs in the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, representing various schools of thought. A number of Caso's students have found their way to these teaching positions. The following men have all been students of Caso.

Oswaldo Robles is the only one among Caso's students who has made philosophy his career who takes his stand as a Christian philosopher. Robles, however, rejects the free Christianity and the existentialist trend in the philosophy of Caso in favor of the orthodox neo-Thomist position. Robles had already

matured in his Catholic convictions before studying with Caso. Today he is the representative of Roman Catholic philosophy in the University.

Samuel Ramos is probably the ablest of Caso's students. He is the author of the "Historia de la Filosofía en Mexico", an excellent study which has served as the basic guide for the Mexican sections of this dissertation. He has been called "the rebel disciple," because he was the first to react against what he termed the "romanticism" of Caso and what he felt to be an excessive dependence on Bergson.[17] Ramos was perhaps the first philosopher in Mexico strongly to feel the influence of Ortega y Gasset, and to turn his attention to the study of the German philosophers. In 1934 he published a volume entitled "El Perfil del Hombre y la Cultura en Mexico." "In this phrase of Ortega's: "I am I and my circumstance, and if I do not save it I do not save myself," I saw a norm to be applied to Mexico, whose reality and whose problems were completely ignored by philosophy," declares Ramos explaining the inspiration which led to the writing of this volume.[18] By raising the question of the philosophical significance of the concrete circumstances of Mexican man, and his culture, Ramos thus became the fore-runner of the present "Mexican School" which has become the leading philosophical movement in Mexico. Ramos, however, has a broader perspective than the new circumstantialists. In 1940 he published a volume called "Hacia un Nuevo Humanismo," in which he shows the deep influence of Scheler, Husserl, and Hartmann as well as traces of the influence of Caso and Bergson. It is a volume which falls in the category of what is today being called philosophical anthropology. In this volume Ramos clearly affirms the spiritual nature of man and the objectivity of ethics even while he evades metaphysical pronouncements.

Another of Caso's pupils is Francisco Larroyo. Larroyo went to the University of Marburg in Germany, and became a convinced neo-Kantian of the Marburg school. In order to defend and propagate his neo-Kantianism Larroyo has engaged in polemical discussions with most of the leading contemporary Mexican philosophers, as well as with professors Gaos and with Francisco Romero of Argentina. Guillermo Hector Rodríguez, a lawyer, is the other prominent Mexican neo-Kantian. He has assisted Larroyo in a number of these discussions.

Two of Caso's pupils who have centered their attention on the axiological problem are Mexico's chief representatives of objectivist axiology, José Romano Muñoz and Eduardo García Máynez. As professor of Ethics in the Escuele Preparatoria (the school founded by Barreda) Romano Muñoz prepared a text entitled "El Secreto del Bien y del Mal." Frankly inspiring himself in the thought of Hartmann and Scheler, Romano Muñoz states as his theme that "the secret of good and evil lies in the knowledge of value."19. García Maynez has been Director of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, and is still Director of the Faculty's philosophical Journal "Filosofía y Letras" and professor of Ethics in the Faculty. García Maynez also went to Europe to study, but whereas Larroyo went to Marburg García Maynez studied with Nicolai Hartmann. In his volume entitled "Ethics" García Maynez closely follows the orientation of his European master. A lawyer, García Maynez has been particularly interested in the relations between law and ethical theory, and has become one of the outstanding contemporary philosophers of law, receiving international recognition. García Maynez opposes positivist legal theories, and posits the existence of objective juridical norms.

2. The Influence of the Spanish Philosophers

The arrival in Mexico of a number of Spanish philosophers in 1938 is an important event in the development of Mexican philosophy. The welcome given by Mexico to a group of philosophy teachers and graduate students of the University of Barcelona and of the University of Madrid who were forced to leave Spain because of their sympathy with the Republican cause is one of the brighter stories in contemporary cultural history. Antonio Caso, at the time Director of the Faculty of Philosophy in the University of Mexico made room in the faculty for a number of these professors, and others found places in other schools and cultural activities. The Mexican government also extended special help so that these scholars could continue research and writing. Mexico has received its reward for this act of hospitality in the new flowering of philosophical culture.[20]

The most influential of the Spanish philosophers has been José Gaos, a great scholar and linguist, and a great teacher. Gaos was made the director of a new seminar for graduate study in the Faculty of Philosophy, the Seminar for the Study of the Thought of the Countries of Spanish Tongue. A disciple of Ortega, and as such, a representative of the historicist emphasis in philosophy, Gaos was uniquely equipped to serve as the mentor to a new generation of Mexican philosophers. He has been influential in directing the attention of Mexicans to their own philosophical past, and in his seminar in recent years a number of research studies have been made, embodied in a series of scholarly dissertations which have helped Mexicans to revalue their intellectual history. Among these studies are three which have been published and have been available as sources in this dissertation. They are: Leopoldo Zea's two volume study of positivism in Mexico, "El Positivismo en Mexico,"

and "Apogeo y Decadencia del Positivismo en Mexico"; Monelisa Pérez Marchand's "Dos Etapas Ideológicas del Siglo XVIII en México a Través de los Papeles de la Inquisición;" and Bernabé Navarro's "La Introducción de la Filosofía Moderna en Mexico." The most significant and able of these studies is the one by Leopoldo Zea, a vigorous thinker and brilliant writer who has become the leader of the newest and most vital movement in Mexican philosophy today.

3. The Quest for a Mexican Philosophy--Leopoldo Zea and the 'Hyperion'

In no other Spanish American country has there been such a preoccupation with the idea of the development of a national philosophy as in Mexico. José Vasconcelos and Antonio Caso directed attention to Mexican problems, and the Mexican scene, but without a definite philosophical slant. Mexico's great muralists, Diego Rivera, José Orozco, and David Siqueiros also helped to put the spotlight on Mexico, to make the country aware of its peculiar culture. But then Samuel Ramos, inspired in Ortega's circumstantialist emphasis, began the cycle of meditation concerning the philosophical significance of the Mexican circumstance. Between Samuel Ramos's book "El Perfil del Hombre y la Cultura en Mexico," and the emergence of a school of Mexican circumstantialism, however, there is a gap. The influence of Professor José Gaos in this interim period is well worth noting.

Through the Seminar on the Thought of the Countries of Spanish Tongue Professor Gaos explicitly raised the question of the existence of a Spanish American philosophy. Gaos noted that while it is proper to speak of an English, a French, or a German philosophy, there is no Spanish or Spanish American philosophy in the same sense. He also observed, however, that there

is a great desire among the people of Spanish tongue for their own philosophy. Gaos predicted that because of this desire, and with the new philosophical culture present in the Spanish speaking countries this philosophy would begin to emerge. It would come, he indicated, not by consciously trying to produce a Spanish or a Spanish American philosophy but "by Spaniards and Americans writing philosophy."[21].

Leopoldo Zea, the most brilliant of Gaos' pupils took up the challenge. From his earliest published essays, written in 1940 while still an undergraduate in the University, Zea shows his dominant concern for the creation of an authoctonous Spanish American philosophy. Influenced, through Gaos, by Ortega's circumstantialism, Zea stated that this philosophy "must be the philosophy of the Spanish American circumstance."[22]. In an essay written in 1942 Zea holds that Spanish America has been living by borrowed philosophies, slavishly imitating European culture since colonial days. Spanish Americans have had no culture except the European, yet they have never felt it as their own. Feeling incapable of truly appropriating European thought and culture, yet conscious of the inferiority of their own creations, they have developed a sense of inferiority. But now that European culture is breaking up in the crisis of European civilization, the fact that the Spanish American has not been able fully to appropriate European culture turns out to be an advantage. Instead of being hurt by the European cultural crisis, this crisis can turn out to be the opportunity for him to create a philosophy and culture of his own.[23].

Zea views all philosophy as an attempt to solve the problems and answer the questions raised by the concrete circumstances of man's existence. That is why "every metaphysical abstraction culminates in an ethic and a politics."[24].

Since every philosophy is conditioned by the particular circumstances in which it is evolved, and is, even in the case of the most abstract system, an answer to those circumstances, Zea expresses the confidence that a Spanish American philosophy will emerge as men reflect upon the peculiar character of the Spanish American circumstance and offer solutions for its problems.

Zea reiterates these thoughts in all his later writings, but since 1948, at least, his emphasis has shifted from that of the creation of a Spanish American philosophy to that of a specific Mexican philosophy. In this effort he has been joined by a group of younger thinkers with whom he has formed a philosophical association to which they have given the name "Hiperión". The name, Zea informs us, taken from Greek mythology's Hyperion, the son of Zeus, son of earth and heaven, was chosen as a symbol of the desire to link the concrete with the universal.[25] With Zea as the leader, and with Ricardo Guerra, Joaquín Macgregor, Jorje Portilla, Salvador Reyes Nevárez, Emilio Uranga, Fausto Vega, and Luis Villoro as charter members, this group began its public activity in 1948 with a series of lectures which Gaos has compared to those given by the "Ateneo de la Juventud" in 1908.[26,27] These lectures were an exposition of French existentialism. The avowed purpose of the lectures, however, was not to call attention to Sartre's existentialism, per se, but to clear the ground for an emphasis on the existential situation of the Mexican as the suitable point of departure for the elaboration of a Mexican philosophy. "In this group," declares Zea, "existentialism is only an instrument to capture the reality of man in Mexico, not a doctrine to which any specific faith is attached."[28]

The quest for a Mexican philosophy through an analysis of the Mexican

and his circumstance is now being carried forward through the production of a series of small books being published under the general title of "Mexico y lo Mexicano." The purpose of the series, according to Zea is to attempt "to capture the spirit of Mexico, the essence of what is Mexican and the being, or mode of being of the (Mexican) man, of his reality."[29] Beginning in 1952, the publishers have tried to issue one book each month, in small, popularly priced volumes which present various aspects of Mexican culture. Philosophy, art, literature, folk customs, social mores, indigenous superstitions and myths, etc., every aspect of Mexican life and culture, comes up for review in these volumes. The most important book in the series from the standpoint of this study is the one written by Zea himself, the second in the series, entitled "Conciencia y Posibilidad de lo Mexicano." In this volume Zea repeats many of his previous statements. "The proper study of mankind is man," declared Pope, to which Zea would add: "Yes, but not of man in the abstract, 'of man in his situation, of man in a particular circumstance.'"[30] He insists that that is the only way man can be studied. There is no such thing as an "essence" of man as a universal. Man's "essence is to lack essence",[31] he is always a becoming in relation to his circumstance.

Zea declares that this concern for "the Mexican" is not a narrow nationalism. Mexican man had been content to live in a borrowed culture, "but the Revolution (Mexican) with its powerful shaking up permitted Mexican man to encounter himself."[32] The Mexican's self-discovery, in which he is now engaged because of the shake-up received in the revolution, and because the crisis of European culture has forced him to search for new values, has universal significance, for as the Mexican searches for the universal in the

> "Our philosophy must also realize that permanent inversion of values which will permit their permanent concordance with our needs and our reality...the articulation of a mode of living and of co-existing ('vivir y convivir') proper to the Mexican: in order to be elaborating with it a morality; a morality which shall not only be that of México, the Mexican situation or the Mexican, but which because of its rootage in the concretely human, may also be a morality for man, every man in circumstances similar to ours."[38]

Emilio Uranga, one of the colleagues of Zea in the "Hiperión" also manifests the ethical interest which lies behind the activity of the group when he declares in his volume "Análisis del Ser del Mexicano", the fourth in the Series "México y lo Méxicano": "More than a limpid, rigorous meditation about the being (ser) of the Mexican, what takes us to this kind of study is the prospect of effecting moral, social, and religious transformations with that being."[39]

It is too early as yet to venture a final judgment on the position taken by Zea and his Mexican school. It is evident that this movement is provoking a significant awakening of culture. The publications already issued in themselves represent a cultural contribution of no small size. Zea and his colleagues are still young, and perhaps in the future they may be able to give valuable indications which will help to produce the transformation which they recognize as a need and which they are seeking to effect. Thus far, however, they have only gone as far as diagnosing the illness, they have pointed to the current irresponsibility and the lack of standards which results in opportunism. But they have not indicated where the remedy lies. Whether a new "Mexican" philosophy, and a new sense of values will indeed issue from this type of national introspection, seems to this writer highly questionable.

Professor Gaos deftly suggests in his book "En Torno a la Filosofía Méxicana", published in two volumes (7 and 11) of the series "Mexico y lo Méxicano" that Zea and his associates have gotten the idea that "to elaborate a philosophy of the Mexican and of that which is Mexican (del Mêxicano y de lo Mêxicano) is the best way to elaborate a Mexican philosophy.. in the double sense of (a philosophy) conceived by him and of one that is new in relation to those conceived by men of other nationalities."[40] Zea himself had recognized the fallacy of such a self-conscious attempt to create a national philosophy when, agreeing with the dictum of Professor Gaos that "the question is not to create Spanish or American philosophy, but to have Spaniards and Americans make philosophy,"[41] he wrote in 1942: "We must simply attempt to make philosophy; for the American character will (automatically) come with it." The present attempt to create a Mexican philosophy by reflecting upon the "Mexican circumstances" seems to the writer a tour de force which is a negation of the earlier insight. Professor Risieri Frondizi holds that this approach has "centered attention on the Ibero-American forgetting philosophy." Though without crediting them as sources, he echoes the statements just quoted from Professor Gaos, and from Zea declaring: "In order for a philosophy which is one's own to emerge it is necessary to produce philosophy, nothing more; the American character of it will (automatically) come with it."[43] Frondizi suggests that it is necessary to overcome the desire to have an original philosophy and says that "a narrow interpretation of the 'perspectivism' of Orgega y Gasset and of the concept of the 'circumstance' is in part responsible,"[44] for what seems to him a mistaken course. Zea's writings on the Mexican theme seem to this writer more properly to belong to the field of social psychology than to philosophy in the stricter sense of the word.

Professor Gaos deftly suggests in his book "En Torno a la Filosofía Mexicana", published in two volumes (7 and 11) of the series "Mexico y lo Mexicano" that Zea and his associates have gotten the idea that to elaborate a philosophy of the Mexican and of that which is Mexican (del Mexicano y de lo Mexicano) is the best way to elaborate a Mexican philosophy.. in the double sense of (a philosophy) conceived by him and of one that is new in relation to those conceived by men of other nationalities."[40] Zea himself had recognized the fallacy of such a self-conscious attempt to create a national philosophy when, agreeing with the dictum of Professor Gaos that "the question is not to create Spanish or American philosophy, but to have Spaniards and Americans make philosophy,"[41] he wrote in 1942: "We must simply attempt to make philosophy; for the American character will (automatically) come with it." The present attempt to create a Mexican philosophy by reflecting upon the "Mexican circumstances" seems to the writer a tour de force which is a negation of the earlier insight. Professor Risieri Frondizi holds that this approach has "centered attention on the Ibero-American forgetting philosophy." Though without crediting them as sources, he echoes the statements just quoted from Professor Gaos, and from Zea declaring: "In order for a philosophy which is one's own to emerge it is necessary to produce philosophy, nothing more; the American character of it will (automatically) come with it."[43] Frondizi suggests that it is necessary to overcome the desire to have an original philosophy and says that "a narrow interpretation of the 'perspectivism' of Orgega y Gasset and of the concept of the 'circumstance' is in part responsible,"[44] for what seems to him a mistaken course. Zea's writings on the Mexican theme seem to this writer more properly to belong to the field of social psychology than to philosophy in the stricter sense of the word.

Such criticisms will prove to be unjust if Zea's analyses really serve as the groundwork for a new interpretation of reality which does have universal significance, and for a new ethical philosophy, "a morality..... (which) may also be a morality for every man in circumstances similar," to those faced by the Mexicans. But what kind of morality this will be Zea has not even intimated. Zea's repeated emphasis on the relativistic character of all philosophical positions, whether in ethics or metaphysics, because of their conditioning by the particular circumstances in which they have been elaborated, does not seem too promising a standpoint from which to base a philosophy which can help the Mexican in his circumstance. In his analysis of the ethical attitude of the Mexican Zea states: "Because he is opportune; because he rests on the immediate and circumstantial, the Mexican falls easily into that which we call opportunism." The Ortega inspired circumstantialism which is as the very center of Zea's entire philosophy is hardly an adequate point of departure from which to work out an ethic which can help to deliver the Mexican from this opportunism.

The reader will have noted in this exposition of Zea's philosophy a change of emphasis from the search for a Spanish American philosophy to a concern for a specifically Mexican philosophy. The writer has found no explanation of this change. In spite of explicit denials that there is a nationalistic motivation behind the present search for a Mexican philosophy, it is evident that there is a strong nationalism in Mexico today, and that the concern for Mexican culture and for having a Mexican philosophy is one of its manifestations. This interest in a Mexican philosophy has taken Ortega's perspectivism as its rationale.

We may well question the adequacy of perspectivism as the foundation

from which to develop a genuine national philosophy, or indeed any philosophy. (Whether or not there really can be such a thing as a national philosophy or not is a point we cannot discuss here.) Zea's shift from the idea of "Spanish American" to "the Mexican" is an illustration of the fact that perspectivism as a basis for true philosophy is a shifting sand. At first Zea, as a student of Gaos interested in the "thought of Spanish tongue" interpreted Ortega's perspectivism to mean that "philosophy for the Spanish American must be the philosophy of the Spanish American circumstance." Zea reasoned that philosophy cannot take the standpoint of universal man, who is an abstraction, but must have as its point of departure a particular man in a particular circumstance. Hence the emphasis on Spanish American man in his circumstance. But a further application of this principle leads to the conclusion that Spanish American man is also an abstraction. A broader knowledge of the Spanish American scene discloses great diversities between various Spanish American nations. Indeed, these diversities are so great that certain Spanish American countries are closer to certain European countries in racial composition and culture than they are to other Spanish American countries, taken as a whole. So we come to "the philosophy of the Mexican circumstance."

Now, in positing a philosophy of the Mexican circumstance Zea tries to claim a universal validity for it by claiming that it can serve as the philosophy for "every man in circumstances similar to ours." But in the final analysis no man's circumstances are really similar to those of any other man's. Only the concrete individual has ontological reality. Hence, if we take a strict perspectivism as our starting point we finally have to narrow our base to the point where we are concerned with the philosophy of one

concrete individual, and no one else--to Ortega's "I am I and my circumstance. "Mexican man" is also an abstraction. So, logically, from the insistence that "philosophy must be the philosophy of the Spanish American circumstance," we move to the search for "the philosophy of the Mexican circumstance, to end in the "philosophy of my circumstance." There is no valid stopping point between the "universal man" and the "concrete man", as Zea has attempted to do.

The position of this study is that a relevant philosophy must always begin as the philosophy of concrete man, "the man of flesh and bone", to cite Unamuno. But from this starting point it is possible to move to a philosophy relevant for all men. Extreme perspectivism assumes that the circumstances of one man are so different from the circumstances of every other man that no one can speak validly for any one else. Adopting an attenuated perspectivism, some thinkers, (e.g. Zea) posit a sufficient similarity in circumstances between certain groupings of men to make possible a philosophy which is valid for all men in such circumstances, but not universally valid. Yet the basic similarities in nature and circumstance between all men are greater than the differences between the men of one grouping and those of another. Either philosophy as something of significance beyond the lone individual, (and if it is not who would trouble to communicate it or even to elaborate it) is not possible at all, or it is possible as a philosophy for all men. The attempt to take a national perspective of any other limited perspective is the suicide of philosophy. To be sure, differences in outlook are inevitable, and for various reasons, not only because of different circumstances. But they need not come intentionally, they will emerge naturally, "por añadidura", as the result of sincere

philosophizing.

Man's task as a philosopher is simply to search for "the truth--that truth which is the truth for me." He begins this search with himself as a concrete individual in a concrete circumstance. With faith in the essential harmony of the truth he glimpses with ultimate reality, he then presents his truth as a truth for all men, even while knowing that his perspective is limited and that he must unendingly continue on the search for truth. Intentionally to take a relativistic position, to surrender the hope of an essential harmony between his understanding of the truth and the truth itself, between his truth and the truth is to surrender the very quest for truth, which is the death of philosophy. The true philosopher must say: "this is the truth--as it has been given to me to understand it."

If the philosopher be a Christian he is further, and fundamentally, delivered from the skepticism of relativism by the recognition that there is a Truth which we do not make, but find. God, whose nature is Truth, has revealed Himself to man, together with such truths as man needs for true self-understanding and salvation. This Truth is valid for all men in all circumstances. It is contained primarily in the Holy Scriptures. The Scriptures are not the Truth, but as man meditates upon them under the guidance of the Holy Spirit of God, he is led to an apprehension of the Truth which God reveals through His Spirit. Having found the God of Truth, man cannot then objectivize his truths and parcel them out to others as dogmatic data. He can only reflect upon what he has found, trusting that others may be led, also under the guidance of the Spirit, to the same dynamic encounter.

Only God is the Truth, knows the Truth, reveals the Truth. That is why the quest for Truth must lead, existentially to the revelation of God in Him who said: "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life." That is what Antonio Caso, preeminently among Mexican philosophers, discovered; and that is why he proposed that a true ethic must be an "imitation of Christ."[45] In Caso's philosophy, Zea and his colleagues of the Hyperion, can find an ethic which is both concrete and universal, which is suited to the immediate circumstance of every man, yet does not fall into opportunism, which is not an abstract system but a Life. Is Caso's contribution to be wholly neglected while today's thinkers continue the search for a peculiarly "Mexican philosophy?"

4. Reawakening in Cuba

Francisco Romero places Enrique José Varona, whose work we have considered in Part I of this study, among "the founders." Varona would thus be an exception to the rule that the founders have been the leaders of the reaction against positivism in Spanish America.[46] It would seem, however, that Varona is better understood as a lone figure, not only in the sense of one who meditated in solitude,[47] but also in the sense of one who had no continuers of his thought. Varona stands at the end of the empiricist tradition in Cuban philosophy, he does not found a new movement, while Caso and Korn are the true "founders" of a new attitude in philosophy in their respective countries. Varona, according to Professor Medardo Vitier, the foremost authority on the history of thought in Cuba, "has been an animator in literature, and politics, (but) not in philosophy."[48]

In recent years, however, after an interim in which philosophical pro-

ductivity was at a low ebb in Cuba, there has begun a reawakening of philosophical concern. Luis Recaséns Siches, one of the distinguished Spanish philosophers who emigrated to Mexico in 1938, and who has spent considerable time in Cuba, states: "Cuba was at the end of the XVIII century and in the first half of the nineteenth the country in America where philosophy developed to a highest level. Today it presents a vigorous renaissance."[49]. An adequate survey of this philosophical renaissance has not yet appeared, to this writer's knowledge; such recent descriptions as may have appeared have not been available. From the introductions to the works of the great masters of Cuban philosophy in the past, which have been employed in this series it is possible to identify professors Roberto Agramonte, Humberto Piñera Llera, Elías Entralgo and Rafael García Bárcena as foremost leaders of present day Cuban philosophy. Positivism has disappeared in Cuba as in other Spanish American countries, and the influences of German historicism (Dilthey), phenomenology, and existentialism are uppermost. The influence of Scheler and Hartmann dominates ethical thought. The Cuban Philosophical Society is a vigorous organization in which various schools of thought are represented. Under the auspices of the society, Pedro Vicente Aja, a young Protestant Christian thinker, has recently published an essay entitled (in translation) "Christianity in the Crisis of the West"). In this essay Aja, showing a profound understanding of the spiritual history of the West, makes a brilliant analysis of the part which Christianity can play in the solution of the spiritual crisis of the West. This essay can well be placed alongside the writings of Antonio Caso as a Spanish American Christian criticism of culture. Much can be expected from the future contributions of Pedro Vicente Aja.

5. Post-Positivism in Argentina

Philosophy in Argentina today has a towering figure in Francisco Romero, the greatest of the students of Alejandro Korn. In 1930, when Korn retired from his chairs in the University of Buenos Aires and the University of La Plata, Romero was elected to succeed him. Upon the death of Korn in 1936 Romero became the recognized leader of Argentine philosophy. To the work of Romero we must devote a separate chapter of this study.

The post-positivist period in Argentina begins with Alejandro Korn. Korn exercised a profoundly stimulating influence on his associates and students. An example of this influence is found in the formation in 1929 of the Kantian Society of Buenos Aires, an unofficial branch of the famous Kantian Society of Berlin. Though lacking an organized structure, Alejandro Korn acted by common consent as the de facto president of the Society, with Romero as the secretary. The Society pioneered in the study of the new masters of European philosophy. In its first year, Romero informs us, the philosophy of Dilthey was studied, and soon after the thought of Husserl, Heidegger and Hartmann. In 1930 the Colegio Libre de Estudios Superiores (Free College for Higher Studies) was founded, with Korn as one of the founders, and as first professor of philosophy. This remarkable institution has played a leading role in the quickening of philosophical interest in Argentina in the 1930's.[50]

Though Romero has dominated Argentine philosophy since the death of A. Korn in a way in which Korn himself never did, except perhaps in the last years of his life, he is by no means the only important thinker in this period since the death of Korn. The late professor Alberto Rougés, of the

University of Tucuman was an independent Catholic thinker who was strongly influenced by Augustinian and neo-Platonic thought. Rougés was particularly interested in the problems of being and of eternity, and his one published volume "Las Jerarquías del Ser y la Eternidad,"[51] explores these problems. Romero calls his work one of "rare perfection and profundity."[52] Professor Saúl Taborda of the University of Córdoba, is another thinker who like Rougés, died while much was still expected from him. Taborda had a deeply spiritual interest as his volume, "La Crísis Espiritual y el Idéario Argentino" (1933) reveals. Professor Manuel Nuñez Regueiro, a native of Uruguay who spent most of his teaching years in the University of Rosario, was a prolific writer to whom Dr. E. S. Brightman has referred as standing "close to American personalism." Nuñez Regueiro's style has been too verbose, his writing too prolific and lacking in philosophical precision for his work to receive the attention it might otherwise have received had it not had these defects. Nuñez Regueiro also died in the 1940's.

The largest and most active school of thought in present Argentine philosophy is Thomism, which seems to be stronger in Argentina than in any other Spanish American country. Argentine Thomism has been greatly strengthened by the visits of Father R. Garrigou-Lagrange and of Jacques Maritain. Thomism has become particularly strong in the University of Cuyo, in Mendoza, but leading representatives of the school can be found in all the Argentine universities. Among the leading representatives of Thomism are Dr. Tomás Casares, Rafael Pividal, Father Juan R. Sepich, and Father Octavio N. Derisi. Father Derisi's "Los Fundamentos Metafísicos del Orden Moral" is a scholarly exposition of Thomist ethics. Though Derisi refers to the new contributions to the field of ethics on the part of Scheler, Hartmann, and other contempo-

rary thinkers, he takes the position that they have nothing of basic importance to offer and is content to reassert the postulates of St. Thomas.

Turning to a group of thinkers who have been students of Romero we find the names of Risieri Frondizi, Aníbal Sánchez Reulet, Angel Vassallo, Luis Fauré, Eugenio Puciarelli, and Vicente Fatone. Frondizi, at present a professor in the University of Puerto Rico has taken a special interest in the problem of knowledge. In conversation with this writer in 1949 the late Professor E. S. Brightman called Frondizi's book "El Punto de Partida del Filosofar," (The Point of Departure in Philosophical Reflection") "the best book on the field which has appeared in the last ten years." Sánchez Reulet has specialized in the historiography of Latin American philosophy and is now director of the philosophical section of the Pan-American Union in Washington, D. C. Angel Vassallo has probably been the most creative of the group. He has taken a special interest in the field of metaphysics, an area in which Romero has given his students no position of his own to which they might cling. In his "Nuevos Prolegómenos a la Metafísica" Vassallo shows the strong influence of Bergson and of the Christian existentialists, Blondel and Marcel. Fauré has followed in Romero's historical interest and has published a study of the utilitarian philosophers. Puciarelli has specialized in the field of psychology. His most notable work is his collaboration with Romero in the text "Lógica". Vicente Fatone has become particularly interested in existentialism and has traced its roots in Kierkegaard as well as its fruits in thinkers like Karl Barth.

Miguel Angel Virasoro and Rafael Virasoro are the leading representatives of existentialism in Argentina, together with Fatone and Carlos Astrada. Astrada, who studied under Heidegger in Germany, in addition to a number of

exposition of existentialist thought has published a book "La Etica Formal y los Valores," with the promising sub-title, "An Essay of Existential Reappraisal of the Kantian Morals Oriented in the Problem of Liberty." The sub-title, however, promises more than is accomplished. Astrada's criticisms of Kantian morality are not sharp and his final conclusions are not a significant addition to the literature on the subject.

In 1946 the present Argentine government decided to require a loyalty oath from all public employees, including the professors in the government universities. Francisco Romero preferred to surrender his chairs rather than comply with these requirements. Frondizi and Sánchez Reulet have preferred to work in other countries in recent years. (Whether their departure is linked to the political situation in Argentina, the writer does not know.) Romero has increased the number of his publications since giving up his teaching positions, but the newer generations of students are being deprived of the stimulus of his classes. To what extent the present regimentation of thought in the Argentine universities will adversely affect the philosophical renaissance which has taken place in Argentina since the days of the founding of the Kantian Society, it is too soon to predict. Barring unforeseen development, however, it appears that Argentine philosophy is falling behind Mexico in the vitality of its philosophical life. Thus far there has been no movement in Argentina parallel to Zea's Mexican school.

The new currents of Argentine thought, led by Romero, are strongly spiritual, in contrast to the abandoned positivism. There is no clear indication yet, however, that a new dominant philosophy is about to appear in Argentina.

E. POSTCRIPT

This review of the major trends and figures of Spanish American thought since the end of the positivist period is, to be sure, highly inadequate without the fuller consideration of the work of Caso, Vasconcelos, Korn and Romero which is included in the following chapters. After the presentation of the thought of these leaders we must return for a final appraisal of Spanish American philosophy, even though our proximity to the most recent events we have been describing makes such an appraisal difficult, if not impossible.

F. Footnotes

Chapter IV

1. Brightman, E. S., South of the Border, p. 3.

2. The writer makes the statement on the basis of the number, distinction, and variety of schools of thought represented in the professors of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters in the University, and on the quality of the dissertations for the degrees of Master of Philosophy and Doctor of Philosophy, a number of which have been employed in this study.

3. The recognition given to Romero as the leading philosopher in Spanish America today could be extensively documented. We choose one example at random: The review "Revista Cubana de Filosofía", published by the Cultural Department of the Ministry of Education of the Cuban Government, in a special issue dedicated to honoring Romero refers to him as the "patriarch of Ibero-American philosophy." In the introductory note, the editor, Professor Rafael García Bárcena states that for those who are writing philosophy in Spanish America today, "Maestro Romero is the one to whom we are most deeply indebted...."

4. Romero, Filósofos y Problemas, p. 15. See also the article "Sobre la Filosofía en Iberoamérica" in Filosofía de la Persona. Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, 1944. pp. 147-158.

5. Romanell, Patrick, The Making of the Mexican Mind. Lincoln. The University of Nebraska Press, 1951.

6. Romero, Sobre la Filosofía en Ibero-América, p. 62.

7. Gaos, José, Filosofía Mexicana de Nuestros Días. México. Imprenta Universitaria, 1954. pp. 308-309.

8. Romero employs this designation in various writings. Cf. Sobre la Filosofía en Iberoamérica, p. 72.

9. Ibid., p. 72.

10. Korn, Obras Completas, p. 433.

11. Ibid., p. 430.

12. Quoted by Romero, Sobre la Filosofía en América, p. 73.

13. Sanchez Reulet, Aníbal, Contemporary Latin American Philosophy. Albuquerque. University of New Mexico, 1952. p. 46.

14. Ibid., p. 46.

15. Vaz Ferreira, Carlos, Moral Para Intelectuales. Montevideo. 1908. p.199.

16. Ibid., p. 46.

17. Gil Villegas, Francisco, "Antonio Caso y su Escuela", in Anuario de Filosofía, Vol. I. México. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1943. p. 135.

18. Ramos, Samuel, História de la Filosofía en México. p. 153.

19. Romano Munoz, José, El Secreto del Bien y del Mal. México. Antigua Librería Robledo, 1943. p. 14.

20. For an account of the welcome given in Mexico to the exiled Spanish philosophers and of the outstanding contribution which they have made since their arrival, see the article, "Los Transterrados Españoles de la Filosofía en México" by Jose Gaos in his volume Filosofía Mexicana de Nuestros Días. México. Imprenta Universitaria, 1954.

21. Gaos, José, El Pensamiento de Lengua Española. México. Editorial Stylo, 1945. p. 356.

22. Zea, Leopoldo, "En Torno de una Filosofía Americana", article published in the journal Letras, 1943, and reproduced in the volume Ensayos Sobre la Filosofía en la História. México. Editorial Stylo, 1948. p. 142.

23. Ibid., p. 142.

24. Ibid., p. 175.

25. Zea, Leppoldo, Consciencia y Responsabilidad del Mexicano. Serie "México y lo Mexicano", Vol. 2. México. Porrúa y Obregon, s 1952, p. 82.

26. For a description of the "Ateneo de la Juventud" see pp. 133 of this study.

27. Gaos, Filosofía Mexicana de Nuestros Días, p. 201.

28. Zea, op. cit., p. 82.

29. In the introduction to the series "México y lo Mexicano", Vol. I Reyes, Alfonso, La X en la Frente. México. Porrúa y Obregon, 1952. p. 2.

30. Zea, op. cit., p. 82.

31. Ibid., p. 19.

32. Ibid., p. 37.

33. Quoted by Gaos, op. cit., p. 202.

34. Ibid., p. 205.

35. Zea, op. cit., p. 89-90.

36. Ibid., p. 91.

37. Ibid., p. 107.

38. Ibid., p. 108.

39. Uranga, Emilio, Análisis del Ser del Mexicano, México. Serie "México y lo Mexicano," Porrúa y Obregón, 1952. p. 10.

40. Gaos, José, En Torno a la Filosofía Mexicana. "México y lo Mexicano," Porrúa y Obregón, 1952. p. 12-13.

41. Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, p. 361. (Quotation taken from this page is from an article first published in the review Cima, February, 1942.)

42. Zea, Ensayos Sobre la Filosofía en la Historia, p. 157.
Note: The clause which has been translated "will (automatically) come with it" is a translation of the expression "vendrá por añadidura". This is the expression employed in Mathew 6:33 in the verse: "Seek ye the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you." The things which are "added" are the "añadidura". It is the word which is used by both Zea and Frondizi in these passages.

43. Frondizi, Risieri, "Is there an Ibero American Philosophy?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. IX, No. 3, March 1949. pp. 345-355.

44. Ibid., p. 355.

45. See Chapter V of this study p.

46. Romero, Sobre la Filosofía en América, p. 63.
There has been no group of disciples of Varona, as there have of Antonio Caso and Alejandro Korn, whose students have carried forward, if not the same position of the masters, at least many of the same basic emphases.

47. Romero has written a beautiful passage concerning the greatness of Varona in his lonely dedication to philosophy. Cf. Filósofos y Problemas, p. 27-28.

48. See p.151 of this dissertation.

49. In the prologue of the volume by Pedro Vicente Aja, El Cristianismo en la Crisis del Occidente y Otros Temas. La Habana. Sociedad Cubana de Filosofía, 1953, p. 17.

50. For a description of the activities of the Kantian Society and of the Free College for Higher Studies see Romero, Sobre la Filosofía en América, pp. 52-56.

51. Rougés, Alberto, Las Jerarquías del Ser y la Eternidad, Tucamán. Universidad de Tucumán, 1942.

52. Romero, Sobre la Filosofía en América, p. 58.

CHAPTER IV

ANTONIO CASO (1883-1946)

The name of Antonio Caso has already appeared prominently in this study. It is to Caso that we owe the exposition of the thought of Father Gamarra, the first Mexican eclectic. It is to him that we owe the clearest judgment of the work of Ignacio Ramirez and the Mexican "Jacobins", and of Barreda and the positivist movement. It is Caso who leads the reaction against the domination of positivism and ushers in the post-positivist era in Mexican philosophy. The time has come for a detailed consideration of Caso as "the first philosopher of Mexico" and the greatest Christian thinker yet to emerge in Hispanic America.

A. THE FIRST PHILOSOPHER OF MEXICO

1. A Biographical Note

No adequate biographical study of Antonio Caso has yet appeared, to the knowledge of this writer. This is a serious omission in the very excellent volume, "Homenaje a Antonio Caso" which contains a very complete exposition of his works. The facts of his life here presented are necessarily fragmentary because of the absence of any definite biographidal sources; they have been gleaned from the critical articles regarding his philosophical works.

Antonio Caso was born in Mexico City in 1883. He attended the Escuela Preparatoria, and then entered the law school of Mexico, known at that time as the Escuela Nacional de Jurisprudencia, for there was no university. Caso's real interest, however, was not in the practice of law, and though

he obtained his title, he seems never to have exercised the legal profession. Upon graduation from law school he became a professor in the Escuela Preparatoria and then in the school of law. In 1913, when he was only thirty, we find him as Director of the Escuela Nacional de Altos Estudios, which was the liberal arts school of the re-established University of Mexico. From this time until the day of his death Caso was related to the University of Mexico. For a time he was its Rector, but because of political difficulties this position was not his for long. Above all, and from the beginning Caso was a teacher of philosophy. If Caso did not enter the more lucrative profession of law it was in order to be true to his vocation as a philosopher, and in so doing became the first Mexican ever to make of philosophy a profession. Says Samuel Ramos, "Caso represents in Mexican intellectual history the first person who gives his life wholly to philosophy spurred by a genuine vocation."[1].

But for Caso the teaching of philosophy was no retreat to an ivory tower. If philosophy was for him an intimate and personal search for truth even more truly it was a discipline which conferred a great sense of social responsibility. He was deeply aware of the relation of life and thought. He had no interest in pure speculation of an abstract sort, and not only did he seek to make his insights practical, they were themselves fruit of his brooding over the realities which surrounded him. "The social problem of Mexico", he once wrote, "as everywhere else, is a moral question."[2]. He felt that his insights were needed to help Mexico out of its moral and spiritual dilemmas, and so he consciously assumed the position of mentor and moral leader of the nation. Gifted as an orator, (José Gaos says of Caso, reviewing his activities at the beginning of his teaching career, that "he

was THE orator of Mexico in those years")3. he chose to dedicate his talents to the moral uplift of the nation rather than to his own profit. His orations were cultural and patriotic in character; directed not only to the few that heard them but to the nation as a whole. A number of his books are formed by these orations: thus the "Discursos a la Nación Mexicana" of 1922; "Nuevos Discursos a la Nación Mexicana," 1934; "El Problema de Mexico y la Ideología Nacional," 1924, etc.

In Spanish speaking lands the word "maestro", literally master, is used in a very special way when it is applied as a title to a teacher who is admired and revered. Caso, when he was still a young man, came to be known as "el maestro Caso." His title was a badge of his moral and intellectual leadership, of his position as the guide and teacher, not only of a few students within the halls of the academic cloisters, but of the entire nation. E. S. Brightman, in his splendid eulogy to this Mexican philosopher calls attention to the economic sacrifices which Caso had to undergo in fidelity to his vocation as a philosopher and teacher, as he quotes from the Mexican lawyer Isidro Fabela the following words: "The holy poverty of Caso is his pride because it is his power, his shield, his capital. Caso, limited in funds, feels himself rich in liberties."4. Caso could well have felt that his sacrifices were recompensed. No other man did more than he to overcome the sway of positivism in Mexican culture and to prepare the way for the spiritual reawakening which Mexico needs.

Caso's last words before his death were these: "at last I shall know." Perhaps other words he spoke are more deeply indicative of his ever questing spirit, and of his firm belief in the existence of a higher world of spiritual reality. Because Caso tried earnestly and effectively to share his sense

of the reality of the life of the spirit, and to lead his countrymen to nobler living, he fully deserves to be called, to use the words of Brightman, "one of America's most illustrious men."[5.]

2. The Critic of Positivism

When Caso entered the school of law, Mexico was still under the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. The positivist ideology ruled unchallenged in the secular educational establishments of the nation and dominated the culture of the day. The role of Caso in the intellectual struggle against positivism has already been reviewed in a previous section of this study and need not be described again. What is necessary at this time is to point out that Caso's consciousness of philosophical vocation begins with his reaction against positivism. In view of this fact, it is interesting to note that there is surprisingly little purely negative criticism in his writings. From the beginning Caso seems to have been more interested in disseminating a new way of thinking than in destroying the old, except as it was necessary to do the latter for the sake of the former. This attitude is well illustrated in the title of the first philosophical essay he wrote, expressing his own thoughts rather than presenting the thoughts of some other writer. This title is "The Perennial Character of Religious and Speculative Thought," in itself a criticism of positivism which had denied the validity of religion and metaphysics and predicted their early demise, but at the same time a constructive statement. To replace positivism, Caso depended more on the "expulsive power" of new modes of thought than in mere negation. But before we can turn to some of the new ideas he tried to introduce it is necessary to review some of his objections to positivism as they help us to appreciate the centrality of the ethical interest

in the thought of the "master."

Caso's basic objection to positivism is a moral one. Drawing up the balance sheet of the positivist era in Mexico in an essay first published in 1915, he accuses positivism of direct responsibility for the hated dictatorial regime of Díaz. "Positivism" he states, "had triumphed, establishing a government which never proposed to itself an ideal, proper to individuals who seemed to have none[6]:..(It) formed a generation of men avid of material welfare, jealous of their economic prosperity, who for thirty years collaborated in the political work of Díaz. The failure of Mexican positivism is manifest. It is one of the direct conditions of the tremendous moral crisis which the Republic suffers."[7].

Caso rightly considers the morality of positivism to be a form of utilitarianism, and he is convinced that utilitarian morality can only result in a moral decline: "Morality founded on the pleasure of the largest number, as the disciples of Bentham say, does not lead to the elevation of life, to its fulfillment, to its triumph, but to its relaxation, to its inevitable defeat."[8]. And his basic objection to the agnosticism of positivism is not because it is agnostic, but because in making an ultimate of agnosticism it gives up struggle and is morally enervating:

> "The evil of an agnostic philosophy is not in its theory of knowledge but in its immoral corollary. If the agnostic said: "We do not possess truth, nor shall we ever possess it, but we must struggle every day to reach it, that we may ever approach more nearly its hermetically sealed circle; far from injuring the will, it would fortify it with its bitterness, it would aid it with its caution, it would strengthen it with its prudence; but the agnostic disappoints, paralyzes, suppresses the heroism of philosophy."[9].

It is on moral grounds that Caso rejects the philosophy of Hostos in his

famous Ateneo lecture of 1910. The vigorous rejection of determinism which he manifests in this lecture is the expression of a principle which we can recognize as one of the guiding thoughts of Caso. Writes Caso:

> "If we were to rule our actions by the reflection of the fatal laws of the world inert in our own consciousness, we would be completely immoral, or better, amoral; good and evil would be lacking in meaning for us, and the law of absolute hedonism would logically be the ethical norm of our spiritual life."[10].

Caso also objected to positivism on rational grounds. He objected to the dogmatic assurance of the positivists, their claim to base their conclusions on the immutable laws of nature revealed by science. This objection also appears in his essay on Hostos. Hostos had pretended to base morals on the very laws of the universe, scientifically. Caso denies this claim of scientific certainty saying that "science can offer us nothing except relative results."[11]. This statement shows the deep influence of Henri Bergson and of Emile Boutroux upon the younger Caso. This influence becomes still more evident as we turn to his own philosophical constructions. But before we can do this, we should pause to consider Caso's attitudes as to the functions and methods of philosophy.

3. Caso's Approach to Philosophy

Antonio Caso does not belong among the builders of philosophical systems. In contrast to his friend and colleague of the Ateneo, José Vasconcelos, who has consciously tried to develop a system, Caso studiously refrained from giving his writings systematic form, except for his treatises on sociology and esthetics, and never did he try to relate his thought as a whole structurally. This does not mean, however, that there is no coherence at all in

the thought of Caso. On the contrary, although there are certain inconsistencies, (and there is a kind of looseness, which, this writer believes, detracts from the effectiveness of his philosophy), there is really a remarkable unity in his writings. Caso was fond of quoting the words of Kant apropos of the method of writing philosophy: "He who thinks methodically may present thought systematically or fragmentarily. That expression which is fragmentary in appearance but methodical at the core is an aphoristic exposition."[12] Caso trusted that in spite of the aphoristic form of his thought it would be apparent that his thought was methodical, but the possibility of contradiction troubled him less than the possibility of yielding to the "geometric spirit".[13] He accepted the words of Bergson: "Systems tend to subjugate the spirit. It is necessary to break those bonds of philosophical and scientific systems..."[14] For Caso, the development of a rigid system tended toward dogmatism, which presupposes that since all questions have already been answered there is no further room or need for questions. His distaste of system was bound up with his aversion to what he calls "official philosophy", an illustration of which he found in the scholasticism which ruled in colonial days and the positivism of the regime of Díaz. "All the despots of the human conscience lacked the "esprit de finesse',"[15] he declares.

Caso's ideal was to be what Eduardo García Maynez, in a phrase which cannot be translated, calls "un filósofo de la problematicidad." That is to say, he chose to call attention to great philosophical and social issues rather than to present ready made solutions, to stimulate thought and inquiry rather than to satisfy. "To philosophize," he declared "is not only to construct, but to inquire."[16] This ideal of philosophy as a quest rather than

as a safe discovery is closely linked with one of his most important distinctions in the interpretation of the history of philosophy, his description of philosophers as "heroic" and "discreet". The systematizers, for Caso, are the discreet philosophers. They wish to have all truth s afely corralled, with no loose ends to disturb them. They wish to have all doubts safely resolved. But this, for Caso, is the negation of the very spirit of philosophy. Says Caso:

> "The philosophical spirit is a constant and incorruptible spirit of adventure which contains a great deal of the heroic. The delight of philosophy resides, more than in the success of the affirmation, always problematical, in the effort displayed in meditation. Whoever craves for the interior quietism of the mind, the solid stability, the easy rest, should not concern himself with the study of philosophical questions."[17].

Caso quotes at this point the celebrated words of Lessing expressing the desire for the eternal search for truth rather than the possession of the truth.

But Caso recognizes that philosophy cannot be pure inquiry. It must propose solutions even if it should not do so in the spirit of dogmatic absoluteness. Therefore philosophy has need for the discreet as well as for the heroic, indeed the greatest thinkers are those who combine both heroism and discretion. "Every great thinker," he states, "synthesizes the heroic and the discreet."[18]. If only the heroic philosophized there would be no continuity in philosophy; it would be nothing but a jumble of unrelated thoughts.

Even more important in Caso's approach to philosophy than the distinction between the "heroic" and the "discreet" is his view that philosophy is not only a form of knowledge (un saber) but that it is an attitude and a

way of life, (un modo de ser).[19] In the words of Caso:

> "What is philosophy? The answer to a double question: What is existence? What value does it have? But the first question is subordinated to the second, just as, for action, the understanding is subordinated to the will. Philosophy is the theory of pleasure, of felicity, of beatitude. To know is little, though it may be something. To be able is much, though it be not all. To gain the peace 'within and without', 'inter et foris', as the Imitation of Christ says, that is all.
>
> "Philosophy teaches all to be heroic as the heroes, saintly as the saints, wise as the wise, artistic as the artists, industrious as industrious, pure and clean of heart. We may never know what life is. But from this moment, we know we must exalt it, until each of us makes of himself an absolute Man. When each of us has reproduced the divine greatness of Christ, philosophy will be useless... Meanwhile it seems discreet to continue proclaiming it."[20]

This emphasis on philosophy as a way of life, rather than as a mere knowing as a practical wisdom and understanding which exalts life, is a theme which is found in the earliest writings of Caso and which recurs continually. It is because philosophy must issue in a call to heroic and saintly living that philosophers are called to be heroes and saints in the thought of Caso. But to perceive this involves a higher wisdom than that of mere knowing. The empirical, sense bound, knowledge of science can give us no clue to the values and meanings which make life worthwhile. That is why Caso believes in the power of the intuition. His theory of knowledge is intimately related to the practical and ethical bent of his thought. Let us pause to consider Caso as a philosopher of the intuition.

B. THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS OF CASO

1. The Philosophy of the Intuition

Caso's first exposition of his own philosophy, delivered in 1914, is

entitled "The Philosophy of the Intuition." This emphasis on the place of the intuition in philosophical knowledge is a basic theme in the works of Caso. It is evident that his first ideas regarding the limits of empiricism and intellectualism are strongly influenced by Kant and Schopenhauer, both of whom he read and discussed during his student days in the literary circle with his friends. His thinking in the repudiation of mechanistic determinism owes more to Emile Boutroux than to anyone else. Caso believed that freedom and ethics are impossible in a world bound by a rigid determinism. He was greatly impressed, therefore, by the writings of Boutroux stressing the philosophical significance of the evidences of contingency in the world of nature. "If the contingency of natural laws is true," remarks Caso commenting on the significance of the ideas of Boutroux, "then there remains a ground of existence possible to the Spirit and to the Good."[21]. But if the reasoning of Boutroux clears the ground for Caso's belief in the existence of Spirit and of Good, it is only by his confidence in the faculty of the intuition that he feels certain of the world of spiritual reality. In the development of a theory of the intuition Caso is chiefly influenced by two men, first by Henri Bergson, and afterward by Edmund Husserl.

For Caso the affirmation of the faculty of the intuition is not a negation of positivism, rather it is the completion of it, the affirmation of a true positivism. "The philosophy of our time," he declares in his major philosophical work, "La Existencia como Economía, Desinterés, y Caridad," "must be founded on experience, but in all of experience, that of the laboratory and that of the oratory."[22]. And elsewhere he adds, "all knowledge is born from experience; from the complex of the spiritual life."[23]. The

most important achievement of the philosophy of Bergson and of the German philosophers he feels to be the rescuing of experience from its marriage to agnosticism. "Both in the philosophy of Bergson and in the powerful current of phenomenology," he states, "the radical agnosticism of Kant and of positivism is overcome."[24]. Especially in phenomenology does Caso see the true positivism. He expresses unbounded admiration for the achievements of Husserl:

> "The entire work of thoughtful humanity appears synthesized in the great work of the Husserlian phenomenology. A radical intuitionism and a positivism of the essences which vindicated the Platonic ideas and links them with the life of the spirit, but not in absurd syncretism but in the reiterated and constant effort of a new philosophical method, based on the eternal thought of Socrates, St. Augustine and Descartes..."[25].

In Husserl he also sees a synthesis of the work of Hegel and of Comte. Hegel had taught that there could be no secrets for the intelligence. Comte taught that there could be no effective knowledge beyond the sphere of sense experience, and therefore no metaphysics. But Husserl combines both the daring of Hegel and the method of experience. "A true positivism which restricts itself to pure experience will have to admit with Husserl, against Comte, that there are universal objects which constitute the "ultimate laws ot eh intuition', 'the positivism of the essences'".[26].

There is a difference of opinion among students of Caso regarding his concept of intuition. Oswaldo Robles states that Caso achieves a synthesis of the intuitional concepts of Bergson and of Husserl which surpasses that of both and which is original with him.[27]. Samuel Ramos, on the other hand, feels that Caso is really an eclectic at this point,[28]. and suggests, as does Rafael Moreno,[29]. that Caso first leans on Bergson for his theory of

This is only one of many expressions of naive faith in the powers of man, an evidence of the romantic strain which was a very important part of the temperament of Caso.[31] Caso is not really consistent at this point. As we shall see soon, he really doubts the ontological existence of values; an attitude which is inconsistent with his acceptance of Plato's eternal ideas.

