Frenemy at the Gates: Measuring the Diplomatic and Economic Impact of Recognition on the Relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, 1933-1941

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Introduction

The United States and the Soviet Union had high hopes and expectations for recognition in 1933. Both governments believed recognition would create a closer relationship and open doors for diplomatic and economic negotiations. Analyzing the historical sources of recognition, it is harder to assess the Soviet government's hopes and expectations without having access to Soviet documents. Therefore, the following analysis will focus on the abundance of historical sources from Franklin Roosevelt's Presidential Library archives and the State Department records found in the Foreign Relations of the United States archives from 1933 to 1941. The analysis of these documents will attempt to measure the impact of recognition on US-Soviet diplomatic and economic relations, emphasizing the effect on the United States due to the limitations imposed on the research and a paper of this size.

To measure the impact of recognition, I first examine the background history of the sixteen years of the policy of nonrecognition since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. History showed that economic relations between the two countries were not negatively affected. However, the policy of nonrecognition left the United States uninvited to specific conferences in the 1920s and less influential in European affairs. Ultimately, the decision to recognize the Soviet government rested with the president of the United States. After winning the Presidential election in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt began receiving letters and advice from all corners of the American government and society about Soviet recognition. Roosevelt researched the issue to assess the benefits or repercussions the Soviet government's decision would have on the United States politically, economically, and socially. Realizing the magnitude of altering US foreign policy adhered to since the existence of the Soviet Union, Roosevelt's decision to recognize the Soviet Union in October 1933 and reestablish formal diplomatic relations between the two countries was significant.

Especially when Germany, Italy, and Japan were taking more belligerent stances in Europe and Asia.

Analyzing the State Department's documents during the period of recognition from 1934-1938 provides eyewitness accounts from the American ambassadors and the diplomatic staff from the Embassy in Moscow and its dealings with the Soviet government. The documents also give orders to the embassy and reactions from Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, several assistant secretaries, and others in the State Department staff in Washington. The actions and reactions of Soviet diplomats in Moscow and Washington were also recorded in meetings with the Soviet ambassadors assigned to Washington and discussions with the Soviet officials from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and its Commisar, Maxim Litvinov. In addition, the documents capture notes American diplomats took in meetings with other high-level Soviet officials like President Mikhail Kalinin, Premier Vyacheslav Molotov, and the Soviet Union's leader Joseph Stalin. The analysis focuses on the negotiations between the United States and Soviet governments regarding the issues between the countries' outstanding debts, claims, and the extension of American credits or loans to the Soviet Union. The State Department documents also reveal its perception of the Soviet government's violation of certain assurances Litvinov gave Roosevelt during the initial negotiations in Washington in November 1933. The records show that the friendly and normal diplomatic relations that both countries had hoped for with recognition did not occur.

Both governments also hoped that recognition would boost their country's economy by facilitating trade with a trade agreement. The State Department documents also discuss the trade agreement negotiations between American and Soviet officials, providing a basis for measuring the economic impact of recognition. In addition, the documents provide an opportunity to measure the diplomatic implications of recognition on US-Soviet foreign relations. The United States government's decision to recognize the government of the Soviet Union in November 1933 provided

a foundation for the two countries to form an alliance against Germany in October 1941, only several months after the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union. The evidence showed how recognition allowed the two countries' leaders, statesmen, and diplomats to build this foundation despite evidence proving that US-Soviet relations were not as friendly and normal as both countries hoped. The first steps towards the alliance began with recognition and were achieved through diplomatic ties. The partnership of the United States and the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany was not only a fortunate coincidence. It was a crucial moment in the twentieth century.

Chapter 1: "It's Complicated": US-Soviet relations during the policy of nonrecognition, 1917-1932.

The United States initially recognized Russia's new provisional government after the Tsar's abdication in the spring of 1917. Still, the subsequent Bolshevik Revolution in October completely changed America's foreign relations with Russia and its views toward the country. The United States had relations with the Russians since its foundation. The two countries were extensive, populous, and less established than the European powers. Therefore, they both shared similar interests and desired to be players on the international scene. However, the Bolsheviks became the standard bearers for the ideology of a socialist-communist state, which was perceived to be antithetical to American democratic, capitalist, and free society.[1] Woodrow Wilson held these ideals dear and perceived that the Bolsheviks had different intentions when governing Russia.[2] These ideological differences and the Bolshevik Revolution prompted Robert Lansing, Wilson's Secretary of State, to order the withdrawal of American diplomats, formally ending foreign relations with the new Soviet regime. On December 15, 1917, Lansing sent a telegram to David Rowland Francis, the American ambassador to Russia, ordering him to close the American Embassy, signaling the beginning of the United States government's policy of nonrecognition of the Soviet government.[3] Most foreign nations withdrew their ambassadors from Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution in October.[4] Most of America's diplomatic staff left Russia in November, but Francis stayed in Petrograd, and his Consul General in Moscow, Maddin Summers, stayed in Moscow. The two diplomats reported on the Bolshevik government, assessing whether it could maintain power. Francis and Summers often sent hostile reports back to the State Department about the Bolshevik government and their tactics in seizing control in Moscow and Petrograd, thrusting the country into a civil war. Most American diplomats' reports focused on the anti-capitalist posture the Bolshevik government expressed in its political speeches. Francis reported to Lansing that Lenin and Leon Trotsky declared that the Red

Army would “aid worldwide social revolution and overturn all governments.”[5] Consul General Summers sent a translation of Vladimir Lenin’s address to the Moscow Soviet on April 26, 1918. Lenin proclaimed, “We have unfurled the flag of war against capitalists in all countries.”[6] Francis and Summers did not leave Russia until late April 1918. Lansing decisively explained to the diplomats that the United States refused to recognize what President Wilson described as an “autocratic government” that oppressed its people’s freedom.[7]

While America’s allies Great Britain and France eventually decided to recognize the Soviet government in 1924 and most other European nations by 1927, the United States continued the policy of nonrecognition for 16 years until October 20, 1933.[8] Six months after the newly elected Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration reestablished formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the historian Malbone W. Graham wrote that the “highly contentious” period of nonrecognition was over and boldly claimed that it could be analyzed “with some degree of accuracy and finality.”[9], Graham did not have the final word, and more nuanced, in-depth historical interpretations followed, examining the long-standing policy of nonrecognition. The following analysis focuses on the developments that led to the United States government's decision not to recognize the Soviet government during the Wilson administration. In addition, the role that anti-Bolshevik sentiment played in the decision of the subsequent three Republican administrations of Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover to continue the policy of nonrecognition is analyzed.

President Wilson's administration believed in the policy of constitutional legitimacy when deciding whether to recognize a foreign nation’s government.[10] Although some politicians argued that a revolution similarly created the United States, the Wilson administration believed the Bolsheviks had obtained power illegitimately from the provisional government using violent means. Therefore, in the eyes of Wilson and his administration, the revolutionary Bolshevik government had no constitutional legitimacy.[11] On April 7, 1918, Francis told Lansing that “internal dissension,

dissatisfaction, and opposition" existed in the Bolshevik government and among the Russian peasants that "threaten openly to overthrow the Soviet government."[12] The State Department seemed convinced by Ambassador Francis's reports of anti-capitalist sentiment and reports about dissension in certain factions of the Bolshevik government against Lenin's rule.[13] Advocates of the policy of nonrecognition focused on the perceptions and, often, misperceptions regarding the Soviet government's future intentions. The United States government began to fear the spread of communist propaganda, the threat of domestic subversion, and the Soviet government's intention to foment revolutions around the world based on communist and socialist principles.[14]

After the Soviet government implemented the New Economic Policy, which included elements of capitalism, the Republican administrations in power from 1921-1932 technically accepted the economic legitimacy of the Soviet Union.[15] The country had a large consumer market for American goods before the Bolshevik Revolution and became an important international trading partner. This did not change during the period of nonrecognition. American businesses continued to trade with the Soviet Union without interference from the United States government.[16] However, formal economic relations between the two governments were strained due to the unanswered questions of debts, confiscated property, and other financial claims. The United States wanted the Soviets to pay around 150 million dollars in various debts accrued when the United States supported Russia's provisional government before the Bolshevik Revolution.[17] The paradox of distancing diplomatic relations while economic relations between the two countries increased, embodied the period of nonrecognition.[18]

Some wealthy American industrialists and former engineers who had established business relations in the Soviet Union before World War I and throughout nonrecognition vociferously advocated for Soviet recognition. A short list of the most prominent businessmen included the wealthy industrialists Charles R. Crane, Henry Ford, H.H. Westinghouse, Alexander Legge, and an

emerging entrepreneur, Armand Hammer.[19] Former army engineer Colonel Hugh Cooper, who worked in Russia throughout the 1920s, also believed recognition would provide much-needed business opportunities for Americans.[20] Politicians in Congress argued for recognition, mainly from the Republican party, like William Borah, veteran Senator of Idaho and Senator of Iowa, Smith W. Brookhart.[21] Seasoned diplomats and advisors in foreign affairs also thought recognition would only benefit the United States. Prominent diplomats included William C. Bullitt and Raymond Robins, former chairman of the Progressive Party and the Red Cross mission during the famine relief America provided the Soviet Union in 1921-1922.[22]

Wilson made his position on the legitimacy of the Soviet government clear in several public speeches in 1919. On September 6 in Kansas City, Missouri, Wilson explained that the Soviet government would not dare attempt to hold a constitutional convention because "they have no mandate from anybody."[23] The prevalence of anti-Bolshevist sentiment during Wilson's administration hindered any change to the policy of nonrecognition.[24] In addition, the Communist International (Comintern) formed in March 1919 acted as the arm of the Bolshevik government in charge of communist propaganda to spread socialist revolutions beyond the Soviet Union's borders.[25] Wilson's administration feared the Soviet government's power to spread domestic communism. In DesMoines, Iowa, Wilson made his anti-Bolshevist stance quite clear, calling the Soviet government "a little group of men just as selfish, just as ruthless, and just as pitiless as the Czar himself assumed control and exercised their power not by terror, and not by right."[26] Furthermore, Wilson blamed the Soviet government of spreading "the poison of disorder, the posion of terror, the posion of revolt, the posion of chaos" though other nation's telegraph and radio.[27] Concerning the Soviet government's legitimacy and its subversive activities, President Wilson warned the crowd:

> It is the negation of everything that is American, but it is spreading, and so long as disorder continues, so long as the world is kept waiting for the answer of the kind of Peace we are going to have and what kind of guarantees there are to be behind that piece, that poison will

> steadily spread, more and more rapidly until it may be that even this beloved land of ours will be distracted and distorted by it.[28]

However, during the period of nonrecognition, the Comintern's efforts to spread the communist revolution to the United States were ineffective, and the American Communist Party received only minor support from the Soviet government.[29] Regardless of the Comintern's overall ineffectiveness in America, anti-Bolshevist and anticommunist sentiment spread throughout certain conservative sections during the period of nonrecognition.[30] Business elites used the threat of a socialist or communist revolution to attack the growing power of labor unions.[31] Wilson and his administration's reaction to the Bolshevik revolution and the increasing fear of anti-Bolshevism caused hysteria across America, a crucial component to beginning the Red Scare in America.[32]

Ideological complications: The policy of nonrecognition 1917-1920

The Bolshevik revolution in October 1917 sparked a civil war throughout Russia between the Bolshevik Red and Tsarist White armies. The Allies had not recognized the Bolshevik takeover of the Russian provisional government, as it remained unclear whether they could consolidate and legitimize their power over such a large and diverse country. The Bolshevik leaders sought to end hostilities with the Central Powers as soon as possible so that they could focus on staying in power. On March 3, 1918, the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, agreeing to end Russia's participation in World War I against Germany.[33] However, the Russian Civil War continued after World War I ended on November 11, 1918. Before the end of the year, the British government committed around 20,000 troops to the port cities of Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok. The British government wanted to ensure that Germany did not seize the weapons and supplies in these strategic Russian port cities.[34] In July 1918, the Wilson administration agreed to send around 6,000 troops to support the British forces.[35] The Allies essentially blockaded the ports, and there were several battles between the Soviet Red Army and Allied forces in the vicinity of these ports.[36] The

Unites States withdrew late in 1919. Still, British troops remained in the Soviet Union until early 1920.[37] Regardless of the Allied military and financial aid to the White armies, the Bolsheviks were still nominally in power when World War I ended in 1918. However, the presence of Allied troops supporting the White armies in the Russian Civil War was a further rebuke of the leadership of the Soviet government.

The Allies did not invite the Bolshevik government in January 1919 to participate in the Paris Peace Conference. However, Russia was so geostrategically important that it could not be ignored. Therefore, President Wilson, Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Great Britain, and Georges Clemenceau of France discussed diplomatic options for a Bolshevik victory at the conference. The Allies agreed not to recognize the Bolshevik government on the basis that the Bolsheviks took power over the Russian provisional government illegally and using violent means.[38] Despite the collective Allied decision to adopt a policy of nonrecognition towards the Bolshevik government, American diplomats secretly contacted Bolshevik leaders in Moscow during the Paris Peace Conference. Colonel Edward House, the American commissioner at the conference and a close advisor to President Wilson on foreign relations, sent several diplomats in late February 1919 to Moscow without the president's knowledge. The secret mission's goal was to discover the future intentions of the Bolshevik government. Furthermore, the diplomats also would access the Bolshevik government's willingness to abide by international law regarding outstanding loans, debts, and war reparations.[39] The American diplomatic team, led by William Bullitt, met with the Bolshevik leadership in March 1919. Bullitt reported that the Bolsheviks agreed to the initial terms and conditions that the United States government wanted to begin the process of official recognition and reestablish formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.[40] Although the diplomats advised Col. House that the Bolshevik government was firmly in power in Russia and was willing to

reestablish diplomatic relations, it did not change President Wilson's mind or America's foreign policy.[41]

Complicated relations: The policy of nonrecognition, 1921-1927

The inauguration of Warren Harding as President in 1921 ended eight years of Democratic party leadership in the White House. Analyzing US-Soviet relations during Harding's presidency showed that the anti-Bolshevist sentiment in the State Department under Wilson continued to thrive.[42] The United States government worried that the Bolshevik Revolution and the Comintern could influence social unrest, especially among the American unions and low-paid working classes. Fears were confirmed on January 21, 1919, when over 300,000 union workers stopped working in the Seattle General Strike.[43] More strikes followed in major cities across America. The government and American newspapers blamed socialist and communist influence for the increasing social unrest among America's working class. This hysteria led to the Red Scare. The fear of domestic communism spread to the elites, who were afraid of losing their grip on their power, privilege, and wealth over the mass majority of Americans.[44] The Comintern supported and funded communist or socialist political movements worldwide when it could. In 1919, a short-lived Soviet government took power in Hungary with the Comintern's support.[45] Anti-Bolshevist and anti-communist fears in America continued to increase, most significantly in the American government. The Department of Justice of the United States created the Bureau of Investigation, the precursor to the FBI, to investigate anyone it suspected of supporting Bolshevist, communist, or socialist subversive actions against the United States government.[46] Therefore, the United States government was hostile to the global rise in anticolonial nationalism and considered any country or person who advocated for it an enemy.[47]

The Comintern also tried to support emerging communist and socialist political parties outside the Soviet Union. The American Communist Party (CPUSA) was formed in 1920 and

looked to Moscow and the Comintern for support.[48] Leaders in the CPUSA traveled to Moscow to meet with members of the Comintern several times a year.[49] Therefore, elites and staunch anti-Communists continued to attempt to link the Comintern's actions directly with the Soviet government, proclaiming domestic communism threatened the interests and status quo in American politics and society. However, the Soviet Union and CPUSA party's records highlighted the inability and, at times, the Comintern's unwillingness to finance the CPUSA's activities. The Comintern provided more vocal support than financial support to the CPUSA during the mid-1920s and early 1930s.[50] Therefore, America's perception of the Comintern's power was more potent than it had been, specifically during the period of nonrecognition.

During the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations, the prevailing attitude throughout the State Department and the United States Foreign Service was anti-Bolshevist.[51] The three Republican administrations' Department of State held similar hardline stances to the Soviet government that had started in Wilson's administration under Secretary of State Lansing.[52] Harding's Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, continued this posture after Harding died in office on August 2, 1923, working under the new President Calvin Coolidge.[53] On December 18, 1923, Hughes ordered the American Consul in Reval, Estonia, to deliver an official statement by the State Department to Gregory Chicherin, leader of the Comintern. Hughes declared that friendly relations between the United States and the Soviet Union could not be restored until the Soviets stopped spreading propaganda from Moscow "to overthrow the institutions of this country."[54] Hughes reiterated what Coolidge said in a message to Congress regarding recognition. The President said, "The American Government is not proposing to barter away its principles."[55] Other staunch anti-Bolshevists in the State Department included Robert F. Kelley, who remained the director of the Division of Eastern European Affairs in the United States Foreign Service from 1923 to 1937. Kelley taught the young diplomats under his direction to distrust the Soviet government.[56] Although

anti-Bolshevism had spread throughout the State Department, the final decision to recognize the Soviet Union lay with the President of the United States. Most of the presidents' advisors on foreign relations claimed that the United States could not trust the Soviet government to abide by the legal conditions of recognition, let alone pay off its debts. Moreover, the perception that the Comintern continued to spread subversion as an arm of the Soviet government remained one of the primary reasons for continuing the policy of nonrecognition.

On the other hand, the Soviet government eagerly sought recognition from the United States. The Russian newspapers Pravda and Izvestia expressed their desire for the Soviet Union and the diplomatic and economic benefits that recognition by the United States would have for the Soviet Union.[57] The benefits of diplomatic recognition included providing much-needed industrial and technical assistance during Stalin's Five-Year Plan starting in 1926. In addition, Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, promoted a policy of collective security, which hinged on making diplomatic alliances with the West.[58] Therefore, the Soviet government was ready to negotiate terms of recognition with the United States government whenever it decided to change the policy of nonrecognition. Although this did not happen until 1933, informal relations between the two countries periodically continued during the 1920s.

The United States government hosted foreign delegates at the Washington Conference from November 1921 to February 1922 to discuss the limitations of naval armaments. The issue of increasing Japanese intervention in mainland Asia since the end of World War I was also a central talking point.[59] Although the Bolshevik government was not invited to the conference, the United States government did invite the newly formed Far Eastern Republic. The Republic consisted of several breakaway territories of strategic importance in Eastern Russia along the Trans-Siberian railroad and around Manchuria. The United States supported the leadership of the White armies in nominal control of the breakaway Republic, sending a more significant force of 13,000 soldiers to

Siberia in 1919. When the Bolsheviks defeated most of the White army's resistance later that year, the United States promptly withdrew its support.[60] The Soviet Union had absorbed most of the territories of the Far Eastern Republic in 1921, but the United States still recognized the Republic's anti-Soviet government.[61] The Soviet and American governments considered the sizeable Japanese force in mainland Asia and Siberia a threat to their regional interests. Around 62,000 Japanese troops were estimated on mainland Asia by 1921.[62] Although the recognition of the Soviet Union might provide the United States with an ally against an increasingly belligerent Japan, the United States government's mistrust of the Soviet government superseded the issues in Asia.

