

JUST OR UNJUST:
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

A dissertation submitted to the Caspersen School of Graduate Studies

Drew University in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree, Doctor of Letters

Committee

Chair:	Dr. William Rogers
Second Reader:	Dr. Jonathan Golden
Third Reader:	Dr. George Beck

Richard G. Rosell

Drew University

Madison, New Jersey

May 2022

Abstract

JUST OR UNJUST: THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Doctor of Letters Dissertation by

Richard G. Rosell

The Caspersen School of Graduate Studies
Drew University

May 2022

For as long as there have been people, there have been hostilities between them. As civilization evolved and people organized into collectives, leaders rose, and nation-states emerged. Conflicts between nation-states gave birth to war. Even in ancient times, concurrent with the inevitable bloodshed produced by war, leaders argued for rules to govern the death and destruction they were causing. In some cultures, religion played a vital role in determining who, what, when, why, and how one nation would attack another. In others, good vs. evil, and right vs. wrong, dominated the debate regarding the justice of war.

War is, and has always been, viewed as a necessary instrument to achieve a myriad of different political, economic, religious, and personal objectives, and as such, it is good that rules be set to govern its inevitability. But does war have to be inevitable? Why should people die in defense of borders or ideals set up by politicians whose motives can be, at best, questionable? Are there avenues leaders can travel to avert bloodshed? Is there a fair way to wage war?

Less than a month after the attacks of September 11th, President George W. Bush declared the commencement of a Global War on Terror (GWOT). The President did not identify a nation-state as America's adversary, rather, he identified all present and future terrorist organizations, specifically the group that claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks, al Qaeda. To create an air of credibility for his declaration of war against a theoretical adversary, he

formed a coalition of the willing (and arguably not so willing) nations to help vanquish al Qaeda as well as all terrorist organizations identified as the enemies to freedom. These enemies shared at least one common trait: they followed Islam. This war differed from previous wars as the coalition would spend most of its effort fighting groups rather than nations.

This research will analyze the origins of the just war theory, or just war tradition. Moreover, the purpose and intent of two other wars in which the United States has been involved will be examined to display how distant GWOT was in comparison to historical US policies on war. Also, to demonstrate the interdisciplinary nature of this war, both religious and political ideals related to just war theory are presented extensively. In conclusion, this research ratiocinates, in the sum of all its pieces, that GWOT was not a just war.

Vita

Full name:

Richard George Rosell

Place and date of birth:

Kearny, NJ 11/24/1959

Educational Institutions:

<u>School</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Degree</u>	<u>Date</u>
Collegiate:			
Thomas Edison State University	Trenton, NJ	B.S. in Human Services	7/15/2001
Graduate:			
Seton Hall University	S. Orange, NJ	M.A. Human Resources	5/12/2003
Naval Postgraduate School	Monterey, CA	M.A. Security Studies	9/1/2007

Dedication:

To every American veteran.

Contents

Abstract	iii
Vita	v
Dedication	vi
Acknowledgements	ix
Abbreviations	xi
Preface	xiii
Chapter One: Introduction	1
Was it Worth the Cost?	3
Methodology	6
Chapter Two: Just War Theory	11
Pre-Christian Attempts	14
Christian (Western) Just War Tradition	16
Eastern Just War Tradition	20
Philosophical Take on War	23
Chapter Three: Just War and the United States	28
World War I	29
World War II	33
Preventive, Preemptive, and Targeted Attacks	40
Chapter Four: What Exactly is a Global War on Terror?	50
Identifying the Threat	51
What is Terrorism?	53
Afghanistan-OEF	57
The Flagship of the GWOT-Iraq	60

The Spread of the GWOT into Iraq	65
The GWOT in Sub-Saharan Africa	77
The GWOT in Philippines	82
You're Either with Us or Against Us	87
Chapter Five: Could the GWOT be Loosely Considered a Just War?	97
A War by Any Other Name	100
Chapter Six: Could the GWOT Have Been Avoided?	109
Interpretation through the Hermeneutical Approach	112
War is a Racket: The Military Industrial Complex	117
Chapter Seven: Conclusion	122
Appendix 1	129
Appendix 2	134
Index	141
Bibliography	151
Notes	162

Acknowledgments

There are two people who ceaselessly supported and believed in me during this entire process. The first is my wife, Darlene. She supported my decision to apply to Drew University's Doctor of Letters Program. She supported my decision to put my studies on hold to pursue my career objectives. She continued to push me to go back to school and finish what I started, even after employment took me out of state and unable to attend Drew. She kept tabs on the D. Litt. program during the pandemic because she prayed the University would go virtual like every other school in New Jersey. She alerted me when the Casperson School of Graduate Studies went virtual with their doctoral programs and pushed me to reapply. I would never have started, restarted, or completed this program without her. She gained nothing from my endeavor. Her response when I remind her how much I owe her is always the same: "you owe me nothing." Her actions were truly selfless. It was not the abundant love she has for me which motivated her to act in my best interest; rather, simply, she is the most decent person I have ever known. Neither words nor actions could ever suffice to convey my appreciation.

The second person is Dr. Joseph Devine. Joe molded my professional and academic career like none other. I had known him all my life, as he was the son of my namesake and godfather. Joe, as a five-year-old boy, awaited my arrival home from the hospital after my birth. He was there for me on that day, as he was for me on the day he died, and every day in between. He convinced me that a Liberal Arts Doctorate from Drew University would bring to me the enlightenment which he knew I not only desired but needed. He was correct. He assisted in getting me accepted into Drew in 2012. He mentored me during my studies. And one of the final things he did in this world was to send an email highly recommending my readmittance to the program. The proudest day of my professional career came the day that Joe told me how proud

he was of me. I pine for his guidance now and always shall, no matter the number nor extent of any future successes I might enjoy.

Abbreviations

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AFRICOM	African Command
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ASG	Abu-Sayyef
AUMF	Authorization for Use of Military Force Act
BP	British Petroleum
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSP	Center for Security Policy
DoD	Department of Defense
D.C.	District of Columbia
EUCOM	European Command
FDR	Franklin Delano Roosevelt
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPS	Global Positioning System
GWOT	The Global War on Terror
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
JI	Jemaah Islamiya
MIC	Military Industrial Complex
NEOCON	Neo-Conservative
NEPDG	National Energy Policy Development Group
NEP	National Energy Policy

NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OEF-P	Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines
PAE	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PNAC	Project for the New American Century
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SOTU	State of the Union Address
UBL	Usama bin Laden
UN	United Nations
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission on Iraq
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Preface

The domestic American landscape had not been altered by the ravages of war since the Civil War ended. The attacks of September 11th changed all of that. In an instant, buildings, people, and a way of life were gone forever. The culture of nations was forced to adapt to a new normal. One never fully understands the loss of something obvious until it is no longer noticeable.

The temperate weather in Northern New Jersey conveys beauty to the suburban landscape. Flora and fauna abound under the lifeblood of rain and the warmth of the sun. It is impossible to resist spending time during the afternoon watching blue jays swoop from the summer sky to deliver additional padding for their nests or food for their chicks. Their songs are enthralling, seemingly having the tempo and purpose of a song a child might learn in grade school.

Eventually, summer gives way to fall and, quickly, winter. Winter sends the blue jays away—no need to despair. They always return in a few short months, and while patiently waiting, winter can be enjoyed as it is filled with different joys to keep a youthful mind occupied. Winter is a wonderland for a child in Jersey. Children have neither arthritis nor aches and pains to haunt them when the temperature dips below freezing. There is snow, football, and vapor emanating inexplicably from the mouth when exhaling. Winter is tolerable, but many adults long for spring—and the return of blue jays to the backyard. How sad it would be if these majestic birds flew away forever and never returned. For a child, nothing goes away forever, or does it?

In the weeks after September 11th, in a flash many things went away. Airplanes, a readily available sight in the air over many northern New Jersey hometowns, were gone. Not only were

they not visible, but the unmistakable sound of their engines had disappeared. Did it seem odd that although routinely unnoticed the absence of jets in the sky was deafening? The planes eventually returned—their noise and pollution once again traversing the sky. However, what did not return were the twin towers of the World Trade Center—2606 souls lost at Ground Zero. What did not return were the unincumbered movements and liberties enjoyed by all Americans. We all look for the buildings, the souls, and the liberty every time we pass within view of downtown Manhattan, much as we looked for the blue jays' return in the spring. Unlike the birds, the buildings and the people are gone forever. Taken by a senseless and hateful criminal act of ideological violence.

The blue jays still return to northern New Jersey every spring, only now their songs and antics have less meaning. Each time we look to the east, it is impossible for us to enjoy the Manhattan skyline, for our mind's eye can only see the unseen: the 2606 souls who will never return. The GWOT, meant to avenge the September 11th attacks, did not fill the void, nor will it ever.

Chapter One

Introduction

“War is sweet to them that know it not.”¹

—Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus

Americans had not been forced to stare at burned-out buildings and widescale destruction due to war in over 155 years. The stark reality of what it is like to live with the ravages of war hit America hard. Americans wanted blood, more specifically, Muslim blood. Military recruiting and retention were high abounded. Hysteria proliferated in the cities and the countryside across the boundaries of race, religion, creed, and color. President George W. Bush tried to quell misplaced anger six days after the attacks during a speech at the Islamic Center in Washington, DC, when he declared, “The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent peace. They represent evil and war.”² Try as he could, President Bush could not temper the nation’s misplaced outrage at the Muslim world, and his failure made some in America wonder if race played a role in the GWOT.

The immediate patriotic and nationalistic attitudes exhibited post-September 11 by Americans were predictable and blameless. America’s (continental) homeland had never been attacked. This was a new frontier and Americans seethed. They were deluged with slogans, T-shirts, television documentaries, network news “experts,” and motivational memes that created an aura of patriotic Americans defending their homeland, while non-Americans like those from the Middle East were cast in opposition. Even renowned thespian Robert DeNiro appeared on *Saturday Night Live* to participate in a skit that mocked Middle Eastern names.

Bush, however, consistently attempted to temper sentiments by stating routinely without equivocation that Islam was neither to blame nor were they America’s (potential) targets.³ His

insistence did little more than take the liability for nationalistic, anti-Islam racism off his shoulders. But for many Americans, President Bush's play was obvious. He was going to make "them" pay and get "us" the retribution blood America craved. According to Anthony Gregory, this type of "belligerent nationalism has for centuries been a particularly odious and destructive form of collectivism."⁴ Patience was wearing thin in the weeks after the attacks as Americans waited for the first jihadist to feel American wrath. Bush delivered it on October 7, 2001, with the beginning of an endless war against a phantom menace who followed a rogue religion. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) had commenced, and its justification in real time was doubtless.

The research used in this study commenced on an open-minded path, simply seeking to determine, if possible, whether or not the GWOT was a just or unjust war. Certainly, America was historically capable of entering into war against an enemy for just cause. To establish a just cause baseline, the author chose to analyze conflicts post-1900 to determine whether or not America was capable of entering into justified war. The start of the twentieth century marked great technological advances in war-making means. Arguably, the American Revolution and the Civil War are excellent examples of wars fought by the United States which were undeniably just. The former was fought against the tyranny of imperialist Great Britain and would lead to the creation of the great republican democracy in which Americans live and thrive today. The latter not only ended the blight of slavery but saved that republic for which so many Americans fought during the Revolution. This paper had to create limits to the research, and that historical limit was set at 1900.

World War I and World War II are excellent examples of just wars and, as such, were researched to establish a just cause baseline. Preliminary research into conflicts and wars after World War II to find additional examples of just war proved to be fruitless, as all conflicts and

wars after World War II were declared and fought under circumstances that concluded they were not waged with just cause. Even the motives of the first Gulf War were questionable, as it is arguable that America only entered that conflict to stabilize the oil industry in the Gulf region.

Determining with certainty why America entered into any of its wars is not possible because American politicians have constantly operated under a veil of secrecy, only disclosing what they desire Americans to know. It's probable that they hide more facts than they disclose; therefore, a researcher must sift through the information at hand and offer a well-informed opinion with limitations of access to information in mind. Moreover, the results of research into both World War I and World War II indicate that the preponderance of the existing data reaffirm both conflicts having been waged with just cause. There are several extenuating circumstances organic to each conflict that have been, and should always be, looked upon with a wary eye, but in the end, America possessed justification to save Europe both times.

The GWOT raged from 2001 until 2014 and is arguably still waged today in the same places against the same enemy alongside the same allies. This study started long before the controversial withdrawal from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 but will not parse it beyond this sentence, as there is not enough scholarly, peer-reviewed data currently available. That said, up to the point of the withdrawal, for all the human and monetary costs, whether just or not, can it be said that the GWOT achieved its goal of defeating every global terrorist group?

Was it Worth the Cost?

“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”⁵

—President George W. Bush, September 20, 2001

The United States has lost at least 7063 service members during the twenty-plus years of the GWOT.⁶ The total cost of lives, both combatants and civilians, is as much as 900,000.⁷ At a

staggering cost of over \$8 trillion, America will still be reconciling the bill decades from now.⁸

Was revenge worth the cost?

The long campaign in Afghanistan was started to eliminate al Qaeda's ability to operate their terrorist network from that country while enjoying the protection of the Taliban. The Taliban had permitted Al Qaeda (AQ) to train jihadists for years and had been responsible for most of the terrorist attacks in Europe.⁹ The 9/11 Commission report cites intelligence estimates that claim as many as 20,000 terrorists received some type of military training in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda had to go, not just in retaliation for September 11th but as a matter of self-defense for America and the West.

The importance of neutering AQ cannot be overstated, as America's ability to protect its citizens and interests is accomplished more efficiently while in an offensive (proactive) posture. America's invasion could be considered successful because the operational and tactical goals of rendering AQ operationally ineffective were largely met.

Operations in Afghanistan resulted in some progress regarding the implementation of a liberal Western democracy, at least until the summer of 2021. Afghanistan has enjoyed the benefits of the rule of law. Free elections, as free as the West could hope, have been the norm for years, though there are still some who believe that hostilities could have been minimized had the Bush administration sanctioned a government in Afghanistan that included Taliban representation.

As in Afghanistan, post-invasion Iraq has enjoyed increased freedom and free elections. Some people would agree that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was positive for both the country and the region. The government of Iraq holds free elections, albeit the country still suffers from internal civil strife. But as this research offers, the invasion was a win-win from the

US-British perspective. Fringe elements from the West, and not just governments, succeeded with their long-postulated plan to place the Iraqi oil market under the control of American and British energy companies. The military-industrial complex (MIC) thrived for the duration of the GWOT.

Sub-Saharan Africa seemed to fare well under the GWOT, as America was able to avoid major military engagements for troops by adhering to the longstanding policy of utilizing select nation-states as surrogates. These surrogates proved to be effective in keeping terror organizations at bay while at the same time carrying out the policy created by Eisenhower over sixty years ago designed to keep the Soviets off the continent.

The one true success story of the GWOT occurred in an unlikely place, the southern Philippine islands. The local populace was wrested free from the dark grip of occupying terrorist groups and voluntarily rejoined the nation. This feat was accomplished by a Spartan group of American military advisors to the operational forces of the Philippine Army. These Americans, rather than engaging militarily as their counterparts did on the other GWOT battlefields, used counterterrorism techniques to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population.

Successes and failures aside, the question posed by this paper is “Was the Global War on Terror a Just War under the United States Just War Policy?” Success or failure has no impact on justification. The ends do not justify the means. No amount of success is relevant if America had neither an ethical nor moral basis for declaring war.

Just war tradition consists of three facets: 1) Jus ad Bellum (the Justice of War), 2) Jus in Bello (Justice in War), and 3) Jus post Bellum (Justice after War). This study examines the American Justice of War tradition to determine if the United States had a moral right to wage the GWOT.

Methodology

There are countless resources available to investigate the topic of this thesis. The author started collecting data almost ten years ago, and since that time, the data has continued to grow. From the inception of collection and analysis, it was apparent that most, if not all of it, fell into seven distinct categories. Data was procured and separated into these seven categories which made reading and analyzing much more efficient. The author initially relied heavily on printed published texts, but as the research grew, another seemingly unlimited data pool was uncovered.

The institutions of higher learning maintained by the United States military have countless graduate and post-graduate theses published in their various internal digital libraries which contain documents on every category the author selected for research. These institutions include the Army War College, the Navy War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Marine Corps War College, and the Air War College.¹⁰ These theses are remarkably objective given the fact that they are all penned by commissioned officers in all five branches of the military. Many of the authors served at least one tour during the GWOT. The author found the operational insight rendered in those theses very helpful in choosing other texts to analyze.

Lastly, while many are not peer-reviewed, the internet contains countless articles published over the twenty years of the GWOT.

After accumulation, the data was separated into the following seven categories for the accompanying reasons:

1. Key to this study was the ability to explain to the reader the history of just war theory.

This category was studied to determine an acceptable historical baseline for the reader to understand the concept of a just war. For this analysis, just war theory was separated into

four sections: 1) Pre-Christian just war theory, 2) Western (Christian) just war theory), 3) Eastern just war theory, and 4) Philosophical discussion on just war theory.

2. A baseline to describe American just war theory is important because without it there would be nothing to compare to the GWOT. This category would set that baseline for the reader to understand that America has waged just wars in the past and is fully capable of doing so in the future. The author chose World War I and World War II for this section, as the historical preponderance of evidence, while not unanimous, favors viewing both as just causes.
3. Three controversial self-defense initiatives exist as American policy: 1) Preventive Military Attacks, 2) Preemptive Military Attacks, and 3) Targeted Military Attacks. Much has been written on these topics, which are relevant to the GWOT because America has employed each of the three in the last twenty years. Many view the Iraq invasion as having been waged in self-defense.
4. A description of the GWOT is important since America had never before waged such a conflict. Data for this category was analyzed to identify the threat America faced as well as to provide a definition of terrorism. Summaries of the major campaigns, including Afghanistan, Iraq, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Philippines, are included and show the diverse nature of combat in the GWOT. Data was identified which illuminated the failure of the intelligence community. This intelligence failure contributed to the invasion of Iraq, but not in the way America had been led to believe.
5. President Bush desperately needed to create a coalition to add credibility to his GWOT. The possible origin of his controversial statement “You’re Either with Us or Against Us” is suggested. Additionally, the long-postulated theory that the invasion of Iraq was fought

as a war-for-oil conflict and was arguably waged for political stabilization was considered and thoroughly researched.

6. Was the GWOT a just war? As the research progressed, abundant data was uncovered that suggested the GWOT was not a just war under the accepted United States just war policy. But could research find a positive facet of the GWOT that would justify even part of the military action undertaken?

7. The final category discussed the possibility that the GWOT could have been avoided.

There seemed to be little diplomacy and no negotiation leading up to the commencement of the GWOT. The United States, rightfully angered by the unprovoked attack by a foreign criminal enterprise, arguably had no obligation to negotiate with AQ. But AQ was not the only group, or nation, that in the name of self-defense would be devastated by the American military. The art of hermeneutics was researched and found to be a reasonable negotiation application that could have had a positive role to play in post-attack, prewar decision-making. The final facet of this category involved researching the military-industrial complex. Data suggests that the GWOT was imminent regardless of the September 11th attacks, predicated by the omnipresent MIC.

As profound an impact as the September 11 attacks had on the American landscape, that impact pales in comparison to the impact of the GWOT. The US economy has arguably never fully recovered. The United States Veterans Administration (VA), already historically mismanaged and overburdened, is bursting at the seams. Our relationships with traditional allies have been strained, possibly beyond reconciliation.

This paper will provide evidence to support the argument that after considering the sum of all the GWOT pieces, there is no possibility that the war was just.

The Bush administration has portrayed as fact that the GWOT was necessary to prevent the inevitability of continued terrorist attacks by al Qaeda. Further, the administration desired to bring those responsible for the September 11 attacks to justice. The GWOT commenced with military action in Afghanistan, but the justification for the war must include any and all military incursions under the auspices of a global war. Therefore, this paper cannot ignore activities in sub-Saharan Africa, the Philippines, and Iraq.

The war in Afghanistan could have been, as some insist, nothing more than the procurement of real estate from which to operate militarily unencumbered in the region. But given the Bush administration's assertions that the action sought to destroy the operational abilities of al Qaeda, which had been training and operating from within the country, and the fact that the incursion did in fact meet those objectives, Afghanistan could, very loosely, be considered just.