Caso has been accused of irrationalism and anti-intellectualism. While this writer finds it impossible to accept Caso's theory of knowledge because of the complete absence of any concept of revelation, and a corresponding naive faith in the powers of man, it is only fair to point out that Caso does not rely on the intuition alone, but believes that the intuition must be tested by reflection. The act of reasoning begins with an intuition, otherwise there would be nothing to reason about. Following Bergson at this point he declares: "The reason must recognize that by itself, it cannot establish anything. It has to base itself on the evidence, on the intuition which gives it its point of departure."[32] It is the intuition which gives the primary evidence for Caso; indeed he defines the intuition by saying, "to intuit is to know by seeing."[33] But this evidence must be judged by the powers of reflection. In one of his clearest statements on this point Caso states:

> "The great logician, Edmund Husserl, has said; 'The beginning of all beginnings is to take each intuition as it is given; but only within the limits in which it is given.' That is, ingenuousness to see; but reflexion to judge. If one is to begin with criticism one falls into destructive subjectivism. Let us begin, as Bergson says, affirming 'the immediate data of the consciousness'. The pure intuition basis of all knowledge, must be watched, however, by the reflection, without suspicions, certainly, but with care. Many times we believe we see that which we only imagine;

at other times, we take a simple prejudice of ours as if it were the evidence of the truth."[34]

E. S. Brightman examines the charge of irrationalism directed against Caso, and completely exonerates him.[35] Indeed, the accusation of irrationalism can only be made from the premises of a narrowly empirical or positivist epistemology which makes room for no evidence except that of the senses. The real flaw in Caso's theory of knowledge, in this writer's judgment, is not that of irrationalism but rather that of rationalism. In Caso's view it is "our science" which "communicates us with the absolute." It is an intuitive science, to be sure; it is neither a sensate knowledge nor a mathematical, geometric knowledge, but it is still "our" knowledge. The movement of man toward the ultimate truths is purely immanental, it is from man upward. There is a shift from empiricism to intuitionism, but man's knowing is still posited as taking place within the bounds of man's autonomous reason. This confidence in the autonomy of the reason, is quite incompatible with Caso's belief in an ethic of charity as a supernatural order, and his assertions of God as a person. Caso's ethical and metaphysical postulates are essentially Christian, but they are compromised by the foundation of a purely anthropocentric epistemology.

2. The Philosophy of Beauty

Antonio Caso was a profound lover of beauty. His aesthetic appreciation seems to have been most developed in the field of music. One of his books, "Dramma per Música" is a brilliant commentary on the works of a number of the greatest composers. His interest went far deeper than the mere beauty of the sounds. Caso desired to understand the basic feelings and philosophies which underlie the work of the great composers. He was

also a great critic of art. His criticisms of music and of art comprise one of his great contributions to the culture of Mexico and the Spanish speaking world. But it is with the place of esthetics in the total philosophy of Caso rather than with his work as a critic that we are concerned in this study.

For Caso the world of art had a profound spiritual significance, and his theory of esthetics occupies an important part in his total philosophy. This can best be seen in the work in which Caso comes closest to expressing his total philosophical viewpoint, "La Existencia como Economía, Desinterés y Caridad." In Caso's view of existence, life appears first of all as a matter of existence on the animal plane. Life on the biological level is always egotistical, always acquisitive; this is what Caso calls "existence as economy." The law of life on the biological plane he defines as "the maximum of profit with the minimum of effort,"[36]. in other words, sheer utilitarianism. But human life is not to be understood as something purely biological, as mere economy. Even in the higher animals there is a surplus of vitality which spends itself in play, with no thought of utility and with utter spontaneity. In man this surplus of vitality is still more apparent, it makes possible activity outside of the bounds of acquisitiveness, activity which is completely disinterested. At this point Caso takes up Kant's theory of esthetics as a form of disinterestedness. Artistic activity is an expression of disinterestedness, and as such is based on the surplus of vitality existent in man. Indeed, "this human surplus makes man a possible instrument of culture, heroism, and sanctity."[37]. Art, however, is the first reflection of capacities in man which are more than merely organic. "Art," he states, "is innate disinterestedness which life does not explain;

the intuition and then on Husserl. The writer feels forced to agree with Ramos and Moreno. This however, is a highly technical point which does not lie within the scope of this study. The important point for us to see is that Caso freed himself from the barrenness of positivism and moved to a deeper understanding of ethics and of metaphysics, and even beyond this, came to an assurance of the existence of spiritual realities through a confidence in the validity of the intuition. In his understanding of the intuition he uses both Bergson and Husserl. At times he seems carried away by his confidence in the powers of the intuition. In an essay entitled "The Error of Nicholas Berdiaeff" he takes vigorous exception to what he calls Berdiaeff's "aversion toward the heroic spirit of humanism", to Berdiaeff's repudiation of the Renaissance. He quotes Berdiaeff's words describing the spirit of the Renaissance as they appear in "The Meaning of History:"

> "Man's self-consciousness at the beginning of modern history had inspired him with confidence in his boundless creative powers and his ability to create life through the medium of Art and the infinite possibilities of his knowledge when applied to the mysteries of nature."

Whereupon Case adds:

> "These words of Berdiaeff's, in so far as they interpret the spirit of the Renaissance are perfectly just; but we have not abandoned the faith of the men of the Renaissance! ..... We believe, today, against that which positivism affirmed, against that which agnostic Kantianism formulated, that our human person is capable of supreme knowledge. We intuit the essences, we seethe forms, we know, as Plato taught, not only the shadows that line the walls of the Cave, but also the eternal ideas, which illuminate and guide us. Our philosophy is not agnostic. Our science communicates us with the absolute."[30].

it claims an enormous effort and its results are negligible."[38]. It follows then, that "in art the circle of vital interest is broken, and as a consequence the soul, freed from its biological prison, reflects the "spiritual) world which was hidden to its egoism."[39]. "Such," he concludes, "is the first of the victories of the soul over life, the esthetic victory, the principle of the superior human life, existence as disinterestedness."[40].

In 1924 Caso presented the first course in the philosophy of esthetics ever presented in Mexico. Here he develops with greater detail a theory of the nature of esthetic experience. He restates the theory of disinterestedness acknowledging antecedents in Kant and Schiller. He relates esthetics to intuition: "The artist, the poet, the musician, think intuitively."[41]. But he is not satisfied with a rational concept of intuition. He finds a double movement in esthetics, affective as well as conative, and he makes it clear that the affective element is the most important. He finds in the esthetic theory of Theodore Lipps the most satisfactory definition of the esthetic experience. Its essence is an "einfuhlung", a word he reproduces in the original since there is no equivalent for it in Spanish. The closest he can come to it is to call it a "sentimental projection." "The sentimental projection", he states, "makes art possible. At the bottom of human spiritual life there is a mystic union of subject and object. Or what is the same, the sentimental projection is a primary act of the spirit, irreducible and constant."[42]. But this is rather an explanation of the "how" of esthetic experience. "What" it is is still defined in terms of "disinterestedness:" "values are esthetic if they refer to a disinterested joy."[43]. At this point he defines the relation of esthetics to morals. The relation is that there is no relation. Esthetic disinterestedness is a

completely neutral thing which cannot be thought of in terms of good or evil. Biological life is pure acquisitiveness. Morality is wholly sacrificial, self-giving. Beauty is "an intermediate sphere between vital egoism and heroic altruism...Between the struggle for life and the fight of the good, there is a divine neuter point in existence."[44]. Moral categories simply do not apply in the field of art, according to Caso.

It is perhaps in his esthetic theories that the romantic trend in Caso is most clearly apparent. He quotes with enthusiastic assent what he calls "the profound phrase" of Novalis, that "all true ontology begins in esthetics."[45]. His definition of esthetic experience as an "einfuhlung" is in the tradition of German romanticism. But he does not follow up the statement of Novalis to develop a metaphysic based on esthetics, as does Vasconcelos. It is one of the "loose ends" in the thought of Caso.

3. The Christian Moralist

To label a particular section of this study of Antonio Caso "the Christian moralist," may be quite misleading. It must not be thought that the moral interest is merely one among a number of other preoccupations with Caso. As José Gaos states: "The root of his thinking, for it is that of his understanding (sentir),[46]. is in an ethicism which inspires itself, free from all confessional links, in Christianity."[47]. If a special section is devoted to Caso's moral ideas it is in order to place them in the setting of his thought as a whole, and to call attention in a particular way to this central element in his philosophy.

The title of this section is important. Caso is a moralist; and he is a Christian moralist. But as we consider his ethical thought it is

important to remember that his ethicism is "free from all confessional links." Whereas in philosophy it is possible to trace specific influences of various philosophers upon the thought of Caso, in his interpretation of Christianity Caso follows no particular philosopher or theologian, until he begins to follow the Christian orientation of the personalism of Max Scheler. Caso's basic moral ideas, however, had been formulated before that.

How far removed Caso is from the ethical ideas of the positivists is clearly indicated in the fact that he emphatically denies the idea of moral progress. "Man is as evil today as he has always been," he states laconically.[48] But this does not lead him to a pessimistic philosophy of life. On the contrary, he believes in the existence of the good and in its accessibility to man. Just how he believes in the good can best be seen in his fundamental work "La Existencia como Economía, Desinterés, y Caridad." He believes in the good as a supernatural order of charity.[49]

As we have already seen, there are three manifestations of existence in the philosophy of Caso. On the biological plane, existence manifests itself as egoism, or economy. On the esthetic level, existence is disinterestedness. On the ethical plane, existence takes the form of charity. Existence as charity is at the opposite extreme from existence as economy. Existence as economy is "maximum of profit with a minimum of effort"; existence as charity is a "maximum of effort with a minimum of profit."[50] This definition of existence as charity is the guiding principle in the interpretation of the values of life. Writes Caso:

"The table of values of humanity is this: The more merely

> animal life is sacrificed for purely disinterested ends, the more difficult that sacrifice is, until one reaches--from esthetic contemplation and simple good actions--to heroic action, the nobler one is."[51]

This means that the highest manifestation of life is found in selfless and spontaneous sacrifice: "In the supreme value of the moral world everything is a giving, a rendering, a sacrifice."[52] True giving cannot be coerced; therefore, the good cannot be a law, an obligation, it must be a spontaneous overflow. In consequence, Caso objects to the Kantian ethic:

> "The good is not a categorical imperative, a law of the reason, as Kant believed, but an enthusiasm. It does not order, it never orders, it inspires. It does not impose, it does not come from the outside, it springs from the intimacy of the conscience, from the sentiment that sinks its roots in the depths of spiritual existence. It is not the coercion of the pure reason, nor of exterior life, it is not deduced nor induced, nor is it obeyed; it is created. It is liberty, personality, divinity. It is, in one word, 'the supernatural which is felt as the most natural thing in the world'".[53]

At this point Caso seems aware of having departed from the bounds of philosophy. If so, it does not trouble him, he never once apologizes for it. His thoughts flow in these passages, which are essentially religious meditations, with a magnificent eloquence and lyricism which cannot be abstracted. Caso's subject here is Christian love:

> "Charity is neither demonstrated nor inferred. It is the fundamental religious and moral experience. It consists in going out of oneself, in giving of oneself to others, in flinging oneself with abandon without fear of exhausting oneself. This is in essence the Christian."[54]

Caso goes on to recognize that to live the existence of charity is to live in faith: "Faith is the verification that alongside of the world ruled by the natural law there is a world ruled by the supernatural law of love."[55]

But he denies that one believes first and then acts. He would subscribe to the Johannine "He that doeth the will shall know the doctrine...", for he says: "To believe is a direct consequence of doing the good. If you are not charitable, you will not be believers."[56]. "There is," he concludes, "only one law of the moral world, love; not biological love, profoundly interested, love which is, in short, hunger; the economy of the species if not of the individual. There are, in all strictness, no precepts in love, as Stirner holds. One loves because love is supernatural, because man is supernatural."[57].

Caso turns repeatedly to the figure of Jesus Christ for the illustration of what he means by "existence as charity": Among many quotations which might have been selected we have chosen this one--the closing words of the book:

> "We have a criterion to prove the superiority of Jesus Christ to all other human beings; the spirit (ánimo) of sacrifice, apotheosis and supreme negation of the personality. The more one sacrifices oneself, the freer one is. The entire universe is an effort to reach liberty, peace, affirmation without contradiction. All animate and inanimate beings desire to be free. And all are slaves, all obey a law extrinsic to their nature. Only Christ was able to realize his personality completely on the cross. That is why he is the model of men. That is why for centuries he has been sought and he has not yet been found; for to find him one must be like him!
>
> "That is why morality and human liberty are resumed in the imitation of Jesus Christ. We might well eliminate ethics as a speculative philosophy and say to men and to nations this single word: 'Imitate Jesus!'"[58].

We must call attention at this point to the fact that it is impossible not to notice a similarity between Caso's concept of charity as it is developed in "La Existencia Como Economía, Desinterés, y Caridad", and the

christian concept of love, or "agape" as it is developed by Anders Nygren.[59] Caso makes the same distinction between biological love--which is appetitive, acquisitive, a hunger--and charity,--which is utterly spontaneous and disinterested--as Nygren makes between "eros" and "agape". There is no doubt that at the heart of Caso's ethical philosophy we find a true Christian concept of love, "agape". Whether it rightly belongs there, in the setting in which Caso places it, is another question to which we shall have to return in our critical evaluation of Caso's thought.

Our exposition of Caso's ethics would not be complete simply with this presentation of the concept of "existence as charity" as we find it in his major philosophical work. Caso deals extensively, and in more rigidly philosophical fashion, with the epistemological basis of values in "El Acto Ideatorio", his principal epistemological work. Although these reflections do not touch the heart of his ethical thought as already given, we must consider them briefly. In "El Acto Ideatorio" Caso posits an intuition of values parallel to the intuition of rational principles by the intuitive reason. The organ of the intuition of values is the conscience. Acknowledging at this point the inspiration of Lotze he states: "Man possesses an organ (the moral conscience) which apprehends moral values; as he possesses in his reason a faculty which elevates him to the knowledge of principles. The recognition of values is like the recognition of principle, an ideational act which is absolutely primary and fundamental."[60] Caso recognizes three types of morality: the hedonistic, based on the idea of the dominance of the sentiments; the teleological, based on the idea of the dominance of the will; and the formalistic, based on the idea of the dominance of the reason. He feels the need of a morality which takes cognizance of the

characteristics of the whole person, which synthesizes all three types. This synthetic concept is the realization of the person. Acknowledging a point of departure in the ethics of Aristotle he seeks to relate this ethic of the realization of the person with the Christian morality as the imitation of Jesus:

> "Ethics cannot be founded except in the old Aristotelian concept which speaks to us of the realization of the human person. Only in the person can the hedonistic, volitional, and intellectual factors be posited. The secret of the moral transcendence of the gospel is in the realization of the human person, because Christianity institutes as the supreme principle of morality the imitation of a real person: Jesus Christ. For that reason it seems to us that Aristotle not only advocated an ethical voluntarism, as Brightman insinuates, but rather a superior system (which can only be personal) of the ethical activity."[61].

This exposition in "El Acto Ideatorio", written after "La Existencia como Economía, Desinterés, y Caridad" shows how Caso was moving to a personalist philosophy. It also shows how difficult it was for him to integrate the essentially religious concept of "existence as charity" with this philosophy, for at this point the spontaneity of the "supernatural" charity is forgotten for the more human notion of the realization of the person, in Aristotelian terms.

There is a very significant discussion in "El Acto Ideatorio" regarding the essential nature of values. After having posited the intuition of values as parallel to the intuition of essences through the phenomenological methodology, Caso, willing to grant an objective existence to the "essences", hesitates to grant the same objective existence to values.[62]. The reason for this hesitation is that Caso senses that to grant values an ontological status compromises human freedom. Writes Caso:

> "To divide philosophy into ontology and axiology, later to create, through objectivism, an ontology of axiology is absurd. Ontologism goes against the very notion of axiology which it subordinates completely to ontology denying thereby the very sphere of valuation whose apotheosis it sought to effect. The esthetic value would no longer be a creation of man but a subjection of man to value; and more serious, moral conduct would become pure fatalism which apprehends good if it apprehends it and intuits evil if it intuits it. History is converted into a pure ontology deprived of autonomy and liberty."[63].

On the other hand, Caso seems to be almost as hesitant to deny the ontological existence of values as he is to affirm it. He ends this discussion saying: "We prefer to conclude by adding to the antinomies of the Critique of Pure Reason, this other new one, because it seems to us that the arguments for and against objectivism are the object of a profound, perhaps interminable discussion."[64]. It must be noted that Caso, surveying the possible solutions to the question of the ontology of values recognized only three possible choices, namely, the old scholastic categories of realism, nominalism and conceptualism. None of these solutions seemed adequate to him. It is strange, since he was moving to the position of Christian personalism, that he did not see that values might be posited as having a real existence in the mind and will of God; the God of the Christian revelation, who is the author of the moral order, yet nevertheless respects the freedom of man.

A point of real interest in the moral reflections of Caso is his defense of Christian morality against the attack of Nietzsche and others who accused Christianity of being a morality for the weak, a criticism which was widely disseminated in Latin America where Christianity has been traditionally considered by many to be chiefly a woman's affair. To these criticisms of Christian morality as a slave morality Caso replies by saying

that it is Nietzsche, Stirner, and Guyau who are the weak ones. They are sickly types who are enamored of a vitality and energy they themselves did not possess. That is why they exalted the will to power, the overflow of vitality, the morality without obligation or sanction. And it is the Christian who is really strong. Caso speaks of "the explosion of force which the sentiment of charity implies, conquering the resistancesof egoism, springing from the soul of the strong."[65]. "He who is charitable," he declares, "cannot desire to be strong or happy because he already is, more than anyone else. Only those can wish for more power who are weak without ingenuousness, without charity, without humility."[66].

Writing in 1941 Caso reproduces the statements written in 1919 which we have just quoted because of their concordance with Max Scheler's remarks regarding the "ethics of resentment." With Scheler he takes this expression originated by Nietzsche to describe Christian morals, and turns the expression back on Nietzsche. He finds in the equalitarian ethics of Marxism another example of an "ethic of resentment." These criticisms of Marxism and of Nietzsche are an excellent example of the way in which Caso took his philosophy out of the classroom and make it an instrument of practical criticism.

4. The Christian Personalist

As no other prominent philosopher in the history of Hispanic American thought, Antonio Caso takes his stand on a philosophy of Christian personalism. There is no systematic exposition of personalism. We could not expect that of Caso; but it is clear that in his later years personalism becomes the dominant concept in his philosophy. There is no discontinuity in the thought of Caso because of the "lateness" of his personalism; on the contrary

the concepts of personalism, which he accepts largely under the influence of Max Scheler, seem to complete and unify his thoughts. As Eduardo García Maynez states:

> "The last two volumes of philosophy published by the master, La persona humana y el Estado totalitario (1941) and El peligro del hombre (1942), reveal the fidelity of the author to the concept of the world which he had advocated since his youth, but at the same time they signalize a new direction in his thought, as well as the frank and enthusiastic adherence to one of the principal currents of contemporary philosophy: personalism".67.

It is in these books that we find the most complete expression of Caso's concept of man and the most nearly definitive statements of his metaphysical position. Both of them were written, as the titles well indicate, in the desire to vindicate the claims of the person against the pretensions of the totalitarian state as well as other contemporary forces and trends which would deny the importance of the person. Caso's personalism is not merely a restatement of Scheler. As we have seen, Caso anticipated in a number of respects, the insights of the German thinker. His personalism, though it owes much to Scheler, is his own. It comes to flower at the time of the Second World War, when Caso was brooding deeply concerning the future and meaning of democracy. It is as if, under the pressure of the totalitarian perils, the significance of the person became more real to him, and because he was a philosopher, he saw the implications of this significance for the whole realm of thought.

Caso analyzes the significance of the person in the contrast between the person, the individual, and a thing--which he distinguishes as the three grades of being. The thing is "being without unity." It can be divided and its nature is in no way affected. The individual is "being with life";

that which cannot be divided without destroying its nature. Man is an individual; but he is more than an individual, he is a person. He is a person "by virtue of his moral and intellectual superiority."[68]. Man's reason makes him superior: "The human person opposes in his conscience, reason to instinct, to ignorance, to passion, to unreason..."[69]. But even more important, and at bottom, it is man's spiritual nature which makes him a person:

> "The mere psychic nature of man is not enough to define the concept of person. Above the psychic is the spiritual. Man is not only a psychic being he is also a spiritual being. He is a 'creator of values', according to the magnificent expression of Nietzsche."[70].

Man's superiority is such that it gives him a dignity and value above all other beings. Caso was fond of quoting the words of Kant: "Things have a price; persons, dignity." He also quoted Scheler at this point:

> "The human person--according to Scheler--is in himself a higher and more sublime being than all life and its values; than the whole of nature; he is the being in whom the psychic liberated itself to the service of life, purified itself, and ascended to the dignity of spirit; 'spirit at whose service life now enters, both in an objective and in a subjective sense.'"[71].

This emphasis on the supreme value of the person is raised to an ontological plane:

> "Ontologically and axiologically, nothing surpasses the person. To be personal is to assume the supreme manifestation of that which is real. Nature had one end: the person. Culture can only be conceived as the work of persons. God is a person."[72].

Human ideals and values have as their final point of reference the person of God:

> "The human ideal cannot be satisfied except with the postulate of a Person, who, if active, should be omnipotent; if loving, should be absolutely disinterested; if intelligent, should comprehend all knowledge in a single thought; if free, should be completely autonomous; if holy, should be holiness itself. This person whom the human ideal postulates, this synthesis of being and the ideal, is God."[73].

At some points Caso identifies this ideal person not only with God but with Jesus Christ as the God Man. Using the word humanism as synonymous with personalism he writes:

> "Humanism links itself closely and intimately with the Christian religion and its mysteries. We Christians revere the God Man. Our religion is the only one which loves and obeys a God incarnated in the human clay! This is why there is a fund of undeniable, notorious and splendid humanism in the claims of the Christian dogmas. The pure cult of "humanity" as August Comte understood it is false, it is a profane thing, ultimately profane; but Jesus Christ is God in human form. Behold here the profound meaning of humanism."[74].

This central principle of the value of the human person guides Caso in his social and cultural criticisms, in synthesis with his earlier thoughts of existence as "economy, disinterestedness, and charity." The error of both individualistic liberalism, which in its extreme form is anarchism, and of socialism, in its extreme form, communism, is that both of them violate man's nature as a spiritual being and would reduce man to the status of an individual or of a thing. Individualism is sheer egoism; it declares the individual to be the only reality. "It says, I conceive of the state as a means to my pleasure; society was made for my felicity. My good is that which I want to have, if they do not give it to me I will take it."[75]. Communism is also egoism, but the egoism of the collectivity. It makes of the collectivity a biological unity, like a beehive, subordinating the individual to a mere part of the whole. Life on the biological plane is always

egotistical and can lead to nothing but struggle: "Life says with Hobbes, 'man is the wolf of man'; with Darwin 'struggle for life'; with Nietzsche, 'not contentment, but more power'."[76].

A proper understanding of man, according to Caso, leads neither to individualism nor to communism but to a society of free persons. Man needs the community; "human spirituality cannot be realized in the isolation of the psyche."[77]. "The isolated individual is impotent. Egoists cannot achieve the salvation of anyone, not even their own salvation."[78]. But neither must the person be subordinated to the community. "Neither the individual nor the community;" Caso concludes, "but a society based on justice. That is, THE MORAL UNION OF MEN, respectful of values."[79]. "Above tyrannical communities and above individuals who think themselves absolute, there is something else, to wit: THE HUMAN SPIRITUAL SOCIETY COMPOSED OF PERSONS."[80].

This understanding of man as a person presupposes freedom, for to deny liberty is to deny personality. In the words of Caso: "Personality is an individuality which knows itself; to be a person is to be a master of oneself, that is, to be the cause of one's own action. Personality supposes liberty."[81]. "Civil and political liberties are mere corollaries of our human personality."[82]. Liberty is not to be understood in an absolute sense, for that is an absurdity, but it is a relative thing, yet so important that it "fills our existence with meaning."[83].

In his last volume, "El Peligro del Hombre," Caso seems to forget his previous rejection of the Kantian ethic and turns to Kant in order to relate the concept of liberty to the moral law, as he writes:

"The entire moral process of personalism (If one is a

> person one must act with conduct which may be made a universal law) carries us to the affirmation of human liberty; because it would have no sense to tell men that they should act respecting the law of our own dignity if we were not free. The reason implies liberty. Liberty only submits itself to reason. He who understands understands that he is rational and free in so far as he is a person."[84].

There is one further emphasis, already touched upon in part, which Caso derives from his understanding of man, and which he develops in his basic criticism of our contemporary culture as a whole. This emphasis is the distinction between the ends of the individual and the ends of the person. The end of the individual is "to have"; the end of the person "is to be." The great and prophetic significance of Nietzsche lies in his having understood and clarified this distinction. He quotes Nietzche's words: "Individualism looks constantly toward its own advantage (hacia el propio sujeto). Personalism desires to be something; individualism desires to have something."[85]. The fundamental ill of our contemporary civilization, the ill of which individualism and communism are but symptoms, lies in our craving for things, our desire to have rather than to be. We have been seduced by our technological advances, by our increasing comforts. Things havebeen elevated to the place of supreme value. In this process man has lost the moral consciousness of his own being. The chaos and darkness of our day are the result of this fundamental error. This criticism is developed in numerous passages. Perhaps one of the clearest is this one,--quoting the words of St. Augustine, "If thou dost love earth, earth thou art; if thou dost love heaven, thou art heaven; and if thou dost love God, thou art God," Caso declares:

> "The evil of contemporary civilization is that it has cleaved to the earth, it has embraced it in a fatal and retroactive ecstasy. Thereby persons deny their own being, and by the practice of an axiology which lacks philosophical validity,

> put supreme values at the service of inferior ones; this 'transmutes the scale of values', as Nitezsche would say: it thrusts the whole of civilization toward the summit of negation; and not only upsets the march of contemporary history in its organic development but it also prepares for future generations a certain erroneous and criminal influence, which they will have to rectify some day, placing the intrinsic ends of true knowledge in accord with true love."[86].

Elsewhere, after a similar analysis, he makes it clear that this task of rectification, or repairing the fatal axiological and ontological error of our civilization is a basic preoccupation of personalism. "This," states Caso, "is what personalism undertakes, to recover being over against having, within the ontological concern which characterizes contemporary philosophy. Our ambition is to recover true being, both in metaphysics and in ethics."[87]. This recovery, however, is basically not a philosophical movement, although it is that, to be sure, but a religious movement. Caso does not say this, but it is the clear inference of the passage above, as it is of this one:

> "The person transcends the social and the political because his destiny, that is to say the 'meaning' of his existence can only be resolved in the direction of his essence, on the plane of absolute spirituality. 'Fecisti nos ad te,' says St. Augustine 'et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.' Yes, it is true; because the human personality cannot find repose in a finite love; thus he seeks, beyond the love of an ideal person, the love of the person who is pure love and pure abnegation. That is why this prayer is addressed to God as Thou. God is the eternal THOU, the person who synthesizes the fullness of being."[88].

The recovery of the person, Caso is trying to tell us, is impossible apart from a rediscovery of our primary relationship to God.

C. CRITICISM AND CONCLUSION

1. His Influence as a Christian Philosopher

It is still too soon after the death of Antonio Caso to estimate the

full measure of his greatness and significance. Forty years have passed, however, since Caso began his struggle against positivism and for the recovery of spiritual values. Certain conclusions can be stated regarding the place of Caso in the cultural history of Mexico. No one can deny to Antonio Caso the role of being the most influential figure both in the revolt against the sway of positivism and in the dissemination of the new ideas which have come to take the place of that discredited philosophy in the culture of the nation. In the words of Eduardo García Máynez:

> "It is true that the defeat of the 'official philosophy' (i.e. positivism) was not due exclusively to Antonio Caso, but to a select group of writers, philosophers, and artists; but it is also true that his was the principal role in that struggle and that, once the victory was obtained, it was he who was best prepared to realize the essential task of restoration. The collapse of Mexican positivism was inevitable, and sooner or later would have occurred even without the intervention of Caso; but the constructive and restorative labor could have been undertaken only by someone like him. To consummate such a task philosophical talent was not enough; there was needed the zeal of an apostle and the eloquence of a Master."[89].

Caso's influence has been profoundly seminal. More than anyone else he helped to awaken the philosophical consciousness which today is so vitally stirring the cultural life of Mexico.[90]. With the exception of the exiled Spanish philosophers now laboring in Mexico all the significant thinkers in contemporary Mexico were, at one time, pupils of Caso. To be sure, Caso has been working in an historic hour. The influences stemming from Europe, which have always had a decisive effect in Hispanic American culture, the influence of Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset of Spain; of Bergson, Boutroux, Maritain, Gilson, Mounier etc., of France; of Dilthey, Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger of Germany; the contemporary influence of Soren Kierkegaard (to name but a few of the leading contemporary influences); these have been

influences which have underlain the work of Caso and made his own leadership so fruitful. But this is not to detract from the work of Caso to whom may be applied, just as truly as to Alejandro Korn, concerning whom they were written, these words of Francisco Romero:

> "...in this corner of America, he has lived this stage in the history of ideas with a strange similitude, which at times reaches identity with respect to the European thinkers. He has not been their disciple, nor much less their echo, but their peer."[71].

Perhaps no other man in the cultural history of Hispanic America has been so influential in his own lifetime as Antonio Caso, the nearest parallel being Alejandro Korn himself.

How is the influence of Caso being continued today? There is little doubt but that the acceptance of the new German spiritualist currents, which Caso did so much to transmit, is more wide-spread today than ever before. For those, however, who, like the present writer, believe that the noblest and most profound insights of Caso stemmed from Christian inspirations, it must be a matter of profound regret to observe, that, with the exception of Oswaldo Robles, a scholastic, not one among the prominent pupils of Caso continues in the Christian orientation of Caso's thought. José Romano Muñoz, Samuel Ramos, and Eduardo García Maynez, for example, the three most prominent philosophers in present day Mexico who have turned their attention in particular to the problems of ethics and the concept of man, have all veered in the direction of N. Hartmann's atheistic formulation of objectivist ethics. This writer believes, nevertheless, that as students of philosophy return to explore the immense riches of the thought of Caso they will be forced to reconsider the strength and significance of the Christian

heritage.[92] This, we believe, constitutes the greatest significance of Caso for the future. Men will be unable to judge the work of Caso without confronting the fact of Christian faith.

If this be true, then it is important for us to consider the role of Caso as an interpreter of Christianity. It is profoundly significant, first of all, that for the first time in more than one hundred years in Mexican history the man most universally accepted by the cultured sector of the population as the most eminent philosopher in the nation is an avowed Christian. Since Caso's influence extends beyond Mexico to all of Hispanic America this is significant for the spiritual culture of the entire continent as well. (José Vasconcelos, after Caso, Mexico's leading twentieth century philosopher, is also an acknowledged Christian, although far more heteredox in his ideology). For those who believe that the moral and spiritual salvation of Hispanic America lies in a true Christian reformation, the importance of the fact that "the first philosopher of Mexico" found his real inspiration in Christianity, unashamedly confessed his allegiance to Christ, literally made himself an apostle of the faith, can hardly be exaggerated.

2. An Evaluation of Caso's Christian Insights

Because Caso takes his stand as a Christian philosopher, however, it is necessary to consider the adequacy of his interpretations of Christianity, as well as his soundness as a philosopher. In such an attempt the presuppositions of the critic are necessarily brought into play. This writer's first word of criticism must be one of praise, in all honesty, for the Christian inspiration contained in Caso's writings. There are numerous passages which it is impossible to judge purely on their merits as philosophy. As somewhat

similar passages in Pascal or Kierkegaard, their primary value is one of Christian "edification."[93] There is an unmistakable vein of pure Christian metal in the mine of Caso's writings. This is perhaps most evident in his exposition of "existence as charity."

But there are also serious weaknesses in the philosophy of Caso which, in this writer's judgment, seriously compromise the effectiveness of his Christian witness. These weaknesses are undoubtedly related to Caso's obvious lack of grounding in Christian theology, however competent he may have been in the field of general philosophy. At bottom, they can be traced to a lack of awareness of the fundamental difference between God and man, to his absence of a genuine recognition of man as sinner. This is not merely a theological weakness, it has most important philosophical consequences. It means that Caso, in spite of unmistakable and tremendously significant Christian insights tends to resolve the problems of the destiny of man in the direction of an Aristotelian ontologism; to betray his Christian personalism and existentialism in the direction of a Hellenistic rationalism.

The absence of an adequate understanding of man as sinner reflects itself at many points in the philosophy of Caso. Three points of weakness may be singled out for special consideration: first, the absence of a concept of revelation in his theory of knowledge; secondly, the compromising of the ontological significance of the human person; and thirdly, the ambiguities of his ethical position.

In Caso's theory of knowledge he posits a power of intuition in both a Bergsonian and Husserlian sense. He is quite sure of the power of the human mind to "intuit" essences. He hesitates to posit the intuitive knowledge of

values in the same absolute sense as the knowledge of essences, questioning the objective existence of values. At the end, however, he seems to identify the essences of Husserl with the Platonic ideas without real qualification, implicitly accepting the ontology of values.[94] Basically, his concept of intuition is a concept which assumes man's capacity to elevate himself to an immediacy with the absolute. That is why Caso rejects Berdiaeff's criticism of the Renaissance spirit. "His effort to reclaim the religious meaning of history is excellent," Caso says of Berdiaeff, "but his aversion toward the heroic spirit of humanism cannot be accepted without rectification...we have not abandoned the faith of the men of the Renaissance."[95] Caso misses Berdiaeff's point, which is that fundamentally the "heroic spirit" of the Renaissance is irreligious, in the Christian sense, and therefore incompatible with the recovery of the consciousness of "the religious meaning of history." It is irreligious because it posits an absolute confidence in the powers of man. Caso misses Berdiaeff's point because he shares this confidence. Luis Recaséns Siches, one of the ablest of the exiled Spanish philosophers in Mexico, speaks of Caso's "transcendental humanism."[96] In the strictest sense Caso's humanism cannot be called transcendental. He conceives of man's reason as wholly autonomous; man's intuitive reasoning is an immanental movement toward the absolute.[97] But the Christian knows of no way, from man's side, to bridge the gap between immanence and transcendence. That is why the Christian view of knowledge, as this writer understands it, is built on the assumption of God's self-revelation. Caso's philosophy is inadequately Christian, and inadequately philosophical, in so far as it lacks a concept of revelation. He speaks of the belief in the existence of God as based on faith, and in his development of "existence as charity" as something "supernatural" he is assuming revela-

tion. But his philosophy makes no room for faith, except as intuition, and intuition is nowhere described in any except immanental terms.

The second point of inadequacy in Caso's interpretation of Christian philosophy which we wish to stress is found in his tendency to posit an ultimate "union" with God, thus betraying at the end the insight into the ontological value of the human person. Perhaps one of the clearest illustrations of this process is found in this statement:

> "Beside the religious tradition, which conceives of the person as a reflection of the divine, as his image, occidental Europe possesses the result of the scientific movement, which sees in man the last fruit of the evolution of the biological species.
>
> "In any event, the human person synthesizes the cosmic evolution and gives meaning to the interpretation of the work of culture. Nature and culture have two centers: God and man; God who constitutes the final end (fin último), and humanity which is a constant development toward the divine person."[98]

Along the same line as that quotation is Caso's appropriation of the Aristotelian notion of the realization of the person, which is really wedded, in Thomistic fashion, to the notion of realization in God,--God as the supreme object of love and as the final end. (cf. quotations cited on pp.255) of this section). This is not, the writer believes, true Christian personalism. True Christian personalism never forgets the qualitative distinction between God and man. It speaks not of union but of communion with God. It respects, for all eternity, both the individuality of man and the sovereignty of God. Every attempt to resolve the problem of the destiny of man in the direction of the revival of the Thomistic ontologism, with the implied revival of the medieval structure, runs the risk of betraying the very values Christian personalism stands for both here and in the

hereafter.

The third point of weakness derived from Caso's failure to grasp the distinction between God and man, and man's status as a sinner, is the ambiguity of his ethical thought taken as a whole. In Caso's description of "existence as charity," there is a true description of the work of Christian love. Caso, undoubtedly influenced by Pascal, rightly describes this love as "supernatural", Caso is also on Christian ground when he makes existence as charity, which he so eloquently describes, synonymous with the imitation of Christ. But this existence as charity cannot be "natural" to man unless, as Caso suggests, almost casually and without elaborating, man is really "supernatural".[99] This is a contention that Caso does not and cannot sustain without considering the question of Christian grace, which he does not do. In calling man "supernatural" Caso seemsto forget for the moment all he has said concerning "existence as economy." In Christian ethics, side by side with the description of the supernatural ethic of love, "agape", there is the promise of a supernatural grace. The "imitation of Christ" in the true Christian sense does not mean that Christ is the "ideal" or "model" man and is therefore to be emulated by human effort; it means that the life of grace, the ethic of redemption, as Berdiaeff calls it, is such as we find exemplified in the life of Jesus Christ. To speak of the Christian ethic of love without speaking of the grace of God through Jesus Christ is to neglect the power which makes the Christian ethic relevant.

The effect of Caso's failure to recognize his description of Christian ethics as the ethics of redeemed man and not the ethics of man as a sinner, is that Caso often lapses into a Kantian ethic[100] when this seems more relevant, and at other times insists on the application of the Christian ethic

in a Tolstoyan manner.[101] We have just noted his appeal to Aristotelian ethics. Thus we see in Caso's thought, when analyzed with care, three types of ethics, unrelated to each other: First, a Christian ethic of love, "agape"; an ethic of pure disinterestedness, which has no "end" or "value" in view, not even that of "union with God", but expresses itself with utter spontaneity. Then there is a Thomistic ethic whose end is the realization of the human person in God, and in which conduct is guided by the imitation of Jesus as a "model". And finally, there is a Kantian ethic, which is a rationalist ethic based on the categorical imperative so to live that our every act may be made a universal law. Perhaps it is fortunate that because of the aphoristic nature of Caso's writings, the ambiguity which comes from the advocacy of these three positions is not apparent. It is the Christian ethic, which he defends with greatest eloquence and to which he gives the greatest amount of attention, which is to be identified as the real ethic of Caso.

Because Caso hoped for a moral regeneration through the spirit of Christianity it is proper to inquire what program Caso had to achieve this. Specifically, it is right to ask what place Caso made for the church in the spiritual recovery which he desired. The answer would seem to be that Caso did not really conceive of any function for the church in this task, expected the renewal to take place through independent work, such as his own. Again, Caso's failure to reckon with the nature of man as sinner is responsible for his failure to come to grips with the question of the need for the church, for Caso leaves it out of his considerations altogether. Caso was the enemy of any church. His attitude toward the Roman Catholic church was one of firm but courteous opposition to its "official philosophy" of scho-

lasticism and of personal aloofness to it. He was opposed to the political interests of the Catholic church and his judgment of the colonial Roman Catholic culture is a negative one. Gaos has described his Christianity as "free from all confessional links". Caso seems not to have considered the possible role of protestantism in Mexico. He himself describes his position as a christian in these words:

> "To us what seems reasonable is not precisely the orthodox catholic, and dogmatic faith, but the faith of the heterodox who, rejecting fixed and absurd dogma, tried timidly, discreetly, to harmonize the RAISONS DU COEUR with the rational principles of knowledge, the knowledge of science; and since we do not pretend to IMPOSE our belief upon anyone, we keep it to ourselves, convinced of the absurdity of a universal dogmatic religion. We do not confess any religious communion, nor do we make the apology of any creed. We believe and we affirm what we believe, according to the liberty of our personal conviction."[102].

In a passage in Caso's description of "existence as charity" it may be inferred that Caso believed both Catholicism and Protestantism to be merely historical expressions which Christianity has taken and that the future may see the development of a religious expression completely free from historical encumberances, a Christianity of pure spirituality, evidently not needing any organized expressions. He writes:

> "Catholicism is historic Christianity, political, organizer and saviour of Europe and its culture in the middle ages; the heir in the temporal of the latin juridical form, a UNIVERSAL SOCIETY OF MINDS AND HEARTS, Christianity of Peter. Protestantism is Germanic Christianity, individualist, wise energetic, and moral, adequate to modern thought; the Christianity of free inquiry and INTENSIVE SPIRITUALITY. But still another Christianity is possible, more perfectly essential, a religion in which all that does not form a part of its intimate nature, has

> disappeared, a religion disentangled from the alluvion of accessory accretions. The history of humanity is purifying the content of Christianity, turning it more spiritual each day, more profound and exclusively religious. All contingent or accidental action disappears, and there remains only the irreducible essence. Christianity newest and eternal, solely triumphant; Christianity of John with his two favorite teachings; the love of neighbor and eternal life; that is to say, the three divine virtues which are only one virtue, for as St. John says, "He who loves not knows not God, for God is love."[103].

With all due allowances for Caso's exuberant rhetoric it seems evident that Caso conceived of the ideal Christianity as being outside of both Protestantism and Catholicism, and outside of any possible "ecumenical" synthesis of the two. The "newest" Christianity for which he hoped, it appears, is one which would not have any historical expression in a church, but would be a religion of pure spirituality. Caso, who recognized so clearly that "human spirituality cannot be realized in the isolation of the psyche", failed to recognize the need of sinful man for the nurture and association of the church, failed to recognize the place of the church as the "Body of Christ" but hoped for some disembodied expression of Christianity.

We believe that the movement toward the apprehension, in life and in thought, of the spiritual values and realities of Christianity which Hispanic America so greatly needs cannot be realized apart from the effective influence of the Church of Jesus Christ. And further, that the Christian personalism which is advocated in the thought of Caso at its best, is bound up with the future of the churches which represent the Reformation emphasis of Christianity rather than with the church which is still attempting to revive the medieval structure which has had such unfortunate effects in the spiritual life of Hispanic America.

3. A Final Word

It is impossible, however, to end this exposition of the thought of Antonio Caso, the Christian moralist and personalist par excellence in the history of Hispanic American philosophy on a note of negative criticism. No Christian can fail to be grateful for the Christian sincerity of Caso or for his fidelity to his spiritual mission as he felt it. His theological weaknesses can be largely explained by his lack of training in Christian theology. The criticisms this writer has made are made as from within the same family of those who profess the name of Christ, and are not meant to constitute a repudiation; much less an "excommunication" of this noble warrior of the faith. Among the Christian thinkers and among the philosophers of Hispanic America, the name of Caso, in the opinion of this writer, is the brightest which has yet appeared.

D. Footnotes

Chapter V

1. Ramos, Historia de la Filosofía en México. p. 137.

2. Caso, Antonio, El Problema de México y la Ideología Nacional. México, Editorial Cultura, 1924. p. 59.

3. Centro de Estudios Filosóficos de la Universidad Nacional autónoma de México, Homenaje a Antonio Caso. México. Editorial Stylo, 1947. p. 22.

4. Ibid., p. 190.

5. Ibid., p. 191.

6. Caso, Antonio, Discurso a la Nación Mexicana. México. Librería de Porrúa Hnos., 1922. p. 68.

7. Ibid., p. 71.

8. Ibid., p. 229.

9. Caso, Antonio, Doctrinas e Ideas. México. Andres Botas e hijo, Sucesor Editores, 1925. pp. 18-19.

10. Caso, Discursos a la Nación Mexicana. p. 191.
    Note: While this criticism is clear, it is evident in the essay on the moral philosophy of Hostos that Caso is not altogether dependable as a critic, for another passage in the same essay is in clear contradiction with it: "One must not let himself be seduced by those who pretend to build morality on scientific bases, however worthy and conscientious may be their notions. Science cannot offer us anything except relative findings, never norms necessary for action, and only by virtue of necessary principles is it possible to obligate beings with reason, such as men." (Ibid. p. 192). Caso does not make clear what the difference between "the fatal laws of the world" to which he objects, and "the necessary principles" which he believes are necessary is; indeed he seems wholly unaware of a contradiction. This writer does not see any difference. Obviously, both criticisms cannot be equally valid. In one of them he objects to the rule of a determinism in the moral order, in the second he pleads for it.

11. Ibid., p. 192.

12. Caso, Antonio, Historia y Antología del Pensamiento Filosófico. p. 23.

13. Caso, Antonio, La Persona Humana y el Estado Totalitario. México. Universidad National Autónoma. 1944. p. 50.

14. Ibid., p. 59.

15. Ibid., p. 51.

16. Ibid., p. 50.

17. Quoted in Homenaje a Caso. p. 70.

18. Ibid., p. 71.

19. Ibid., p. 45.

20. Caso, Antonio, El Pensamiento de América. pp. 10-11.

21. Caso, Antonio, Ensayos Críticos y Polémicos. México, D. F. Editorial México Moderno, 1922. p. 52.

22. Caso, Antonio, La Existencia como Economía, Disinterés, y Caridad. México. Ediciones de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1943. (First published in 1919). p. 18.

23. Caso, Historia y Antología del Pensamiento Filosófico. p. 112.

24. Caso, La Existencia como Economía, Disinterés, y Caridad. p. 75.

25. Ibid., p. 87.

26. Ibid., p. 91.

27. Homenaje a Caso, p. 65.

28. Ramos, Samuel, "Antonio Caso, Filósofo Romántico". Filosofía y Letras. Vol. XI, April-June, 1946. p. 193.

29. Homenaje a Caso, p. 130.

30. Caso, Antonio, El Peligro del Hombre. México. Editorial Stylo, 1942. p. 165. cf. Berdiaeff, Nicolas, The Meaning of History, p. 132. (Quoted from a translation of the Spanish version).

31. Note: Referring to Rousseau, Caso states: "There are some of us who feel a singular affection for him. There are still some of us left in the world who are incorrigible romantics." Doctrinas e Ideas, p. 158.

32. Caso, Ensayos Críticos y Polémicos, p. 35.

33. Caso, La Existencia como Economía, Desinterés, y Caridad, p. 76. The Spanish language does not have the word "insight". Perhaps Caso might have been willing to call intuition "insight" instead of identifying it with "sight."

34. Caso, La Persona Humana y el Estado Totalitario, p. 52.

35. Homenaje a Caso, pp. 192-193.

36. Caso, La Existencia como Economía, Disinterés, y Caridad, p. 44.

37. Ibid., p. 45.

38. Ibid.; p. 101.

39. Ibid., p. 102.

40. Caso, Principios de Estética, México. Publicaciones de la SRIA. de Educación, 1925. p. 64.

41. Ibid., p. 65.

42. Caso, Principios de Estética, p. 102.

43. Ibid., p. 125.

44. Ibid., p. 127.

45. Ibid., p. 220.

46. Note: The word "sentir" has no equivalent in English. It indicated both feeling and knowing. It is equivalent to the French "sentiment".

47. Homenaje a Caso, p. 37.

48. Caso, Doctrinas e Ideas, p. 87.

49. There is undoubtedly a Pascalian influence at this point, but the way in which Caso develops this is largely his own. He quotes Pascal's thought "all bodies, etc". (792 Everyman; La Existencia Como Economía, Desinterés, etc. p. 153; 793 Brunschvig Fr.)

50. Caso, La Existencia como Economía, Disinterés, y Caridad, p. 154.

51. Ibid., p. 153.

52. Ibid., p. 127.

53. Ibid., p. 154.

54. Ibid., p. 155.

55. Ibid., p. 160.

56. Ibid., p. 161.

57. Ibid., p. 165.

58. Ibid., p. 198.

59. Cf. A. Nygren, Eros and Agape.

60. Caso, Antonio, El Acto Ideatorio. México, Librería de Porrúa Hnos. y Cía, 1934. p. 115.

61. Ibid., p. 152.

62. Note: Both in "El Acto Ideatorio" and in his exposition "La Filosofía de Husserl", Caso reproduces Husserl's demonstration of the objectivity of the essences by means of the illustration of the triangle, and of color. He accepts the existence of an "ideal" triangle, and an "ideal" red. "Triangularity and redness," he states, "are nowhere and never have been nor ever will be, and yet are always as the inescapable ground of all triangles and all reds." "There is offered to us", he concludes from Husserl's demonstration, "an ideal world of meanings, with its own structure. This is the eidetic world, basis and ground of the factual." (Ibid., p. 96.)

63. Note: This is a contrast to José Romano Muñoz, Eduardo García Maynez, and Samuel Ramos, three former students of Caso and leading contemporary Mexican philosophers, who accept without reserve the objective nature of values. Ibid., p. 168.

64. Ibid., p. 172.

65. Caso, La Existencia como Economía, Desinterés y Caridad. p. 155.

66. Caso, La Persona Humana en el Estado Totalitario, p. 81.

67. Homenaje a Caso, p. 53.

68. Caso, La Persona Humana en el Estado Totalitario, pp. 187-188.

69. Caso, Antonio, El Peligro del Hombre y el Estado Totalitario, p. 46.

70. Caso, La Persona Humana en el Estado Totalitario, p. 189.

71. Ibid., p. 207.

72. Ibid., p. 205.

73. Ibid., p. 190.

74. Caso, El Peligro del Hombre, pp. 143-144.

75. Caso, La Persona Humana y el Estado Totalitario, p. 191.

76. Ibid., p. 193.

77. Ibid., p. 189.

78. Ibid., p. 100.

79. Ibid., p. 192.

80. Ibid., p. 193. These words are italicized by Caso.

81. Ibid., p. 218.

82. Ibid., p. 209.

83. Ibid., p. 209.

84. Note: The insertion in parenthesis belongs to Caso. El Peligro del Hombre, p. 49.

85. Caso, La Persona Humana y el Estado Totalitario, p. 238.

86. Ibid., p. 236.

87. Ibid., p. 203.

88. Ibid., p. 200. Love of God in this context is not the "agape" which we find in the passages on "existence as charity" but a synthesis of eros and agape in the fashion of St. Augustine, i.e. the medieval "caritos" cf. Nygren, Eros and Agape. Vol. II.

89. Homenaje a Caso, p. 44.

90. For evidence of the vitality of Mexican philosophy today confer "Cinco Años de Filosofía en México." by J. Gaos, in Filosofía y Letras, Vol. X. No. 20, pp. 145-165.

91. Aznar, Luis; Romero, Francisco; Vassallo, Engel, Alejandro Korn, Buenos Aires, Editorial Lozada, 1940. p. 35.

92. This is apparent in the lectures on the thought of Caso which have been published in the "omnibus" volume, Homenaje a Caso. Every one of the writers represented in the volume has been forced to recognize the christian elements of Caso's thought.

93. The writer has marked many of them as source material for future sermons.

94. His last clear statement on the subject is the one quoted on p. 12. Cf. also "This act of the mind whereby, by means of the spiritual intuition we elevate ourselves to the εἶδος , to the Idea, as Plato said, is the distinctive quality of the human intelligence, it is the ideational act." Caso, La Existencia como Economía, Disinterés, y Caridad. p. 83.

95. Caso, La Persona Humana y el Estado Totalitario. pp. 162-165.

96. Homenje a Caso, p. 291.

97. Caso rejects the Scholastic arguments for the existence of God, basing the belief in God on faith. (Cf. La Existencia como Economía, Desinterés y Caridad. p. 195; also Homenaje a Caso, pp. 162-167). But Caso at no point relates faith to his theory of knowledge. The only possible inference is that he thought of it as a type of intuition.

98. Caso, La Persona Humana y el Estado Totalitario, p. 206.

99. Cf. footnote 57.

100. Cf. pp. 27-28 of this section for example.

101. "The doctrine of Tolstoy is the systematic enunciation of the final verses of the Fifth Chapter of the Gospel according to St. Matthew." (La Existencia como Economía, Desinterés y Caridad. p. 170).

102. Homenaje a Caso, p. 166.
Note: This quotation is taken from a polemic Caso sustained against a leading Mexican scholastic Alfonso Junco in the pages of one of Mexico's leading newspapers. This polemic carried on for a period of eight months and forced Caso to make explicit his objections to scholasticism and Catholicism. The above quotation is taken from Juan Hernández Luna's report of the polemic which appears in Homenaje a Caso, pp. 161-167.