Boris Skvirsky acted as the Far Eastern Republic's representative at the Washington Conference. Skvirsky became one of the most influential Soviet contacts in America throughout nonrecognition. The Soviet government did not officially recognize Skvirsky, but he stayed in Washington and set up the Russian Information Bureau, which the Soviet government directed from Moscow.[63] In 1922, Boris Bakhmeteff, the ambassador of Russia's provisional government, finally left the old Russian embassy in Washington, leaving Boris Skvirsky as the primary contact in the United States for any business with the Soviet government. Skvirsky's presence in Washington was crucial to the development and increase in trade between the United States and the Soviet government, regardless of his unofficial and unrecognized status.[64]

The policy of nonrecognition did not stop business and trade between the two countries.[65] American businesses like Singer and Westinghouse had already established profitable trade relations with Tsarist Russia.[66] In the 1920s and 1930s, all of the Soviet economic policies focused on the rapid modernization and industrialization of its nation's urban and agricultural regions.[67] In the early 1920s, major American companies and industries like International Harvester, General Electric, and the Ford Motor Company conducted profitable business with the Soviet Union. Ford built a factory in Leningrad in 1925, and by the end of the decade, around two-thirds of the tractors in the Soviet

Union were Fordson tractors.[68] Despite the policy of nonrecognition, Americans were still able to profit from conducting business in the Soviet Union due to the implementation of Stalin's First and Second Five-Year Plan.[69]

In 1924, the Soviet government sent official representatives to America to regulate the increasing trade and discover new economic opportunities. The Soviet Union established the American Trading Corporation (Amtorg) in Washington in 1924. Amtorg was the focal point for American trade with the Soviet Union during the period of nonrecognition. Amtorg established relations with prominent Wall Street bankers and Republican members of Congress.[70] However, the economy of the Soviet Union benefited from American trade more than the American economy did from Soviet trade, except for the few individual businesses and dynamic entrepreneurs.[71] From 1923 to 1927, America exported almost $220 million to the Soviet Union but imported only $44 million worth of trade.[72] President Calvin Coolidge and his administration did not interfere with or actively oppose the increase in trade between the two countries. However, the government continued to fear that recognition would open American society to subversion and communist propaganda.[73]On February 23, 1928, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg explained the Coolidge administration's commitment to the policy of nonrecognition over the last four years in a decisive statement. Kellogg's wrote:

> During the past four years, the government of the United States has maintained the position that it would be both futile and unwise to enter into relations with the Soviet government so long as the Bolshevik leaders persist in Ames and practices in the field of international relations which preclude the possibility of establishing relations on the basis of accepted principles governing intercourse between nations.[74]

He maintained that the United States government would not interfere with the increasing trade development between the two countries, adding the warning that corporations and individuals "do so upon their responsibility and their own risk."[75] However, regarding recognition, Kellogg conclusively wrote that the United States government would not discuss relations "with the present

regime in Russia so long as the present rulers of Russia have not abandoned those avowed aims and known practices which are inconsistent with International friendship."[76] Harding's and Coolidge's administrations both rigorously maintained the policy of nonrecognition.

Depressed relations: the policy of nonrecognition, 1929-1932

During President Herbert Hoover's administration, the dire domestic economic situation was sparked by the sudden crash of the New York Stock Exchange six months after Hoover's inauguration, which plunged America into the Great Depression. Therefore, domestic issues dominated Hoover's agenda. Secretary of State Kellogg's statement was the final entry in United States Foreign Relations records about the question of Soviet recognition throughout Hoover's presidency. For the next three years, Secretary of State Henry Stimson and the State Department did not release any formal statement about the recognition of the Soviet Union. Unlike the preceding administrations, the country was conspicuously absent from the records in the files on United States Foreign Relations. Advocates for Soviet recognition in Congress and American businesses continued to argue that recognition would severely provide the economic boost the country needed.[77] Great Britain and Germany had trade deals with the Soviet Union due to having formal diplomatic relations between their governments since 1922. However, statistics from the State Department showed that United States exports to the Soviet Union from 1924 to 1927 exceeded the total amount of exports from Britain and Germany.[78] The policy of nonrecognition acted as a barrier to opening much broader trade with the Soviets for more American businesses and entrepreneurs than just a few already doing business in the Soviet Union.[79] However, domestic economic issues overshadowed international issues after the Great Depression. Maintenance of the status quo for US-Soviet relations seemed to be the priority as the depression spread around the globe. The United States and the Soviet government focused on reviving their economies more than on international affairs.[80]

In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria with a large force. The Japanese army cut off the Trans-Siberian railroad connecting important Soviet cities like Vladivostok and its influence and possessions in China, like Port Arthur.[81] At the same time, Italy's and Germany's fascist governments acted more belligerent in Europe. These were perhaps more immediate and closer threats to the Soviet Union than the United States. However, cold the relations were between the US and the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution, unofficial relations continued through increasing trade and private foreign investments. Yet the policy of nonrecognition made American diplomats' jobs much harder. Organizers of international conferences had to deal with the question of inviting Soviet or American diplomats. Although a certain level of cooperation between the two countries existed during the period of nonrecognition, sometimes the United States government had no representation at conferences, whereas the Soviet Union did. For example, the United States could only observe the signing of the Rapallo Treaty in Genoa, Italy, about postwar economic reconstruction in Europe made between Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union in 1922. The treaty signed at the conference solidified the Soviet Union's neutral approach towards Italy and Germany, concluding a lucrative trade deal with the latter.[82] The nonrecognition policy affected the United States' ability to be included in crucial decisions about European alliances and security measures. Therefore, the longer the United States government continued its policy of nonrecognition, the less influence America had internationally concerning the increasingly belligerent actions of Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1930s.[83]

The incumbent President Hoover ran on a platform of nonrecognition during the 1932 Presidential campaign. Secretary of State Henry Stimson and the State Department had not addressed US-Soviet relations in three years. Therefore, Hoover had Assistant Secretary of State William Castle, Jr. prepare a statement defending his administration's decision to continue the policy of nonrecognition for the upcoming campaign. Castle explained that "a vast majority of

American people oppose recognition of any government which, failing to respect the institutions and the form of government of its neighbors, interferes with their internal affairs."[84] President Hoover's administration continued mistrusting the Soviet government and its subversive activities in other nations.

Documents showed that Franklin Roosevelt's position on recognition during the 1932 presidential campaign was unclear. On the campaign trail, Roosevelt said that before deciding to reverse the longstanding policy of nonrecognition, he would examine all the issues "from every angle."[85] However, if Roosevelt and the Democrats won the election, some newspapers believed Russian recognition would be inevitable in 1933.[86] Recognition was arguably the most significant international issue facing the United States. Those in favor of recognition explained that reestablishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would address the problematic international situation by repairing its relationship with the Soviet Union, making it a valuable ally against a more belligerent Germany, Italy, and Japan. Furthermore, opening more trade relations would greatly benefit America's economy during the most dire economic situation it continued to face. Regarding the diplomatic question of recognition, advocates emphasized that since Jeffersonian times, a nation's specific ideology and form of government were not barriers for the United States to recognize a foreign country's government.[87] However, specific conservative organizations and individuals in American society and the government still feared the spread of domestic communism through propaganda distributed by the Comintern, Soviet consulates, the American Communist Party, and its sympathizers. Large patriotic groups and labor organizations, like the American Legion and the American Federation of Labor, also continued to oppose recognition in 1933.[88] Therefore, Roosevelt and his administration approached the issue of Russian recognition cautiously.

The anti-Bolshevist sentiment in America and the status quo of the policy of nonrecognition were the initial obstacles for Roosevelt and his administration to address, overcome, or disregard. His administration needed to understand the specific conditions and terms the United States and the Soviet Union wanted regarding recognition. This would have to be negotiated, making the question of recognition more complicated than it seemed. In 1933, European and Asian countries took threatening postures against the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the most critical foreign relations question facing Roosevelt and his administration in 1933 was whether to abandon the sixteen-year-long policy of nonrecognition and establish official diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and its government.

Chapter 2: First Date: The Recognition Decision, 1932-1933

When questioned about the issue of Soviet recognition while campaigning in 1932, Roosevelt answered, "I can only assure you that if I were elected, I would make it a point to inform myself as to the different angles of this question and to reach the best decision within my power."[89] The presidential candidate clarified that he would explore all the issues if elected. He wanted to learn more about the complexities of recognition before making such a significant decision. The United States government's policy towards the Soviet government remained a policy of nonrecognition since the Wilson administration. The previous chapter analyzed the primary reasons for the continuation of the policy of nonrecognition during the Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations. As the Soviet Union grew politically and economically during the 1920s, the fear of the rise of global, and mainly domestic, communism also grew with it.[90] The previous analysis showed that the State Department's negative perceptions of the Soviet government continued to dominate the discussion during the policy of nonrecognition.[91] In 1933, the voices for or against Soviet recognition had not changed.

The following analysis of those against recognition showed that a continuing prevalence of anti-communist sentiment was still a significant concern in 1933. The volume of hostile letters Roosevelt received regarding the recognition of the Soviet Union and its government when he was elected president confirmed that the Red Scare continued to cast its shadow over the issue. Often, the letters examined below-expressed concern about the perceived activities of Communist International (Comintern) in spreading communism throughout America. Roosevelt also received letters from concerned labor organizations regarding the Soviet government's involvement in spreading subversion throughout America's working classes. However, the State Department's advice to Roosevelt highlighted the Comintern's ineffectiveness and lack of support from the Soviet government in the 1930s, proving that these fears were mainly perceived.

The advocates for recognition also inundated Roosevelt with letters and advice highlighting the benefits of recognition after his election. Letters from prominent businessmen sent to the new president explained how the American economy would benefit from recognition still reeling from the Great Depression. True to his words recorded on the campaign trail in 1932, Roosevelt examined the issue of Soviet recognition "from different angles" after he was elected President in November.[92] He compiled advice from his cabinet and other trusted advisors, examining the arguments for and against Russian recognition for almost a year before making a decision.[93] Roosevelt comprehensively studied the issues facing recognition, analyzing all the legal, economic, and financial questions. He sought advice about the legal problems of the recognition of the Soviet Union, which could arise regarding issues of debts and claims between the two countries. After such a long period of nonrecognition, the advice examined below provided Roosevelt and his administration a general understanding of the magnitude and significance of the decision facing them. It also gave the president an idea of the benefits and the problems recognition might initially have on US-Soviet relations and the American economy. The time the President and his administration devoted to the question of whether to change the policy of nonrecognition after sixteen years as soon as the election was over proved its importance. The process of reestablishing relations with the Soviet government was not simple. The complexities of the conditions and terms of recognition since 1917 needed to be understood before they were adequately negotiated.

However, the timing of the announcement of recognition remained uncertain. Roosevelt and his administration proceeded with cautious intent without the immediacy that some of the advocates for Soviet recognition in America and the Soviet Union wanted. Once they heard that the new administration in the United States was open to formally recognizing the Soviet Union, the Soviet government anxiously waited for Roosevelt's official decision.[94] Meanwhile, Japan's imperialist actions in Asia on the Soviet border went unchecked, and Germany's new fascist government

threatened the Soviet Union's national security and interests in the region. Battlelines drawn and alliances forming in Europe and Asia prompted the advocates for recognition to call for the reestablishment of official diplomatic relations between the two largest nations on either side of the world. However, the voices against recognition remained strong in the country in the 1930s. The possibility that the United States might recognize the Soviet Union stoked the fear that domestic communism would continue to spread if Roosevelt restored diplomatic relations. Therefore, Roosevelt took the time to understand the issues of such a consequential decision and change to American foreign policy.

1932 Presidential Election and the issue of recognition

The incumbent Hoover defended the policy of nonrecognition during the 1932 presidential campaign.[95] While Hoover's position on recognition was widely known, as mentioned, Roosevelt did not explicitly indicate his intentions while on the campaign trail. Despite Roosevelt's non-commital position on Soviet recognition, he won the presidential election in 1932 in a landslide.[96] Historians examining the presidential race of 1932 argued that Russian recognition was not a significant issue due to the overriding issue of the dire situation of America's economy.[97] Some historians assumed Roosevelt's position was opposite to Hoover's position on recognition without supplying any evidence other than Roosevelt's interest in foreign affairs.[98] Although Roosevelt dismissed the international policies of the previous three administrations, whether this implied a new direction in foreign policy remained an assumption.[99] Other historians claimed Roosevelt remained silent regarding his position.[100]

However, two letters sent to Roosevelt while he was on campaign alluded to his position on recognition while on campaign in 1932. Matthew Woll, the acting president of the National Civic Federation (NCF), sent a letter to Roosevelt on October 18. Woll explained to Roosevelt the long-standing and vehement opposition the NCF had toward recognizing the current Soviet government.

He attached all the former statements in favor of the policy of nonrecognition since it started under Wilson. Woll reminded Roosevelt that when the presidential candidate was asked about his position on recognition, he answered with an evasive reply that he would look at the issue from different angles. Woll further reminded Roosevelt that the NCF had powerful and valuable connections with other labor federations.[101] The NCF was a well-known conservative business group with a history of anti-Soviet sentiment since the Wilson era, so the NCF's position against recognition was not a surprise.[102] However, the letter showed Roosevelt had not committed yet to a definitive position on recognition during the presidential campaign.

In a letter sent on November 3, 1932, a few days before the presidential election, the executive committee of the United Russian National Organizations in America, representing sixteen different Russian organizations across the nation, personally thanked Roosevelt for taking a position *against* [emphasis added] recognition of the Soviet Union. The letter's authors referred to "an interview" Roosevelt had at his Hyde Park, NY home with Prince Sergei Gagarin, an old noble family member who had escaped to America after the Bolshevik Revolution.[103] Prince Gagarin asked Roosevelt about his attitude toward recognizing the Soviet regime. According to the letter, Roosevelt answered that if elected president, he "would have no intention of granting diplomatic recognition with the Soviet government."[104] The second and last paragraph of the letter shed more light on the reason behind Roosevelt's answer. According to the letter, the executive board of the United Russian National Organizations in America represented a fifty-thousand-strong voting block. As a presidential candidate, perhaps Roosevelt just told Prince Gagarin what the United Russian National Organizations of America wanted to hear to win votes for the upcoming election. Roosevelt was most likely aware that the URNO in America represented a powerful and wealthy organization of prominent Russian emigres loyal to the Czars of Russia and adamantly against the Soviet government. Perhaps Roosevelt told the exiled Russian Prince what he wanted to hear to get

the United Russian National Organizations in America's support. Surprisingly, scholars overlook the letter or fail to give it the attention it deserves.[105] Fifty-thousand votes in an election was not inconsequential. However, it was not out of the ordinary for a candidate in an election to agree with anybody's position out of concern over alienating a particular group of voters whose support might be consequential. Although we do not know precisely why Roosevelt told Prince Gargarin that he would not recognize Soviet Russia, the letter proved that recognition was a significant and controversial issue during the 1932 presidential campaign. At least important enough that Roosevelt was willing to say he was against Soviet recognition in return for securing 50,000 votes.

Continued fears of communism and the Comintern

The history of the policy of nonrecognition showed how the sixteen-year policy distorted the negative perceptions of the Soviet Union. The United States and most countries allied with it feared the Soviet Union's perceived influence over anti-Bolshevism and anticommunism fostered in America.[106] Those against recognition of the Soviet government highlighted its brutality and cruelty to its people, undemocratic tendencies, and other Western perceptions of the Soviet government's communist ideology. Taking its cue from the government's stance towards the Soviet Union during the period of nonrecognition, various American societies and organizations believed that communism was an evil ideology and incompatible with American democratic values. They feared the Comintern's goal to spread global communism and revolution. Ordinary Americans also voiced their concerns about the rise of communism at home and the Soviet government's policy of atheism. However, not everyone fell into these categories. There was a large constituency in the US for progressive policies, left-wing ideologies, policies, and programs, especially after the passage of the New Deal.[107]

American fears about the Soviet government were often misconceptions. Since the early 1920s, the Soviet government has been primarily concerned with the state of the domestic economy

rather than financing communist or socialist revolutions worldwide. In 1928, Stalin intensely focused on the success of implementing his first Five-Year Plan more than international concerns. After the Great Depression impacted the global economy, the Comintern saw little funding from the Soviet government.[108] The Soviet government tried desperately to stabilize the economy during the global economic crisis that the crash of the New York Stock Exchange in October 1929 triggered.[109] Historians explained that soon after its inception, the Comintern's attempts to undermine other governments included more verbal support than financial support.[110] American newspapers often overstated the Comintern's effectiveness, misunderstanding that the Soviet government and the Comintern were the same entity. England and France had already recognized the Soviet Union in 1924.[111]. However, those against recognition pointed out that England and France also had issues with the Soviets spreading communist propaganda through their embassies and diplomatic channels. In the case of England, this led to some Soviet diplomats being dismissed for a year in 1928.[112] However, in both countries, communist agitation did not make much political impact, and diplomatic relations were quickly reinstated within months.[113]

The Comintern financed some of the activities of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA), and its leaders consulted with the Comintern in Moscow a few times a year during the 1920s.[114] These funds generally paid for printing pamphlets and publications but not much more. Membership was down in the 1930s, especially after some prominent members left the CPUSA, let down by the lack of support from the Comintern. The historian Norman Saul described the CPUSA as "an ineffective, much divided and divisive organization that had practically no impact on American social, political, or economic life."[115] Other historians analyzing the CPUSA and its relationship with the Soviet Union did not come to the same conclusion regarding the party's impact. However, histories of the CPUSA concurred that the Soviet government and the Comintern gave the party little support during the period of nonrecognition. Except for the significant union strikes in

Seattle, Detroit, and Chicago in 1919, the Comintern commented negatively on the CPUSA's lack of momentum and effectiveness to enlist more from the ranks of the working classes in the 1920s and 1930s.[116] The CPUSA's membership remained small, its leadership was fractious, and was always under the watchful eye of far more powerful enemies, like J. Edgar Hoover's FBI. Furthermore, in 1933, the influential leaders of the CPUSA became disaffected with the party, like Jay Lovestone, or had defected, like Henry Wolfe.[117]

One of the significant concerns raised by adherents of nonrecognition was the fear that the United States would be overrun by consulates distributing Communist propaganda to the American working classes.[118] In the months before Roosevelt's inauguration, representatives from various patriotic societies, labor organizations, religious groups, and various individuals expressed their concerns in letters sent to Roosevelt regarding Russian recognition. These groups and individuals feared reversing the long-standing tradition of nonrecognition of the Soviet Union while the last three Republican administrations were in the White House. Although Roosevelt had not decided on the issue and was not yet in the White House, the authors of letters believed the rumors that the new Democrat administration would recognize the Soviet Union. For fringe conservative groups, like the Society of Constitutional Security and the Sons and Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR), this was an ethical and moral disaster. Various chapters of the DAR, primarily from New York and New Jersey, protested the recognition of Russia "with its insidious propaganda of atheism, immortality, blasphemy, and other destroying influences."[119] According to the DAR's Morristown, New Jersey chapter, any American leader who did not use executive power to prevent the spread of domestic communism and socialism was "most unpatriotic" and even "traitorous."[120] The conservative *National Review* reported that recognition would open the door to a "Communist onslaught."[121] The labor unions, notably the American Federation of Labor, feared communist ideology spreading to the workforce.[122] Over 160 organizations and over 6,000 people attended a

famously conservative business union meeting, the American Federation of Labor. Against recognition in April 1933.[123]

However, the Comintern's mission to spread world revolution in the 1930s lacked the necessary funding. Roosevelt received reports that the Soviet government in 1933 was more busy governing the state's internal affairs and attempting massive economic programs to strengthen the state than spreading subversion. Jerome Davis, the head of Yale's divinity school, explained in a letter to Roosevelt that the Soviet Union did not have the financial power to sufficiently fund the efforts of the Comintern beyond pamphlets and verbal encouragement.[124] Davis was a specialist on Russian history and informed Roosevelt that the Comintern had been largely ineffective since 1928. Davis mentioned Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenov as the leaders who blamed Stalin for not supporting the Comintern. He explained that when other leaders blamed Stalin for not supporting the Comintern, he had them "expelled."[125] Therefore, the advice and information Roosevelt received in 1933 showed that those prejudiced against the Soviet Union and its government inflated their concerns about the Comintern.