The conflict in sub-Saharan Africa did not involve an invasion similar to that of Afghanistan; rather it was waged using African nation surrogates. This paper will provide two possible justifications for American involvement in African affairs, both of which could be seen as just.

American military action in the Philippines, which saw no operational action by United States forces other than as advisors, could easily be seen as just given that our Philippine allies had lost control of their southern province and asked for our help. This leaves Iraq.

Regardless of how Afghanistan, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Philippines are judged, this was a Global War on Terror and, as such, must be judged by the sum of its parts. This paper will present, in detail, evidence suggesting the likelihood that the planning for Bush's incursion into Iraq had been planned as many as six years in advance by a NEOCON political action group

headed by individuals who would eventually be selected as Bush's highest level foreign policy advisors. Information analyzed and presented suggests that this group did not desire to overthrow Saddam Hussein because he was a despot, nor were they concerned about his possession and deployment capabilities of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This group was interested in placing the Iraqi oil market under the control of American and British oil companies, thereby stabilizing the region's oil market. In other words, the Iraq War was about oil. As this paper will demonstrate, the war in Iraq could never be seen as just for two reasons: 1) the justification(s) portrayed by the Bush administration were untrue, and 2) the true reason behind the war was to provide America and the West access to Iraqi oil, both of which taint the remainder of the GWOT.

Chapter Two

Just War Theory

“American strategy has to face the fact that it may be confronted with war, and that if Soviet aggression confronts us with war, and we are unwilling to resist, it will mean the end of our freedom. It boils down then to a value choice. In these terms, yes, I think war must be made a usable instrument of policy.”¹¹

—Henry Kissinger July 13, 1958

The purpose of this study is to determine if the GWOT, in its entirety, was a just war. The GWOT was not a single war; rather, it was a series of military conflicts and preemptive and preventive strikes, all with a common goal to rid the world of organizations labeled by the United States as terror groups. Only one nation-state, Iraq, was invaded by the United States and its coalition partners to overthrow the political regime. Arguably, the United States utilized surrogates to topple regimes in other countries. Even Afghanistan, the country in which America had been operating for almost twenty years, was not invaded in a manner consistent with a conventional declaration of war. Certainly not with the vigor in which Iraq was invaded.

To determine the justification for the GWOT we must identify what is, by definition, a just war. As with most arguments, there are differing opinions on the topic of the justification of war.

In the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations passed a charter requiring all its members to settle international disputes by peaceful means rather than through wars, advocating for the creation of just war criteria. The United Nations did not make recommendations related to the criteria each member’s just war policy should contain, leaving such decisions to each nation’s policymakers.

There are three (3) groups, or mindsets, which can be expected to have a voice among the policymakers in any given nation. The first group, the pacifists, are ferocious in their belief that

war is never acceptable. A truly committed pacifist would argue that it would be better to be conquered by an invading hoard and spend generations under subjugation rather than lose one life to war. Their theory is not at all unsound; after generations of interbreeding with the conquerors, the assimilated society would eventually again achieve homeostasis. After all, what is now Great Britain was either invaded, conquered, or both many times over a very long period by the Romans, Germans, Normans, and Danes. Each invading army bred with the indigenous inhabitants and was assimilated into their culture until, once again, Great Britain rose. Some pacifists base their anti-war beliefs on religion, even though most religions do not forbid war.

Other pacifists simply abhor the loss of human life. Jesus Christ is an example of a pacifist who would not advocate raising a hand to an enemy even when that enemy meant to harm. Whether or not the reader acknowledges the existence of Christ, or a higher power, it is unarguable that His example of pacifism exemplifies the pacifist theory that no war is just.

The second group, the advocates for war, cannot be persuaded otherwise. They will never back down from a fight and always have at the ready a reason for killing, even if the reason makes sense only to them. Adolph Hitler, the notorious mass-murdering, genocidal architect of the Third Reich claimed to have justification for the atrocities he committed. War was not only acceptable to Hitler it was as inevitable and necessary as breathing. Neither the countries he attacked nor the Holocaust victims he murdered behaved aggressively toward Hitler's Germany before his aggression. His perverse desire to spread his master race throughout the world justified his bloodthirst. To reasonable minds, his reasons were absurd. Logic proved Hitler's supposed justifications were simply misplaced rationalizations conjured for murder and conquest purposes. Yet, paradoxically to Hitler and his followers, his ideas were sound. In Hitler's mind, all his actions leading up to and during World War II were just and necessary.

Last are the groups, people, and countries that support the middle-ground: war can be justified under certain circumstances. These groups, people, and countries may or may not like war but recognize that the world is full of aggressors, and if a nation-state is to survive, war might be a necessary evil. They suggest that if war is a necessary evil its inevitability should be governed by rules to make certain that it is only used as a last resort, and its combatants are not subjected to cruel and unusual circumstances. It is the need for these certain circumstances which brought about the creation of just war theory.

Just war theory, also referred to as just war tradition, has been contemplated, argued, and rationalized for centuries by all sides of the argument. Just war theory is often referred to by its Latin name, “Jus ad Bellum,” or Justice of War.

Scholars who have studied or taught Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello (Justice in War), or Jus post Bellum (Justice Post-War) are more familiar with Western just war theory. The term Western just war theory refers to writings and practices grounded in early European Christianity. The United States Army training module on the law of war, as well as the *Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, are grounded in Western just war theory and appear to have been drafted using Christian just war theory as a guide.

Scholars, philosophers, politicians, theologians, and many others have written about the law of war for centuries. There is no universal set list of just war criteria; however, the US *Department of Defense Law of War Manual* contains a credible set of criteria that will be referenced herein and applied to the GWOT. Those criteria are:

- 1) a competent authority to order the war for a public purpose
- 2) having just cause
- 3) means being proportionate to the just cause

4) all peaceful alternatives have been exhausted

5) a right intention on the part of the just belligerent ¹²

Both the Western and Eastern just war models provide for the use of force, or war, to accomplish the defeat of an enemy who has brought the use of force upon itself. Further, they advocate for all diplomatic avenues to be exhausted before the decision to go to war is made. A nation-state deciding to go to war to correct a legitimate grievance is not acting lawfully if that nation-state has not made every attempt possible to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the grievance. In fact, that nation-state is as wrong in its action as another that has attacked its neighbor for no apparent reason. Resolution by peaceful means can include but is not limited to political negotiations, trade embargos on food, fuel products, and other commodities, naval blockades, and constructive demonstrations of military force. There is no set time limit for these peacekeeping tactics. A nation-state must demonstrate that it has exhausted all avenues.

Pre-Christian Attempts to Create Rules for the Justice of War

There are no written accounts historians can point to that indicate the exact beginning of the contemplation of just war theory. One indisputable fact is that war has been waged since prerecorded times when our ancestors decided to leave their solitude and organize into collectives. Early wars consisted of battles between these collectives for various reasons, some resembling an argument one might have with a neighbor over food sources, more comfortable living arrangements, or a dog barking. These wars were uncivilized, as the weaponry used to wage them was quite often used as a farming tool just prior to dispatching the enemy. As the early collectives grew and became more organized, nation-states evolved, and within those nation-states, leaders, warriors, and weapons took shape. Humans organized into classes, with the dominant class becoming gentrified and educated. This dominant, educated class viewed the

lack of civility in random slaughter as problematic, especially when religion became a dominant variable in government, and decided to attempt to create rules for warfare.

One of the earliest Western attempts at the creation of just war rules can be traced back to the famed Greek philosopher Aristotle over 300 years BCE. Aristotle was not a pro-war monger; in fact, he felt war to be unnecessary. Aristotle opined, “The lawgiver (nation-state) should aim generally to establish peace and a cultured life.”¹³ But Aristotle knew that humankind was predisposed to violence and, as such, theorized that combatants should consider three (3) criteria before going to war:

- 1) Is the war being waged to avoid enslavement?
- 2) Is the war being waged to establish an empire that would benefit the governed?
- 3) Is the enemy of a stock that is predisposed by nature to be enslaved?

Today’s historians can see the inherent problems with Aristotle’s work, as he implies that in his time some people were predisposed to enslavement.

Marcus Cicero, a Roman, felt that the primary purpose of war was to protect the Roman Empire.¹⁴ After all, according to Cicero, all of humankind could benefit from being involuntarily annexed into the Roman Empire. Paul D. Miller called Cicero’s nationalistic attitude “a natural kind of patriotism.”¹⁵ Cicero was a proponent of self-defense but did not reject the possibility of warring over what he referred to as honor, provided there was an imminent or inevitable threat.¹⁶ He was keenly aware of the brutality of war and believed it should only be waged with temperament and for the right reasons. Cicero argued for two primary points related to war:

- 1) No just war can be waged except for the purpose of punishment or repelling enemies.
- 2) The only excuse for going to war is that we (Romans) may live in peace unharmed.¹⁷

It would take some 700 years before the Christian scholar and philosopher St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430) would provide the world with a more acceptable set of rules governing the declaration of war, rules which would guide leaders in the Christian world for more than one thousand years and eventually provide the foundation for today's American just war policy.

Christian (Western) Model of the Just War Tradition

Christianity is no stranger to war, having sanctioned and fought the brutal crusades in the name of God. It was Michael Howard who remarked that "Christianity is one of the great warrior religions."¹⁸ For several hundred years it appeared as though the followers of Christ had forgotten his teachings of love and forgiveness and adopted a culture of hate and brutality. But the reality of the crusades was that the lust for power and misguided interpretation of right and wrong created a mindset within the Catholic church that made it easy to rationalize the atrocities committed by the crusaders at the direction of the highest level of Christianity itself. The crusades were one of many very bleak periods in the history of Christianity when the simple criteria established by St. Augustine were distorted to fit the morally corrupt ideals of the leaders of the Catholic church.

Still, it is historically very important and significant that St. Augustine developed his three just war criteria because it enabled those Christians who were not supportive of ideals that would see them enslaved for millennia by invading hordes rather than fight back against those who would do them harm to justify and therefore support war. These criteria were a construct of natural law.¹⁹

Regardless of the subsequent distortion of those Augustinian principles, the church realized that if their flock were to thrive, they would have to promulgate laws for war and sanction them from the highest levels of Catholicism.

St. Augustine was an early Christian theologian whose deliberations on war and pacifism are well documented and considered to be the first sanctioned by the church. Early writings by Augustine have been scrutinized for hundreds of years, with nary a provision for sanctioned killing found within. In fact, Augustine wrote that while killing might be permitted by temporal law, it was forbidden and wrong by divine law.²⁰ Later in his journey as a scholar, theologian, and philosopher, Augustine tempered his earlier thoughts, recognizing that killing was a permissible act by a soldier in defense of peace under the direction of God or competent authority. He observed that war was a necessary consequence of sin and evil.²¹ According to Augustine, in the Bible's Romans 13:4, God instituted civil government to punish evil.²² Civil government (competent authority), therefore, had an obligation to keep the public safe from evildoers by punishing them with war, as appropriate. Augustine further supports the law of grace teachings from Luke 17:21, teachings which are fundamentally opposed to the taking of human life but took this one step further by evoking the term "law of justice," which he claims provides for self-protection.²³ According to Augustine, Romans 13:4 advocates for humans to act in their own best interest or as Palmer put it, "for your own good."

In his own work centuries later, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) argued that war could be justified under only the strictest terms. Aquinas improved upon the work of his predecessors Augustin and Cicero by relating to the reliance on natural law when arguing for the justice of war.²⁴ It would be the work of Aquinas that would set the foundation upon which conventional United States just war policy would be built. According to Aquinas, a war could be considered just only if:

- 1) the proper authority undertook the action.

2) just cause existed; the country attacked must have done something to deserve the attack.

3) the intention should be right.

The proper authority referenced by Aquinas in the first criterion is meant to be a civil authority under God.²⁵ In other words, if God recognized the existence of a country, then that country was considered a civil authority under the word of God and therefore enjoyed divine authority to wage war to protect its citizens. In turn, that war would be just, although this rationale could easily be manipulated to allow an aggressor country to justify its actions.

The second criterion, just cause, referred to the reason for the military action. Aquinas believed Christians, as a creation of God, had the moral, ethical, and religious obligation to protect themselves under His law.

Lastly, the right intention implies that the reason for the war cannot be dominance over another nation-state, population, or group. Aquinas would not look kindly at a war with the intended purpose of one nation-state securing the natural resources of another nation-state for its benefit any more than he would agree to war with the purpose of enslaving inhabitants.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church expanded upon the criteria published by Aquinas, adding four criteria that must be present if a war were to be just.²⁶

1. Legitimate Authority: A war must be waged by a legitimate civil authority (i.e., a State, in accordance with Romans 13, not individuals or groups who do not constitute an authority sanctioned by whatever the society deems legitimate).
2. Just Cause: The cause must be just (i.e., self-defense of the innocent against an armed attack, redressing an injury, punishing evil, restoring territory unjustly seized).

3. Right Intention: The central intention of the war must be reestablishing a just peace (not conquering, spreading seeds of revolt, or acquiring power or material possessions).
4. Last Resort: All other non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force is justified.
5. Reasonable Prospect for Success: Death and injury incurred in a war not having a reasonable chance of success are not morally justifiable.
6. Grave Damage from the Aggressor: The damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation must be lasting, grave, and certain.
7. Proportionality: The use of arms must not produce evils graver than the evil to be eliminated; the peace established by the war must be preferable to the peace that would have prevailed had the war not been fought.²⁷

Two hundred years later, the Westphalian Treaty would adopt many of the characteristics of Augustine's and Aquinas's work to carve out a world order and establish self-defense rights for the sovereign nation-state. Miller, in his book *Just War and Ordered Liberty*, argues that Westphalia is significant enough in the history of just war that it merits recognition as a separate just war tradition, rather than simply as a treaty. He identifies that Christian just war tradition is grounded in "medieval Christendom," while the Westphalian treaty was the product of the Enlightenment, based on natural law.²⁸ While Augustine and Aquinas centered their work around what man perceived as good and righteous, Westphalia removed the theological reasoning and recognized the necessity for the protection of sovereignty.²⁹

Eastern Just War Theory

While much of what is published on just war cedes credit to Western Christian theory, the West does not have a monopoly on the law of war. The tenets of just war can be traced back to ancient Hindu and Chinese cultures. Eastern just war theory is not diametrically opposed to its Western counterpart and arguably predates the teachings of Augustine.

The Hindu teachings related to the justice of war are based on goodness, which does not imply a reluctance on the part of Hindi followers to wage war. Goodness in war means that war must be considered righteous.³⁰ For many in the West, ancient India is seen as a peaceful and mystical country. Alexander the Great would disagree, as he found the warlords of India to be among the most fearsome he had ever fought.³¹

Just as in Europe, where Christianity promulgated rules and ideals for the proper and civilized waging of wars, so did the Hindu religion in ancient India. These rules were meant to curb the barbaric nature of combat and make certain that wars were fought humanely and for the right reasons.³² Hindu morality emphasizes collective needs over individual rights, which are tied to situational notions of time, place, status, and, particularly, duty.³³ Killing for the sake of Dharma (righteousness) was not only sanctioned but was also encouraged to maintain the harmonious balance of the Hindu religion.

Among its myriad teachings, the Hindu religion includes a rich body of ideas about proper military conduct, political strategy, and ethical warfare. Though its military traditions are not well known to the West, Hindu civilization harbors an extensive record of advice in matters of war.³⁴

Ancient India was divided into classes, with the warrior class being expected to fulfill its obligation to fight, but for only the right reasons. The ruling class was expected to make certain these right reasons existed.

The concept of Hindu just war is a construct within Hindu mythology found in the Bhagavad Gita and is referred to as Ramayana, which claims a type of moral superiority in the fight against good and evil.³⁵ Hinduism teaches that while it is acceptable to wage a war to defend your country, it is also acceptable to proactively attack a group that is not necessarily your enemy if they are involved in immoral occupations or have done nothing to deserve an attack and are too weak to defend themselves. The Ramayana sees war as a means to an end. In other words, upon the revelation of injustice, a moral entity has a righteous obligation to intervene and stop the injustice. Once that action is complete, the need for violence is over, and peace can once again reign, as the best intentions of the aggressor have been realized.

Walzer's realistic views on war include the admission that these best intentions can be abused, even going so far as to admit that humanitarian intervention can be subject to abuse.³⁶ But the possibility or even the probability that this abuse could take place does not invalidate the justification for the action. Walzer cites the invasion of Bangladesh by the Indian Army in 1971 as such an event, conducted on a slippery slope.

In such circumstances, Walzer contends a state must act decisively to intervene in the affairs of another state to prevent internal massacres of the neighboring population (or subsets of its population, such as ethnic or religious minorities as in the case of the former Yugoslavia). If such military intervention necessitates transgressing the state's right to territorial sovereignty, then so be it. For Walzer, protecting human rights is a greater good and higher value in his ethical hierarchy than protecting state sovereignty.³⁷ Also, Walzer suggests that modifying civil

liberties if they are incompatible with the effectiveness of necessary police work during times of war against the asymmetrical threat of terrorism would be acceptable in a contemporary liberal democracy.³⁸ Walzer's thoughts related to the extent to which a nation-state might go to protect itself, its citizens, and its way of life seem to be consistent with Cicero's assertion that the protection of the Roman Empire was paramount to any other reason for not going to war.

The Chinese belief in just war is very similar to that of Hinduism because it too permits similar moral superiority when championing a cause for the weak but has a tendency to be undertaken with a more definitive end state, such as imperialism or occupation.³⁹ Sun Tzu, the legendary Chinese warlord who in his day was considered one of the most fearsome generals in the world, disliked war, always viewing it as a last resort and the worst way of handling a dispute.⁴⁰ Both the Hindu and Chinese theories of war are less concerned with the concept of competent authority than their Christian counterparts.⁴¹

Islamic just war theory is grounded in jihad. Jihad covers many types of battles or struggles in the name of Allah. In America, the term jihad evokes various forms of emotion ranging from fear to uncontrollable anger. The word jihad, which is best translated as a verb meaning "to strive," has been warped and twisted by many groups to the point that some people believe it is a philosophical term directly related to terrorist activities against America and the West, but this is a falsehood. Jihad should be viewed as a Muslim's obligation to promulgate their (faith) religion, not just through war but through education and celebration. As such, jihad is relevant in any discussion related to Islamic just war theory, and it should never be viewed through a lens of negativity.

In terms of warfare, jihad in the Qur'an and Sunnah foreshadows many features of the modern just-war theory concepts of Jus ad Bellum ("Justice to War") as well as Jus in Bello

(“Justice in War”): non-aggression, proper declaration, right intention, war as a last resort, proportional retaliation, strict adherence to covenants, and protection of civilian lives and property.⁴²

The Qur’an has many passages that can guide Muslims who take up arms in defense of Islam including when and why it is proper to fight as well as the conduct of warfare. Much like the term jihad has been distorted to evoke unnecessary fear, the Qur’an has been consistently misquoted, often portrayed as a type of playbook for warring Muslims to kill for the sake of killing and take no prisoners. The reality is that the Islamic just war theory is not at all dissimilar to the other eastern models and the western (Christian) model.

Philosophical Take on Just War

For as long as nation-states and religious scholars have sought to define the proper rules for the declaration and conduct of war, liberal philosophers have debated its legality and morality.

Erasmus (Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus) would undoubtedly argue that there can never be a reason to go to war. He would further claim that war was “stupid” and refer to those who waged it as “military idiots.” War was utterly irrational. It was neither glorious nor necessary. Those who conducted war were worthy of not admiration but contempt. Erasmus would never have agreed with Thomas Aquinas and possibly claim he was just seeking to create criteria that would justify aggression. War could never be an option, even if your nation-state was under attack. Princes, according to Erasmus, should be more concerned with the well-being of their kingdoms than with waging war.⁴³ Erasmus believed the divine purpose wished upon humans by God was not rooted in war, rather it was to maintain one’s country in a state of peace.⁴⁴

The noted seventeenth-century French writer and advocate for peace Emeric Cruce argued that wars occurred because men of war were inherently impatient of repose. He encouraged citizens to seek more peaceful occupations predisposed to economic development.⁴⁵ Bush's impatience (and haste) related to both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein support Cruce's argument since we will never know if war could have been avoided if Bush displayed more patience.