103. Caso, La Existencia como Economía, Desinterés, y Caridad, p. 188.

CHAPTER VI

JOSE VASCONCELOS (1879-)

A. The Importance of Vasconcelos

There are those who would question the philosophical importance of José Vasconcelos, as this writer himself has been tempted to do. Vasconcelos seems to lack completely in that objectivity and balance which we are prone to associate with the work of the philosopher. Even his judgments as a historian of philosophy appear to be colored by his political prejudices and personal biases. He seems never to weigh and consider his words, but writes in a white heat, and then lacks the patience and self-discipline to correct what he writes. In contrast to Alejandro Korn, of Argentina, whose ideal it was not to say one word which was ambiguous or superfluous, and who left us a very few written works but of uniformly superlative quality of style, Vasconcelos has been an incredibly prolific writer but much of what he says is of inferior quality. If one were to judge Vasconcelos solely by his most careless and prejudiced statements he could safely be dismissed as an insignificant eccentric. Dr. E. S. Brightman, who has contributed an appreciative study of the philosophy of Vasconcelos to the journal "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research" rightly observes: "The Anglo-Saxon reader, noting the almost vituperative denunciations of opposing views in which Vasconcelos indulges, may easily be tempted to write him off as a mere romanticist, luxuriating in his emotions..."[1] Brightman thinks that this would be "quite unjust", as indeed it would be, for while Vasconcelos is certainly a romanticist, he is not a "mere romanticist" but possibly "one of the most constructive and versatile thinkers that Latin

America has produced,"[2]. to quote again the authority of Dr. Brightman.

In spite of his obvious defects there are two very important reasons why José Vasconcelos deserves a place in this study as one of the four leading philosophers in the Twentieth Century in Hispanic America. The first of these is that Vasconcelos is the only Latin America thinker who has endeavored to construct a complete philosophical system. In sheer metaphysical audacity, in scope and magnitude of effort, no other Hispanic American writer can approximate what Vasconcelos has done. There is an element of genius in the creativity of Vasconcelos which cannot be denied, however one may differ with his conclusions. In 1916, during a peaceful interlude in his activities in the Mexican revolution, Vasconcelos published his first creative philosophic work "Pitágoras, o una Teoría de Ritmo", in which he promised to elaborate a new system of philosophy based on the esthetic ideas sketched in the essay. During the next twenty years, in the midst of what may well be the most turbulent career in the history of philosophers, Vasconcelos worked on the elaboration of his system. "El Monismo Estético", a long essay which gives its name to the system and gives a brief preview of it, was published in 1918. Not until 1929 was he able to bring out the "Tratado de Metafísica". The "Etica" followed in 1932 and the completing volume, the "Estética" was published in 1935. In a later volume, 1943, Vasconcelos summarizes his system, this time calling it "El Realismo Científico," and in another he develops further his epistemological position which he calls "Lógica Orgánica," (1945). Much has to be said for a man who not only promises a new philosophical system, but who makes good on his promise in a brilliant fashion. Brightman is right when, after acknowledging some of the obvious defects of Vasconcelos,[3]. he declares: "These defects

expression of Christianity, every Christian must rejoice in the tributes he pays to Christ.

B. Politician and Philosopher[6].

José Vasconcelos was born in the city of Oaxaca, in southern México in 1879. Soon after his birth the Vasconcelos family moved to northern Mexico as José's father became an employee in the Mexican customs, and was sent to a border city. While the father was stationed in the customs house at Rio Piedras, José attended the American grammar school across the border in the town of Eagle Pass. His early experiences in Texas account for his excellent command of English, (a language in which he read Plato Jowett's translation and the oriental philosophers). It may also account for the beginning of his prejudice against the United States and all things Anglo-Saxon, as Mexican children on the border were continually exposed to the cry of "greaser" and were frequently made to feel inferior.

Antonio Castro Leal, a contemporary Mexican scholar, has gone through the vast immensity of Vasconcelos' writings to make a selection for a Vasconcelos anthology. Castro Leal lists the following influences as the most decisive on the thought of Vasconcelos, and in this order: Plotinus, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, the Upanishads. Castro Leal should have included the most important influence of all---that of his mother. The picture Vasconcelos gives us in his autobiography of the character of his mother and of his relations with her leave no doubt that it is from his mother that he derives his esthetic sensitivity and his tendency to mysticism which lie at the very root of his philosophizing. A remarkably devout and pious Catholic, she made no attempt either to regiment his life or his

should not blind American scholars to the fact that Vasconcelos has for a generation been writing philosophy in the great tradition, although independent of bondage to any school, including Thomism--and in what may justly be called the grand style."4.

The second reason why Vasconcelos is singled out in this study for detailed consideration is that to a greater degree than any other Hispanic American philosopher, not excluding Antonio Caso, Vasconcelos attempts to synthesize his philosophy with the traditional dogmas of the Christian faith. This writer believes that Vasconcelos does greater violence, by far, to the central insights of Christianity, than Caso, in spite of the fact that Caso never had the dogmatic pretensions of Vasconcelos. Be that as it may, the fact that Vasconcelos takes his stand as a Christian philosopher adds greatly to his interest for us. Outside of the strictly scholastic circles, and after almost a century in which Hispanic American philosophers have been either ignoring or condemning the importance of the contribution of Christianity to philosophy, it is refreshing to find such an expression as this:

> "After the formulation of the Christian message, philosophy is no longer the same; now no one can think without feeling the influence of the greatest revelation conceded to our species. For this reason every impartial thinker divides philosophy into two fundamental stages, the pagan philosophy of antiquity, and Christian philosophy."5.

Throughout his philosophical works, from "El Monismo Estético" on, there are constant references to Christian concepts, at times strangely blended with gnostic and oriental elements. Nevertheless, even such distortion seems preferable to the neglect, condescension, or affront, which Christianity still suffers at the hands of most Hispanic American writers. Even while Vasconcelos deliberately misrepresents and depreciates the Protestant

thought, and yet succeeded in imbuing him with something of her own deep religious feeling,[7] a quality which never left him, even during the days of his intellectual revolt from Christianity. So deep was her influence that Vasconcelos writes: "Rarely did she caress me, yet so deeply was she within me that I felt myself to be her projection."[8] As student in the Escuela Preparatoria in Mexico City at the time of her death, Vasconcelos never forgot her dying request that he "should not forget the Lord God."

Vasconcelos's father, evidently a rather mediocre person, seems to have had no such influence as that of the mother, though Vasconcelos refers to him with tender affection. The natural son of a Spanish merchant the father had no income outside of his meager salary and the family was always in moderate circumstances. Vasconcelos' mother was also of pure Spanish descent, a fact of which he is extremely proud,[9] all his theories of a "Cosmic Race" notwithstanding.

Vasconcelos tells us that during his school days in the Escuela Preparatoria he adopted the positivism of the age. His autobiography contains some of the most graphic descriptions we have of the materialistic atmosphere of the citadel of positivism. Porfirio Parra, whom we have noted as the successor of Gabino Barreda as the intellectual leader of the positivists was one of Vasconcelos' teachers. But Vasconcelos' adherence to the positivist faith was not a really serious one with Vasconcelos. His own temperament was too romantic and restless, his sensitivity to beauty and to religion too strong for him to be satisfied with a positivism that was already beginning to be discredited. His first real reaction against positivism, we learn in "Ulises Criollo" came with the reading of Dante. After the death of his mother he had tried to find forgetfulness in low pleasures and sank into a

mire of sensualism. It was the reading of Dante that inspired him and helped him rise again (out of this mire). For Vasconcelos Dante is the supreme poet of mankind. Recalling the impression Dante produced on him then, he writes: "Only Dante moulds in each verse a portion of eternal reality. Newton, Comte, Spencer, were classifiers of facts---none of them merited the name of philosopher....It is Dante who reveals that "the same love moves souls and stars'."10.

Upon graduation from the Escuela Preparatoria, Vasconcelos entered the school of law. It was here that he entered into the association with Antonio Caso, Henriquez Ureña, Alfonso Reyes and the others of the literary circle which became the "ateneo de la Juventud". Explaining the formation of this group as an attempt to make up for the lack of philosophical training in the law school, Vasconcelos says: "There was a war to the death against metaphysics. Even logic was hardly tolerated, and that according to Locke, almost as a chapter of physiology. On our own initiative, and outside of the curriculum, we had constituted a group determined to study the philosophers."11. The philosopher who produced the deepest impression upon him in this period, according to Vasconcelos, was Schopenhauer. The beginning of his interest in oriental philosophy, whose influence, especially the Buddhist strain, parallels that of Schopenhauer, also began at this time through his readings in Max Muller. Unlike Caso, Vasconcelos entered the practice of law upon graduation. His graduation thesis, it is worth noting, was the exposition of a new philosophical theory of law, which he entitled "Una Teoría Dinánica del Derecho" (A Dynamic Theory of Law). In this thesis we see an early demonstration of his creative capacity and of his dislike for static categories. It is shortly after his graduation that

Vasconcelos began to compile his first philosophical notes, something he was to continue throughout his lifetime. As a young lawyer he seems to have had time on his hands. Says Vasconcelos:

> "Instead of a diary at that time I used to write sketches for future books; notes for philosophical artistic theses with which I imagined I would shake the bases of contemporary thought. Apart from the ambition of fame, what moved me in these attempts was the need for finding some key or formula for the total explanation of life, an adequate world system. A discovery of the sort, I needed, not only to begin a philosophical treatise, but also to straighten out and to organize my own internal life needful of architecture. What preoccupied me and what I asked of knowledge was the value of my soul and its course among the routes of the cosmos."[12]

It is this personal accent that must be kept in mind in judging all of Vasconcelos philosophical work.

The same year, 1910, in which Vasconcelos collaborated in the famous series of the "A Teneo de la Juventud" with the lecture on Gabino Barreda, he joined as a conspirator in the movement to overthrow the dictator Porfirio Diaz. As soon as it became evident that Diaz was not going to hold an honest election, the great Mexican revolution broke out, and Vasconcelos joined the revolutionary forces. Diaz was defeated in 1911 and for as long as the Madero administration lasted, Vasconcelos shared in the triumph. With the downfall of Madero, Vasconcelos once again became a revolutionist. Until the triumph of General Obregón in 1920 Vasconcelos wandered over Mexico, the United States, and Europe as a soldier or as a confidential agent of revolutionary governments. With the victory of Obregón he became the head of the public school system of Mexico, first as rector of the University and then as Minister of Education, when this ministry was created. After four years of great service, during which Vasconcelos

achieved world renown for his efforts on behalf of the education of all the Mexicans and his encouragement of the autocthonous developments in culture he became once again a wanderer over the face of the earth. This time it was his uncompromising opposition to General Calles which sent him out into self-imposed exile. In 1929 he returned to Mexico to campaign unsuccessfully for the presidency in opposition to the official government party. Whether or not he would have been elected in a free and honest election, as he contends, it is impossible to say. After the failure of his call to revolution he returned to his wanderings. For some time he edited a journal called "La Antorcha" for the purpose of attacking the Mexican government and the influence of the United States in Mexico.[13]. It is during these years immediately before and after the presidential campaign that he works on the elaboration of his philosophical system. After the election of General Cárdenas (6, he returned to Mexico, still unreconciled to his enemies but mollified by the passing of the influence of General Calles. His latter years have been spent writing the volumes of his autobiography, a history of philosophy, a history of Mexico, and a number of other works as well as the additional statements of his philosophy already mentioned. Vasconcelos' historical works bear the imprint of his vigorous personality and contain many brilliant passages but are marred by his lack of objectivity. Antonio Castro Leal writes of his "Breve Historia de la Filosofía": "He was unable to overcome his temperamental incapacity before systematic work. In the prologue he himself recognizes his shortcomings as an expositor. In general, he lacks objectivity in judgment and in certain cases further study. He turns out to be a judge who patronizes the parties and occasionally does not even want to hear those whom he has already condemned."[14]. But, as Brightman has reminded us, all the glaring defects of Vasconcelos cannot blind us to the

brilliance and value of his finest work. We may reject Vasconcelos, the politician and journalist, but we must listen seriously to Vasconcelos, the philosopher.

2. Introduction to the Philosophy of Vasconcelos

When Vasconcelos published his "Treatise on Metaphysics" in 1929, he inscribed on the title page the following words: "There is explained in this volume the first part of a system entitled Esthetic Monism whose exposition will be completed in an Ethic and an Esthetic composed of three parts: the Apollonian, the Dionysian, and the Mystical or Religious." (words capitalized by Vasconcelos). In this trilogy Vasconcelos devotes to the exposition of "Esthetic Monism" alone more than 1,700 pages. Ramos understandably speaks of the system as "luxuriant" and it is indeed easy to lose oneself in the tropical richness of these three volumes. Is there a clue which can guide us through the dense forest of his system?

Vasconcelos tells us that in his earliest philosophical theorizings, in the days of the "Ateneo", he "began to construct a thesis which because of its theorizings (he) linked to it the name of Pythagoras....a dynamism which begins with things, but transforming itself through man, reaches toward the divine." "I have found a theme" he declares, "on which to compose an infinity of variations if not the complete symphony of a system."[15] He might have added that in the end, in this dynamism, all things are absorbed in the divine, and that it is Plotinus, rather than the vague Pythagoras, who gives him the chief inspiration for the construction of his system. It is important to keep this basic theme in mind in reading Vasconcelos, and to remember that he has chosen to construct his system, not as a logician

who builds in orderly and coherent fashion, but as a poet and a mystic. "The philosopher," he declares, "is a poet with a system."[16]

At the same time Vasconcelos does not give up the notion that his philosophy has a scientific as well as an esthetic validity. In his restatement of his system under the name of "El Realismo Cientifico" he states: "Under the name of scientific realism, we postulate a doctrine which finds in modern science the elements to define being in a concrete manner and within a metaphysic which is developed relating the part to the whole, contrary to the ancient metaphysic, analytical and abstract."[17] Perhaps with greater clarity he declares in the prologue to the "Esthetics": "My system pretends to construct a philosophy of scientific basis, but with supra-scientific and spiritualist projections. I believe, that that is what Bergson, for example, is seeking, as well as Meyerson, and that for a modern philosopher this is the only way to philosophize."[18] To this writer, however, the scientific pretension of Vasconcelos seems extraneous and artificial. The imposing scientific legerdemain with which he seeks adds nothing of real value to his system and could just as well have been omitted. It illustrates again, however, the desire to express a transcendence rather than a repudiation of positivism.

b. The Metaphysics of Vasconcelos

Vasconcelos begins the exposition of his metaphysics with an explanation of his point of departure. This point of departure he labels "existence." This "existence" he affirms as a "primary datum of the mere emotion of presence." "All the rest," he adds "follows from this."[19] One does not need to demonstrate or intellectualize existence, since we have an intuitive emotional

perception of it. "The emotion of existence," he tells us, "reveals itself to us as a solid substance in the manner of Spinoza."20. He does not define existence but proceeds to describe it in flights of poetic language. "Let us contemplate existence as a great absolute reality of which we are part, insignificant or important, but not exclusive."21. "Let us make system with existence, from whose unfathomable bosom all qualities emerge."22.

> "I sink once and a thousand times in the profundities of my being, I investigate appearances, I contemplate what I am, and I find once and a thousand times the same certainty, the same notion, independent of accidents and circumstances: existence. Essence, and a little more: existence. The beginning and the end, the part and the whole, the marrow of the cosmos, and also the marvelous fabric of its manifestations. And within myself a particle of isolated existence, a pulsation of the magic fluid which coagulates in our interior and also propagates itself in the plurality of the universe."23.

> "Beings exist, things exist, and attributes exist; color and sound exist, realities and appearance, an entire noisy chaos of existences. Let us surrender ourselves to its dance and analyze afterward. The rhythm of the world rocks us, envelops us as marine waves do the swimmer; everywhere an orgy of brightnesses, abysses, distances, shadows and splendor. And the same magic fluid permeating all, above, beneath, in the fullness of dimensions and of feelings. If it coagulates in slow and constant rhythms it produces things; if the rhythm changes its inner meaning then it resolves itself into units of active potential, unpredictable: beings are born; another miracle and souls appear. At the beginning energy constrained, limited, regulated; at the end liberty, incessant creation, grace. Behold there the physics of the cosmos; intertwined dynamic of the subjective and objective, of the thing and the soul."24.

Existence, then, is the all embracing concept, whose various manifestations comprise all of reality. The intuitive emotion of existence is as a window which discloses the oneness of each part with the whole,---each "particle of isolated existence, a pulsation of the magic fluid...permeating all."

Little wonder that for Vasconcelos the emotion is the true organ of

knowledge.[25] He holds that the only real knowledge is that which perceives a unity in diversity, that the reason is dissociative, while emotion "re-creates and synthesizes"; it achieves a "synthesis of the heterogeneous."[26] "The synthesizing faculty par excellence is the emotion, and only on the emotion may a transcendental knowledge be founded. On it shall rest my entire system."[27] This primacy of the emotion, he believes, is only a consequence of the original postulate of "existence":

> "Given the initial general postulate of my thesis, the postulate of existence as such, it is easy to see that, as a consequence, the emotion acquires a greater power of conviction in my theory than the reason. Since we began by affirming that we conceded greater importance to the 'I am', than to the 'I think', there was established the precedence of the emotional criterion over the intellectual. The 'I am' is nothing other than the very notion of existence, fundamental notion, immediate datum, given to me by the emotion before, during and after the exercise of reason."[28]

Returning to the notion of the "rhythms of coagulation of the magic fluid of 'existence'" we can see how Vasconcelos derives from it the concept of the basic units of reality in the universe. These units are "atoms, cells, and souls," corresponding to the three basic cycles in which the cosmos has manifested itself, "the physical, the biological and the psychic."[29] These cycles are occasioned by "revulsions of energy"; each transition from one of these cycles to another partakes of the nature of miracle. What these cycles have in common is that they are all expressions of "existence", but existence must be understood as dynamic, as a "changing becoming," and as "ascendent process."[30] Vasconcelos believes that the positing of this ascendent process liberates his system from the taint of pantheism.

> "In this fashion, the unity is not destroyed, the essential monism of the world is not broken, but what is avoided is having the monism fall into its natural peril, pantheism; as only by

> determining the state of the energy in each of the cycles of becoming is it established that the superior energy does not lower itself to confuse itself with the honogeneous mass of the primal energy; nor can it thus occur in a progressive monism, organized and ascending."31.

Vasconcelos recognizes the direct inspiration of Plotinus in this scheme as he states: "To start with the atom, to reach, without destroying the unity, the summit of divine knowledge, such is the route which that great (enorme) ancestor of contemporary scientific knowledge, Plotinus traces for all of us."32.

Vasconcelos summarizes the process we have been describing in a more succinct fashion in "El Realismo Cientifico" as he writes:

> "We have today as modern men, the possibility of seeing substance in its creative operation, and we know that the function of the atom produces the Cosmos, and that the cell in its fission inundates the planet with life. Then, after an enormous leap, a leap that has no need of the theory of the evolution of species, we find souls. If it is true that the cell appears tardily in geology, it is no less miraculous that without any logical or energetical necessity, the cell which initiated life should appear; just as later there surged a conscience in the first man, that is a larva of the spirit."33.

To these three basic cycles of existence belong the great divisions of philosophy, physics, ethics and esthetics, according to Vasconcelos. But this must not be understood as a horizontal classification; it is "physics below, conduct in the middle, and uppermost beauty, the yearning for communion with the divine nature."34. Actually, the classifications in Vasconcelos are far more involved than this simple scheme. He is enamored of the mystic number, three, and uses it in various combinations. An example of this is in the Esthetics where he speaks of the "trinitarian order of the universe," and writes:

> "In the elemental periods the process is divided into the work of atoms, cells, and souls of men. In the interior of these stages there rules as well a triple sequence. Ethics is divided into physiological, rational, and revealed ethics. In Esthetics the process breaks down into apollonian, dyonisiac, and mystic. In mysticism we distinguish three ways: purgative, illuminative and unitive. And dominating the various partial developments, there stands the fundamental reality of the Trinity: The Father Creator, the Redeemer Son, and the Spirit, which is a miracle of transfiguration, grace and plenitude."35.

Vasconcelos does not limit his metaphysics to speculation about the structure of the atom, nor ethics to the biological, and there is as much metaphysics in his "Esthetics" as pure esthetics; so it is difficult to see exactly what he gains by this classification. In this accomodation of Christian theology to a Plotinian metaphysics Vasconcelos strongly resembles the Christian Neo-Platonists. His metaphysics is really a scheme of cosmic redemption which at times is definitely gnostic in accent, as we can see in this passage.

> "The appearance and reappearance of the cycles has as its object to lift matter and souls to the plane of Grace. Matter is like a shadow which follows the soul during the course of its condemnation; but as soon as the last soul is saved, the world we see with the senses will disappear with it; all physical substances shed upon souls will be transfigured with them and will become, like them, spiritual substance."36.

E. The Ethics of Vasconcelos

The "Ethics" of Vasconcelos seems to suffer from a lack of orderly and coherent structure even more than his other works. He divides the book into three main sections: The Moral Problem, Types of Morals, and The Ends of Ethics. But as Castro Leal observes, the book is only "systematic in appearance and gives the impression of constantly avoiding the subject. It seems to have been written in times of spiritual intranquility and without sufficient dedication."37. This judgment is confirmed by reading Vasconcelos'

autobiography in which we learn that the "Ethics" was written during the period immediately following his unsuccessful bid for the presidency of Mexico; a period of constant travel, in which he was dominated by the compulsion to attack the official government party in Mexico. Vasconcelos speaks of "the notes of my 'Ethics', abandoned in the bottom of suitcases which were constantly changing place."[38] Even more important at this time, he was troubled by the incidents and final tragic outcome of the most serious of all of the various extra-marital involvements of his career.[39]

Vasconcelos defines ethics as "the science of the disciplines which are necessary to the consummation of the purposes or ends of life,"[40] and also as the "science of energy directed toward a purpose".[41] It is the latter definition which he uses as a working definition in the "Ethics", on the basis of which he extends the domain of ethics far beyond the usual scope given to this field. He establishes a "biological ethics"; "since ethics by definition", he writes, "is the science of energy directed toward a purpose, biological energy, intermediate between human energy and the energy of the spirit, has to include the conduct outside of the human cycle in animals and plants."[42] Indeed, he even raises the question of a "mineral ethic" and answers it by saying that the "ethic of minerals consists in providing forms of life which approximate life," though he soon adds that "the chemical process cannot be immoral since it lacks consciousness of responsibility, but it can be moral in the sense that it collaborates, prepares, serves as the seat of processes which transcend it."[43] Vasconcelos devotes more than fifty pages to a chapter considering the ethics of plant and animal life, an investigation which he deems most important since he wishes "to determine precisely the manner in which physical and biological becoming can coincide

with voluntary becoming. Only through some such linking can mineral, plant and animal acquire a value which gives them sense within the general scheme of spirit."[44] As we have seen in the "metaphysics" Vasconcelos associates matter with evil and must consider the destiny of the lower forms of existence in his scheme of cosmic redemption.

Vasconcelos distinguishes three main types of human ethics: terrestrial, metaphysical, and revealed ethics; that is to say, "conduct subordinate to earthly ends, conduct subordinate to reason and hence to ideal ends, and conduct which tends to transcend human ends."[45] What Vasconcelos criticizes in terrestrial ethics, among which he includes all forms of hedonism and utilitarianism that do not have a reference to a supra-terrestrial absolute, is precisely the surrender of aspiration to the absolute. "They do not even respect," he declares, "that man does not live by bread alone." Appetite moves them and earth satisfies them."[46] Vasconcelos' critical statements regarding the various forms of terrestrial ethics constitute perhaps the best part of the entire volume of "Ethics", though some of them are too sweeping in character. He singles out Confucius, first of all, as an advocate of a "terrestrial" ethic. "He taught an entire race the secrets of temporal welfare,"[47] Vasconcelos declares. He also holds him responsible for the completely static order of China which he sees as a consequence of the Confucian ethic. Today's "philosophic materialism is the modern costume of the old notion of a terrestrial paradise which inspired Confucius."[48] He praises the frankness of the Epicureans who took Happiness as the measure of the good; today's modern humanists, he says, "disguise their hedonism with the abstract love of humanity."[49]

Vasconcelos condemns the Renaissance for "beginning the 'mundane' period, (of) morality based on conveniences."[50] In contrast to Antonio Caso who praised the humanism of the Renaissance Vasconcelos depreciates it. He praises the technological gains of the modern period but deplores its philosophy. "In the Renaissance," he declares, "it is necessary to distinguish the indispensable technical contribution and the shabby transcendental vision. Humanism is the enemy of culture." Since the Renaissance "a humanity of artisans denies the ends and worships the means; than it does not know what to do either with its misery or its abundance." "Such a relapse into original sin, substituting God for man, obliges us to convert the poor subject into the center of gravity of creation....ridiculous after a thousand years of wisdom."[51] Bentham posits an "arithmetic of pleasures."[52] The sociological theories of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl convert morality into a "science of customs"; a "thesis of base submission to facts" which suggests comparison with female fashions.[53] Both capitalism and communism are condemned for their excessive preoccupation with material ends. "We must," he states, "search beyond matter, beyond the earth, for the treasure of happiness, the destiny which stirs in our hearts."[54]

Vasconcelos defines metaphysical ethics as those which search for norms "in abstract ideas, in the general and necessary law, or in an immovable principle."[55] In contrast to the materialists and evolutionists who find morality implicit in the social state, the metaphysical moralists place the origin of the ethical judgment in a "kind of internal sense relatively independent of the world and which judges itself at the same time that it judges the world." Responsibility is recognized as a "fact which imposes itself on reality instead of being derived from it."[56] This is obviously a morality

superior to the terrestrial. The fault which Vasconcelos finds with it is the familiar criticism of rationalism, that it tends to identify the good with formal truth.[57] Although Vasconcelos follows Kant in the "Critique of Pure Reason", he rejects the "Critique of Practical Reason" seeing in Kant's universal laws of the moral order a perfect example of "a morality in which acts are subordinated to ends of a general character, abstract, and universal."[58] "What good is the autonomy of the categorical imperative," he asks, "if then the ethical movement is itself to converge toward rational determinations as abstract as a universal law? And if the universal law is a discipline of the thing, useless for a spirit?"[59]

Vasconcelos arrives at the third type of ethics, revealed ethics, asking wherein lies the essentially creative character of Ethics. He answers all this by saying that the most important "invention" of the moralists "is that which leads to the transcending of temporal ends in favor of absolute ends."[60] Therefore: "The ethical solution requires the invention of resources to consummate the miracle of transcending the ordinary manners of sensation and idea. Its climax is an esthetic state characterized by the announcement of a transcendental revelation."[61] Vasconcelos thus identifies revelation with the esthetic order. It becomes clear as one studies this portion of his thought that though he speaks of "revelation" he does not use this word in the sense of something given---a divine self-communication. He uses the word illumination and revelation interchangeably. Revealed ethics, he states, "proceed from the illumination" of the great personalities."[62] He finds the illuminated seers of mankind especially among the Asiatics; the Brahman, "who listened to the inner voice",[63] and the Buddha, who "inaugurated the most important ethical event before Christianity."[64] But compared with

Christianity he finds both Hinduism and Buddhism inadequate. The superiority of Christianity lies in its Messiah, "who does not deny nor detain destiny, but fulfills it, hastens it. He does not say 'no' to life, but 'forward'."[65]. The destiny of which Vasconcelos speaks is that of final transmutation into absolute spirit, of reincorporation into the divine, or union with the absolute. The role of the revealed ethic of Christianity is to serve that end.

Before we can appreciate this outcome in Vasconcelos' thought it is necessary to consider briefly some other aspects of his ethic. Vasconcelos believes in free will, which, he claims "is implicit in the essence of the ethical, which is liberation, the transcendence of the physical dynamism."[66]. Freedom means that man can sidetrack the constructive current of the ethical and take it to perverse as well as to noble ends. He thus admits the existence of evil, which he calls a "cosmic regression."[67]. The only adequate explanation for evil he finds in the Christian doctrine of the fall, which he associates in gnostic fashion, with the involvement of man in matter. Evil for man, he writes, "derives from our intermediate situation between matter and spirit."[68]. Human sinfulness lies in being satisfied in this intermediate state. "The only sin," he writes, "is to believe in man, to venerate man, to take delight in man. The good is to deny him, conquer him, overcome him."[69]. To be sure, Vasconcelos denies at this point that nature, as such, is evil. "Evil is human;" he states, "evil does not exist in nature, it has no meaning there."[70]. At the same time he declares; "Metaphysically, evil has no importance and is nothing other than the estrangement from the divine substance."[71]. And matter is estranged from the divine substance, as we have seen,[72]. and will disappear with the saving of the

last soul.

Vasconcelos, with his notion of the return of all things to the absolute cannot conceive the notion of an eternal punishment. Hence, instead of souls condemned for eternity he posits a condemnation to absolute extinction. "Evil, then, is an obstacle which does away with itself, while the energy is reabsorbed in the vital current and divine current."[73] In the end, nothing can stop the process of reintegration into the absolute, because this is the divinely ordained destiny of the universe; because there is a longing in all portions of existence for wholeness; because the intervention of Christ has taken place to fulfill this cosmic process. Writes Vasconcelos:

> "Thus there is a scale, from the atom to the heart; an identical infinite longing of the partial for the whole, ... of the splinters of being for absolute being. This leads us to recognize that the supreme end and norm of morality are contained in the Gospel. There the obscure force of life acquires substance to emerge regenerated, fortified, transfigured. The role of Christ may be understood as the transmuter of the cosmic energy, which he reforms and identifies with the first cause. That is why the Gospel is ethic and esthetic; the final revelation, the definitive orientation of the Cosmos toward its absolute goal."[74]

Vasconcelos identifies this longing for the infinite in man with St. Augustine's "ordo amoris". "My thesis," he writes, "tries to make clear the nature of this love and the possibility of its juncture with the cosmic processes. That is why it subordinates morality to esthetics, in which this love, a form of divine emotion, is transformed into the rhythm and superior law of the Cosmos."[75] This is basically the same conclusion which he had first outlined in "El Monismo Estético" in 1918, at which time he declared:

> "The good is not performed because of the results it produces, but for the love of God as the mystics have said, or as we should say more humbly and with greater exactitude; by sense of Beauty. The conscience which thus practices the good transmutes the voluntary energy of ethics into the divine energy of esthetics; the classic example of the transfiguration of the moral purposes in the conscience in harmony with the supreme divine beauty, is given to us in the gospels, concerning which it has never been possible to say if they are more excellent because of their tender goodness or for their magic beauty."[76]

What this subordination of ethics to esthetics means is that, since for Vasconcelos there is only one valid form of ethics, revealed ethics, and this belongs in the esthetic order, ethics is really made a chapter in esthetics. This is confirmed by such a remark as this in "El Realismo Cientifico," : "I understand by esthetic thought one that includes both morals and beauty."[77] It is necessary therefore, in order to understand more completely the ethics of Vasconcelos to turn to a brief consideration of how his system comes to a climax in his theory of esthetics.

The Esthetics of Vasconcelos

It is neither possible nor necessary to try to present an abstract of the 761 pages of the "Esthetics" of Vasconcelos. All we can hope to do is to present the main outlines, and show how the ethics are linked to esthetics and esthetics itself is resolved in mysticism on a religious plane.

One of the first things which strikes us in Vasconcelos "Esthetics" is the much freer use of terms taken from the traditional language of Christian theology. It is apparent that Vasconcelos began the "metaphysics" with the idea of adhering mainly to philosophical language, but in the development of the system came to lean more directly on the theological concepts. In

the prologue to the "Esthetics" he makes it clear that he intends the volume to be an exposition of Christian belief. Writes Vasconcelos:

> "Side-tracked, lost in infinite errors, I believe I have at last hit upon a spark of truth. My premises may be unintelligent, of my solutions I am certain. And I am certain because they represent the faith of my childhood; that is to say, the Christianity of a merciful God who leads us out of the shadows to the clarity of salvation."78.

With such an introduction it would seem as if we should look for rectifications, to an attempt to distinguish his "previous errors" from the solutions he is now offering. It becomes clear, however, that aside from this freer use of Christian symbols there is no change over the previous volumes. The "Esthetics" is merely a further elaboration of the ideas we have already met in the other works, with greater attention to the esthetic and mystical aspects of experience.

After another long section on the epistemology of esthetics, Vasconcelos considers esthetics as the manifestation of three basic modes of human expression: the apollonian, the dionysian,79. and the mystic. The apollonian is linked with the predominance of the reason, and the sense of form; its characteristic artistic expressions are found in plastic arts and painting. The dionysian is associated with the predominance of the passions, and its most characteristic expressions are in the dance and music. The mystic is identified with the "intuition of the absolute",80. with revelation in religion and its chief artistic expression is found in the Christian liturgy. Each art, however, has apollonian, dionysian, and mystic expressions. What makes art apollonian, dionysian, or mystic is the attitude it expresses rather than the kind of art it is. Vasconcelos does not really define these expressions, rather, he describes and illustrates them. We have to note a

number of these descriptions, therefore, in order to capture adequately the meaning of these expressions within his system. Let us note first the apollonian form:

> "We make of Apollo the symbol of an esthetic of ideas linked with the Platonic tendency to identify form and beauty."81.

> "The apollonian is the art of nature before redemption but with the Greek Platonic restlessness which foreshadows the era of divine art. Apollonian art is also, particularly in its lesser manifestations, a simple will to form and falls easily into the sterility of the geometric and schematic." Left to itself it falls into the monstrosity of art for art's sake."82.

The dionysian, in Vasconcelos' concept, is a far more complex manifestation:

> "Just as the Greeks identified the God of the apollonian with the Sun, they incarnated the God of the passions, i.e. the dionysian divinity in a very complex figure, who in his decadence presides over drunkenness but also represents the deliverance of the will to the most exalted passions. And what use of the will is there which is more beautiful, more noble, and in many cases more daring, than to launch it on all the roads of desire? To use the whole of one's energy to investigate and enjoy all the gifts of a vigorous temperament: good and evil, sin and virtue!"83.

> "The myth desires to express that when Dionysius arrives people become demented; demented with license and alegría. Then, with great insight, the myth requires that Dionysius should end dismembered by the very women whom he awakened to desire. Symbol that a loosened sensuality leads to the destruction of the individual."84.

> "The dionysian constitutes a magnificent effort to liberate one from the encumberances of matter, customs, even of the usual norms of ethics, in order to make the passions King."85.

> "The equilibrium of dionysian art is unstable; it oscillates between the attraction from below and the impulse to the higher."86.

> (In the romantic...) "the confidence grows in the power of the soul and this breaks the apollonian boundaries and expands the dionysian in order to transform ordinary passion

into a demand for eternity."[87].

The mystical experience is the crown and climax of esthetics:

> "All esthetics---no all Metaphysics---issues ('desemboca'-empties as a river into the sea) fatally in the necessity of the mystic experience."[88].

> (In religion it is possible)..."to leap directly without passing through the geometry of discursive reason, without the need for the melody of the esthete and as though by direct miraculous transfiguration. Thus the vision of the apostles, sudden and blinding contemplation of the presence of Christ. That is direct revelation and pure mysticism."[89].

Vasconcelos is aware of the fact that in the mystic sphere of esthetics he is beyond the sphere of philosophy. At the close of the "Esthetics" he declares that to explore further what he calls the "esthetic apriori" in the "ordo amoris", i.e. the sphere of Christian revelation, would require "in addition to singular grace" a special volume devoted entirely to the odicy.[90]. The highest form of art he holds, is not within the philosophical classification of Esthetics but belongs in religion. This as we have previously noted, is the liturgy:[91].

> "The liturgy, according to our theory, is the supreme esthetic art, in contrast to the classic thought which presents architecture as the greatest of the arts. It is the liturgy, because it takes its central concept from theology. Theology is superior to philosophy because philosophy posits problems, and Theology gives solution; and then in this world of solved problems, of achieved destinies, thought itself ceases its labor and gives itself to delight, enjoying its function which harmonizes with the being of all things and embraces within its emotion, the Universe."[92].

In one paragraph in the prologue of the Esthetics Vasconcelos brings all these concepts together in summary:

> "In its redeeming function the soul is turned toward things and develops within itself three movements: the apol-

Ionian which has as its object to incorporate the physical [illegible] into the spirit, through the image which reproduces the object, but with a changed interior rhythm. The dionysian, which is esthetics applied to the realm of the will; not in order to assert for its ends but in order to liberate [illegible] from ends and to transport it to love as spirit. The mystical, which consists in transporting existence to the [illegible] divine plane. In it the definitive salvation of man and of his Cosmos, of men and the Cosmos, is consummated. The doctrine of this final redemption surpasses the power of aesthetics and corresponds to the "Sacred Wisdom" (Hagia Sofia) or religious truth."93.

On the higher levels of esthetics and on the level of mysticism considerations of an ethical character have been completely superseded in the system Vasconcelos proposes. The notion of an imperative does not belong in his esthetics. "There is in esthetics", he says, "no concept of the commandment, 'Love thy neighbor'; what prevails is the impression of community and beatitude in an abundance which knows no narrowness nor compromise..."94.

G. An Evaluation of the Philosophy of Vasconcelos

The philosophical system of Vasconcelos stands by itself in the culture of Mexico and Latin America; there is nothing else quite like it. As far as this writer has been able to discover, Vasconcelos has no followers of any importance. The younger philosophers of Mexico have found both Caso and Vasconcelos too anti-intellectualistic and have preferred the orientations of contemporary German philosophy. What the final significance of the work of Vasconcelos will be it is impossible to say at the present time. José Gaos expresses the idea that Vasconcelos writings in defense of Hispanic culture and of the unity of the Hispanic American nations in their broad philosophical outreach may be the most permanent part of his work. He imagines a future in which the Hispanic American nations will have achieved a unity and

with it the status of a world power and suggests that the people of that day will recognize in Vasconcelos the "father of the spiritual fatherland (patria), the 'precursor', and finally a 'genius'."[95] But what Gaos does here is to postpone to a hypothetical future the troublesome problem of estimating the real significance of Vasconcelos. While one can only speak personally at this point, it is necessary to anticipate a judgment of his work.

First of all, we must recognize that on the strictly philosophical plane the work of Vasconcelos leaves a great deal to be desired. Vasconcelos has dreamed great dreams, but his reach has exceeded his grasp. Samuel Ramos has expressed his judgment of the shortcomings of Vasconcelos as a philosopher in words with which this writer fully concurs:

> "Vasconcelos has had the laudable intention of philosophizing on his own, i.e. of confronting the problems directly in order to resolve them by himself. In this the attitude of Vasconcelos is irreproachable, for the only way to create philosophy is to go straight to the heart of things in order to ponder deeply. But if his method has been sound, and though he does not lack the intellectual capacity of the true philosopher, as far as achievement is concerned, he has lacked in an indispensable requisite to objective validity in results, and that is the rigor of a discipline to conduct thought."[96]

Whether time will preserve the finest insights of Vasconcelos or not, we cannot say, but Vasconcelos' system as a system, in this writer's judgment, because of its lack of discipline and coherence will hardly stand the test of time. What does seem profoundly significant, however, is that the first Hispanic American philosopher to attempt to create a complete system of philosophy has turned to the concept of "spirit" and to Christian theology, in however distorted a form, for the basic ideas of his system.

Since Vasconcelos has chosen to call his system a Christian philosophy it is necessary to judge it from the point of view of its value as a Christian contribution. Once again personal presuppositions form the basis of judgment. We are not restricted, however, to personal opinion in pointing out that what Vasconcelos has attempted is, essentially, to revive the early neo-Platonic formulations of Christianity, conceptions based on what Anders Nygren calls the "Alexandrian world scheme". Nygren has shown conclusively how the Greek "Eros", which is an ascending movement toward the divine, was incorporated into Christian theology in the patristic period. This is in contrast with the Pauline "Agape", in which love revealed as a divine Grace incarnate in Jesus Christ in whom the Godhead descends in order to redeem. This process of the absorption of the Greek "Eros" is particularly decisive in Origen, who merges in the Alexandrian world scheme with the Christian doctrine of redemption. "Origen's whole structure" says Nygren, "is determined by the Alexandrian world scheme, with its double movement, the outgoing of everything from God and the return of everything to Him, the degeneration of the pure spirit so that it becomes a soul bound to the sense and the world, and its regeneration, by which it is restored to the state of pure spirit. God is conceived in the Greek manner as Absolute Being, pure undifferentiated unity."97. How similar is this structure of Origen, to whom Vasconcelos acknowledges a kinship, stemming from the common inspiration of Plotinus, whom Vasconcelos read before knowing Origen, may be seen from these words of the Mexican philosopher: "The Plotinian vision is in reality nothing other than the Christian thesis according to which the being descends from the Father and decays by separation until it is reintegrated by the work of the son---God-Man, to the fullness of the Holy Spirit."98. Vasconcelos uses the same analogy of Jacob's ladder which Origen uses in

order to describe the ascending process of "esthetic monism":

> "Esthetic monism is a kind of Jacob's scale in which substance keeps undergoing transformations: from material energy it passes to biological energy, and from this to the energy of the spirit. Even in this last one, there takes place the final redemption, the redemption of Grace. And only after this regeneration can one speak with validity of the identification of energy with God."99.

Even in the notion of Grace in Vasconcelos, there is the taint of Eros for he does not use grace consistently as a divine act; at one point at least he speaks of "the springboard of grace",100. as of a human upward leap aided by grace in the role of springboard.

For those who, like the writer, follow Nygren in considering the accomodation of the basic concepts of Christian revelation and redemption to the neo-Platonic philosophy as a deviation from the fundamental revelation contained in the Bible and consequently a departure from true Christian theology, the attempt of Vasconcelos to revive the neo-Platonism of Origen can only mean the repetition of a tragic mistake. The absorption of the Greek "eros" as either a substitute or a supplement of the Christian "agape" can only result in the loss of the sense of the uniqueness and power of the Christian doctrine of redemption. What Vasconcelos has done is to surrender the fundamental personalism of Christianity in favor of a Plotiniam pantheism in which the basic distinctions between things, man, and God, are blurred in the all embracing concept of "existence" as forms of energy moving toward reintegration in absolute Spirit.101.

The main interest of this study, however, lies in the ethical field. Even more than the formal incompatibility with a sound Christian theology what concerns us is to judge the ethical adequacy of the philosophy of

Vasconcelos. This writer finds such a confusion between ethics and esthetics in this philosophy as leaves no sure ground for ethics. The subordination of ethics to esthetics within an esthetic in which the emotion is made supreme can only result in the complete loss of standards for ethical action. The place where this result is most apparent is in Vasconcelos' treatment of sexual morality.

Vasconcelos devotes an entire chapter in his "Ethics" to "Sexual Ethics." This chapter is full of contradictions and confusions. Vasconcelos himself states at the beginning of the chapter that "whoever has an ethical doctrine must put it to the test on the erotic case."[102] If this be so, his own ethical doctrine fails to pass the test, for, far from adding light on the subject, he adds to its darkness. "The juvenile erotic problem has no other solution than the harsh one of an inflexible moral restraint."[103] This would seem clear, but then Vasconcelos admits that for the human this ideal is impossible and then turns to the prudential counsel, which is nothing other than a form of utilitarianism, and the esthetic exception, in which he makes the apology of hedonism. Here for example, is the prudential counsel:

> "Abstain from sexual pleasure, deceitful and terrible; but if you cannot resist and fall, use contraceptives to avoid abortion, and do not drag the future in your fall...[104] It is better to tolerate the lesser evil than to impose a harsh rule, which nobody keeps, or very few, and which, on the other hand, leads to the hypocrisy of celibacy, infanticide and all the complicated arrangements of bastardy in the upper classes...[105] Since it is not possible nor is it necessary to write an ethic for saints, let the tormented one remember that the rule is: Continence or passion; never habits, and, even less, vices."[106]

This last counsel is, to be sure, the allowance for the esthetic exception.

This is clearer still in these expressions:

> "For my part I still find youthful abandon beautiful, if it is passing, and is accompanied by the light of fancy. "What is repugnant is to extend it beyond the exigency of appetite."[107]

> "To sin in longing for beauty (por afán de belleza) is excusable;"[108].

At the same time Vasconcelos appears to try to rise above these statements. "Let us no longer tarnish the soul," he says, "granting a spiritual category to what is only the attack of a disease."[109]. He tries to make a distinction between spiritual sentiment and sensuality. But he gives us no clear differentiation between what is reprehensible sensuality, "granting a spiritual category to what is only a disease," and an excusable sin "in longing for beauty." There are frequent examples of confusion at this very point, as when he says: "Romantic art is a variety of the Greek dionysianism with its Bacchic disorder, but with the addition of the Christian element of hope which permits the romanticist to give himself to all excesses without the loss of his dignity as a soul worthy of heaven."[110].

One must praise in Vasconcelos the frankness with which he has spoken on this difficult subject. At the same time it is not possible to excuse him for the confusion which he has injected in condoning, as esthetic exceptions, violations of his own highest standards. It is impossible, having read the autobiography of Vasconcelos, not to see in his reflections on sexual ethics, a kind of apology for his own erotic life, so equivocal from a Christian ethical standpoint. Be that as it may, the loophole for the exceptions from the ethic of the Gospel is present in the very notion of the subordination of ethics to esthetics, with its implied excuse of the passion

which partakes of beauty.

POSTCRIPT

Having considered with some care the attitude of Antonio Caso toward the church it is interesting to turn to consider the position of Vasconcelos at this same point. Caso, as we have seen, leaned toward the Protestant interpretation of Christianity, but with complete freedom from all confessional involvement. Vasconcelos on the other hand attacks and ridicules protestantism at every possible opportunity. Protestantism, as he depicts it, is a degradation of Christianity, and in Latin-America, a venal tool of North American imperialism. He acknowledges his heterodoxy as a Roman Catholic but nevertheless pleads for the right to be included in the Catholic fold. Here again his attitude is exceedingly strange. "Tolerance in protestant fashion," he declares, "leads to mediocrity and theological anarchy." And then he pleads for a latitude within Roman Catholicism which is allowed within few Protestant churches, if any. "Temperaments like those of Origen, he states, "should not be excluded from the church since Origen was not." He would like to see the Roman Church add to its creeds the words: "All these dogmas are recommended as the highest expressions of the wisdom of the ages; but if any, by reason of an intimate disposition and with full sincerity, thinks otherwise,....let God judge him....and let him be saved!"[111]. Vasconcelos deplores Roman Catholicism's record of restriction of religious freedom in the middle ages, and through the Inquisition, but in his own campaign for the Presidency of Mexico he made it clear that he would restrict the freedoms of protestants in Mexico if successful. He associates the defense of Mexico against the United States with the Catholic church. By incorporating the description of the issues of his presidential campaign

written by the Mexican writer "Valeria" into his autobiography he endorses this statement:

> "The role which the Church plays spiritually is definitive, even in the life of those who have ignored it, it moulds the souls, immunizing spirits against the virus of Protestantism, for this, once its historic role as the champion of free inquiry has ended, by exaggeration of individualism engenders the contemporary capitalistic system. Thus it is that every Hispanic person may be a catholic or an atheist, but not protestant, for in our countries what the protestant denominations reap are only the harvest of souls which have previously been bruised. To give Mexico its traditional religion, to turn its heart toward its proper Spanish spirit, is to erect an impenetrable wall. (against U. S. imperialism)."[112]

The charges of complicity in North American imperialism levied against the protestant community of Latin America, are both baseless and infantile. A growing indigenous protestant community is furnishing increasing evidence that to be Hispanic does not mean that one must be either a Catholic or an atheist. Upon the growth of that community depends the dissemination in Hispanic America of the ethics of the Reformation, an ethic far truer to the spirit of Christianity than the esthetic monism which Vasconcelos has so ambitiously proposed.

Footnotes

Chapter VI

1. Brightman, Edgar. "Discussion Don José Vasconcelos", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. VII, No. 3, March 1947. p. 453.

2. Ibid., p. 453.

3. Brightman's remark regarding "these defects" in this sentence refers specifically to the "Estética" and the "Lógica Orgánica" rather than to his work as a whole.

4. Ibid., p. 459.

5. Vasconcelos, José. Manual de Filosofía. México. Ediciones Botas, 1940. p. 1516.

6. Note: The chief source of biographical information concerning José Vasconcelos is the monumental autobiography, "Ulises Criollo" which, in four volumes and more than 2,500 pages, only takes us to the early 1930's. It provides a veritable mine of information concerning the attitudes and development of the philosopher.

7. Vasconcelos tells in his autobiography, with obvious emotion, of an experience he had as a boy with his mother while attending mass. The image of the Virgin smiled at him. Later he persuaded himself that he had had an hallucination.

8. Vasconcelos, José. Ulises Criollo--La Vida del Autor Escrito por el Mismo. México. Ediciones Botas. 9th edition, 1946. p. 115.

9. This pride of Vasconcelos in his Spanish heritage appears repeatedly in his writings and his praise of the Spanish tradition as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon is an important element in his thought. Perhaps one of the clearest illustrations of this pride is found in the selection of the title of his autobiography. "Ulises Criollo". "Criollo" (creole) in Hispanic America means--of pure spanish ancestry.

10. Vasconcelos, op. cit., pp. 184-185.

11. Ibid., p. 168.

12. Ibid., p. 241.

13. Vasconcelos' political activities and opinions comprise the most controversial aspect of his turbulent career. He has defended his record and attacked his enemies with almost unequaled passion. His history of Mexico and the volumes of his autobiography are really works of political controversy, and cannot be accepted as

13. (continued)
sound interpretations of the events to which they refer. Latin American protestants, in particular, have reason to resent the gratuitous insults of Vasconcelos, who never admits their sincerity or integrity, but always pictures them as agents of a foreign power, the United States, in the service of a treasonable conspiracy against their own countries. In his book, "Bolívar y el Monroeismo", in which he proposes a Latin American union as opposed to the pan-American ideal, he specifically charges the Methodist mission with being an organ of American imperialism. At times his diatribes against all protestants seem to be the product of a disordered mind. In the fourth volume of his autobiography Vasconcelos goes so far as to allege a Protestant (called Luteranos this time) and Jewish world wide conspiracy. "They do not want peace," he charges, "but the destruction of the Christian idea in the whole world." Campaigning for the presidency, he made it clear that he would take measures against the freedoms of Protestants in Mexico. Vasconcelos, José. Páginas Escogidas Selección de Antonio Castro Leal, Prólogo.

14. A case in point is Kierkegaard, whom he has obviously not read, and to whom he refers scornfully as a "tormented mystic" (Manual de Filosofía p. 99.) and always calls, "the protestant"; in one case the "Swedish protestant", (El Procansulado, 3rd edition, p. 611).

15. Vasconcelos, Ulises Criollo, p. 268.

16. Vasconcelos, José. Estética México. Ediciones Botas, 1935, p. 55.

17. Vasconcelos, José. El Realismo Ciéntífico. México. Centro de Estudios Filosóficos de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Colección de Monografías Filosoficas. 1943, p. 11.

18. Vasconcelos, Estética. p. 27.

19. Vasconcelos, José. Tratado de Metafísica. México, Ediciones Botas, 1929, p. 42.

20. Ibid., p. 42.

21. Ibid., p. 43.

22. Ibid., p. 42.

23. Ibid., p. 45.

24. Ibid., p. 49.

25. Vasconcelos theory of knowledge is far more complicated than this paragraph can suggest and cannot be adequately described here. To it he dedicates not only the "Lógica Orgánica" but hundreds of

25. (continued)
pages in the trilogy, i.e. large sections of each of the volumes. His analyses do not coincide, however, In the "Metaphysics" he speaks of three kinds of knowledge; rational, emotional, and antenal. (by analogy with the insects he speaks of the "antennae of the soul", hence an intuitive knowledge is "antenal". Tratado de Metafísica pp. 136-1952). In the "Ethics" he speaks only of intellectual and emotional knowledge. In the "Esthetics" it is sensorial, intellectual and emotional knowledge. (This recognition of "sensorial knowledge" in the "Esthetics" is taken from Kant). The antenal knowledge of the "Metaphysics" is included under emotional knowledge, which is also called esthetic knowledge.