Initial inquiries

Less than two weeks after Roosevelt defeated Hoover in 1932, the president-elect instructed the seasoned diplomat William C. Bullitt to travel to Europe.[126] Roosevelt wanted Bullitt to discover from his extensive political contacts in Europe their intention of paying the next installments of war debts due in December that year. Moreover, Roosevelt wanted to know the general feelings of various European governments if the United States government decided to alter its policy of nonrecognition of the Soviet government. Bullitt left for Europe on November 19, 1932.127. His visit did not go unnoticed despite Roosevelt's wishes. After arriving in London, Bullitt told reporters about his mission. He wanted European governments to understand the real reasons behind his visit, as he had no official title yet. Bullitt's first visit was unsuccessful, receiving inaccurate information

about Europe's commitment to debt repayments and information about underestimating the threat of Hitler's new government.[128]

On January 15, 1933, Roosevelt sent Bullitt to Europe again. Roosevelt hoped that Bullitt could meet with his contacts to explore the possibility of France reconciling with Germany.[129] Bullitt's second trip coincided with Germany's pronouncement of Adolf Hitler as its new chancellor.[130] As Roosevelt was only president-elect, he could not give Bullitt an official title. This hindered both of Bullitt's information-gathering missions in Europe. Therefore, the information Bullitt gathered was limited and sometimes inaccurate..[131] Unfortunately, by Bullitt's admission, his early missions did not yield much information.[132] Having Bullitt sent on two fact-finding missions to Europe immediately after Roosevelt won the election and before he was inaugurated in March 1933 proved the President’s and his administration's commitment to foreign affairs.

Several weeks after Roosevelt's inauguration, Esther Lape contacted her close friend, the First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, to help provide advice on Russian recognition. Lape, an advocate of Women's Rights and former American diplomat, had contacts with the American Foundation, a non-profit organization in New York City. The foundation represented the Committee on Russian-American Relations and was compiling a report evaluating the current arguments for and against the recognition of the Soviet Union.[133] The report compiled findings by foreign affairs, law, economics, and business specialists.[134] It was exhaustive, covering every aspect of recognition from important diplomatic, economic, and legal considerations to the fallacies of anti-communist sentiment in American society in over three hundred pages. The report sought valued advice from diplomats like Roland Morris, the former ambassador of Japan, and influential leaders in their fields, like James D. Mooney, President of General Motors, and Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School. Everyone who contributed to the report was a well-known advocate for the recognition of the Soviet Union,

which should be considered.[135] However, Lape assured Roosevelt that the report was unbiased. She wrote:

> That your interest in recognition is, of course, assumed by the group; what they want is not to discuss with you the general question of recognition but to present their views and their information as to the general approaches to the present situation and as to certain immediate practical possibilities which they consider to be of great importance.[136]

After finishing the report, Lape eagerly contacted Eleanor Roosevelt on July 21, 1933. She asked whether some of the prominent members of the Committee on Russian-American Relations could meet personally with the president to discuss the report's findings.[137] Roosevelt denied Lape's request. The official publication of the report was delayed until November 1, 1933.[138] Whether Roosevelt requested the delay remains uncertain. However, on July 28, 1933, he sent a forceful rejection to the committee's request for a meeting, insisting that if he met any group "at Hyde Park or anywhere for that matter… it would be taken as an out and out announcement of recognition."[139] Despite the benefits the Committee on Russian-American Relations emphasized that America stood to gain from Soviet recognition, Roosevelt's answer to the committee's request for a meeting showed how cautiously he continued to approach the question of recognition.

Economic opportunities and financial barriers

Since the Bolshevik Revolution, the new Russian leaders actively sought diplomatic recognition from Western powers to open trade relations, increase commercial connections, and obtain technical assistance in the Soviet government's efforts to industrialize and modernize Russia.[140] American businesses like Singer and Westinghouse had already established profitable trade relations with Tsarist Russia.[141] Trade did not stop between the two countries, as demonstrated in the analysis above during the period of nonrecognition.[142] The economic policies the Soviet government implemented all focused on the rapid modernization and industrialization of the urban and agricultural regions.[143] In the early 1920s, critical American companies like International Harvester,

General Electric, and the Ford Motor Company conducted profitable business with the Soviet Union. Ford built a factory in Leningrad in 1925, and by the end of the decade, around two-thirds of the tractors in the Soviet Union were Fordson tractors.[144] Despite the different economic focus of Stalin's Five-Year Plan, Americans could still profit from conducting business in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union established the American Trading Corporation (Amtorg) in Washington in 1924. During the period of nonrecognition, Amtorg was the focal point for American trade with the Soviet Union.[145] Amtorg hoped recognition would increase its business with the United States. However, Amtorg's chief representative, Peter Bogdanoff, expressed the trading corporation's concerns that Roosevelt's administration might continue the policy of nonrecognition.[146] On April 11, 1933, Dorsey Richardson reported Bogdanoff's concerns in a letter to the New York banker Alexander Sachs. According to Richardson, Bogdanoff was worried that the rumors in the American press that circulated regarding Roosevelt's intention to recognize the Soviet government were "more remote than press reports would indicate."[147] Richardson explained that the Soviet government "has no idea when, if ever, diplomatic recognition is likely to occur."[148] If any American company wanted to trade with the Soviet Union, it needed to contact Amtorg in Washington. Therefore, only the largest corporations and most ambitious entrepreneurs conducted trade with the Soviet Union during the period of nonrecognition. In the same letter sent to Sachs, Richardson reported how the Standard Oil Company attempted to profit from the current trading situation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Directly negotiating in Moscow, representatives of the Standard Oil Company tried to position themselves or the company as "the intermediary trading agency through which Russian-American trade will be handled."[149]

Several companies interested in the timber and cotton trade sent letters to Roosevelt explaining that recognition would open the trade market to less connected companies like Ford and Standard Oil. On May 22, 1933, Tom Connelly, a Democrat Senator of Texas, sent a letter to

Roosevelt claiming recognition would allow competition and free trade with the Soviet Union, specifically in the timber business.[150] Later that month, Jesse H. Jones of the Reconstruction Finance Company explained that the Soviet Union was a perfect market for America's surplus cotton. The letter suggested that selling America's surplus cotton to the Soviet Union provided much-needed capital for the Soviet government to meet its outstanding debts. Jones explained that Amtorg had agreed to the condition of paying thirty percent upfront for 70,000 bales of cotton and the rest on five percent interest a year.[151]

On July 5, 1933, an American engineer, J. Chamberlain Carter, asked permission to send the president some film footage he had taken in the Soviet Union. Carter had worked throughout the Soviet Union, traveling the length and breadth of the country for two years as an engineer for a Soviet company during the Five-Year Plan. He explained his job's advantages, claiming in his letter to Roosevelt he had "a wonderful opportunity to gather information and data which the visitor or prejudiced person does not obtain."[152] Carter concluded that if Roosevelt watched his film footage, he would get "a much truer picture of the actual situation from the contradictory reports constantly being circulated" about working conditions and professionalism in the Soviet Union."[153] Despite the advice and opinions Roosevelt received regarding the benefits of recognition, there remained several financial obstacles. Due to the economic depression that affected most of the world in the 1930s, one of the issues concerned the Soviet government's outstanding international debt.[154] Other financial concerns of recognition included repairing the Soviet government's damaged economy through extending credit. Americans also claimed that the Soviet government had confiscated an estimated 330 million dollars of property owned by the American government and American citizens.[155] The Soviet government denied many of these claims. Therefore, the State Department advised Roosevelt so that he would understand the questions about debts, credits, and claims that existed between the two countries.

Secretary of State Cordell Hull held a generally conservative view regarding foreign relations. Initially, Hull left the complicated issue of Soviet recognition to Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips.[156] On July 27, 1933, Phillips sent a memorandum to Roosevelt outlining the economic problems he believed were necessary to settle before recognition. Phillips advised Roosevelt that:

> So long as these obstacles remain, official relations established as a result of recognition tend to become, given the extraordinary nature of these obstacles, the source of friction and ill will rather than the mainspring of cooperation and goodwill.[157]

Phillips's memo continued to recommend that if the United States government needed to confront the complicated financial obligations of the Soviet government or recognition would not "render possible the maintenance of friendly operation between the governments of the United States and Russia and the development of trade and intercourse between the two countries."[158] Phillips emphasized that the other severe financial issues included the Soviet government's denial of debts to the American government. He explained that the Soviet government's reluctance to repay its international debt "have severely handicapped the development of commercial relations between Russia and foreign countries," practically destroying the Soviet government's credit.[159]

Phillips's memo to Roosevelt also included a section on the perceived aim of the Soviet government to spread a global communist revolution. Phillips explained that other governments accused the Soviets of subversive activities. Although the United States government considered the activities of the Comintern currently ineffective, Phillips reminded Roosevelt that:

> Even when these activities do not constitute a present menace to establishing order, the systematic interference of a foreign power in the domestic affairs of a country is a source of deep resentment and unfavorable friction. The persistence of such interference after diplomatic relations have been established leads inevitably either to the rupture of relations, as has taken place in the case of England, China, and Mexico, or severe tension and the reduction of existing diplomatic ties to a barren, meaningless relationship.[160]

Phillips's memo showed how complex the process of reestablishing formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was by including details about the diplomatic obstacles remaining regarding the

question of recognition. Furthermore, he emphasized addressing these economic and diplomatic issues before Roosevelt decided to increase the pressure due to the variety of problems that recognition would bring.

Diplomatic issues

Advocates of recognition emphasized the necessity of recognizing the Soviet government to protect America's interests and influence in Europe and Asia. In 1933, the governments of Japan and Germany grew increasingly hostile and threatened America's national security. In 1930, the Soviet Union and China came to a compromise regarding the territory of Manchuria controlling a vital part of the Trans-Siberian railroad to the Soviet city of Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean. The following year, Japan suddenly invaded Manchuria and met little resistance as the Japanese army captured a large area of the Asian mainland stretching to the borders of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in Europe, the Nazis took control of the Reichstag in Germany.[161] The practice of recognition in the United States since birth only required a foreign nation's government to prove its legitimacy. A foreign nation's politics, economics, and culture were not constitutional barriers to recognition.[162] The diplomatic history of recognition started immediately after the American Revolution, according to the precedent set when France agreed to recognize the United States of America after its successful revolution.[163] Thus, advocates for recognition pointed out the apparent contradiction or inconsistency in the US having recognized Italy, Germany, and Japan despite their political differences.[164]

Jerome Davis reiterated that the nonrecognition policy ran against the Jeffersonian principles of diplomatic recognition in a letter sent to Roosevelt on March 23, 1933.[165] Davis insisted that the Soviet government had been stable for the past fifteen years. Therefore, ignoring the United States government's policy to recognize de facto foreign governments would be difficult. The definition of recognition was based on the Jeffersonian principles of recognizing a *de facto* government. If the government was stable and represented the people, then it was a government that was sufficient for

the United States to remember it.[166] Davis argued that the United States had practically recognized the Soviet government when they signed the Kellogg-Briand agreement in 1928.[167] According to Davis, the United States had no legal or legitimate reasons not to recognize the stable Soviet government because of different political and economic governing philosophies.

Japan and now Germany posed a threat to America and its allies in Europe and Asia, along with America's possessions and ambitions in the Pacific. According to Davis's letter, allying with the Soviet Union against Japan was the most significant diplomatic advantage of recognition. He argued that "recognition of Russia by the US would be a warning to Japan."[168] Roosevelt's decision whether or not to recognize the Soviet Union in 1933 carried more significant implications than most Americans understood. When Bullitt met with his Soviet contacts in Europe, they expressed their grave concern that an attack by Japan was imminent. At a time when governments were forming alliances with war in Europe and Asia seemingly imminent, the recognition of the Soviet government was a crucial step to ensure the United States had a stake in European and Asian affairs.

On October 3, Roosevelt finally decided to recognize the Soviet government. Roosevelt duly informed Secretary of State Hull to start the procedure. Hull asked Bullitt and Assistant Secretary of State, R. Walton Moore, to tell Roosevelt the crucial terms and conditions he and his administration needed to negotiate with the Soviet government.[169] Bullitt advised that "whatever method may be used to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union, it seems essential that formal recognition should not be accorded except as a final act of an agreement covering several questions in dispute."[170] One of the disputed points Bullitt emphasized was to convince the Soviet government to agree that recognition would not be retroactive to when the Bolsheviks came to power. This would protect the American government, corporations, and citizens from suits for damages dating back to 1917.[171] Bullitt insisted that Roosevelt needed to know all of the diplomatic, legal, economic, and financial questions before negotiating the conditions of recognition.[172]

Assistant Secretary Moore's memo further explained the relevant domestic and international laws regarding recognition. He claimed that if the Soviet government agreed not to interfere politically with the United States, they should be recognized "without undue delay."[173] However, he warned Roosevelt that the two countries needed to negotiate the terms of recognition to ensure that the Soviet government adhered to what it agreed. Moore, similar to Bullitt, advised the President and the State Department to "take the time necessary to explore the entire situation."[174] The State Department wanted to ensure that Roosevelt brought up these conditions during future negotiations. Moore further warned Roosevelt in another memo on November 5, 1933, that "immediate and unconditional recognition would not be of any special moral or material advantage and, on the other hand, might be attended by rampant adverse criticism."[175] He advised that once the United States formally recognized another country, it could not be "retracted."[176] The State Department thoroughly warned Roosevelt that the terms and conditions of recognition were internationally binding and challenging to renegotiate after the two countries agreed to the terms and conditions.

Roosevelt claimed he intended to recognize the Soviet Union "since the beginning of my Administration."[177] However, the primary sources showed otherwise. Instead, Roosevelt slowly and meticulously gathered advice regarding the decision to recognize the Soviet Union. The primary sources showed that Roosevelt and his administration methodically examined the issue for almost a year. Recognition was not a simple decision or, perhaps, inevitable in the first year of Roosevelt's term in office, as most histories about recognition depict.[178] The primary sources also showed that the United States government continued to address the concern that recognition would lead to the further spread of domestic communism. Moreover, whether recognition of the Soviet Union brought the benefits the advocates for recognition claimed was not yet determined. Recognition was one of the most controversial and significant issues facing America and its President in 1933.

Chapter 3: Commitment Issues: US-Soviet Relations, 1934-1939

Roosevelt formally announced the United States government's decision to recognize the Soviet Union's government in a letter to Mikhail Kalinin, President of the Soviet Union Central Executive Committee, on October 10, 1933. From the beginning of his administration, Roosevelt wrote that he had "contemplated the desirability of an effort to end the present abnormal relations" between the two countries.[179] The Soviet government accepted the United States government's decision to reestablish formal diplomatic relations a week later. On October 20, Roosevelt read both letters and gave mimeographed copies to the press corps at the regular biweekly press conference in the Oval Office behind closed doors.[180] The next day, American newspapers across the country reprinted Mikhail Kalinin's letter to Roosevelt:

> I have always considered most abnormal and regrettable a situation wherein, during the past 16 years, two great republics - United States of America and the union of the Soviet Socialist republics - have lacked the usual methods of communication and have been deprived of the benefits which such communication could give. I am glad to note that you also reached the same conclusion. There is no doubt that difficulties, present or arising, between two countries, can be solved only when direct relations exist between them; and that, on the other hand, they have no chance for solution in the absence of such relations. I shall take the liberty further to express the opinion that the abnormal situation, to which you correctly refer in your message, has an unfavorable effect not only on the interests of the two states concerned but also on the general international situation, increasing the element of disquiet, complicating the process of consolidating world peace and encouraging forces tending to disturb that peace.[181]

Kalinin emphasized how new or old issues between the two countries could not be solved without restoring diplomatic relations. Similar to Roosevelt, Kalinin expressed regret for the sixteen years of nonrecognition. His letter stressed how the policy prevented both countries from protecting their mutual interests, including maintaining world peace. However, Roosevelt's letter added a caveat concerning the negotiations of the conditions of recognition shortly. He wrote, "participation in such a discussion would, of course, not commit either nation to any future course of action, but would indicate a sincere desire to reach a satisfactory solution of the problems involved."[182] The problems involved were more complex than the simple exchange of formalities, diplomats, and setting up

embassies and consulates. As examined, the State Department, advisors, and law firms informed Roosevelt of the primary problems the United States government needed to solve with the Soviet government. Roosevelt and his administration had discussed the issues of recognition throughout 1933 and had prepared for this moment since Roosevelt notified others in the administration of his decision in early October 1933. Roosevelt knew negotiations were necessary, and his caveat warned of the difficulties of finding agreeable solutions for both countries. However, recognition was announced without any terms and conditions formally discussed.