More contemporary liberals such as Jonathon Dymond argued that even a war of self-defense is immoral and illegal. Dymond claimed that there is, "no hope of eradication of war but by an absolute and total abandonment of it."⁴⁶ Dymond, a Quaker from Britain, believed that war was started and perpetuated by statesmen and politicians motivated by the ability to profit from the war, whether that profit was from land acquisition, trade routes, or by virtue of lucrative contracts with the government to provide requisite commodities. Are Dymond and Erasmus wrong in their zealous pursuit of peace through the abolition of war?

Pacifists such as Dymond and Erasmus might argue that even if a nation-state capitulated peacefully during a time of siege, it would be better to live under the rule of another, whether that person is a monarch or a dictator, than risk the loss of tens of thousands of souls defending a way of life that might well flourish under that rule. To Erasmus and Dymond, the choice was really no choice at all. Peace would always be better than war, regardless of the outcome. But is that a realistic view of the world? Is it even a practical view? Would the populace of a nation-state truly be willing and eager to capitulate to an aggressor, if they knew beforehand they would be risking enslavement and subjugation?

Many recognize that war is inevitable. Nation-states will always have grievances, and some of those grievances will only be able to be settled by war. Therefore, these proponents

argue that criteria must exist and be applied to a conflict to determine if the nation-state is justified, if for no other reason but to ensure humanness during the bloodshed.

The eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant viewed war as necessary, at times, in order to establish peace. He recognized that the state of peace between men living together was not natural, rather it was one of war. For Kant, the establishment of a liberal democracy or republican state was paramount. If a nation-state must go to war against a non-liberal nation-state to force that nation-state to adopt a republican government, Kant approved, arguing that liberal democracies (republics) would not have the need to war against one another. Kant raised a valid point since there are few instances where liberal democracies have warred against each other.

Kant's arguments in all his writings were based in pure reason. According to Kant, our duty to promote the highest good is the sum of all moral duties, and we can fulfill this duty only if we believe that the highest good is attainable. Therefore, it must be moral to spread liberal democracies (republics), which in turn create personal freedom. While Kant argued for perpetual peace and harmony, he recognized that war might have to be the vehicle in which it was delivered to the world.

Thomas Paine, the political activist and philosopher, wrote numerous publications (pamphlets) on the topic of human rights and freedom. His *Rights of Man* pamphlet, published in 1791, helped establish a foundation for the furtherance of American law of war and gave way to the modern philosophy of treaties, agreements, and negotiations between countries.⁴⁷ Paine was a revolutionary who saw the path to peace through revolution.

Friedrich Nietzsche's perspective on war was a bit different than some of the philosophers of his time, as Nietzsche could not find justification in waging war. To Nietzsche, a

just war is waged by a protagonist who believes they occupy a moral high ground that justifies the desire to attack and kill an enemy. To this protagonist, the enemy (antagonist) has no moral equivalent and must be considered evil.

Nietzsche was a nihilist. His nihilistic views are evident in many of his writings. Nihilism is often confused with atheism or agnosticism, but there is a difference. A true nihilist believes that one's life means absolutely nothing to anyone but the person living it and that meaning is nothing more than a construct created by the person's individual ego and (false) self-worth. For example, a soldier might choose to serve his country because of a strong feeling of national pride he has toward his nation. That country's government may be guided and protected by the values of the predominant religion. The nihilist rejects this nationalist loyalty because the country and the religion's values could never be anything more than a false creation designed to give the soldier self-worth, worth that is wholly non-existent except in the mind of the soldier. Once the soldier's ego is filled with this false self-worth, he is presented with an enemy which is suggested to be subhuman or evil, clearly not worthy of the soldier or his nation. This enemy is immediately presented by the government as a threat, and the soldier's natural inclination is to exterminate this threat, which his government has portrayed as evil.⁴⁸

Nietzsche believed that good and evil were relative terms that existed in the minds of everyone. One person believed themselves to be righteous and moral (good) and the enemy to be wrong (evil), while the wrong person believed themselves to be the righteous and moral person. In the end, Nietzsche claims that there is neither evil nor good, simply flawed perspective. These perspectives give birth to all types of conflict including war.

Heraclitus of Ephesus, a presocratic Greek philosopher, opined “War is the father and king of all.”⁴⁹ Nietzsche had studied and was influenced by the ancient Greek philosophers, including Heraclitus.⁵⁰ He also shared with Heraclitus a similar disdain for the populace, as it was the latter who suggested ‘most people sleepwalk through life,’ implying they were easily led by their rulers.⁵¹ Was it this influence that created Nietzsche’s belief that “A good war sanctifies any cause”?⁵² Nietzsche’s writings, like those of many philosophers of that time, often required interpretation to derive the true meaning behind the words. Nietzsche was not at all implying that the death and destruction caused by a war sanctified its cause, nor did he find war to be particularly ‘good.’ Rather, Nietzsche’s comment is a paradox. While Nietzsche’s feelings on war fluctuated throughout his lifetime, he often condemned a battle between two parties who both see themselves as righteous. Nietzsche’s point is that they are neither good nor bad; they are simply driven by ideals that have been created within their own minds, religion, or government. These ideals, on both sides, are promulgated to the citizens as righteous, and the result is a war that could never be just, as both sides have created the circumstances which make their argument just. For Nietzsche, the best possible (good) outcome of a war would be total annihilation of both sides. Then, both sides would have no choice but to see that neither was good nor evil. There was no purpose for the war because there was no purpose for life or the resulting death.

Chapter Three

Just War and the United States

“Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed...”⁵³

—President Dwight Eisenhower

Strong words from one of the architects of the bloodiest amphibious military landing in the history of warfare. Historians argue endlessly regarding what prompted the change in President Eisenhower’s sentiments about war, but there is little argument that the antiwar feelings Eisenhower had when he gave his famous farewell speech were correct. Eisenhower warned America of the dangers the military-industrial complex (MIC) posed to society by allowing them to determine when, where, and with whom we fought. Eisenhower was so concerned about the MIC that he dedicated his farewell speech to the nation to warning America of its existence and his fear it would overrun research efforts, even in universities. As he left office, he saw less utility in war and felt a sense of urgency to redirect money toward America’s social wellbeing.

The United States has, at least publicly, always advanced the notion that it would only go to war for a just cause. History, however, does not agree that America has always met that standard. But that does not mean America has never succeeded. The two case studies presented below exemplify when the United States waged war for morally correct reasons.

Both presidents involved, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, realized the importance of meeting the just war theory standards before waging their respective World Wars. America waited much longer than its allies preferred before deciding to unleash the mighty American war machine on the enemies of freedom. Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt kept

America out of their respective World Wars until they were faced with insurmountable circumstances that gave them a moral duty to act.

World War I

The United States stood hard and fast behind President Woodrow Wilson and his decision to remain neutral during World War I. Wilson's campaign slogan at the time, "He kept us out of War," showed he was keenly aware that the public did not want to be drawn into a conflict in Europe. Wilson's lack of action implied he was committed to the wisdom imparted by General George Washington during his farewell speech when he implored his successors to "Steer clear of permanent alliances with any parts of the foreign world."⁵⁴

World War I started without America on July 28, 1914. The primary belligerents were Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy on one side and England, France, and Russia on the other. The actual reasons for the conflict are not easily explainable, as there was not a specific military action that started the hostilities.

The most widely accepted reason offered has sufficed for over 100 years. This reason is often conveyed in just one sentence, with no accompanying explanation: Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, and his wife were assassinated by the Serbs. But more factors occurred in Europe than the assassination which help explain the start of the Great War and America's entry into it.

In the early 1900s, several countries in Europe entered into military and economic alliances. The world was involved in a global industrial revolution that not only quickly grew the economies of these countries but also increased military capabilities. The British and French had many colonies throughout the world, as did Germany and Italy. Each country defended its colonies vigorously, both militarily and politically. They each exploited their colonies vigorously

as well, cultivating their respective natural resources for their own use or sale in the burgeoning industrial market. These colonies tended to get little in return for the privilege of being a colony. The defense offered to each country's "property" created an arms race of sorts, putting all of Europe on eggshells until eventually each country seemingly abandoned the principles of the Westphalian Treaties and developed plans for invading and defeating each other. The British, French, and Russians had formed an alliance called the Triple Entente, while the alliance formed by Germany and Austria-Hungary was called the Triple Alliance. Wilson seemed content to spectate from the other side of the Atlantic. Pre-World War I Europe was looking for an excuse to wage war. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand acted as a catalyst, if not the excuse, for the commencement of a vicious war that spent most of its time as a stalemate, each side bogged down, immobile along a line of trenches that brought death to millions.

All parties on both sides knew full well that the entry of the American military into the war on the side of the Triple Entente would signal the start of almost instant victory for them. America had developed into the global industrial powerhouse by the turn of the century, with much of that industry aimed at modernizing its ability to defend against any enemy. America had no reason to enter a global conflict in Europe, but it certainly had the resources to enter and decisively win, and everyone involved knew it.

By the beginning of 1917, Wilson had tired of analyzing the negligible reasons which started the conflict and wanted no part of it. Both Britain and France begged him for years, but his resolve was firm, up to a point. In his book *America's Greatest Blunder*, Burton Pine identifies six reasons that may have contributed to Wilson's change of heart:⁵⁵

1. Britain's aggressive propaganda campaign
2. Germany's counter-campaign trying to dissuade American involvement

3. Growing American economic reliance on selling food and war material to the Triple Entente
4. Germany's submarine attacks, which had started targeting American ships
5. The Russian Revolution overthrowing the Czar, an unpopular figure in American politics
6. The gradual change in the American public's attitude toward their government's responses to both sides' actions

History will never know for certain how heavily these six reasons weighed on Wilson's decision to enter the war, but there is one interesting factor not listed which may have been the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back—the Zimmermann Telegram.

The validity and mere existence of the Zimmermann Telegram were debated by global historians for years, but now, over 100 years later, enough information has been uncovered to validate its existence. Its relevance to Wilson's decision is still open to debate among historians, but it does offer a very plausible reason for Wilson's change of heart.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the German Republic Arthur Zimmermann composed and sent a telegram to the Mexican government containing an offer should Germany win the war. Mexico had remained neutral but still harbored resentment over the treaty that resulted from the Spanish-American war. The treaty forced Mexico to relinquish its colonies and territories to America. Zimmermann, convinced that Germany's continued torpedoing of American escort vessels would draw America into the war, needed a contingency plan. He offered to return everything lost in the Spanish-American war to Mexico if, after America joined the war in Europe, the former attacked the latter. An attack by Mexico would cause America to fight a war on two fronts. Once Germany won the war, the attention of the Triple Alliance would turn

toward America. The combined military strength of the Triple Alliance and their new North American ally Mexico would finish America off.

Mexico was less than two decades removed from a resounding defeat at the hands of America in the Spanish-American War. There was no hope for Mexico to win a war; rather, the hope was to keep America distracted and busy long enough for the Triple Alliance to win the war in Europe and turn their weapons on America. Zimmermann knew that if Wilson were to prioritize one front in a two-front war, it would be the one threatening the American homeland.

Thankfully, the British had a very robust and successful message decoding program and, after intercepting the telegram, alerted Washington as to Germany's plan. Wilson did not immediately act upon the contents of the telegram, but eventually, rather than take a gamble which would have certainly resulted in disaster for Europe and possibly for the United States, he joined the Triple Entente.

The United States lacked the moral justification to enter a war in Europe without the Zimmermann Telegram. America had no quarrel with the belligerents nor did they pose a military threat. It is true that Germany had torpedoed American escort ships delivering commodities to Great Britain, but those attacks fell well short of an act of war. America was neutral but was providing material support to Germany's enemy Great Britain. The loss of American life was sad, but Germany's response was reasonable and just.

The Zimmermann Telegram made America's path to war much clearer. Perhaps Wilson had neither the desire nor justification to enter World War I before the telegram, but he clearly had just cause to enter the war once he read its contents. The Germans had obviously developed a tentative plan for an attack from America's southern border. This attack was neither imminent nor inevitable, but any hesitation could have opened a North American front to the Great War.

Wilson's decision was morally correct and in keeping with just war tradition. But could there be yet another more nefarious reason for Wilson's seemingly sudden and inexplicable change of direction?

The late Smedley Butler claimed that a meeting took place just before America's commitment to the Triple Entente between President Wilson and a group of advisors. These advisers were an early example of the MIC. The group told President Wilson,

There is no use kidding ourselves any longer. The cause of the allies is lost. We now owe American bankers, American munitions makers, American manufacturers, American speculators, and American exporters five or six billion dollars. If we lose (and without the help of the United States we will lose), we, England, France, and Italy cannot pay back this money . . . and Germany won't.⁵⁶

If Butler's account of this meeting is accurate, it represents one of the earliest examples of the influence the MIC had over military affairs in America. The industrial revolution was moving rapidly, funneling private money, MIC money, into the overseas effort.

World War II

World War II is an interesting case study in just war theory since the country founded on the principles of Christianity sat on its hands while the Third Reich was perpetrating the European Holocaust. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) took painstaking strides to keep America neutral in the war raging in Europe. The United States, at the insistence and direction of FDR, had remained neutral throughout the early part of the Second World War. When Hitler's offensive movements in Europe started with his September 1, 1939 invasion of Poland, America was only twenty-one years removed from World War I, a conflict that cost the lives of 116,516 American servicemen. America, FDR felt, was neither willing nor ready to

sacrifice any more American lives in a war across the Atlantic. He thought the conflict should and could be handled by a united Europe.

Even as news of the atrocities committed against the Jewish population became globally acknowledged, America remained neutral, adhering to FDR's nationalist policies designed to hasten recovery from the Great Depression. Germany grew more brazen and bolder as the world watched, wondering why FDR and the mighty American military refused to fight.

America seemingly turned a blind eye to Germany's provocation even when the latter sunk several American-flagged ships, some of which were escorting cargo ships to England with supplies related to the Lend-Lease program. Many in America wondered why FDR refused to allow safe haven to the MS St. Louis, which departed Europe in 1939 with over 400 European Jews escaping Nazi persecution. Eventually, the St. Louis was forced to return to Europe, and several of the unfortunate souls ended up meeting their deaths in extermination camps.

FDR could have pointed to the unprovoked attacks on American-flagged ships as well as the atrocities of the Holocaust to prove to his constituency that joining Europe in a war against Hitler was a just cause. But FDR was not turning a blind eye; rather, he was simply waiting for the right moment.

In August 1941, three months before the official entry of the United States into World War II, FDR told the American public that he was going to spend some time on his boat fishing. He even went so far as to have a decoy who looked like him smoking on the back of his boat to mislead the media. While America thought FDR was enjoying the sea, he had traveled to England, where he and Churchill penned the draft of the Atlantic Charter.⁵⁷ FDR was preparing for America's inevitable entry into World War II.

History will never know when FDR decided to commit America to enter its second war in Europe because on December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, forcing his hand.

Germany and Japan declared war on America four days later, drawing America out of isolation.

FDR held on to his commitment to neutrality longer than most of the world wished him to, but eventually he relented, though he did not relent for free. In early September 1940, six months before enacting Lend-Lease into law, FDR sent fifty World War I era destroyers to the British in exchange for American control over air and naval bases in the Caribbean, greatly expanding American regional influence.⁵⁸ A few months later, in a speech to America, FDR would declare that the United States must become the “greatest arsenal of democracy,” acknowledging that the American industrial worker would be the lynchpin of creation.⁵⁹ The MIC had now broadened the scope of its influence.

While Germany did not want America to enter the war given the disastrous results of the Great War, Japan was another story. Japan still harbored deep resentment toward America, resentment which had been simmering for decades. Japanese novelist Natsume Sōseki once wrote of America, “The memory of having sat at someone's feet will later make you want to trample him underfoot...”⁶⁰ Years of military preparedness needed only the prodding of a bully to force Japan's hand, and the United States had all the power and hubris to be that bully. Smedley Butler insists that American strategic economic involvement in post-Spanish American War Philippines, coupled with military exercises in the South China Sea were designed to “rile” the Japanese.⁶¹

In the mid-1800s, Japan was still very much isolationist by choice. The military, at a national level, was loosely organized. The Samurai had been, for millennia, the dominant military force within Japan. International trade had helped Japan's economy, making the ruling

class much wealthier. That ruling class sought to make Japan powerful and rejected the ancient Samurai for a Western-style expeditionary military force. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan took note of the global domination occurring in the Pacific and the Far East through the imperialism of Great Britain, France, the United States, and other countries. Japan feared that someday they might be subjugated under someone else's empire and decided to develop their military and economy to become the dominant Asian superpower in the Far East. Japan wanted to become a force to be reckoned with, so it had to find a way to become an industrial empire.⁶² The lack of such commodities as oil, rubber, and rice kept Japan at a geopolitical disadvantage.⁶³ Eventually, Japan realized that if they lacked the internal resources to facilitate their quest to become a global industrial superpower, they would simply have to take them. As early as 1858, Lord Hattori had prepared Japanese doctrine which would call for the acquisition of machinery for world conquest.⁶⁴ Systematically, the Japanese ruling body improved military capabilities dramatically until 1889 when they codified their efforts in a new constitution. The (Emperor) Meiji Constitution became Japan's long-term strategic plan for the next fifty-plus years. While Japan maintained a certain degree of isolationist belief during the profound modern military buildup which started with the Meiji Constitution, they were not shy about copying the United States and United Kingdom military doctrine.⁶⁵

The results of the Russo-Japanese war just after the turn of the century surprised everyone but the Japanese. They had been preparing to engage and defeat a world superpower and did so quite readily in their defeat of the Russians. Japan thought they had finally earned a seat at the table among the warrior-nation-elite. But President Theodore Roosevelt, the mediator of the post-Russo-Japanese War treaty, dealt a crushing blow to Japan's desire for global domination when he clearly favored the Russians by refusing to cede any territory to Japan, as

well as grant any reparations to the Japanese people. This treaty sowed the seeds of animosity against the United States.⁶⁶ The Japanese military machine would continue to grow, and their discontent would simmer for years.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese immigration into the United States, particularly on the west coast, increased greatly. Word quickly got back to the Japanese islands of the racism their former countrymen had to endure. Japanese immigrants were viewed as subhuman, often being forced to live in squalor. Intolerance was not limited to the common people. A California politician used the phrase “Yellow Peril” when describing this influx of Japanese into America.⁶⁷ This disrespect only made the Japanese continue to view America negatively.

While Japan is not widely recognized for playing a major role in World War I, they did assist the Allied efforts in the Pacific, mostly utilizing their already impressive Navy to facilitate Allied nation shipping routes. The Japanese hoped the world powers would appreciate their effort, recognize them as world superpower, and treat them accordingly. Their hopes were dashed once again when the treaty of Versailles in 1919 failed to grant the Japanese the dignity of racial equality.⁶⁸ Enraged, they continued their military buildup with zeal. They started to realize their imperialistic dreams by seizing German territories in the Pacific.⁶⁹ The Japanese sought to be seen as an imperial power, much like the United States and the United Kingdom, with Tanaka Giichi, the influential Japanese Prime Minister, as the architect of an aggressive plan to take over not just Asia but the world. His eight-point program boldly predicted war with the United States.⁷⁰ Shortly after the Treaty of Versailles, the United States was at the top of the list of enemies of Japan.⁷¹

Japan’s plan to take over the world first took them into a long battle against China. The result of that conflict, not at all inconsequential to the west, was the development of strategic,

operational, and tactical experience that would further help in the creation of a professional and experienced land fighting force.

The consequence of a militarily powerful and threatening Japan was of serious concern to the United States and the United Kingdom, who collectively desired to maintain the balance of power in the Pacific. In 1922, the countries of the United States, Great Britain, Italy, France, and Japan met at a conference in Washington, DC, to discuss disarmament and limitation of power. This Five-Powers Treaty limited the Japanese naval force to 60 percent of that of the United States and Great Britain. Angry and disrespected yet again, Japan no longer would sit back and let the West give them what they believed they so rightfully deserved. Their military buildup continued.

In Berlin on September 27, 1939, Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.⁷² The pact, while not specifically mentioning the United States and not providing any strategic direction, primed Japan for warfare against the allies and set the stage for the Japanese and German declarations two years later. The United States responded to the pact with a series of equally aggressive economic sanctions. On July 18, 1941, the United States hit Japan hard when it ordered an oil embargo and froze Japanese assets.⁷³ Japan was not impressed with these sanctions, as the emperor did not view America as prepared for war. They were filled with confidence in their military, as well as faith in their newfound Axis friends.⁷⁴ Japan would soon find out how wrong they were.