26. Vasconcelos, Estética. p. 66.

27. Vasconcelos, Tratado de Metafísica. p. 163.

28. Ibid., p. 163-164.

29. Ibid., p. 164.

30. Ibid., p. 198.

31. Ibid., p. 199.

32. Vasconcelos, Estética. p. 28.

33. Vasconcelos, El Realismo Científico. pp. 19-20.

34. Vasconcelos, Estética. p. 40.

35. Ibid., p. 373.

36. Vasconcelos, Tratado de Metafísica. p. 259.

37. Vasconcelos, Páginas Escogidas, Selección de A. Castro Leal, p. 14.

38. Vasconcelos, El Proconsulado, p. 575.

39. Vasconcelos' autobiography contains an amazingly frank and detailed account of his amorous life. The person in reference at this point is one whom Vasconcelos mentions simply by her pen name, "Valeria". He calls her one of Mexico's greatest writers. She had volunteered her help in his presidential campaign, and subsequently became his mistress. She was with him in Paris after the election when in a fit of despondency she committed suicide in the interior of Notre Dame Cathedral,--with Vasconcelos' revolver.

40. Vasconcelos, Tratado de Metafísica. p. 304.

41. Vasconcelos, José, Etica. México, Ediciones Botas, 1932, p. 455.

42. Ibid., p. 455.

43. Ibid., p. 491.

44. Ibid., p. 505.

45. Ibid., p. 337.

46. Ibid., p. 338.

47. Ibid., p. 341.

48. Ibid., p. 347.

49. Ibid., p. 347.

50. Ibid., p. 344.

51. Ibid., p. 344-345.

52. Ibid., p. 363.

53. Ibid., p. 360-361.

54. Ibid., p. 382.

55. Ibid., p. 425.

56. Ibid., p. 388.

57. Ibid., p. 394.

58. Ibid., p. 413.

59. Ibid., p. 413.

60. Ibid., p. 416.

61. Ibid., p. 425.

62. Ibid., p. 427.

63. Ibid., p. 430.

64. Ibid., p. 433.

65. Ibid., p. 433.

66. Ibid., p. 202.

67. Ibid., p. 213.

68. Ibid., p. 216.

69. Ibid., p. 242.

70. Ibid., p. 213.

71. Ibid., p. 22.

72. Ibid., p. 13.

73. Ibid., p. 258.

74. Ibid., p. 204.

75. Ibid., p. 203.

76. Vasconcelos, José. "El Monismo Estético." Cultura, Tomo IX No. 1, 1918. p. 60.

77. Vasconcelos, El Realismo Científico. p. 41.

78. Vasconcelos, Estética, p. 12.

79. Vasconcelos acknowledges the inspiration for these terms in Nietzsche's "The Birth of Tragedy".

80. Vasconcelos, op. cit., p. 365.

81. Vasconcelos, El Realismo Científico. p. 147.

82. Vasconcelos, Estética. p. 488.

83. Vasconcelos, El Realismo Científico. p. 154.

84. Ibid.; p. 154.

85. Ibid.; p. 155.

86. Vasconcelos, Estética. p. 359.

87. Vasconcelos, El Realismo Científico, p. 159.

88. Vasconcelos, Estética. p. 164.

89. Ibid., p. 168.

90. Ibid., pp. 760-761.

91. Vasconcelos admits both the Greek liturgy and the Latin Roman Catholic liturgy.

92. Vasconcelos, El Realismo Científico. pp. 166-167.

93. Vasconcelos, Estética. Prologue.

94. Ibid., p. 398.

95. Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, p. 143.

96. Ramos, Historia de la Filosofía en México. p. 144.

97. Nygren, Eros and Agape. p. 165.

98. Vasconcelos, Estética. p. 51.

99. Vasconcelos, Etica. p. 86.

100. Vasconcelos, Estética. p. 337.

101. In "El Realismo Científico" Vasconcelos comes out for the first time with a clear statement in favor of the person of God. In previous statements his use of the words Father, and Son, save as applied to Christ in his historical manifestation had been obviously symbolical. There is, however, no mistaking such statements as this: "In place of eons and other intermediaries religion gives us a personal relation with an Absolute conceived as a divine person, whose intermediary is Jesus Christ... It is more rational, beautiful and logical to speak of a Divine person and of a Divine mind." (pp., 70-71). Basically, however, this volume merely restates the world scheme of esthetic monism, and these statements remained isolated and unrelated. Vasconcelos at various times denies that his system is pantheistic, identifying pantheism with Spinoza and not Plotinus. cf. above p.

102. Vasconcelos, Ética. p. 508.

103. Ibid., p. 515.

104. Ibid., p. 517.

105. Ibid., p. 517.

106. Ibid., p. 549.

107. Ibid., p. 530.

108. Ibid., p. 532.

109. Ibid., p. 548.

110. Vasconcelos, Estética. p. 489.

111. Op. cit. p. 265.

112. Vasconcelos, El Proconsulado, p. 165.

CHAPTER VII

ALEJANDRO KORN

A KANTIAN SOCRATES IN ARGENTINA

The reader will already have recognized the name of Alejandro Korn (1860-1936) as the author of the "Influencias Filósoficas en la Evolución Nacional," the basic secondary source on Argentine philosophy employed in this study. He will not be surprised, therefore, to see his name reappear now as the subject for a separate chapter, for in this historian of Argentine philosophy we have a master thinker in his own right. Only in the last few years of his life was he generally recognized as such, but now Francisco Romero expresses the consensus of opinion in Argentina when he says: "Korn was an absolute philosopher, that is, wholly a philosopher; the greatest---at a great distance of the others---which we have in these parts."[1]. Only Romero himself, as we shall see later, can stand alongside of him. The recognition given to him in Argentina extends throughout Latin America. Mexico's most distinguished critic, Alfonso Reyes joins in saying "in the development of philosophical studies in America, Korn occupies a unique place."[2]. The writer hopes in this chapter to give some idea of this uniqueness and greatness of Korn, as well as to point out some of his limitations.

A. A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Alejandro Korn was born in the town of San Vicente in the province of Buenos Aires. His father was an ex-Prussian army officer who settled in Argentina after the failure of the liberal revolution of 1848, in which he had participated actively. His mother was Swiss. The elder Korn identified

himself deeply with his adopted country, becoming naturalized and taking part in the town government. Alejandro Korn grew up with a deep consciousness of Argentine nationality. His deep patriotism expressed itself in later years in the intense interest which he took in the study of the significance of Argentine culture. Korn's earliest education was imparted in his home by his parents and German tutors. At the age of 12 he was sent to continue his studies in the Liceo of Buenos Aires. A brilliant student, he received his degree in Medicine at the age of twenty-two. After five years of medical practice in small provincial towns he was appointed police physician in the suburban Buenos Aires town of La Plata where he lived the rest of his life. In 1897 he became the Director of the hospital for the insane, "Melchor Romero" a position which he held until his retirement from the hospital in 1916.[3] While still related to the hospital Korn began a second career in which he was to find his real vocation. In 1906 he became substitute professor of the history of philosophy in the University of Buenos Aires, being promoted to full professor in 1909. "Korn," says Luis Aznar "discovered himself on the very day he occupied a university chair, and applied himself systematically to search for the marrow of the great thought systems of the past."[4] When the University of La Plata was founded, Korn became professor of the history of philosophy there as well, and in 1923, he became the professor of Epistemology and Metaphysics in Buenos Aires. Both of these universities were a part of the Argentine government educational system, and Korn held all three chairs until 1930 when he definitely retired from professional activity.

Korn, who always felt a deep aversion for mere arm chair philosophers took an active interest in university and national affairs. The great stu-

dent led reform movement that swept the Argentine universities beginning in 1918 found in him a sincere friend and ally as well as a loyal critic. Nominated by the students he served a number of posts in university administration, but refused to accept the rectorships which were offered to him. At various times he occupied political office, the most important being that of deputy to the national congress for one term, representing the Socialist party. In the last years of his life Korn spent a great deal of time lecturing to various groups, including worker's groups in which he was greatly interested.

Korn did not write any "books" as such. He did write a number of philosophical essays and monographs on the significance of a number of the great philosophers, and a considerable number of critical articles. The "Influencias Filósoficas en la Evolución Nacional" was completed in 1919, but did not appear in book form until after his death. In 1930 he published six of his philosophical essays for private circulation. In 1935 he published a small volume entitled "Apuntes Filosóficos", (Philosophical notes) containing a definition of the basic concepts and terms of philosophy. Not until the posthumous edition of his complete works by the University of La Plata was Korn's written work brought together in usable form, although popular editions of his essays and critical works appeared after his death as well. Outside of the circle of his students, then, it can be said that the writings of Korn, most of which first appeared in student periodicals, were not known by the larger public until after his death, which came the ninth of October, 1936.

B. THE PERSONAL INFLUENCE OF ALEJANDRO KORN

Francisco Romero, the most eminent living Hispanic American philosopher, was an intimate friend and disciple of Alejandro Korn. He has written with enthusiasm and touching devotion of his teacher, yet with such persuasiveness that Alfonso Reyes speaks of "the unimpeachable authority of Romero."[5] It is Romero, more than any other person, who has drawn attention to the person and the writings of Alejandro Korn and has helped to fix the high place which Korn enjoys today in the philosophy of Hispanic America. Since the importance of Alejandro Korn is so intimately related to his influence over those of his students, of whom Romero is foremost, who today are the leaders in Argentine philosophy, we must see Korn through the eyes of his students.

According to Francisco Romero, Alejandro Korn was above all else a great personality. It is impossible to judge him purely by his writings, for Alejandro Korn was a far greater figure as a man than as a teacher and a greater figure as a teacher than as a writer. Korn's few published works do not begin to express the richness of the thought of Korn, let alone give an inkling of the strength of his personality. Writes Romero:

> "Even though he had never written a single page, Korn would still be one of our greatest thinkers, because of his austere will to truth, because of the erudition and critical rigor with which he confronted all the problems of philosophy, because of his admirable capacity of going to the bottom of things, to relate every theme to the ultimate issues."[6]

With Korn, more than any other philosopher whom we have yet considered, it appears evident that we must seek a glimpse of the man himself; we cannot be satisfied with a knowledge of his writings.

What was it in Korn that captured the interest of his students and drew them to him? More than his penetrating and lucid intelligence, more than his profound and sure scholarship, more than his superlative competence as a teacher, it seems to have been the virile integrity and nobility of his character. Romero says that every gesture of Korn revealed "the superior man."[7] "One breathed in his proximity," he adds, "a clean and stimulating air, an atmosphere of superiority."[8] Another of his pupils, Enrique Anderson Imbert says; "His was an example of dignity, of refinement, of heroic autonomy."[9] And Angel Vassallo, another student, considered by many, after Romero, Argentina's foremost philosopher today, speaks of "the greatness of the noble and authentic man."[10] The goodness men saw in Korn was not a passive quality, a mere conventional morality; "his goodness", says Romero, "was active, energetic, militant."[11] The highest tribute of all paid to Korn, the man, is by Francisco Romero, who considers Korn himself to be the clearest illustration of, and consequently the most persuasive argument for, the belief in the supreme worth of the human personality. For Romero, the very meaning of the universe is to be found in such a person as was Korn. "If we wish to find a fixed point in the variable march of time," he writes, "we must return to the human person, to man in those rare instances in which the human condition is projected toward the ideal goal."[12]

Fortunately for those of us who were not able to know Korn a number of the qualities of which his students write are reflected in his writings. As we read Korn's magnificent expositions we are impressed with the clarity of his definitions, with the terse and lucid style in which there seems not to be a word in excess nor a single thought which has not been carefully considered; we are struck by the evidence of a scholarship which is deeply

versed in the primary sources. As we read on, it becomes apparent that this clarity of style and this manifest erudition can only be the expression of a deeply honest temperament. Romero speaks of his "supreme honesty as a thinker." We are also tempted to impatience at what sometimes seems an excess of caution, but this caution, we conclude tentatively, is also an expression of his sense of honesty. "He always presented his certainties as certainties, and his probabilities as probabilities, without falling into the easy trick of changing one for the other," remarks Romero, and adds: "His ultimate possibilities he kept to himself."[13]

Korn had a deep aversion to external authority in matters of conscience and was as fearful of posing as an authority himself as he was zealous in combating the unwarranted authority of others. Romero points out that words which Korn wrote concerning Kant are really an expression of his own creed and determination: "He (Kant) did not embody his metaphysical faith in formulae. In silencing his ultimate and personal intuitions (sentires) he abstained from creating a new dogmatic authority."[14] There is undoubtedly much truth in what Romero has brought out at this point, yet it seems to this writer that Korn went farther in the direction of silencing his own metaphysical postulates than can be accounted for by this explanation. In his writings, and outside of the classroom of a secular university, he might have shared his deepest convictions without compromising honesty so long as he continued to make it clear that the things of which he spoke were matters of personal faith and not of knowledge. The further reason for Korn's metaphysical reticence, it appears to this writer, is to be found in Korn's profound metaphysical agnosticism. It was an agnosticism which did not go to the extremes of cynicism or real despair, but was sufficient

to lead Korn to hesitate to speak. He was not ready to share with others convictions which were not stable within himself.

To the influence of Korn, the outstanding teacher, we must add the influence of Korn, the friend, if we are to understand his impact upon his students. Romero says that Korn had a gift for friendship and the capacity to unite others about him. Those who were friends of Korn were friends among themselves "as if the friendship of 'Don Alejandro' was a countersign which permitted them to appreciate each other."[15]. Korn, declares Romero, "was admired and he was loved, and those who were near to him did not separate their admiration from their love in their relation with the master."[16]. It was a part of the secret of the attraction of Korn that he had the faculty of bringing out the best in the persons who surrounded him, according to Romero. Vassallo says of him that he was "the stimulator of spiritual vocations."[17]. Surely this gift for friendship and the capacity for awakening consciences explains the deep personal influence of Korn over his students. If we add to this the efficiency of Korn as a teacher, we can understand how it is that Korn must be considered a landmark in Argentine philosophy, "even if he had never written one page." The success of Korn's students is the success of Korn himself.

Korn did not create a "school of philosophy" about himself. But he did impart certain basic directions of thought which are the common possession of his students. It is interesting to note that Korn's students have gone beyond him at a number of points, each in his own direction, yet holding fast to the central insights of the master. These central insights were squarely opposed to the currents of positivism which were dominant when Korn began his teaching career. In the overcoming of positivism in

Argentina, it is Korn's influence which is uppermost. "Korn, more than anyone else among us has contributed to a fundamental philosophical renewal,"[18] says Romero. Fortunately for those who were not privileged to know him, Korn did leave many written pages where we can learn what the main directions of his thought were, and with the testimonies of his students regarding his personal influence, reconstruct for ourselves the message and importance of this master in the philosophical history of Hispanic America.

C. THE PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCE OF KORN

(A Kantian Socrates in Argentina)

Perhaps the strongest impression produced by the writings of Alejandro Korn is the clarity of definition and expression which we have already noted. This attention to precision and clarity must be seen in the context in which Korn had to work. When Korn began his teaching career in philosophy, positivism was regnant everywhere except in the Roman Catholic seminaries and schools which were still clinging to the teaching of scholasticism. It is amazing to think that Korn, himself a scientist, trained during the hey-day of scientism in Argentina should have seen so clearly the fallacies of positivism, yet it seems evident that Korn's opposition to positivism pre-dates his earliest teaching. This opposition was an independent one; Korn was not a Catholic. From the evidence of his earliest writings we can see that Korn believed that positivism had inaugurated an era of confusion both in the realm of thought and in ethics. Positivism, he believed, was destroying the moral bases of society by confusing the good with the useful, and even more serious, by imposing a concept of determinism it was denying the very freedom without which there can be no ethics. The basic task of philosophy,

in his mind, was to impart a guiding sense of values, but a proper sense of values is impossible without clear thinking. And so Korn set himself to the task of teaching how to think; a Socratic task. He did not try to reach the entire nation, as did Alfonso Caso of Mexico, but his students only, yet he was not less earnest than Caso in his purpose. His great weapons in his campaign were precisely those of Socrates; first, definition, and after definition, irony.

How did Korn escape the positivist influence? In the absence of direct autobiographical testimony we can only surmise, but it seems safe to venture that Korn's freedom from positivism was a direct reflection of the influence of Immanuel Kant. Korn, for whom German was a mother tongue, must have read Kant while still a young man for the marks of the "Critique of Pure Reason" are evident from his earliest writings. For Korn the "Critique of Pure Reason" is like a great watershed in the history of thought. He believed that Kant's analyses have firmly fixed the boundaries of thought making it impossible for philosophy to pretend to dogmatic certainty in metaphysics, whether on the basis of supposed inductive premises or a priori deductions. He was the "great demolisher", the one who had destroyed the authority both of theology and of reason as pathways to metaphysical knowledge. After Kant there could no longer be any thought of knowledge except within the bounds of empirical data. At the same time Kant had established the legitimate place of metaphysics as a construct of faith, and as an inevitable activity of the human mind. The nineteenth century, Korn believed, had erred in neglecting the teachings of Kant, falling as a consequence, into two great stages in which philosophy was dominated by erroneous concepts; first a period attempting an impossible romantic reconstruction of metaphysics, and

second, the stage in which a pseudo science was attempting to destroy all metaphysics but actually imposing a new metaphysic of mechanistic determinism. To use the words of Korn:

> "The nineteenth century neglected this teaching (Kant's): it was tormented by the obsession to overcome the prudent antinomies of Kant, first in the romantic reconstruction of metaphysics and then in the positivist repudiation...The idealist speculation of the romantics, absorbed in transcendental visions, forgetful of the empirical world, ignored the plebeian existence of mathematics and the greatest of its systems attempted to dissolve the physical process of nature in the dialectical process. (Hegel) Then inversely, positivism tried to take mathematics to spheres where neither the categories of space nor of quantity have any authority and tried to create a physical sociology and a physical psychology as if the human personality were a factor of no account."[19].

Korn, in other words, derived from Kant the critical principles which were to guide him in his attempt to teach others the ways of clear thinking. Because the greatest confusion of his day lay in the confused relations of science and metaphysics, Korn turned his principal attention to the errors of positivism, without neglecting, however, to criticize all attempts to revive the notions of a metaphysical "knowledge."

As we have noted, Korn tried to combat the prevailing misconceptions by insisting on sound and clearcut definitions. Not that Korn had an ingenuous faith in the power of intellectual definitions; he did not, but he did see that the philosopher's first responsibility is to think clearly. Korn's works abound in definitions, and one of his chief works, the Apuntes Filosóficos, is an attempt to clarify the basic working definitions of philosophy. The most important of Korn's working definitions is his definition of science. "Science," he held "is the mathematical interpretation of objective reality."[20]. It is therefore necessarily limited to that which can

be measured. Psychic processes, historical processes, value; all that which is outside of the spatial order, even though it is developed in time, is outside of the competence of science. In keeping with this definition, Korn is ruthless in his repudiation of all attempts to claim the authority of science for conclusions or premises which are not of the sphere of time and space. There are no such things as "sociological laws". Axiology and ontology cannot be sciences. He would like to restrict the name of science strictly to the physical and natural sciences, the only ones that deal with the measurable.[21] It is in line with this definition that he criticizes the overweening pretensions of positivism.

Positivism had claimed to put an end to all metaphysics. In reality, held Korn, it was seeking to impress its own metaphysic under the pretext of substituting metaphysics for science. Korn was a master scholar, and he differentiates clearly between the various forms of positivism. But there was, he claims, a "common base" in all positivist theories "the mechanistic conception of the universe and the common pretention of a scientific rigor in their conclusions."[22] "Positivism," wrote Korn, "boasted of its anti-metaphysical attitude; as a matter of fact it was saturated with a shame-faced metaphysics. It did not lack, it had an excess of metaphysics. Swayed by an absolute preconception, it pretended no less than to find the "epiphenomenon of the conscience', an algebraic formula analagous to the equations of physics and chemistry."[23] Korn believed that this attempt to find an organic cause for all psychic phenomena, to chain the conscience in causal link with the physical world could only spell the end of concepts of the freedom and dignity of the human personality. It was a myth, but a dangerous myth, to be combated by incessant insistence on the lack of authority

of science to make any pronouncements of finality in the analysis of the conduct of man. In trying to preserve the notion of freedom Korn was moved by a conviction that without freedom there could be no ethics. Writes Korn:

> "The mechanist concept, in suppressing liberty, also suppressed the sine qua non condition of all ethics. The positivist attempts to supply these deficincies with a theory of customs or of social instincts could not be satisfactory in the long run because the identification of the moral with the useful in the end justified all egoisms and constituted the subject in the idle witness of his own acts. The founders of positivism abounded in dialectical efforts to save ethics but in the logical evolution of the doctrine we come to the point where amorality is openly proclaimed with certain boastfulness and pride. Before the evident impossibility of founding an ethic, they end by declaring it superfluous!"[24].

Korn's careful delineation of the sphere of science cleared the way for his interpretation of the functions of metaphysics and axiology. Interestingly enough, Korn does not have a standard definition of metaphysics, as he does of science. In the Apuntes Filosóficos he declares: "Metaphysics supposes an intelligible knowledge without empirical content."[25]. We must note the words "supposes", for Korn makes it clear that the "knowledge" of metaphysics is not knowledge in the strict and scientific sense, but it is really a form of faith. "Metaphysics offers," he declares, "systems which are not the expression of the demonstrated but hypothetical constructions of the creative imagination...They are works of art, dialectical poems, ideal symbols."[26]. Criticizing the pretension of the Argentine positivist, José Ingenieros that the metaphysic of the future must be based on science Korn answers: "Metaphysics is not science--then it is something else. What is that? It is art, it can be nothing other than a dialectical poem. Yet thou believed not."[27].

Metaphysics is an inescapable activity of man; for man is the metaphysical animal. It emerges from the need of man to comprehend the whole of existence. Man cannot help asking himself questions: "How shall we find the relation of the particular to the universal, of the ephemeral to the eternal, of existence to Being?"[28]. The answers are beyond the domain of science, beyond the realm of time and space, and "to affirm something outside of time and space is to affirm a metaphysical concept. It is to posit the ontological problem, or the problem of being."[29]. But although metaphysics is something inescapable, "it is something different from the empirical knowledge of reality."[30].

Faithful to this concept of metaphysics Korn rejected all contemporary attempts to revive the notion of an ontological knowledge. He studied with care the philosophy of Husserl and the various attempts to apply his methodology to the investigation of values and the notions of the absolute. His conclusion was to reaffirm the Kantian epistemology, to admit the indispensability and validity of the concepts of intuition in the apprehension of empirical knowledge at the same time refusing to admit the competence of the intuition beyond that point. At one time it seems he was greatly tempted by Bergson's use of the intuition as a window to the apprehension of ultimate reality. Writing about the philosophy of Bergson in 1926 Korn states:

> "A great lesson is derived from this study: not reason but an immediate intuition, permits us to reach the absolute unity, whose creative impulse renews each instant its work over the ruins of the past and like a torrent of life suffuses itself through the multiplicity of beings."[31].

But in 1935, assessing again the contribution of Bergson, he describes the vision of the French metaphysician and declares: "I retreat before it,"

only to add, wistfully---"If persons cannot renounce the transcendent and anthropomorphic myth--very well, let it be this one. It is the most beautiful. It affirms the solidarity of all living beings; it calls us to cooperate without truce in the ascendent evolution of life."[32]. Also in 1935 in publishing the Apuntes Filosóficos he gives his final judgment regarding the validity of the intuition, clearly distinguishing between the empirical intuition and the extra-empirical concepts:

> "Actual facts are intuited; when they are bodies, through the senses; when they are modes of feeling (estados de ánimo), by immediate perception. This capacity to become aware of spacial and temporal facts is called intuition. We intuit the sensible. Unfortunately the term intuition is also used in a figurative sense and is applied to the vision of the ideal. We speak then of intellectual, poetical, or mystical intuition. These are mental processes which are very different and to identify them with intuition properly speaking, gives rise to deplorable ambiguities. In reality there is no intuition except of the existent, that is, the spatial and temporal."[33].

In other words, Korn returns to the concept of intuition as Kant conceived it, as a "synthetic apperception," to the definition he employed in his essay "La Libertad Creadora" (Creative Liberty) written in 1922 when he said: "In every case I understand by intuition the evident fact, the spontaneous and immediate knowledge constituted in unity by the synthetic apperception."[34]. The intuition, no more than logic, cannot lead us to metaphysical certainty. We must construct our visions of ultimate reality, but "not as a science; we must put in them all the sincerity of our convictions without attributing to them a dogmatic validity."[35]. This conclusion Korn presses at times almost to the point of skepticism. Mindful that the knowledge of science is only a knowledge of the particular and that all generalizations are necessarily relative he exclaims. "We become aware that our knowledge is deficient and then we transfer to something absolute this world of purely relative

relations, accidental. We experience the need for metaphysics, but we do not possess the means to satisfy it."[36].

The distinction Korn made between science and metaphysics is clear cut. But the distinction which Korn attempted to make between metaphysics and religion is not so clear. Indeed, when pressed, Korn's thought at this point reveals a basic confusion. It is one of the two weakest parts of his philosophy. In the Apuntes Filosóficos we find the most extensive discussion of this issue. Both metaphysics and religion, in Korn's mind, involve myth creations. Both hypostathize in order to reach their concepts of reality, that is to say, they posit "the creation of entities which are outside of the reality of time-space."[37]. A myth is a hypostasis which is given a sustained character. "When, as occurs in the beginning, emotional impulses prevail, the myths take on a religious character."[38]. As culture advances the poetic fiction involved in the religious myth is perceived, "then the critical examination replaces the poetic creations of the imaginations by logical creations."[39]. "Both metaphysics and religious longing," Korn adds, "have a common root, which is the problem of the connection between the ephemeral and the eternal; but in the religious sphere the sentimental attitude predominates and in the metaphysical it is the intellectual problem."[40]. Having said this, Korn recognizes immediately that "even in the most logical work, alogical elements filter in, consciously or unconsciously,--frequently the very metaphysical myth returns to take refuge in the bosom of faith."[41]. But when, we may ask, remembering Korn's expositions on this very point in other passages, did metaphysics ever leave the bosom of faith? A myth creation, as we have seen, always involves a hypostasis, and a hypostasis, according to Korn, "can never be the object of an experience its affirmation

being an act of faith." "To endow a concept with existence," he declares in italics, "is no longer an operation of logic. This miracle can only be realized by faith. That faith does not yield a knowledge but it does impart a personal conviction."[42]. From the moment that Korn is willing to call metaphysics a myth and to admit the hypostasis involved in all metaphysical speculation he admits the play of faith in metaphysics. When we examine closely Korn's distinction between metaphysics and religion we find that it is purely one of the relative degrees of sentiment or rationality. The strange part of this is that Korn never ceased hoping to find some metaphysical solution to the problems which disquieted him, but seems to have turned his back to religion, at least in all its historic forms, and in particular to the idea of revelation. The conclusion seems evident that having rejected religion, Korn also cut himself off from the possibility of a metaphysical conviction. Both, in his mind, involved a leap of faith, and it was the leap of faith which he was unable to take. This is the point to which we shall have to return in our final evaluation of his work.

Perhaps it is too much to have expected of Korn that he should think as clearly in the field of religion as in philosophy. For Korn always viewed Christianity from the outside, and the significance and power of Christianity are never understood until it is experienced as a way of life. Korn's agnosticism barred him from this experience, and thus he remained to the end a Kantian Socrates in Argentina, knowing only that he could not know. But that, it must be recognized, was a great improvement over the muddled positivists whose proud "knowledge" contained such a large measure of delusion.

D. THE ADVOCATE OF CREATIVE LIBERTY

Francisco Romero, in a penetrating article entitled "Skepticism and Relativism," makesthe shrewd observation that the skeptic's attitude is always negative, but that a relativist may have a basically constructive attitude. In the words of Romero: "The skeptic studies the results of knowledge in order to discuss them and invalidate them, while the critic of the reason turns to them in order to study their functioning and to discover its secret resources and its limits."[43]. These words apply to Alejandro Korn no less than to Kant. If, as we have seen, Korn displays an agnosticism in metaphysics which verges on skepticism, he nevertheless had a constructive attitude toward philosophy and life. Korn never thought of himself as a skeptic, and in truth, despised skepticism. "Though skepticism is, to be sure," he declared, "the strongest logical position, it is also the most wretched philosophy. It is as necessary to understand it as to overcome it."[44]. Korn had one basic and unshakable conviction, strong enough to account for what Romero calls his "reflexive optimism."[45]. This conviction was that man is a being of worth and dignity because he is a center of creative liberty. Angel Vassallo sees Korn's philosophy as "one continuous meditation concerning Liberty."[46]. We have already noted that his polemic against positivism responded largely to his passion for the defense of man's freedom. This concept of liberty is the subject of his most significant philosophical essay, which he entitled "La Libertad Creadora"--"Creative Liberty."

"La Libertad Creadora" is a small philosophical masterpiece. In the development of his theme Korn takes his stand on the Kantian theory of knowledge, rejecting both ingenuous realism and absolute idealism.[47]. We know

nothing, he holds, except that which is given to us in our consciousness. Consciousness reveals to us ourselves as subject, and also a world which is outside of the subject. We recognize the existence of that which is "I" and that which is "not I". "But though the external world is outside of the I, it is not outside of consciousness."[48]. Realism makes the confusion of considering the consciousness as the epiphenomenon of the outside world, as nothing more than the passive reduplication of the external denying all autonomy to the subject. Absolute idealism, on the other hand, supposes the world to be nothing more than the projection of the I, like Rostand's cock who believed the sun would not rise unless he crowed."[49]. Korn believes that he overcomes the subjectivist fallacy of absolute idealism by positing this dualism in the consciousness between the I and the external world of empirical reality, but he refuses to hypostatize either subject or object, holding that they are both abstractions[50], until they come together in consciousness in the creative act of apperception.

Korn accepts the Kantian categories of thought as the necessary preconditions of the process of knowing and of reasoning, but these categories have no content for him, they are but the necessary scaffolding. The categories, without intuition, are empty. Knowledge takes place only by means of an intuitive act, a "synthetic apperception", but within the conditions prescribed by the categories of thought.

Korn's entire theory of knowledge, as we can see, is aimed to protect the freedom of the subject against the tyranny of the empirical world. For Korn follows Kant in holding that the phenomenal world is subject to the law of casualty with its rigid determinism. But because the subject is independent of the external world and subject to its own determinations the external

world cannot trespass upon the citadel of conscience which is a center of freedom. In the words of Korn:

> "The external world obeys necessary norms, laws. The subjective world has no laws, it is free. In the first there develops mechanically a series of necessitated acts which can be predicted. In the second there acts a will that wills what it wishes and whose resolutions cannot be predicted. The former obeys the lost causes of the past. The latter responds to finalities projected toward the future....In the actualizations of the physical order, effect and cause are linked inexorably as in a causal chain, without purpose, or finality, amorally and impassibly. The subject, on the other hand, trembles with pain or joy, he affirms or denies, he forms purposes, forges ideals, institutes values and subordinates his conduct to the ends which he pursues."[51].

In this sharp contrast Korn recognizes an antinomy between necessity and freedom, an antinomy which is present in the consciousness where both the external world under the law of necessity and the subject with its freedom have to meet. It is a point to which he has to return, as must we.

In the freedom of the subject, Korn finds the highest and most distinctive characteristic of man. "Freedom, then," he writes, "is the intrinsic characteristic of the subject; to affirm it is the most genuine expression of his being; personality and freedom are two names for the same fact."[52]. Korn does not believe that this freedom can be demonstrated by logic, nor does he think liberty can be adequately defined. The description he prefers for it is simply "the absence of coercion."[53]. "Freedom", he says "is known intuitively." "Let whoever does not know it by the immediate testimony of his conscience," he adds, "resign himself not to understand me."[54].

In describing freedom as "an absence of coercion" Korn does not go on to speak of the freedom man knows as something absolute. The freedom of

the subject for Korn is manifested as a freedom of choice; but the freedom to actualize our desire is limited by the laws of necessity. Thus in contrast to the fashion of the positivists who followed Locke in defining freedom as "the power to act according to our wishes" but who denied the freedom to select the object of desire, Korn affirms the freedom of the will to choose the object of desire but denies the power to actualize it. As Korn puts it: "His (man's) freedom is to will, not to do...The subject is autonomous, but not sovereign."[55]

To actualize one's freedom then becomes the very meaning of life for Korn. There are two basic directions in which man needs to actualize his freedom: the first is in the direction of economic liberty, which is the dominion of man over the world of nature; and the second is in the direction of ethical liberty, which is the dominion of man over himself. Says Korn:

> "To actualize absolute freedom by the conquest of economic dominion over nature, and by ethical dominion of the self, to submit necessity to liberty, to reach the full development of one's own personality: there is the goal."[56]

Angel Vassallo feels that Korn in coming to this point and making it an absolute, in spite of his frequent disavowals of metaphysical conclusion, really made of liberty a metaphysical concept. He quotes the words of Korn which give the title of this essay as evidence:

> "For our freedom we have struggled since we left the shadow of animality; for it we continue pressing. When the conquest is ended freedom and necessity will have been conciliated. The conscience will be at peace with itself, the final doubt will have been stilled. Not meanwhile; philosophy does not have the final word because life is action,--perpetual task and not a theorem. Theories march haltingly behind actions. But the principle which moves these acts...we have already named it: let us call it

creative liberty."[57]

Stating a similar conclusion, eight years later, in his essay "Axiología", Korn made bold to go ever farther; declaring:

> "Perhaps the reader still has a question, because it is not within the limits of this essay. Let us try to answer it. The Personality is, within the empirical, an ultimate term. Its roots penetrate into the metaphysical ground of things and the complete realization of Liberty would identify us with the Absolute. I, said he, I am the alpha and the omega."[58] (Capitals are Korn's)

Vassallo's point would seem to be well taken: Korn had a metaphysic; it is the metaphysics of creative liberty. But Korn himself never acknowledges it as such.

E. THE PHILOSOPHER OF RELATIVE VALUES

After the essay on "Creative Liberty" Korn's most important philosophical work is the article which he has entitled "Axiología." It contains Korn's attempt to set forth, in systematic fashion, his theory of values. The conclusions of this essay are most disappointing. They do not represent the strong ethical sense of Korn at its highest. To do justice to Korn as an ethicist we must take into account Korn's total work and the impact of his personality as well. But we can in no way afford to neglect what Korn has presented as the fruit of his ethical reflections in the "Axiology."

Korn held, particularly in his later years, that philosophy is virtually synonymous with axiology. Despairing of the possibility of knowing the ultimate reality of things or comprehending the totality of the universe, he proposed that philosophy be dissociated from ontology and cosmology and restrict itself to investigation of the subject, which for him meant that it

should become an axiology.[59] Cosmology, he suggests, should be left to the hypotheses of the scientists. Ontology is something for the poetic imagination rather than for reason. Without cosmology or ontology what is left for philosophy is axiology.

Korn does not linger long in the "Axiology" in what is today being called "philosophical anthropology." The striking thing he finds in man is that instead of molding himself to his environment man seeks to mold the environment to his own ends. "Man," he declares "is the rebellious animal."[60] Having an autonomy and a will of his own, man always has his own reaction in the face of facts and events. To every object and circumstance he can respond in a negative or positive fashion: "I desire, I desire not"; "It pleases me, it displeases me." Man is the evaluating subject. Hence the object of philosophy being the subject, the theme of philosophy becomes man's value judgment, i.e. axiology.[61]

Korn defines a value judgment (valoración) as "the reaction of a human will before a fact;" (hecho--a word which can also be translated act), while a value he defines as "the object of an affirmative value judgment."[62] Analyzing the values which man has pursued through the ages Korn distinguishes seven basic groups. Each of these groups he identifies in relation to its central concept of value and the opposite negative concept; and he links each to its ideal end, to its historical value, and to its illustration in some philosophical systematization. The whole he embodies in a chart, as shown here on the following page, making up a table of values. Korn then follows the device of setting forth in succession, first the claims of each of these groups of values to be the supreme value, and then the arguments against the claim. It is a device in which, presumably, by taking both the

TABLE OF VALUES

	Criterion of Value	Fundamental Concept	Ideal Ends	Historical Values	Example of Philosophical Systematization
I.	Economic	Useful Harmful	Welfare	Technique	Utilitarianism
II.	Instinctive	Agreeable Disagreeable	Happiness	Pleasure	Hedonism
III.	Erotic	Lovable Odious	Love	Family	Mysticism
IV.	Vital	Select Vulgar	Power	Discipline	Pragmatism
V.	Social	Permissible Prohibited	Justice	Law	Sociological systems
VI.	Religious	Sacred Profane	Saintliness	The Cult	Scholasticism
VII.	Ethical	Good Bad	The Good	Morals	Stoicism
VIII.	Logical	True False	Truth	Knowledge	Rationalism
IX.	Esthetic	Beautiful Ugly	Beauty	Art	Intuition

63.

positive and the negative sides in the debate, Korn avoids the necessity of expressing his personal judgment or establishing a hierarchy of values. Nevertheless, it is impossible, because of their similarity with parallel expressions in other parts of his writings, not to see the opinion of Korn in the rebuttal of some of the claims to supremacy in value. Let us note here a series of rebuttals which have the ring of judgment:

> "Economic value is not the highest value...In an advanced culture the concept of welfare (advanced by bourgeois utilitarianism), ceases to be an end and becomes a means to the realization of more desirable ends..."64.

> "Pleasure is a vain word. It lacks all objective content...Pleasure is a vulgar and subordinate value..."65.

> "That among the psychological elements which enter into the value judgment there is frequently a sentimental impulse which is more or less powerful, is undeniable. That this impulse, when it is or simulates being altruistic, must overrule the will, without restriction, is open to discussion... Love is dignified when it is the object of higher values."66.

> "The exaltation of life in itself has no meaning... Life can only be affirmed if a higher finality puts in it the apollonian serenity of measure, integrity, and equanimity."67.

Korn's rejection of the claim of the primacy of the religious values is of particular interest in the opinion of this writer:

> "In spite of all efforts to apprehend it rationalized in logical molds, faith (i.e. religion) remains subjective and variable; yesterday's faith, and someone else's faith is sometimes called superstition. We except the faith which the reader may profess."68.

(The last statement is placed there without parenthesis, with apparent seriousness but with obvious irony.) He then continues:

> "What has been sanctified with a religious valuation? From the most barbaric acts to the highest ideals. Behind

> religious values there are concealed excessively human values, selfish, sectarian, social or political interest... When sincere, the religious vision stamps its austere character to the whole of human personality, but upon spreading itself out in myths, precepts, and rites, it dissipates itself in subordinate evaluations."[69]

To the notion that truth is the highest value, Korn's negative speaker replies with the question of Pilate, "What is truth?"[70]. But when we come to the consideration of esthetics as the highest value, we meet with the greatest surprise of all, the negative speaker has nothing to answer except a cryptic "so may it be."[71]

It might well have been thought, in view of ideas expressed elsewhere, that Korn would have inclined to the idea of making ethical values uppermost.[72] What happens is that Korn's negative speaker suggests that the notion of the good is a purely abstract term, and that we cannot know what the good is in the concrete instance. But Korn, at this point, is not satisfied to leave the argument with the negative speaker, and a third speaker intervenes, whom we can presume to speak for Korn himself. He agrees that the good cannot be identified with any particular act or acts, but he denies that the concept of the good has no meaning. Virtually paraphrasing Kant's dictum that there is "nothing good save a good will," Korn declares: "The ethical value is only applicable to a will, to a disposition (estado de ánimo), only to an actor and not to an act, not even to a precept, to an imperative, or to the norm which pretends to rule it." And here Korn again identifies ethics with freedom: "The ethical impulse is a liberation of an instinctive impulse, the drawing away from the animal automatism, an attempt to assume a dominion over one's own acts. To realize the ethical idea is synonymous with autarchy."[73] But Korn fails to give any real content to

this ethical will, apart from the notion of liberation from the bondage of instinct. As Angel Vassallo suggests, "by ethics Korn seems to mean a mere independence of the impulses to realize a---whatever---discipline which the will has fixed upon itself; ethics of a 'gentlemen', let us say."74. Korn goes somewhat farther than Vassallo and indicates when he opposes the ethical not only to the coercion of instinct but also to the human tendency toward egoism. "When the drama of life," he declares, provokes a conflict between discordant tendencies and the will superimposes itsenergy to the natural egoism we have an ethical act....The ethical attitude supposes a conscious abnegation, the real sacrifice of a passionate, perhaps legitimate impulse."75. But Korn ends this passage by speaking of the "impossibility of establishing an ethical value which is the same for all. The autonomous personality obeys only its own law."76.

Having analyzed all the arguments for and against the various groups of values Korn returns again to speak unmistakably for himself. The real unity in the concept of values, Korn suggests, is not to be found in a hierarchical arrangement of them, but in a synthetic concept which is common to all. It is man himself who creates values and who accords them their validity, and outside of man's subjective appreciation there are no values. "The effective valuation," he states, "lies in the tribunal of conscience, and above the conscience there is no judge."77. Aware of the trend in contemporary German philosophy toward the acceptance of objectivism in ethics, he analyzes the arguments in that direction and decidedly rejects them. "There are no values independent of the value judgment,"78 he reaffirms. The conclusion, then, is that values are purely subjective creations. Outside of the autonomous conscience, there is no real point of reference. And since

there can be no possibility of "an ethical value which is the same for all," ethics are necessarily relative in character.

Now, Korn, far from being dismayed at this conclusion regarding the relativity of values seems to rejoice in it, because he interprets the conclusion regarding the subjective character of values to be a clear illustration of the supreme fact of creative liberty. The evidence for the liberty of the personality which Korn had found in the conclusion that the act of empirical apperception is not the imposition of the external world but represents a creative activity of consciousness is now repeated for him in the conclusion that the values man lives by are not an imposition either. They are the exclusive creation of his conscience which determines its own ends and ideals. What we have surrendered in abandoning the notions of the stability and universality of values, he would seem to suggest, is more than offset by what we have gained in the recognition of the exceeding greatness of the freedom of the personality.

It becomes obvious at this point, though Korn seems not to recognize it, that the concept of liberty in his "axiology" has become more than just a mere unifying concept, it has become no less than another value, and the very highest value. As Korn himself expresses it: "All value judgments emerge from one source and tend to the same end. They affirm the autonomy of the Personality, they pursue its emancipation from all bondage, that is, its liberation as the common and ultimate end."79. Translating this conclusion to the field of ethical values we merely need to assert what Korn has already stated: "To realize the ethical idea is synonymous with autarchy."80. In other words, to use the classic expression, freedom itself is the "summum bonun". Whence it must follow that it is "beyond good and evil." It is

permissible to wonder if Korn realized how close he stood at this point to the individualism of Stirner!

But having reached this apotheosis of the individual will, the axiology of Korn comes to a curious and sudden debacle! It begins as Korn raises the possible criticism to his theory of the danger in an ethic in which there are "no fixed and obligatory values;" to which he answers immediately: "Well, there never have been; they do not exist."81. Then he goes on to suggest that we should not be greatly concerned about the danger "since values have always been subjective in character but not for that reason has humanity fallen into anarchy."82. The reason why it has not is that man is a gregarious animal and does not care to violate the standards which have been sanctified by the approval of the group. Says Korn graphically:

> "Without feeling repressed, he (man) will recite the liturgical formula which he has been taught, he will bow down to the current juridical norm, he will repeat the accepted passwords, and will dress according to the prevailing fashion."83.

Man only rebels, he tells us, as the result of a deep dissatisfaction, and his rebellious judgments establish new norms only when they are shared by a considerable group and win the assent of history:

> "The rebellious value judgment, if it appears, will run a risk. Only in an oppressed conscience is there born a protest; it is generalized when many experience the same coercion. But a subjective value judgment will die without consequences if through brief or long struggle it does not acquire historic dignity. The expression of a general will, in order to be efficacious, must elevate itself to the expression of the will of a more or less extensive group."84.

And how shall the selection of the permanence of value judgments be effected? It is the question Korn asks and he answers:

> "The selection is verified by the historic process; those prevail which triumph. Not always do the most just triumph, that is to say, ours (!) In order to propitiate them we recur to ratiocination, to persuasion, to the coincidence of interests or to authority if we possess it."[85].

All of which means that Korn has come to precisely the same conclusions as the positivist moralists whom he had so consistently criticized. The positivists had insisted that man is moral because he is social;---Korn calls him gregarious---and that morals are the result of social experience---Korn calls it the historic process. From a Nietzschean apotheosis of the autonomy of the will[86]. he has tumbled to an apology, in sociological fashion, for the "morality of the herd."

And so for the second time we can see how the philosophy of Korn has gone on the rocks. The first time, in skepticism over the possibilities of metaphysics he concluded by suggesting that philosophy be limited to axiology, referring cosmology to the scientists and ontology to the poets. Now in order to protect ethics from the possible anarchy resulting from pure individualism he turns to the general norms of society, thereby turning axiology over to the sociologists and historians, whom he thinks must be aided by the pedagogians. Writes Korn:

> "Value judgments do not obey the theoretical concepts of a professor of philosophy; they are the work of concrete becoming, the synthesis of the successful experiments and of the errors of rational beings perturbed by alogical impulses. We find ourselves before a problem of the utmost gravity, but rather pragmatic than philosophical. Its solution corresponds to Pedagogy. Pedagogy is to axiology what applied science is to pure science. It will determine the values which are preferred in practice."[87].

This is a tragic outcome after the years of brilliant criticism of the ethics of the positivists.

And once again we can see that Korn's philosophy could only have been saved by the acceptance of something "given,"; by the acceptance of the existence of values that do not merely rise in the unstable recesses of the individual conscience or imagination, but which represent the expression of a higher will and law and which can be accorded an objective validity. This higher will, the Christian finds, is the will of the Holy God.

F. A CRITICAL CONCLUSION

The significance of Alejandro Korn in Argentine and Hispanic American philosophy can only be evaluated in the context of the time and the circumstances in which he labored. It is in such a study as the present one, coming to Korn after a detailed study of the positivist literature that we gain the best perspective from which to estimate the importance and significance of this Kantian Socrates in Argentina. To read Korn after months of continuous reading of positivist literature is like going from the grey dusk of morning to the clear light of day. There are pages in Korn where he is confused and equivocal, but in the bulk of his writings, and especially in his critical works, his judgments are clear and penetrating. The positivists had capitulated to the dogmas of scientism. Claiming the authority of science they had sought to impose a mechanistic conception of the universe which denied freedom and reduced ethics to the level of utilitarian conveniences. Korn fought this scientism, insisting on the illegitimacy of scientific pretentions in metaphysics and proclaiming the freedom of the human personality. By his superlative scholarship, his effectiveness as a teacher,

his power as a writer, and above all, by the power of his influence as a friend and revered example, Korn became the most important philosopher in Argentina. He forced his students and readers to rethink their premises, and among his followers, he cleared the rank growth of positivist conceptions. Even though he failed to develop a satisfactory metaphysics, even for himself, by calling attention to the need for metaphysics he helped to rid the country of the positivist prejudice against metaphysics, and stimulated a new metaphysical consciousness. Though he did not approve of them, he helped to disseminate the new metaphysical directions of European philosophy.

Perhaps Korn's great service to Argentine philosophy can be summarized by saying that by making the principles of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" his own, and applying them with great effectiveness in criticism, the importance of Korn to Argentina is parallel to the importance of Kant for the whole of modern philosophy. Kant, as the history of philosophy since the "Critique of Pure Reason" demonstrates, is the necessary starting point of all modern effort to philosophize. Luis Aznar, one of Korn's students, has summarized the significance of Korn by saying: "Herein lies the importance of the teaching of Alejandro Korn. He constitutes an epoch, a meridian; he may be surpassed, he must be surpassed, perhaps he has already been surpassed: but it will always be necessary to adopt his point of departure when it is desired to meditate philosophically."[88] Korn without doubt, marks the turning point in the history of Argentine philosophy. Now with the widespread dissemination of his works throughout Hispanic America, his influence in Argentina is in many ways being reduplicated throughout the continent.

But Aznar is right. Even as we recognize the importance of Korn we must surpass him! In our critical examination of Korn's writings we have pointed

to two areas where Korn shows weakness and confusion, and where it is necessary to revise his standpoint, and to go beyond him. It is not too much to say that at these points Korn's philosophy goes on the rocks since he himself proposes that these areas be abandoned by philosophy. Since these areas of confusion comprise two great divisions of philosophy, metaphysics and axiology Korn's philosophy, as a constructive body of thought, does not really survive the wreckage. Korn was a great critic in philosophy, but his constructive power was not equal to his analytical power and in the end it is he himself who provides the critical arguments which nullify his constructive proposals. In his criticisms Korn comes to a point, both in metaphysics and axiology, where these can be rescued only by a leap of faith, but Korn refused to consider the alternative of faith seriously as a possibility for philosophy, and thus had to permit his philosophy to come to disaster. We must review this denouement with the greatest possible care.

The first area in which Korn's philosophy reaches a crisis is metaphysics. Angel Vassallo expresses an irrefutable conclusion when he observes that "Korn's concept of metaphysics is always unprecise and poor in content."[89] We have suggested that the reason for this poverty of content in Korn's metaphysics is related directly to his prejudice against religion. Korn recognized that a definite metaphysical position involves a venture of faith, akin to the religious venture. Korn tried to distinguish between religion and metaphysics by suggesting that religion involves a sentimental and volitional step while metaphysics is a logical and rational movement. But Korn was too honest to insist on this distinction. When Korn spoke of replacing "the poetic creations of the imagination (religion) by logical creations," (metaphysics),[90] he gave the case away for he was immediately forced to re-

cognize, as he characteristically did, that the logical reason does not create. The function of logic is regulative and not constitutive; in logic the major premise must always be given. Korn's conclusion was that metaphysics is also, like religion, a poetic creation. Though it is purified by reflection, metaphysics is impossible without initial a priori or intuitive assumptions. But Korn was unwilling to grant philosophical validity to what he believed to be the work of mere imagination; he rejected the dependence on the "poetic intuition" as the foundation for an intellectually respectable metaphysical structure; hence his rejection of Bergson, whose system he came nearest to adopting, and of all metaphysics. Within Korn's critical premises there can be no faith in metaphysics without faith in faith. Metaphysics dissolves under the light of skepticism unless we believe that that which we conceive with the imagination is not purely imaginary, but corresponds to the nature of ultimate reality. The only way in which we can break the circle of subjectivism, in which all our tenets are doomed to the fate of mere subjective projections, is to believe that somehow the Reality which is not ourselves has communicated its nature to us. The only philosophical alternative to solipsism is revelation. The Christian who believes that the ultimate Reality is a Divine Person who can and has communicated himself with man takes that alternative. Alejandro Korn disdained the testimony of Christianity.

Korn's attitude toward religion is quite contradictory. Even as he granted the inescapability of metaphysical conjectures he granted the corresponding inevitability of religious sentiments. Repeatedly he manifested respect for the religious outlook as a legitimate expression of mankind. But at the same time he expressed a subtle contempt for all the historic

expressions of religion, and for Christianity in particular. He seems to have viewed Christianity through the eyes of Nietzsche, as an Oriental life-denying, negativistic creed. He interpreted its message as an invitation of escape from the world of realities to the life of the cloister, and thought of the ethics of Christianity as a counsel of weak resignation. He regarded the hopes of Christianity as suitable props for the weak but unnecessary for the strong. "The cane that supports human weakness," he declared, "deserves respect whatever wood it is made from; erect spirits do not need its aid."91. Personally, he put himself resolutely outside of the fold of all religious communions. Occasionally he permitted himself to criticize rather directly what he believed to be the pretentions of religion. Rejecting the religious solution to the dualisms of existence he writes in "La Libertad Creadora:"

> "Finally there is the religious solution. It inspires the vehement conviction we call faith. Its foundation is not, as it is usually pretended, the supernatural revelation, but an emotional state which reaches to extasis and gives room to the mystic vision."92.