The Soviet government sent Maxim Litvinov, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, to America to negotiate the terms and conditions of recognition with Roosevelt. Readers of *Time* might have recognized Litvinov's face from the magazine's April 24, 1933 cover. The magazine's foreign news section contained a two-page article dealing with a trial in the Soviet Union against several British engineers from the British company Metro-Vickers, who were accused of sabotage. After the report on the treatment of the prisoners, the trial, and eventual fines levied, the article focused on Maxim Litvinov. The author described him as a "roly-poly" and "pudgy" who was allegedly Stalin's accomplice in a bank robbery in Tiflis, Georgia, in 1905. The article explained that Litvinov later defended the bank robbery as "a political act" more than a crime. After more gossip about Litvinov on the run through France, "fleeing to England," and taking an English bride, the author focused on Litvinov's career since the Bolshevik Revolution. The Soviets "crowned" him as the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and he has been a delegate at every European conference since the early 1920s. According to the author, his experiences outside the Soviet Union made Litvinov "another paradox in Stalin's regime."[183] His experience living in England, the English language, and marrying an English woman made Litvinov a unique choice to represent the Soviet Union and mingle with Europe's bourgeois society of diplomats.

A *Universal Newspaper Newsreel* showed Litvinov arriving in Jersey City on November 7, 1933, shaking hands with reporters and others while debarking the ship. Litvinov addressed the cameras, stating the "great pleasure and honor of meeting with your greatest and illustrious President," continuing to praise Roosevelt's "wisdom and broad views of taking the initiative in addressing President Kalinin."[184] The newsreel's narrator explained to its audience that after America snubbed Litvinov after World War I, this time Litvinov was greeted "with great ceremony."[185] There was heightened security around Litvinov's visit. Over 100 Jersey City police officers and the Secret Service would escort Litvinov on a train to Washington after the ship passed quarantine the next day. The train's departure time was confidential.[186] The footage continued, with the narrator showing Hull and the other "dignitaries" meeting a smiling Litvinov in Washington surrounded "by a veritable army of reporters and cameramen."[187] Roosevelt sent his car for Litivinov "escorted by a fleet of motorcycle cops."[188] America buzzed with excitement about Litvinov's "momentous visit."[189] New York City, New Jersey City, and Washington heightened the police presence for Litivnov's visit. On November 8, 1933, NY police arrested a man from Brooklyn who claimed he wanted to kill Litvinov.[190]

The newsreel's narrator predicted that formal recognition of the Soviet Union was expected in only "a few days."[191] The *New York Times* reported that Litvinov was more confident that negotiations should only take "a half hour."[192] The American news cycle followed Litvinov's schedule, and the progress of the talks was closely related to Soviet recognition. Recognition was front page news for the *New York Times*, the *Washington Times*, and the *Washington Evening Standard* for the next two weeks. On the morning of November 8, Litvinov arrived in Washington and was met by a delegation from the State Department, including Hull, Hughes, Moore, and Bullitt.[193] Litvinov then met privately with Boris Skrivsky and the other principal Soviet officials of Amtorg, perhaps to explain the Soviet government's intention that Amtorg would continue to

control all American exports to the Soviet Union. Litvinov first met with Roosevelt at lunch in the White House. The next stop was at the State Department meeting with Secretary Hull, Hughes, Bullitt, and Kelley to discuss the particulars of recognition. That night, Litvinov met privately with Roosevelt in the White House over a small dinner. Public reports of Litvinov's meetings with Roosevelt and his administration with Litvinov stressed their friendliness, reporting progress with the negotiations.[194]

The Honeymoon: The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements

Secretary of State Hull, Under Secretary of State William Phillips, Assistant Secretaries of State Charles Evans Hughes, R. Walton Moore, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., the newly tapped Secretary of the Treasury replacing William Woodin, Robert F. Kelley, the Chief of Eastern European Affairs, and William Bullitt acted as the delegation negotiating for the United States government's terms and conditions of recognition. Litvinov alone negotiated on behalf of the Soviet Union's government. The State Department had complied a list of problems related to recognition by the summer of 1933, but the negotiations over the next two days focused on concerns regarding Soviet debts, claims of confiscated American property in the Soviet Union, protecting American citizen's legal and religious rights in the Soviet Union, and the noninterference in American internal affairs.[195]

On November 10, the *New York Times* reported that the negotiations at the State Department focused on Soviet debts and American banks and private citizens' claims to property in the Soviet Union confiscated by its government since 1917. The article reported that the Soviet Union owed the United States upwards of $800 million.[196] A State Department memorandum sent to Roosevelt before the negotiations with Litvinov explained the department's concerns that some American banks had outstanding loans and credits in Soviet banks.[197] The State Department needed to negotiate carefully, as it worried the Soviets might bring up counterclaims regarding debts the United States incurred during President Wilson's failed expedition in Siberia in 1919-1920. Also, Russian

companies operating in the United States since before the Soviet government took power could claim they were owed money. Furthermore, the memo warned Roosevelt of cases the Soviet government might bring against American citizens doing business or owning property in the Soviet Union that it considered illegally gained.[198]

Roosevelt also received advice from other advisors in the State Department on the United States government's policy with the Soviet Union concerning the conditions of recognition. Green Hackworth, a legal advisor at the State Department, and FDR's personal law firm, Polk, Davis, and Wardwell, had proposed four conditions to emphasize to Litvinov. The legal advisors wanted the Soviet government to agree, firstly, not to interfere in America or its territories' internal affairs. The other three points included the Soviet government agreeing to refrain from spreading communism in America. The Soviet Union must agree not to spread propaganda through its officials or spies. Also, it must refrain from supporting and forming organizations with the intent "to bring about any change in the political and social structure or conditions in the US, its territories, and possessions."[199] The fourth point, perhaps the most contentious, advised Roosevelt to demand that the Soviet government not support any organization or group within its own country, territories, and possessions.[200] The document proved the State Department's concerns that if Litvinov did not agree to these four conditions, then the Soviet government, the Comintern, or any other country in the Soviet Union's influence would feel free to disrupt American society. After the meeting at the State Department on November 11, Litvinov agreed that it would also be the "fixed policy" of the Soviet Union to protect American citizens' civil, legal, and religious rights living in the Soviet Union.[201]

On Saturday, November 12, Roosevelt invited Litvinov to dine at the White House. Most of Roosevelt's cabinet and the delegation from the State Department were present, except for Secretary of State Hull, who had left for the Montevideo Conference in Uruguay that morning.[202] Reporters wondered whether Hull's absence indicated that the negotiations had ended and the dinner was to

celebrate the Soviet government's initial agreement to the United States government's terms and conditions.[203] Litvinov and the State Department had no further formal meetings over the next few days. However, on November 12, Roosevelt invited Litvinov and most of the delegation from the State Department to a late-night dinner to try and finalize the terms and conditions of recognition.[204] When negotiations resumed on the morning of November 15, the issue of the amount of debt the Soviet Union owed the United States was still outstanding. Litvinov had already made his government's position clear in the negotiations that the debt issue was a nonstarter. However, the State Department's delegation hounded Litvinov to agree on the debt the Soviets owed for over two hours. Bullitt sent a message to Roosevelt before the President met with Litvinov later that afternoon. He how Litvinov argued over the 150 million dollar figure the State Department claimed the Soviet government owed the United States. Litvinov offered 50 million, which the State Department found "unacceptable." Litvinov argued that the Soviet government believed that the Johnson Act would be passed in January, which forbade the United States from making loans to countries indebted to the United States. Litvinov hinted that the Soviet government did not want to negotiate debts without discussing a loan. Bullitt advised Roosevelt to negotiate for at least 100 million. In the postscript, Bullitt claimed, "I think we were a little too gentle on him this morning," hinting that the State Department did not press the issue to further anger Litvinov before meeting with Roosevelt one final time.[205]

On November 16, Roosevelt and Litvinov met in the White House to finalize the initial conditions of recognition in ceremonial style. Roosevelt and Litvinov exchanged reciprocal letters that set out the conditions and terms of recognition agreed to by both governments during the last week of negotiations. The Roosevelt-Litivinov Agreements formally began:

> I trust that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly and that our Nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world. I am, my dear Mr. Litvinov, Very sincerely yours, Franklin D. Roosevelt.

> I, too, share the hope that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our Nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world. I am, my dear Mr. President, Very sincerely yours, Maxim Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics[206]

The letters that followed the opening exchange included point-by-point lists of the United States government's specific terms for the Soviet government to agree to as conditions of recognition. Litvinov's letter stated "that coincident with the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two Governments it will be the fixed policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" agreed to the first of four conditions discussed in the negotiations between the President and the State Department. Litvinov wrote that it would be the policy of the Soviet Union, firstly, to not interfere with the internal affairs of the United States and its territories, and secondly, to stop anyone in the Soviet government and any Soviet propaganda "under its direct or indirect control" that would encourage revolution within the United States. The third and fourth points agreed not to allow any political or military group to organize in the Soviet Union with the expressed goal to overthrow the government of the United States of America in any "overt or covert" way with either "armed intervention," which point three stressed, or groups planning to interfere in America's "political and social order." Roosevelt replied, "I am glad to have received the assurance expressed in your note." He included Litvinov's first four points in his letter, assuring the United States government that it would be the Soviet Union's "fixed policy" regarding these issues.[207]

The following exchange of letters concerned the religious and legal rights of American citizens living, working, or visiting the Soviet Union. The Soviet government assured the United States government that it would be the Soviet Union's "fixed policy" to protect the religious rights of American citizens over five points. Firstly, the Soviet Union would allow American citizens in the Soviet Union to practice any religion they want. Secondly, Americans could worship and conduct religious ceremonies without fearing persecution or prosecution. The third point allowed

religious groups to use or construct buildings or buy property as a place of worship. Fourthly, religious groups could collect donations and money as long as it was used for "the upkeep of the place of worship." The last point regarding the religious rights of American citizens in the Soviet Union dealt with the Soviet government's assurance to allow the teaching of religion in schools and places of worship and to allow "the freedom of conscience and the free exercise of religion which shall not be less favorable than those enjoyed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by nationals of the Nation most favored in this respect." In reply, Litvinov's letter stated this will be considered "a fixed policy accords the nationals of the United States within the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the following rights referred to by you." Litvinov ended this letter stating his "desire" that these religious rights will be extended to American citizens in the Soviet Union "immediately" upon recognition.[208]

Litvinov followed up the letter on religious rights with a written assurance that the Soviet government would also protect the legal rights of American citizens living, working, or visiting the Soviet Union "immediately" upon recognition and no less than those legal rights Soviet citizens have or foreign citizens of a "favored" nation. Litvinov included a copy of a Soviet law explaining the protection of legal, business, and property rights afforded to German citizens living, working, or visiting the Soviet Union. Roosevelt's letter, in reply, thanked the Soviet government's assurance that it would protect the legal, business, and property rights of American citizens in the Soviet Union. Roosevelt expected from the Soviet government "that the nearest American diplomatic or consular officer shall be notified immediately of any arrest or detention of an American national, and that he shall promptly be allowed to communicate and converse with such national." Roosevelt insisted that American diplomats in the Soviet Union "will be zealous" in protecting American citizen's right to a speedy and fair trial.[209]

The next day's headlines in the *New York Times*, *Washington Times*, and *Washington Evening Star* highlighted the details of the historic meeting and decision to change 16 years of the policy of nonrecognition. On November 17, 1933, in a closed-door meeting with the press, Roosevelt read out the exchange of letters that he and Litvinov had agreed to and concurrently signed to the entire press corps in the Capitol. The Evening Star reporter wrote that Roosevelt invited every newspaper, so they all had a "fair shot?" to break the historic news.[210] Roosevelt could also ensure that the reporting of the agreements would be more accurate if the press received written copies of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements. That evening, Roosevelt left to spend a week with his mother in Warm Springs, Georgia, over through Thanksgiving.[211]

Litvinov traveled back to New York to attend a dinner given in his honor on November 24 by long-time advocates of Russian Recognition, Hugh Cooper and Raymond Robbins, at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.[212] In Litvinov's address at the testimonial dinner, he expressed his conviction "that the friendship and cooperation of our two countries may in the future only strengthen and develop in new ways, to the great benefit of our peoples and the consolidation of world peace."[213] In a farewell letter to Litvinov, Roosevelt also expressed his hopes that "the cooperation of our governments in the great work of preserving peace should be the cornerstone of an enduring relationship."[214] The Soviet government seemed content with recognition, and Roosevelt and the State Department seemed content regarding the written assurances Litvinov gave as its sole representative. Except for once angering Litvinov about the debt the Soviet government owed, everything else during the Soviet Commissars diplomatic visit was on friendly terms.

In the opening exchange of letters that began this chapter, Roosevelt used the word "trusted," and Litvinov replied that he "hoped" that foreign relations between the United States and the Soviet Union "may *forever* remain normal and friendly."[215] However, diplomatic relations would be tested over the next five years. Regardless of the assurances made in the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements,

the Soviet government repeatedly violated specific points of the agreement, according to the United States government, during the next six years. According to the language of the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, whereas Roosevelt trusted and expected the Soviet government to accept the demands of the United States regarding recognition, Litvinov only hoped and desired that the Soviet government would respect it. The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements did not include assurances regarding debts, credits, claims, loans, or trade deals. These issues were left for future Soviet and American diplomatic delegations to negotiate.

The Break-Up: Ambassador Bullitt, 1934-1936

Roosevelt tapped Bullitt for the ambassadorship, considering his experience in European affairs, diplomatic contacts, and enduring positive temperament toward the Soviet government and the Soviet experiment.[216] Bullitt advocated for Russian recognition after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1919 and advised Roosevelt to do the same throughout 1933. Bullitt relished the opportunity to be the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union since approaching Roosevelt after his election, volunteering to travel to Europe and the Soviet Union unofficially for the president-elect. Bullitt thanked Roosevelt for the posting and left the United States with Litvinov, arriving in the Soviet Union on December 11, 1933.[217] A Soviet delegation from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, including Alexander Troyanovsky, future Soviet ambassador to the United States, greeted Bullitt at the train station in Moscow. He attended several formal engagements, meetings, and dinners over the next few weeks. On December 13, 1933, Bullitt formally presented his credentials as the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Ambassador Bullitt remarked that his mission was "to create not merely normal but genuinely friendly relations" and pledged "to forge strong and enduring ties."[218] Kalinin replied how happy the Soviet government was to have Bullitt as the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union. Kalinin remarked on Bullitt's long-standing advocacy for recognition and considered Roosevelt's appointment "an act of friendship."[219] Kalinin gave Bullitt

his government's assurance that "you will always meet with the fullest and most active cooperation."[220] In the first few weeks, Bullitt and his small staff received anything they needed in Moscow. Bullitt dined with Litvinov, General Kliment Voroshilov, and met Premier Vyacheslav Molotov before finally meeting Stalin at a dinner at the Kremlin on December 20, 1933.[221]

Bullitt sent telegrams to the State Department, including his candid conversations with Soviet leadership. According to Bullitt, Stalin had never personally received any ambassador, and after dinner, he told Bullitt, "At any moment, day or night, if you wish to see me, you only have to ask, and I will see you at once."[222] The Soviets cooperated with Bullitt and showed him every courtesy. He returned to the United States full of enthusiasm to assemble his staff before leaving for Moscow on February 15, 1934.[223] However, not only did Bullitt never meet with Stalin again personally during his ambassadorship, but also the amicable attitude the Soviet government and its officials had towards the United States government in November and December 1933 showed signs of change just after the New Year.

The United States government did not roll out the red carpet like Bullitt's Soviet counterpart, Ambassador Alexander Troyanovsky. Robert Kelley and another low-level State Department official met Ambassador Troyanovsky at Union Station in Washington on January 7, 1934.[224.] The new Soviet Ambassador to the United States met Roosevelt the next day, presenting his credentials and officially sealing recognition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The meeting was friendly but formal. A State Department report about a meeting with Troyanovsky and Roosevelt in the White House on February 16 discussed the Soviet government's view about the amount of debt it owed to the United States. The Soviet ambassador told Roosevelt that the Soviet government was prepared to pay 75 million. However, the amount could be increased through further negotiations in Moscow. Roosevelt was unhappy about the "circuitous method of communication" the Soviet government offered.[225] It was a bad omen. The issue of debt was the first obstacle of many facing

Roosevelt's administration and the American embassy in Moscow when negotiating the conditions that Litvinov, officially representing the Soviet government, agreed to in November 1933. Troyanovsky took up residence in the original, grand Tsarist Russian Embassy building in Washington and invited over five hundred guests to a party on April 12, 1934. Hull, Morgenthau, and most of the State Department attended the large reception at the embassy, whose guests were all served "buffets filled with champagne, vodka, and caviar."[226] Troyanovsky and his staff outdid the reception Roosevelt and his administration gave him when he arrived. The same happened to Bullitt when he returned to Moscow to officially take his post as United States Ambassador in March 1934. However, the reception he received compared to Troyanovsky was significantly less friendly than his first visit. The friendliness and openness Bullitt experienced a few months earlier was replaced with indifference, aloofness, and delay.

Bullit found out about Troyanovsky's low-ball offer of 75 million when stopping at the American embassy in Warsaw on March 2, 1934, on his way back to Moscow. In a telegram, Hull explained that Troyanovsky seemingly did not have the authority to negotiate the conditions of debt on behalf of the Soviet government. Therefore, he tasked Bullitt to continue negotiations with Litvinov in Moscow, reminding Bullitt that 75 million was half of what Roosevelt would settle on due to the recent devaluation of the dollar.[227] The State Department had a draft of a letter approved by Roosevelt and Litvinov agreeing that the Soviet Union would pay $150 million over 20 years with 10 percent interest per year commencing on July 1, 1934.[228] The official exchange of letters in the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements on November 16, 1933, however, did not mention the amount of debt owed. The State Department gave Troyanovsky a copy of the draft of the letter that it believed Litvinov agreed to while in Washington before November 16. Troyanovsky forwarded the copy to Litvinov.[229]

While Ambassador Troyanovsky had no authority to negotiate on behalf of the Soviet government, Bullitt and his ambassadorial staff did. The Soviets were usually polite to Bullitt, Charles A. Wiley, the Chargé of Affairs, and other American foreign service members, including a young George F. Kennan. However, American diplomats often found the Soviets immovable when negotiating debts, credits, and claims. Litvinov denied the State Department's instance that he and Roosevelt came to a "verbal understanding" regarding agreeing to pay the amount of debt. Instead, Bullitt reported that the Soviets had several "misunderstandings," insisting that these "must cease at once and the Soviet government must show that it is indeed ready to cooperate with us."[230] Therefore, Bullitt secured several meetings with Litvinov in early April to understand the Soviet's position on the problems with debts and claims.