No country deserves to have civilians killed as Japan did to the United States in Pearl Harbor, but the United States should have seen what was coming. Could the catastrophe have been averted altogether through more sensitive diplomacy efforts? In the book *Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.- Japanese Relations: 1919-1941*, Jon Thares-Daviddann claimed that an

American intelligence official in 1936 knew of the discord within the Japanese hierarchy.⁷⁵

According to Thares-Davidann, the consul general of Hawaii, Tamura Teijiro, remarked to him “America is very difficult to get along with.”⁷⁶

Japan had made a conscious decision that they were going to pursue world domination, and that world domination would have to include attacking and defeating the United States. Japan felt a war against America was justified and planned it decades before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Historians have theorized that Japan had no intention of entering into a prolonged conflict with the United States and was convinced that we were unwilling to commit our military to a front so far away. Further, some in the Japanese military believed the United States was unable to field a military force capable of defeating the Japanese military. It was a roll of the dice the Japanese were willing to take. If the Americans immediately sought peace terms, the Japanese finally got the global recognition they so badly wanted (and believed they rightfully deserved). If the Americans dared to fight back, the Japanese military, already hardened from years of war against the Russians and then the Chinese, would crush the American spirit. But this was not just a war about world domination. The Japanese hated the Americans for the years of racial bigotry they had been forced to endure, not just post-Versailles but through the treatment of Japanese nationals who emigrated from Japan to the United States. War with the United States was as much about payback as it was about world domination.

America passed the Lend-Lease Act, which resulted in the MIC developing and selling arms and equipment to Great Britain long before committing to war. Despite the massive material support provided through Lend-Lease, FDR maintained that America was neutral. That neutrality would end on December 7, 1941, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, thereby declaring what they considered to be a just war against America. The United States declared war

on Japan the following day. Germany declared war on the United States four days later, in response to the declaration of war against its ally. America's entry into World War II was now clearly just.

The two World Wars offer exceptional examples of how America showed patience and virtue before deciding to embark on a path that the presidents knew would result in prolific loss of allied, enemy, and civilian life. The wars also suggest that when America desires to wage war in a manner consistent with its just war policy, it certainly can.

Preventive, Preemptive, and Targeted Attacks

"Offensive operations, oftentimes, are the surest, if not the only means of defense."⁷⁷

—General George Washington

The moral implications of preventive, preemptive, and targeted attacks spark ferocious debate between both pro and con sides of the argument. Self-defense is the premise behind the justification of preventive, preemptive, and targeted attacks. International treaties or agreements do not necessarily require nations to wait for an attack to initiate before they invoke the right to self-defense. A nation rarely allows a belligerent to draw first blood. It is also a terrible strategy upon which to embark if one's desire is to win a war. But the ability of a nation to defend itself using preventive, preemptive, and targeted attacks is not without concern, as these types of attacks are subjective actions that carry the risk of abuse and error.

In domestic American society, preventive, preemptive, and targeted attacks are not dissimilar to attacking a bully who told you and the rest of your classmates of their intentions to render you unconscious in the schoolyard after school. One would have three options, 1) wait, and fight the bully on their terms, 2) attack the bully on your terms, or 3) run. There truly is no downside to striking first, as it increases one's chances of victory, provided you are 100 percent

sure harm is imminent or inevitable. While some would see a surprise attack as unfair, there is an adage that suggests that the only fair fight is the one you lose.

Preemptive, preventive, and targeted attacks are legitimate methods of self-defense that have been employed by America for decades. This subchapter will define preemptive, preventive, and targeted attacks, provide historical examples of when they have been employed, and illustrate the need for prudence before wandering down a path from which there is no return.

Preventive Military Action

Preventative military actions seek to prevent a military attack by a belligerent. According to Barry Strauss from the Hoover Organization, “Preventative wars are a military endeavor, aimed at an enemy whom one expects to grow so strong that delay would cause defeat.”⁷⁸ Zajac described preventive attacks as “an attack or raid initiated on the belief that the threat of an attack, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve great risk.”⁷⁹

The Carnegie Center, in 2003, defined preventive war as when a “conflict with the adversary is so deep and unrelenting that war is ultimately inevitable, on worse terms than at present, as the enemy grows stronger over time.”⁸⁰ Henry Allan Stephenson considers preventive action as “a cold-blooded strategy undertaken before a crisis is ongoing...” and regards preventative military action as “the quintessential just cause.”⁸¹

Allen Buchanan, in his essay “Justifying War,” does not offer a definition, rather he asserts that preventive military action can be “justified to avert harm.”⁸² He argues that while temporal distance related to the threat might be present, it certainly does not preclude a nation from acting in self-defense.⁸³

The common core contained within Stephenson and Buchanan's definitions either states or implies inevitability; therefore we can conclude that a preventative military action has occurred when a nation under threat believes that an attack is inevitable. Preventive military action seeks to attack before the threat is developed, thereby eliminating the threat.

Consider a hypothetical example: A sovereign nation possesses verified intelligence that another nation (or in the case of the GWOT, any group of people the United States government has identified as being an enemy) intends on attacking either the country or its assets, and the attack is inevitable (it is going to happen at some point). The former would be justified in conducting an offensive action, with the claim of self-defense, before they were attacked to keep the enemy attack from ever occurring.

Nations should take heed to the laws of war and measure their intent using their current just war policy as a metric since the results of preventive military action can be a war. Stephenson does just that and accurately concludes that while a preventative military action can meet four out of the five just war criteria this research uses to measure the GWOT, it cannot meet the requirement of exhausting all peaceful alternatives.⁸⁴ This fact begs the question, "When a preventative military action is undertaken prior to the inevitable attack anticipated by the belligerent, has he purposely removed the need to exhaust the last resort?"⁸⁵

Stephenson very keenly acknowledges the difficulty of either side actually knowing what 'last' is. He quotes Walzer, who in *Just and Unjust Wars*, confronted the "just" elephant in the room by concluding "we can never reach lastness, or we can never know that we reached it. There is always something more to do: Another diplomatic note, another UN resolution, another meeting."⁸⁶ What a salient point regarding a preventative attack: "we can never reach lastness."⁸⁷

Preventive military actions pose an ethical dilemma beyond the fact that they are undertaken without exhausting the last resort—preventive actions start the war. It may very well be a fact that the threat intends on starting a war but did not have the opportunity because it was attacked before firing a shot. While the nation under threat can assert emphatically that it took military action because of an inevitable military threat, there is no measurement to prove they are correct. If they are wrong, then a war broke out at their hand. There was no war before the preventive military action. The preventive military action starts the violence. The perceived threat responds in kind. And there is war. Every assertion that the original military action *was* necessary because of what *might* happen can be met with an equally emphatic assertion that what *did* happen only occurred *because* of the preventive military action.

The German attack on the Russians in 1914 is an example of preventative military action. In this case, Germany strongly believed that a Russian invasion of the German homeland was inevitable. At that time, Russia was showing signs of developing into a military power, figuratively threatening Germany's influence in the Eastern European region, and was massing on German borders. Germany responded to the perceived inevitable Russian attack by striking first in self-defense.

Arguably, the American military action in Granada in 1983 could be considered a preventive action. The most repeated justification for America's action in Granada was to rescue American citizens, most of whom attended school on the island. The more accurate reality was that Communist Cuban soldiers had invaded Granada, and America felt that should they develop a stronghold on the island, our interests in the Caribbean could be compromised. The threat had yet to become imminent but was developing in a direction that eventually would have transitioned into inevitable.

The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese has been viewed as a preventative military action, but deeper research refutes this assertion.⁸⁸ The description of the origin of the Japanese feud with the United States in a previous section of this chapter provides insight to dispute any claim the Japanese acted in self-defense. The Japanese never thought, nor did they have any reason to believe, the United States would attack the Japanese Islands. Bad blood between the nations had simmered for decades, perhaps seventy years. In fact, Japan had been preparing for war with the United States since the 1800s. Seven decades is too long a period for any nation to exist unmolested across the Pacific Ocean then claim it attacked out of fear for its safety.

Preemptive Military Action

The Carnegie Council (1992) defines preemptive military action as “unobjectionable in principle, since it is only an act of anticipatory self-defense in a war effectively initiated by the enemy . . . preemption assumes detection of enemy mobilization of forces to attack, which represents the start of a war.”⁸⁹

Barry Strauss from the Hoover Institute says preemptive military actions “seek to preempt an enemy’s ability to attack a nation”.⁹⁰ Daniel Zajac defines preemptive military action as “an attack or raid initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.”⁹¹ And Stephenson defines preemption as “a sub-category of self-defense in which a state reacts to a clearly identifiable and imminent threat by initiating hostilities to thwart the threat to minimize its detrimental effort.”⁹²

Preemptive military action has long been internationally recognized as a credible and valid action and a component of self-defense. Walzer drew a distinction between preventive and preemptive military actions when he observed a preemptive war is fought only in situations

where a would-be aggressor exhibits hostile actions short of war that suggest an intent to attack accompanied by military preparation that makes the intent a positive danger.⁹³ To Walzer, preemption is consistent with the law of war as well as accepted just war theory.

In the GWOT, the invasion of Iraq is considered preemptive and was presented as such by the United States based on the insistence by America and Great Britain that Iraq possessed WMD and intended to use them imminently. The reality is that the attack on Iraq was a preventive military action, and the threat, if any really existed, was inevitable. Iraq and Saddam Hussein were not preparing to attack anyone, and preparation to attack is a criterion that must be present to establish justification for preemption. Their ballistic missile delivery capability had been eradicated in 1991. For the sake of argument, if Bush was correct about his fears that Iraq had WMD capabilities, at best the attack would have been preventive.

The Six-Day War in 1967 between Israel against the forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria was clearly a preemptive military action. The Egyptian Army had massed along the border of Israel after Egypt's decision to close an important maritime shipping route to Israel. Israel saw troop buildup as preparation for an attack, feared the threat was imminent, and attacked to preempt an Egyptian offensive.

During the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union presented an unprecedented act of aggression when they staged nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba, well within striking distance of the United States. The incident, known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, ended peacefully, without a preemptive attack by the United States. President John F. Kennedy's inference that he would have attacked Cuba clearly would have been preemptive, as he felt the Russians were fielding the missiles in preparation for an inevitable attack.

Targeted Military Action

Targeted military action, often referred to as targeted killing, was described by Gary Solis in 2010 as the “targeting and killing, by a government or its agents, of a civilian or unlawful combatant, taking a direct part in hostilities in the context of an armed conflict who is not in that government’s custody and cannot be reasonably apprehended.”⁹⁴ In 2010, Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur defined targeted killing as the intentional, premeditated, and deliberate use of lethal force by States against specific individuals who are not in their physical custody.”⁹⁵ Alston’s definition seems to purposely remind the reader that targeted killing does not include prisoners, a point which seemingly doesn’t need to be made.

An internationally agreed upon definition of targeted killing does not exist.⁹⁶ This fact leaves countries open to creative definitions which could be prone to abuse, basically creating reasons to justify targeted killing.

The United States does not have a specific policy related to targeted killing; rather it relies on a provision within the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) Act that authorizes the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, and individuals responsible for 9/11.”⁹⁷ Further, the United States considers targeted killing to be a permissible action, compliant with current just war policy, taken in self-defense, based on the provision contained within most definitions of preventive military action, specifically that an attack is imminent. America continually finds itself precariously navigating the slippery slope that exists between targeted killing and assassination due to the lack of a clear-cut American policy on targeted killing.

Gary Solis’s definition is a clear and concise opinion that delineates what targeted killings are, who commits them, who may be the target and why, and a reason which would render a killing unnecessary.⁹⁸

Alston's definition is empty. He fails to acknowledge targeted killing as "killing," rather referring to it as lethal force. Lethal force does not necessarily imply death; rather it implies the intent could result in death. It refers to its targets as "specific individuals" rather than identifying them as belligerents. Finally, it does not mention, nor does it imply, that these "specific individuals" might be involved or suspected of violence against America.

Michael Walzer, in *Just and Unjust Wars*, identifies three criteria to justify a preemptive or anticipatory (targeted) attack against an imminent threat to include violating sovereign territory: 1) a manifest intent to injure, 2) a degree of active preparation that makes the intent a positive danger, and 3) a situation when waiting, rather than acting, greatly magnifies the risk.⁹⁹

Walzer's suggested criteria are brief yet substantive. While they do not contain the detail of Solis's definition, they do create a situation wherein policymakers must provide justification. Since Walzer is the preeminent global scholar on just war, it is reasonable to assume that by justification he means the decision must be consistent with current just war policy. His suggested criteria are vague, but possibly purposefully vague, as Walzer considers just war criteria to be static while at the same time he considers the actions are taken under the criteria to be fluid, dependent on the circumstances faced at the time.

There have been hundreds of examples of targeted killings during the GWOT, with many being executed by the deployment of drones. In fact, between 2009 and 2013, Pakistan alone was the recipient of 295 targeted attacks.¹⁰⁰ A noteworthy and recent example of a drone attack was the killing of Qasem Solimani, a high-ranking Iranian General. Solimani was considered the architect of many attacks on American and coalition service members in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States was not at war with Iran but made the decision that the world and the war effort would be better off without Solimani's presence. In 2020, President Trump

authorized a drone strike on Solimani, killing him instantly. The Solimani killing was interesting when compared to a standard targeted killing conducted during the GWOT. A standard GWOT targeted killing involved a drone or missile strike on the Taliban, al Qaeda, or another terrorist suspected of active involvement against the United States or its coalition partners. Solimani was an Iranian general, and despite Bush's categorization of Iran as one of the three members of his Axis of Evil, the United States was not at war with Iran. Solimani was suspected of being the architect behind many attacks on US and coalition service members over a long period. He was a member of the Iranian military but was also a surrogate of the Taliban and al Qaeda. The United States viewed him as an inevitable threat based on past military operations he either planned or participated in, so it carried out a targeted attack on him in Iraq, killing him. Global outrage was limited to Iran and those countries sympathetic to their anti-American policies.

There is a lack of international agreement on the definitions of preventive, preemptive, and targeting attacks not just between nation-states but also in academia. While there is a difference of opinion among most groups, there is concurrence regarding the concerns with each type of attack. Nations should be very careful before authorizing such attacks. Justification should contain more than just a preponderance of the evidence that an attack is imminent or inevitable, for that standard is just 51 percent. Obviously, this means there is a 49 percent chance there will not be an imminent or inevitable attack. There are very few chances in life worth taking which are separated by 2 percentage points. Nations that adopt as policy preemptive, preventive, and targeted military action would be wise to adopt a standard consistent with the western model of criminal justice, that being probable cause. Probable cause does not rely on a percentage of fact; rather it relies on the "reasonable man" standard. If a reasonable person was

to review the existing evidence and agree with it, then probable cause has been met. Probable cause assumes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Research identified enough published data that not only supports the legality and morality of preemptive, preventive, and targeted attacks but also the utility of each as a policy of the United States. There were no instances discovered where a nation found preemptive, preventive, and targeted attacks so distasteful and useless that it struck the employment of these actions from their strategic defense policies. All three activities clearly fall under the umbrella of self-defense. Self-defense, even in such a questionable action as a “Global War on Terror,” is, and should be, a subjective term to be deliberated by the nation which finds itself in need of defending itself proactively. The improper justification and classification of the invasion of Iraq as a preventive attack were eventually uncovered and exposed. When unlawful and immoral actions take place and the right to self-defense is improperly invoked, people notice, especially when the United States is involved.

Chapter Four

What Exactly is a Global War on Terror?

“Whether we bring enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done. Fellow citizens, we’ll meet violence with patient justice-assured of the rightness of our cause and confident of the victories to come.”¹⁰¹

—President George W. Bush on September 20, 2001

The GWOT is not a war, by conventional definition, but a name given to any number of military actions by the United States or any of its coalition partners against any perceived or actual threats throughout the world. Moreover, it began as a direct result of terrorist acts against the United States. The threats to which President Bush was responding were not necessarily from sovereign countries, rather they included any group that the United States or any of its coalition partners had identified as a terrorist threat. Bush’s description of the terrorist threat was vague, but he was much less subtle in his promise to vanquish the enemies of the civilized world. Were the unidentified enemies nation-states, groups, or individuals? His words rang strong and ominous to a frightened nation still reeling from the September 11th attacks, but who exactly were these enemies? In other post-attack speeches, Bush mentioned Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as members of the exclusive “Axis of Evil” club, but was Bush implying these three countries were responsible for all global acts of terrorism? Concurrent with Bush’s post-attack speeches, al Qaeda had already been implicated in the September 11th attacks, as well as the Axis of Evil, so were Americans left to imagine the identity of these additional enemies? Did these additional enemies do something to America, or was Bush planning to bring justice to them preventatively or preemptively? The president’s post-attack words were strong but contained little substance, a battle cry of sorts against an enemy that had yet to be clearly identified to the American public. The potential targets of the GWOT were seemingly endless.

Identifying the Nature of the Threat

The stated enemy of the GWOT was global terrorism, which included the terror group al Qaeda. AQ is an Islamic fundamentalist group that harbors deep resentment toward the United States, diametrically opposes all Western lifestyles, and is a stalwart proponent of ridding the planet of Israel.

Even before the start of the GWOT, before the dust even settled in Manhattan, Washington, and Pennsylvania, Bush superabundantly emphasized the distinction between the terrorists responsible for the attacks and the mainstream global Muslim population. It was a theme that he has repeated for over twenty years, and no research has uncovered any information to indicate that he is insincere. However, perception is often more important than intent, and the perception among many in America was that Islam was responsible for the attacks.

America and the world could accept al Qaeda as an enemy and target since they claimed responsibility for the September 11th attacks and the unrepentant nature of Usama bin Laden (UBL) and other AQ leaders. However, the continued perception that Islam was culpable for any part of the attacks did great damage and was good-for-naught. The Bush administration, consumed with proclaiming to the world that their cause was just and therefore everyone who thought otherwise was wrong, continued to emphasize that Islam was not the war target. But Bush's relentless insistence did little to quell the legitimate trepidation of the world's Muslim population who feared they were included on the target list simply because of their faith. It was Thoreau who observed in the mid-nineteenth century, "It's not what you look at that matters, it's what you see." Citizens of the world saw the coalition's military attacking predominately Muslim countries and, therefore, that occupied their attention. To further exemplify this, as early

as 2004, favorable ratings of the United States fell from 61 to 15 percent in Indonesia and 71 to 38 percent in Nigeria.¹⁰²

The number of civilian casualties and the extent to which America wielded its firepower would leave people to worry if they were on Bush's target list. America did not attempt to reach the masses by applying best practice counterterrorism methodologies until after the initial bombings were over. The United States seemed satisfied with the false blameless premise with the indigenous populations if they apologized for missing a target here and there. During the entire GWOT, there never seemed to be an indication that America considered how the innocent civilians in any of the theaters felt about their presence and their methods.¹⁰³

American armed forces were deployed to such places as the Philippines, assisting that government with its struggles against two dangerous terrorist groups: Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf. The US military has routinely initiated military strikes in Pakistan and even launched drone strikes from airbases in the country. In May 2011, the US Navy encroached upon Pakistani soil to kill UBL. The GWOT has also spawned military operations in African nations such as Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya, but with little stated reason other than to battle al Qaeda. While the Obama administration had changed the name from GWOT to the softer Overseas Contingency Operation in 2014, the objective of ridding the world of the threat of terrorism has not changed.

At the onset of the GWOT, President Bush issued a statement that any state or party that did not denounce terrorism would be viewed as supporting terrorism and, therefore, would be considered an enemy and potential target. In reflex, Libya, a known state sponsor of terrorism and recipient of the wrath of the American military, almost immediately renounced terrorism.

It is not surprising that some countries have misused the term GWOT to justify attacking targets in neighboring countries or within their own borders. Syria has attacked ethnic targets within its borders claiming they were fighting terrorism. And this comes from one of only four countries appearing on America's state-sponsored terror list. Russia has made incursions into Georgia and Chechnya to vanquish terror groups they claim are a threat to their sovereignty.