It is curious that Korn, with all his critical perspicacity seems not to have recognized that if we take the critical standpoint of Kant the only thing which can save philosophy is religion. In his essays analyzing the trends of contemporary philosophy he sharply critizes all "neo-romantic" attempts yet formulated to reconstruct metaphysics. "Contemporary philosophy," he says, "appears to us as an impulse to find meta-empirical solutions; but at the same time it offers us the lamentable spectacle of a lack of creative energies and of men who might really interpret the needs of the hour."93. He particularly deplores the trend to seek the solution to the dilemmas of metaphysics in religion.94. Writes Korn:

of a hierarchy of values in which the ethical motive would be predominant. He himself in "La Libertad Creadora" (1922) had written: "(The ethical end) becomes the most complete expression of the personality, the ultimate objective of the free action, intent on subjecting the natural order to a moral order."97. Criticizing the positivist age he had pointed to Nietzsche's ethics as the denouement of positivists morals and summarized Zarathursra's message in the words: "It is my will that arbitrarily fixes the values of existence."98. Now Korn, in the Axiologia (1930) concludes with Nietzsche in an apotheosis of the autarchical will. But Korn, at the last moment, afraid of the possible "arbitrariness" of the autonomous will, (in an argument of a philosophical significance he seems not to have been aware of) ends by referring us to the concept of values as the norms of society, "screened by the historic process. Thus, after all the years of criticizing positivist morality, Korn ended in the camp of the positivists by remitting ethics to the social historians, and making axiology a branch of sociology. Such a step, as we have suggested earlier in this study, is to make ethics synonymous, not with autarchy--the autonomy of the will--but with customs.

Francisco Romero, taking note of the relativism of Korn's "Axiology" expresses the opinion that we cannot take it too seriously as Korn's last word on the subject of values. "At times", says Romero, "he speaks of justice as an absolute value. At others he refers to 'higher values' with a meaning that can hardly be reconciled with the professed relativism."99. Romero's remark is undoubtedly sound, and is in line with the observations already made here regarding the incongruence of Korn's "Axiology" with the rest of his writings. And not only with the rest of his writings but also

with the strong ethicism; the high standards of value; the nobility he reveals in his own person. But these considerations cannot blind us to the fact of the disappointing outcome of Korn's "Axiology"; nor to the fact that in this official formulation of his theory of values, Korn was advocating a principle fraught with danger to the people of nations unschooled in the disciplining of the self. Korn was a noble personality, whose free will inclined toward the highest values men have exalted throughout the ages; values, which though he may not have cared to recognize it, we owe in largest measure to the influence of Christianity. But what can autarchical freedom mean for those whose will is in tension toward the lowest? As Korn himself suggests in a phrase which, as Vassallo points out, has no meaning in the context in which he uses it, freedom can become a "monstrous capacity".[100] The Christian would say, demonic. No wonder that Korn, however surreptitiously, turns at the last to society for protection.

If Korn wished to avoid the dangers of an individualistic, relativistic moral theory without this recourse to the norms of the group he had, broadly speaking, two other possibilities. The first of these is some form of rationalist metaphysical ethics. It is strange that Korn nowhere in his writings gives serious attention to the Kantian formalist ethic. He did consider seriously, however, the proposals of the followers of Husserl's phenomenology of an objectivist ethic based on the eidetic intuition of "real" values. But having considered them he rejected them as inconsistent with a sound epistemology and with the notion of the liberty of the person. The writer believes that Korn was right on both grounds in rejecting the objectivist ethic. The idea of objective impersonal values is untenable. The very notion of value implies a valuer. Korn was right in linking, throughout his discussion of

axiology, the concepts of value and of value judgment. He shrewdly criticizes the method of the phenomenologists who begin with an act of psychological intuition in order to arrive at an objective entity. Speaking of the objective values posited by the phenomenologists he says: "They are born from a psychological gestation, but severing the umbilical cord they assume their own destiny."[101]. That this involves a hypostasis which is logically indefensible and which, as Caso pointed out, surrenders axiology to ontology, seems to us to be quite clear. And Korn was also right in fearing that this ontologism in values involves a threat to human liberty which the dignity of man is forced to protest. If there are objective impersonal "values"--laws or principles would be better words--then man is subjected to an impersonal moral order which cannot be less dependable, and hence necessitarian, than the physical order itself. A criticism, we must add, which applies to all rationalist metaphysical systems.

The only other solution, as the writer sees it, lies in an existentialist Christian ethic, for which Korn felt such disdain. The Christian ethic is the only consistent defender of both the creative liberty of man and of the objectivity of values. The Christian ethic posits a primary and indestructible freedom in man. The Christian accepts the significance of the concept of values for ethics. In human experience, values emerge as a creative act of conscience and of will. Man's values are influenced but not determined by his social experience. In the determination of his own values man's conscience does have the last word. The values of the person become "personal" only by the free acceptance of the conscience. But the Christian knows that in a deeper sense his individual conscience does not have the last word on the subject of values. Beyond the subjective values of the individual

and the relative values of society, there are the values of the Cosmic Valuer. These, viewed from man's side, are objective values. For God, they are subjective values. And so for man, these cosmic values become known, not in the form of an inflexible and impersonal law, but as the expression of a will of one who is both Holy and Loving. The Christian knows that autarchical freedom is indeed a "monstrous capacity", unless it is placed in subjection to the higher will of God. The paradox of freedom is that autarchical freedom without reference to a higher will destroys itself. The paradox of Christian freedom is that in servitude to the will of God man finds the fulfillment of freedom. This true Christian freedom is only known as man begins to live in the Grace that flows from the Cross, the Grace of God through Jesus Christ--overcoming man's bondage to his animal nature and to the sins of the spirit to find release in the glorious freedom of the children of God. Thus, in a very real sense, the attainment of freedom is the highest end of man, but it cannot be an end in itself. Freedom is the destiny of the Christian, not the purpose. Perhaps we can say that it is a pre-condition, not a value. The end of life for the Christian is beatitude, which is the glorifying of God, and signifies the fulfillment of the person as the child of God.

Because the Christian ethic is not the subjection to an impersonal law but to a Holy and Loving will it is free from the defect of rationalist ethics which are either devoid of content (Kant), or else posit "objective values" which are necessarily the same for all men. Christian ethics are neither devoid of content nor do they subject all men to uniform regulations. God's will, the Christian believes, has been revealed supremely in the life, the teachings, and the work of Jesus Christ, His Son. The Christian ethic

in its content can best be understood as an "imitation of Christ." It is thus an ethic of freedom. As Antonio Caso observes:

> "When the mystic counsels the imitation of Christ as the paradigm of morality he does not propose to blot out the personality but to realize it. Jesus sets us free when he offers or gives himself as a model. Each imitator of Christ is a different Christian according to his form of personal life. St. Augustine, St. Theresa, Pascal, and Tolstoy, are authentic Christians, profoundly personal and distinct, the more Christian they are."[102]

Korn's ethical philosophy, with its supreme concern for the freedom of man, could have been saved from the debacle of a final relapse into sociologism by the corrective of the Christian understanding of ethics. Korn was right in affirming the freedom of man, but he was wrong in denying the reality of God. We can see the axiology of Korn as a bold experiment in thought which goes on the rocks because it seizes one truth, the truth of the freedom of man, and neglects the complementary truth without which this freedom becomes monstrous until we recoil from it in terror. This complementary truth is the Christian doctrine of God revealed in Jesus Christ, "in whose will is our peace" appropriated by an act of faith, and verified by its "fruits".

Korn's disciples in Argentina are today engaged in a sincere effort to surpass the evident limitations of their master. Perhaps not all of them will repeat his blindness of overlooking the testimony of Christian Faith.

Footnotes

Chapter VII.

1. Romero, Francisco, Sobre la Filosofía en Ibero-America, p. 48.

2. Reyes, Alfonso, Norte y Sur. México. Editorial Leyenda, S. A., 1944. p. 210.

3. Note the similarity in the career of Korn and that of José Ingenieros. Both were physicians, both specialized in psychiatry, both turned to philosophy and to history as avocations. But the similarities are purely external. They had opposite temperaments, and represented opposing philosophical positions.

4. Romero, Francisco; Vassallo, Angel; Aznar, Luis, Alejandro Korn. Buenos Aires, Editorial Lozada, 1940. p. 68.

5. Reyes, op. cit., p. 219.

6. Romero, Vassallo, Aznar, pp. 14-15.

7. Ibid., p. 15.

8. Ibid., p. 17.

9. Korn, Alejandro, Ensayos Críticos. Buenos Aires. Edición Claridad, 1937. p. 7.

10. Romero, Vassallo, Aznar, op. cit., p. 69.

11. Ibid., p. 21.

12. Ibid., p. 58.

13. Ibid., p. 30.

14. Ibid., p. 31.

15. Ibid., p. 20.

16. Ibid., p. 19.

17. Ibid., p. 69.

18. Ibid., p. 31.

19. Korn, Obras Completas, p. 390.

20. Ibid., p. 327.

21. Ibid., pp. 327-328.

22. Ibid., p. 210.

23. Ibid., p. 432.

24. Ibid., pp. 210-211.

25. Ibid., p. 323.

26. Ibid., p. 241.

27. Ibid., p. 600.

28. Ibid., p. 241.

29. Ibid., p. 250.

30. Ibid., p. 250.

31. Ibid., p. 426.

32. Ibid., p. 434.

33. Ibid., p. 303.

34. Ibid., p. 219.

35. Ibid., p. 243.

36. Ibid., p. 480.

37. Ibid., p. 313.

38. Ibid., p. 315.

39. Ibid., p. 323.

40. Ibid., p. 323.

41. Ibid., p. 323.

42. Ibid., p. 313.

43. Romero, Francisco, La Filosofía de Ayer y de Hoy. Buenos Aires. Editorial Argos, 1947. P. 77.

44. Korn, op. cit., p. 599.

45. Romero, Vassallo, Aznar, op. cit., p. 70.

46. Ibid., p. 22. Angel Vassallo holds that the distinction between Korn's theory of knowledge and Bishop Berkeley's, whom Korn disavowed, is not as great as Korn believed; that Korn was really an idealist. Many statements in Korn would be cited, in addition to those

46. (continued)

Vassallo selects to confirm Vassallo's opinion. Vassallo quotes the following: "We must keep in mind that the external world is not a known reality, but a problem." (Romero, Vassallo, Aznar, op. cit., p. 77). The writer finds the following statement still more indicative of a subjective idealism. "Subject and object are nothing but synthetic operations in which the complex of affective states (estados de ánimo) or the bundle of sensations are unified. As far as the substratum which we suppose exists--matter or spirit--it is NOTHING MORE THAN A CONCEPT AND NOT A THING." (Korn, op. cit., p. 223, Italics ours). Whose concept? we must ask. A concept of the subject, presumably--but the subject, we have been told, is an abstraction. Then of the "consciousness? It would appear that Korn has fallen into the very solipsism he deplores, for out of two abstractions it is impossible to synthesize a reality. More consistent was Bishop Berkeley who posited the universe as a concept of the Divine subject. A repetition of this subjective idealism reappears every time that Korn suggests that the antinomy of subject and object is not an ontological dualism, but only an epistemological dualism, as he does a number of times. More frequently, however, Korn is content to posit the antinomy as an irreducible dualism and to leave it at that.

47. Korn, op. cit., p. 216.

48. Ibid., p. 217.

49. Ibid., p. 222. "The subject or the object in isolation are abstractions; one does not exist without the other."

50. Ibid., p. 224.

51. Ibid., p. 226.

52. Ibid., p. 236.

53. Ibid., p. 236.

54. Ibid., p. 224.

55. Ibid., p. 240.

56. Ibid., pp. 240-241.

57. Ibid., p. 295.

58. Ibid., p. 270.

59. Ibid., p. 269.

60. Ibid., pp. 269-270.

61. Ibid., p. 270.

62. Ibid., p. 273.

63. Ibid., p. 271.

64. Ibid., p. 274.

65. Ibid., p. 275.

66. Ibid., p. 275. It must be noted here that Korn makes no distinction in his rebuttal of love as the highest value, between the higher and the lower forms of love. In significant contrast to Antonio Caso of Mexico he rejects the New Testament concept of love: "The Sermon on the Mount or the Tolstoyan doctrine of non-resistance preach the annihilation of the personality. They attempt to eliminate all egoistical interest, that is, the most powerful drive of human activity. They promise us a paradise very similar to a fold of tame lambs. Such an ideal does not seduce everyone." To be sure, we cannot know to what extent Korn was speaking for himself, but he was at least willing to be thought of as saying this.

67. Ibid., p. 276.

68. Ibid., p. 279.

69. Ibid., p. 279.

70. Ibid., p. 284.

71. Ibid., p. 286: e.g. "The ethical end comes to be the most complete expression of personality, the ultimate objective of the free action, bent on submitting the natural order to the moral order." (Ibid., p. 225).

72. Ibid., p. 281.

73. Ibid., p. 283.

74. Romero, Vassallo, Aznar, op. cit., p. 83.

75. Korn, op. cit., p. 283.

76. Ibid., p. 288.

77. Ibid., p. 288.

78. Ibid., p. 291. This sentence is italicized.

79. Ibid., p. 288.

80. cf. footnote 72.

81. Ibid., p. 295.

82. Ibid., p. 296.

83. Ibid., p. 296.

84. Ibid., p. 296.

85. Ibid., p. 296. The ambiguity of the paragraph is in the original. The writer does not know how to make the translation clearer.

86. Ibid., p. 297. In an essay entitled "Incipit Vita Nuova", (written in 1918) calling attention to the emergence of new philosophies superseding positivism, Korn suggests that Nietzsche's ethic is the culmination of the positivist ethic. He summarized Nietzsche's message in these words: "It is my will that arbitrarily fixes the values of existence." It was with obvious reference to Nietzsche that he declared: "in the logical evolution of the doctrine (the positivist ethic) we reach a point in which it is proclaimed openly and even with a certain pride and boastfulness. Before the evident impossibility of establishing an ethic one ends by declaring the ethic superfluous!" (Ibid., p. 211).

87. Ibid., p. 297.

88. Aznar, Romero, Vassallo, p. 127.

89. Romero, Vassallo, Aznar, op. cit., p. 88.

90. cf. above p. 333 ft. 39.

91. Korn, op. cit., p. 645.

92. Ibid., p. 242.

93. Ibid., p. 474.

94. He particularly deplored the religious elements in the philosophy of Bergson (the ethics) and of Max Scheler whom he considered the ablest of contemporary thinkers.

95. Ibid., p. 480.

96. cf. above p. 345 ft. 80.

97. Ibid., p. 25. cf. footnote 71.

98. cf. footnote 85.

99. Romero, Vassallo, Aznar, op. cit. p. 67.

100. Aznar, Romero, Vassallo, op. cit., p. 97. The passage quoted by Vassallo is the following: "What a difference separates the moral law from the physical! The latter we tolerate, the former we dictate; the latter is an expression of a necessary order, the

100. (continued)

latter a postulate of our free will. We cannot imagine that the law of gravity should fail a single time....Not so the moral law which we violate, because we conserve the monstrous capacity of disobeying it." To which Vassallo adds, in parentheses, ("It would be well for you to ask yourselves here, as I ask myself: why should the capacity which we conserve to disobey the moral law be MONSTROUS italics by Vassallo if the moral law is the arbitrary creation of the will?") We can suggest that the word "monstrous" here is an unconscious give away of his fear of the autarchical freedom, the fear that led him, in the "Axiology" to turn to society for protection from this freedom.

101. Korn, op. cit., p. 290.

102. cf. Chapter V p.

CHAPTER VIII

Francisco Romero (1891-)

A. THE SOLDIER-PHILOSOPHER

Spanish America's most eminent living philosopher was not born in America. This fact comes as a distinct surprise to those who, like the present writer have followed Francisco Romero's work for some time before seeing a biographical study of the author. His life has been so completely identified with America, and with the country of his adoption, Argentina, it would never occur to one not versant with the details of his personal history that he is not a native son of America.

Francisco Romero was born in Seville, Spain, in 1891, the first born son of a Spanish industrialist. The elder Romero was an adventurous and somewhat quixotic figure who found conditions in Spain unpropitious for his enterprises, and so decided to try his fortunes in the new world. He came to Argentina in 1904, bringing with him his first born. Finding the country to his liking he sent for his wife and seven other children, and the family settled in Buenos Aires, which has been home for the philosopher since the days of his boyhood.

Though living with comfort, the needs of the large family made a short course of professional training for the eldest advisable, and so Francisco Romero, on completion of secondary school entered the military college of Argentina. In 1912 he graduated, and was commissioned an officer in the corps of engineers. The young officer decided to make the army his career, and continued studies in military engineering for three more years. He

remained in the army for twenty-one years, retiring as a major in 1931. Romero has written of his army experience: "(I was) very satisfied with my military career, which afforded me honors and positions over and above those of rank, among them that of Director of a technical school."[1]. The qualities of disciplined effort, thought, and expression, perhaps the outstanding characteristics of Romero as a scholar, thinker, and writer, may well be viewed as evidence of the influence of army life in the formation of the philosopher.

As much as Romero enjoyed army life, however, his true career was not to be the army. Possessed of a penetrating and inquiring mind, he early developed a profound interest in literature and philosophy. As early as 1918 he began publishing critical articles, and also wrote a volume of poetry. Gradually, his preference for philosophy asserted itself. Because of his purely technological training Romero had to form himself in philosophy. Says Romero: "In philosophy, I have been entirely self-taught." He makes this statement to clarify his relationship with Alejandro Korn, whom he first met in 1923. "When I met Alejandro Korn," he declares, "I was not only formed, I was rather well known for my philosophical writings."[2]. The encounter with Korn, nevertheless, had a profound influence on Romero. From the beginning it was an association of friends and colleagues, rather than of master and disciple. Romero, however, is the first to acknowledge the profoundly stimulating influence of the great master of Argentine philosophy, and has described the years of friendship with Korn as the richest of his life. In 1929, with Korn as acknowledged leader and Romero as the secretary, the Kantian Society was established in Buenos Aires. "The most beautiful years were those of the friendship with Korn, grouped in the Kantian (society)," declares Romero[3]. In 1930 Romero also collaborated with Korn in the

formation of the Free College of Higher Studies, Romero had enrolled in a number of Korn's classes but it was in personal contact and association, more than in the classroom that Korn came to recognize Romero as the ablest scholar and thinker of the younger generation. It was Korn who persuaded Romero to leave the army for philosophy. He did not have an easy time. Romero writes of a twelve hour conversation in which Korn tried to persuade Romero to resign from the army so that he might be able to take over Korn's chairs upon his retirement. In the end Romero agreed, succeeding Korn in 1930.

From 1930 to 1946 Romero taught at the University of Buenos Aires and the University of La Plata. He resigned his chairs in the universities unwilling to surrender his intellectual freedom to the new political regime of Argentina, which insisted on a "loyalty oath" from all professors. Except for his relation with the "Free College for Higher Studies", Romero has spent the major part of his time in recent years writing. Until recently his philosophical writings have consisted almost entirely of articles published in various journals, many of them in the Sunday edition of the great Buenos Aires daily, "La Nación". These articles, gathered into books account for all his published volumes, except his major treatise, "Teoría del Hombre," published in 1952. He is now engaged in revising his work and has promised new studies on the subjects of culture, and of values. The definitive study of his work as a philosopher must await the publication of the volumes he is preparing. It is doubtful, however, whether these books will introduce any radical changes in the basic positions which he has already set forth in his articles.

[1] In addition to his work as a philosopher and teacher Romero has served

in recent years as the Director of the Philosophical Library of the publishing house, Editorial Losada, in Buenos Aires. As such he has played an outstanding part in the dissemination of philosophical culture in the Spanish speaking world, being responsible for the publication of many of the most important philosophical works in the history of philosophy, and of a number of new volumes written by contemporary Spanish American philosophers.

B. THE PHILOSOPHER OF AMERICA

There is another aspect to the work of Romero, which he himself has underscored, and which has helped to give him the place of unique leadership which he occupies in American philosophy. This is the interest which he has taken in American philosophy, including that of the United States. In 1940 the Free College of Higher Studies in Buenos Aires established the Alejandro Korn Chair, in honor of Argentinas great philosopher, with Romero as Professor. In a survey of Argentine philosophy Romero singles out the accomplishments of the Chair for special mention, as if to emphasize their importance among his various labors. This accomplishment has been that of stimulating interest in American philosophy. From the Chair Romero has promoted the interchange of philosophical information and viewpoints among the philosophers in the various countries, and has encouraged research in the philosophical heritage of the American nations. He takes pride in the fact that the greatly increased inter-relationships now taking place, and the new interest in American philosophy now general throughout Latin-America owe a great deal to "the effort of the Chair," something which "has been widely recognized."[4] A measure of this recognition is found in an article published in the great Mexic an journal "Cuadernos Americanos," in which

Romero is referred to as "the first American philosopher whose action of intellectual leadership (apostolado) surpasses the national frontiers in the idealistic purpose of uniting all the philosophical minds of the continent in one synchronized movement of spiritual collaboration."[5].

Romero's philosophical articles have appeared in their first publication in the journals of almost all the American countries, and of Spain. He has been generous in contributing some of his most significant essays to reviews in other countries than his own. Because of this interest in the philosophical labors of philosophers in other lands, an interest which has been reciprocated, and his own generous collaborations, he has become, without any doubt, the best known philosopher in Latin America today. With this widespread acquaintance with his writings has come the general recognition of the profundity and brilliance of his contributions. In 1951 the philosophical Society of Cuba devoted the entire July-December issue of its journal, "Revista Cubana de Filosofía" to honoring Romero. In the introductory editorial of this issue Professor Rafael García Bárcena speaks of Romero as "the Patriarch of Ibero-American Philosophy," and declares:

> "Maestro Romero is the one to whom we in America who came to philosophy one or two decades after he, are most deeply indebted, and not only for reasons of time, but because Romero, in spite of his solid philosophical formation in the cultural heritage of the Old World, by his own effort created for himself a genuine Ibero-American consciousness which has opened furrows of thought for an Occidental continuation of the European in the Hispanic-American."[6].

Increasingly Francisco Romero is being referred to as "the philosopher of America."[7]. As far as Spanish America is concerned, no other thinker today more richly deserves this designation.

C. ROMERO'S APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

In our study of the great Mexican thinker, Antonio Caso, we have noted the importance of understanding his approach to philosophy before considering his philosophical concepts. This is perhaps even more important in the case of Francisco Romero. Why has Romero written so much about the work of other philosophers and so little, relatively, in exposition of his own views? Why has he been so reticent about advancing his own concepts and so careful to state before explaining many of his positions that his formulations are tentative? Why does he take time to review the main positions in the history of philosophy whenever he treats a major subject? The reasons become clear when we understand Romero's view of the task of philosophy and of the proper method to be followed by the philosopher.

In a criticism of the Argentine positivist philosopher, José Ingenieros, Romero gives us a clue to his view: "A restless and independent spirit, perhaps his (Ingeniero's) greatest shortcoming was not to have familiarized himself with the philosophical heritage of humanity, not to have established with it that dialogue in which dissent must be based on a background of sympathetic comprehension and respect, the condition of any fruitful philosophical effort."[8] (Sobre la Filosofía en América, pp. 64-65). Romero had a right to make the criticism, for his work has been precisely that: "a fruitful dialogue with the philosophical heritage of humanity." Romero has thought he did not have the right to advance his own concepts, propose his own solutions, until he had first examined the most important contributions to the subject under consideration in the history of thought. And he has also been reticent about advancing his own solutions, has taken pains to emphasize the tentative character of his formulations, because as a student

of the history of thought he has a profound distrust of pat answers, of magnificent systems which are a triumph of ingenuity, but achieve their success by conveniently disregarding all the facts that do not fit into the system.

Indeed, the task of philosophy, according to Romero, is not so much to propose solutions as it is to conduct a search, and to clarify the problems. Romero, even more than Caso, can be called "un filósofo de la problematicidad"[9], the title given by Eduardo García Maynez to Caso. Romero has used the same title in an essay devoted to Nicolai Hartmann. In this essay Romero sets forth Hartmann's view of philosophy with such obvious approval that we can safely regard his exposition of Hartmann's thought as the expression of his own. Romero calls attention to Hartmann's distinction between systematic thinking and the building of systems. He agrees that systematic thinking is needed but "the epoch of the great systems has passed."[10] "Today systematic thought takes another way. It is chiefly concerned not with the system but with the problems."[11] The difficulty with the great, closed systems is that they "begin with an a priori scheme or presupposition..." and then all the facts are made to fit into the scheme. When this is done something "fabricated, artificial" is substituted for the truth.[12] This does not mean that the attempt to arrive at a coherent view of reality is abandoned, but the "system" must be an a posteriori synthesis, not an apriori scheme, and it must remain open. "It is possible to arrive at a systematic and comprehensive conception," states Romero, but not immediately (sin más ni más).... Only a long and troublesome effort of investigation, of distrustful probing, of groping, of rectification, can approximate us to this end."[13]

This view of philosophy as essentially an inquiry, a delving into the perennial problems of man, a suggesting of tentative solutions, is what has determined Romero's method of writing philosophy. He believes that there must be three stages in philosophical thought, the phenomenological, or research into the primary data, the problematical, and the theoretical, or systematic; "because the question presents itself successively as data, or phenomena, as enigma or problem, and as theory, or solution, or system."14. But to start with a system projects all interest on theory to the neglect of phenomena. Romero believes that this is the application of scientific method in philosophy: "Science does not renounce the possibility of a vision of the whole of reality; but when it does not overstep its bounds, it adopts a monographic procedure, an examination in depth of all questions, and the scientific systematization appears as an ideal goal, as a possible future integration of the collective task."15.

Romero has been perfectly consistent with these principles in his philosophical labors. By far the greater part of his work consists of studies of the work of other philosophers, and constitutes a true "dialogue with the philosophical heritage of humanity." These studies are never mere expositions. The distinguished Spanish philosopher José Ferrater Mora, author of a notable "Dictionary of Philosophy," has written an article about Romero entitled "Un Estilo de Filosofía", in which he points out that Romero's style is remarkable in that he never merely informs, he moves forward the consideration of the issues raised by his subject, and also incites the reader. "In the same page, and thanks to a most unusual literary ability," writes Ferrater, "we find the source material for all who seek; to inform themselves in philosophy, to clarify the problems elucidated; to learn about the original thought which the author has on the subject."16.

In addition to his remarkable articles concerning other writers, Romero many years ago began to set forth his own philosophical position in the form of anticipatory monographs. His first outline of a metaphysical scheme, published in 1940, he entitled "Programa de una Filosofía." Some years later he included it with other monographs in a book to which he gave the title "Papeles para una Filosofía." Even in his definitive statement on man, the "Teoría del Hombre," he still insists on the tentative character of a number of his positions. Concerning his scheme of reality, for example, he states: that it is advanced "as indications which must be broadened and better founded and perhaps corrected in part."[17]

Romero describes his method as empirical, taking pains to differentiate this new empiricism from that which carries this label in the history of philosophy. The empiricism he proposes is "on the style of that advocated by Husserl and put in practice by phenemenology, which broadens the notion of experience to make room in it for essences and values; which does not close itself to the recognition of transcendence as did the traditional one, dazzled by the tangibility and consistency of 'things'--of immannences."[18] Romero believes that this approach can yield rich fruits, illuminating the history of thought as "the dynamic march of the human spirit," and more significantly, "verifying and describing the modes of transcendence, its routes and degrees," when applied to the exploration of reality and of ideality.[19] He also believes that the main course of contemporary philosophy is following this approach and is hopeful that it will lead to the generalizing of an "empirical transcendentalism" as a commonly accepted view. Thus would a sense of transcendence, which has been lost since the immanental rationalism of the modern age replaced the theological transcendentalism of the middle ages, be restored to humanity.[20]

The favorite themes of Romero's philosophy are the problem of man and the problem of culture. He is also greatly interested in the questions of the nature of reality, the philosophical significance of time, the nature of values, and the problem of knowledge. But his interest in these subjects is always related to the prior interest in man and culture. Before considering his views on man and culture, however, it will help us to examine his concepts of reality and totality. We shall better understand his view of man if we can place him in the scheme of reality.

It is evident that Romero's view of reality and his view of man owe a great deal to the influences of Bergson and of Scheler. A thesis dedicated solely to the work of Romero would have to trace these influences, as well as other important influences, (such as Dilthey's in his view of culture). In this chapter we merely call attention to these influences, observing that however strong the influences of other writers may be on Romero, the synthesis is his own, and many insights are also original in him. It would not be just to discount the creative effort represented in Romero's philosophy.

D. ROMERO'S CONCEPTS OF REALITY AND OF TOTALITY

1. Reality as Transcendence

Romero conceives of reality as composed of four planes, or orders: the inorganic, or physical; the organic, or life; psychic intentionality; and spirit. These four orders form a qualitatively ascending scheme of reality propelled by an upward transcendence. There is least transcendence on the physical plane, but there is successively greater transcendence in the orders of life and of psychic intentionality, until in the order of

spirit transcendence becomes absolute.

Transcendence is the key word in this scheme, as it is the key word in Romero's entire philosophy. Romero calls transcendence "the positive ingredient of reality, the impetus which projects itself starting from the immanent base (the inorganic) until it becomes pure transcendence."[21] Even the immanent base, however, is not pure immanence, rather it is a "dormant transcendence, a bundle of possible transcendences in so far as they are not yet actualized." Transcendence is inherent to all being; "TO BE IS TO TRANSCEND", declares Romero.[22]

Romero recognizes the Heraclitean ancestry in this notion of transcendence as a dynamic principle of flux and change at the heart of the universe, and the affinity of this notion with the idea of becoming in the philosophy of Hegel and in romantic metaphysics. In the romantics, however, becoming is confused with passion. There is a more direct relation with Bergson, with the "elán vital" of the "Creative Evolution," and with the notion of process in the philosophies which stress reality as process.[23] Transcendence operates in time, thus temporalism is posited as an essential factor in this scheme. Time, change, and historicity are incorporated into the very nature of reality, into "the heart of being."[24]

Romero readily admits the offense to the reason implicit in such a scheme. "Transcendence," he declares, "does not enter into the rational frames."[25] The reason operates according to the principle of identity, and therefore has to deny the reality of time, change, and even motion, as evidenced in Zenon's celebrated demonstrations. Romero views the mechanistic interpretation of reality as the supreme triumph of the eleatic reason, in

that by reducing all phenomena to mechanical parts it succeeded in explaining changes in appearance as the mere redistribution of the parts while denying any fundamental change in the structures of reality.[26] But "the continuous dealing with reality has been demonstrating the insufficiency of the eleatic reason,"[27] states Romero. The use of the intuition, as developed in Bergson, shows the way out, for "the intuition apprehends the transcendent nature of movement and duration...."[28]

The higher orders of reality, life, psyche, and spirit are seen by Romero as introducing basic, qualitative, changes in the structure of the cosmos. And so he posits a "monism of transcendence, but an irreductible ontological pluralism."[29] The emergence of each of the higher orders signifies a "growth and increased complexity in the activity of the cosmos," "an evident acceleration of the cosmic pulse," a "more intense vibration.."[30] Each of the higher orders emerges out of the lower one and "colonizes it."[31] It co-exists with the lower order and uses it for its own benefit. Thus life exists on the substratum of the physical, but it transcends the physical and uses it for the purposes of life. With the emergence of psychic intentionality, a "revolutionary, abrupt change" has taken place in the cosmos. It is not "a mere refinement or improvement in the preintentional psychism" exhibited by animal life, but "an entirely new form of reality."[32] A subjective center is created which objectivizes the rest of reality; it is the emergence of man.

But in psychic intentionality transcendence is not yet complete. With intentionality the possibility of absolute transcendence appears, implicit in the capacity to posit objects and values. But in intentionality transcendence is arrested, because objects and values are posited in function of

self-interest.. It is only with the emergence of spirit in which the act is projected toward values or objects in pure transcendence, with no other interest than that of the values or objects themselves that absolute transcendence is reached.

2. Reality as Structure

A second basic notion in Romero's concept of reality is that of structure, though it is not in the same category as transcendence, since structure must be defined in terms of transcendence. "Structure," says Romero, "is a whole which contains a novelty with respect to the parts; such a novelty cannot be conceived save by admitting that the parts transcend themselves in composing the whole, they surpass themselves in an original synthesis."[33]. Such a view is contrary to the mechanistic concept of reality, in which reality is atomized, the parts are conceived as interchangeable, and related to each other by mechanical causation. Romero tries to trace the significance of the concept of structure in physics, biology, and psychology in which it spells the necessary abandonment of a mechanistic view, but he recognizes the difficulty of tracing its various implications. "At every step we confront it now, and it is always enigmatic, almost impossible to grasp"..."there is no other notion so pregnant with future, more replete with possibilities, difficulties, and problems."[34]. Romero recognizes the romantic origins of structuralism; it is a part of the romantic revolt against rationalism with its mathematical interpretation of reality. The insight into structure, like the notion of transcendence, is not reached by the operations of the discursive reason; it is a matter of intuition.[35].

Professor Frondizi in his review article of Romero's "Teoría del Hombre"

calls attention to Romero's structuralism and accuses him of inconsistency in positing both structuralism and an "unbridged gap between nature and spirit."[36] The inconsistency, if any, lies in Romero's ambiguity rather than in any loose thinking. Frondizi understands Romero's concept of structure as an interpretation of the whole of reality as "an organic whole."[37] But that is Frondizi's interpretation, not Romero's. In speaking of a "monism of transcendence" and an "irreductible, ontological pluralism" Romero posits a plurality of structures, in themselves indivisible, but nowhere speaks of an all-encompassing, "organic whole." He also posits a radical discontinuity between the various orders of reality, not merely between nature and spirit. If there is an essential contradiction between structuralism and ontological pluralism, this is one of the antinomies which Romero is content to have remain as such. He does not pretend to a self-enclosed, rationalistic system. He would insist that it is more important to make room for all the facts than it is to exclude all the antinomies.

3. The Concept of Totality

According to Romero, however, totality is greater than reality. Reality is consubstantial with the temporal, or the temporal-spatial. The order of the physical and the order of life belong to the temporal and the spatial, while the order of psychic intentionality and of spirit belongs to the temporal. Romero presents the following scheme of reality.[38]

Classes of real entities	Kinds	Species
	temporal-spatial	inorganic
		organic
	temporal	intentional
		spiritual

There is a realm of essences relations, and values, however, which is not included in this scheme. Romero follows Husserl in positing an ontology of essences, numbers, and relations; and Hartman and Scheler in positing an ontology of values. These essences and values are "objects" but they are ideal objects, not real objects, since they cannot be located in space or time. Since they are "objective entities", they must be included in the scheme of totality. Romero presents the following scheme of totality:39.

Objects (totality) —
- real (temporal sensible)
  - spatial
  - non-spatial
- ideal (mathematical objects, essences, relations)
- metaphysical values

Romero does not explain what he means by the metaphysical objects in this scheme.

4. Romero's Metaphysical Optimism

Implicit in Romero's notion of transcendence is a basic metaphysical optimism. He repeatedly affirms, as if it were axiomatic, that reality is a cosmos, not a chaos. In the ascending structures of reality he sees the activity of "an impulse which courses through reality and impells it forward and upward."40. In one of the clearest expressions of this optimism he declares:

> "Temporalized transcendence is not an undivided and chaotic flux, a shapeless and directionless current. The world is a cosmos, a solidly structuralized and qualified reality, with a rigorous ordering; if it were not so there would be a chaos in which transcendence itself would fail."41.

Romero refuses to consider the possibility of a transcendental purpose, a

cosmic architect, behind this "rigorous ordering." "Let us not risk that supposition," he specifically states at one point, "not even in the character of a hypothesis." But then he adds: "The fact is, however, that things happen as if that purpose existed."42.

On ultimate metaphysical questions Romero is purposefully ambiguous. ("My office," he has stated, "is not to dogmatize, nor is it my practice to present my possibilities as certainties. I do not intend ever to resign a right which to me is one of the most indubitable ones of the thinker, and which is not without discomfort: the right to doubt.")43. Nevertheless, when at the close of his basic exposition of his philosophical position, the "Programa de Una Filosofía" he raises the question of whether the universe itself has meaning, his optimistic conclusion is perfectly clear. Says Romero: "Totality as pictured in these considerations has meaning, because spirit exists and determines itself in function of value; for me this is a matter of empirical demonstration."44. As for reality, he suggests that two answers are possible. The first is that meaning emerges accidentally by the accidental turning of transcendence to spirit. The second is that it is inherent to transcendence to arrive at its absolute form, which implies a fullness of meaning. "In this second interpretation," declares Romero, "reality would appear to be entirely impregnated with meaning from the beginning; there would be something like a pursuit of value from the very root of being, from the first awakening of transcendence; one might even suspect that it is that attraction of value which produces it in the bosom of pure immanence--pure nothingness--the tide of transcendence--of being--as the Moon moves the waters of our oceans from a distance..."45.

One is reminded of Samuel Carruthers' poem: "some call it evolution,

others call it God." Here the word is "Transcendence."

E. ROMERO'S THEORY OF MAN

With Romero's scheme of reality before us we can see how important a place man occupies in this scheme. Reality is a movement of increasing transcendence, from the dormant transcendence of immanence to the absolute transcendence of spirit. It is in man that spirit becomes an order of reality in Romero's scheme. But before we can have spirit we must have intentionality.

1. Man as Psychic Intentionality

Romero begins his description of man by positing a qualitative distinction between man and the higher animals. Animals belong to the order of life, and the higher animals exhibit a "preintentional psychism" which is inherent to the higher manifestations of life.[46] But with man a new order of reality appears characterized by "psychic intentionality". While there are vague stirrings of intentionality in the higher animals, only in human intelligence do we find an "intentional or objective capacity as a continuous and normal activity, together with nomination, which permits the fixing of objectivities in the consciousness and their transmissions to other consciousnesses."[47] Man, as a temporal-spatial entity belongs to the physical and organic orders, but it is his intentional consciousness which makes him a man. Romero describes the intentional consciousness as "a bundle of intentions or acts projected toward objects in function of cognitive apprehension, emotion, or will."[48] With the intentional consciousness there arises the subject-object relationship. Subject and object emerge simultaneously in the consciousness: "Whatever is a 'something' for

a subject is an object."[49] Through the repetitive subjective recognition of objects the subject recognizes itself as an "I" for whom objects become "the world". The characteristic of man as an intentional being therefore, "is to be an 'I' and to have a world."[50]

In insisting upon the capacity for identifying objects, or intentionality, (the term he seems to prefer) as the distinctive characteristic of man, Romero admits to an intellectualist view of the nature of man. Whatever the importance of emotional and volitional acts and impulses, they are not the determinative elements in the creation of the intentional consciousness. This is essentially a cognitive process. Emotional and volitional elements are also present in the pre-intentional psychism. But without a cognitive act will and emotion have no conscious objective reference and hence no direction or meaning. There is really no comparison between the intentional subject, man, and the animal that "does not know itself, and is unconditionally placed at the service of the conservation and expansion of life...." man "knows himself and creates his own ends."[51]

2. Man as Spirit

The description of man as psychic intentionality is only the first stage in the analysis of the nature of man. In man emerges not only psychic intentionality but also spirit. From the moment that man possesses intentionality he becomes capable of spiritual acts. For the intentional act and the spiritual act have the same origin: the subject posits the object (se pone al objeto).[52] But where the merely intentional act always has a subjective reference--the objectivation starts from the subjective center, goes out to the object, but returns to the subject because the intention is

ego-centric--in the spiritual act there is no subjective recoil. "The spiritual act projects itself toward the object and remains there."[53] "The only difference between them," adds Romero, "lies in the final subjectivist intention of the first and the objectivist (intention) of the second: nothing else. But with the step to the radical objectivism which defines the spiritual act in its purity, the natural plane is abandoned, and even a particle of the divine is inserted in the human: nothing less."[54] Romero seldom employs the usual theological terminology, but in one of the key essays for his philosophical position, "Transcendencia y Valor", he identifies the ego-centricity of the subject and the refusal of transcendence with sin: "It is a primary and common intuition," says Romero "that in strict ethics there is no other sin but egoism, that is, the centering of action in the individual subject and referring it to himself alone, acting in the sense of immanence."[55]

It is the distinction between mere intentionality and spirituality which establishes the difference between nature and spirit--"the two great orders into which reality is divided."[56] Romero explains this difference by playing on the word "natural". He says that it is not "natural" for any individual entity to transcend itself totally. "Nothing more 'natural'", he adds, "than that each should operate according to what he is and in function of what he is, with intentions which, because he is a self, should have himself as a final point of reference."[57] Therefore, when the spiritual subject eliminates this subjective return, he is not acting according to "nature," he transcends the realm of nature, breaking the bonds of particularism, the enclosure of the self within the self which is the characteristic of everything that belongs to the world of nature. The spirit is

free.

The spirit is also pure disinterestedness. What the spiritual subject seeks is "not to affirm itself as a center of particularity, but to affirm that which is or that which has value, as the case may be."[58]

Romero's analysis of the characteristics of spirit comprises one of the most valuable chapters of his "Theory of Man." This analysis owes a great deal to the inspiration of Scheler, but Romero has greatly modified Scheler's scheme. The first characteristic of spirit Romero notes is that of absolute objectivity, or pure disinterestedness. He makes clear that this does not mean that the spiritual subject disappears as he projects himself toward the object. The subject must remain as the agent of the spiritual act or there is no spiritual act. What it does mean is that in the spiritual act the subject is purified of subjective self-interest. A second note of spirit is that of universality. This is what separates spirit from nature--the freedom from particularism. Romero again points out that this does not mean that the self can surrender its identity and submerge itself in mystic union with reality. This would be the annulment, not the fulfillment of the spiritual act. "In the order of the real," says Romero, "universality is only possessed by the spiritual subject, and when its impetus is exhausted in the purpose of identification it annuls itself as spirit and deprives reality of the moment of universality which he only can confer."[59] Freedom as a characteristic of spirit, stressed by Scheler, is a derivation of absolute objectivity; that is, it is autonomy which the subject enjoys with liberation from subjective self-centeredness. Another derivation of absolute objectivity is the unity of all spiritual acts, since with the cancellation of the subjective return, the conflict of subjective self-

interests is avoided.

Romero stresses the historicity of spirit. Spirit does not belong to the spatial world, but it does manifest itself in time. Secondary, but not unimportant characteristics are those of respect and concern. "Spirit respects all and interests itself in all; the lack of respect and indifference before things and beings are manifest signs of an absence of spirit."[60] Still another characteristic is responsibility. This is in the nature of an ethical imperative of the spirit. "The spiritual subject feels himself the bearer of a supreme and universal principle, justified and responsible before him, and he suffers when he confirms that this principle does not yet prevail."[61]

But the most definitive note of spirit, concludes Romero, is that of "absolute transcendence." Even popular expressions testify to this when they refer to "altruistic acts," or "disinterested acts."

3. The Dualism of Nature and Spirit in Man

Romero, more than any other Spanish American philosopher, has insisted on the inherent dualism in man. Man is that being in whom nature, in the form of mere intentionality, and spirit, as the impulse toward absolute transcendence co-exist. "Man as a historical reality," says Romero, "manifests himself to us as a complex in which mere intentionality and spirit alternate and interplay."[62] Even without spirit, as mere intentionality, man is still man--still far above the animal; but he is not complete man. For spirit is implicit in intentionality and when man remains on the level of mere intentionality, there is an arresting of the impulse toward transcendence.

The dualism of nature and spirit is not the same as the conflict between good and evil, but there are parallels. Ego-centric action is often judged as relative or total evil by those whose own rights and interests are trampled upon and in many cases "by the supreme tribunal of the spirit which condemns particularism, especially when it violates the ethical imperatives."[63] In the conflict between intentionality and spirit Romero recognizes that spirit is still the weaker. But this is not surprising, for spirit "is a novelty in the cosmos; its existence hardly dates from yesterday if it is compared with other levels of reality."[64] He nevertheless expresses confidence in the role of spirit for "in itself and in principle, if not always in actuality, it is order and agreement, universality which tends to include particularities and to coordinate them harmoniously, eliminating frictions between them."[65] In the long run, just as the organic establishes its dominion over the inorganic and uses it for its purposes, and intentionality prevails over the organic and forces it into its channels, "so spirit, in the historical progression, imposes itself over the merely intentional and begins to accumulate a positive balance."[66] At present, purely intentional acts far outnumber the spiritual, but the qualitative significance of the spiritual is such that no quantitative comparison is valid.

The conflict between spirit and intentionality in man is an extremely complex process and exhibits as wide a variety as there are human beings. It is particularly acute in the adolescent, in whom the self-assertive and the spiritual impulses are developing simultaneously as he grows in self-awareness. A special field in which the conflict is exceptionally strong is in the relations between men and women. In the conflict between intentionality and spirit, spirit finds a strong ally in the collective con-

science. The subject can always recognize the play of self-interest in others more readily than he can in himself. This originates a vigilance over the acts of others which creates an external spiritual control in the form of collective norms of conduct. Romero calls this the "censure or stimulus of the spirituality of all over the naturality of each."[67] It is normal for the spiritual standards of society to be above those of the individual, but there are spiritually sensitive individuals or groups who struggle to elevate the spiritual standards of the community. When they do so, however, it is because they are already the heirs of the spiritual heritage of mankind.

In an early essay, "Filosofía de la Persona" (1935), Romero had set forth the main outlines of his philosophical anthropology, fully developed in the "Teoría del Hombre". In the early essay Romero labels the aspect of man which is mere intentionality "the individual" and the spiritual aspect "the person". He does not employ these terms in his definitive work, presumably because he prefers the greater precision of the terms intentionality and spirit. But save for terminology the "Theory of Man" is largely an elaboration of the insights contained in "Philosophy of the Person."

E. THE CONCEPT OF VALUES

1. The Ethics of Transcendence

Though Francisco Romero has not written any treatise on ethics, it can be said that all of his work is an expression of an ethical concern. His concept of transcendence and the concept of spirit, as we have seen, are charged with ethical content. His theory of values is a further

expression of this ethical interest.

If the significance of transcendence for reality is such that transcendence can be equated with being, Romero feels justified in changing Hegel's dictum "the truth of being is essence," into "the truth of being is transcendence."[68] Values then becomes "the measure of transcendence," they are "the dignity which corresponds to an instance,--entity or activity---because of the transcendence it embodies."[69] Values are spiritual and non-spiritual. Spiritual values are absolute, for in them transcendence is absolute. When transcendence is incomplete, when there is some measure of particularism or one of the characteristics of spirit is lacking, then the value is relative.

Romero also classifies values as theoretical and ethical. (He also recognizes esthetic values but refrains from analyzing them in any of his writings thus far.) The theoretical value has reference to knowledge as such, while the ethical value refers to conduct. The theoretical value is spiritual when the intention in the quest for knowledge is for pure knowledge, when it is free from utilitarian concern; also when there is a desire for complete and universal knowledge, even though the goal is not reached. Romero makes a distinction here between the intention of knowledge and knowledge as such. The cognitive act is spiritual if the intention is for absolute and complete knowledge. But as objective knowledge it is absolutely transcendent only if there is an absolute correspondence between the thesis and reality itself.

Theoretical value refers only to cognitive apprehension per se. The spirit cannot be content with the mere recognition of what is. In the very

recognition of varying grades of transcendence comes the desire for absolute transcendence, for spirit cannot be neutral. This is the foundation of the ethical. Says Romero: "Those acts are ethical which manifest an explicit adherence to transcendence, as such."[70] The absolutely ethical act is one in which there is an absolute adherence to transcendence, that is to say, the absolute ethical act is the spiritual act. The ethical value of the act does not depend on the result, but on the intention. If the intention is not that of absolute transcendence, if there is any measure of self-interest in the act, it is not truly ethical though it may result in a "collaboration with transcendence."[71] But for a norm, or some other objective expression to be truly ethical it must serve an ethical end, it must realize transcendence objectively.

Romero claims that this ethical standpoint is both formal and material. It is formal in the sense that the ethical act is defined in terms of the form, of a fundamental ethical precept which can be expressed in the following terms: "Act in such a manner that the direction of your act agrees with the essential direction of reality,"[72] that is, is a conscious cooperation with transcendence. It is also material in that it "assigns a concrete end to ethical activity, the projection toward transcendence and collaboration with it.[73] He also claims that this position eliminates the opposition between an ethic of effort and an ethic of grace. In the ethic of effort stress is laid on the concept of duty, the duty to realize the ethical act, and any other motivation or factor compromises the merit of the act; ethics is a stern discipline. In the ethic of grace, ethical action takes place only when there is spontaneity, when the act is an expression of an ethical nature. For Romero it makes no difference whether the act is one

of effort or of spontaneity, the only "decisive consideration is the intention of adhering unreservedly to transcendence; the ways of arriving at this are secondary."[74]

At this point it seems to the writer that Romero is not wholly aware of the implications of his own position. Setting forth the relation between ethics and spirit he states: "It is almost unnecessary to stipulate that the ethical projection is intrinsic to spirit, consubstantial with it.... The ethical projection, the practical adherence to transcendence, is a spontaneous and necessary activity of spirituality."[75] Mere intentionality, if we take Romero's categories, cannot realize an ethical act, for, by definition, it is ego-centric, and is incapable of pure transcendence. The spirit, on the other hand, cannot help but act ethically, for, again by definition, its nature is to realize transcendence. If Romero links ethics to the activity of spirit, and defines the ethical act in terms of intention and not results, then ethics must necessarily be "ethics of grace," the spontaneous activity of the ethical, i.e. spiritual personality.

In a brief note at the end of his exposition of the ethical value in the "Theory of Man" Romero declares that "the transit from interest in the non-spiritual to the spiritual constitutes a 'conversion' in the fullest sense of the word, a change of direction."[76] In this recognition Romero approximates the Christian emphasis on a spiritual rebirth through which man is made capable of spiritual acts, instead of acting always in bondage to self-interest, (sin).

2. The Objectivity of Values

Influenced by the phenomenological school Romero posits the objectivity

of values as ideal objects. In his secondary school text on Logic he declares:

> "Values are instances regarding which we can only say in definition that they have not being but do possess value; (que no son sino que valen.) that their peculiar mode of being is to be of value. Some philosophers conceive them in a relativistic sense; the most generalized opinion today, that which guides the present philosophy of spirit and of culture (his own position) supposes them absolute and distinguishes the relativity of the knowledge of them, and of the active acceptance which they achieve, from the absoluteness which they possess in themselves."[77]

There is an evident contradiction here between this description and his classification of values as spiritual (absolute) and non-spiritual (relative) as set forth in his "Theory of Man" and explained above. If values are objective, and hence absolute, there can be no room for non-spiritual or relative values. It is not clear how they can be spiritual either, for as "ideal" objects "values are outside of time",[78] while the spiritual belongs to the world of the real, and hence to time.

This ontologism of values seems unnecessary and confusing to this writer. Values are relevant only in the context of a subject-object relationship. In our discussion of Alejandro Korn's and Antonio Caso's theories of values we have noted the difficulties with a notion of values divorced from subject, and the danger of legalism inherent in the concept of impersonal objective values. If Romero is concerned to avoid the dangers of relativism in a purely human-subjective view of values, this concern is well founded. But this danger can be avoided if values are seen as existent in the mind and will of God, who is absolute Spirit.