At a meeting on April 2, Litivinov informed Bullitt that the Soviet government wanted the United States to extend the Soviet Union a long-term credit, which would double the amount of debt owed, payable over 20 years. If the United States government agreed, then the Soviet government would continue to negotiate the amount of debt owed. Litvinov laid out the scenarios to Bullitt in detail, generally explaining that if the United States agreed that the Soviets owed 75 or 100 million dollars, the long-term credit must be 150 or 200 million.[231] In reply, Hull wrote that the Soviet government's proposal was "so unreasonable not to say fantastic as to make it unnecessary to comment on" because, at the end of the 20-year loan, the Soviet Union would end up owing the United States twice as much, including the interest.[232] Hull continued to express the United States government's dismay that Livinov "now seems to have a version of the debt understanding entered into on his visit here completely different from anything the American officials thought they were discussing and certainly different from anything they had in mind."[233] Hull angrily suggested to hold off on all negotiations on debts, claims, and credits "given Mr. Litvinov's new and unexpected contentions."[234] Similarly, Bullitt reported that the State Department's response to his government's

proposal angered Litvinov.[235] Litvinov was adamant that the State Department's drafted letter "was in absolute contravention of his understanding with the President."[236] He said the Soviet government had never presumed to pay its debts nor "would ever do so."[237] Furthermore, he claimed his government's proposal would not change. The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs had strongly clarified his position. Therefore, Bullitt suggested that the American embassy and the State Department avoid discussing debt negotiations for the time being. Bullitt claimed he and his staff would try "to cultivate tranquil personal relations."[238] However, he also recommended that the State Department abandon the plan to open American consulates in Vladivostok and Odessa in the summer to signal the United States government's disappointment in the state of current relations less than six months since recogntion.[239]

After Bullitt's unsatisfactory meetings with Litvinov regarding the debt issue, he wrote to Roosevelt on April 13, 1934, declaring, "Moscow has turned out to be just as disagreeable as I anticipated. The honeymoon atmosphere had evaporated completely before I arrived."[240] Therefore, Bullitt decided to battle aggressive diplomacy with equally aggressive diplomacy, employing a formula called "the donkey, the carrot, and the club", which he attributed to the French diplomat Paul Claudel. Bullitt explained to Roosevelt the reasoning behind employing this style of diplomatic approach:

> The only effective way to deal with this general attitude, I believe, is to maintain the friendliest possible personal relations with the Russians but to let them know clearly that if they are unwilling to move forward and take the carrot, they will receive the club on the behind.[241]

Bullitt wanted to maintain friendly relations, but "the donkey, the carrot, and the club" style of diplomacy often failed when negotiating debts and claims with the Soviets.

On September 8, 1934, Bullitt replied that he was disappointed to hear about the State Department's failed attempts to negotiate the issue of debts in claims with Ambassador

Troyanovsky in Washington. Bullitt wrote that "the Russians have had so much success lately they are feeling cocky."[242] Reporting on another meeting with Litvinov, Bullitt told Roosevelt the Soviet government was neither worried about Germany, believing they would break the Locarno treaties, making Czechoslovakia and Poland Soviet allies, nor about an imminent Japanese attack. Litvinov told Bullitt the Japanese "would not dare attack."[243] A complete reversal from the fear of an imminent attack by Japan that the Soviet government and Litvinov often publicly and privately stated. Bullitt admitted that Livinov and the Soviet officials were much less friendly now in their meetings. Therefore, he suggested that the United States could "develop a real understanding with Japan" to use as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviets about debts and claims.[244] Bullitt's suggestion that the United States and Japan repair their foreign relations despite the Soviets showed how desperate he was because the debt negotiations had achieved nothing but confusion and anger among the diplomats in both countries. Determined to succeed, Bullitt did not concede to Soviet demands. However, neither did the Soviets. Bullitt's style of aggressive diplomacy failed. By early 1935, the Soviet government practically shut down any debt negotiations without a guarantee from the United States government to extend a loan to the Soviet Union.

In January 1935, Cordell Hull invited Ambassador Troyanovsky to meet to emphasize the United States government's frustration regarding the delay in the negotiations regarding the issues of debts and claims. The State Department wanted to explain to the American press why debt negotiations with the Soviets had not progressed for over a year.[245] The day before his meeting with Hull to explain the Soviet government's point of view, a nervous Ambassador Troyanovsky met with Bullitt, who was also in Washington over the winter.[246] Troyanovsky revealed that the French government had offered to loan the Soviets 500 million dollars to settle all debts and a credit of 1 billion dollars for purchases in France, which the Soviet government refused. Therefore, Stalin had harsh words for Troyanovsky when he returned to Moscow late last year without securing a deal

with the United States government. The Soviets only asked the United States for 100 million dollars in credits and a 100 million dollar loan to the Soviet Union, much less than France was willing to offer.[247] Troyanovsky declared that "Stalin earnestly desired close friendship with the United States," to which Bullitt replied:

> It was too bad that responsible members of the Soviet government did not seem to share Stalin's views and added that I had warned Litvinoff as earnestly and as vigorously as I could that his present policy might quickly bring an end to all possibility of intimate and fruitful cooperation between our countries.[248]

The Soviet Ambassador to the United States agreed with his counterpart that "the possibility of establishing close friendship" between the two countries might end.[249] Certainly, negotiations did not go well during the first year of the recognition.

Hull, Moore, Bullitt, and Kelley met with Ambassador Troyanovsky at the State Department on January 31, 1935.[250] The Soviet ambassador explained that if the Soviet government accepted the amount of debt the United States wanted the Soviets to pay, then it would have to settle its debts with every other country. He claimed that while the Soviet Union desired friendly relations with the United States, it was not prepared to accept the amount of debt the Americans demanded without credits and a loan. Troyansky insisted that, in any case, other countries were willing to offer the Soviet Union better credit and loan terms than the United States.[251] However, the offer from the French government to the Soviet government never happened. A telegram from the American Ambassador to France, Jesse I. Straus, confirmed that the French government never offered these terms after talking with the French Minister of Commerce.[252] Disappointed that Litvinov did not make the Soviet government's condition about a loan straightforward in November 1933, the State Department's memorandum of the meeting concluded that if the two governments could not sort out "a minor problem, there was little expectation of their being able to cooperate in larger matters."[253] Not only did the Soviet government consider negotiations regarding debts, claims, and credits at an end, but also Roosevelt's administration.

In a release to the American press, Cordell Hull detailed the United States government's proposals regarding debts, claims, and credits with the Soviet Union over the last year. He explained that the United States government did not want to extend credits and loans to the Soviet Union "to facilitate trade" without the Soviet government agreeing to the amount of debt owed and to protect American claimants of confiscated property in the Soviet Union. The report claimed that the United States had made concessions, but "no understanding had been reached."[254] Therefore, Hull concluded that "given the present attitude of the Soviet government, I feel that we cannot encourage the hope that any agreement is now possible… there seems to be scarcely any reason to doubt that the negotiations that seem so promising at the start must now be regarded as having come to an end."[255] The United States government's position regarding the issues of debts and claims seemed as inflexible as the Soviet government's.

After hearing the United States government's reasons why negotiations had failed, Litvinov gave an interview presenting the Soviet government's side to the *Moscow Daily News*.[256] Similar to Hull's press release, Litvinov blamed the Americans for not abiding by the agreements made in November 1933. He explained how the Soviet government had continually made its position clear. The Soviet government would never discuss old debts if the United States did not advance the Soviet Union a loan. Litvinov regretted the two countries not agreeing on these monetary issues. However, he stressed that the negotiation failures should "not interfere with international cooperation in the development of trade relations or the preservation of peace."[257] Litvinov blamed the negotiations on the State Department in Washington, consistently placing the issue of "an unrestricted loan" to the Soviet Union in doubt.[258] Therefore, Litvinov explained, Bullitt's negotiations in Moscow with the Soviet government went nowhere. Soviet newspapers also printed that the US State Department had denied reports that Bullitt intended to resign over the failure in negotiations.[259]

Litvinov hoped that trade deals between the Soviet Union and the United States would continue and that the two countries' mutual goal to preserve peace would continue. However, the two countries' mutual goal to maintain "friendly and normal" relations was seriously tested over the issue of debts and claims. Although Litvinov and the Soviet government made their position clear repeatedly, the United States government considered its position unfriendly, and its refusal to negotiate in the first place was an abnormal diplomatic protocol. The State Department reacted much more severely regarding the breakdown in debt negotiations than the Soviet government. In March 1935, the United States began withdrawing staff from the American embassy and ceased its plans to open further consulates in the Soviet Union.[260]

Litvinov made it clear to Bullitt in a meeting in May 1935 that Stalin refused to enter into debt negotiations with either England, France, or the United States.[261] He told Bullitt that Senator Burton K.Wheeler, Democrat from Montana and ex-Rebulican Senator of Iowa and long-time advocate for Soviet Recognition in the 1920s, Smith W. Brookhart, had sent a written offer to Ambassador Troyanovsky to extend a 20-year loan to the Soviet Union as long it made a one-time purchase of one million dollars worth of goods from the United States at the start of the loan. Bullitt replied that he had never heard of such a deal and told Litvinov that senators or ex-senators had no authority to offer a loan. Bullitt explained Litvinov's final position regarding the debt issue in his report to Hull about the meeting:

> While he was not opposed to reopening the question of debts and claims, he could see no point in reopening it unless there was some possibility of agreement. He added that as the differences between our governments were one of principle that the Soviet Union insisted on the loan and we refused to give a loan - he felt that at the moment, the difficulties were insurmountable.[262]

Despite Bullitt's continued attempts to reopen negotiations on debts and claims, the Soviet government's position remained the same. Soviet stubbornness was met equally by American stubbornness. Although the State Department continued to consider the negotiations a pending issue,

the United States government never offered the Soviet Union a loan; therefore, the problem remained unresolved.

Not only did the failed debt negotiations negatively affect US-Soviet relations, but the United States also insisted that the Soviet Union often showed indifference regarding the assurance it gave in the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements that it would not interfere in American politics and society. Bullitt wrote to Roosevelt on July 15, 1935, concerning the Comintern's technical violation of distributing propaganda through the Soviet consulates in New York and San Francisco.[263] Bullitt believed that some in Washington might consider breaking diplomatic relations ultimately if the Soviet Union continued to spread propaganda through its consulates flagrantly. Bullitt advised that the United States should withdraw the consul-general to the Soviet Union only "if they grossly and insultingly reject the propaganda pledge."[264] Four days later, Bullitt flatly concluded in a letter sent to Hull that the Soviet Union's aim "is, and will remain, to produce world revolution."[265] Bullitt and the State Department knew that formal diplomatic relations superceeded these violations, hoping that if alerted of the United States government's disapproval, the Soviet government would promise to stop its transgressions of the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements. Regardless of the withdrawal of the consul-general and the threat to sever relations, according to the Americans, the Soviets continued violating the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement.

The meeting of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International took place over a month from July 25 to August 20, 1935. Members of the CPUSA were invited. Assistant Secretary of State Moore confided in Bullitt that the State Department would be "interested" in discovering the new representative of the CPUSA in Moscow since the death of its most recent leader.[266] The meeting of the Comintern, according to Bullitt, was in strict violation of the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements. By inviting the CPUSA, Bullitt informed the State Department and the Soviet government of why he felt it had violated America's conditions that the Soviet government refrain

from interfering with American "political and social life."[267] On August 25, 1935, a press release by the State Department claimed that the meeting of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International had violated the noninterference clause of the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements.[268]

Two days later, Nickolay Krestinsky, Litvinov's deputy in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, in a meeting with Bullitt. He asked Bullitt to stay so they could read a translation of the note together regarding the Soviet government's reaction to the State Department's press release. Bullitt refused, took the note to have it translated at the Embassy, and left. He remarked how much this disappointed Krestinsky.[269] Bullitt's relationship with the Soviets was at a breaking point. Bullitt included the text of Krestinski's note that denied the meeting of the Comintern violated the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements. Bullitt recommended that Roosevelt "state that both the Soviet Government and the Communist International are merely different aspects of Stalin's mind and will."[270] Regardless of the Soviet government's continual denial that it violated any of the conditions it agreed to in the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, Bullitt remained unconvinced and took the violations of the gentleman's agreement personally. Bullitt's once lofty opinion of the Bolshevik government and its potential in 1917 quickly changed from the praise he gave the Soviet government in December 1933 to extreme condemnation by the end of 1935.

On April 20, 1936, Bullitt gave his final formal assessment of the Soviet Union as Ambassador in a final letter to Hull before terminating his ambassadorship in June. As positive as Bullitt's first assessment of the path of US-Soviet relations in December 1933, this assessment was the opposite and devoid of any notion of future friendly relations. Once a pro-Soviet, Bullitt ominously warned, "Communists are agents of a foreign power whose aim is not only to destroy the institutions and liberties of our country but also to kill millions of Americans."[271] Although Bullitt's opinion about the Soviets had dramatically changed from the praise he gave the government up until 1933, the Soviet government continued to treat Bullitt and his staff in a polite and friendly. The

friendliness might be superficial, and according to Bullitt, it was always when the Soviet government wanted something from the United States for its benefit. American relations with the Soviet Union changed again under the next American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph E. Davies.

The Make-Up: Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, 1937-1938

Joseph E. Davies, a successful lawyer, was perhaps better known as the husband of Marjorie Merriweather Post, the daughter of the owner of General Foods and one of the wealthiest women in America.[272] Davies was considered an odd pick for ambassador as he had no prior diplomatic experience and did not speak Russian. However, Davies used his lack of expertise to emphasize his differences with his predecessor, Bullitt. Davies approached the Soviet Union like a lawyer and believed the Soviet Union deserved a fair trial.[273] Ambassador Troyanovski warned Davies, before leaving for Moscow, to expect "some coolness on the part of Soviet officials arising out of the differences and misunderstandings" between Litvinov and Bullitt.[274] Therefore, from the beginning, Davies tried to distance himself from Bullitt. In his diary, Davies wrote that the Soviet government "preferred a capitalist rather than an overzealousness of people who were too friendly in their approach and who frequently after that cooled off equally suddenly and were equally violent in unfair condemnation."[275] Although Davies did not mention Bullitt by name, his comments allude to his predecessor's aggressive style of diplomacy. Davies told Ambassador Troyanovsky that his primary goal was to improve relations between the two countries.[276]

On tour around the country for a week, the Soviet Union reminded Davies of the late 19th century in America when the country was on the verge of emerging as a powerful, industrialized nation.[277] According to Davies's point of view, the Soviet Union was going through some growing pains. He commented on specific aspects of the Soviet government and society to which most other foreign observers and diplomats reacted differently. For example, after attending the final session of

the Constitutional Convention a few weeks after he arrived in the Soviet Union, the democratic processes impressed Davies the most.[278] Davies and his wife took in the best of Soviet high culture and society, buying Russian art to take back to America. The Davies were guests at the annual revolutionary parade of the Red Army and the ballet at the Bolshoi Theatre. Davies's friendly embrace of Russian culture due to the ambassador's insistence to maintain friendly relations with the Soviets at all costs endeared them to Litvinov, his assistant, Nikolai Krestinsky, and others in the Soviet government. The Davies were often invited to Litvinov's private dacha for lunch and other parties with foreign dignitaries.[279] However, Davies's pro-Soviet views often clashed with most of his staff.

John Wiley had left with Bullitt, now American ambassador to France, leaving Loy Henderson as Chargé of Affairs with George Kennan as one of his assistants in Moscow in 1937. Henderson and Kennan had years of experience dealing with the Soviets and were growing warier of the Soviet government's totalitarianism and Stalin's authoritarianism.[280] Davies relied more on reports on the radio and the foreign press on the Soviet Union than from the experts among his staff, who he considered somewhat biased against the Soviet Union.[281] Some journalists influencing Davies were also known pro-Stalinists, like Walter Duranty, Harold Denny of the *New York Times,* and Joseph Barnes and Joseph Phillips of the *New York Herald-Tribune*.[282] Davies also relied on reports from Major Philip Faymonville, the experienced military attaché to the Soviet Union since 1934. The Soviet military was most friendly towards the American diplomats since the beginning of recognition. Faymonville, on friendly terms with General Voroshilov, often reported favorably about the Soviet military's decisions and actions. Faymonville was fluent in Russian and sometimes served as the translator for Davies, whose language knowledge was limited.[283] Davies's primary goal was to maintain friendly and normal relations; therefore, he relied mainly on reports that he considered unbiased against the Soviet government.[284]

The most controversial moments during Davies's tenure as ambassador to the Soviet Union were his reactions and comments on the trials he witnessed during Stalin's Great Purge of 1937-1938. A professional lawyer, Davies saved copies of the trial transcripts he sent to his colleagues back in America. He believed they might contain something of value for future cases, although the legal rights of a citizen were utterly different in each country.[285] The continual arrests occurring while Davies was ambassador shocked him. However, his reports to the State Department of the trials contained attempts to rationalize the reasons behind what many considered "show" trials.[286] For example, only weeks after arriving in Moscow in January, Davies attended the trial of Karl Radek, a celebrated writer and once the Secretary of the Comintern, three other former Soviet officials, and thirteen more lesser-known defendants accused of treason and espionage.[287] While the trial shocked Davies, he concluded that the prosecution's case was well presented and the accused were guilty as charged. Radek and the former Soviet Ambassador to England, Grigori Sokolnikov, were sentenced to prison for 8 to 10 years. The other fifteen defendants were sentenced to death by firing squad.[288] Davies sent copies of the prosecution's case to his lawyer colleagues and Roosevelt for future reference.[289] Kennan, who translated for Davies at the trial, had an opposing legal view and reaction to his boss. In his despatch to the State Department, Kennan argued that "a cursory study of the published record of the proceedings is sufficient to show that the evidence given before the public was not only incomplete and conflicting but was also strangely ambiguous."[290] After a detailed analysis of the court proceedings, the defendants' immediate confessions, and the practiced cross-examination by the prosecutors of the few witnesses and the accused, Kennan concluded:

> Even if all of the facts of the case were available, which they certainly are not and never will be, it is doubtful whether the Western mind could ever fathom the question of guilt and innocence, of truth and fiction. The Russian mind, as Dostoevski has shown, knows no moderation and sometimes carries both truth and falsehood to such infinite extremes that they eventually meet in space, like parallel lines, and it is no longer possible to distinguish between them.[291]

In the summer of 1937, the military trials of Marshall Tukhachevsky, one of the Soviet Union's most experienced and successful officers in the Red Army, and eight other senior military officers surprised most foreign diplomats in Moscow.[292] Foreign diplomats criticized the move, seeing the arrests weakening the Soviet army at a crucial time. Davies, Faymonville, and others in the embassy knew Tukhachevsky personally.[293] The trial found the army officers guilty, and all nine were sentenced to death, shot a day after the verdict.[294] Davies thought the Soviet trial, procedure, and evidence presented were sufficient to prove that the military officers had planned a coup d'etat to depose Stalin or curb his growing authoritarian control over the government. Davies attested that the Red Army's morale was still high.[295] Contrary to the ambassador's opinion, Henderson, the Chargé of Affairs, in a telegram to Hull on June 23, 1937, explained that most of the diplomatic missions and foreign observers believed the actions of the military officers showed disapproval of Stalin's recent dictatorial actions. However, "not to go so far… as to result in the conspiracy."[296] Henderson claimed in the telegram that "not one diplomatic mission here, nor a single foreign observer in Moscow whose opinion bears weight, believe that the executed Red Army officers were guilty of the crimes attributed to them."[297] Davies's assessment of the purge trials was contrary to most other foreign diplomats' views and his staff's.