What is Terrorism?

The attacks on September 11th changed America forever. One of the most dramatic changes occurred when Bush coined the phrase "Homeland Security." There still is no universally accepted definition for Homeland Security, though over twenty years have passed since the introduction of the term into American popular culture. The same can be said for the word terrorism. In his text *Why Terrorism Works*, noted constitutional scholar Alan Dershowitz suggests there is no "all-encompassing definition of terrorism."¹⁰⁴ Research associated with this chapter supports Dershowitz's claim because myriad definitions from countless scholars, politicians, and military experts are broad and multifaceted.

Perhaps Sun Tsu, the legendary ancient Chinese warlord, said it best, and quite succinctly, without ever using the word terror or any of its derivatives: "Kill one, frighten one-thousand."¹⁰⁵ Sun Tsu was not a terrorist, but his quote embodies the fundamental philosophy of a terrorist.

Terrorists do not seek to win wars. Their numbers and military assets could not equal those of even a modest modern army. A terrorist seeks to frighten a demographic for a reason(s). Reasons terrorists have historically offered to justify attacks include, but are not limited to, religion, politics, and personal grievance. Often, terrorists tend to adhere to one of Clausewitz's tenets of war—that their actions seek to impose their will on the enemy.¹⁰⁶ A terrorist might

attack to influence the populace and elected leaders. They often attack to destroy morale and disrupt the lifestyle and economies of the countries they view as enemies. Many terrorists aim their acts at civilians. In Beslan, Russia, in 2004, Chechen terrorists sought to frighten a specific region of Russia by taking over a school and killing 186 school children.¹⁰⁷ In the Beslan attack, the terrorist's grievance was not against the children, their parents, or the Russian people. The attack was designed to influence upcoming political elections in the region as well as stall Russian influence in the Caucasus. The attack was not a battle; rather it was a suicide mission. Only one terrorist survived the incident.

Terrorists see the world outside of their own beliefs as their enemy. They are hyper-focused on achieving their intended objective and are careless about the death and destruction their actions cause. Most terrorist acts do not have lofty goals; therefore, terrorists claim victory virtually all the time. The September 11th terrorists' goals in Manhattan were to fly planes into the twin towers, killing as many people as possible, bringing attention to what they considered to be illegal and immoral interference by the West in the Middle East. Their original plan called for the buildings to collapse immediately upon impact, causing a much higher death toll. The buildings did not collapse immediately, and while the loss of life was profound, it could have been much worse. Still, their initial goals were met, and they considered the attack a success. They killed many, frightened many more, and brought the United States to a standstill for many days. The attack was not meant to win a war, nor was it meant to start one; rather it was meant to send a global statement.

Noted eighteenth-century revolutionary Robespierre proclaimed, "Terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue, it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our

country's (France) most urgent needs."¹⁰⁸ Robespierre describes terror as an instrument or initiative employed at a specific time to address a specific problem that needs to be dealt with immediately. There are several more contemporary definitions of terrorism:

Terrorism can often be distinguished from other natural and man-made disasters by the characteristic of extensive fear, loss of confidence in institutions, unpredictability and pervasive experience of loss of safety.¹⁰⁹

—Norwood, Ursano, and Fullerton, 2003

This definition by Norwood et al. highlights one of the terrorists' primary objectives—instilling fear. Once fear is experienced in the victim, they naturally lose faith in the institutions charged with maintaining their safety.

Terrorism is the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.¹¹⁰

—US Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense

This definition, as brief as it is, covers important aspects of terrorism. Terrorist acts are generally directed at noncombatants (civilians) during peacetime with unlawful acts that make them criminal in nature. Rarely does the terrorist have a grievance with the civilian population who bears the brunt of the attack.

An important yet sometimes overlooked facet of the aftermath of the September 11th attacks is the civilian law enforcement response. Citizens of the United States in real-time watched American law enforcement take the investigatory lead on the homeland rather than the American military. Perhaps this may have caused confusion because America was attacked, and therefore, the subsequent response would initiate a military response. But the September 11th attacks were not an act of war by any military. The word military is reserved for the national

defense and security mechanism maintained by a nation-state. Al Qaeda was not a nation-state. They did not have a military. Their attack on America was a criminal act, or as the DoD definition of terrorism phrased it, an “unlawful” act. The reason law enforcement took point on the investigation was that the attacks fit the American domestic description of a crime, not a military action. While there were soldiers deployed to the airports and other infrastructure deemed critical by Bush, those soldiers were from the various state National Guards. The National Guard is a reserve component of the United States Army but is considered to be under the direction of each individual state governor unless placed on Federal active-duty Title 10 Orders, which they were not. Federal troops are strictly forbidden by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 from exercising law enforcement duties on American soil.¹¹¹ These attacks, being criminal in nature, fell under the various state, local, and federal jurisdictions. National Guard units are permitted, in most states, to involve themselves in law enforcement activities while under the direction of state and local authorities.

The DoD definition further depicts the goals of terrorism as political, religious, or ideological. The attacks on September 11th were undertaken with all three goals in mind. Politically, Usama bin Laden was not a supporter of democracy. His ideal form of government was an Islamic republic that recognized Sharia law. As with many of the Middle East grievances, religious hatred of the Jewish State of Israel was surely a motivation for the attack. The United States (Great Satan) has been an unequivocal supporter of Israel (Little Satan) and their right to exist pursuant to UN Resolution No. 181. Finally, ideologically, bin Laden resented all western influence in Middle East affairs.

While there are countless definitions of terrorism, this example clearly and concisely describes the September 11 attacks:

Terrorism is the illegitimate or extranormal use of violence against noncombatants to achieve political ends.¹¹²

—Laqueur (1987)

Dr. Phil Zimbardo would agree with Laqueur's claim related to illegitimate or extranormal uses of violence as significant when comparing them to the mission of guerilla or special forces actions during wartime.¹¹³ Both activities are asymmetrical and are often judged as outside the normal left and right limits of conventional warfare. Zimbardo presents an excellent defense in distinguishing guerilla or special forces activities from extranormal use of violence (terrorism) by making two salient points: 1) acts of terror always take place on a stage at the horror of an intended audience, while guerilla or special forces activities are reserved for military operations which do not require fanfare, and 2) acts of terror usually do not have military significance but are used to send a message, while guerilla or special operations activities always have a stated mission and end state meant to degrade, disrupt, or destroy the enemy's ability to operate in a specific area of operations.¹¹⁴ However one defines terror, the primary distinction between terror and war is that acts of terror purposely target innocents, while acts of war seek to avoid collateral damage.

Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom

The conventional definition of war is a conflict fought between two or more countries. The formality of a declaration of war often precedes the action, but not always. War is not new to the twenty-first century, as countries have fought wars for as long as there have been countries to fight them. The GWOT just happens to be unlike any other war in which America has engaged. This war saw America attacking and bombing specific groups operating in foreign countries, countries with whom these groups had little or no affiliation. And apart from one country, Iraq,

we never declared war on the others. The execution of the GWOT made the edges of war appear fuzzy.

The GWOT had a very broad scope, its battlefields spanning the globe (good thing it was named accordingly), but its birthplace, and the proverbial lucky winner of the George Bush inaugural GWOT lottery, was the country of Afghanistan. On October 7, 2001, Bush commenced the GWOT and attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan in response to the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The Taliban was the ruling Islamic government in control of much of Afghanistan, and they were selected because al Qaeda, the terror group responsible for the September 11th attacks, was permissively using the country as a base for operations. Al Qaeda was globally accepted as a terrorist organization, and the Taliban had been protecting them and their assets for years. While neither a country nor a political party ruling one, the Taliban was the de facto ruling authority in many parts of Afghanistan. The Taliban had created an Islamic state, governed by very strict Sharia law, and refused to provide the United States with the whereabouts of the mastermind of the attacks, Usama Bin Laden, while at the same time refusing to deny AQ use of their land for training bases. The Taliban posed no direct or indirect threat to the United States. Afghanistan was never labeled as a state sponsor of terror. AQ did pose a direct threat to the government of Afghanistan, a government that, while not hostile to the United States, was not exactly a cohort. Neither AQ nor the Taliban is a country, and this attack on them would not mark the first time during the GWOT campaign that specific groups were attacked inside a sovereign nation, but it would be the first time such an act would be referred to by America as a war. Other than destroying AQ's ability to launch terror attacks, was it necessary for America to invade Afghanistan?

In addition to removing AQ from Afghanistan, America needed real estate in the Middle East from which to launch attacks against AQ and other terrorist organizations. According to Daniel Bynum, Senior Fellow from the Brookings Institutes, America needed a legal framework for utilizing Afghanistan to launch its GWOT attacks.¹¹⁵ The fact that AQ was operating out of the country and the Taliban had been allowing them provided Bush (and later Obama and Trump) that framework.¹¹⁶ Bynum further claims that the Authorization for Military Force (AUMF) of 2001, while passed for the purpose of approving the GWOT, could also have been considered as a pretext for using Afghanistan as an area of operations for further action.¹¹⁷

Lacking such a forward area of operations, Afghanistan was a logical choice for America. The relentless pressure put on AQ resulted in their retrograde to Pakistan. Those AQ operatives who chose to remain behind paid a heavy price, as the organization lost many top cadres.¹¹⁸ America owned the land and sky of Afghanistan in short order, and, although the Taliban remained as a military force and nemesis, AQ was put on its heels for over twenty years. AQ had been operating out of Afghanistan for some time before the September 11th attacks, and if they were permitted to continue, America would always be on the defense.¹¹⁹

The war in Afghanistan raged on for twenty years. That war, fought first to destroy al Qaeda's ability to function, transitioned into a conflict fought to make certain that when we leave, Afghani citizens enjoy freedom under their first liberal democracy. But there is more to the GWOT than just Iraq and Afghanistan.

As the war in Afghanistan tempered, it became apparent that the United States wished to maintain a strategic presence in the region, short of colonization. This was not only due to a shift in the strategic desire of the United States, but many Afghan leaders sought a more long-term

strategic partnership with the United States. Part of that partnership included an open-ended military presence in the form of bases and prepositioned military logistical assets.¹²⁰

There were many negative aspects to the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, but one in particular, which get little attention, was the dramatic increase in opium production. It is one of the unfortunate byproducts of the action in Afghanistan. The region had long relied on opium as one of its primary exports, accounting for as much as 60 percent of its GDP.¹²¹ During the days of the Taliban rule, they managed and taxed the opium trade, but by 2004, without their management, production rose 64 percent, making Afghanistan the world's opium leader.¹²² Research has not uncovered any information to imply that the destabilization of the world opium market was an intended consequence of military operations in Afghanistan; certainly, the United States could not possibly have been surprised by the outcome. For example, the dismantling of the major cartels in Colombia in the 1990s and early 2000s during America's War on Drugs saw the emergence of multiple smaller cartels that increased supply and drove the prices down, resulting in very affordable drugs on American streets. For all their evil, and for better or worse, until the United States decides to create and stick with a more effective plan for keeping drugs out of America, the cartels they dismantled regulated the supply, thereby regulating the price.

Afghanistan was the first country to feel the wrath of America in the new post-September 11th world but, as mentioned, was not the only one. In subsequent subchapters additional conflicts outside of the Middle East are detailed. However, before further discussing the GWOT, determining why America waged war is paramount.

The Flagship of the Global War on Terror – Iraq

The invasion of Iraq is further discussed later here within, but at this point it is appropriate to refer to Iraq as the flagship of Bush's GWOT. While the GWOT started with the

attacks on the Taliban and AQ in Afghanistan, the focal point has been and will always be his decision to invade the sovereign nation-state of Iraq. Officially named Operation Iraqi Freedom, this war-within-a-war raged from March 20, 2003, to December 15, 2011. Americans overwhelmingly approved of Bush's strikes at AQ in Afghanistan, and the administration seemingly sought to capitalize on its popularity with the invasion of Iraq. But those who followed Bush's candidacy saw a remarkable shift from his election platform that some felt was caused by something other than Iraq's alleged and unproven ties to al Qaeda.

In 2000, then-candidate Bush's platform strongly opposed nation-building. It appeared that Bush publicly favored FDR's philosophy on nation-building:

The respect and right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.¹²³

—President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Bush could have benefitted from the philosophy espoused by Bernard Lewis in 2006 when he remarked that while the western version of democracy is a construct owned and operated by English-speaking peoples, just because a foreign form of government does not conduct its affairs as does the West, they are not necessarily wrong. Perhaps they just need nourishment and reinforcement to form their own version of democracy.¹²⁴

Whatever consternation Bush had about nation-building seemed to fade immediately after the September 11th attacks. Or did it? Did Bush's declaration of the GWOT mark the start of the abandonment of his concurrence with FDR's philosophy, or had his public commitment to self-determination been nothing but a facade? Did he ever truly believe in self-determination? Was the invasion even his idea?

Answers to these questions start in a book titled *The Global War on Terror: 9/11, Iraq, and America's Crisis in the Middle East* in which the author very confidently asserts that planning for incursions into sovereign states using an unspecified threat of Islamic terrorism was started by a neo-conservative (NEOCON) working group while Clinton was still in office.¹²⁵ The group was formed in 1997, given the name Project for the New American Century (PNAC), and included such notable public figures and members of the Bush 43 administration as Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, L. Scooter Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle.¹²⁶ The work of the PNAC predates the attack on September 11th by four years. Paradoxically, the name George W. Bush cannot be found associated with the group PNAC in any research analyzed here within, leading one to believe that the concept of GWOT was not at all an original idea of Bush 43. The PNAC and other American think tanks accounted for the pressure George Bush felt to change the pace of history.¹²⁷

PNAC was not simply a NEOCON working group content with meeting occasionally, publishing white papers, and complaining about the foreign policies of the other side of the aisle. They were actively seeking to create what would appear to be a new world order. In 1998, just one year after formation, a letter written by Richard Perle and signed by Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz was sent to then-President Clinton demanding an incursion into Iraq.¹²⁸ Clinton declined their request.

While the PNAC group was filled with prominent figures in the conservative foreign policy hierarchy, perhaps none were as influential as Paul Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz was a well-respected and well-known foreign policy statesman who successfully worked both sides of the aisle. When he spoke, people listened. They might not have agreed with him, but they knew he was well informed and could support his arguments. And while the PNAC group may have been

the birthplace of the idea that the United States should be involved in regime change in Iraq, Paul Wolfowitz was seen as the architect.¹²⁹ In his book *To Start a War: How the Bush Administration Took America into Iraq*, Robert Draper offers support for the claim that the PNAC group, led by Wolfowitz, not only presented the idea of an invasion to President Clinton but that he (Wolfowitz) had championed this invasion for ten years before the September 11th attacks.¹³⁰ In 1997 Wolfowitz coauthored an article in the *Weekly Standard* with Zalmay Kalilzad titled “Overthrow Him.”¹³¹ In 1998, while attending a function with the British Ambassador to the United States, Wolfowitz, then the Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, commented that “We should invade Iraq, seize the oilfields...”¹³²

While some still claim that Bush was disinterested in nation-building before September 11th there are clues as to his lack of commitment to that mindset. Then-candidate Bush, during a debate in New Hampshire in 1999, proclaimed of Saddam Hussein: “I’d take ‘em out—I’m surprised he’s still there.”¹³³ Strong words for someone who previously seemed to reject the notion of nation-building.

After his hotly contested, hanging-chad-tainted election victory, Bush hurriedly assembled his foreign policy team, which had already included his running mate Dick Cheney. He added Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Libby (Chief of Staff to the Vice President), Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense), and Perle (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs). If the assembling of former PNAC members could be perceived as a mere coincidence, it would not be for long, particularly when in the first ten days of his administration, Bush had started the planning for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. This would be almost eight months before September 11th and more than two years before the invasion.¹³⁴

Even those not inclined to believe in conspiracies would concede that George Bush was not at all a dove as he projected. Consider and reflect on his words made just months after the September 11th attacks during a meeting with such noted American clerics as Reverend Franklin Graham, Cardinal Bernard Law, and Muslim scholar Hamza Yusef Hanson when Bush uttered the sentence “I am having trouble controlling my bloodlust.”¹³⁵

The belief that the invasion of Iraq was undertaken because of its status as a member of the Axis of Evil is quite implausible when looking at the actions of the administration in the months and years leading up to the invasion. There is a preponderance of evidence that the stated reasons for the invasion were nothing more than a falsehood to hide the true pretext for military action. The Bush administration would offer three distinctly different reasons for a regime change in Iraq throughout the justification phase of the GWOT: 1) to stop the human rights violations occurring at the hand of the dictator Saddam Hussein, 2) a clear and convincing nexus to al Qaeda, and 3) Iraq possessed and was capable of employing WMD. Each reason provided has since been publicly debunked and will be covered in more detail later in this paper.

Lacking any actionable intelligence to prove that Saddam Hussein had anything to do with the September 11th attacks, Rumsfeld, at the direction of Bush, began reviewing existing invasion plans for Iraq in late September 2001.¹³⁶ The key word in this sentence is “existing.” Draper claims invasion plans already existed.¹³⁷ It appears that Bush had already committed to invade by March of 2002, a full year before the invasion of Iraq and only six months after the September 11th attacks. He dispatched Cheney to brief certain Arab states as to the possibility of an attack.¹³⁸ Still, is it fair to categorize Bush as the sole architect of the invasion of Iraq?

Given that three of the primary players in the PNAC had sent a letter to President Clinton five years before the invasion of Iraq is a clear indication that Bush 43 could not possibly have

invented the idea during a moment of contemplation related to the proper course of action to address Saddam Hussein's reluctance to cooperate with the UN inspectors. Rather, it implies even worse, that PNAC came up with this idea five years in advance, attempted to promulgate it, failed, and waited until they came to power as Bush's foreign policy team; in other words, it was a war looking for an excuse.

In his book *Dreaming of War*, author Gore Vidal asserts that two days before the September 11th attacks, Bush 43 was "presented with a draft of a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) outlining a global campaign of military, diplomatic, and intelligence action targeting al Qaeda," further supporting the claim that the GWOT was inevitable whether al Qaeda attacked or not.¹³⁹ Vidal goes further, quoting an NBC News report that "President Bush was expected to sign detailed plans for a worldwide war against al Qaeda . . .but did not have the chance before the terrorist attacks..."¹⁴⁰

The Spread of the GWOT Into Iraq

The GWOT has brought conflict and destruction throughout the Middle East, as the United States, its coalition partners, and countries vowing allegiance to the coalition have fought battles against supposed terror groups, all in the name of fighting the GWOT. Fighting has not been limited to the Middle East, as sub-Saharan Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines, Indonesia, Russia, India, and Pakistan have all seen bloodshed in the name of the GWOT. The only nation-state with which the United States and its coalition partners waged a war was the Republic of Iraq.

St. Augustine warned that a just war might obscure into an unjust war.¹⁴¹ An ominous warning from the eleventh century, one which the president of the United States should have heeded.

Arguably, Iraq and Saddam Hussein were doomed from the day that the former members of PNAC became Bush's foreign policy advisors. In an article written for the *Washington Post* in 2002, Bob Woodward, Dan Balz, and Jeff Himmelman claim that very shortly after the September 11th attacks, Paul Wolfowitz began each daily briefing by "prodding" Bush to include the invasion of Iraq into his plans for a GWOT.¹⁴² Woodward et al. claim that Wolfowitz was, from the beginning, the champion of the invasion of Iraq. They further claim that Secretary of State Powell and General Shelton both vigorously disagreed with Wolfowitz's plan.¹⁴³ Bush finally agreed and added Iraq to the list of "things to do."

The United States and its coalition partners attacked the Republic of Iraq on March 20, 2003, in response to the assumption that Saddam Hussein was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The United States, already the head of a military coalition operating in the Middle E and entrenched in the GWOT, reportedly feared that Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq, was stockpiling WMD that could be used against coalition members. Bush laid out a coherent and plausible case for engaging in a just war with Iraq based on those fears. The goals of the invasion included the elimination of Iraq's capability to create and deploy WMD, the removal of the dictatorial form of government, and the installation of a modern liberal democracy. Additionally, the United States claimed they had intelligence that al Qaeda had conspired with Saddam Hussein for years prior.

The motivation behind any political decision should always be questioned since politicians are expected to serve the populace and represent their collective wants and needs. The decision to invade the sovereign nation-state of Iraq in 2003 was no exception. At the time of the invasion, the United States was not at war with Iraq. Saddam Hussein was nothing more than a nuisance to the world and was certainly of no consequence to the safety and security of America.