There is one other aspect in Romero's treatment of value which deserves

special attention. Romero's entire philosophy is impregnated with the sense of time. He notes with approval the note of temporalism in the metaphysics of Bergson, of Simmel and of Heidegger. But where Heidegger's temporalism finally issues in despair and leads him to speak of man as a "being for death," (ser para la muerte) Romero holds that through life in the spirit man can conquer death." "The spiritual act," declares Romero, carries with it a BEYOND DEATH. ("mas allá de la muerte", italicized by Romero). The complex of human spiritual activities is a growing from the standpoint of eternity; the most moving thing with regard to spirit is to verify how, replete with time and the last of a temporal series, it triumphs over time by means of acts which are, nevertheless, temporal."[79]. Speaking from the standpoint of his belief in man as spirit Romero avers: "In the most intrinsic and genuine part of his being, by the highest and most limpid part of him, (man) is the conquerer of death."[80]. It is by putting himself resolutely on the side of values that man achieves this victory. "The last evasion," says Romero, "is not existential, but extraexistential, he abandons the temporal plane and takes refuge in the intemporality of values. In his final and definitive definition, man is not, as Heidegger thinks, a being for death, but a being for value. (ser para el valor.)"[81].

One may well ask, however, what kind of victory this is if it means leaving the realm of reality for the abstract world of ideality. Can man be satisfied with a victory over death which is achieved at the expense of existence and subjectivity? The insistence on the objectivity and intemporality of values would seem to lead to just such a result. If, however, values are posited in God, the absolute and eternal Spirit, man's victory over death, accomplished through the action of God's grace and not merely

as the result of man's effort, is eternal life. In this victory the individuality and existentiality of man as a spiritual personality are respected. Freed from its association with corruption, temporality is redeemed, transmuted into eternity, but not nullified. This, indeed, is victory. "Thanks be to God who giveth us the victory, through Jesus Christ our Lord," exclaims the apostle in the triumphant close to his prose-poem on the theme of Christian immortality.[82]

G. ROMERO'S PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE

1. The Meaning of Culture

Romero's philosophy of culture is directly related to his theory of man. Man, as we have seen, is the intentional, objectivizing being. In his intentional activity, man creates objectivities. In his earlier definitions Romero attributes all culture to the activity of spirit, accepting Hegel's definition of culture as "objectivized spirit." "Culture consists in a gallery of spiritual objectivities," he declares in his text on Logic, (first published in 1938).[83] In the "Theory of Man", however, he declares: "For us culture is not necessarily spiritual although it surely is in many of its parts and tends to be all of it governed from above by spiritual motivation."[84] Whatever is the product of man's intentional activity, whether from mere intentionality or from spiritual intentionality, constitutes culture: "Every specifically human activity is cultural...the notion of culture includes every human product and every human comportment."[85] Culture, in the same way as man, then, belongs both to the world of nature and to spirit. "If the creation of cultural activity is foreign to spirit, it is nature; if the spirit intervenes in it, it will be that combination

of nature and spirit, in variable proportions, which is the common thing in man and in everything human."[86].

2. Culture and Community

Man lives in community. The human community is the intentional, objectivizing community. That is what makes it different from all sub-human communities. Through life in community man's objective creations can become the possession of the entire community. Some cultural creations, such as language, folk myths, etc. are the creation of the community as a whole. When cultural objects become the possession of the community a cultural capital is accumulated, and a tradition, or heritage is gathered which can be transmitted with cumulative effect.

With the objects of culture man creates his own world; cities, techniques, arts, norms, institutions, etc. This cultural world becomes the medium in which he lives. Thus man not only creates his culture, he is also shaped by the culture in which he lives. All human communities show some of the same essential features which are the universal expression of man's objectivizing power: "a community ruled by norms, language customs, religion arts, techniques."[87]. But concrete historical communities develop cultures which have unique characteristics, not only different material objects of culture, but different attitudes and interests, a special way of viewing the world and human existence. Certain values become dominant in the concept of reality in certain epochs or in certain groupings, and then become the unifying values which impress their seal on various or on all cultural expressions. Thus the religious motive impressed a peculiar character on the Occidental medieval community.[88].

Man's sense of values makes him a citizen of two worlds; "the world of that which is, and the world of that which ought to be."89. This has a direct relation to his cultural creativity, for in seeking to realize that which should be man transforms culture. Philosophy has a special place in human culture. "In a certain way, it is simply the self-consciousness of culture, human culture thinking of itself...Philosophy is culture as idea or problem; the human spirit which in large measure has created culture spontaneously or even unconsciously, returning over it to understand it and judge it, to clarify its ends, and to grasp its sense."90.

3. The Concept of the World and the Great Historic Cultures

Among the problems in the philosophy of culture the question of the "concept of the world" (weltanschaung) has held a special interest for Romero. His main inspiration in the field has been Wilhelm Dilthey. He describes and illustrates what he means by concept of the world rather than defines it. Much as he values the role of philosophy Romero understands how greatly "concept of the world" exceeds the bounds of academic philosophy of mere intellectual formulation. "The concept of the world," he declares, "does not belong to the intellectual order, although it contains intellectual elements and may seek to justify itself intellectually, it answers to complex exactions and primary inclinations, our desires and hopes."91. In a historic culture a concept of the world is a "system of basic convictions about things and about man and his role and destiny."92. Every real historic culture has its own concept.

Romero holds that there are three great living world cultures, with three different corresponding concepts of the world. These cultures vary

fundamentally in their attitude to time and reality and in their interpretation of the basic meaning of existence. These are the Hindu, the Chinese, and the Occidental world cultures. In answer to the problem of the basic meaning of existence the Hindu culture answers that all reality is an indivisible whole, that perfection and meaning reside in the whole. Temporality and all individual instances are illusory, and belong to the world of appearance, not to reality. The way for man to find meaning is by reintegration with the whole, returning to the world of reality. The classical Chinese view is that perfection and reality are found in the social grouping, the national-racial community, for it only embraces past, present and future. Man finds meaning in belonging to the community, through the link with his ancestors and his posterity. In this view time is detained and the individual is submerged in the totality of the eternal community. The Occidental view is the only one which values the individual personality as such, and posits the realization of the individual as a spiritual personality. "For the culture of the Occident", says Romero, "the supreme reality is the spirit in march in its personal form, subduing nature, realizing itself in an ever broader and more nearly perfect manner."93. In synthesis: the Hindu says "the whole"; the Chinese says "us", the occidental says "I".94. The three basic attitudes toward time involved in these concepts of reality are respectively: to deny it, to detain it, to affirm it. Since these are the three basic attitudes possible they determine the three major forms of historic culture.

All three of these conceptions are able to impart a sense of meaning to existence according to Romero, but only the Western view provides man with a dynamic view of culture, it only takes account of the historicity of man.

The Asiatic views deny history and produce static forms of culture, while the Occidental accepts history as its indispensable ally in the purpose of realizing, in history, the demands of the spirit.

These basic concepts are connected with the religious views in the respective cultures. In the Occident there is a greater divergence between religion and philosophy, nevertheless these largely coincide in the above mentioned concept of reality. Romero holds that there is no conflict between the religious ideas that God as a person is the supreme instance in whom all values converge, and that the hope for a better life can find its fulfillment in a "blessed other-worldly realm of souls" and "the faith that the supreme ideal values are reached in this world and that the present is incubating a happier and better destiny, a future time on whose shores, the spirit will glow, realized in the harmony of the human person."[95]

4. The Crisis of the Concept of the World in Western Culture

Sharing in the optimistic world view of the Occident as he has described it, Romero states nevertheless that Western man's concept of the world is undergoing a serious crisis. Writing during the time of the Second World War Romero was particularly aware of the general crisis of the West. For Romero this crisis is at bottom a "crisis of faith". "Among the various causes which enter into the present crisis," says Romero, "one of the principal ones is that of the lack of a world view which is broadly shared, the absence of a system of basic convictions concerning things and concerning man, his role and his destiny."[96] It is not that a world view is totally lacking in the western world, but there is no "basic, organic, and adequate view, prevailing throughout the whole of the West."[97]

Western man is without a world view because what was his world view, modernism, has broken down. In a number of brilliant articles Romero traces the rise and downfall of modernism. He places the origins of modernism in the Renaissance and describes it as a substitute for the medieval concept of the world. Romero does not analyze the medieval world view, or why it was that Western man desired to supplant it. He does examine the significance of the philosophy of Descartes in the rise of modernism and speaks of Cartesianism as "the recovery of the individual."98. He links the Reformation and the doctrine of natural rights with Cartesianism and speaks of them as parallel movements for the recovery of the individual in religion and in politics. At one point he also speaks of the three movements as "a program of immanentism,"...which turns its back "on the medieval transcendentalism."99. They represent, declares Romero, "a recoil from the vast perspectives of transcendence, (belief, tradition, authority, divine right) to individual immanence. Cartesianism is the immanentism of knowledge; protestantism is the immanentism of belief; Natural Right is the immanentism of power."100. This reference to the Reformation as the "immanentism of belief", as far as this writer has been able to trace, appears in only one page in his published writings, and is not explained in any way, but it is in his basic essay "Programa de Una Filosofía," and has been widely quoted. It is a curious insertion. Nowhere else does he define transcendence as "belief, tradition, authority, divine right (of kings?)". His whole philosophy of "empirical transcendentalism" would lead one to suppose that Romero would be in sympathy with the "recovery of the individual," and that he would share Alejandro Korn's lack of sympathy with the evident rationalism of the Medieval world-view. (Cf. p. 34 and p. 45 of this study). In his analysis of the great world cultures he stresses the Occidental

emphasis on the realization of the individual spiritual personality, a clear Reformation emphasis, as the specific point of superiority in the Western world view. One can only conclude that Romero has not sufficiently analyzed the nature of the Medieval synthesis or the basic motive of the Reformation, and that he has been misled by his source at this point. (He cites no source, but we may surmise an influence of Maritain's "Three Reformers"). If the Medieval world view can be described as a "transcendentalism," the Reformation view, with its emphasis on the personal experiential relation to God through transcendent faith, is even more so. Indeed, it can be contended that the Reformation, instead of being a "program of immanentism" in its central emphasis, represents a resistance to the immanental tendency of modernism. And it is significant that the greatest triumph of modernism was achieved in the very nation which perfected the medieval world view.

This inclusion of the Reformation is a part of the immanental program of modernism, however, does not invalidate Romero's basic thesis that modernism, in its attempt to compress and explain all reality within the categories of the mathematical reason was a program of immanentism; nor his contention that modernism was intended to supplant the medieval world view. Modernism as a new world view slowly won adherents and came into its own in the eighteenth century, "the age of the enlightenment." In modernism faith in man's natural reason was substituted for faith in a transcendent deity. With the elaboration of the principles of mechanical causation, all reality was thought to have been brought within the compass of the rational mind, and hence, that the reason would be able to solve all problems, inaugurating a new age of progress.

Romanticism arose at the turn of the nineteenth century as a revolt against the rationalism of the eighteenth. But it was short lived, for modernism regained its dominance in the form of positivism. Positivism was "the restoration," but it was more than restoration of the eighteenth century. It carried the mechanical interpretation of reality still further by "annexing the order of life, and with it all the orb of spirit and of culture to the mechanical scheme," through the biologism of Darwinian evolution.[101] Evolutionism as a universal principle of interpretation became the basis for a new faith in progress, not merely the progress of man through the application of reason, but progress as the inevitable "forward march of reality....based on the mechanical interaction of the forces of nature just as Darwin understood them for biology and even more broadly, Spencer for the entire physical and human universe."[102] "Positivism," declares Romero, "achieved a complete vision of things, and became a faith like no other has become, save only religious faith: faith in the perfectibility of man, in limitless progress, and the future."[103]

But this faith soon "came tumbling down." More profound philosophies challenged the naive scientism of the age; the new physics overthrew the dogma of mechanical causation; evolutionism as a mechanically determined ascending process was denied; the faith in progress collapsed."[104] "Then," says Romero, "came the dispersion of souls; some sought solace in the traditional creeds, others fell into nihilism or a cult of the present moment capable of justifying the unjustifiable."[105] The exaggerated nationalisms of the last years can also be understood as one of the products of this loss of faith. "The men of the West have been left without firm convictions on which to lean, without common principles to bind them

together, without securities before the enigma of the cosmos."[106]

There is one aspect in the downfall of positivism which Romero deplores. This is the loss of faith in progress. We recognized the weakness of the mechanical concept of progress which fell with the collapse of positivism. "But," declares Romero, "the idea in itself, of man as a being who is thrust forward cannot be impugned without impugning man himself, because man in large measure lives by that image of himself which he sees going before him, by the idealized shadow of himself which he struggles to reach."[107] He asserts that the rejection of the idea of progress was "immature and superficial", and that "the question is not closed."[108]

And what of the future? There are many signs, says Romero, that a new concept of the world is in formation. The crisis, as all crises in the concept of the world, is a transition between the abandoned world view and the new one which is emerging. In a 1939 essay written for "La Nación", after designating the lack of a world view as a cause of the world crisis Romero states: "Whether or not a new scheme is taking form--which in my opinion could be no other than that of structure--is a theme which will have to be examined elsewhere."[109] As far as this writer knows he has not recorded the results of that examination if indeed he has completed it. In a 1943 article, also for "La Nación," he makes bold to assert that "in philosophy the crisis is already a thing of the past, perhaps the only branch of culture in which it has happened."[110] Presumably, it is with the prestige won by the philosophies of structure, or of transcendence, that the crisis has been solved. But Romero has not analyzed the new philosophy with regard to its adequacy to serve as a new concept of the world, a generalized view which can restore faith to man in the Western world; not

simply for the philosopher, but for the common man. Can Romero's "transcendental empiricism", or "structuralism" serve this need?

H. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

No one who believes in the life of the spirit and the need for a sense of transcendent, spiritual values can fail to applaud the work of Francisco Romero. It is a matter of the most profound and hopeful significance for Spanish America that its leading philosopher today should be such a resolute champion of a view of man and reality which breaks decisively with naturalism and affirms the centrality of spirit. Romero's ethical views, thoroughly consistent with his emphasis on the primacy of spiritual values, furnish a clarion call for higher and nobler living in realization of that which "ought to be". The philosopher's life, in complete harmony with his philosophy, has been a shining example of the dignity, freedom, integrity, and dedication to the service of others, which characterizes the life which is oriented to the realization of spiritual values. If it is possible to speak of "a concern for transcendent values in contemporary Spanish-American philosophy," it is in large measure because of the exemplary work of Francisco Romero.

As we examine Romero's philosophy in a final, critical estimate, and seek to assess the significance of his influence, however, there still remain a number of questions on whose answer our final appraisal must rest. Let us first briefly review Romero's position.

Romero conceives of reality as composed of ascending orders of the physical, the organic, psychic-intentionality, and spirit. The dynamic,

positive element in reality, which accounts for its forward and upward motion is called "transcendence." Reality is a march of nature toward spirit--which is absolute transcendence. It is spirit which gives meaning to the universe. Spirit has not emerged by accident, it is implicit in reality itself. It emerges as a distinct order of reality in man. Transcendence is being realized in time, but its final goal is the realization of absolute value, which is outside of time. Through spiritual acts of adherence to absolute value, man also overcomes time.

The first question we must ask as we consider this, on the whole, admirable scheme is: How can we account for the appearance of spirit? To suggest, as Romero does, that it is implicit from the beginning and is not an accidental appearance does not answer this question, for it is still necessary to explain why it is implicit, if indeed it is. "Let us not risk the supposition of a transcendent will," says Romero, "not even as a hypothesis;" only to add, "but the fact is that things happen as if such a purpose existed."111. This is the closest approximation to an affirmation of the existence of God which the writer has found in Romero's writings. We may well ask Romero; why not risk the supposition of a transcendent will? If things happen as if a purpose existed, is it not more reasonable to accept the Biblical view and to say "In the beginning God..."? Reality is not self-explanatory, and if we reject the theistic hypothesis we only end by introducing another and inferior concept--Romero's word is "transcendence,"--to account for what the Biblical cosmology attributes to the work of God.

To say "God," is not the mere affirmation of a rational principle, an abstract notion of a first cause. For the Christian God is the existential,

and absolute Spiritual Personality, who is the Lord of history, and of all reality. He is beyond all our definitions, and his ways are beyond our understanding, but the Christian knows that all reality and all value originate and center and converge in Him. Faith in God illuminates every aspect of reality and of existence. It determines not only our understanding of reality but also our understanding of the duties, and the destiny of man.

Romero affirms "the existence" of transcendent spiritual values. The fact of spiritual value places an ethical imperative on man to put himself on the side of value. Declares Romero: "This imperative says: 'proclaim value', 'decide thyself for it.'"[112]. There is no greater concern for ethical action in contemporary philosophy than Romero's. But the force of his call for ethical action is weakened at two basic points by his failure to center values in God. In the first place, without God, values, if absolute, are necessarily conceived as "ideal objects," impersonal, intemporal. In this view the destiny of the ethical personality is to "conquer death" through the realization of absolute value, by "taking refuge in the intemporality of values."[113]. But this as we have seen, is the negation of the destiny of the spiritual personality as a concrete existential entity. The Christian, whose values are centered in God, awaits a destiny in which victory over death means not the taking of "refuge in the intemporality of values," but entrance into eternal fellowship with God in the redeemed time of celestial existence.

In the second place, in any ultimate sense the imperative of the realization of absolute value is an impossible challenge. Even on his "best behavior" man cannot achieve it. There is, as Romero himself recognizes,

"an unbridgeable abyss between nature and spirit," which man cannot leap. How can man, in whom nature and spirit are always intermingled, realize absolute spirit? The Christian recognizes the imperative of spiritual action. But as he faces this imperative he counts for its achievement not on his own effort, though his effort must be fully engaged, but on God's grace. "Ethic of grace" for the Christian does not mean the theoretical possibility of a spontaneous ethical action, but the God granted power to surpass his "natural possibilities" in the accomplishment of God's holy will. And in the end victory over death does not depend on his own achievement, but on God's merciful grace vouchsafed in Jesus Christ.

To the above observations we must add, however, that Romero's "ethics of transcendence," represent a remarkable approximation to the Christian ethic for one, who, as far as this writer knows, has depended entirely on the works of secular philosophers for his inspirations. Perhaps the main "christian" elements in his philosophy are those which are derived from the philosophy of Scheler who was not, strictly speaking, a "Christian philosopher" but who experienced profound Christian inspirations. Romero's ethic is not so much in error, as it is incomplete. It needs the complement, which to be sure, would also be the corrective, of the Christian view of man and reality. Which leads us to suggest that what contemporary man, or man in any age, needs, is not an empirical transcendentalism but an empirical-theological transcendentalism. This would not be a return to the theological rationalism of the medieval world view, but the assertion of the pristine, Biblical Christian view--not a systematic philosophical position, but an existential faith whose content is determined by God's "word" in historical encounter. (Cf. Chapter IV, p.222). This brings us to the final

question which we must consider with regard to Romero's philosophy. This question is whether Romero's philosophy can be a contribution to the solution of the crisis of faith in which man finds himself, and which has been particularly acute for Spanish American man; whether it can serve as the basis for the new concept of the world which is needed to replace discredited positivism.

Romero himself has recognized that a generalized concept of reality is much more than an intellectual formulation, more than an academic philosophy, it must have the ingredients of a faith. Modernism became a concept of the world because it answered the demand for a faith which could supplant the medieval faith. It proposed a faith in reason, in progress, in man's own powers, in causality. Its program was easily understood. In large measure it obtained its dynamic from the power of religious faith, by inverting the categories of religion--this has been particularly clear in our analysis of Spanish American positivism, which, as we have seen (Chapter III) was "a polemic against the Catholic Weltanschaung" as well as a new concept of the world.

For a philosophy to become a concept of the world, it must not only win the acceptance of an intellectual elite, it must become the accepted view of a large sector of the people of a cultural grouping. Romero's philosophy is a philosopher's philosophy. It is full of subtleties. Its central concepts of transcendence, structure, intentionality, spirit etc. are difficult to grasp.[1] Indeed, Professor Risieri Frondizi, in his review article of the "Theory of Man", referring to Romero's key words, declares: "all of these words are full of ambiguity and it is difficult to make up one's mind about the author's theories if one does not know exactly what he

means."[114] Professor Frondizi should not have found them so difficult! But his point is of importance. Romero is proposing a faith in the rather vague, difficult, abstract notion of "transcendence" as the new faith for Western man. It is not a basically simple idea which the common man can grasp. Romero would re-write the creation story to read, "In the beginning, transcendence..." Granted that it is far better than to say "In the beginning nature accidentally..." But both from the point of view of cosmological soundness, and from the point of view of the need for a simple faith, man still needs to say, "In the beginning, God..."

Again, however, we must consider the remarkable correspondence between the essential insights of Romero and the Christian view. Other philosophers, José Ingenieros comes immediately to mind, have thought it necessary to attempt to destroy Christianity in order to establish their philosophies. There is nothing of this in Romero. Indeed, we may go so far as to suggest that Romero's interpretation of reality may be far closer to the Biblical view than many so-called christian interpretations which employ certain Christian words but have wedded the Christian concepts to various forms of rationalism, or even to naturalism.

An early Christian saint and scholar, Justin Martyr, found his way from paganism to Christ, inspired by Plato's doctrine of Ideas. Perhaps Romero's philosophy of spirit and transcendent values may lead scholars of today to an encounter with the Transcendent Spirit in whom all spiritual values find their alpha and omega. But even if the scholars, like Romero, hesitate before the leap of faith, if they will go as far as Romero and reaffirm the spiritual dimension of life, they will help to create a new spiritual climate in which faith will be easier for all men. For though

Romero's empirical transcendentalism may not serve as the faith men need, through its dissemination the experiential Christian Transcendentalism to which it points--at once more simple and more profound than Romero's philosophy--will become a more lively option for those who are now adrift.

Footnotes

Chapter VIII

1. Quoted by Rodríquez-Alcalá, Hugo, Francisco Romero. New York. Hispanic Institue in the United States, Columbia University, 1954. p.13.
2. Ibid., p. 21.
3. Ibid., p. 24.
4. Romero, Francisco, Sobre la Filosofía en América. Buenos Aires. Editorial Raigue, 1952. p. 55.
5. Rodriguez-Alcalá, Hugo, "Francisco Romero, Filósofo de América" in Cuadernos Americanos 3. Mayo-Junio, 1954, Año XIII, Vol. LXXV, p. 139.
6. García Bárcena, Rafael, "A Francisco Romero, Patriarca de la Filosofía Americana" in Revista Cubana de Filosofía, Julio-Diciembre, 1951, Vol. II, No. 9. p. 3.
7. Cf. Aja, Pedro Vicente, El Cristianismo en la Crisis del Occidente. La Habana. Sociedad Cubana de Filosofía, 1953. p. 72. Also the article by Rodríguez-Alcalá, Hugo, "Francisco Romero, Filósofo de América" as cited above.
8. Romero, Sobre la Filosofía en América, pp. 64-65.
9. See above. Chapter IV, p.
10. Romero, Francisco, Filosofía Contemporánea. Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1941. p. 13.
11. Ibid., p. 14.
12. Ibid., p. 20.
13. Ibid., p. 14.
14. Ibid., p. 23.
15. Ibid., p. 25.
16. Ferrater Mora, José, "Francisco Romero: Un Estilo de Filosofía" in Revista Cubana de Filosofía, Julio-Diciembre, 1951, Vol. II, Num. 9, p. 17.
17. Romero, Francisco, Teoría del Hombre. Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1952. p. 209.
18. Romero, Francisco, Papeles para una Filosofía. Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1945. p. 29.

19. Ibid p. 29

20. Ibid. p. 27

21. Ibid. p. 14

22. Ibid. p. 14

23. Ibid. pp. 9-30, and Romero, Teoría del Hombre, pp. 74-85

24. Romero, Teoría del Hombre, p. 306

25. Romero, Papeles para una Filosofía, p. 25

26. Romero, Filosofía Contemporánea, p. 32

27. Romero, Teoría del Hombre, p. 306

28. Romero, Filosofía Contemporánea, p. 44

29. Romero, Papeles para una Filosofía, p. 15

30. Romero, Teoría del Hombre, pp. 77, 83

31. Ibid. p. 80.

32. Ibid. pp. 82, 83

33. Ibid. p. 206

34. Romero, Filosofía Contemporánea, p. 71

35. Ibid. p. 71

36. Frondizi, Risieri,"Francisco Romero-- Teoría del Hombre"(Review Article) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. XV.,No. 2, p. 289. (Cf. also Romero, Teoría del Hombre, p. 165)

37. Ibid p. 290

38. Romero, Teoría del Hombre, p. 164

39. Ibid. p. 172

40. Romero, Francisco, Filosofía de la Persona, Segunda Edición, Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, 1951, p. 54

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42. Romero, Filosofía de la Persona, p. 50

43. Ibid. p. 43

44. Romero, Papeles para una Filosofía, p. 29
45. Ibid. p. 30
46. Romero, Teoría del Hombre, p. 11
47. Ibid. p. 12
48. Ibid p. 15
49. Ibid p. 16.
50. Ibid. p. 19
51. Ibid. p. 82
52. Ibid. p. 158
53. Ibid. p. 158
54. Ibid. pp. 161, 162
55. Romero, Papeles para una Filosofía, p. 41
56. Romero, Teoría del Hombre, p. 165
57. Ibid. p. 167
58. Ibid. p. 178
59. Ibid. p. 192
60. Ibid. p. 197
61. Ibid. p. 198
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64. Ibid. p. 246
65. Ibid. p. 247
66. Ibid. pp. 247-248
67. Ibid p. 257
68. Ibid. pp. 213-214
69. Ibid. p. 214
70. Ibid. p. 231

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81. Romero, Filosofía Contemporánea, p. 51

82. I Corinthians 15:57

83. Romero, Lógica, pp/ 206, 207

84. Romero, Teoría del Hombre, p. 116

85. Ibid. p. 116

86. Ibid. p. 124

87. Ibid. p. 130

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95. Ibid. p. 160

96. Romero, El Hombre y la Cultura, p. 46

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99. Romero, Papeles para una Filosofía, p. 21

100. Ibid. p. 21

101. Romero, Filosofía de la Persona, p. 101

102. Romero, El Hombre y la Cultura, p. 102

103. Ibid. p. 103

104. Ibid. p. 62

105. Ibid. p. 63

106. Romero, Filosofía de la Persona, p. 31

107. Romero, El Hombre y la Cultura, p. 61

108. Ibid. p. 67

109. Romero & Jesinghaus, La Cultura Moderna, p. 14

110. Romero, Papeles para una Filosofía, p. 129

111. Romero, Filosofía de la Persona, p. 50

112. Romero & Jesinghaus, La Cultura Moderna, p. 48

113. See above p. 392

114. Frondizi, Op. Cit. p. 289

CONCLUSION

In the introduction to this study the writer compared the movement of Spanish American philosophy from colonial days to the present to a four act drama enacted on the stage of history. In the first four chapters we traced the main action of this drama, each chapter corresponding to an act. In the first chapter we found scholasticism as the official and dominant philosophy in the American colonies of the theocratic Spanish state, in a prolongation of medievalism three hundred years after its passing in Europe and North America. In the second chapter we saw the first reactions against scholasticism and then the full revolt against it, and how this intellectual revolt both inspired and was in turn inspired by the political revolt against the Spanish Crown. In the third chapter we saw the rise of a new philosophy, positivism, which came to have almost as complete dominance over the thought life of the Spanish American republics as scholasticism had over the colonies. In the fourth chapter we witnessed the rejection of positivism and the initial stages in the search for a new philosophy which can take the place of positivism. Then in four additional chapters we undertook a more complete examination of the work of four leading philosophers of the contemporary post-positivist philosophy: Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos, of Mexico, and Alejandro Korn and Francisco Romero, of Argentina.

Analyzing this dramatic movement in terms of the dominant views of the world which its dialectic discloses we see: first, a period of colonial medievalism, (scholasticism); second, a period of transition in which medievalism is rejected and the impact of modern thought, (both rationalism and romanticism), is experienced; third, a new period of unified thought in which

nineteenth century positivism prevails; fourth, a new period of transition in which positivism is repudiated and new philosophies bid for dominance, their one principal common characteristic being the rejection of the positivist standpoint.

The student of the history of western culture recognizes in this dialectic a reduplication of the course of western thought, with the very significant difference that this movement from medievalism, through modernism and positivism, to the present crisis has been compressed into the last two hundred years instead of covering almost six hundred years. The reason for this duplication is that after the anachronistic period of colonial medievalism (which was due to the influence of Spain) Spanish America has lived under the influence of the dominant philosophies of Europe, having no real philosophy of its own. As Risieri Frondizi has observed: "What we usually call Latin American philosophy is a restatement of European philosophical problems. We may say that up to now the history of Latin American philosophy can very well be substituted by the history of the influence of European thought."[1]. It is only now that the question of an indigenous Spanish American thought is being seriously raised. As Spanish America has borrowed the philosophy of Europe it has been caught in the contemporary crisis of Western culture.

Perhaps this very proximity to medievalism, with the compression of the modern era, including positivism, into the period of one century, has made it easier for Spanish America better to understand the antecedents of the present crisis of Western culture. In his brilliant analysis of the crisis in Western culture, "The Crisis of Faith", Professor Stanley R. Hopper has described the medieval period as one of "static culture and hierarchical

rigidity.". "Its virtue was order. Its fault was a metaphysical regimentation of the spirit,"[2] declares Professor Hopper. The Spanish American repudiation of scholasticism was a revolt against that regimentation, a movement in which revolt against Spanish rule went hand in hand with the spiritual revolt. Spanish Americans found, however, that it is far easier to achieve freedom from a foreign political rule than it is to achieve freedom of thought. In the search for a new world view, Spanish American thinkers took over the modern, secular philosophies of Europe and repeated the modern "experiment in thought." All at once, they sought to duplicate the Renaissance, the modern scientific and philosophical revolution, the revolution of the rights of man--to incorporate themselves completely into the "modern age." What Spanish America did not duplicate in any way was the Reformation. For with the rejection of the medieval world view came the rejection of all thought of God as well--as if God had been specifically responsible for the colonial regimentation of the spirit against which it continued to rebel; nor has it yet ceased. But then came the discovery that the rejection of medievalism, and the rejection of God, did not necessarily mean entrance into the freedom of the spirit. With the rejection of scholasticism came the achievement of "free examination". But this freedom was used to embrace a philosophy which denied freedom itself. (Cf. the criticism of "The Positivist Era" at the end of Part I).

Yet, in spite of their voluble enthusiasm for science and for progress, Spanish Americans, as Leopoldo Zea has pointed out,[3] never truly felt the borrowed European philosophies as their own. Perhaps that is why Spanish American thinkers seem to have been readier than those of other parts of the West to admit the failure of positivism and naturalism and to give it up.

No outstanding Spanish American philosopher can be found today who will defend the philosophy which failed to see in man a being who is qualitatively outside of the world of nature. The positivist world view has admittedly broken down, and the search consciously is on for a new philosophy which will satisfy the need of Spanish American man, (who is also Western man) for a meaningful interpretation of life and the universe.

As Spanish America once again searches for a philosophy which can serve as its world view a number of questions may be raised concerning the significance and possible outcome of this search. We have already suggested our answer to some of these questions in various places, but we return to them at this point for a brief, final review. These questions are: First, what progress has been made thus far in the quest for a new philosophy for Spanish America? Second, will this philosophy again be borrowed from Europe or will it be indigenous to Spanish America? Third, what common features are there in the most important philosophies which today's Spanish American philosophers are advocating which may serve as basic points in the coming new philosophy? Fourth, can a new philosophy which synthesizes the main features of the present major philosophies of Spanish America become the new world-view, and if so, will this view furnish an adequate moral and spiritual orientation for Spanish America? These are difficult questions, and it is a venturesome task indeed to attempt to answer them. The author advances his suggestions purely in the form of suggestions, conscious of the fact that his own convictions are inescapably involved in his answers.

1. Present State of the Search for a New Philosophy for Spanish America.

Francisco Romero has expressed the opinion that in the present crisis of Western culture "philosophy is the only branch of culture in which the crisis is a thing of the past." (Cf. Chapter VIII, p.401). Romero presumably makes this statement on the basis of the influence achieved by the philosophies which stress the concept of structure, in which he finds an explicit repudiation of mechanism and naturalism, and a clear emphasis on transcendence. What Romero has called philosophy of "structure," would seem to coincide with what Professor José Gaos of the University of Mexico has termed "philosophies of life", under which he includes the "existentialist, and historicist, together with the strictly personalist," currents. Gaos states that these philosophies, which see "in man and the human (lo humano) something which cannot be reduced to nature and the natural" represent the "general orientation" of Spanish American thought at the present time. Professor Gaos, however, nowhere, to the knowledge of the writer, claims that in philosophy the crisis is already "a thing of the past." (Cf. Chapter IV p.200).

If Romero is right, then perhaps the new philosophy has already emerged. (The tentative character of Romero's statements needs to be remembered). The position of this study, however, is that while it seems evident that these "philosophies of life" tend to prevail as the "general orientation" in Spanish American philosophy, it is not to such an extent that it may be claimed that the stage of transition in philosophical thought has already been completed. (Cf. Chapter IV, Section D). A more serious objection, however, is that in themselves these "philosophies of life" hardly furnish a sufficiently coherent viewpoint for them to serve as the new unifying

philosophy. Existentialism, historicism, and personalism as systems are philosophies with significant differences as well as significant points of contact. Moreover it is questionable whether such a standpoint as historicism, which is an approach, rather than a philosophy, can be said to have sufficient content to be included as an adequate new philosophy. We have seen that the Mexican historicist school (Leopoldo Zea and his followers), for example, analyzes the faults of Mexican man and points to the need for new values, without specifying what these values shall be. Romero's philosophy of transcendence is more explicit, but it also lacks the simple, clear, basic concepts which seem to be the necessary elements in a philosophy adequate to serve as a world view.

It would seem to this writer, therefore, that though Spanish American philosophy has made a significant and hopeful beginning toward new philosophy which can serve as a unifying world view-that the repudiation of positivism has been followed by "an emerging concern for transcendent values"-it cannot yet be said that the new philosophy itself has yet emerged.

2. The Role of Spanish American Philosophers in the Quest for a New Philosophy.

Spanish American philosophers are no longer content merely to borrow the dominant European philosophies. In the formulation of the new philosophy for Spanish America, Spanish American philosophers intend to play, and undoubtedly will play, a much more important role than in the past. Whether on the right track or not, for example, the Mexican philosophers grouped around Leopoldo Zea are consciously striving for the creation of a new Mexican philosophy. Francisco Romero, more conscious of his indebtedness to the great contemporary European philosophers, nevertheless represent

a vigorous effort to arrive at a personal synthesis. Caso, Korn, and Vasconcelos are illustrations of a vitality of philosophical thought which we may well expect to find duplicated among younger thinkers who are not yet widely known.

This writer concurs, however, with Risieri Frondizi's conclusion that it is not yet possible to speak of an original Spanish American philosophy as such. Spanish America, whether it desires it or not, is to a lesser or greater degree, depending on the country, an integral part of Western culture. It is still possible to observe the preponderant influence of the European philosophies, even on the Mexican philosophers, who take their standpoint on a historicism of German origin, and an existentialism of European coinage, even as they insist on the need for an original Mexican philosophy.

There is no easy short-cut to a peculiarly Spanish American philosophy; nor is there any particular reason why an effort should be made to formulate such a philosophy. What is important is that in the common crisis of faith in the West, Spanish American thinkers should share creatively in the formulation of the new world view. They should not isolate themselves in this effort, each philosopher trying to work out his own system, or each country trying to work out a peculiar national philosophy, but they should share in the "dialogue" of western philosophy, assimilating the best that contemporary philosophy has to offer, (as well as the best in the history of philosophy) even as they seek to make their own contributions. Antonio Caso and Francisco Romero, in this writer's opinion, have both made significant contributions in this collective effort.

If Spanish American thinkers creatively participate in this dialogue, they will be setting forth a Spanish American viewpoint, merely by virtue of being Spanish Americans.

3. Characteristics of Present Philosophies which may serve as Basic Concepts in the Coming New Philosophy of Spanish America.

Professor Risieri Frondizi has emphasized the ethical interest which seems to be at the center of Spanish American philosophy today. "An ethical concern," he states, "seems to characterize and give direction to all Ibero American thinking."[4] "This ethical interest, as we have noted in our study of positivism, was also present in the positivist era, but it was geared to sociologism, and to a notion of automatic evolutionary progress. Even while positivist thinkers were greatly interested in political freedom and social progress, the question of ethical freedom was blurred in the context of a naturalistic psychology. With the abandonment of positivism, philosophy today is relating ethics to the affirmation of spirit and of freedom, to the pursuit of transcendent values.

Summarizing the main tendencies of contemporary Spanish American philosophy Francisco Romero has written:

> "With great risk and provisionally, it might be indicated that our philosophy seems to show a marked preference for the questions which relate to the spirit, values, and freedom, and even to intuit the profound unity of these three terms, tending to the affirmation of the spirit as the essence or the summit of reality, and seeing, above all, in spirituality, the free affirmation of value."[5]

The writer believed this description of Romero's to be essentially true to the main emphases of present day Spanish American philosophy, with Romero's own philosophy as an outstanding example of this description.

We may add to this statement of Romero that there is an evident general determination to avoid a rationalistic approach, to follow an empirical approach which is a broader, deeper empiricism, making room for the testimony of the intuition.

Outside of the neo-scholastics and orthodox Roman Catholic philosophers, with very few exceptions, however, the movement of contemporary Spanish American philosophy, seems to be searching for spirit, freedom, and values, in a non-theistic framework. As E. S. Brightman has observed, "the problem of God is rarely faced by philosophers who are not fairly orthodox." The late Antonio Caso is indeed exceptional in his forthright, independent Christian personalism.

4. Inadequacy of the New Orientation.

It is in this lack of a theistic reference, the insistence on a vague spiritualist metaphysics, and the affirmation of man himself as the highest expression of spirit that the writer finds the most serious weakness in the new orientations which seek to become the new philosophy for Spanish America. Implicit in such a scheme is the underestimation, neglect, or even denial of the power of evil in human life. For the place of God in metaphysics a vague term such as "transcendence" is substituted. The new philosophies of life are not atheistic in the materialistic way of positivism. The idea of God is not combated. But the effort is made to posit spirit without reference to God. This is a subtle position, and it seems doubtful to this writer whether this minimum form of spiritual belief, this ethical humanism, can win the adherence of the masses.

The late Professor E. S. Brightman has observed: "The spiritual

distress of Latin America will not be allayed until Latin America can develop a spiritual metaphysics and philosophy of religion corresponding to their needs and problems." The concern for a spiritual metaphysics is increasing, but the interest in a philosophy of religion is decidedly lagging. "Such a pursuit of spiritual idealism," observes Professor Brightman, "is in unstable equilibrium; it is both tragic and hopeful."[6] This was written in 1946. Subsequent developments have not changed this picture.

Yes, the present situation is both tragic and hopeful. It is tragic in that Spanish American thinkers seem to be attempting to repeat an experiment in thought in which God, though no longer explicitly denied, is still left out of account. The present crisis of western culture should have taught men that to pursue spirit apart from God is only to lose oneself in unreality. The dialectic of life and history, as Professor Hopper has reminded us, teaches us that "apart from God man seeks himself in centers of death." The search for Spirit apart from God is doomed to failure, for it neglects the only power that can save man from his circumstance--the circumstance that his capacity for self-transcendence only leads to self-destruction in the recoil of ego-centricity, unless, if we may echo Romero, this transcendence becomes absolute. But this can happen only when spirit becomes Holy Spirit; when man relates himself to the Eternal Spirit in answer to the divine initiative.

But the present situation is also hopeful. It is hopeful in that in seeking for "spirit, values, and freedom", Spanish American man is really seeking for the Eternal, even though he may not be aware of it. It is possible that in this search he may yet become aware of his need for God, and turn to him in recognition, to learn that he had already been found of Him.

There is a unique responsibility in the opportunity of this hour for those who know that the present crisis of faith can only be resolved in the God-given Faith through which we are justified.

Footnotes

Conclusion

1. Frondizi, Risieri, "Tendencies in Contemporary Latin American Philosophy", reprinted from International Intellectual Interchange, Institute of Latin American Studies. Austin, Texas. The University of Texas, 1943. p. 35.

2. Hopper, Stanley R. The Crisis of Faith. New York. The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944, p. 56.

3. Cf. above Chapter IV, pp. 214,216.

4. Frondizi, Risieri, "Is There an Ibero-American Philosophy?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. IX, No. 3. March, 1949. p. 351.

5. Romero, Francisco, "Sobre la Filosofía en America, Buenos Aires. Editorial Raigal, 1952. p. 17.

6. Brightman, E. S. "South of the Border", p. 11.

7. Hopper, op. cit., p. 300.

APPENDIX A

Francisco Bilbao, Juan Montalvo, José Victorino Lastarria and Manuel Gonzalez Prada

Juan Montalvo, Francisco Bilbao, José Victorino Lastarria and Manuel Gonzalez Prada cannot be called positivist philosophers. They are not philosophers in the strict sense of the word, and only Lastarria had any academic relationship. Yet they were all powerful writers who turned their talents against the influence of the Roman Catholic Church and advocated a faith in science and democracy. Romantic influences were particularly strong in Montalvo and Bilbao, especially the latter, the most prominent disciple of Lammenais in Spanish America. An impassioned enemy of all that Spain stood for, politically and culturally, Francisco Bilbao (1823-1865) is the romantic rebel precursor of the positivist era. Exiled from Chile for his inflammatory speeches and writings against the Roman Catholic Church and the traditions inherited from the colonial past, his influence extended throughout the continent as he travelled about. A flaming apostle of a social humanitarian interpretation of Christianity, and possessed of a mystic faith in the common people, Bilbao's is still a name to conjure with in Chile, a hundred years afterward.

Juan Montalvo (1833-1889) of Ecuador, is one of the great masters of the Spanish tongue. Though personally Catholic he was the implacable foe of clericalism and of tyranny. He found a worthy enemy in the Ecuadorean dictator, Gabriel García Moreno, a man of intellect, integrity, and force of character, though a narrow bigot.[1] A fanatical Catholic, García Moreno attempted to establish, and for a time well nigh succeeded, a theocratic

state in Ecuador--a closer alliance of civil and clerical power than even Spain had known. With great solemnity he dedicated the Republic to the Sacred Heart. He turned over all education to the Church. Montalvo dipped his pen in gall to anathematize and ridicule the dictator, and when García Moreno finally fell, assassinated by a youthful disciple of Montalvo, the exile master exclaimed "I have slain him with my pen."[2]. But Montalvo was not an extreme iconoclast. He attempted to preach the virtues of political freedom, and faith in America, without repudiating all the heritage of Spain.

José Victorino Lastarria, (1817-1888), on the other hand, is perhaps the most important foe of the influence of Spain in Hispanic America during the nineteenth century. A professor of constitutional history in the University of Chile he put into his writings not only the zeal of an apostle, but also the documentation possible to a scholar, and his writings benefited from the prestige of his professorial position. He was by no means an impartial scholar. Invited by the Rector, Andrés Bello, to deliver the principal address at the first anniversary celebration of the foundation of the University of Chile Lastarria seized the opportunity to pronounce a tremendous oration denouncing the colonial record of Spain and its lingering influence in Chilean society.[3]. "His interpretation", says Crawford, "is one of the classic documents which have built up what is called the Black Legend of Spain."[4]. Lastarria returned to this theme again and again, developing it in its fullest form in a book addressed to all Latin-America which he entitled "La America". "Hispanic America", he writes in this volume, "is irresistibly condemned to react against the civilization of its mother country and its progress is in direct proportion to its abjuration of its

past.[5] As a part of the repudiation of Spanish civilization Lastarria rejected the religion of Spain, but affected like Bilbao, though not to the same extent by the ideas of Lammenais, he tries to distinguish this religion from the Christianity which he approves. Terrible is his indictment of Spanish Catholicism:

> "The Christian religion is saintly, who doubts it; it is the expression of modern civilization and carries within it the seeds of democracy. But in the religion and in the idiom which Spain taught America there is none of that, only slavery, fanaticism, and a somnolent civilization, which lives on the ignorance of society, on the nullity of the individual, on orthodoxy and puerile credulity, on the hatred of truth and progress, and on the lie on which is founded the civil and spiritual power which dominates all. Religion was nothing more than an instrument of domination and its ministers played no other role than that of partners of the civil power in the exploitation of the colony. America owes to Spain not its civilization but its backwardness and funest social vices which prevent the consolidation of order and of new institutions. This Catholicism never was Christianity, but superstition and fanaticism placed at the service of Power and of Greed."[6]

Lastarria would start all over again. He would reconstruct all education and morals, society itself, on the dogma of democracy, which is the legacy of the revolutions and of independence, which he calls "the greatest event of the centuries after Christianity."[7] This dogma he defines as the belief "the providence has given each individual, whoever he may be, the necessary degree of reason to govern himself in the things which interest him exclusively."[8] He did not think of democracy in economic terms, but was rather a typical nineteenth century liberal opposing socialism as a danger to freedom.

Lastarria became a convinced positivist, a fact indicated in the very title of his work on jurisprudence, "Lecciones de Política Positiva." In

this work he follows the Comtian analysis of progress and holds that as a part of this progress "education will be taken away from the church, will become a positivistic and scientific education without ceasing to inculcate the knowledge, love, and practice of what is just and true, making the good and useful citizen."[9]

Manuel Gonzalez Prada, considered by some critics as Peru's "most distinguished writer",[10] is also its greatest positivist influence. He was a poet and an essayist, and in prose excelled as a satirist. He turned the keenest of his rapier-like thrusts against the Catholic church, breaking the heart of his sisters who were nuns, and earning for himself the ostracism of Lima aristocracy to which he belonged by birth. In recompense he gained the a oration of a considerable portion of the university students, and of the forces opposed to the power of the Catholic church. Many of Gonzalez Prada's thrusts are undoubtedly "below the belt." Her is one, which must have deeply hurt his sisters if it ever came to their attention:

> "The influence of the secular clergy cannot be denied. If some men breathe the wholesome atmosphere of the nineteenth century, almost all the women are asphyxiated in the atmosphere of the middle ages....They live in mystic marriage with the catholic priest, because they have celebrated black betrothals with the men of error, of obscurity, and of death."[11]

Gonzalez Prada was steeped in the spirit of Renan. We have called him a positivist, but he was first an esthete and secondarily a believer in science. But he himself would not have made this distinction as he believed that truth, the truth revealed by science, and beauty must be inseparable. "Literature which disdains or fears to base itself in the deductions of positive science," he wrote, "may be an archaeological restoration worthy to be filed in the

galleries of a muesum, not a living edifice which may draw the applause of contemporaries and awaken the admiration of posterity. The hypothesis of science are not less inspirational than all the affirmations of stale theogonies."[12]. Immediately after this however, his esthetic impulse leads him to say a final word on behalf of art. "Art occupies the same hierarchy as religion and science. Since it possesses music, or rhythm it exceeds science in harmony; and since it does not depend on local beliefs nor ever stained its hands with blood it exceeds religion in the universal and immaculate."[13].

Like Varona of Cuba, González Prada developed a skeptical and pessimistic strain which is well illustrated in his reflections entitled "Life and Death," written in 1890. "To be born," he exclaimed "seems like entering a macabre dance, never to emerge, to fall into a vertiginous whirlpool in order to gyrate eternally without knowinw how or why."[14]. "The universe," he asked rhetorically, "is it actor, accomplice, executioner, victim, or only an instrument and scene of evil?" Who knows!"[15]. In the same essay he expresses a doubt as to the worth of man, yet virtually in the same breath he expresses a faith in humanity. "Little or nothing is the worth of man," he writes, "but do we know the destiny of humanity? Comparing what we were with what we are we may estimate where we shall be and what we will be tomorrow. We lived in caves and now we live in palaces, we grovelled in the darkness of bestiality and we already feel the powerful flitting of interior wings which lift us to realms of serenity and light." But this progress, he makes clear, is not due to any supernatural help. All that man is or ever will be he owes to himself alone. "To march, we do not need to look upward but forward," is his conclusion.[16].

Appendix A

Footnotes

1. García Moreno, though obviously outside of the stream of positivism, deserves more than a passing reference. No common dictator, he had a definite moral philosophy related to a philosophy of government. He believed that "to moralize a country one must give it a Catholic constitution, and to ensure the necessary cohesion a statute of unity." (F. García Calderón, Latin America, Its Rise and Progress, p. 215.)

2. He insisted that the Catholic religion is the indispensable foundation of morality and hence called for an education "based on morality and faith", by which he meant the Catholic faith to the exclusion of all others. He preached that "the absence of morality is the ruin of the republic", and that "there are no good manners and morals without a pure clergy and a church free of all official tutelage." "More Catholic than the Sacred College", writes García Calderón, "García Moreno insisted upon the reform of the clergy despite the hesitation of the Pope. His ideal was the monarchy of Phillip II, the Jesuit Empire of Paraguay, the return to the middle ages, and a conventual peace." (cf. García Calderón, op. cit., pp. 215-221).

3. The full title of the oration, "Investigaciones sobre la influencia social de la conquista y del sistema colonial de los Españoles en Chile."

4. Crawford, op. cit., p. 61.

5. Gaos, op. cit., p. 435.

6. Gaos, Antología del Pensamiento Hispano-Americano, p. 437-438.

7. Ibid., p. 419.

8. Ibid., p. 420.

9. Crawford, op. cit., p. 65.

10. In Gaos, Antología del Pensamiento Hispano-Americano, p. 562.

11. Ibid., p. 563.

12. Ibid., p. 553.

13. Ibid., p. 553.

14. Ibid., p. 571.

15. Ibid., p. 572.

16. Ibid., p. 572.

APPENDIX B.

Andrés Bello (1781-1865)

Andrés Bello belonged to a respected but not wealthy Venezuelan family. He had already attained a reputation as a scholar and linguist in his native country, and for a short time had been one of the tutors of Simón Bolívar, when he was sent to England in 1811 on a diplomatic mission on behalf of the Venezuelan revolutionists. He was thirty years of age at the time. Bello never found it feasible to return to Venezuela. After eighteen years of life in England, where he married an English woman, widowed, and married another English woman, Bello migrated to Chile at the invitation of the government, to occupy an important post in the ministry of foreign affairs. In Chile, Bello came into his own. He became the mentor of Chile's foreign policy, the founder of the national university, the codifier of the country's laws, the organizer of national education, a senator of the republic, the indisputable intellectual leader of the nation. When he died in 1865, a venerated octogenerian, Bello was unquestionably the most distinguished citizen of the country of his adoption.

A great classical scholar, philologist, grammarian, poet, jurist, statesman and philosopher, Bello was above all else, the sage, the man of well balanced judgments and of measure.