When Davies asked Litvinov whether he felt the purges had weakened the Soviet Union, he argued the opposite. Instead of weakening the Soviet government, Litvinov believed that the purges showed its strength. Litvinov claimed that no other government could survive the removals of many high-level military and civil officials and "still preserve its stability, direction, and force to the degree where business went on, as usual, every day."[298] When Cordell Hull asked Troyanovsky why everyone accused during the purge trials confessed to all of their crimes, the Soviet Ambassador countered that J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI told him he also noticed similar confessions from those accused of treason or espionage in the United States.[299] Soviet officials did not want outside

observers to think the Soviet government was unstable. However, in 1937 and 1938, Soviets who worked or had contact with foreigners started to confer with their superiors before speaking with foreign diplomats or the foreign press corps. Henderson reported to the State Department the fearful conditions faced by Soviet citizens who had had contact with foreign diplomats.[300] Henderson referred explicitly to the arrest of Boris Steiger, one of the most valuable contacts to the American embassy, but stressed in his report that:

> Practically all Soviet citizens who have had occasion during recent years to have relations with members of foreign diplomatic missions or foreigners who keep in touch with their diplomatic missions appear to be in constant fear of being arrested on charges of espionage or terrorism. This alarm extends even to those Soviet citizens who, as agents for the people's commissariat for internal affairs, have been specially authorized to maintain contacts with foreigners.[301]

Henderson continued to report that the fear extended to foreign diplomats and citizens also, as the Soviet government's NKVD increased its surveillance operations.[302] The American embassy was no exception. The staff discovered microphones on embassy telephones and in the ceiling in Davies's bedroom. The discovery did not upset Davies, however. He claimed the Soviets would only realize how friendly the United States government felt about the Soviet Union.[303] Regardless of Davies's optimism, the NKVD arrested three Soviet citizens working at the American embassy in August 1937. This affected morale, disrupting the American embassy and its functioning efficiency. Henderson explained to the State Department embassy staff, "hesitate to continue or to develop such contacts as they already have since they do not wish to be instrumental in causing misfortune to innocent persons."[304] The Soviet officials told the American embassy that the arrests were in connection with those accused in the purge trials. Henderson disagreed, writing that the arrests were "the result more of Stalin's tirade against the capitalist encirclement and espionage and the subsequent series of articles in the Soviet press advising Soviet citizens to beware of foreigners" than a connection with the purge trials.[305]

The purge trials continued in March 1938 with twenty-one current and former politicians, officials, and other civilians accused of treason and espionage in connection with the other alleged Trotskyites executed in previous trials. For foreign diplomats, including Davies and the staff at the American embassy, the trials had a personal feeling. The diplomats had met and had dealings with some of the accused, like Christian Rakovsky, former ambassador to Great Britain and France, Arkady Rosengoltz, the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, and Nikolai Krestinsky, Litvinov's assistant in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to Germany. Krestinsky was the first to receive Davies warmly as ambassador, and he remarked on Krestinksy's friendly disposition. Like previous trials during Stalin's purges, most foreign observers saw the trial as another show trial. It was clear the accused confessed to the charges under coercion and tremendous pressure.[306] Davies thought the charges were sufficient for the alleged crimes.[307]

George Kennan, one of Davies's harshest critics while working for the ambassador, compared his reactions to the purge trials "as extensions of Stalin's sadistic, narcissistic, and neurotic personality and as debilitating attacks on the Soviet state."[308] American newspapers also expressed shock concerning the trials of the Great Purge. According to the United States government's interpretation of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements, the Soviet government continued to violate specific points. During Bullitt's ambassadorship, the violation involved the Soviet Union technically breaking its promise not to interfere with American politics and society due to spreading propaganda from consulates in America and the proclamations made during the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. The Comintern's involvement and support of the opposition against the fascist forces of Franco during the Spanish Civil War did not directly interfere with American politics and society.[309] By 1937 and 1938, the Comintern's power and its direction had shifted since several former leaders of the Comintern, like Karl Radek and Nikolai Bukharin, had been executed.[310] The

violation of the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements during Davies's ambassadorship instead involved several forced deportations and arrests of American citizens in the Soviet Union.

During his ambassadorship, Davies also attempted to raise questions about Soviet debts with Litvinov and others in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs several times. The Soviet government's demand for a loan and the United States government's refusal still defined the deadlock in the negotiations. Litvinov told Davies consistently that if the Soviet Union began discussing debt with the United States, it would have to open up unsettled debt negotiations again with England and France.[311] The United States government seemed more concerned about debts than the Soviet government. This issue was not one of the Soviet Union's primary concerns, considering that war was on the horizon in Europe. The Soviet government never entertained negotiations on the debt until America guaranteed a large loan or extended credit with a low interest rate. The United States government refused this demand based on what Litvinov and Roosevelt supposedly agreed to in November 1933. Both governments acted like a true frenemies, never budging on the debt issue, and examining the history of debt negotiations during the period of recognition before the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact showed that the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements and the informal agreements between the President and the Soviet diplomat were never considered binding contracts to the Soviet government, which the United States government expected. The debt issue continued unresolved.

In June 1938, Davies resigned as United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Kalinin and Molotov invited Davies to the Kremlin to give him a formal goodbye on June 4. Stalin suddenly appeared at the meeting and spoke with Davies for over two hours through a translator about various general and political topics. He wrote about his impression of Stalin at this meeting, commenting on his smiling grandfatherly nature, but warning, "It is difficult to associate his personality and this impression of kindness and gentle simplicity with what has occurred here in connection with the purges and shootings of the Red Army generals and so forth."[312] Joseph E. Davis came to the Soviet

Union with a positive frame of mind, and his experiences in the country only improved that impression despite the purges and fear associated with the Soviet Union under Stalin from 1937 to 1938.

Davies gave his final report of his ambassadorship to the Soviet Union to the State Department on June 6, 1938. Overall, Davies considered his mission a success due to the mutual diplomatic friendliness between the two countries, in line with the Roosevelt administration's "Good Neighbor Policy," based upon a tolerant attitude recognizing the right of the Soviet government to govern the Soviet Union "in any manner" despite disapproving of "the ideological concepts of this government."[313] Davies concluded:

> There is no doubt of the sincerity and the friendliness of the USSR toward the government of the United States, in marked contrast and to a greater degree than to any other nation. It has been my experience here, that where matters or projected as between the two countries in the spirit of tolerance, understanding, and friendliness, there has been a prompt and generous response on the part of this government to try to accommodate itself to a reasonable agreement. Upon leaving this post I can say that, in my opinion, while at all times we have proclaimed our loyalty to our political ideals and to our system of government, while we have at times insistently maintained and asserted with vigor the dignity and rights of the government of the United States, the conduct of the mission here has nevertheless reflected the historical traditions of friendship which have existed between the American and the Russian people.[314]

Although Davies's assessment of his ambassadorship left the relations between the two countries on the friendliest terms, other more critical diplomatic issues remained unresolved. Therefore, Davies also listed the pending issues for his successor in his report. These included the ever-present debt negotiations that both Davies and Bullitt could not resolve.[315] Despite the overall friendliness that existed between Davies and Soviet officials like Kalinin and Litvinov, the Soviet government continued to frustrate negotiations on debts, credits, and claims and, according to the United States government, continued to technically or openly violate the assurances the Soviet government gave in the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements regarding protecting American national's legal rights and interfering in American politics and society.

The Roosevelt administration's debt negotiations and pleas to stop violating certain aspects of the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements during 1934-1938 did not meet its expectations after reestablishing formal diplomatic relations. In 1938, the debt negotiations were still unresolved, and the Soviet government continued to show indifference when the United States government claimed it had violated the agreements made in November 1933. The Roosevelt administration could not consider recognizing the foreign relations coup it expected and anticipated. The documents from Roosevelt's administration showed continual frustration during what they trusted would be a new era of friendly relations between the two countries. The Soviets also frustrated the Roosevelt administration's efforts to make recognition the success they wanted for many reasons, not alone, to use as a talking point in future elections. However, the evidence examined showed that it would be hard to prove that recognition was a success in 1936. Despite a few accusations that Roosevelt's policies reeked of socialism and that the administration's relationship with the Soviet Union was pro-communist, Roosevelt won in a landslide in the Presidential election of 1936. During 1937-1938, Davies tried to mend the fracturing relationship using a different approach to Bullitt. However, Davies's relationship was more friendly with the Soviets. Facing belligerent countries threatening its borders, the Soviet Union desired more friendly and normal diplomatic relations.[316] Ambassador Davies's approach was more effective than Bullitt's diplomatic style of "the donkey, the carrot, and the club."

Chapter 4: On the Rebound: The Economic and Diplomatic Relationship of Recognition, 1935-1941

The United States and the Soviet Union had high hopes for recognition diplomatically and economically in 1933. However, the implementation of reestablishing formal diplomatic relations presented more obstacles than both countries initially thought. Only months after the two countries agreed to the terms and conditions of recognition, US-Soviet relations were fraught with difficulties, confusion, misunderstandings, and mistrust.[317] The issues both countries hoped recognition would solve, in some aspects, failed to emerge. Sources showed that the United States government's claim that the Soviet government did not respect, and in some cases violated, specific points it had assured the United States in the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements damaged the friendly relations between both countries throughout 1934 until 1939. Analyzing the United States government's sources regarding the negotiations concerning the issues of debts, credits, and claims showed that they were a complete failure. The Soviets never agreed to the amount of debt it owed the United States, and the United States never extended the long-term credits or unrestricted loans the Soviet Union wanted. Throughout 1934, the United States government claimed Litivinov had agreed to a draft of a letter that stated the Soviet government agreed to pay the $150 million the United States government estimated it owed the United States when Litivinov was in Washington in November 1933. On the other hand, Litvinov continued to claim that he never agreed to the draft of the letter and insisted that Roosevelt and the State Department discuss extending credit to the Soviet Union. The State Department claimed it never agreed to a loan in November 1933. The sources examined in the previous chapter proved that the stubbornness of diplomats on both sides to trust each other contributed to the failure of debt negotiations.

Advocates of recognition, including some politicians, diplomats, academics, newspapers, business journals, business groups, and individual business people, also thought Soviet recognition would help the bleak economic situation in 1933. *Business Week* estimated the Soviet market was

worth one billion dollars.[318] Whether the value was overestimated did not change the fact that from 1934-1939, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union achieved the value of trade that both countries had hoped for. However, US exports to the Soviet Union increased yearly, except in 1935. Success was on a case-by-case level. Private versus government ownership made trade between the two countries more complicated. The value of the US dollar and Russian ruble fluctuated, making transactions more difficult due to unstable exchange rates. The distance between the two countries was an apparent barrier.

Moreover, Amtorg, the Soviet operation located in New York City, controlled all US exports to the Soviet Union and held a unique position of power regarding US-Soviet trade. However, like debts, credits, and claims, Roosevelt and Litvinov did not discuss the details of any trade agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union in November 1933. Although both governments were anxious and anticipated a trade boom, the details of the trade agreements had yet to be negotiated. The failed negotiations regarding debts, credits, and claims took up the first year of Bullitt's ambassadorship. The potential of the Soviet market was undeniably huge. A few large American companies, like Singer, International Harvester, General Electric, and Ford, had established themselves in the Soviet Union during the policy of nonrecognition. Individual entrepreneurs like Armand Hammer also worked with the Soviet Union in the 1920s.[319] In 1933, businesses excited about increased trade due to recognition were primarily those who had previously done business with the Soviet Union. After recognition, the possibility of trade with the Soviet Union affected many other companies, industries, and private entrepreneurs.[320]

A day after formally announcing the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, the *New York Times* reported that Senator Smith W. Brookhart estimated the Soviets were ready to buy over half a billion dollars worth of American goods. Brookhart further estimated that recognition would produce around 300,000 new jobs. In addition, the newspaper article projected that recognition would

facilitate around 50 million dollars worth of US cotton exports to the Soviet Union.[321] The Soviet government embraced the necessary concepts of capitalism and the free market to conduct business with capitalist countries and enterprises. Stalin's Five Year Plans focused on mass industrialization and collectivization across the Soviet Union, making the Soviet market attractive to new and emerging United States manufacturers and industries.[322] The New York Times reported that the automobile businesses in Detroit were "likely to reap a financial harvest" due to recognition.[323] The United States government also supported facilitating trade with the Soviet Union, supporting concessions during the 1920s and passing acts like the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934 to reduce American tariffs and stimulate more international trade.[324]

However, recognition did not facilitate trade with the Soviet Union after 1933. Similar barriers and obstacles remained, which deterred American businesses unwilling or unable to take a risk in a foreign market. Everyone in the government and the business sector did not share Senator Brookhart's optimism. The day after reporting the positive effects that recognition would have on the front page of trade, Edwin L. James wrote an editorial with a much more pessimistic attitude about recognition's economic impact.[325] James noted that Litvinov was staying in Washington another week, despite the absence of Roosevelt and Hull, to negotiate with Bullitt and others in the State Department regarding obtaining credits from the United States. James reported the debt the Soviets owed the United States. He argued that there was no reason to think recognition would increase trade with the Soviet Union, inferring that Litvinov understood this, too. Although US-Soviet trade only amounted to 12 million dollars in 1932, James pointed out that in 1930, the United States did more business with the Soviet Union than Britain and France combined despite having no ambassador or formal diplomatic relations. He judged that recognition would not lead America to buy millions more in Russian caviar, vodka, and manganese than it already imports.[326] James predicted it correctly. Soviet imports after recognition only doubled from 1933 through 1939.[327]

American business trade with the Soviet Union

Not all American businesses felt the same about the United States government's decision to recognize the Soviet government. Some businesses and organizations debated conducting business with the Soviets to protect American industries from outside competition and on moral grounds.[328] These businesses and business organizations held the stereotypical preconceptions of the Soviet government and its political, economic, and social policies as antithetical to the United States. Businesses represented by conservative groups often holding anti-Soviet views included the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Foreign Trade Council, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the American Bankers Association (ABA), and the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB).[329] Members of the latter group included prominent owners of powerful businesses, like Heinz, Monsanto, Sun Oil, National Steel, General Motors, and DuPont.[330] The representatives in these groups promoted free trade, but not at the expense of American business interests. They published journals and pamphlets against the current government's policy supporting increasing foreign trade and lowering tariffs. Instead, they endorsed United States foreign policies that sought to protect American trade overseas through tariffs and other government protection.[331] Not all the businesses represented by these groups were unanimously against trade with the Soviet Union or against the government's policies. Many supported the New Deal policies to help the United States economy but were usually more skeptical about saving the economy through international trade.[332] For example, New York bankers in the ABA facilitating business transactions with foreign nations were less vocal about trading with the Soviets than the more minor rural bankers that comprised most of the ABA membership.[333]

American businesses conducting business in the Soviet Union were more concerned about US-Soviet foreign relations than others that refused to conduct business with the Soviet Union due

to ideological concerns. Often, the businesses and specialized business groups representing them were involved in implementing Roosevelt's New Deal and advocating for more cooperation between businesses, labor, and the government.[334] The Twentieth Century Fund (TCF), a business group representing agriculture and manufacturing businesses, published research studies supporting the New Deal and United States foreign trade policies. Edward A. Filene and Henry Denison established the TCF in 1919. Filene was especially outspoken about the significance of recognition to US-Soviet business relations.[335] The chairpersons and owners of businesses in the TCF like General Electric, Leeds and Northrup, Macy's, and Studebaker held more liberal views about government regulations on businesses, extending lower tariffs to foreign nations trading with the United States, and more open to expanding trade relations with the Soviets.[336] More popular among these business groups was the ideology of economic determinism, creating a more stable business market and peaceful world by raising living standards.[337]

On the other hand, the conservative business groups of the 1930s wanted to preserve capitalistic ideals and curb government spending, which they argued weakened the free market, inviting socialist ideology to take hold.[338] In 1933, American businesses that advocated for recognition and conservative companies and groups that opposed it made it known in their conferences and publications, in American newspapers, and to the government. As analyzed, how much American businesses, specialized business groups, or individual businessmen influenced Roosevelt's decision to recognize the Soviet Union was difficult to answer. Roosevelt received advice from many, arguing that the ultimate reason was not entirely necessary. When analyzing the economic history of US-Soviet relations in 1933, the historian Joan Hoff Wilson argued that American businesses did not take "any of the steps that social scientists now know are necessary to affect as great a change of policy as the one toward the USSR that occurred under FDR."[339] On the other hand, economic historian Jonathan Boe emphasized that influential businesses and

businessmen contacted Roosevelt early in 1933 and throughout the summer advocating for recognition.[340] Members of the American Foundation's report for the American-Russian Foreign Relations tried to meet with Roosevelt in July 1933. Still, Roosevelt refused, worried it signaled he had already decided on Soviet recognition.[341] Boe effectively defended his counterargument; however, he admitted that American businesses generally did not concern themselves with US foreign policy. American companies that chose to enter the Soviet market entered at their own risk regardless of the status of the formal diplomatic relationship between the two countries.[342]

From 1924 until 1941, Amtorg controlled all exports to the Soviet Union from its office in New York City or by contacting Boris Skvirsky, a representative in Washington.[343] Amtorg is a Russian-owned cooperative trading society doing business in the United States. However, as in the 1920s, during the policy of nonrecognition, Amtorg continued to act as a representative in the United States until 1941.344. The trading organization made business with the Soviet Union unique in terms of other foreign trading partners of the United States. Amtorg recruited the American businesses and engineers that helped Stalin's economic Five-Year plans and the government's goals to thoroughly and quickly industrialize the country through the mid-1920s to mid-1930s. Amtorg's business contacts grew from the massive construction and engineering contracts before recognition to include more diverse American businesses after recognition. Influential New York lawyers helped the Soviet cooperative conduct business in America legally.[345] Amtorg received extensive credit from the Soviet government for securing contracts and trade deals. Therefore, New York bankers extended large credit lines and gave loans to the Soviet government.[346]

The United States government did not approve of Amtorg. However, due to its influential partners, it did not go after Amtorg's business legality. Furthermore, the Soviet government insisted that all business with the Soviet Union from America go through Amtorg. Regardless of whether the American business had negotiated the deal with the Soviet Union, a representative from the

American business had to contact Amtorg in New York City. The centralization of trade suited the Soviet government and extended its influence in the United States regardless of the current or future diplomatic situation.[347] Although Amtorg facilitated much business and trade between the United States and the Soviet Union, contacting the Soviet cooperative in New York City or Washington excluded many smaller businesses from trading with the Soviet Union. It created delays in business due to its own complex and distant bureaucracy.[348] However, the expected boom in trade did not materialize after recognition for either country. Total US exports to the Soviet Union reached a high point of over $14 million in 1930. US exports did not get more than $70 million for the rest of the decade in 1939.[349] Since 1931, US exports to the Soviet Union had dropped below $9 million by 1933. After recognition, this number jumped to just over $15 million in 1934. As the United States government and the Soviet Union government had yet to sign a trade agreement in 1934, trade continued to increase but only in small increments. There was no boom in trade.