It was widely known that Iraq was historically a thorn in the side of Israel, as Saddam Hussein openly displayed sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause, dating back to his launch of over three dozen SCUD missiles late in 1991. Jarrett Murphy reported in a March 14, 2003, article posted on CBS News Online that Saddam Hussein had distributed \$260,000 to twenty-six families of Palestinians killed in over two years of fighting with Israel, including a \$10,000 check to the family of a Hamas suicide bomber.¹⁴⁴ Clearly Iraq, at the direction of Saddam Hussein, had earned the title “State Sponsor of Terror.” Globally, he was an abhorrent man but especially when it came to the Bush family. In 1993 he hatched an elaborate but pathetically unsuccessful plan to assassinate Bush 41.¹⁴⁵ But still, none of his actions could definitively be seen as a direct threat to the security of America. Nonetheless, the United States embarked on a journey to prove that a regime change was needed in Iraq.

Chasing Ghosts – The Intelligence Cycle

Intelligence gathering is a complex task. Quite often, operatives start with nothing, slowly gathering information and analyzing it to create actionable intelligence. Tasks become even more difficult when the theory directing the collection is flawed, as was most of the direction related to the AQ/Iraq connection coming from the White House. The primary boggle of intelligence gathering is best described as “having a thousand-piece jigsaw puzzle and not having the box top to show you what the finished puzzle is supposed to look like.”¹⁴⁶ That said, the intelligence cycle is still not an impossible arena in which to perform.

The intelligence cycle works the same whether it is military, law enforcement, or corporate. It all starts with direction from the top. The direction gives the operatives their intelligence collection priorities. The operatives collect the information and send it to analysts for processing, analysis, and dissemination. The gathering of intelligence is always driven in the

direction of the leader, although it is true that sometimes an intelligence operative will uncover information unrelated to the mission at hand that could cause the leader to change their direction.

Terror organizations did not sprout up the day after Bush 43 was inaugurated. They were operating at various levels on every continent. As mentioned previously, research has already suggested the likelihood that the Bush administration, at the direction of the PNAC group, started plans for the invasion of Iraq shortly after the inauguration date. An important aspect necessary to justify those plans would have been the production of actionable intelligence. It is possible that Bush was handed intelligence that al Qaeda was operating in Iraq on his first day in office, but more likely that he or someone in his administration gave the national intelligence community direction to prioritize the collection of that intelligence. This does not imply that Bush himself is solely responsible for developing the direction of guidance for the nation. Certainly, the DoD, the vice president, or some high-level advisor, particularly Paul Wolfowitz, could make recommendations. But ultimately the direction comes from the top.

Think of the intelligence cycle as an hourglass ready to transfer its sand to the bottom. The full top of the hourglass is the direction coming from the leader. As the sand (direction) flows down, it passes several key components of the intelligence cycle until it gets to the collections cell. Collection follows the direction and initiates a methodology for collecting information on that specific direction. When they have enough, the hourglass is turned over again. The sand (information) passes through the various components of the intelligence cycle and is turned into actionable intelligence that is returned to the leader for dissemination and exploitation.

Robert Draper quotes a former Iraq intelligence group chief named Hal Rooks who stated, “The thing about intelligence is that you can always find what you want somewhere on

the spectrum.”¹⁴⁷ What Rooks posits is that it is easy to find information related to an event and present that information as actionable intelligence even though the situation might not have occurred as the curator of the direction believed. This appears to be exactly what happened when, try as they might, the American intelligence community relentlessly pursued information that would justify the invasion by creating a link between AQ and Saddam Hussein.

President Clinton certainly saw al Qaeda as a threat, perhaps even before the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. But Clinton did not go to war against UBL, Iraq, or AQ, nor did he sanction a war against any country allegedly doing business with either. While the first attack on the World Trade Center was nowhere near as catastrophic as September 11th, it was still an attack. Clinton simply had no reason to start his own GWOT.

In the aftermath of September 11th, America was chasing ghosts not only trying to confirm/deny a second wave of attacks that never came but trying to develop any intelligence which would tie AQ to Saddam Hussein. The administration, concerned that Americans would not be enthusiastic about a regime change in Iraq, never stopped looking for that smoking gun. The Bush administration blindly followed any information down any rabbit hole if there was any chance that the information could be turned into an actionable intelligence product to justify the invasion.

In 2002, Wolfowitz seized the opportunity to direct certain intelligence assets to confirm that a meeting took place between an AQ operative and Iraqi Intelligence.¹⁴⁸ Czech intelligence operatives reported that a little over six months after the attacks Mohammed Atta, one of the ringleaders and suicide bombers of the September 11th attacks, had met with Iraqi intelligence in the months before the attacks. Bush would not need the UN inspectors to provide him with evidence of WMD if he could prove an AQ/Iraq operational connection. An operational Iraqi

nexus to AQ would be even better than a picture of Saddam Hussein spooning with a WMD. But in the end, there was not enough information to prove that Atta had ever met with any Iraqi intelligence operative. Eventually, even Wolfowitz doubted the veracity of the story.¹⁴⁹

The relentless pursuit of proof that Ahmed Hikmat Shakir had provided material support to two of the September 11th terrorists is another example of Wolfowitz's desperation. In the post-attack investigation, any information which could possibly be analyzed related to any inference of collaboration between AQ and Iraq was vigorously pursued. American intelligence developed information that Iraqi national Shakir, who appeared to be nothing more than an airport greeter in Malaysia, had met with Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi. The former were two of the three terrorists who hijacked and crashed a plane into the Pentagon.¹⁵⁰ This narrative was chased for months, but in the end, any evidence uncovered was far from conclusive.¹⁵¹

American intelligence leader Jose Rodriguez Jr. remarked in his text *Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives* that while there was clearly a supportive connection between Saddam Hussein and several terrorist organizations, "connections between Iraq and AQ were remarkably thin."¹⁵² Even Vice President Cheney admitted during an interview on *Meet the Press* in 2003 that he did not know if Saddam Hussein had anything to do with AQ and the September 11th attacks.¹⁵³

The administration's failure to prove the AQ and Saddam Hussein connections did not mean an end to chasing ghosts through procurement of actionable intelligence. American intelligence received information that an Iraqi government official had attempted to acquire mapping software for war planning. The administration ran with this narrative without a thought of corroborating it. It was not until the Iraqi was brought in for questioning that they found his

intent was nothing more than interest in a simple GPS product available to the general public. He thought he had to purchase the mapping software to make it work.¹⁵⁴

Unable to snare the ghost, by September 2002 the Administration would revert to a vigorous assertion that Iraq possessed WMD.¹⁵⁵ Bush would speak of the existence of intelligence that Iraq possessed WMD in several speeches, including the 2003 State of the Union Address. Bush claimed that both American and British intelligence reports contained information to support his WMD claims. He rode the figurative WMD horse right into Baghdad, only to abandon it when it became evident when American operatives had failed to find those WMD. The response from the administration was to blame the intelligence as “faulty.”

According to the administration, America and its coalition partners were justified in invading Iraq to get rid of Saddam Hussein before he deployed his WMD because they had actionable intelligence to support the invasion. It could not be their fault the intelligence provided by the British and the American CIA was faulty. America acted in good faith. But did America act in good faith, and was the CIA information faulty?

After September 2002, when all American efforts failed to uncover an operational nexus between Saddam Hussein and AQ, America turned all its efforts into proving the now debunked claim that Iraq possessed WMD. Former CIA operative and task force leader Sam Faddis was in Iraq well before the March 2003 invasion and claims that until later in 2002 his team viewed WMD discovery as a very low priority.¹⁵⁶ In fact, the CIA had yet to receive direction from the administration to turn their collection activities toward WMD. As far as his team was concerned, their presence in Iraq was to prepare for an invasion to remove the despot from power.¹⁵⁷ But things changed in the winter of 2002, and Faddis came to realize that the Bush administration now planned to justify the invasion to preempt the deployment of WMD by Hussein.¹⁵⁸ The

change of course required a change in direction for collection, and the task force set out to find intelligence indicating Iraq possessed WMD.

Faddis had spent a considerable amount of time in Iraq, living and interacting with the Kurds. He had developed valuable insight into the way Saddam Hussein thought and behaved. Faddis became convinced that Hussein had “divested himself” of WMD in a “desperate effort” to have the sanctions removed.¹⁵⁹ In the end, Faddis claims that the CIA never found any evidence that Iraq possessed WMD.¹⁶⁰ The CIA intelligence was not faulty, rather, it was accurate and transmitted to Washington before the invasion: Saddam Hussein did not possess WMD.

The Inevitable Outcome

President Bush referred to Iraq as a member of the Axis of Evil during his 2002 State of the Union Address. Also earning that honor were the sovereign nations of Iran and North Korea. Bush, for the first time publicly, laid the tracks for the figurative train ride into Bagdad, as the collective free world gasped. The next fourteen months would be spent feeding the metaphorical train engine with enough oil to complete the trip without breaking down. Much of this oil would come as a result of a purposeful mischaracterization of the outcome of UN inspections.

The United Nations created the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) eleven years prior. UNSCOM was created to carry out weapons inspections in Iraq to identify the existence of those WMD and properly dispose of them. Iraq arguably stonewalled UN inspectors during this eleven-year period, but there was slow and steady progress. Inspectors had found caches of chemical weapons and destroyed them accordingly. In 1995, a high-ranking Iraq had a more sophisticated biological weapons program than originally thought and was reasonably close to developing the ability to enrich uranium. In 1998, Iraq’s cooperation with the UNSCOM inspectors deteriorated, resulting in a US airstrike on a facility believed to be utilized for the

development of WMD. The airstrike was deemed a success, and in 1999, the UN named Hans Blix to head the renewed inspections. Blix became frustrated over the next three years as Hussein made things very difficult, if not impossible, for the inspectors to determine Iraq's WMD capabilities. Saddam Hussein was, at the very least, toying with the United States. Still, there was no evidence to substantiate the existence of WMD. The United States had to accept the UNSCOM opinion that the 1998 attack on the Iraqi facility destroyed Iraq's WMD capabilities.

Media reports churned around the possibility of a US attack on Iraq during the latter part of 2002, almost a year after the attacks on September 11th. The Bush administration would not confirm these reports, nor would they deny them, but Bush's address to the UN on September 12, 2002, did little to squash the rumors. While Hans Blix continued his task looking for WMD to destroy, he found none. Blix reported to the UN a few months later on January 9, 2003, that he failed to find a "smoking gun" that would indicate Iraq was actively involved in creating, maintaining, and/or obtaining WMD.

If the 2002 State of the Union Address was the laying of the tracks, the 2003 State of the Union Address was the train speeding out of control when Bush proclaimed that Saddam Hussein was attempting to purchase significant amounts of uranium from Africa. It did not take long for this statement to be debunked, as one of the inspectors whose responsibility to conduct nuclear capability inspections determined the letter on which the intelligence was dependent for its authenticity was a forgery.¹⁶¹ But it didn't matter at this point because the metaphorical train was on a collision course with history.

The UN inspectors continued to labor and at each turn failed to find even circumstantial evidence to prove the WMD ruse. Unfortunately, the diligent work of the UN inspectors was all for naught. Not only did the UN inspectors fail to give the Bush administration their smoking

gun, but they also excited the delirium of Wolfowitz and others by noting that over 400 inspections were conducted of Iraqi WMD possession and delivery capabilities without a single episode of impediment.¹⁶²

The following is a timeline of events, a prelude to the here-within discussion related to the administration's response:

January 17-February 23, 1991

During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein launched missiles into Israel. None of these missiles fit the description of WMD.

February 28, 1991

Iraq is defeated and is required to submit to inspections of its weapons programs.

June 30, 1991

UNSCOM is formed and started inspections of Iraq's weapons programs with an emphasis on identifying the existence of WMD. Iraq immediately enters into a repeated pattern of non-cooperation.

August 8, 1995

A high-ranking Iraqi official defected and told the West that Hussein's WMD program was further advanced than previously thought.

December 16, 1998

After years of minimal cooperation from Iraq, the United States bombs an alleged WMD facility, effectively and admittedly destroying Iraq's ability to manufacture WMD.

December 17, 1999

Hans Blix is designated as the lead inspector for UNSCOM.

September 11, 2001

The 9/11 attacks occur. None of the perpetrators have a connection with Iraq.

September 12, 2002

President Bush, during his SOTU Address, accuses Iraq, Iran, and North Korea of being part of an “Axis of Evil.” During an address to the UN, Bush publicly assumes that Iraq is a “grave and gathering danger.”

January 9, 2003

Hans Blix reports that he has not uncovered a “smoking gun” that shows Iraq possessed WMD.

The stated timeline for the invasion of Iraq will pause for an analysis of the preceding.

It is impossible to determine what went through President Bush’s mind upon hearing of Blix’s failure to provide any evidence to support an invasion of Iraq. Saddam Hussein had clearly toyed with or stalled the West for years. But why was he stalling? What was he getting away with? For twelve years the Republic of Iraq lay upon the sand, bathing in the hot desert sun, under constant scrutiny by the UN, its economy virtually destroyed by an oil embargo. The US airstrike in 1998 destroyed its ability to develop WMD. They had not attempted to attack any country at all nor were they in any position to pose a military threat. Yes, they were stalling, but why? Were they waiting for the right time to pounce? If they were, they missed their opportunity on September 12, 2001, when the United States was still trying to process what had happened. Should Bush have acknowledged the lack of a “smoking gun” as an important revelation before declaring war?

During Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address, when he stated, “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa,”

it was apparent to many that he no longer needed anything from Hans Blix. That sentence forebode the end of Saddam Hussein and the beginning of a new campaign in the war on terror.

After Bush's SOTU address, he and members of his cabinet would repeatedly make the case over the next two months that Saddam Hussein's reluctance to provide unfettered access to all his military weapon's operations was tantamount to Iraq concealing WMD which were destined to be used against the United States and its allies. They offered no proof to support these claims. The claims were not repudiated by Blix, but to his credit, he stuck to his logical assumption that despite Iraq's lack of cooperation being troublesome, there still was no evidence to support any assumption based on accusations and/or unsubstantiated intelligence reports.

Saddam Hussein could have continued to stall, as well as continued to be of no consequence to the free world, had the sanctions and inspections been left in place and war had not been declared. But on March 20, 2003, President Bush provided the information for this research's last entry on the prewar Iraqi timeline:

March 20, 2003

The United States, with help from its coalition partners, invaded Iraq. The invasion took place without sanction from the UN and over objection from the French government. President Bush now had his war. That war, just or unjust, according to Bush and the coalition, was being waged to rid the world of Saddam Hussein and his WMD. All the world was now safe from the WMD threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Unfortunately, the ruse put forth by Bush started to unravel within months. The WMD Bush and his administration insisted existed were not in Iraq. Even respected statesmen like Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld, with looks of surprise on their faces, were forced to explain to America that although the reason our coalition attacked a sovereign nation had been discovered to be invalid, we still needed to continue the

campaign to liberate the Iraqi people from the repressive regime under which they were forced to live and transform their government into a successful liberal democracy.

There was no unilateral support for this war from the onset, as many felt that even if Saddam Hussein was hiding WMD, continued diplomacy would serve the world better than war. Americans aptly questioned the need to continue the campaign after the revelation that there were never any WMD in Iraq. But Bush assured that continuation of this campaign was now necessary to stabilize the Middle East. But what exactly did he mean by “stabilize”? As of 2022, Iraq and the Middle East are still unstable.

The Global War on Terror in Sub-Saharan Africa

For many who briefly thought that Bush hit the nail right on the head—that there was an imminent global threat from terrorists that would necessitate a GWOT and that the September 11th attacks were just the tip of the iceberg—one need only to look as far as the continent of Africa to debunk his claims. For decades, there has been social, economic, and political turmoil throughout the approximate 40 independent countries on the African continent. Then, almost overnight, much of that turmoil was being blamed on terrorists who happened to be followers of Islam.

The state of African political affairs has always been peculiar. Most of the African population lives at a level of poverty unfathomable to most Americans, even though Africa is purported to be sitting on \$24 trillion in oil, gold, diamonds, cobalt, uranium, and coltrons, the latter being a requisite raw material for cellular phones and computer chips.¹⁶³ A country like the United States could easily help Africa exploit those resources for their greater good and all but eliminate poverty and disease. Yet Africans die daily of diseases that are rarely fatal or even seen

in America, while assistance is often distant and absent. But even more perplexing is the fact that the former Soviet Union (and its present-day evolution of it, Russia) has also been inattentive.

Africa had long been colonized by several European countries. Great Britain alone had colonized at least fifteen African nations dating back to the nineteenth century. Portugal had colonized at least eight nations. France had either full or partial influence with at least ten, with Italy maintaining a claim to four. The United States had traditionally seen very little utility in Africa right up to and including World War II. The United States seemed content to leave imperialism to Europe when it came to colonization and control of post-war Africa. But America became less comfortable with Europe's ability to maintain control over their colonies and keep them out of the Soviet Union's hands as the power of the Red Empire developed. By the 1950s, President Eisenhower realized that America needed to develop a policy on Africa before the Soviets added to their bloc, and it has been that policy that has kept America overtly out of African affairs since. Eisenhower developed a 'two track' approach, professing support for African self-determination while giving African leaders a stark choice: side with America or side with the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁴ If with America, expect lavish foreign aid and free rein to control your own people and resources by any means, including harsh repression. If with the Soviets, expect no US military or development aid and risk being overthrown or assassinated by covert CIA operatives or rebels backed by them.¹⁶⁵ African leaders had already seen what Stalin and his violent form of Marxism did to those they ruled, and they made the right choice. The Soviets were powerless to counter Eisenhower's policy with invasion, as it would start a third world war, one which would have the Soviet Union standing alone against all of Europe and the United States. This approach has been part of American foreign policy for over sixty years, and most

recently, every president from Reagan through Trump continued the policy of providing countries like Uganda with massive aid package awards as well as lucrative trade agreements.¹⁶⁶

Applying this policy to the GWOT explains many aspects of the past twenty years, particularly as they relate to Uganda, Sudan, and Somalia. America would expand the GWOT to sub-Saharan Africa, but was the purpose to rid the world of terror organizations threatening Africa or America?

Bush's declaration of a GWOT resulted in alliances with several US-supported dictators, who in turn pledged allegiance to America, its money, and its GWOT.¹⁶⁷ These dictators have waged wars, often unrelated to the GWOT, that have cost millions of lives and have given rise to one of the most notorious Islamic terror organizations, Al-Shabaab.¹⁶⁸ Before the GWOT, all American military-related affairs fell under to purview of the European Command (EUCOM), but on October 1, 2008, in response to the increased operational tempo in Africa, the United States put all American military operations under the newly formed African Command (AFRICOM).

Uganda is one of America's staunchest allies in all of Africa. It is a former British colony run by a dictator named Yoweri Museveni. Museveni has been president for many years, having changed the Ugandan constitution and reportedly rigged elections to remain in power.

The Bush administration had relied on labels to justify many actions leading up to and with the execution of the GWOT. Two terms thrown around were State Sponsors of Terror, which were nations whose governments provided sanctuary to terrorist organizations, and Failed States, which referred to nations whose governments failed to thrive.¹⁶⁹ Those nations which fell into the category of State Sponsors of Terror would include Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Libya.

Examples of Failed States include Sudan and Somalia. Both terms provided America or its surrogates with justification to operate with impunity to meet the goals of the GWOT.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a peacekeeping initiative staffed by several African nations with an interest in seeing the country of Somalia free of Al-Shabaab. AMISOM, with Museveni and his battle-hardened Ugandan soldiers, formed in 2007 and was recognized by the United Nations as a peacekeeping authority. Uganda gave new meaning to the term peacekeeper and became AMISOM's warhead. In the years after the founding of AMISOM, and with US funding and support, Ugandan peacekeepers set upon Somalia to completely eradicate Al-Shabaab using violence rather than peace.¹⁷⁰

The existence of orthodox Islamic movements in certain parts of Africa is undeniable. Uganda has been battling Islamic terror forces from within the Democratic Republic of Congo for years. Islamic State Central Africa Province, also known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), has been wreaking havoc in that region since the 1990s, eliciting military incursions from Uganda and its African allies. The ADF started its operations in Uganda but was promptly dispelled by Museveni.¹⁷¹

It is a matter of irrefutable fact that 1) the ADF fits Bush's description of the enemy in the GWOT, and 2) the ADF poses a regional threat in Africa. What is not clear, in fact it is murky, is why the United States chooses to send billions of dollars to Uganda and other African countries to fight Islamic forces that represent no immediate or long-term danger to the United States. Could this interest in the ADF be somehow linked to America's longstanding Africa policy?