Bello's one strictly philosophical work, "La Filosofía del Entendimiento," was published posthumously in 1881 as a part of the complete works edition of his writings, sponsored by the Chilean government. "Philosophy of the Understanding" is a creative contribution to the field of epistemology which is judged by José Gaos to be the outstanding philosophical production in

Latin-America in the nineteenth century.[1] In philosophy Bello is a "solid" and independent thinker who seeks to avoid extremes. Though loyally Catholic he rejected scholasticism, following rather the English and Scottish traditions. In the development of his epistemology he quotes from the English philosophers from Hobbes to Mill, especially from Locke and Berkeley, and from Reid, Dugald Stewart and Hamilton of the Scottish school. Gaos, in the introduction to the edition of the "Filosofía del Entendimiento" published in Mexico in 1948, the most careful study thus far made of this work of Bello's, also notes an influence from Kant, but concludes that Bello did not study him directly, but became acquainted with Kantian forms of thought through Cousin. But whoever Bello cites the thought is always his own. Pedro Henríquez Ureña, one of the leading contemporary Latin-American critics has characterized Bello's thought in these words: "In his 'Filosofía del entendimiento' he follows a via media between the various isles of English thought, at one time drawing near to Hume and Berkeley, at other times to Hamilton, others anticipating John Stuart Mill."[2]

Bello divided philosophy into two parts, the philosophy of the understanding and moral philosophy. The first of these he divides into mental psychology and logic, and the second into moral psychology and ethics. These correspond to his definition of philosophy concerning which he says: "The object of philosophy is the knowledge of the human spirit and the proper direction of its acts."[3] Bello never wrote the section on moral philosophy, but from scattered references in various speeches and from a criticism he published of the "Theory of Moral Sentiments" of Jouffroy, it is possible to reconstruct some of his views on the subject. It can be said that these

moral ideas are of an eclectic type in which he attempts to harmonize his religious convictions as a Catholic with ideas of utility and the ethics of feeling. He believes strongly in the need for religious instruction as the basis for morality. The utilitarian trend is not surprising in Bello since he came into direct contact with the leaders of the utilitarian school in England. At one time he was employed by James Mill to decipher and copy notes from Bentham's writings. He was also a tutor in the home of Sir William Hamilton. But his is a moderate utilitarianism which never becomes the point of departure for a lay morality. He held that God is the author of the moral order, "whose laws (He) has stamped in the conscience and the heart of man."4. He insisted on the freedom of man and on the immortality of the soul, beliefs which he regarded as moral necessities. In his mind, morals were not only founded on religion, they were inseparable from religion. "Morality, which I do not separate from religion," he declared in his famous inaugural address at the founding of the University of Chile, "is the very life of society."5.

Bello is the one great representative of Hispanic American thought in the nineteenth century who seems to escape almost completely the influence of French thought, a fact which seems more linked to his temperamental aversion to extreme forms of thought, whether romanticism or rationalism, even more than to his many years of residence in England. Bello, however, is not in his own lifetime the spokesman for any school of thought in Hispanic American philosophy, nor do any disciples carry forward his work. Gaos places his work in the eclectic tradition linking it to that of Gamarra and Varela, and calls it "the climax in value, if not strictly in time, of all the philosophy which in Spanish America responded to the modern, prior to the romantic thought and the positivist philosophy of Europe."6. And

yet because his work came at a time when eclecticism had already given way, his effort stands out as an individual and isolated achievement. The "modern" aspects of Bello's work, however, geared into the trend toward positivism. Francisco García Calderón feels that his influence was mainly a positivistic one.

> "Bello was especially noted for the vigor of his logic and his analysis of the phenomena of consciousness, his penetrating psychology, and his positivism, which caused him to disdain anything in the nature of metaphysics."7.

There is truth in this, but Bello's positivism is not the positivism of Comte or of Spencer. He is "positivist" in his sturdy common sense, in his tolerance. His biographer, the Chilean Miguel Luis Amunátegui states:

> "In the multiple and varied labors of his long and beneficent existence, Bello always showed himself a faithful and rigorous observer of the principles given for intellectual procedure by the English philosophy, or if you wish, the positive. He never accepted an idea as true merely because authority, or time, proclaimed it as such."8.

In spite of his intellectual eminence, Andrés Bello's many-sided achievements perhaps obscured his importance as a philosopher. It is one of the ironies of the intellectual history of Hispanic America that the man who was responsible for the most successful effort to elaborate a theory of knowledge not contradictory to the beliefs of the Church while still taking into account the tenets of modern philosophy, should be remembered today chiefly as a grammarian.

Footnotes

Appendix C

1. Bellos, Andrés, La Filosofía del Entendimiento. México. Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1948.

2. Ibid., p. 12.

3. Ibid., p. 1.

4. Quoted by Rafael Caldera, Andrés Bellos, Su Vida, su Obra, y su Pensamiento. Buenos Aires. Editorial Atalaya, 1946. p. 68.

5. Ibid., p. 69.

6. Gaos, José, El Pensamiento Hispano Americana. p. 15.

7. García, Calderon, Francisco, Latin America, Its Rise and Progress, p. 151.

8. Ammategui, M. L. Andrés Bello. Santiago de Chile. Pedro A. Ramírez, 1882.

APPENDIX C

Eugenio María de Hostos (1839-1903)

A. THE EXEMPLARY LIFE OF HOSTOS

Eugenio María de Hostos stands out among all Hispanic American philosophers for his exaltation of the concept of duty, and for his embodiment of this concept in his own life. "If there has been a just, pure, and good man, it was Hostos," says his biographer Antonio S. Pedreira.[1] His is the story of self-less devotion to a cause, and of incorruptibility in every aspect of life. For the cause of the independence of Cuba and Puerto-Rico from the tyranny of Spain, Hostos was wi ling to give up wealth and home and comforts to become a wanderer on the face of the earth. No other figure in Spanish American history has had a deeper sense of mission and of obligation than this frail Puerto-Rican professor. It would have been strange indeed if this great personal devotion to duty had not reflected itself in his writings. Hostos makes it the central theme of his "Tratado de Moral".[2] And yet Hostos thought of himself as a positivist, not as a Kantian. His theme is duty, but his hope is to establish it on scientific bases. His attempt to do so is creative and original. Even though his system must be judged to be basically contradictory, Hostos stands out as one of the most creative minds Hispanic America has produced. A study of the moral ideas of Spanish America would be quite incomplete without a consideration of the attempted synthesis of formalism and positivism which Hostos represents.

Eugenio M. de Hostos was born in the Spanish possession of Puerto-Rico in 1839. A member of a well known family of pure Spanish descent Hostos

received his early schooling on the island and then was sent to Spain to finish his secondary education and obtain his degree in Law. A career of ease and comfort beckoned to him as he returned to Puerto-Rico. But even in his years of life in Spain Hostos had not become reconciled to the Spanish rule and he gave up his career for a life of homeless, self-imposed exile. From country to country he travelled, including a period of life in New York City, attempting to make friends and to raise funds for an insurrection against Spain. He earned his way as he went writing for newspapers and teaching, lingering a few weeks or months or even longer, as the case might be. That his writings were well received and widely influential is shown by an experience he had during a period of residence in Peru. Knowing the trust placed in Hostos, a railroad contractor, Henry Meiggs, offered him $200,000. for Cuban independence, if Hostos would write an article favoring his proposition for the construction of a railroad. Needless to say, Hostos indignantly refused. In 1874, after a long period in Child, we find Hostos in Argentina, where the recognition of his wide culture and great intellectual capacities led to his being offered the chair of philosophy in the University of Buenos Aires. As he refused the offer Hostos is said to have replied: "I have come to Latin America for the purpose of working for an idea. Whatsoever separates me from it, separates me from the object of my life."3. Some years later, however, he did accept the call to organize the public school system of the Republic of Santo Domingo, and served there with singular distinction for a period of ten years. When the political situation changed, and Hostos lost his position in Santo Domingo he found a new home in Chile, where he had made excellent contacts in his years as a journalist. For the next eight years he served as a professor and then director of secondary schools, and as professor in the School of Law of the University of Chile.

Under his direction the Liceo M. Luis Amunátegui became known as the best school in the country, and Hostos was asked to help revise the curriculum of all Liceos in Chile. No other foreigner since Andrés Bello had enjoyed the confidence of Chile as this Puerto-Rican exile. He now had a large family, and his position was secure. Yet, when the end of the Spanish American war seemed imminent and the independence of Puerto Rico seemed at hand, he gave up his position in Chile and returned to Santo Domingo in order to be ready to enter the land of his birth at the earliest possible moment. When it became apparent that the United States would not yield the island, he went to Washington to expostulate before McKinely, but to no avail. In protest, he returned to Santo Domino, once again to give his services to education in this land, and there he died in 1903.

No one can read the Odyssey of the life of Hostos, know of the purity of his life, and the single-mindedness of his devotion to his calling, without being inspired by his example. He stands, with José Luz y Caballero, as one of the greatest and noblest personalities America has known. And because of his self-less contribution to a number of American nations other than the land of his birth, he deserves, more than any other figure, the title conferred upon him by his biographer, "Citizen of America." The moral system which Hostos tried to develop has not stood the test of time, but the importance of his example grows with the passing years.

There were many celebrations throughout the Americas in the year 1939 in order to honor the memory of Hostos. The most important result of these celebrations was the publication of his complete works under the sponsorship of the territorial government of Puerto Rico. These appeared in twenty handsome volumes with additional volumes containing the leading articles

written about Hostos, and complete bibliographical studies. Many of the writings of Hostos had been unedited up to that time, therefore, it has only now been possible to obtain a vision of the thought of Hostos as a whole. Most of the volumes are made up of the journalistic writings and occasional speeches of Hostos.

B. PRINCIPAL INFLUENCES IN THE THOUGHT OF HOSTOS

Professor Pedreira, author of the outstanding biographical study of Hostos, has attempted to analyze the influences which were significant in the formation of the thought of Hostos during his student days in Spain. "Of the three philosophical movements which were present in Spain in that epoch, "positivism, neo-Kantianism, and Krausism, none of them," he concludes, "was able to capture Hostos in absolute fashion though all more or less had an influence upon him."[4] Of these influences Pedreira calls positivism the "cardinal direction of his thought."[5] There is no doubt that Hostos believed that he was a positivist. He shows the typical positivist scorn for theology and metaphysics. He praises Comte and Spencer and invokes the authority of science at every turn. But as Pedreira indicates in the first statement, other influences besides positivism appear in his works. He cannot be fitted neatly into any one school.

An example of the metaphysical influence of Christian Krause may be seen in the following reflections of Hostos on the subject of death, written in 1872 in Chile:

> "The whole is immortal; it is the part which dies; part of the universal spirit, my soul dies: but my soul is immortal in the universal spirit of which it is a part, as my body is immortal in the decomposed molecules which go to adhere to cosmic matter...Death is the progress from an incomplete life to another complete."[6]

There are many articles which reveal the neo-Kantian in Hostos. As we have indicated, duty is the theme of his treatise on morals. But nothing Hostos ever wrote contains a more eloquent exaltation of duty than an article written for a Chilean newspaper which was inspired by the sacrifice of a volunteer fireman in the attempt to save the life of a person trapped in a burning home. It is really a magnificent prose poem. It's title is "Devotion to Duty." A few excerpts may give the spirit of it:

> "Above all the positive religions, changeable as the progress of human ideas, there remains throughout the ages, the infallible religion of duty.[7]

> "The religion of duty has altars wherever there is a conscience, and there is a conscience wherever there is no evil interest."[8]

> "It is better to due usefully than to live uselessly; to die for humanity than to live for oneself."[9]

There is also a strong rationalist vein in Hostos which leads Antonio Caso to go so far as to compare him with Spinoza[10]. While Professor Brightman, of Boston, in a brief study of Hostos prepared for the centenary celebration calls him "the Fichte of Spanish America". The reason Brightman gives for this is "because of(his) understanding of the unity which exists between pure reason and the practical reason."[11]. This emphasis on reason is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in Hostos' famous address given to the first graduating class of the Normal School in Santo Domingo which Caso in 1910 called "the masterpiece of the independent moral thought in Spanish America."[12]. Said Hostos:

> "Morality is founded on nothing other than the recognition of duty by the reason, and virtue is nothing more nor less than the fulfillment of a duty in each of the conflicts which constantly occur between reason and the instincts. What we have of rationality conquers then what we have of animality, and that is

> virtue, because that is to fulfill the duty which we have to be always rational; for that is the strength (virtus), the constitutive essence, the value of being possessed of reason."[13].

In this same address there is an expression of faith in "truth", and expression, really, of confidence in the rationality of the universe of which Brightman says, "these words alone would have sufficed to make him immortal:"[14].

> "Give me truth, and I give you the world. You, without the truth will destroy the world; and I with the truth, and nothing but the truth, as many times shall reconstruct the world as you will have destroyed it."[15].

C. THE MORAL THOUGHT OF HOSTOS

For the systematic expression of the thought of Hostos we must turn to his treatises, the "Treatise on Morals," and the "Treatise on Sociology". The texts which we have of both of these treatises have been edited from student notes. This may be the reason why the style of these works is frequently repetitious and involved. For this reason, and because both of them are closely reasoned works, their teaching is difficult to summarize or to present in the words of Hostos himself. The "Treatise on Morals" was first published in 1884, but not in complete version, as Hostos only authorized the section on social morality for publication. Indeed only until the complete works edition appeared did the complete Treatise become known and it is as the "Moral Social" that the masterpiece of the thought of Hostos has been known through the years. The "Treatise on Sociology" first saw the light in 1903.

We have stated that the theme of the "Treatise on Morals" is duty. Just as significant for the understanding of the moral system of Hostos,

however, is the concept that duty is derived from the existence of a moral order in the universe, and that this moral order is a part of the order of nature itself, governed by immutable laws just as the physical universe. Indeed, Hostos suggests that the moral order and the physical order are really inseparable and apart of the same cosmic order. This is illustrated at the very beginning of the Treatise on Morals. In the prolegomenon Hostos raises the question as to whether man's perceptions are limited to sensate experience. Instead of giving the typical positivist affirmative answer to this question he states that there are actions which are not materially perceptible, namely, the moral actions which "are directly perceptible by the reason." He immediately proceeds to suggest, however, that there is no real distinction involved here because "the physical order and the moral order are probably nothing other than different manifestations of the same phenomena and of the same plan and laws", which manifest themselves "in different modes" but "may not be distinct in essence."[16] Hostos does not indicate at any time whether he realizes how close he stands to Spinoza at this point.

Without elaborating further on a theory of knowledge Hostos recognizes three organs of moral ideas: "common sense, reason, and conscience."[17] Conscience is the highest of these, indeed, it is "the highest distinctive of human nature,"[18] for it "serves to give us an immediate knowledge of the moral nature."[19] Conscience is higher than reason or common sense, because all the faculties are involved in conscience.

Unlike Varona who does not recognize duties toward oneself, Hostos devotes a section of the treatise to individual morality. Individual morality involves a person's duties toward the body, the will, the affective

and rational sides of our natures. States W. Rex Crawford summarizing these ideas on individual morality:

> "Self-preservation' and self-development along physical lines, avoidance of agitation, education of the will to carry out necessary action energetically, and its training for a life which is certain to require abstentions and sacrifices, development of our rational factors and even more of conscience--all these are defined and defended as imperatives of the good life."[20].

This section on individual morality, however, is brief, and it is obvious that the main preoccupation of Hostos is with social morality. Hostos begins the "Moral Social" with an introduction in which he expresses his confidence in evolution as a law of nature instituted for the good of man.[21]. The human reason and conscience, he feels, has become adult. Contemporary man is morally superior to the man of the past. "But if he is superior to the past, he is not equal to himself; i.e. not equal to all that he ought to be, what his actual development of reason and conscience demands of him that he should be." In order to make "man as good as he is conscious and as moral as already he is rational" it is necessary to "convert duties into customs."[22]. Civilization and morality are held to be identical and the easiest way to attain these is through the path of duty. But duty, Hostos holds, has heretofore been presented as an artificial concept deduced from metaphysical ideas. This has been the reason for the weakness of moral ideas. The real force of duty must be seen to proceed from the "positive facts", from its truth as a fact of inductive science. It is to the development of this "scientific" concept of duty as a part of the necessary order of nature that Hostos dedicates the "Moral Social".[23].

Having thus posed the ethical problem, Hostos begins the development of the social ethic, defining society as "a living organism which forms an

aspect of nature and is subject to natural laws."[24]. The social organism is composed of various organs with their respective functions which are classified as six: the individual, the family, the municipality, the region, the nation, and the family of nations. The aggregate of these is general or universal society.[25]. Social morality is a science because it deals with the operation of laws in a natural order. The object of social morality is to apply the laws of the moral order for the good of society and its organisms. No other foundation is needed for morality than the fact that man "is by nature related to society." Theological and metaphysical motivations are therefore both inadequate and superfluous.[26]. Another way of stating the object of morality is that it "consists in linking increasingly and more effectively the ends of individual life with the ends of the collective life."[27].

There are five relations which link the individual to society. These are the relations of necessity, of gratitude, of utility, of rights,[28]. and of duty. The highest relation is that of duty, for only through the observance of duty is the order of society possible; "without morality there is no order, and without duty there is no morality."[29]. Duty is the "refraining, ordering, harmonizing" power in society. It springs from the operation of conscience, and "as conscience grows, the impulse to duty grows with it."[30].

Not only in the relation of duty, however, but in all the relations duties are involved. These duties are generic and secondary. The generic duties are those which "are deduced immediately from each of the social relations. The relation of necessity leads to the duty of work; the relation

of gratitude, to that of obedience; that of utility, to the duty of sacrifice; the relation of rights establishes the duty of education."[31] Hostos does not think that this classification is complete, and because he believes that "the greatest need for social morality is to define with such adequacy the duties which refer to life in relation to each group so that vagueness and generality shall not weaken the duty,"[32] he proceeds to suggest modifications of these basic duties as they apply to the different groups. Thus the duty of work in the individual and family group becomes the duty of contribution toward the municipality, of development in the region, of patriotism in the nation, and of confraternity in the family of nations. A similar series of modifications pertains to each of the other relations. And what is the duty of the relation of duty? It is "the duty which embraces all the others;" or "the duty of fulfilling all duties."[33] With each of the primary duties Hostos lists a related secondary duty, thus, for example, for the primary duty of obedience there is the secondary duty of veneration, etc. These secondary duties are also classified into social, political and economic.

It is curious that Hostos could persuade himself that this highly complicated scheme of relations and duties was a truly scientific one, developed according to strictly inductive processes. To be sure every sincere philosopher conceives of his interpretation as a description of a reality itself and not merely as one more interpretation among many. The interesting thing about Hostos is that he did not recognize the rationalistic and conceptual origin of his scheme but insisted on its empirical nature. The rationalistic nature rather than the empirical nature of this system becomes apparent when we inquire how Hostos expects these duties to be carried out. It is clear that he believes the basis of morality to be duty, but what, we may ask, is

to inspire duty; and what is to guarantee that duties, once recognized, will be fulfilled? The answer is one which Hostos does not demonstrate but is one which he has accepted as an axiom, which he has really assumed a priori. He has assumed that because man is a part of the order of nature and the moral order is also a part of nature that morality will emerge automatically in all social relations. Duty needs no other foundation than the fact that the existence of a law necessarily involves the obligation of fulfillment, and duty must emerge spontaneously every time the conscience perceives the existence of the law--a categorical imperative. In one of the clearer statements of this rationalistic structure Hostos says:

> "Now, since the reflex knowledge of law leads the one who acquires it, that is, the conscience, to submit itself to the precept of the law, and duty is nothing more than the submission of conscience to the laws and principles, precepts and rules, mandates and ordinances of nature in any of its manifestations and in any of its ends and purposes, duty is a spontaneous deduction of each and every relation which links us with the external world, the inner world and the social world."34.

Hostos goes even farther in disclosing his metaphysical presuppositions in the "Treatise on Sociology," when setting forth the idea that there is in society as a law of sociology, a law of the ideal--the ideal of the good,--he says:

> "Even if the spontaneous logic of things did not establish a relation of means to end between each inhabitant of the world and that world, the beneficent influence of the harmony of all things among themselves would be sufficient to cause the ideal of the good to surge in the souls of men as a natural product of the environment."35.

Here we see that the optimism of Hostos is sustained by a belief in the pre-established "harmony of all things."

It is not strange that with this rationalistic optimism Hostos does not manifest a realistic understanding of the presence of evil in the world or that his development of the idea of freedom, (of which he says little in the "Moral Social" but which he develops as one of his basic laws in the Treatise on Sociology) should seem highly artificial.

In the "Treatise on Morals" Hostos does not enter into any detailed analysis of the nature of man. It is in a study of "Hamlet" that he comes closer to a real consideration of the irrational factors present in man. Here he expresses his distrust of the will which he calls "an essentially perverse faculty."[36] But after considering the aberrations of the will, the betrayal of the reason when the flesh gains the ascendancy over the reason, Hostos voides his belief that reason will triumph, and that "the otpimistic ideal of today will be the insuperable reality of tomorrow."[37]

The "Moral Social" is divided into two parts. The first part, which we have already considered, is entitled "relations and duties". The second part deals with "morals and the activities of life". Here Hostos considers the relation of morals to positive laws, to politics, the professions, the school, the church, science, art, literature, etc. Perhaps the best chapter is that on morality and the professions, in which he stresses the importance of the concept of vocation. He deplores the influence of romanticism in literature and considers novels an evil thing because of the time which is wasted on them.

There is one aspect in which Hostos is rather typical of the positivists, and that is in his disdain for the historic concepts of Christianity, his antagonism to the Roman Catholic Church, and his attempt to establish

morality apart from any particular religious faith. Hostos prefers Protestantism to Catholicism because he sees it as a moralizing force while he does not recognize Catholicism in that capacity.[38] Within Protestantism his preference is for the Universalists and Unitarians. But his real hope is for the emergence of a universal religion of mankind along the lines proposed by Comte, whom he calls the "most effective thinker of the nineteenth century."[39]

In the "Treatise on Sociology," Hostos takes up with greater precision the question of the relation between religion and morality. He holds that there is the most intimate relation between them and that "there can be no religion without morality." But he does not admit the converse, believing that morality may be established without religion. He indignantly rejects the idea that religion should take precedence over morals, making of morals something dependent on or derived from religion. On the contrary, he insists that "religious ends are subordinated to the moral ends", and declares:

> "...no religion is good which tries to establish itself independently of morals, or has the effrontery to pretend that morals should be subordinated to it, or carries its insolence to the point of condemning as inefficacious the morality which, as it should do, explicitly withdraws itself from all prejudice or prior judgment of any religion."[40]

D. CRITICISM AND EVALUATION

It is difficult to render a fair estimate of the moral thought and influence of Hostos. While it is relatively simple to point out his inconsistencies and to criticize his pretensions of scientific authority for a highly personal philosophical scheme of interpretation, there is nevertheless something heroic in his exaltation of duty which makes of his "Treatise on

Morals" one of the great documents in Hispanic American philosophy. And more important than any verbal argument, his own life of devotion stands out as the best evidence for a philosophy of duty. There are exalted passages in Hostos which will always be of inspiration, passages which remind us of the words of Longinus, "sublimity is the echo of a great soul."

Perhaps because of this strong accent of idealism in his writings, Dr. José Franquiz, a disciple of E. S. Brightman, has tried to claim Hostos as a personal idealist. Defining the essence of personal idealism as a "great respect for human values," Franquiz states that "there is more harmony between his postulates and the position of Lotze, Bowne and Brightman than between his position and the positivism of Comte and Spencer."[41] That may be true. It should be obvious, however, that this attempt to fit Hostos into the categories of personal idealism is highly artificial and can only succeed by making the categories of personal idealism so broad as to be virtually meaningless. Antonio Caso is far nearer the mark when he suggests that Hostos is essentially a Stoic.[42] Indeed, the appeal of Hostos to modern science may be discounted and his moral system would still be intact. Hostos like the Stoics believed in ethics as a conformity with the natural order of the universe and preached devotion to duty for duty's sake. Again, like the Stoics, Hostos taught the duty of universal brotherhood, and like them he maintained a basic optimism founded on a belief in the rationality of the cosmic order.

There can be no question that for many who had lost faith in traditional christian morality as taught by the Roman Catholic church, the teaching and example of Hostos has been uplifting. Gabriela Mistral, the Chilean poetess and Nobel prize winner, raises a serious question, however, when

she reproaches Hostos for his advocacy of "laicism."[45] She laments that Latin-Americans who have cast off their "primitive-Christian idolatries", have been left in "dreadful inner desolation", since nothing has been given to them to take the place of their cast-off faith, which might satisfy their deep mystic longings.' Sharing this criticism of Gabriela Mistral's, we can also wonder if in the end, by helping to destroy the traditional faith without suggesting anything better than the Comtian pseudo-religion, Hostos was not doing greater damage to morality than he could repair with his philosophy or even with the example of his noble personality.

Footnotes

1. Pedreira, Antonio S., Hostos, Ciudadano de América. Madrid. Espasa-Calpé, 1932. p. 3.

2. Hostos, Eugenio María de, Tratado de Moral. La Habana, Cultura S.A., 1939.

3. Pedreira, Op. Cit., p.89.

4. Pedreira, El Maestro Eugenio María de Hostos. Universidad de la Habana, Jan-Feb. 1939. Vol. 22. p. 28.

5. Ibid., p. 28.

6. Hostos, E. M., Hombres e Ideas. Obras Completas Vol. XIV. La Habana. Cultural S. A. 1939. p. 297-298.

7. Ibid., p. 285.

8. Ibid., p. 285.

9. Ibid., p. 288.

10. Caso, Discursos a la Nacion Mexicana. Mexico. Porrua Hnos., 1922.

11. Comisión Pro-Celebración del Centenario del Natalicio de Eugenio María de Hostos, América y Hostos. Habana, Cultura, 1939. p. 69.

12. Caso, Op. Cit., p. 191.

13. In Gaos, Antología del Pensamiento de Lengua Española en la Edad Contemporánea. p. 548.

14. Brightman, E. S., "Hostos Juzgado por los Norteamericanos" in América y Hostos, p. 68.

15. in Gaos, Op. Cit., p. 546.

16. Hostos, Tratado de Moral, pp. 6-8.

17. Ibid., p. 15.

18. Ibid., p. 17.

19. Ibid., p. 19.

20. Crawford, Rex, A Century of Latin American Thought. Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 1944. p. 243.

21. Hostos, E. M. Moral Social. Santiago, Chile. Editorial Cultura (no Date) (Note: All further reference in the Tratado de Moral, (Treatise on Morals) belong to the section entitled Moral Social, which was published separately. This reference and all future notes are cited from the writer's copy of the Moral Social.)

23. Ibid.,pp. 16-18.

24. Ibid., p. 25.

25. Ibid.,pp. 22-25.

26. Ibid., pp. 25-27.

27. Ibid., p. 29.

28. Ibid., pp. 30-44.
Note: The Spanish word "derecho" has no exact equivalent in English. It may mean law, or equity, or justice; it may be a "right" which belongs to an individual.

29. Ibid., p. 44.

30. Ibid., p. 45.

31. Ibid., p. 51.

32. Ibid., p. 54.

33. Ibid., p. 82.

34. Ibid., p. 17.

35. Hostos, E. M., Tratado de Sociología. Santiago. Editorial Cultura, no date, p. 84.

36. Quoted by Caso, Op. Cit., p. 188.

37. Ibid., p. 188.

38. Hostos, Moral Social, p. 145.

39. Hostos, Tratado de Sociología, p. 150.

40. Ibid., p. 149.

41. Comisión Pro-Celebración del Centenario, América y Hostos, p. 311.

42. Caso, Op. Cit., p. 172.

43. América y Hostos, p. 44.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Note: This bibliography has been divided into three sections. First, there is a listing of secondary sources which have been used as works of general reference in relation with the entire study. Then both primary and secondary sources relating to Part I of the thesis are grouped together. Finally, primary and secondary sources relating to Part II are listed by chapters.)

WORKS OF GENERAL REFERENCE--BOOKS

Barbieri, Sante Uberto, Spiritual Currents in Spanish America. Buenos Aires. Editorial "La Aurora", 1951.

The Fondren Lectures for 1950 at Southern Methodist University, this volume traces some of the religious and intellectual influences in Spanish American history. Its fragmentary references to philosophical sources and dominant preoccupation with institutional aspects of contemporary Protestant influence have limited its usefulness for this study.

Crawford, W. Rex, A Century of Latin American Thought. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1944.

This comprehensive survey of Latin American thought, the only work of its kind in Spanish or in English, is extremely valuable for its capable summaries of the principal ideas of the thirty-five authors whose work has been reviewed, and for its bibliographical notes. It suffers, however, from three serious defects, not to mention a series of minor ones. The first defect is its method of presenting the work of each author in isolation, conveying no sense of the relationship of the authors to each other, or more important still, of their milieu. The second is its arbitrary selection of the period of 1840 for the beginning of its survey, which makes the thought movement surveyed rather unintelligible since the background for it is omitted. In the third place, the rather obvious positivist bias of the author makes it impossible for him to deal adequately with the reaction against positivism on the part of the post-positivist philosophers.

Diffie, Bailey W., Latin American Civilization. Harrisburg, Pa. Stackpole Sons, 1945.

This massive and impressively documented volume gives special attention to the intellectual influences in the colonies. In his survey Diffie may be said to continue the "black legend of Spain" though the facts he presents in this volume cannot be overlooked. Yet the over-dependence on sources unfriendly to Spain, such as the positivist Argentine philosopher, Ingenieros, may be said to lead him to exaggerate his case. He neglects such evidence as that presented by John Tate Lanning and others which show that the colonial period was not as lacking in culture, as alleged by the extremist critics of this era.

Ferrater Mora, José, Diccionario de Filosofía, Tercera Edición. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamerica, 1951.

The work of an exiled Spanish philosopher, now teaching at Bryn Mawr College, this Dictionary in its first edition established itself as the finest philosophical dictionary in the Spanish language. In this revised and enlarged edition, Ferrater has included numerous references to outstanding Spanish American thinkers. These references are remarkable for their accuracy and comprehensiveness within the limits of strict brevity imposed by the necessity of covering the whole of philosophy in one volume.

Gaos, José, Antología del Pensamiento de Lengua Española en la Edad Contemporánea. México, Editorial Séneca, 1945.

Spanish and Spanish American thinkers have been included in this magnificent anthology of thought in Spanish tongue from the end of the eighteenth century. The Anthology includes a number of thinkers who are not philosophers strictly speaking, but whose work illustrates the main currents of Spanish and Spanish American thought. Selections are included from works long out of print. It has been an invaluable source for the present dissertation. The introduction to the Anthology contains an incisive interpretation of the main currents of thought in Spanish tongue for the period covered in the Anthology.

Gaos, José, El Pensamiento Hispano Americano. Jornadas 12. El Colegio de Mexico, Centro de Estudios Sociales, 1944.

A brilliant monograph by a profound student of Latin American philosophy. This exiled Spanish philosopher now living in Mexico, has desired to express his gratitude to Mexico and Hispanic America for the asylum and opportunities he has found in the new world, by making Hispanic American philosophy the object of his preferential study. Gaos is not content with a survey of Hispanic American philosophy, but seeks to penetrate its deeper significance. His preoccupation with the "philosophy of philosophy" is his central concern. (This theme is the title of one of his books.)

Gaos, José, Pensamiento de Lengua Española. México. Editorial Stylo, 1945.

The compilation of the critical essays and review articles written by Professor Gaos in the first six years of labor in Mexico, this volume begins with a brilliant analysis of Spanish American thought. It contains a large number of perceptive review articles. As everything else which Professor Gaos has written in this field, this volume is an indispensable reference for the student of Spanish American philosophy.

García Calderón, Francisco, Latin America, Its Rise and Progress. London. T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1913. (5th Printing, 1918).

This famous work by a great Peruvian man of letters is a brilliant interpretation rather than a history in the academic sense. Representing the distilled product of a vast, though not complete, acquaintance with Latin American thought and life, even though exception may be taken to many of his judgments. It is particularly valuable for the student of

the intellectual history of Latin America because García Calderón has made it a point to stress the dominant ideas and sentiments of men and of groups.

Hopper, Stanley R., The Crisis of Faith. New York. The Abingdon Press, 1944.

A brilliant interpretation of the present crisis of faith in Western culture, this volume has furnished basic insights employed in this study, particularly in the analysis of colonial medievalism and of the present period of transition in Spanish American philosophy. The analyses of Professor Hopper owe their relevance to the fact that Spanish American culture is an integral part of Western culture.

Mackay, John A. The Other Spanish Christ. New York. The MacMillan Co., 1932.

This volume is full of profound insights into the spiritual history of Spain and Spanish America. It is particularly helpful in its interpretations of the significance of Spanish influence in America.

Navarro Monzó, Julio, The Religious Problem in Latin American Culture. Translated by Webster Browning. Private Edition, Montevideo, 1925.

A severely critical analysis of the religious situation in Latin America, in which the author finds the influence of Spanish Roman Catholicism almost completely negative.

Robertson, William Spence, History of the Latin American Nations. New York. D. Appleton-Century Company, 1922.

Though now somewhat outdated this careful history by a great Hispanic scholar is a dependable account of historical developments in the nations settled by Spain and Portugal.

Romero, Francisco, Sobre la Filosofía en América, Buenos Aires. Editorial Raigal, 1952.

A collection of essays in which Romero deals with various aspects of Spanish American philosophy. The first three essays have been of invaluable assistance in this study.

Weber, Alfred, History of Philosophy. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.

A standard history of philosophy, this work has been consulted as background reference for the positions of the philosophers whose work has directly influenced the philosophers treated in this survey.

WORKS OF GENERAL REFERENCE--ARTICLES

Brightman, E. S., "Personalism in Latin America", in The Personalist. April, 1943.

An article noting "the wide spread spirit of personalism" in Spanish American philosophy, and noting the ways in which personalism as a philosophy can appeal to the Latin American philosophers.

Brightman, E. S. "South of the Border", Reprint from Religion in Life. Spring, 1946.

An informative and incisive article surveying in brief synthesis the main course of Spanish American philosophy. Professor Brightman finds the three principal characteristics of contemporary Latin American thought to be "its social interest, its concern with personality, and its spiritual idealism." Written for the general reader, totally ignorant of Spanish American philosophy, this article serves as a good introduction. It is of limited value to the student already acquainted with the field.

Garcia Calderón, Francisco, "Las Corrientes Filosóficas en la América Latina", published in Ideas e Impresiones. Madrid, Editorial America, 1919.

Prepared for an international congress of philosophy held in Heidelberg in 1907, this extensive paper is here reprinted, with valuable interpolated comments by the great Dominican critic, Pedro Henriquez Ureña. Beginning with the colonial period, Garcia Calderón traces the main influences in Spanish American thought with brilliant incisiveness. He notes the preponderant influence of positivism in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the anti-positivist reaction with the influence of Bergson and Boutroux.

Frondizi, Risieri, "Tendencies in Contemporary Latin American Philosophy". Reprinted from International Intellectual Interchange, Institute of Latin American Studies, Austin, Texas: The University of Texas, 1943.

One of the best short surveys of Latin American philosophy, this article condenses an enormous amount of information and is an invaluable aid to any student of philosophy in Latin America. A weakness in the article is the failure to designate an intermediate or transitional stage between scholasticism and positivism, and the failure also, to include the role of Félix Varela and Father Gamarra in the break with scholasticism.

Frondizi, Risieri, "Panorama de la Filosofía Latino Americana Contemporánea", in Minerva, Vol. I. No. 2. Buenos Aires, 1944.

An enlarged Spanish version of the previous article.

Sanchez Reulet, Anibal, "Panorama de las Ideas Filosóficas en Hispano-América", in Tierra Firme. Madrid, Año II, No. 2, 1936.

A most able survey of philosophical trends in Spanish America, beginning with the colonial period, although necessarily sketchy because of its brevity. A serious error is that of grouping Varona, of Cuba, with the anti-positivists. Varona, however, lost his positivistic empiricism. The author is now director of the philosophy section of the Pan-American Union.

PART I--PRIMARY SOURCES

Alberdi, Juan B., Bases y Punto de Partida para la Organización de la República. Buenos Aires. Clásicos Argentinos, Ediciones Estrada, Bolívar 466, 1914.

A work of profound influence in the making of the Argentine constitution of 1853. It shows both the positivist and sociopolitical bent of the leading Argentine thinkers of the 19th century. Alberdi stresses the importance of the economic factor and his answer to it is to "populate". His counsel for tolerance in religion is above all the argument of expediency.

Alberdi, Juan B., "Ideas para Presidir a la Confección del Curso de Filosofía Contemporánea, en el Colegio de Humanidades, Montevideo", in Gaos, José, Antología del Pensamiento de Lengua Española en la Edad Contemporánea. México. Editorial Séneca, 1945.

This remarkable introductory statement to a course of philosophy presented in Montevideo in 1842 by the exiled Alberdi anticipates the "circumstancialist" view developed by Ortega y Gasset and applied to the contemporary problem of American philosophy by Leopoldo Zea. This brief statment (referred to with approval by Korn on many occasions) signalizes the practical, or positivist bent in Latin American philosophy for the next seventy years, a trend which even today, according to Korn, is not displaced but rather incorporated so that it can be superseded. It also forecasts the emphasis on liberty which is a recurring theme of Latin American philosophy.

Barreda, Gabino, Estudios, Selección y Prólogo de José Fuentes Mares. México. Edición de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma, 1941.

A volume edited by a student of the University of Mexico, including the principal writings of the founder of positivism as an official philosophy in Mexico. The introduction by the editor reveals an uncritical defense of the ideology of Barreda, where a critical estimate of the significance of the work would have been far more valuable for the reader. The value of this volume as a source book for the student of Mexican philosophy cannot be denied, apart from the merits of the introduction.

Barreda, Gabino, Oración cívica declarada en Guanajuato el 16 de Setiembre de 1867. Printed in Gaos, Antología del Pensamiento de Lengua Española.

A "Fourth of July" type of address in which the author traces the history of Mexico to that date, interpreting that history as a struggle between the forces of science and democracy against the forces of absolutism, represented by Spain and its legacy. This is the "orthodox" positivist interpretation, as evidenced by its similarity with the ideas of Lastarria. (See below)

Barreda Gabino, Carta dirigida a C. Mariano Riva Palacios in Gaos, Jose, Antología del Pensamiento de Lengua Española en la Edad Contemporánea. México. Editorial Seneca, 1945.

A basic statement of Barreda's ethical theories.

Bello, Andres, La Filosofía del Entendimiento. Mexido. Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1948.

Spanish America's greatest intellectual of the nineteenth century was Andres Bello. This is the outstanding philosophical work of the century dealing with the problem of knowledge. It was published posthumously, as a part of the Chilean government's Complete Works edition, but had long been out of print when republished in Mexico. Bello was influenced by the English and Scottish empiricists and represents a moderate empiricism. There is an excellent introduction by Professor José Gaos.

Caballero, Jose Agustín, Philosophia Electiva. La Habana. Editorial de la Universidad de la Habana, 1944.

A reprint, in the original Latin version, with a Spanish translation, of the historic text in which, for the first time in Cuba, an eclectic philosophy is advocated, as a substitute for scholasticism. A careful introduction and annotations by Jenaro Artiles, and critical articles by Francisco González del Valle and Roberto Agramonte greatly add to the usefulness of this volume.

Días de Gamarra, Juan Benito, Tratados. Mexico. Universidad de México, 1947.

A selection by Professor Jose Gaos of the most significant passages from the writings of the first Mexican philosopher to break with scholasticism. There is an excellent introductory study by Professor Gaos.

Feijóo, Benito Jerónimo, "Cartas Eruditas y Curiosas, Carta XVI", in Gaos, Antología del Pensamiento de Lengua Española en la Edad Contemporanea.

One of the famous "letters" in which the celebrated Spanish Benedictine monk, ridicules the scholastic philosophers for opposing the study of Descartes and experimental science. Feijóos' works were widely disseminated in colonial Spanish America and had great influence in undermining the influence of scholasticism. This letter was published in 1744.

Fernandez de Agüero, Juan, Principios de Ideología. Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1940.

Fernandez de Agüero, Juan, Principios de Ideología Abstractiva y que Comprenden la Metafísica. Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1940.

A publication by the University of Buenos Aires of the second course in philosophy taught in Argentina after the independence, and the first taught in the University of Buenos Aires after its foundation in 1822. A mediocre work its significance lies in its historic value. The second volume listed above contains Fernández' ethics. The prologue by Jorje R. Zamudio Silva, contained in the first volume, has an extensive biographical study and analysis of the work of Fernández de Agüero.

González Prada, Manuel, "Discurso en el Palacio de la Exposición"; "Discurso en el Teatro Olimpo, 1888"; "La Muerte y la Vida, 1890", in Gaos, Antología del Pensamiento de Lengua Española en la Edad Contemporanea.

These selections illustrate the powerful style and the vigorous thought of the great Peruvian positivist thinker. Though not a philosopher, in the narrower sense, Gonzalez Prada expresses his faith in science and in progress, and his implacable opposition to the Roman Catholic Church. His writings had a profound philosophical influence.

Hostos, Eugenio María de, Hombres e Ideas. (Obras Completas, Vol. XIV) Edición Comemorativa del Gobierno de Puerto Rico. Habana, Cuba. Cultural S. A., 1939.

A collection of articles and speeches published in various newspapers or unedited. One common quality shines through all of them--Hostos' great civic interest, which is never merely political, but of the noblest mien, his high sense of integrity and devotion to duty. In one of these articles he speaks of the infallible religion of duty.

Hostos, Eugenio María de, Tratado de Moral. (Obras Completas, Vol. XIV.) Edición Comemorativa del Gobierno de Puerto Rico. Habana, Cuba. Cultural S. A. 1939.

Considered by many the greatest specific work on ethics in Hispanic America in the 19th century, this treatise was first written by Hostos for his classes on ethics ("moral" in the Liceo M. L. Amunategui in Chile.) Its great strength lies in its moral earnestness, its great weakness lies at the point of its metaphysical confusion.

Hostos, Eugenio María de, Tratado de Sociología. Colección Argentina de Sociología. Buenos Aires. El Ateneo, 1942. (First published in Madrid, 1904.)

This work must be judged not in the light of present day sociologies, but as a pioneering effort of a lone thinker struggling creatively to explain the "laws" governing social life, spurred by a great social and ethical interest. Although his explicit frame of reference is positivistic, his basic emphasis on the "law of the ideal" and his final grounding of the law in the very structure of the universe makes him more akin to the stoics and to Kant than to the modern "scientific sociologists". That Hostos himself did not realize this is a mark of his confusion.

Hostos, Eugenio María de, "Discurso Pronunciado por el Director de la Escuela Normal de Santo Domingo, en la Investidura de los Primeros Maestros Normales de la Republica, Discípulos Suyos en 1884", in Gaos, Antología del Pensamiento de Lengua Española en la Edad Contemporanea.

An eloquent address in which Hostos shares his lofty idealism with the graduating class of the Normal School in Santo Domingo, of which he was director. Hostos states that the "only foundation of morality is in the recognition of duty by the reason."

Ingenieros, Jose, El Hombre Mediocre. Buenos Aires. L.J. Rosso, 1925(?).
Ingenieros, Jose, Hacia Una Moral Sin Dogmas. Buenos Aires. L.J.Rosso, 1919.
Ingenieros, Jose, Las Fuerzas Morales, Buenos Aires. L.J. Rosso, 1926.

These three volumes contain the moral philosophy of Jose Ingenieros according to his own statement. In them Ingenieros advocates what he calls an experimental idealism.

Ingenieros, Jose, Proposiciones Relativas al Porvenir de la Filosofía. Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1945.

A reprint edition of a "classic" of Argentine philosophy, the carefully worded "Propositions" in which Ingenieros tries to suggest what the future philosophy will be. The role of metaphysics he suggests, is to formulate hypotheses regarding what he calls the "inexperiential", that which cannot be explained by experimental science.

Lafinur, Juan Crisóstomo, Curso Filosófico. Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1938.

The new edition of the first course in philosophy taught in Argentina after the independence. The work of a young man of 22, untutored in philosophy, this is a work of slight intrinsic value, but of great historic significance. In her excellent prologue and notes, Delfina Varela Dominguez de Ghioldi traces the origin of Lafinur's philosophy in the French "ideologists" and fixes his place in the develppment of Argentine philosophy.

Lastarria, Jose V., La América, in Gaos, Antología del Pensamiento de Lengua Española en la Edad Contemporánea.

A selection of the most significant paragraphs of Lastarria's book are presented here. Lastarria's "La América" is perhaps the most complete expression of the repudiation of Spain and the colonial past, and of authoritarian ideas in general, in Spanish American literature. Even though the criticism of Spain is extreme, (although not as violent as that of many other writers) to the point of prejudice, "La América" is significant for its influence, and as the expression of the thinking of those who embracing democratic and scientific ideas, reject the culture and dominance of Spain.

Luz y Caballero, Jose de la, Aforismos y Apuntaciones. La Habana. (Obras de Jose de la Luz y Caballero, Vol. I.) Editorial de la Universidad de la Habana, 1945.

This collection of aphorisms reflects the inmost thought of Luz y Caballero and gives us the best guide to his basic views. In these reflections his deep religious vein and his sympathy for the Reformation are clearly evident. His strength of mind and spirit are translucent in the intensely personal character of these reflections. There is an excellent introduction by Professor Rafael García Bárcena.

Luz y Caballero, Jose de la, (and others), La Polémica Filosófica: Vol. I. Cuestión de Método. La Habana. Editorial de la Universidad de la Habana, 1946.

A spirited defense by Luz y Caballero, in the pages of the "Diario de la Habana", of the educational principle that the study of the natural sciences should precede the study of logic and other philosophical disciplines, and that moral sciences are also subject to the empirical method.

Luz y Caballero, Jose de la, (and others), La Polémica Filosófica, Vol. II. Ideología, Moral Religiosa, y Moral Utilitaria. La Habana. Universidad de la Habana, 1948.

Here are three series of polemics. The first contains articles defending and attacking sensationalist psychology. Luz takes his stand firmly on Locke's dictum "that all our knowledge is derived from experience." The second is a controversy regarding the positive or negative moral consequences of empiricism. Luz vigorously denies any connection between empiricism and moral decadence or a necessary connection between empiricism and materialism. The third is a discussion of the morality of duty vs. the morality of utility. Luz takes a mediating position between two polemicists holding the positinn that duty is paramount but that the principle of the general welfare (a term he preferred to utility) is needed to interpret the content of duty.

Luz y Caballero, Jose de la, (and others), La Polémica Filosófica, Vol. III. Sobre el Eclecticismo. La Habana. Universidad de la Habana, 1946.

The most important of the Polemics in which Luz engaged was the controversy regarding the eclecticism of Victor Cousin. These articles in which Jose Zacarias Gonzalez del Valle and his brother Manuel, defended Cousin while Luz attacked him, appeared in the Habana Journals from Sept. 1939 to April, 1940, and are published together in this volume.

Luz y Caballero, Jose de la, (and others), La Polémica Filosófica, Vol. III. Parte 2, Sobre el Eclecticismo. La Habana. Universidad de la Habana, 1947.

A continuation of the controversy regarding the eclectisism of Cousin in which Luz argues against a number of writers among whom Manuel Gonzalez del Valler was the leader.

Luz y Caballero, Jose de la, (and others), La Polémica Filosofica, Vol. V. Polémica Sobre el Eclecticismo. Parte 3. La Habana. Universidad de la Habana, 1948.

In this study, Luz y Caballero presents an abstract of Cousin's critical review of Locke's "Essay on Human Understanding", annotating all of his own criticisms and objections to Cousin's work. By refuting Cousin's refutation he hopes to establish the soundness of Lockes's position. While today's reader wearies of this flaying of what is today a virtually forgotten experiment in philosophy, one is forced to admire the keeness of Luz's polemical thrusts.

Luz y Caballero, Jose de la, Escritos Literarios. La Habana. Universidad de la Habana, 1946.

A collection of miscellaneous writings, articles and orations. Of particular interest are his reflections on Félix Varela's book, "Cartas a Elpidio" which he praises for its "divine alliance of religion and philosophy" and his eulogy of Father Jose Agustín Caballero.

Luz y Caballero, Jose de la, De la Vida Intima. Vol. I. Epistolario y Diarios. La Habana, Universidad de la Habana, 1945.

A collection of the letters and journal of Luz. Many of the letters illuminate various facets of his character and of his career. Of special interest are his reflections upon the death of his only child, a daughter/

Penned over a period of fifty-one days, these thoughts, show the depth of his grief and despair, and the profundity of his religious sentiments.

Luz y Caballero, Jose de la, De la Vida Intima. Vol. II. La Habana. Universidad de la Habana, 1949.

Letters written to Luz. Of special interest are the letters from his uncle, Jose Agustin Caballero and Felix Varela, showing the intimate relation which existed between them and the influence they had on his life.

Reyes, Alfonso, El Pasado Inmediato y Otros Ensayos. Mexico. El Colegio de Mexico, 1943.

Alfonso Reyes is the most distinguished living representative of those amazing Latin American figures, perhaps best characterized as humanists, who seem to be equally at home in all fields of literature and philosophy and who write with equal brilliance on ancient poetry or drama as on the works of the latest European or American writers. (Reyes has recently published a monumental study of criticism in Ancient Greece) In this address prepared for the 50th anniversary of the first National Mexican Student Congress, Reyes surveys in reminiscent fashion the evolution of Mexican thought away from positivism to the new idealisms and value theories. Since Reyes was one of the leading protagonists in this evolution his reminiscences share all the value of primary source material for this change.

Rivarola, Rodolfo, Escritos Filosoficos. Buenos Aires. Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1945.

Selected essays from the writing of the first professor of Ethics and Metaphysics in the University of Buenos Aires, after the foundation of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters in 1906. Rivarola stands broadly in the positivist tradition but considerably influenced by Kant. He attempts to qualify his positivism without openly rejecting it. The result is aconsiderable ambiguity of statement.

Sarmiento, Domingo F., El Pensamiento Vivo de Sarmiento. (Presentado por Ricardo Rojas). Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1941.

One of the volumes of the Spanish edition of the "Living Thoughts Library", this book is included here in lieu of the impossible task of reviewing the 52 volumes of Sarmiento's collected works. Though not a philosopher, properly speaking, Sarmiento is generally recognized as the most vital and influential personality in Argentina in the 19th century--its greatest writer, educator, President, etc. A positivist, in the broad sense of the work, his positivism was in the English tradition.

Sierra, Justo, Prosas, Prólogo y Selección de Antonio Caso. Mexico. Editorial de la Universidad Nacional Autonoma, 1939.

Justo Sierra was one of the most important officials of the regime of the dictator, Porfirio Diaz, of Mexico. His memory is held in highest regard in Mexico, however, as responsible for the re-establishment of the University of Mexico, and as one of Mexico's outstanding men of letters. This selection, by Mexico's leading pphilosopher, Antonio Caso,

reveals the importance of Sierra as a link in the transition away from positivism.

Varela, Félix, Lecciones de Filosofía. Habana. Biblioteca de la Universidad de la Habana, (edición de Filadelphia, 1824) 1940.

Varela's greatest philosophical work shows the eclectic nature of his thought. The last section contains his thought on morals. These follow more largely the scholastic pattern founding morals on the "lux naturales" and setting forth the traditional concept of the four cardinal virtues.

Varela, Felix, Miscelánea Filosofíca. Habana. Universidad de la Habana, 1944. (Text of the 3rd edition published in N.Y., 1827.) First edition appeared in Habana, 1819)

The reprinting of Varela's works is the fruit of the new interest in philosophy in Cuba, which seeks to ground itself in the philosophical tradition of the Island. The new interest is in large part the work of Dr. Medardo Vitier, and has seized upon Félix Varela as the first great philosopher of Cuba. The "Principios Logicos" contains extracts from Destutt de Tracy and other essays, including an essay on Kant written much later, during his N.Y. ministry and published in the Catholic Review. A rather typical Catholic criticism of Kant tries to dismiss his work as an invention-mania.

Varona y Pera, Enrique Jose, Obras I-IV. La Habana. Edición Oficial, 1937.

The first four volumes of what was planned as an edition of the complete works of Varona, but which only reached the fourth volume. The first volume contains prize winning essays concerning Varona. The other three contain literary essays, products of Varona's journalistic work, a medium in which he excelled, and also a number of his orations.

Varona y Pera, Enrique Jose, Estudios Literarios y Filosóficos. La Habana. Editor Anselmo Alarcia, 1883.

A collection, in a massive volume, of some of Varona's early essays and orations. It contains two sections, one of literary criticism, the other of philosophical essays. Included are a number of articles which are fundamental for the understanding of Varona, and Spanish American positivism, including his essay on "The Evolution of Morality" in which he applies the idea of evolution to moral development. The brilliance of Varona stands fully revealed in these essays.

Varona y Pera, Enrique Jose, Conferencias Sobre el Fundamento de la Moral. New York. D. Appleton and Company, 1903.