Trade agreement negotiations, 1935-1939

The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements did not include any formal agreement regarding trade between the United States and the Soviet Union. Once diplomatic relations were reestablished, trade between the two countries was expected to be facilitated. The United States State Department and the embassy in Moscow mainly focused on the debt negotiations with the Soviet government in 1934. Recognition did not change trade relations immediately. Private exports from the United States continued, and individual businesses continued or attempted to establish trade relations in the Soviet Union as they had before. As examined, debt negotiations had all but ended in early 1935. In March, Hull instructed Bullitt and his staff to focus more on talks with the Soviet government to establish a trade agreement. Hull sent a telegram to John Wiley, Bullitt's assistant in Moscow, on March 27, 1935, explaining the State Department's desire to secure a trade agreement with the Soviet Union as soon as possible. Hull hoped that: "if the Soviet government's attitude towards the

purchase of American Products is such that increased American exports to the Soviet Union will result, the government of the United States extend to the Soviet Union concessions granted to other countries."[350] After meeting with Litvinov on April 2, Wiley reported that the Soviet government was also anxious to secure a trade agreement with the United States. He told Hull that trade agreement negotiations would proceed with Litvinov, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Arkady Rosengolts, and officials within the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. When Wiley pressed Litvinov regarding the amount of trade the Soviet government desired, Litvinov "attempted to assume that vague assurances would suffice. I insisted that you would expect a definite commitment."[351] Wiley's report showed that trade agreement negotiations might not be as prompt as the State Department expected. Yet again, the United States government miscalculated the ease and speed of the talks with the Soviet government.

The State Department wanted the Soviet government to commit in writing to import at least $30 million worth of American goods.[352] While the extension of trade concessions on most favored nation status pleased the Soviet government, Litvinov explained to Wiley that "it would be impossible to stipulate rigidly the volume of future Soviet purchases in the United States but declared that they would be substantially increased."[353] Throughout the spring and early summer of 1935, the State Department ordered Bullitt to continue attempting to get Litvinov and Rosengolts to agree on a specific dollar amount of US imports instead of just substantially increasing them after receiving several drafts from the Soviet government, which the State Department found unsatisfactory.[354] When Bullitt met with Litvinov to discuss the issues the United States government had with the drafts of the trade agreement, he replied, "I thought the matter was already settled. I assured Mr. Wiley that we would increase our purchases in the United States to double the amount of our purchases last year." Bullitt replied that the United States government appreciates written assurance more than a verbal one. Litvinov declared that while it might be possible for the Soviet

Union to buy $30 million worth of American goods over the next twelve months, the Soviet Union would find it difficult to agree in writing to do so."[355] Over the next five months in 1935, the Soviets committed only to substantially increase US imports, while the State Department insisted on a specific amount of $30 million. The Soviets only imported over $15 million of American goods in 1934. Therefore, the State Department asked the Soviets to double the imports in return for the most favored nation status and reduced tariffs on Soviet imports.[356]

Negotiations hit an impasse in May 1935 over two outstanding issues. The first was the State Department's insistence that the Soviet Union agree to a specific amount of US imports annually. Hull and the State Department had not learned from the recent failure of the debt negotiations that the Soviet government did not like to commit to anything in writing. After a frustrating meeting with Litvinov, Bullitt reported to Hull what the Commissar of Foreign Affairs replied to the State Department's continual demands on May 16, 1935:

> He stated positively that the Soviet government would not under any circumstances agree to purchase a definite quantity of American goods and added that as Soviet purchasing plans are now made on a one-year basis, the Soviet government would undertake no obligations for a more extended period than a year. I told Litvinov that I regretted this decision greatly as I thought it meant the proposal's death and that the Soviet Union would not get the most favored nation treatment. He made no reply.[357]

The second problem in trade agreement negotiations between the two governments was deciding which trade agreement to base on the US-Soviet agreement and the Soviet government's insistence not to pay a tax on Soviet coal imports to the United States.

The United States had informed the Soviet government that under the Revenue Act of 1932, to protect the American coal industry, if any foreign nation imports more coal than its exports to the United States, its coal imports were subject to an additional tax.[358] Therefore, to avoid paying tax on its imports of coal to the United States, Litvinov told Bullitt they wanted to base their trade agreement on the trade agreement the United States currently had with Czechoslovakia. Hull told Bullitt this was unacceptable as the United States did not import coal from Czechoslovakia.[359] The

Soviets argued that the United States did not seem to apply the coal tax on imports from Britain, France, and Belgium. The State Department did not respond to the accusations. However, Bullitt explained to Litvinov that the State Department did not have the power to circumvent the United States Congress. Hull told Bullitt to tell the Soviet government that it was considering recommending that Roosevelt pass an executive order so that Soviet coal would be tax-exempt. However, this did not happen before the trade agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States was finally agreed to in mid-July 1935.

When the United States and Soviet governments announced the signing of the trade agreement in their respective press releases, they did not match and highlighted different aspects of the deal. The State Department's press release on July 15, 1935, referred to the Soviet government's intention to purchase goods from the United States "to the value of 30 million dollars."[360] The press release explained the United States government's desire to increase imports from the Soviet Union to "provide the Soviet government with greater purchasing power for American products."[361] Hull concluded the press release claiming that he was delighted with the considerable increase in American-Soviet trade" due to the signing of the trade agreement.[362] Contrastingly, the Soviet government's press release did not include anything about the 30 million dollars worth of American goods.[363] In his report to the State Department about what the Soviet press had printed about the trade agreement, Bullitt explained that the Soviet government wanted to give their readers the impression that although the trade agreement would be mutually advantageous for both countries, the Soviets benefitted most. The Soviet press reported that American industries were upset with the lack of trade since recognition pressured the United States government to extend extensive credits to the Soviet Union. The Soviet press claimed that if the United States continued to refuse to extend the Soviet Union credits to help its purchasing power and specific barriers like tariffs on Soviet coal remained, trade between the two countries would be more difficult for the Soviet government to increase.[364]

The same two issues dominated trade agreement negotiations every year until 1939. Firstly, Hull demanded that the Soviet government agree to a specific dollar amount of exports. Then, the Soviets consistently insisted they would not and could not agree to a particular dollar amount of yearly exports. Instead, the Soviet government decided at least to increase exports to the Soviet Union but was always vague about the amount of increase. The United States government wanted to know specific amounts of exports to publicly announce them instead of the vague intentions the Soviets continually gave. The issue of the coal tax continued to delay the signing of the trade agreement when both countries attempted to renegotiate the terms before the previous trade agreement, which would automatically go into effect in August every year, according to the original contract signed in 1935.[365]

In 1936, the trade agreement's terms remained the same due to the Soviet's continual denial of agreeing to a specific dollar amount of exports each year and the Americans' inability to eliminate the coal tax on Soviet imports. The State Department explained that the only way to avoid paying the tax was for the Soviet government to limit coal imports, which it did not want to do. The State Department tried to explain to the Soviet government that legislation in the United States was slow. The Soviets did not understand why Roosevelt's administration did not sign an executive order to eliminate the tariff on Soviet coal. In 1937, Roosevelt signed the executive order to eliminate the tariff on Soviet coal, but the American courts soon overturned it. Ambassador Davies and his staff had difficulty explaining to the Soviet government the processes and nuances of the United States government. The Soviet officials were confused. In 1938, it was a similar story. The Soviets again refused to commit to the new $40 million amount of US exports the State Department demanded, and the issue of the coal tax remained.[366]

The passing of several Neutrality Acts in the United States Congress from 1935 to 1937 excluded the sale of military arms to foreign nations. Due to the arms race occurring in Europe, the

Soviets desired military aid more than other imports. The State Department did not include military arms in the trade agreement, regardless of any pressure from the Soviet government. However, both countries devised ways to circumvent the Neutrality Acts by offering American companies the business opportunity to build a battleship for the Soviet Navy in 1938. The caveat was that in the case of a military emergency, the Soviet government would allow the United States to use the battleship. Negotiations between the two countries proceeded as usual but were full of delays, confusion, and misunderstandings. Over six months of planning and time was wasted, as the deal to build the Soviet Navy a battleship was interrupted once the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed on August 24, 1939.[367]

The evidence proves that trade between the United States and the Soviet Union increased yearly during recognition, but not at the rate either country hoped or expected. Trade with the Soviet Union did not directly affect the United States economy enough to argue that recognition helped the United States out of the Great Depression. Whether one country benefitted over the other is difficult to measure by only examining United States government sources. Both countries benefitted from increased trade during the period of recognition. However, US exports to the Soviet Union always surpassed the amount of Soviet imports to the United States by double or triple. Economic historians pointed out that the Soviets did not have what the US consumers wanted.[368] Conversely, the Soviet Union played trading partners off each other to get the best deal for its imports. At the same time, the United States had long-established trade treaties and restrictive legislation on foreign trade that was not as fluid.[369] The Soviets did not stick to the State Department's script regarding trade agreement negotiations. It frustrated them by delaying the negotiations and threatening the trade agreement each year that was renegotiated without solving the same issues since it was first signed in July 1935.

Friendship Renewed: US-Soviet relations, 1939-1941

In 1939, many of the faces of those dealing with US-Soviet relations changed. Litvinov's policy of collective security, which attempted to align the West with the Soviet Union, did not come to fruition. At the Munich Conference, Great Britain and France appeased Germany in Europe, allowing Hitler to take the Sudetenland. Czechoslovakia was no longer a prospective Soviet ally, and with the debacle in the Spanish Civil War, collective security did not materialize, according to the leaders of the Soviet government.[370] Molotov replaced Litvinov as Commissar of Foreign Affairs in a dual capacity as Premier and replaced his entire staff. The new contact at the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy hardly spoke English.[371] Ambassador Troyanovsky had also moved on from Washington, replaced by Ambassador Konstantin Umansky. The State Department found Umansky much less approachable than his predecessor. In addition, the new staff at the American Embassy in Moscow after Ambassador Davies's tenure found negotiations on any matter much more difficult in 1939. Molotov was rarely available, and everything needed his approval. Although the capable diplomatic staff of Angus Kirk and Alex Grummon in Moscow made sure the US-Soviet trade agreement of July 1935 continued without change in 1939, any other negotiations regarding old debts and claims or the Embassy's protestations regarding the continued violations of the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements by the Soviet government of American citizens' legal rights in the Soviet Union went unresolved.[372]

The Soviet government continued to fail to immediately inform the American Embassy that it had arrested an American citizen, in some cases weeks afterward. The Soviet government also kept the charges and the location of the accused secret. When the new American Ambassador Lawrence Steinhardt finally arrived in Moscow in early August 1939, one of the first tasks he dealt with was meeting with Litivinov regarding the arrest of three American women that the Soviet government failed to notify the American Embassy. Also, they keep their location secret and do not allow them access to counsel or their families. When Steinhardt complained about the issue, an

official at the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs vaguely replied that it was the first time hearing about the matter and "would look into it."[373] Steinhardt, like many American diplomats before him, found negotiations with the Soviets always polite but not helpful during the recognition period.

The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Agreesion Pact on August 24, 1939, three weeks after Steinhardt took up his office as United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, should not have come as a surprise. The few rare times Steinhardt met with Molotov in mid-August, Molotov hinted that the Soviet Union would remain defensive if war broke out in Europe. Molotov told Steinhardt that the Soviet Union "would not go into any agreement aiming at an attack on anybody."[374] Steinhardt sent his assessment of the situation in a telegram to Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles:

> That while the Soviet authorities are genuinely desirous that peace should be preserved, they are particularly anxious to avoid being drawn into any European conflict - at least at the beginning, if for no other reason than because of their internal difficulties and the threat to their political, as well as, economic program, which would result from the outbreak of a general European war at the present time, the guiding principle of their European policy is to assure the non-violation of their frontiers, and they are Deliberately carrying on negotiations with the French and British on the one hand and the Germans, on the other, in the hope of thereby avoiding the outbreak of war before the beginning of October.[375]

War broke out in Europe a week after Molotov signed the non-aggression pact with von Ribbentrop. The Soviet Union effectively stayed neutral. However, while the Nazi blitzkrieg conquered Poland, Soviet tanks rolled into the Baltic States, and then the Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30, 1939. A Gallup poll in the *New York Times* found that the American public was against the Soviet invasion of Finland by a margin of 88 to 1.[376] It was a low point for US-Soviet relations. However, the State Department and Steinhardt did not overreact as they did in the spring of 1935 when the United States withdrew consulate staff from Moscow and discarded plans to build further consulate offices due to the failure in debt negotiations.[377]

In 1941, Germany broke the non-aggression pact by attacking the Soviet Union on June 22. This time a Gallup poll in the *New York Times* found overwhelming support for the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany, 72% to 8%.[378] After the German invasion, the United States and Soviet governments felt fortunate that Roosevelt had decided to change the sixteen-year-long foreign policy of nonrecognition. Reestablishing formal diplomatic relations in November 1933 arguably rescued the Soviet Union from defeat in World War II. Loy Henderson, the former staffer under Bullitt and Davies, wrote to Ambassador Steinhardt on August 18, 1941, predicting correctly that "Hitler made what may be a fatal mistake in attacking the Soviet Union" because Henderson believed the military cost, loss in workforce, and supplies would weaken Germany for the rest of the war.[379] As diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union continued during the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact from 1939 through 1941, Ambassador Steinhardt and his staff remained in the Soviet Union. The American Embassy and other foreign embassies, including most of the Soviet government, evacuated Moscow to another city four hundred miles from the front.[380] Having American diplomats in the Soviet Union allowed the United States to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union now that it was the target of a German attack.

The German invasion of the Soviet Union gave Roosevelt and his administration the permission to extend the Lend-Lease program to the Soviet Union. In early July 1941, Roosevelt's aide, Harry Hopkins, and businessman W. Averell Harriman flew over the Arctic Circle to the Soviet Union with plans to negotiate the terms of Lend-Lease. Their plane was attacked by artillery fire but landed safely in Moscow. Hopkins and Harriman met with Stalin, Kalinin, and Molotov to discuss possibly forming a formidable alliance against Hitler.[381] By August 1941, the first shipment of military supplies through Lend-Lease was on its way to the Soviet Union. In October 1941, the United States Congress officially extended the Lend-Lease Agreement to the Soviet Union, and the US-Soviet alliance was sealed. Although supplies arrived slowly in the Soviet Union due to many

factors, including the distance, shipments already marked for Great Britain, and the slow change of American industries switched from consumer products to military equipment, the Soviets received crucial military aid when two of its major cities, Leningrad and Stalingrad were under siege.[382] The alliance and Lend-Lease brought new life into US-Soviet foreign relations and started trade between the two countries. By 1944, almost a quarter of US exports had been sent to the Soviet Union. From 1942 to 1945, the United States exported an average of $2.5 trillion of American goods to the Soviet Union. Soviet imports to the United States also increased, benefitting both countries.[383] In addition, the alliance between the two countries was a sign of renewed friendship.

Conclusion

Histories focusing on the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements emphasize its failings regarding the subsequent negotiations of the terms and conditions of recognition. Historical interpretations written during the Cold War, like Donald G. Bishop's analysis of the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, admitted its failings in debt negotiations but praised the American ambassador's efforts to conclude a trade deal with the Soviet Union.[384] Some argued that the blame lay with the American diplomats, like David Mayers. Other historians, like Dennis J. Dunn, blamed President Roosevelt's appeasing style of foreign relations with the Soviet Union.[385] David Bishop and Norman Saul, on the other hand, praised Litvinov and the Soviet government's diplomatic tactics and ability to delay, stall, and frustrate negotiations while denying or claiming to be unaware of any problems.[386] Peter G. Boyle is less enthusiastic, arguing that American diplomatic efforts produced profound disillusionment in the United States and increasing distrust of the Soviet Union.[387] Perhaps historians gave the diplomats and the Roosevelt administration's style of foreign policy too much agency. Although Roosevelt's and Litvinov's hope that their respective government's diplomatic relations would "forever remain normal and friendly" did not materialize. Their mutual wish "that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and the preservation of the peace of the world" was also put to the test after the Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact on August 24, 1939, one week before Germany invaded Poland instigating World War II in the European Theater.[388]

American scholarship on US-Soviet relations during 1933-1941 is divided over the diplomatic impact of establishing formal relations with the Soviet Union. The more recent historical analyses most often emphasize the problematic relationship between America and the Soviet Union, which was made worse by actions by Ambassador Bullitt and, by extension, the State Department and President Roosevelt.[389] The argument that these fraught relations made it easier or even led the

Soviet Union to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany is putting too much agency in the diplomats' influence and US foreign policy, in my opinion. The Soviet Union signed the non-aggression pact with Germany for many reasons and vice-versa. The world knew that the United States government's isolationist policy dominated American foreign policy during the 1930s, so how much effect American foreign policy had on world events in 1939 is questionable. However, it cannot be denied that reestablishing formal diplomatic relations was better than being left out in the cold during the era of non-recognition, considering the situation in June 1941 when Germany broke the non-aggression pact and attacked the Soviet Union.

Examining President Roosevelt's and the State Department's documents, one can conclusively determine that US-Soviet relations after recognition in 1933 were no more friendly than during the sixteen years of nonrecognition since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. However, despite the on-and-off relationship, reestablishing relations with the Soviet Union was a significant decision and became crucial when the chips were down. Despite a few outbursts during Bullitt's ambassadorship, Roosevelt's administration did not overreact when the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was signed. Instead, formal diplomatic relations continued, allowing negotiations to extend Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union almost immediately after the Germans invaded. The timing was crucial and, arguably, won the war against Hitler in Europe. Scholars calling the alliance a fortunate coincidence or necessity is a fair assessment. However, the label does not do justice to the successful outcome of the alliance due to Roosevelt and his administration's decision to recognize the Soviet government in November 1933.[390] Although the United States and the Soviet Union did not preserve world peace like both countries' governments wanted after recognition, their alliance saved Europe from Nazi domination.

Endnotes

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2. Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World*, (New York: Random House, 2007), 6-7; Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Internationalism*, (Oxford University Press, 2007), 41-43.

3. Lansing to the Diplomatic Representative in European Countries, Japan, China, and Siam, December 15, 1917, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Office of the Historian, The United States Department of State, digital database, 1918, Russia: Volume I, Chapter VII, document 309.

4. Cravath, 268.

5. Francis to Lansing, March 22, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Russia: Volume I, Chapter X, document 458.