Earlier we discussed President Eisenhower's approach to Africa designed to keep out Soviet influence. It appears that most subsequent presidents have followed a similar policy. In a

subsequent passage, the invasion of Iraq is discussed through a coherent argument that the pretext for the war was the stabilization of the global oil market by allowing American and British oil companies to drill in Iraq. What if Bush, concerned about the increased presence of Islamic terror organizations in Iraq, spread his GWOT to the African continent for the purpose of stabilization? The world can recall when President Clinton was impeded in Somalia after he sent American troops to assist in a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in 1992, but the reality of that situation is that Bush 41 started the American presence there in December 1992.¹⁷² The United States had no readily identifiable interest in anything occurring in Somalia, but it is entirely plausible that Bush 41, followed by Clinton, felt a need to intervene to make certain the Soviets did not exploit the chaos caused by Islamic terror groups in Somalia, a country on the horn of Africa with ocean-access ports. Bush 43 might simply have been continuing that strategy, but now he had a justification that his two predecessors did not—the GWOT.

Additionally, the Bush 43 administration could have been concerned about the stabilization of the African oil market. Some believe that the United States' decision to include Africa in the GWOT was based on America's desire to exploit African oil reserves.¹⁷³ While there is no evidence available to indicate that the United States ever seized or claimed any African oil during the GWOT, it is distinctly possible that America was taking this action for the same reasons they invaded Iraq: stabilization of the African oil market. At the commencement of the GWOT, America imported 15 percent of its oil from the African market. By 2015, this had increased to 25 percent.¹⁷⁴ Those percentages are quite substantial, and any disruption to supply without a similarly priced replacement would certainly have a disruptive effect on the United States economy as well as the stock market.

America withdrew its operational troops from Somalia in 1995, with the UN following suit shortly thereafter. Somalia was still in political shambles, being run regionally by warlords. But American influence was still very strong in that area. AMISOM, with Uganda as the lead, has been operating in Somalia since 2007, mostly funded by America, and since the declaration of the GWOT arguably acting as America's surrogate. It is entirely plausible that Bush 43 used a regional stabilization through (Global) war (on Terror) policy in Africa and that policy has kept Russia out of African affairs, while at the same time assuring that the rising American dependence on African oil was not disrupted.

The Global War on Terror-Philippines

President Bush and his new administration started building the groundwork for the yet-to-be-named Global War on Terror-Philippines (GWOT-P) in the first three months of his incumbency.¹⁷⁵ Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) holds the distinction of being the only campaign of Operation Enduring Freedom that can claim virtually unilateral success. This is largely because the Philippine government had the good sense to forbid the US military from occupying and engaging the enemy with force.

The United States and the Republic of the Philippines have had a relationship for almost 125 years. The relationship can be best described as love-hate. From 1565 to 1898, for over 300 years, the Philippines had been under the colonial control of Spain. The Philippines, an Asian island country, has an indigenous population dating back almost 2000 years. A country rich in its own culture, thriving with little or no industry to speak of, found itself like many others, colonized by a larger, stronger, and more civilized European nation. Spain changed the indigenous culture of the Philippines forever, bringing a European style of government and economy, the Spanish language, and religion. War was not unknown to the inhabitants of the

Philippines, but Spain would introduce them to modern warfare, European style. Some conflicts were fought between the Spanish and the indigenous Filipinos, the latter doing what most occupied people will do, revolt to be free. Other conflicts occurred between other European nations seeking the opportunity to exploit the nation.

The Philippines became a possession of the United States in 1898 after the Spanish-American War treaty. The Filipino people hoped the Americans would immediately grant them independence but were incorrect. The Philippines was forced to settle in with their new master after a short but bloody war.

The United States lost its possession to Japan at the beginning of the Pacific Theatre of World War II. While the Filipino resistance fighters put up an admirable fight against arguably their most brutal occupier, the best they could do was the best they could do, until the Americans recaptured the island in 1945. That same year, the Philippines became a founding member of the United Nations, with the following year bringing them what they had been seeking for some 500 years—independence.

Independence from the United States has never come without a price and that price was an American military presence in the form of Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. Those bases would remain active and manned from the end of World War II until the gradual deterioration of relations in 1992, when the last American troops left the island.

The various voices on either side expressed the reasons why America was asked to leave the Philippines. Some claim that the Filipino people grew tired of being told they were an independent nation when, daily, their country was occupied by a foreign military, a point well taken.¹⁷⁶ Others complained about the sexualization and disrespect of the Filipino female population at the hands of American servicemen.¹⁷⁷ The country was very poor, and sadly, many

Filipino women found that the sex industry was the only way they could feed their families, another point well taken.¹⁷⁸ Whichever is true, the government of the Philippines, forever grateful to the United States for vanquishing the Japanese in World War II, bid the Americans “paalam.”

The dismissal of the American military did not mean the end of an alliance between the two countries; rather the Philippines remained a strong ally of the United States, participating in military exercises through the years. The Philippines is a long strand of islands, some large, others small, that stretch from reasonable proximity to the southern end of Taiwan to within proximity to Malaysia. The southernmost part of the Philippines, while under government control, tends to be a bit lawless and very fond of its autonomy and culture.¹⁷⁹ They do not like government interference and view the Philippine military as occupiers. The region is predominantly Muslim, not unusual given the fact that Malaysia, a predominantly Muslim country, is closer than Manila, the capital of the Philippines.

In the 1990s, the southern region saw an increase in violent behavior attributed to Muslim fundamentalists seeking a stronger foothold for their faith, a foothold that Manila could not allow to exist, as some of these groups had a predisposition to acts of terror. The civil problems in the Philippines fit very nicely into the package of the GWOT and its mission to rid the world of terror groups; however, the conflict should be viewed more as a civil war, with a large group of anti-government inhabitants seeking to succeed from the rule of Manila.

The deployment of Filipino troops to the region made things worse, as the indigenous inhabitants of the southern provinces came to see their own soldiers as an occupying force. The Philippine army, trained for combat for decades by the United States, used tactics rooted in blunt force. They knew nothing of the asymmetrical warfare challenges America and the coalition

learned (the hard way) in the Middle East theatre. By the turn of the millennia, the Philippine government reached out to a very willing America to help solve their problems.

In his text *Success in the Shadows: Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines and the Global War on Terror, 2002-2015*, Barry Stentiford uncovers that the Bush 43 administration started planning for a campaign in the Philippines six months before the September 11th attacks.¹⁸⁰ Bush, as well as PNAC, were aware of the rise and activities of the two predominant terror groups in the area, Abu-Sayyef (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya (Islamia) (JI), as both groups made a splash on the global scene in 2000.

Abu-Sayyef, in the first four years of its existence, fit the description of a criminal enterprise more than that of a terrorist organization. Their preferred modus operandi was kidnapping for ransom. They ran a string of dozens of failed and successful kidnappings, some victims being westerners in the Philippines for various legitimate reasons, others being wealthy locals. They graduated to the big league in 2004 when they bombed a Philippine ferry, killing 116 people.¹⁸¹ ASG, from time to time, committed their crimes on the world stage, as terrorists often do, but for the most part, they stuck to their signature form of terrorism—kidnapping for ransom.

Jemaah Islamia was an entirely different brand. From the onset of their introduction to the world stage, their activities were clearly aimed at terrorism, and the Philippines were not the only victims of their violence. It was JI who was behind the infamous attacks in Bali, Indonesia, in 2002, which claimed over 200 innocent lives.¹⁸²

American military assistance to the Philippines, in the form of Special Operations advisors, started in 2001 and ended in 2014. The Philippine Army, not well trained in asymmetrical warfare, was more than a formidable opponent against their enemy, which had

inferior training and armament as well as considerably fewer soldiers. The primary problem for the Philippine Army was, to the great dismay of the indigenous inhabitants, that they were turning the southern province into a battlefield. When the Americans arrived, their rules of engagement (ROE) were quite different than their Middle Eastern brethren in Afghanistan. Their orders strictly forbade any military action against anyone. Their mission was to develop actionable intelligence in the region and turn it over to the Philippine Army troops. Further, they were tasked to train the Philippine troops in asymmetrical warfare and best-practice counterterrorism techniques, knowing there would be an eventual end state to their mission and the latter would be left to carry on without their input.

The mission was not an overnight success, as the indigenous peoples looked at the Americans as co-occupiers of their land. The American Special Operations personnel, over time, developed strategic partnerships with the population that resulted in the passing of valuable actionable intelligence, which then was turned over to the Philippine army for their exploitation. The Philippine army chose their battles, no longer causing wanton destruction to the populace, who in turn saw them as defenders rather than occupiers. American forces set up a database for the Philippine government which in turn facilitated much-needed medical care for the region.¹⁸³ The Americans became a partner to the indigenous population by doing something the Filipino soldiers did not: they showed compassion. In fact, according to a report from the Rand Corporation, the inhabitants of the region overwhelmingly saw the utility of the American presence, approved of their activities, and local support for ASG dropped significantly.¹⁸⁴

The Philippine government went from a long period of frustration to show for their effort to slow and steady success. The difference in the outcome of this campaign and any other in the GWOT was that the US military was not released as an occupying force on an unwilling

indigenous population; rather, they started and ended on what many in the region viewed as a peacekeeping mission. Rand reports a decline in terror-related attacks from 72 in 2000 to 32 in 2012.¹⁸⁵

The Philippine campaign was not without pitfalls, as seventeen American servicemen lost their lives in the thirteen years the mission was operational. Of those, ten died in one helicopter accident, and the rest by either enemy attacks (IEDS) or accidentally.¹⁸⁶ The highest American troop level was 1302, with the average presence being 600.¹⁸⁷ The cost of the expedition averaged \$50 million per year—by comparison, in 2011, GWOT in Afghanistan cost America \$2 billion a week.¹⁸⁸

One of the primary reasons the campaign in the Philippines worked from the start was because the United States had been able to employ counterterrorism methods without being hampered by the calamity of a bloody and violent preceding war. Counterterrorism strategies include methodologies that seek to disrupt or sever the influence of an enemy on the local population, in this case, the enemy was ASG and JI.

You are Either with Us or Against Us

“When one side only of a story is heard and often repeated, the human mind becomes impressed with it insensibly.”¹⁸⁹

—General George Washington

Who could forget those immortal words by President George W. Bush as he proclaimed, with those eight words, that every country and every subgroup on Earth who would not stand with the United States and its righteous declaration of the GWOT was an enemy? What Bush did with that phrase was enable, even justify, hatred toward every ethnic group, religion, and nationality, globally, that was perceived as being against America. According to the logic of the leader of the free world, anyone who opposed him for whatever reason was now an outlaw. The

Pope, who, right up until the invasion of Iraq, pleaded for restraint and negotiation, would now have to be considered against the United States of America.

Politicians tend to choose their words wisely, and Bush 43 was no exception. The phrase “You are Either with Us or Against Us” sounds eerily familiar to those who have studied the Bible. In the Bible, specifically Luke 9:50 and Mark 9:40, Jesus is quoted as saying: “...Whoever is not against you, is for you.” Did Bush come about his version of this biblical passage by accident, or was it created during a moment of profundity? Did he, or his advisors, carefully craft his quote to appeal to the religious masses on both sides of the aisle who might be inclined to protest America’s participation in a war with no apparent enemy? He also used it as a smokescreen to obscure a hidden pretext for a war in Iraq.

The careful selection of words and phrases is not unique to Bush 43. Most military engagements and large-scale exercises are labeled as “Operation.....” The invasion of Panama in 1989-1990 was no different. Bush 41 named that action Operation Just Cause. In this particular example, it appears Bush 41 purposely took one of the criteria of the United States just war doctrine and named a military invasion after it.

Bush’s moralistic call to arms was inspiring to a nation that had front-row seats to the slaughter which took place in Manhattan, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC. His rationalization as to the morality of questioning the motives of a nation-state that might be hesitant to join a coalition and lose its sons and daughters recalls the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche in his book *Beyond Good and Evil*. Nietzsche theorizes, “There is no such thing as moral phenomenon, only moral interpretation of phenomenon.”¹⁹⁰ Was Bush’s global call to arms to join his moral war (or else) a moral phenomenon or simply his moral (version) interpretation of phenomenon?

Nietzsche also questions, “What does an assertion say about him who makes it?”¹⁹¹ Bush stated to the world, as if he had the authority to do so, that “You are either with us or against us.” Was Bush’s proclamation a result of anger or ‘bloodlust’? Was it an example of immeasurable hubris? Some critics of Bush 43 would, perhaps, agree that his assertion defined his intention in the GWOT.

The next opine from Nietzsche provides insight into Bush’s statement as if he were addressing it personally:

There are systems of morals which are meant to justify their author in the eyes of other people; other systems of morals are meant to tranquilize him, and make him self-satisfied; with other systems he wants to crucify and humble himself, with others he wishes to take revenge, with others to conceal himself, with others to glorify himself, and give superiority and distinction...¹⁹²

While the commentary here may seem unduly harsh on President Bush, it is certainly well-deserved, as Bush mounted the bully pulpit and offered his moral imperative to justify a war unlike any American war waged in history. The juxtaposition of Nietzsche’s writings on good and evil with Bush’s moral imperative fits seamlessly since Nietzsche was a critic of the morally superior. Consider this Nietzsche statement on morality:

The practice of judging and condemning morally is the favorite revenge of the intellectually shallow on those who are less so, it is also a kind of indemnity for their being so badly endowed by nature, and finally, it is an opportunity for acquiring spirit and becoming subtle malice spiritualises.¹⁹³

Bush’s statement was clearly a prejudicial condemnation of any world leader who would dare not stand with the United States. He gave absolutely no respect to the feelings and points of view of the Muslim world. His assertion forced every world leader to conduct an adjustment of their moral compass to make certain they were headed in the same direction as the leader of the free world.

War-for-Oil: Fact or Fiction?

President Bush had started a war and expected every country to agree with its goodness. This included the war in Iraq. While many countries decided to acquiesce to Bush's demand to see the righteousness of the GWOT, many felt the opposite about the invasion of Iraq, including our oldest ally, France. The protests against Bush's "War-for-Oil" broke out around the world almost immediately after the first shot was fired in Iraq. The administration assured Americans that its motives for war were just and had nothing to do with seizing Iraq's vast oil supplies, despite the unavoidable truth that Vice President Dick Cheney was the CEO of Haliburton, an engineering and oil company now turned military contractor, before his tenure as Bush 43's number two.

Immediately following the declaration of victory in Iraq by President Bush on May 1, 2003, American and British oil companies were awarded contracts to drill for Iraqi oil, fueling the war-for-oil conspiracy. Haliburton was one of the oil companies that benefited from these contracts.¹⁹⁴ Haliburton entered the military-contracting business in 2000, the year Cheney left the company, as the second largest military contractor in the United States.¹⁹⁵ By 2003, Haliburton had jumped up to the seventh largest military contractor in the United States, a rather impressive feat. The *Times* further reported that while Haliburton won competitive bidding contracts for various engineering and sustenance-based services, they also benefitted from no-bid oil contracts.¹⁹⁶

Profiteering through war was nothing new to America, nor was the concept of conducting military action to secure American oil interests overseas. Dating back to 1914, the American military had been used in Mexico (over a decade after the hostilities of the Spanish-American War ended) to secure Tampico for United States oil interests. Over ten years later in China, American military might helped secure Standard Oil's interests in China.¹⁹⁷ At least one-tenth of

the world's oil supply lay under Iraqi sand at the onset of the war.¹⁹⁸ As the war progressed, Bush pointed to the fact that neither America nor its coalition partners had seized any of Iraq's oil fields for their own use. Surely the protesters were wrong in their assumptions. If America had any intentions of taking Iraq's oil, it could have done it at any time. But the protesters were not wrong in theory. The war in Iraq was in fact for oil. The United States and its closest coalition partner, the United Kingdom, embarked on this campaign to assure the stabilization of the oil industry in the Middle East.¹⁹⁹

Political Stabilization through War and the Spoils of War

While immoral and unethical, historically, conquering armies engaged in the procurement of the "spoils of war." Pillaging was not at all uncommon upon defeat. A bit rude, even unchristian, but not uncommon. New York Senator William Marcy said it best in 1828 when he coined the phrase, "To the victor, belong the spoils."²⁰⁰

While the term is more commonly associated with individual soldiers pilfering items of value to which they had no legitimate claim, there are also examples of nation-states helping themselves to treasures. The Nazi regime was infamous for stealing artwork and various artifacts from their rightful owners and guardians. To date, there are still artifacts being discovered and returned to their rightful place. But goods and commodities are not the only spoils of war. Land, even nations, have fallen victim to the words in Marcy's phrase.

In post-World War I Europe, the Republic of Germany was not only forced to cede land to Poland, France, and Czechoslovakia, it was required to turn over constructive control to many of their colonies throughout the world to Great Britain, South Africa, Japan, and Belgium. Germany had previously enjoyed an annual revenue stream from each of these colonies, but because they had lost the war, the spoils were divided up by the conquerors.

Post-World War II Europe saw Germany bisected, the East controlled by the Soviets, and the West controlled by America. These two “Germanies” were recognized as individual nation-states, though East Germany was arguably under the total control of the Soviet Union.

After Japan and Russia fought to a virtual stalemate in the early part of the twentieth century, the terms of ending the war were mediated by President Theodore Roosevelt. Japan had been successful in seizing Korea, Southern Manchuria, and the Sakhalin Island. Roosevelt brokered peace through the Treaty of Portsmouth which allowed Japan to continue to control Korea and Southern Manchuria as well as the southern territory of Sakhalin Island. But territory was not the only spoil of war.

Just before World War I, the British floated a plan to nationalize the oil company which would someday be renamed British Petroleum (BP) for the procurement of fuel for their military. Vast oil reserves had just been discovered in Iraq, then called Mesopotamia.²⁰¹ Just eleven days after the British state acquired 51 percent of Anglo-Persian (BP), World War I erupted. Post-World War I saw Great Britain claim Mesopotamia as a colony, thereby giving British Petroleum a claim to Iraqi oil.

In the years following the World Wars, petroleum became a commodity traded on the market, its value per barrel set by supply and demand. Western democracies slowed the practice of colonization and the subsequent raping of natural resources as countries such as Iraq and Iran became more westernized. As with all other traded commodities, the price of petroleum is sensitive to fluctuations driven by political and economic stimulators. For decades, starting with the United Nations Plan 181, which gave birth to the recognition of the State of Israel, the Middle East region has suffered long periods of destabilization. Petroleum is very sensitive to the

political destabilization of the region, and therefore, the West has a vested interest in maintaining political stability.

Saddam Hussein was universally seen as a destabilizing figure in the region, so much so that his neighboring nations disliked him greatly. Iran fought a decade-long war against him. The United States and its allies had long feared that his unpredictable behavior threatened their long-term petroleum policies. Their hubris led them to believe they could stabilize the region by stabilizing Iraqi politics. Their method for stabilizing Iraqi politics was to invade the country, depose its unstable leader, and replace the form of government with a liberal democracy. The end state of this plan was the stabilization of Iraq's blossoming oil industry.

Saddam Hussein cared little about the free market economy. Supply and demand represented nothing to him. The oil under the Iraqi desert belonged to Iraq; in other words, it belonged to him. While Bush, Cheney, and Tony Blair (the United Kingdom's prime minister) were not planning to stick a pump in the ground and start filling up containers onto ships and sailing them to their respective countries, they did in fact want the spoils of war for American and British oil companies. The plan, while not quite as nefarious as Bush and Cheney lining their pockets, was questionable, to say the least. Iraq was a sovereign nation, and while Saddam Hussein was arguably unstable, was it moral to invade a sovereign nation you were not at war with simply to stabilize petroleum prices?