In these lectures delivered in 1882 Varona analyses the development of the moral sentiment and moral ideas as the result of social experience. In the English positivist tradition, stemming from Spencer, these lectures are a brilliant example of the assimilation of positivism in Spanish America. Varona shows a power of creative thought of a high order.

Varona y Pera, Enrique Jose, Con el Eslabón. Manzanillo, Cuba. Editorial el Arte, 1927.

In this collection of aphorisms, the elderly Varona manifests a dire pessimism in the most complete contrast to his early optimism as expressed in the "Estudios Literarios y Filosoficos". Varona calls these thoughts "concentric circles whose axis is in my tired heart".

Vasconcelos, Jose, Ulises Criollo--La Vida del Autor Escrita por el Mismo. Novena Edicion. Mexico. Ediciones Botas, 1945.

In this first volume of the fascinating autobiography of Jose Vasconcelos there are significant reminiscences of the participation of the author in the movement known as "El Ateneo de la Juventud", which carried on an active polemic against positivism in Mexico early in the century.

PART II-SECONDARY SOURCES

(Sources listed as "Works of General Reference" are not listed again)

Agramonte, Roberto, Jose Agustín Caballero. La Habana. Universidad de la Habana, 1952.

This extensive work is the definitive study of the life and influence of Father Caballero, the first teacher of philosophy in Cuba to renounce scholastic philosophy in favor of "Eclecticism". The author calls Caballero the founder of Cuban national consciousness.

Alberini, Corioland, "Contemporary Philosophical Problems in South America with Special Reference to Argentina", in The Monist, July, 1927.

Except for Alejandro Korn, Alberini is credited with having done more to combat positivism in Argentina, than any other thinker. This article, disappointing as a comprehensive treatment of the subject, has been the only available source for Alberini. It abounds in brilliant statements, however, and illustrates the fine irony Alberini turned against the positivists.

Altamirano, Ignacio, Biografía de Ignacio Ramírez. Mexico. Oficina Topografia de la Secretaria de Fomento, 1889.

A eulogistic review of the life of "the great demolisher", the most implacable foe of the Roman Catholic Church and the colonial past in the nineteenth century in Mexico. Altamirano is considered an outstanding continuer of the work of Ramirez.

Amunátegui, Miguel Luis, Vida de Andrés Bello. Santiago. Pedro A. Ramírez, 1882.

This voluminous but poorly written biography contains almost all the pertinent materials for the study of the life and work of the great humanist, jurist, educator, grammarian, poet, philosopher, who was Andres Bello. Even in this loose collection of notes and documents the vigorous personality of Bello stands out.

Bagú, Sergio, Vida Ejemplar de José Ingenieros. Buenos Aires. Colección Claridad, 1936.

The title "Exemplary Life of Jose Ingenieros" indicates the purpose of this work, which is to exalt the personality of Ingenieros. The study reflects the tremendous popularity enjoyed by the greatest Argentine positivist thinker.

Caldera, Rafael, Andrés Bello. Buenos Aires. Editorial Atalaya, 1946.

A careful study of the many-sided work of Bello. Written by the author at the age of nineteen, it is a remarkable mature work, but not the definitive study needed of the great Venezuelan scholar.

Caso, Antonio, Apuntaciones de Cultura Patria. México. Imprenta Universitaria, 1943.

Caso, Antonio, Discursos a la Nación Mexicana. México. Librería de Porrua Hnos., 1922.

Caso, Antonio, El Problema de México y la Ideología Nacional. México. Editorial Cultura, 1924.

These volumes, containing essays and addresses by the leading figure in Mexico in the reaction against positivism are listed here as secondary sources because of the way they are used in the first part of this study. They are also listed in the bibliography of Chapter IV.

Cestero, Julio M., Hostos Hombre Representativo de América. Disertación de homenaje en la Academia National de Historia, Sesión Pública del 20 de Noviembre, 1939. Buenos Aires, 1940. (a pamphlet).

A carefully considered eulogy by an avowed admirer of the great Porto Rican thinker, Eugenio María de Hostos.

Chapman, Charles Edward, Colonial Hispanic America. A History. New York. The MacMillan Co., 1933.

A dependable history of the exploration and settlement of the new world by Spain and Portugal and of the political and economic developments up to and including the independence. Largely disregarding the intellectual and spiritual developments, it is helpful in furnishing the political framework which is a necessary background for all cultural interpretation.

Comisión Pro-Celebración del Centenario del Natalicio de Eugenio Maria de Hostos, America y Hostos. La Habana. Cultural, S.A., 1939.

A part of the magnificent series of volumes, which include the works of Hostos, published by the Government of Puerto Rico in commemoration of the hundreth anniversary of the Island's most illustrious son, this volume contains the most important essays referring to Hostos. The most valuable essays from the standpoint of this study are: "La Moral Social de Eugenio Maria de Hostos", by Pedro de Alba, and "La Filosofia Moral de Hostos", by Antonio Caso. Of special interest for American scholars is an article contributed by Edgar S. Brightman, "Hostos Juzgado por los Norte-Americanos."

Derisi, Octavio Nicolás, Los Fundamentos Metafísicos del Orden Moral. Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1947.

This doctoral dissertation by one of Argentina's leading neo-scholastics is an extensive and impressively documented study of Thomist ethics. Derisi attempts to compare the position of St. Thomas with the contemporary ethics of material values and existentialist thought, but in this effort he uses Thomism as a procrustean yardstick instead of undertaking a creative reconsideration. Derisi's bibliography of sources in European philosophy is monumental. This source is listed at this point for its presentation of the ethics of St. Thomas, the dominant ethic in colonial Spanish America.

Francovich, Guillermo, La Filosofía en Bolivia, Buenos Aires. Editorial Lozada, 1945.

The philosophical production of Bolivia is of secondary importance in Hispanic American thought. Nevertheless, this excellent volume is extremely helpful for the panorama of philosophy in Hispanic America. Tracing the main philosophical currents, with specific attention to the leading thinkers from pre-colonial days to the present, Francovich shows how the same influences of scolasticism and positivism, which have manifested themselves in other countries, appear in Bolivia. At present, however, the dominant trend in Bolivian philosophy is summed up by Francovich as "the mystic of the earth"--the affirmation of the irrational influence of the landscape on the soul and culture of a people. Contemplating their unique and grandiose lanscape and studying the characterisitics of the indian and mestizo, modern Bolivian thinkers call for a turning away from foreign influences to the expression of an autochonous culture based on the realities of blood and soil. Francovich, who notes the influence of Nietzche at this point, realizes that this very mood reflects a foreign influence.

Franquiz, Jose, "Panorama de la Filosofía en Puerto Rico", in La Nueva Democracia. Vol. XXVI, No. 6. Agosto, 1945.

Philosophic production has been exceedingly meagre in Puerto Rico, so that it is not impossible for Jose Franquiz, who obtained his doctorate under E. S. Brightman at Boston, to cover the panorama of philosophy in Puerto Rico. As the only Puerto Rican thinker of continental stature is Eugenio M. de Hostos, Franquiz might well have dedicated more space to Hostos and his influence, and less to that of inter-departmental viewpoints and relationships among the instructors of philosophy in the University of Puerto Rico, at the time the article was written.

González del Valle, Francisco, José de la Luz y Caballero como Educador. La Habana. Cultural, S. A., 1931.

A survey of the life of Luz, extolling his virtues as a philosopher, as an educator and as a man, as well as a series of articles by Luz bearing on his educational theories and practices.

Griffin, Charles C. (editor), Concerning Latin American Culture. New York. Columbia University Press, 1940.

This volume consists of a series of papers which deal with various aspects of Latin American Culture. Two of the essays, both of them by a distinguished Spanish scholar and statesman, Fernando de los Rios, have been particularly relevant to the first part of this study. Their titles are, "Spain in the Epoch of American Colonization", and "The Action of Spain in America."

Gringoire, Pedro, "El Protestantismo del Dr. Mora", in Historia Mexicana. Vol. III, No. 3, Enero-Marzo, 1954.

Through a study of the correspondence of Dr. Mora with the British and Foreign Bible Society, of London, for whom he served as Mexican agent for many years, the author explores the possibility that the leader of Mexican liberalism in the first part of the nineteenth century became a protestant. Gringoire finds no conclusive evidence that Mora was anything other than a liberal Catholic who believed in religious freedom, was at odds with the hierarchy, and firmly believed in the positive moral influence of the Bible, which he was eager to disseminate.

Ingenieros, José, La Evolución de las Ideas Argentinas. (4 vols.) Buenos Aires. Editorial Problemas, 1946.

This monumental work, indispensable to every student of the history of culture and of philosophy in Argentina nevertheless suffers from two great defects. The first is the narrowness of his critical criteria. He expressly adopts the view that the history of ideas is to be seen as a reflection of the class war, and he thereby misses many things which do not fit into his theory. The second defect is his tendency to lose sight of the "ideas", whose evolution it is his purpose to trace, in the detailed description of political and economic developments. Nevertheless, the enormous work of Ingenieros in the investigation of great masses of unedited materials cannot be discounted. Ingenieros has been one of the chief accusers of Spanish colonial policy and of catholicism. Also a primary source of Ingenieros, its principal use in this study has been as a secondary source in Part I.

Hernández Travieso, Antonio, El Padre Varela. La Habana, Jesús Montero Edición, 1949.

This is the definitive biographical study of Varela. The sub-title of the work is "Biografía del Forjador de la Consciencia Cubana", (The Forger of Cuban Consciousness). Father Varela carried on the work of Father Caballero, pressing forward with the reform of philosophical studies.

Hernández Travieso, Antonio, Varela y la Reforma Filosófica en Cuba. La Habana.- Jesus Montero--Ed., 1942.

A careful and scholarly estimate of the part played by Félix Varela in the educational reform in Cuba at the beginning of the 19th century with special emphasis on the antecedents of the reform and a careful exposition of Varela's main philosophical tenents.

Korn, Alejandro, Obras Completas. Buenos Aires. Editorial Claridad, 1949.

The most important references for Part I of this study included in this omnibus, one volume edition of Korn's work are: first and most important, the section entitled, "Influencias Filosóficas en la Evolución Nacional"; the articles "Filosofía Argentina" and "Una Posicion Argentina"; and the review article on Jose Ingenieros' "Proposiciones Relativas al Porvenir de la Filosofia". The "Influencias Filosoficas", is the obligatory secondary source for the study of Argentine philosophy. Korn's power as a critic and historian of ideas makes this an outstanding work in its genre.

Lanning, John Tate, Academic Culture in the Spanish Colonies. New York. Oxford University Press, 1940.

The author of these lectures is unquestionably the outstanding authority on the colonial universities in Spanish America. His researches into the academic theses presented in the universitities in the eighteenth century prove beyond a doubt that the impact of the ideas of modern philosophy began in the eighteenth century and not in the nineteenth as had been held by many.

Levene, Ricardo, A History of Argentina. (Translated and Edited by W. S. Robertson) Chapel Hill. University of North Carolina Press, 1937.

Selected to form part of the Inter-American Historical Series, this volume is thus recognized as the most authoritative history of Argentina written by an Argentine. Its references to cultural developments are much too scanty for it to furnish much more than essential historical background for this study.

Lucero, Humberto Mario, "La Libertad de Consciencia Segun la Etica Cristiana Medieval". Philosophiae. Mendoza. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Ano IX, No. 16. Junio-Set., 1952.

This exposition of the question of liberty of conscience in medieval ethics clearly shows how the scholastic position subordinates liberty to the authority and teaching of the Church. Written by an Argentine neo-scholastic, as a justification of this subordination, this paper furnishes an insight into the attitude toward liberty in colonial medievalism, even though it does not refer to colonial scholasticism as such.

Méndez Plancarte, Gabriel, Humanistas del Siglo XVIII. Mexico. Universidad Nacional Autonoma, 1941.

An outstanding liberal Catholic scholar Father Mendez Plancarte traces the significance of a number of Jesuit scholars of the eighteenth century whom he regards as the real introducers of modern philosophy in Mexico. These scholars, together with the entire order, were exiled from the Spanish empire in 1767 and took refuge in Italy, but continued to have a certain influence in Mexico. The writer believes Father Mendez Plancarte somewhat exaggerates the influence toward modernism in Mexico of these Jesuit thinkers, for it was Father Gamarra who seems to have borne the brunt of opposition as an innovator.

Mendez Plancarte, Gabriel, Humanistas del Siglo XVI. Mexico. Universidad Nacional Autonoma, 1945.

In this volume Father G. Mendez Plancarte presents a number of sixteenth century friars as the representatives of a true humanism "which elevates consideration for the human person and his transcendent value to a primary place". He links their position with that of Erasmus, Luis Vives, and Thomas More. At times Father Mendez also uses the term humanism as synonymous with classical scholarship, introducing a certain confusion. While it is evident, that there was a certain Erasmianism in a number of sixteenth century priests, outstandingly in Fray Juan de Zumárraga, the first Bishop of Mexico, as a current in academic philosophy it had slight influence, a fact which Mendez Plancarte does not point out in his study.

Mesa Rodríguez, Manuel I., Don José de la Luz y Caballero. La Habana. Edición de la Logia Realidad, No. 8, 1947.

An excellent study of the life of the greatest Cuban educator, and its outstanding philosopher in the middle of the nineteenth century. Mesa Rodríguez notes the combination of empiricism and religious sentiment in Luz y Caballero.

Navarro, Bernabé, La Introducción de la Filosofía Moderna en México. México. El Colegio de México, 1948.

A thesis written by a Catholic scholar under the direction of Professor Jose Gaos, in the University of Mexico, tracing the introduction of the ideas of modern philosophy in Mexico, through the Jesuit scholars of the eighteenth century.

Ortiz del Castillo, Lourdes, "La Filosofía Natural de los Vivientes en Fray Alonso de la Vera Cruz", in Anuario de Filosofía, Vol. 1. México. Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1943.

A resume of the position of the first teacher of philosophy in the University of México, which reflects the undeviating Thomism which the Spaniards brought in the sixteenth century to the teaching of philosophy in the New World.

Pedreira, Antonio S., Hostos, Ciudadano de América. Madrid. Printed by Espasa-Calpe, (property of the author), 1932.

The first full length study of Hostos, this fine biography by a Porto Rican professor did much to rescue the memory of one of the noblest personalities in the public life of Spanish America. Deeply influenced by the positivist current, Hostos yet transcends it because of his great moral sentiment. Pedreira does full justice to this fact.

Perez Marchand, Monelisa, Dos Etapas Ideológicas del Siglo XVIII en México a Través de los Papeles de la Inquisición. México. El Colegio de Mexido, 1945.

A doctoral dissertation directed by Professor Jose Gaos in the University of Mexico, this voluminous study traces the first evidences of modern thinking in colonial Mexico through an examination of the records of the Holy Office. This study coincides with other investigations, such as those of Lanning (see above) in placing the beginning of the impact of modern philosophy in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

Publicaciones de la Secretaria de Educación, Homenaje a Enrique José Varona en el Cincuentenario de su Primer Curso de Filosofía. Habana, Cuba. Dirección de Cultura, 1931.

This volume, in honor of Varona, is not entirely concerned with Varona himself or his work. Of the articles about Varona the most valuable are the ones by Medardo Vitier, pp. 519-595 and Rafael Montoro.

Publicaciones del Ministerio de Educación, Homenaje a Enrique José Varona en el Centenario de su Natalicio. 2 vols. La Habana, Dirección de Cultura, 1951.

Two large volumes containing the most important articles written about Varona in Cuba and other countries, and the special lectures delivered in connection with the wide-spread celebrations of the centennial of his birth. These volumes were published at government expense in honor of Varona who is recognized as one of Cuba's most illustrious leaders.

Ramos, Samuel, Historia de la Filosofía en México. México. Imprenta Universitaria, 1943.

This history of Philosophy in Mexico is a mature and discerning work and an indispensable tool for any student interested in learning about the development of philosophy in Mexico. Later studies are confirming the dependability of this basic source, as well as its basic judgments.

Ramos, Samuel, "Influencias de la Cultura Francesa en Mexico", in Cuadernos Americanos. Ano III, 17-18. pp. 140-153.

The facts and views expressed in this article are all to be found in Ramos' "Historia de la Filosofía en Mexico", scattered throughout that work. In this essay Ramos compresses the various examples of French influence during the whole length of Mexican history, making it possible to see in brief compass the great impact of this influence.

Robertson, William Spence, The Rise of the Spanish American Republics. New York. D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942.

First published in 1918 this volume may be considered the standard history of the political and military events involved in the march of the spanish colonies of America towards liberation. Robertsons researches have beeh exhaustive, and as a "disinterested" person he has been above all the controversies which have surrounded the personalities of the chief liberators. It is a weakness of his work, however, that he pays little attention to the intellectual background, and to philosophical currents underlying the independence movement. Hence the usefulness of this study in this dissertation, like the work of Chapman, is limited.

Robles, Oswaldo, Filósofos Mexicanos del Siglo XVI. Mexico. Librería de Manuel Porrúa, 1950.

An able presentation of the work of the scholastic philosophers who were the first teachers of philosophy in Mexico, by Mexico's leadigg contemporary neo-scholastic.

Robles, Oswaldo, "El Movimiento Néo-Escolástico en Mexico" in Filosofía y Letras, Vol. 12, Jul-Set, 1946.

An article showing the continuity of the scholastic philosophy in Mexico from colonial days onward. The philosophers whom Robles mentions in the nineteenth century, however, had little influence outside of the orthodox Roman Catholic circles.

Rodríguez, José, Vida del Presbítero Don Félix Varela. La Habana. Arellano y Cía. Ed., 1944. (Reprinted from the work first published in 1878 with introduction by Mons. Eduardo Martínez D., Bishop of Cienfuegos.)

Adequate in its consideration of the outward events and published w works of Varela, this biography tells us little of the inner struggles and sentiments of its subject. In common with the "Homenaje" type of biography, there is little critical appraisal and a strong tendency to indiscriminate praise.

Romanell, Patrick. The Making of the Mexican Mind. Lincoln, Nebraska. University of Nebraska Press, 1952.

The only volume in English which gives a more or less comprehensive presentation of the philosophical movement in one of the Spanish American countries, this excellent study may be taken as illustrative of the course of philosophy in Spanish America. The second chapter "Five Stages in Mexican Thought" surveys the course of Mexican philosophy from colonial days to the present. Coinciding with the present study in noting a scholastic stage and a positivist stage, Romanell includes two intermediate stages (covered in this thesis as one stage with two phases) which he calls the enlightenment and the antirationalist stage. This study calls these two stages the eclectic and the triumph of modernism, phases of one transitional period, including in the latter phase both romantic and empiricist currents. This writer believes the analysis contained in this thesis (worked out before becoming acquainted with Professor Romanell's) to be more accurate.

Romero, Fransisco, "Enrique Jose Varona" in Cursos y Conferencias. Buenos Aires. Feb.-Mar., 1944. pp415-436.

Also included in Centennial volume "Homenaje a Varona" and in Romero's "Filosofos y Problemas", this fine study of Varona was first consulted in this reference. It is singled out among the articles in the "Homenaje" for its special usefulness in this dissertation.

Sanguilly, Manuel, Jose de la Luz y Caballero--Estudio Critico. La Habana. Establecimiento Tipográfico O'Reilly, No. 9., 1890

A deeply appreciative biographical study by one of Cuba's national leaders, who was a pupil of Luz y Caballero, this study helped to fix the place of Luz y Caballero in Cuban philosophy.

Terán, Juan B. El Nacimiento de la América Española, Tucumán, Argentina. La Velocidad Tucuman, 1927.

A dispassionate yet damning account of the darker aspects of the Spanish conquest. The author cites the cruelty, avarice, and lack of sexual morality in the conquerors, and its effect on social conditions.

Valverde Téllez E. Apuntaciones Históricas Sobre la Filosofía en Mexico. Mexico. Herrero Hermanos, 1896.

A pioneer history of Mexican philosophy this volume, written by a Catholic priest is extremely valuable for the colonial period, and furnishes a wealth of bibliographical references. Father Valverde wrote this history wishing to call attention to the scholastic tradition and its continuity throughout the nineteenth century, but at the time he wrote it, he was a voice crying in the wilderness of Mexican positivism.

Vitier, Medardo, La Filosofía en Cuba. México. Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1946.

This survey is extremely valuable for its treatment of the "grand tradition" of Cuban philosophy—Caballero, Varela, Luz, Varona. The author made no attempt to bring his story up to date, with the inclusion of a survey of post-positivism in Cuba, a serious deficiency in a work of such recent publication.

Vitier, Medardo, Las Ideas en Cuba. 2 vols, La Habana, Editorial Trópico, 1938.

A two volume survey of the development of philosophical ideas in Cubba by Cuba's leading philosophical scholar. It contains a most helpful section on the spanish background of Cuban ideas and a valuable presentation of the thought of the leading philosophical thinkers. Vitier is a scholar rather than a philosopher, however, and the work suffers from the limitation of the writer.

Vitier, Medardo, La Leccion de Varona. Mexico. Jornadas 31, 1945.

A valuable resume of the philosophical significance of Varona prepared for the subscribers of Jornadas, a mexican review devoted to the social sciences and philsophy which gives the entire volume of approximately one hundred pages to the consideration of one subject. Vitier's conclusion is that it is Varona's personal probity and his concern for public service which constitutes his most enduring contribution. His philosophical structure he considers outdated. Vitier underestimates the extant positivism in Latin American culture, which is the result of the lingering influence of the leaders of the positivist era among whom Varona, is not the most influential, was certainlythe greatest as a philosopher.

Vitier, Medardo, Varona, Maestro de Juventudes. La Habana. Editorial Tropico, 1936.

An appreciative study of the life and work of Varona. It is particularly helpful in tracing the background for Varona in the work of Father J.A. Caballero.

Sánchez Reulet, Anibal, Contemporary Latin American Philosophy. Alburquerque. University of New Mexico, 1952.

A splendid anthology made up of significant passages from the work of twelve Latin American philosophers, including three Brazilians. Prepared by the director of philosophical studies of the Pan American Union this work was published first in Spanish and Portuguese under the auspices of the Union. Too fragmentary for the serious student of Spanish American philosophy, the selections nevertheless serve as an excellent introduction to the thought of the philosophers who are presented, and should be of particular value to the student who wishes to obtain a general acquaintance with the field. Of special value is the brief general introduction and the brief introductory articles to each of the philosophers written by the editor.

Uranga, Emilio, Análisis del Ser del Mexicano. México. Serie, "México y lo Mexicano", Porrúa y Obregón, 1952.

Volume four in the series this little volume seeks to explore the ontology of the Mexican man. "In man" says Uranga, "there is a peculiar structure of being the DASEIN, which is precisely (the standpoint) from which the ontological question must be posited and answered." This is a historical-ontological exploration since "the study of our history will teach us what we are." The author has obviously borrowed certain existentialist and historicist emphases, but they do not seem to this reviewer to be used with any real depth or significance. What peculiar form of being in the mexican which is different from that of all other men Uranga expects to find through this type of"analysis" is not quite clear.

Vaz Ferreira, Carlos, Fermentario. Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1944.

Vaz Ferreira is Uruguay's greatest philosopher. In this book Vaz Ferreira comments on a wide variety of themes. His thought is asystematic but there is a living unity in it stemming from his ethical concern and his vigor of personality.

Vaz Ferreira, Carlos, Moral Para Intelectuales. Montevideo, 1908.

This work is disappointing because Vaz Ferreira treats the problem of of morals as a question of pure casuistry, taking up the ethical problems faced by each profession, instead of considering the bases of moral action.

Zea, Leopoldo, Ensayos Sobre la Filosofía en la Historia. México. Editorial Stylo, 1948.

A collection of articles and papers, a number of them prepared while Zea was still a student under Gaos as part of his academic tasks. Most of these essays have a bearing on some phase of the history of philosophy. Of particular value for this dissertation have been his essays relating to Spanish American and to Mexican philosophy.

Weckman Louis, "El Medioevo en la America Hispana" in Filosofía y Letras. Mexico. January-June, 1952.

In this article, a translation into Spanish of a paper read before the Medieval Society of America, the author describes colonial Spanish America as a continuation of medievalism.

Whitaker, Arthur P. (Editor), Latin America and the Enlightenment. New York. Appleton-Century Company, 1942.

These essays by a group of North American Hispanic scholars, deal with various aspects of the enlightenment in the colonies of Spain. They agree on one conclusion which is best stated in the words of John Tate Lanning, "The Americas did not so much receive the enlightenment, they reproduced it from the sources upon which its exponents in Europe depended" (p. 90) One cannot avoid the impression, however, that these scholars, in the attempt to counteract the "black legend of Spain" tend to go to the other extreme and to suggest a freedom that really did not exist. Granted, as Lanning says, that the censorship of the Inquisition "was essentially bureaucratic and ineffectual" it would still be true that the enlightenment took place in spite of, rather than because, of the influences of official Spain, and particularly of the church. Hussey, for example, in mentioning the work of Díaz de Gamarra, fails to mention the persecution to which he was subjected.

Zea, Leopoldo, El Positivismo en México. Vol. I.
Apogeo y Decadencia del Positivismo en México. Vol. II.
Mexico. El Colegio de México, 1943-1944.

This two volume history of positivism in Mexico is the doctoral thesis of Mexico's leading younger philosopher, written under the direction of Dr. Jose Gaos. It is probably as nearly exhaustive as it is possible to be in the covering of the primary source materials. Hence forth all future students of this phase of Mexican thought will have to build on Zea's work. But some of Zea's interpretations are open to question. He proclaims himself to be a follower of Ortega y Gasset, holding that no philosophy is an insight into absolute truth but must be considered a product of circumstance, its validity being limited to the particular time and circumstance it seeks to interpret. He quotes with approval Karl Manheim's thesis that all conceptions are the expression of a determined social class which justify the interests which are peculiar to it through a doctrine or theory which Manheim calls "ideology", and then shows how positivism illustrates this thesis. But he never seems to see that the "ideological" reaction against positivism, led by Caso and Vasconcelos who belonged to the privileged class as surely as any of the positivists, cannot be explained by the same thesis. Zea's thesis suffers from repetitiousness and from too frequent obtrusion of his thesis of circumstantialism into his expository sections.

Zea, Leopolo, Dos Etapas del Pensamiento en Hispanoamérica. México. El Colegio de Mexico, 1949.

With a Rockfeller grant Dr. Zea supplemented his studies of Mexican

positivism with studies of positivism, and the transition to positivism, in a number of other Spanish American countries. The result is a volume which virtually completes the detailed panorama of Spanish American positivism. This is an expository rather than a critical work, and Zea is content to let his materials speak for themselves without attempting any interpretations.

PART II—CHAPTER IV

(Note: With two exceptions the sources listed in this chapter might be classed either as primary or as secondary. No attempt has been made, therefore, to list them separately. Sources previously listed are not repeated. Books by, or concerning, Antonio Caso, Alejandro Korn, Jose Vasconcelos, or Francisco Romero are listed in their respective chapters even though they belong in the period surveyed in this chapter.)

Aja, Pedro Vicente, El Cristianismo en la Crisis del Occidente y Otros Temas. La Habana. Sociedad Cubana de Filosofia, 1953.

The first volume of published essays of a young Cuban philosopher, who boldly takes his stand as an existentialist Christian, this work renews a note of Christian criticism of life in Spanish American philosophy not heard since the death of Antonio Caso, of Mexico.

Astrada, Carlos, La Etica Formal y los Valores. La Plata. Universidad de la Plata, 1938.

The subtitle of this work is "an essay en an existential reappraisal of the Kantian morality, oriented in the problem of freedom." The author's subtitle promises more than is accomplished, for at the same time that he indicates his approval of the existentialism of Scheler and Hartmann he takes his stand with Kant. The work contains a number of valuable criticisms of the ethics of material values, but just where the author stands is not clear. Astrada is considered a leading existentialist philosopher in Argentina.

Erro, Carlos Alberto, "Situación de la Filosofía Argentina", in La Nueva Democracia, Julio, 1939.

An article which stresses the promise for the future of philosophy in Argentina which lies in the increase of spiritual and philosophical concern as evidenced by the number and variety of current philosophical publications.

Finlayson, Carlos, "La Filosofía en la Argentina" in Revista de la Universidad de Antioquía, No. 70. Medellin, Colombia, 1945.

A brief but succint survey of the main trends of contemporary Argentine philosophy.

Frondizi, Risieri, "Is there an Ibero-American Philosophy?", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. IX. No. 3. March, 1949. pp. 345-355.

An article in which Professor Frondizi reviews the present state of philosophical studies in Spanish America. He recognizes the progress which has been made, but sees the desire for an original philosophy as affecting adversely the possibility of the emergence of a genuine philosophy.

Gaos, José, En Torno a la Filosofía Mexicana. México. Serie "México y lo Mexicano". Porrúa y Obregón, 1952 and 1953.

This work has been published as volumes 7 and 11 in the Series "México y lo Mexicano", edited by Leopoldo Zea. Not a history, but a series of reflections about Mexican philosophy, particularly in the present day, this work is full of brilliant and profound observations.

Gaos, José, Filosofía Mexicana de Nuestros Días. México. Imprenta Universitaria, 1954.

This volume gathers together the articles published by Gaos during a period of eight years, beginning in 1945, in various periodicals, on the subject of Mexican philosophy. A number of articles are reviews of the work of other philosophers. Of particular value for this chapter is the article entitled "Cinco Años de Filosofía en México", and the reviews of the work of Leopoldo Zea, and the philosophical group Hiperion. This volume increases Gaos' stature as unquestionably the most penetrating interpreter of Mexican philosophy.

Gil Villegas, Francisco, "Antonio Caso y su Escuela", in Anuario de Filosofía, Vol I. México, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México, 1943.

An essay reviewing the work and influence of Antonio Caso. This article lists the students of Caso who are at present active in philosophical production and the various schools of thought which they represent.

Romano Muñoz, José, El Secreto del Bien y del Mal. México. Antigua Librería Robredo. Segunda Edición, 1943.

Written as a text in ethics for the Escuela Preparatoria, the school founded by the founder of Mexican Positivism, this work shows the long distance travelled from positivist days. Romano Muñoz represents the ethics of material values viewpoint, finding his chief inspiration in N. Hartmann and Scheler.

Ramos, Samuel, Hacia Un Nuevo Humanismo. México. La Casa de España, 1940.

Showing the strong influence of Max Scheler, Dilthey, Hartmann, and other existentialist German thinkers, this volume is an able essay in philosophical anthropology, by the author of "Las Historia de la Filosofía en Mexico". It is one of the best examples of the new spiritualist tendency in contemporary Spanish American philosophy.

Ramos, Samuel, El Perfil del Hombre y la Cultura en México. México. Segunda edición, P. Robredo, 1938.

In this work Ramos calls attention to the need for studying Mexican man and the Mexican circumstance. In this appeal to Ortega y Gasset, Ramos stands at the fountain-head of the present circumstancialist movement in Mexico, though he is not an member of the group gathered around Leopoldo Zea.

Zea, Leopoldo, En Torno a una Filosofía Americana. México. Jornadas 52. El Colegio de México, 1945.

Zea raises the question of the possibility of a Spanish American philosophy. Taking a historicist standpoint he analyses the "vital American situation", then addresses himself to the question of the task to be faced by an American philosophy. This task he finds to be one of furnishing a view which "will justify (man's) practical life and give it meaning", and reach a "new coordination between the metaphysics and reality".

Zea, Leopoldo, Conciencia y Responsabilidad del Mexicano. México. Serie "México y lo Mexicano", 2, Porrúa y Obregón, 1952.

In this volume Zea explains the program of the "Hyperion" group of philosophers, who seek, through an analysis of the Mexican, and of the Mexican situation to arrive at a new philosophical standpoint, which will be not only a Mexican philosophy, but an answer to the problems Mexico faces.

CHAPTER V - PRIMARY SOURCES

Caso, Antonio, Discursos a la Nación Mexicana. Mexico, Librería de Porrúa Hnos., 1922.

Antonio Caso exercised a conscious moral leadership toward the entire nation. This volume is a collection of addresses in which Caso touches on various aspects of the past and present of Mexico, seeking to lead the nation to a higher moral plane. It also contains the lecture, "The Moral Philosophy of Hostos", delivered before the "Ateneo de la Juventud" in 1908.

Caso, Antonio, Doctrinas e Ideas. México. Andres Botas e hijo, Sucesor Editores, 1925.

Another series of essays expressive of Caso's moral thought.

Caso, Antonio, El Acto Ideatorio. Mexico. Librería de Porrúa Hnos. y Cía., 1934.

One of the major works for the understanding of Caso's philosophy this volume is Caso's most important epistemological work. Caso deals with the whole question of the nature and validity of ideas, and especially with the question of the value judgment. After surveying the historical positions he holds Husserl to be the most profound analyst of the ideational act. He demurs, however, when it comes to accepting the objectivity of values, holding that such an idea is a threat to man's freedom.

Caso, Antonio, El Concepto de la Historia Universal. México. Ediciones México Moderno, 1923.

Caso was deeply preoccupied with questions relating to the philosophy of history. In this volume he holds that history is not a form of science, not sociology, but a form of knowledge. This is a knowledge of the particular, not of the universal, an intuition of the real in the concrete individual.

Caso, Antonio, El Peligro del Hombre. México. Editorial Stylo, 1942.

Written during the war this volume shows Caso's profound concern for the spiritual crisis of the world. One of Caso's last works, it is an expression of the Christian personalism of his latter years. It consists of a series of meditations, not directly connected to each other but related by the same spiritual concern.

Caso, Antonio, La Persona Humana y el Estado Totalitario. México. Universidad National Autónoma, 1941.

From the standpoint of a vigorous Christian personalism, Caso repudiates the totalitarian ideologies as denials of the dignity and freedom of man.

Caso, Antonio, El Problema de México y la Ideología Nacional. México. Editorial Cultura, 1924.

Another of the volumes containing various essays and addresses relating to the social, political, and ethical problems of Mexico. "The social problem of Mexico, as that of every place, is a moral problem."

Caso, Antonio, Ensayos Críticos y Polémicos. México, Editorial México Moderno, 1922.

Vigorous essays in which Caso attacks positivistic, deterministic philosophies, and calls for a "philosophical heroism". He includes here his "creed", an affirmation of his independent and somewhat heterodox, but strong and sincere Christianity. This creed ends with the Lord's Prayer.

Caso, Antonio, Filósofos y Moralistas Franceses. Mexico. Editorial Stylo, 1943.

One of the last published works of Caso this contains essays written at various times. He deals with Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot Maine de Biran, Taine, Meyerson and others.

Caso, Antonio, La Existencia como Economía, Desinterés, y Caridad. México. Ediciones de la Secretaría de Educación Publica, 1943. (First published in 1919.)

Caso's greatest, most original philosophical work, where he unfolds his concept of life as something which can be lived on the plane of self-interest, of esthetic creativeness which is purely disinterested, or of charity, which is a completely spontaneous action. There seems to be a Pascalian inspiration in the notion of life as charity, which is a remarkable parallel

to Anders Nygren's exposition of the Biblical concept of "agape", since Caso does not know Nygren's work.

Caso, Antonio, La Filosofía de Husserl, México, Imprenta Nacional, 1934.

One of many writings in which Caso tried to interpret contemporary European philosophy. Caso was greatly impressed by phenomenology, particularly as a more profound and adequate form of empiricism.

Caso, Antonio, México, Apuntaciones de Cultura Patria. México. Imprenta Universitaria, 1943.

In this beautifully printed volume, a number of Caso's articles and lectures are reproduced, as notes for a study of Mexican culture. Caso's study of Father Díaz de Gamarra, here reprinted, was one of the earliest to call attention to the importance of this thinker in the development of philosophy in Mexico.

Caso, Antonio, Nuevos Discursos a la Nación Mexicana. Mexico. Librería de Pedro Robredo, 1934.

Another series of "addresses to the nation".

Caso, Antonio, Positivismo, Neo-Positivismo, y Fenomenología. México. Centro de Estudios Filosóficos de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1941.

One of Caso's less important books, in which he traces in brief fashion the relations between positivism, neo-positivism and phenomenology, in their theories of knowledge. He does not consider them here as views of the world but purely in their technical aspect.

Caso, Antonio, Principios de Estética. México. Publicaciones de la SRIA. de Educacion, 1925.

Caso had a deep interest in esthetics. In his scheme of life as economy, as disinterestedness, and as charity, art is synonymous with disinterestedness. He posits a primary, sentimental projection ("einfuhlung") in which there is present mystical union between subject and object. A romantic streak colors Caso's esthetics.

Caso, Antonio, Sociología. México. Editorial Polis, 1939.

This is not a systematic, academic treatise on sociology but rather a series of reflections about various aspects of life in community.

CHAPTER V--SECONDARY SOURCES

Centro de Estudios Filosoficos de la Universidad National Autonoma de Mexico, Homenaje a Caso. Mexico, Editorial Stylo, 1947.

A year after the death of Antonio Caso, this magnificent volume, containing essays by pupils or colleagues of Caso, was published in honor of the great leader of Mexican philosophical thought in the present century. Among them is an appreciative article by Dr. E. S. Brightman calling attention to the significance of Caso's Christian personalism. A special value is found in the articles of Jose Gaos, and the careful study of Caso's philosophy by Dr. Eduardo Garcia Maynez. Each of the articles is of high caliber, and a necessary reference for all students of the thought of Caso.

Gaos, José, Pensamiento de Lengua Española. México. Editorial Stylo, 1945. pp. 146-168.

Four discerning review articles are reprinted in this volume.

Gaos, José. Filosofía Mexicana de Nuestros Días. México. Imprenta Universitaria, 1954.

In addition to the prominent mention made of Caso in the article "Cinco Años de Filosofía en Mexico", pages 47-127 are dedicated to articles concerning his life and work. The article "El Sistema de Caso", first published in "Luminar" gives an excellent synthesis of the thought of Caso, correctly centering emphasis on the concept of "existence as charity" and stressing the centrality of Christian inspiration in Casos thinking.

García Maynez, Eduardo, El Pensamiento de América. Caso, Selección y prólogo de Eduardo García Maynez. Publicaciones de la Secretaría de Educacion Pública. México, 1943.

This is a carefully selected anthology of Caso's writings, on the style of the "Living Thoughts Library". It is listed here for the excellent prologue by Caso's former student, and one of Mexico's leading philosophers, Eduardo Garcia Maynez.

Gringoire, Pedro, "Antonio Caso, Filósofo Cristiano" in Luminar. Alo VIII, 1946, 3-4.

This article, by Mexico's outstanding Protestant leader, Gonzalo Báez-Camargo (pen name Pedro Gringoire) stresses the role of Antonio Caso as a Christian philosopher, unrelated to any church, but deeply mystical and concerned with the relation of the Christian faith to all aspects of life. The author stresses the significance of Caso's Christianity in the positivist milieu in which it is developed.

Romanell, Patrick. The Making of the Mexican Mind. Lincoln, Nebraska. University of Nebraska Press, 1952.

Professor Romanell devotes one of five chapters of his survey of Mexican philosophy to Caso, with the title "The Christian Dualism of Antonio Caso". In this chapter Romanell stresses Caso's contrast between existence as economy and existence as charity, between life and love.

Ramos, Samuel, "Antonio Caso, Filósofo Romántico", in Filosofía y Letras. Vol.XI, April-June, 1945.

In this article, Ramos, one of Caso's students calls attention to the influence of Bergson in Caso, and the strong romantic vein in all of Caso's writing.

Ramos, Samuel, Historia de la Filosofía en México. México. Imprenta Universitaria, 1944.

Ramos devotes a chapter of his history to Caso, stressing his importance in the transition from positivism and his influence as a teacher.

CHAPTER VI - PRIMARY SOURCES

Vasconcelos José, El Monismo Estético. México, Cultura, 1918.

After "Pitágoras", this essay is the earliest statement of Vasconcelos' philosophical system, and the first in which he fixes the label of "aesthetic monism".

Vasconcelos, José, El Realismo Científico. México. Centro de Estudios Filosóficos de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1943.

In this volume, Vasconcelos restates his system under the label of "scientific realism." Vasconcelos claims scientific validity for his approach, as a form of empiricism, not of rationalism. In this late work he continues the restatement of his aesthetic monism in the classical terms of Christian theology, accomodated into his system.

Estética, México Ediciones Botas, 1935.

Third of a trilogy composed by the "Tratado de Metafisica" and the "Etica," it might be thought this would be the final, climactic volume of a system of esthetic monism. Vasconcelos, however, has promised a "Mistica" (not yet published) as the culminating volume. It would hardly seem necessary since this voluminous work fuses esthetics into religious mysticism.

Estudios Indostánicos, 3rd edition. México, Ediciones Botas, 1919.

Vasconcelos calls this a "kind of manual for the study of Hindu thought" It suffers the defects of hasty composition and of borrowing too heavily from other sources, (seldom crediting them). The volume serves as the basis for some of Vasconcelos mystical theories and shows what great fascination Hindu thought had for him.

Etica. México, Segunda Edicion Ediciones Botas, 1932.

This poorly organized and loosely written work is perhaps the weakest of Vasconcelos' philosophical works. Clearly breaking with positivist ethics Vasconcelos subordinates ethics to esthetics.

Lógica Organica. Mexico, El Colegio Nacional, 1945.

Vasconcelos advocates an esthetic, intuitive logic, akin to that advocated by Whitehead in place of Cartesian reason.

Manual de Filosofía, México, Ediciones Botas 1940.

This "manual" of philosophy has many penetrating insights and criticisms, but it suffers from Vasconcelos' tendency to quick and often inaccurate generalizations.

Pitágoras: Una Teoría del Ritmo La Habana, Imprenta El Siglo 1916.

With this essay, written during the turbulent years of the Mexican civil war, Vasconcelos presents the first statement of his esthetic philosophy, which he has been reelaborating through all the years. Bergsonian influence is very apparent in this statement in which Vasconcelos appeals to the legendary figure of Pythagoras, as is the influence of Plotinus, which Vasconcelos openly acknowledges.

Tratado de Metafísica. México, Ediciones Botas, 1929.

The metaphysical section of his trilogy. Vasconcelos depicts metaphysics, ethics and esthetics as an ascending order. In this treatise Vasconcelos does not yet have as clear cut a Christian bias as later, and explains creation in a combination of gnostic and Bergsonian arguments.

Ulises Criollo, Mexico Ediciones Botas, 1945
La Tormenta, Mexico, Ediciones Botas, 1946
El desastre, Mexico, Ediciones Botas, 1946
El Proconsulado, Mexico, Ediciones Botas, 1946

This voluminous autobiography, running to over 2,500 pages in four volumes reads like a novel. Particularly interesting for the student of Vasconcelos social philosophy, the autobiography helps us to understand undisciplined nature of the life and thought of Vasconcelos.

CHAPTER VI - SECONDARY SOURCES

Ahumada, Herminio Jr., José Vasconcelos. México. Eiciones Botas, 1937

An appreciative biographical study by a son-in-law of Vasconcelos, this study attempts to justify rather than to portray Vasconcelos with accuracy.

Brightman, E. S. "Discussion Don José Vasconcelos" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. VII. No. 3, March 1947.

A review of the "Estética," and "Lógica Organica". Concerned particularly with evaluating Vasconcelos epistemology, this discussion is remarkably friendly in view of the obvious discrepancy of Brightman with many of the statements and conclusions of this book. The defects of the books, says Brightman, "should not blind us to the fact that Vasconcelos has for a generation been writing philosophy in the great tradition."

Castro Leal, Antonio, José Vasconcelos Páginas Escogidas. Selección y prólogo de Antonio Castro Leal, Ediciones Botas 1940.

Vasconcelos has written so much, and of such an uneven quality that this selection of his finest pages fills a very real purpose. The prologue of Castro Leal is one of the finest commentaries available on the work of Vasconcelos.

Gaos, Jose, Pensamiento de Lengua Española. Mexico, Editorial Stylo, 1945. pp. 121-143.

In this review of the selection by Castro Leal, Jose Gaos undertakes to review and evaluate the philosophy of Vasconcelos. Positive and negative criticism are blended in masterful fashion.

Romanell, Patrick, "The Aesthetic Monism of Jose Vasconcelos", in The Making of the Mexican Mind. Lincoln, Nebraska. University of Nebraska Press, 1952.

This is probably the finest study of the philosophyof Vasconcelos available in Spanish or in English.

CHAPTER VII - PRIMARY SOURCES

Korn, Alejandro, Obras Completas. Buenos Aires. Editorial Claridad, S.A. 1949.

This large volume of more than 700 closely packed pages includes all of Korn's writings, including some previously unpublished essays. It is thus even more complete than the official three volume edition of his works published by the University of La Plata. The superlative essay by Romero on the life and work of Korn, published previously in separate edition with the essays of Angel Vassallo and Luis Aznar is here included as an introduction.

CHAPTER VII - SECONDARY SOURCES

Mann, Wilhelm, "El Fondo Ideológico de las Poesias de Alejandro Korn." Atenea. Concepción, Chile. Vol. 21 Oct. 1944. pp. 90-99.

As a philosopher Korn did not permit himself metaphysical fancies. In his poems, written in German, he permitted himself to envision the ultimate oneness of all. Unfortunately these poems have not been available to the students of Korn, and this reference to them in this article is the only mention of them this writer has found.

Romero, Francisco, "Tiempo y destiempo de Alejandro Korn" in La Filosofía de Ayer y de Hoy. Buenos Aires. Editorial Argos, 1947.

A brief article in which Romero speaks of the great influence of Korn. Korn's most eloquent argument against positivist utilitarianism was his own personality.

Romero, Francisco; Vassallo, Angel; Aznar, Luis, Alejandro Korn. Buenos Aires. Editorial Lozada, 1940.

Eloquent, and sincere tributes to the noble personality and great teacher that was Korn. These are not biographical studies, but rather appraisals of the significance of his work and his influence. The study by Romero, in particular, is profoundly inspiring.

Romero, Francisco, Sobre la Filosofía en America. Buenos Aires. Editorial Raigal. 1952.

There are numerous references to Korn in this volume, the most important being the pages which are dedicated to him in the essay on Argentine philosophy, and the description of Korn in the article "Filosofos Latinoamericanos del Siglo XX."

Varela Domínguez de Ghioldi, Delfina, Alejandro Korn: Sus Ensayos Filosóficos. Buenos Aires. Biblioteca del Colegio de Graduados de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1934.

Varela Domínguez de Ghioldi (continued)

An abstract of Korn's "Ensayos Filosoficos" prepared for the purpose of disseminating his ideas, since Korn had not wishes to release them for publication. Shortly after they were published.

CHAPTER VIII - PRIMARY SOURCES

Romero, Francisco, (in collaboration with A. Vassallo and L. Aznar Alejandro Korn. Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1940.

In this essay Romero pays an eloquent tribute of admiration and affection.

El Hombre y la Cultura, Buenos Aires. Espasa-Calpe, 1950.

A series of essays bearing on the philosophy ofman and of culture. Reprinted in a popular edition after appearing in various journals, Romero evidently permitted them to be published in the "Coleccion Austral" series hoping that they would reach a larger number of readers. Romero's writing on the subject of culture in these essays is centered on the problem of the concept of the world.

Estudio de Historia de las Ideas. Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1953.

A compilation of articles concerning various literary and philosophical leaders in western culture. Romero is never interested in the thought of the thinkers he studies per se, but in its relation to the history of ideas.

Filosofia Contemporánea. (Primera Serie) Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1944.

Brilliant essays on some of the main issues and leading personalities in contemporary philosophy.

Filósofos y Problemas. Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1947.

A reprint, in the popular series "Biblioteca Contemporánea," of various articles previously published in periodicals. Of outstanding value are his study of the Cuban philosopher Varona, and his essays on positivism.

Papeles Para Una Filosofía, Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, 1945.

Romeros basic statement for his concept of reality, "Programa de Una Filosofia" is here reprinted, together with a number of other articles which he presents as "papers" or materials for a philosophy. The title illustrates Romero's careful approach.

Filosofía de Ayer y de Hoy. Editorial Argos, 1947.

Also a collection of articles previously published in various periodicals, this volume includes critical reviews of some of the major figures of philosophy, Leibniz, Hume, Nietzsche as well as brief articles concerning a number of contemporary figures. The most important articles here included, however, are: "Sobre la razon y el racionalismo," "Escepticismo y relativismo," "Sobre la Ontologia de la Cultura," and "El Problema de la Concepcion del Mundo."

Filosofía de la Persona. Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1941. 2nd. editinn, 1951.

Early essays setting forth Romero's view of man, as a dualism of nature and spirit. These two aspects of man he calls the "individual" and "the person". Romero explores the relation of "person and cosmos", and the relation of the person to values.

Ideas y Figuras. Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, 1949.

Another volume in the popular edition "biblioteca contemporanea", with miscellaneous essays previously published in periodicals.

Lógica, (in collaboration with E. Pucciarelli), Espasa-Calpe, 1938; 14th edition, 1952.

A secondary school text on Logic, this volume is a remarkable reference work for the positions of the leading philosophers on the problems of the theory of knowledge. It presents a synthesis of the finest thought on the field in the present day, presented with accuracy, and clarity.

Sobre la Filosofía en America. Buenos Aires. Editorial Raigal, 1952.

(see annotation Chapter IV)

Sobre la Historia de la Filosofía. Tucuman. Universidad Nacional de Tucuman, 1943.

Romero has had a profound interest on the question of the "philosophy of philosophy". In this volume he explores the history and the problem of the writing of histories of philosophy.

Teoría del Hombre. Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, 1952.

Romero's first and only systematic treatise on a major subject of philosophy, and the only volume he has published which has not first appeared in some journal. This "theory of man" is the most profound and able work of philosophical anthropology yet published in Spanish America. Romero's clear and profound analyses set forth a spiritual view of man.

(in collaboration with Jesinghaus, Carlos) La Cultura Moderna, Buenos Aires. Universidad Nacional de la Plata, Curso de Cultura Universitaria, Cuaderno No. 1, 1943.

Lectures on the problem of the view of the world.

CHAPTER VIII - SECONDARY SOURCES

Brightman, Edgar S. "Structure and Transcendence of the Thought of Francisco Romero", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, December, 1953.

An article reviewing Romero's philosophy of reality as structure and transcendence, and of man as a dualism of nature and spirit, based on Romero's "programa de Una Filosofia" and the "Filosofia de la Persona". Accurate and appreciative, it is still probably the best article on Romero's thought published in English, but it is somewhat outdated by Romero's later writings.

García Bárcena, Rafael, Editor. "Homenaje a Francisco Romero", Revista Cubana de Filosofia, Vol. II, No. 9. Julio-Diciembre, 1951

This issue of the Cuban "Journal of Philosophy," published by the Ministry of Education is entirely dedicated to Francisco Romero.

Hershey, John H. "The Philosophy of Francisco Romero of Argentina," in Journal of Liberal Religion, Summer 1943, Vol. V. No. 1

A brief, sympathetic article stressing Romero's concept of spirit.

Rodríguez-Alcalá, Hugo, Francisco Romero (1891). New York. Hispanic Institute in the United States, Columbia University New York, 1954.

The subtitle of this monograph is "Vida y obra - bibliografia - antologia." This is the most extensive and useful study published about Romero, either in English or Spanish. It is particularly useful in the description of his life, in which the author introduces personal letters from Romero and some of his friends. The bibliography would be much more useful if the compiler had indicated which articles have not been already reprinted in one of Romero's books. As it is, there is a great deal of overlapping in the references.

Rodríguez-Alcalá, Hugo "Francisco Romero, Filósofo de América," in Cuadernos Americanos. 3. Mayo-Junio, 1954 Ano XIII, Vol. LXXV

An article describing the importance of Romero in American philosophy and setting forth his basic concepts. Rodriguez-Alcala does not attempt any radical criticism.

Victoria, Marcos, "La Filosofía Contemporánea de Francisco Romero", in La Nueva Democracia, September, 1942

A review of Romero's basic concepts, especially his criticism of culture.

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