6. Summers to Lansing, April 26, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Russia: Volume I, Chapter X, document 484.

7. Lansing to Francis, March 19, 1918, FRUS, 1918, Russia: Volume I, Chapter VII, document 408. Lansing attached President Wilson's message to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, March 11, 1918, document 398.

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9. Graham, 387.

10. Cravath, 267-269; Graham, 390-398.

11. Robert Paul Browder, *The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 3-4; Edward M. Bennett, *Recognition of Russia: An American Foreign Policy Dilemma*, (Waltham, MA: Blaisedell, 1970), 13-14; Michael Jabara Carley, *Silent Conflict: A Hidden History of Early Soviet-Western Relations*, (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 5.

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15. Graham, 398; Saul, 3-5; Browder, 3-4; Bennett, 13-14; Carley, 5-11.

16. Katherine A.S. Siegel *Loans and Legitimacy: The Evolution of Soviet-American Relations, 1919-1933*, (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 110-132; Jon Jacobson, *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 19-21; Joan Hoff Wilson, *Ideology and Economics: US Relations with the Soviet Union 1918-1933*, (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1975), 1-13.

17. Browder, 10-18; Bennett, 103-109, 132-135, 179-187; Siegel, 4-5, 39-71; Saul, 326-229.

18. Graham, 400-401; Bennett, 47-60; Saul, 22-24.

19. Browder, 29-30; Wilson, 1-13; Saul, 12-18; Siegel, 14-26, 101-106, 131-139.

20. Bennett, 77-78; Saul, 213-217.

21. Browder, 21-22; Bennett, 61-79; Saul, 29-36.

22. Browder, 6, 11-12; Bennett, 33-37, 43-44; Saul, 3-4, 273-274.

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30. Browder, 13-16; Bennett, 24-25; Little, 377-380, 389-390.

31. Browder, 6-7; Jacobson, 14-17; Powaski, 10-11, Saul, 5-8; Carley, 11-13.

32. Klehr et al., 6; Schmidt, 26.

33. Browder, 7; Powaski, 11; Saul, 4; Carley 414-415.

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37. Graham, 395; Carley, 13-14.

38. Bennett, 149-150; Powaski 24-25; Carley, 6-7.

39. Browder, 11-12; Bennett, 34; MacMillan, 78; Saul, 15.

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41. Bennett, 150; Powaski, 26; MacMillan, 79-80.

42. Graham, 397-398; Browder, 16-17; Little, 377-378; Saul, 13-18.

43. Saul, 6-7; Fogelsong, 287.

44. Cravath, 273-274; Browder, 12-15; Bennett, 89-104, 126-133; Carley, 17-29; Fogelsong, 136-138, 281-286.

45. Fogelsong 283-287.

46. Saul, 5-7; Klehr et al., 12.

47. Manela, 5-7.

48. Klehr et al., 15-30; Fogelsong, 286-289.

49. Klehr et al., 21-30.

50. Jacobson, 36-46; Saul, 265-267; Klehr et al., 15-40.

51. Little, 377-380.

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53. Bennett, 69-70; Saul, 255-256; Carley, 374.

54. Hughes to the Consul at Reval (Quarton), December 18, 1923, FRUS, 1923, Volume II, Russia, document 636.

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57. Browder, 14, 65-66; Bennett, 34-35, 67-68, 147-150, 185-186.

58. Jacobson, 86-100.

59. Bennett, 49; Saul, 22-23.

60. Powaski, 23.

61. Saul, 23-24.

62. Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933-1941: Moscow, Tokyo, and the Prelude to the Pacific War* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1992), 51.

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64. Browder, 115-117; Bennet, 109-112; Saul, 253.

65. Browder, 25-48; Saul, 98-135; Carley, 36-39; Siegel, 62-133.

66. Saul, 113-116; Wilson, 63, 107; Siegel, 32-34.

67. Powaski, 31-33; Saul, 121-123, 227-264.

68. Saul, 121-122; Siegel, 102.

69. Powaski, 31-33; Saul, 121-123, 227-264.

70. Wilson, 79-89; Saul, 132-134.

71. Wilson, 103-132; Siegel, 119-133.

72. Kellogg to the Republican National Committee, February 23, 1928, FRUS, 1928, Volume III, Russia, document 694.

73. Graham, 399-400; Bennett, 68-69; Saul, 28-35; Carley, 223-226.

74. Kellogg to the Republican National Committee, February 23, 1928, FRUS, 1928, Volume III, Russia, document 694.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Saul, 256-257.

78. Kellogg to the Republican National Committee, February 23, 1928, FRUS, 1928, Volume III, Russia, document 694. Kellogg's letter also included trade numbers from the Department of Commerce from 1923-1927.

79. Browder, 109-113; Bennett, 101-14, 134-138.

80. Haslam, 5-6; Saul, 267-270.

81. Haslam, 25-28.

82. Bennett, 139-140; Jacobson, 80, 99-102; Saul, 22-23; Carley, 57-64; Siegel, 70. Siegel called the lack of an American diplomat at the Rapallo Conference a "disaster."

83. Powaski, 33-34.

84. Saul, 260, n.19. Castle to Hoover, August 17, 1932.

85. Matthew Woll, acting president of the National Civic Foundation, to Roosevelt, October 18, 1932, post-dated December 21, 1932, Franklin Roosevelt Presidential Library (FRPL), President's Official File. George McJimsey, ed. *Documentary History of the Roosevelt presidency, Vol. 27: The Recognition of the Soviet Union* (LexusNexus, 2006), Document 3. Roosevelt's answer to a correspondent who asked about his position on Russian recognition during the 1932 presidential campaign was recorded in Woll's letter.

86. Saul, 280-290.

87. Cravath, 266-267; Bennett, 2-13.

88. Saul, 261-265.

89. Matthew Woll, acting president of the National Civic Foundation, to Roosevelt, October 18, 1932, post-dated December 21, 1932, President's Official File, FRPL, McJimsey, document 3.

90. Saul, 254.

91. Donald G. Bishop, *The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements* (Syracuse, NY: 1965), 5-7; Mary G. Glantz, *Roosevelt and the Soviet Union: The President's Battles over Foreign Policy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 5-9.

92. Matthew Woll, acting president of the National Civic Foundation, to Roosevelt, October 18, 1932, post-dated December 21, 1932, President's Official File, FRPL, McJimsey, document 3.

93. Saul, 255.

94. Robert Dallek, *Roosevelt And American Foreign Policy 1932-1945* (Oxford University Press, 1995),19-20.

95. Saul, 258-259.

96. Saul, 259-260.

97. Dallek, 20; Glantz, 16.

98. Glantz, 16.

99. Dallek, 19-20.

100. McJimsey, xi. McJimsey's introduction to the collection of primary sources from 1933 about recognition only explained that Roosevelt criticized Hoover's policy of nonrecognition, remaining silent on whether Roosevelt approached the topic during the campaign; Saul, 260. Saul claimed Roosevelt did not raise the subject for debate during the campaign.

101. Matthew Woll, acting president of the National Civic Foundation, to Roosevelt, October 18, 1932, post-dated December 21, 1932, President's Official File, FRPL, McJimsey, document 3.

102. Browder, 78; Saul, 32.

103. The United Russian National Organizations in America to Roosevelt, November 3, 1932, President's Personal Secretary's File, diplomatic correspondence, box 48: Russia, 1932-1933, FRPL.

104. Ibid.

105. NB: McJimsey edited volume containing 217 sources from the FRPL about Soviet recognition dating from 1932 to 1934 did not print the letter from the URNOA.

106. Browder, 12-15; Saul 15-17.

107. Bennett, 89-104, 126-133.

108. Jacobson, 32-40.

109. Glantz, 10.

110. Saul, 34.

111. Cravath, 268.

112. Bishop, 32-33.

113. Bishop, 32-33.

114. Saul, 265.

115. Bishop, 33-36.

116. Bishop, 37.

117. Saul, 77, 174, 266.

118. Fogelsong, 283-287.

119. Mrs. Katherine B.K. Weaver of the Morristown Chapter of the DAR to the secretary of the president, Louis McHenry Howe, Jan. 25, 1933, Democratic National Committee papers, FRPL, McJimsey, Document 7.

120. Ibid.

121. William Hute, "Why Recognize the Soviets?" by, *National Review* (September, 1933); Saul, 278 n.87 indicated this was the general sentiment of the article and not a direct quote.

122. Bennett, 58-59; Bishop , 42-43; Saul, 278.

123. Bishop, 10.

124. Jerome Davis to the secretary of the President, Louis McHenry Howe, March 23, 1933, Presidential Official File, FRPL, McJimsey, Document 15.

125. Ibid. NB: Both Zinoviev and Kamenev were executed for treason three years later in 1936.

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128. Casella-Blackburn, 77; Saul 271.

129. Casella-Blackburn, 78.

130. Bennett, 105-108; Casella-Blackburn, 76-77.

131. Mayers, 88.

132. Bennett, 92-93; Saul, 275.

133. The American Foundation Report from the Committee of Russian-American Relations, Nov. 1, 1933, Esther Lape Papers, FRPL.

134. Saul, 275.

135. Lape to "Franklin," July 21, 1933, President's Official File 220a, box 2, FRPL.

136. Lape to "Eleanor," July 19, 1933, President's Official File 220a, box 2, FRPL..

137. The American Foundation Report from the Committee of Russian-American Relations, Nov. 1, 1933, Esther Lape Papers, FRPL.

138. Roosevelt to "Esther," July 28, 1933, President's Official File 220a, box 2, FRPL.

139. Saul, 34.

140. Browder, 25-48; Saul, 98-135; Siegel, 62-132.

141. Powaski, 31-33; Saul, 121-123, 227-264; Siegel, 119-133.

142. Saul, 113-114.

143. Saul, 121-122; Siegel, 102.

144. Powaski, 31-33; Saul, 121-123.

145. Saul, 247-249.

146. Dorsey Richardson to Alexander Sachs, April 11, 1933, Alexander Sachs Papers, FRPL.

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid.

149. Senator Connelly to Roosevelt, May 22nd 1933, President's Official File, FRPL, McJimsey, document 24.

150. Jesse H. Jones to Roosevelt, June 24th 1933, President's Official File, FRPL, McJimsey, document 26.

151. Dorsey Richardson to Alexander Sachs, April 11, 1933, Alexander Sachs Papers, FRPL.

152. J. Chamberlain Carter to Louis McHenry Howe, July 5, 1933, President's Official File, FRPL, McJimsey, document 28.

153. Ibid.

154. Saul, 271.

155. Phillips to Roosevelt, July 27th, 1933, President's Personal File, FRPL, McJimsey, document 33.

156. Bennett, 160-161; Saul, 259.

157. Phillips to Roosevelt, July 27th, 1933, President's Personal File, FRPL, McJimsey, document 33.

158. Ibid.

159. Ibid.

160.Phillips to Roosevelt, July 27th, 1933, President's Personal File, FRPL, McJimsey, document 33.

161. Saul, 269.

162. Cravath, 266-267; Bennett, 2-4.

163. Bennett, 1-4; Bishop, 2-3.

164. Saul, 33.

165. Jerome Davis to the secretary of the president, Louis McHenry Howe, March 23, 1933, Presidential Official File, FRPL, McJimsey, document 15.

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169. Hull to Roosevelt, November 5, 1933, President's Personal Secretary's File, diplomatic correspondence, box 50: Russia - Bullitt, William C. 1933-1936, FRPL.

170. Bullitt to Hull, November 5, 1933, President's Personal Secretary's File, diplomatic correspondence, box 50: Russia - Bullitt, William C. 1933-1936, FRPL.

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173. Moore to Hull, November 5, 1933, President's Personal Secretary's File, diplomatic correspondence, box 50: Russia - Bullitt, William C. 1933-1936, FRPL.

174. Ibid.

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid.

177. Walter Duranty, "Roosevelt Acts to Recognize Russia with Invitation to Conference," *New York Times*, October 21, 1933, 1.

178. Bennett, 8; Powaski, 33-34; Saul, 259-261; Carley, 39.

179. Walter Duranty, "Roosevelt Acts to Recognize Russia with Invitation to Conference," *New York Times*, October 21, 1933, 1.

180. J. Russell Young, "Roosevelt Sets Stage to Give Press News Regarding Soviet" *Washington Evening Star*, October 21, A-4.

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196. “Roosevelt Delays Talks to Litvinoff,”*New York Times*, November 10, 1933, 1.

197. Moore to Hull, November 5, 1933, President’s Personal Secretary’s File, diplomatic correspondence, box 50: Russia - Bullitt, William C. 1933-1936, FRPL.

198. Ibid.

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200. Ibid.

201. Frederick T. Birchall, “Washington Seeks Soviet Guarantee,” *New York Times*, November 12, 1933, 1, 3.

202. Saul, 316.

203. *Washington Evening Star*, November 12, 1933, 1.

204. “Calls Litvinoff for Night Parley,” *New York Times*, November 13, 1933, 1.

205. Bullitt to Roosevelt, November 15, 1933, President’s Personal Secretary’s File, diplomatic correspondence, box 50: Russia - Bullitt, William C. 1933-1936, FRPL.

206. Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, November 16, 1933, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 23-24.

207. Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, November 16, 1933, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 25.

208. Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, November 16, 1933, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 26-27.

209. Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, November 16, 1933, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 28-32.

210. *Washington Evening Star*, Nov. 17, 1933, A-1.

211. ”Litvinoff Talks Nearing a Close,” *New York Times*, Nov. 17, 1933, 1.

212. Saul, 304. Senator William Borah could not be head speaker due to an illness.

213. Maxim M. Litvinov, “The American-Russian Chamber of Commerce’s Testimonial Dinner Tendered to the Honorable Maxim M. Litvinov,” New York, November 24, 1933, https://utdr.utoledo.edu/islandora/object/utoledo%3A5465/datastream/OBJ/view Accessed December 27, 2023.

214. Roosevelt to Litvinov, November 23, 1933, President’s Official File, box 220a, FRPL.

215. Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, November 16, 1933, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 23-24.

216. Saul, 306.

217. Saul, 307.

218. Remarks of the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) upon the presentation of his Letters of Credence to the President of the Soviet All-Union Central Executive Committee (Kalinin) at Moscow, December 13, 1933, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 52.

219. Reply of the President of the Soviet All-Union Central Executive Committee (Kalinin), to the American ambassador in the Soviet Union at Moscow (Bullitt), December 13, 1933, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 53.

220. Ibid.

221. Saul 307-311.

222. Moore to Roosevelt, December 26, 1933, President's Personal Secretary's File, diplomatic correspondence, box 48: Russia, 1932-1933, FRPL. Bullitt's telegram is enclosed.

223. Dennis J. Dunn, *Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow*, (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1998), 32.

224. Saul, 311.

225. State Department Memorandum, February 16, 1934, President's Personal Secretary's File, diplomatic correspondence, box 48: Russia, 1932-1933, FRPL.

226. "Soviet Envoy Host at Brilliant Fete," *New York Times*, April 11, 1934, 14.

227. Hull to Bullitt, March 2, 1934, President's Personal Secretary's File, diplomatic correspondence, box 48: Russia, 1932-1933, FRPL.

228. Draft of State Department letter approved by Roosevelt, February 11, 1934, President's Personal Secretary's File, diplomatic correspondence, box 48: Russia, 1932-1933, FRPL The State Department claimed Litvinov agreed to this letter during the recognition negotiations in November 1933.

229. Bullitt to Hull, March 15, 1934, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 62. Bullitt confirmed Litvinov's receipt of the draft of the letter from the State Department.

230. Bullit to Hull, March 28, 1934, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 69.

231. Bullitt to Hull, April 2, 1934, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 70.

232. Hull to Bullitt, April 5, 1934, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 71.

233. Ibid.

234. Ibid.

235. Bullitt to Hull, April 8, 1934, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 73.

236. Ibid.

237. Ibid.

238. Ibid.

239. Ibid.

240. Bullitt to Roosevelt, April 13, 1934, President's Personal Secretary's File, diplomatic correspondence, box 50: Russia - Bullitt, William C. 1933-1936, FRPL.

241. Ibid.

242. Bullitt to Roosevelt, September 8, 1934, President's Personal Secretary's File, diplomatic correspondence, box 50: Russia - Bullitt, William C. 1933-1936, FRPL.

243. Ibid.

244. Ibid.

245. Saul, 316.

246. Saul, 326-328.

247. Bullitt to Hull, January 30, 1935, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 177.

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250. Saul, 316.

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252. Straus to Hull, February 1, 1935. FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 181.

253. State Department memorandum of a meeting between Soviet Ambassador Troyanovski and Secretary Hull, Assistant Moore, Ambassador Bullitt, and Kelley, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, January 31, 1935, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-139, document 178.

254. State Department release to the press, January 31, 1935, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-139, document 179.

255. Ibid.

256. Wiley to Hull, February 3, 1935, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 183.

257. Ibid.

258. Ibid.

259. Ibid.

260. Saul, 331.

261. Bullitt to Hull, May 16, 1935, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 200.

262. Ibid.

263. Saul, 331.

264. Bullitt to Roosevelt, July 15, 1935, President's Personal Secretary's File, diplomatic correspondence, box 50: Russia - Bullitt, William C. 1933-1936, FRPL.

265. Bullitt to Hull, July 19, 1935, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, documents 239-240.

266. Hull to Bullitt, August 16, 1935, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 250.

267. Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, November 16, 1933, FRUS, documents 23-32.

268. State Department released to the press, August 25, 1935, FRUS, document.

269. Bullitt to Hull, August 27, 1935, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 260.

270. Bullitt to Hull, August 27, 1935, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 262.

271. Bullitt to Hull, April 20, 1936, FRUS, document 301.

272. Mayers, 109; Dunn, 68; Saul, 355-356.

273. Dunn 69-73.

274. Davies to Hull, January 19, 1937, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 337.

275. Dunn, 74 n.4.

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278. Dunn, 73-74.

279. Saul, 348.

280. Saul, 340-341.

281. Mayers, 120-121.

282. Dunn, 74.

283. Saul, 349-351.

284. Dunn, 73-75.

285. Dunn, 80.

286. Mayers, 122.

287. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union (Kennan), February 13, 1937, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 338.

288. Ibid.

289. Saul, 341 n.118.

290. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union (Kennan), February 13, 1937, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 347.document 338.

291. Ibid.

292. Saul, 358.

293. Dunn, 81-82. (Mayers?)

294. Saul, 346.
295. Davies to Hull, July 10, 1937, FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, document 347.
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329. Boe, 4-6.
330. Boe, 5-6.
331. Boe, 6.
332. Boe, 4-7.
333. Wilson, 61.
334. Boe, 8-9.
335. Wilson, 114-117.

336. Boe, 9-10.
337. Boe, 15.
338. Boe, 15-16.
339. Wilson, 113.
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