Great Britain and America apparently thought so, and they set upon their plan to place American and British oil companies in Iraq and cede operational control of the Iraqi oil market to these companies to pump Iraqi oil for sale to the West at a fair market value.²⁰² The oil would not be taken; rather, western oil companies would be controlling the supply as a surrogate to Iraq,

since the latter could not be trusted to do so in a manner that would stabilize the oil industry in the Middle East.

The United States and its allies could have taken whatever they wanted. America is the 800-pound gorilla, and as we know, the 800-pound gorilla gets anything it wants. But to his credit, if any credit can be found in this foreign policy disaster, Bush chose not to seize and nationalize, in the name of freedom, Iraq's oil fields. What he opted for wasn't much better. With the Iraq oil fields now operationally under the control of America and Great Britain's oil companies, Bush was on the precipice of stabilizing the oil supply in the Middle East. However, it was problematic since the Iraqi government was refusing to pass into law legislation that would codify foreign governance of their oil industry.²⁰³

Days, weeks, and months went by, with the Iraqi government fighting the very notion that foreign oil companies should be in control of Iraqi oil. They put up a good fight, and eventually, Bush and Blair were forced to settle for Western oil companies to do basically the same thing but under contract from the Iraqi government. Greg Muttitt asserts that the 30,000-person coalition "surge," portrayed to bring an end to the sectarian violence in Iraq, was undertaken first to shore up the US allies in the Iraqi government, many of whom were implicated in sectarian violence, and second, to pressure them to deliver political "benchmarks" by passing a law restructuring the Iraqi oil industry in favor of foreign oil companies.²⁰⁴

Both Bush and Cheney had an inarguable tie to the oil industry. They never tried to hide it, nor did they try to hide the fact that oil production and resourcing were at the top of their agenda. One of the first priorities Bush addressed was America's reliance on oil. He convened the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), which, with Cheney at its helm, created the National Energy Policy (NEP) of May 2001. The NEP made specific

recommendations designed to meet five goals: 1) Modernize conservation, 2) Modernize US energy infrastructure, 3) Increase energy supplies, 4) Accelerate the protection and improvement of the environment, and 5) Increase US energy security. Many of the policy recommendations focused on ensuring that the United States maintained access to supplies abroad.²⁰⁵ America could have, with cooperation from Congress, addressed the first of the four NEP goals, but the fifth recommendation ties directly into the recommendation that the United States maintain access to supplies abroad, and to meet that goal, America would have to stabilize the foreign market.

America was entering its seventh year of Saddam Hussein's policy of impediment regarding the UN-sanctioned inspection process. America was growing tired of his antics, and the attacks on September 11th opened a door through which Bush could drive a tank, a door which led to stabilization of the oil market by wresting control from an unstable dictator through an unjust war. But perhaps there was more of a method to the Administration's madness.

There is a historical precedent that suggests that the nation that can remain strong and unified during a time of war, when surrounding nations fall into chaos, can exploit that chaos and become a dominant regional force. Take, for example, the Thirty Years' War, fought from 1618-1648, waged primarily for religious dominance in Europe. France's Catholic Cardinal de Richelieu saw an opportunity for France to become the dominant European force after years of regional war among nation-states and groups. Richelieu understood that his nation would be forced into subordination to the Austrians should the attacks on Protestantism successfully cause its downfall. Even though he was a pious man, he felt that the nation was more important than the religious implications of supporting the smaller, weaker Protestant nations. He remarked that the nation was not immortal, while the soul of man lived on forever in heaven.²⁰⁶ His strategic

foreign policy, which lasted over two hundred years, kept France safe by supporting the chaos which was being perpetrated upon Austria. A disorganized Europe was in the best interests of France. Once European chaos disappeared, France was no longer preeminent on the continent.²⁰⁷

With the United States firmly entrenched in Afghanistan, much to the dismay of neighboring Iran, America could now move to stabilize Iraq. Bush's ultimatum was bound to alienate many in Muslim countries, and that alienation could create chaos. If America could stabilize two of the largest nations in the region while some of the other countries which might be predisposed to support Iran if for no other reason but religious purposes fell into a state of chaos, it could exert regional dominance—much how France did during the Thirty Years War.

Chapter Five

Could the GWOT be Considered a Just War?

“If a war is to be just, the warring state must intend only what is just, and the aim of the war must be to set right certain specific injustices. That is, the righting of wrong done must be a sufficient condition on which peace will be made.”²⁰⁸

—G. E. M. Anscombe

While G. E. M. Anscombe was not writing about the GWOT, her opinion is as relevant now as it was during the time about which she wrote in. Was the intention of the United States GWOT just, according to Anscombe? If only it was that easy to answer. The variables related to the start of the GWOT are convoluted, to say the least. Let’s compare Anscombe’s version of a just war to Bush’s Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

An argument can be made that the United States “intended only what is just” regarding the incursion into Afghanistan. The AQ group is a terrorist organization that has enjoyed state sponsorship, a freelance organization with its own leadership hierarchy. The United States did not commit one definable act of aggression toward AQ that would justify its attacks on September 11th (or any previous attack for that matter). The United States acted not only in self-defense by attacking AQ in locations where it was known to operate but also in defense of any state that had been victimized by that organization. Therefore, America’s intention for the incursion into Afghanistan to destroy AQ and kill or capture bin Laden could be argued as just.

Next, “Is the aim of the GWOT to set right certain specific injustices?” The al Qaeda terrorist group has been victimizing citizens of the world for years. Not only is America just in righting the injustices levied on the nation by AQ, but it is also just in righting injustices to other states (victims).

Lastly, “the righting of wrong done must be a sufficient condition on which peace will be made.” From the onset of the GWOT, the Bush administration made it clear to the world that if

any terrorist group, terrorist state sponsor, or terrorist state renounced terrorism, all would be forgiven. That statement was not an empty promise. Libya had most, if not all, its punitive restrictions removed quickly after it renounced terrorism.

The Obama Administration's stated intention was that America would leave Afghanistan in 2014 under conditions upon which peace would prevail.²⁰⁹ Both Bush's and Obama's American GWOT objective was to see a peaceful Afghanistan. Though it would be difficult given the twenty-year military presence, their intention was right. But the GWOT does not begin and end with Afghanistan.

The conflict in Iraq is much more complex. The decision to invade Iraq fails to meet any criteria in Anscombe's statement. Rather than break down Anscombe's statement in the same manner as Afghanistan, the point is more easily made by rewriting it to describe the Iraq war:

The war was not just, the warring state never intended it to be just, and the aim of the war was never to set right certain specific injustices. That is, there was no wrong to be righted, and peace already existed.

To be fair, America has left Iraq to grow into its own liberal democracy. America has not sought to, nor will it seek to, occupy Iraq, as most of the world thought it would. America did, in fact, make certain American and British oil companies feathered their nests before withdrawing, but America did not turn Iraq into an American colony. But regardless of the outcome, one cannot ignore the means taken by America.

Noted philosopher Immanuel Kant opined on war, as most philosophers do. Kant was not against war, rather he was against war being waged for improper reasons. For Kant, a war waged based on a position of goodwill was acceptable. Kant believed in the righteousness of liberal democracy and supported wars aimed at supplanting dictatorships and monarchies. To Kant, this action (war) constituted goodwill, claiming: "The only thing that is good without qualification or

restriction is goodwill.”²¹⁰ That is to say, goodwill alone in all circumstances is an absolute or unconditioned good. It may also be described as the only thing that is good in itself, good independently of its relation to other things.”²¹¹ Does Bush 43’s Global War on Terror meet the standard of goodwill in Kant’s philosophical theory? Does Kant’s statement complicate the just war argument? Is it possible to claim and maintain goodwill in a military operation, started under questionable circumstances, in which innocent civilians become collateral damage?

In an address to Congress nine days after the attacks, President George W. Bush said, “Our war on terror will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”²¹² Bush started the GWOT shortly thereafter with the incursion into Afghanistan. The AQ group had been terrorizing the world for years. They indiscriminately killed men, women, and children non-combatants. They rationalized their murderous sprees by incorrectly citing Islamic law. Would Kant agree with the Bush and Obama administrations that there was in fact goodwill in the decision to rid the world of terrorist groups so that the children of the world could prosper in peace? If so, then he would also forgive the atrocities created by this war since, in his own words, this goodwill is “good in itself, independently” of its relation to other things (atrocities). If the incursion into Afghanistan was initiated for the purpose of goodwill, it would arguably meet Kant’s standards.

Again, the Iraq War is different. Bush did not act in goodwill; in fact, he exhibited bad will. His invasion of Iraq was predicated upon a lie and wrought with hidden pretext, none of which could be remotely interpreted as goodwill. Kant’s rationalization of a war waged in goodwill could never be applied to the invasion of Iraq, as Kant would view a lie as the opposite of goodwill.

A War by Any Other Name

The GWOT was not a single war but a broad, overarching doctrine adopted by the Bush 43 administration that encompassed any number of past, present, and future military initiatives, all of which were, are, or shall be undertaken to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks against the United States. But is the GWOT a war? It's inarguable that the invasion of the sovereign Republic of Iraq was not a war. Conversely, it is the remaining military action throughout the world which should be questioned.

Ralph B. Potter argues that

War is not merely a descriptive term employed to inform us that violent deaths are occurring between two organized antagonists. It is also a legal term, indicating a state of hostility in which certain rules and relations ordinarily obtaining between parties or states have been suspended.²¹³

What Potter means is that war is not the stereotype of two Armies facing one another on the battlefield; victory going to the last man standing. It extends from the battlefield into philosophical differences between parties or states. If Potter's definition of war is acceptable, then the GWOT, even absent of Iraq, was in fact a war.

Now that the basis to accept the GWOT as a war has been presented, a further analysis of it is used in the criteria in Appendix 1.

Competent Authority

This criterion is satisfied by the fact that Bush, as President of the United States, was empowered to conduct military operations to protect American lives and interests. He declared the Global War on Terror after America was attacked.

Just Cause

It is this criterion where it becomes problematic for the Bush administration. Bush declared a Global War on Terror. Then, he set upon a series of campaigns in multiple locations for reasons he stated were the same, but which research has debunked.

Looking at the GWOT from the beginning, and giving the administration the benefit of any doubt, the hostilities in Afghanistan could be considered just, as they met the war definition standard argued by Potter as well as Zajac and Strauss in their standards of both preventative and preemptive attacks.²¹⁴ America had been attacked and was retaliating because it feared both imminent and inevitable additional attacks. The Taliban had allowed al Qaeda to operate training camps unabated throughout their country, and America was correct in fearing that the training being undertaken was to enhance the terrorists' abilities to conduct further attacks.

During a speech on September 20, 2001, Bush compared these rogue groups to “fascists, Nazis, and totalitarians” who possessed “murderous ideologies.” These murderous ideologies were directed at the United States, and the Bush administration was not obligated to sit around and wait until the enemy attacked again. The enemy, by the very nature of its organization, is asymmetrical. It does not have its own country which could be invaded. Rather, it has relationships with state sponsors of terrorism and had demonstrated its ability and will to exploit these relationships to further its terroristic intent. Since the Taliban, the de-facto ruler of large regions of Afghanistan, refused to deny refuge to the enemy, the Bush Administration could be viewed as justified in changing the regimes and empowering replacements that would not harbor terrorists.

The invasion of Iraq is an entirely different story. Consider the following timeline research has uncovered regarding events leading up to the invasion of Iraq:

- In 1997 Paul Wolfowitz coauthored an article in the Weekly Standard with Zalmay Kalilzad titled “Overthrow Him.”²¹⁵
- The NEOCON group Project for the New American Century (PNAC) formed in 1997, four years before September 11th and six years before the invasion of Iraq. The group is comprised of such notable public figures as Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, L. Scooter Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle.²¹⁶ Each of these figures was an important foreign policy maker in Bush 43’s administration.
- In 1998, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz drafted a letter demanding an incursion into Iraq and sent it to President Clinton.²¹⁷
- In 1998, while attending a function with the British Ambassador to the United States, Wolfowitz, then Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, commented that “We should invade Iraq, seize the oilfields...”²¹⁸ Wolfowitz had reportedly been seeking alliances with influential people in Washington to support his idea to invade Iraq for at least ten years before the invasion.²¹⁹
- Then-candidate Bush, reportedly not at all interested in nation-building, proclaimed at a 1999 debate in New Hampshire concerning Saddam Hussein “I’d take ‘em out – I’m surprised he’s still there.”²²⁰
- Shortly after victory in the 2000 election, Bush and Cheney form their foreign policy team consisting of Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Scooter Libby (Chief of Staff to the Vice President), Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense), and Richard Perle (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs)—all former members of the NEOCON group Project for the New American Century (PNAC).

- In the first ten days of his administration, Bush started planning for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. This would be almost eight months before September 11 and more than two years before the invasion.²²¹
- Two days before the 9/11 attacks, Bush 43 was “presented with a draft of a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) outlining a global campaign of military, diplomatic, and intelligence action targeting al Qaeda.”²²²
- Just months after the September 11th attacks during a meeting with such noted American clerics, including Reverend Franklin Graham, Cardinal Bernard Law, and Muslim scholar Hamza Yusef Hanson, Bush uttered the sentence “I am having trouble controlling my bloodlust.”²²³
- At Bush’s direction, Rumsfeld began reviewing existing invasion plans for Iraq in late September 2001.²²⁴
- By March of 2002, a full year before the invasion of Iraq and only six months after the September 11 attacks, Bush sends Cheney to brief certain Arab states as to the possibility.²²⁵
- In 2001, the United States receives unproven information about an operational relationship between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. Wolfowitz seized the opportunity to direct certain intelligence assets to confirm this report.²²⁶ For the next eighteen months, the United States fails to corroborate that information, the CIA finding that while there was clearly a supportive connection between Saddam Hussein and several terrorist organizations, “connections between Iraq and AQ were remarkably thin.”²²⁷
- During his 2002 State of the Union Address Bush identifies Iraq as one of three members of the Axis of Evil.

- By September 2002, the administration would revert back to a vigorous assertion that Iraq possessed WMD.²²⁸
- On January 9, 2003, Hans Blix, United Nations Inspector in Iraq, reported to the UN that he failed to find a “smoking gun” that would indicate Iraq was actively involved in creating, maintaining, or obtaining WMD.
- During Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he proclaimed that Saddam Hussein was attempting to purchase significant amounts of uranium from Africa.²²⁹
- Within months this statement was debunked when one of the inspectors who was responsible for conducting nuclear capability inspections determined the letter intelligence was depending on for its authenticity was a forgery.²³⁰
- Hans Blix noted publicly that over 400 inspections were conducted of Iraqi WMD possession and delivery capabilities without a single episode of impediment, calling into question Bush’s previous claims that Hussein’s stonewalling of the inspectors was an indicator of guilt.²³¹
- Post-invasion, the Bush administration blamed the failure to find WMD in Iraq on faulty intelligence. The CIA intelligence lead in Iraq, Sam Faddis, disagreed, claiming that the CIA’s intelligence was accurate: they never claimed, before the invasion, that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD.²³² It was never a case of faulty intelligence; it was a clear case of faulty direction at the highest level of the Bush administration.

The invasion of Iraq could never fit the description of just cause. Even when applying the true reason for the war, the stabilization of the Iraq oil market, this criterion is not satisfied.

Bush’s GWOT in Africa took on a completely different look, as he used surrogates to accomplish his end state, whatever that true end state was. Research presented here has discussed

the GWOT in sub-Saharan Africa, acknowledging the presence of global terrorists on the continent. But rather than send American troops to war, Bush followed a longstanding policy of funding African nations such as Uganda to conduct America's bidding.²³³ US interest in including Africa in the GWOT may have been based on a desire to exploit its oil reserves.²³⁴ Exploitation can take many faces, and while there is no evidence available to indicate that the United States ever seized or claimed any African oil during the GWOT, it is distinctly possible that America was taking this action for the same reasons they invaded Iraq: stabilization of the oil market.

For these reasons, and giving America the benefit of the doubt, there was certainly strategic value in keeping terrorists from gaining too much power in Africa, thereby hampering those terrorists in forming an unholy alliance with Russia. The GWOT in Africa could be seen as having just cause.

The military activities in the Philippines were arguably the only truly successful endeavor of the GWOT. No American forces fought, and there were minimal casualties (minimal is still unacceptable and unnecessary). The Philippines, while not being overrun by terrorist organizations, still lacked adequate military counterterrorism capabilities to wrest control of their southern provinces from the hands of terror groups that had been successful in turning the local populace away from the Philippine government and toward their cause. America's response was measured, effective, and started with just cause.

Proportionality

Coalition human assets were much better trained in warfare and as such could further minimize civilian casualties. Weapons were employed to strike military targets while minimizing

civilian casualties. American military rules of engagement (ROE) were immediately adjusted to minimize collateral damage.

All Peaceful Alternatives Must Have Been Exhausted

The Taliban had been warned to 1) turn over or provide the whereabouts of the mastermind of the September 11th attacks, UBL, and 2) deny AQ the use of its country for terrorist training camps. They were defiant for two months. It is indeterminable if a deadline was ever set or when that deadline was. It is also indeterminable if the Bush administration started OEF in Afghanistan because an attack was imminent or inevitable. For these reasons it would be fair to acknowledge that Bush attacked AQ in October 2001 after all peaceful alternatives had been exhausted.

Iraq was a different story. None of the stated reasons for the invasion of Iraq have ever proven to be valid; in fact, they have all been completely disproven. Without the ability to fulfill the just cause criterion, there could never be a situation where all peaceful alternatives could have been exhausted. Even playing devil's advocate by assuming Saddam Hussein might have been hiding WMD and had the capabilities to employ them, the UN inspectors themselves stated that Iraq had not been stonewalling inspections.

Lastly, Henry Allen Stephenson very keenly acknowledges the difficulty of either side knowing what "last" is. He quotes Walzer, who concluded in *Just and Unjust Wars*: "We can never reach lastness, or we can never know that we reached it. There is always something more to do: Another diplomatic note, another UN resolution, another meeting."²³⁵

While Walzer may be correct in his assertion that "we can never reach lastness," we certainly can tell that with regards to Bush's decision to invade Iraq on March 20, 2003, America was still quite a distance from lastness.

In sub-Saharan Africa, there is no evidence that any negotiations between the United States and any of the number of targets in Africa attempted to exhaust any peaceful means to avoid conflict. The United States knew who needed to be targeted and relied on its surrogates to accomplish that task.

In the Philippines, the belligerents were never at war with America. There was no negotiation to avoid American involvement; rather the Philippine government asked America for help. In OEF-P, this criterion could not have been met by America because it was not obligatory.

A Right Intention on the Part of the Just Belligerent

This criterion is very subjective, as it automatically breeds conflicting perceptions between the nation taking the military action and anyone else who might be standing in judgment. In the just cause criterion, the hostilities in Afghanistan could be considered just, as they met the war definition standard argued by Potter as well as Zajack and Strauss in their standards of both preventative and preemptive attacks. Bush's intention was to rid the world of terrorism starting with the murderous criminal enterprise of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. His intention could be viewed as right.

Regarding Iraq, discounting Bush's preposterous stated good intentions of the invasion can draw a singular conclusion: the invasion does not meet this criterion. As stated, Bush's reasons for the invasion were not truthful. They were a pretext. Plans to invade Iraq preceded Bush's inauguration by almost four years. A pretext to stabilize the Iraq oil industry by supplanting the control with American and British oil companies had been planned by the PNAC before the inauguration. The United States and its closest coalition partner, the United Kingdom, embarked on this campaign to assure the stabilization of the oil industry in the Middle East.²³⁶ Even if the assertion that the war centered on the stability of the Iraqi oil industry was untrue;

everything publicly stated about the war by the belligerent who started it was a lie. The terms “lie” and “right intention” cannot coexist in the same sentence. The lie immediately makes the statement that the lie created the wrong intention.

Sticking to General Eisenhower’s example of management of African foreign affairs had well served every president since.²³⁷ Regardless of the use of surrogates to accomplish the task of vanquishing the world of terrorism, if America’s activities in Africa kept the Russians off the continent, the intentions could be considered right.

The Philippine government was on the verge of a civil war in the Southern Philippines. They asked America for help and insisted on setting the ROE. America obliged and assisted the Philippines in averting a regional civil war with minimal bloodshed. All American campaigns should be conducted with these intentions.

Chapter Six

Could the GWOT Have Been Avoided?

“I shall constantly bear in mind, that as the sword was the last resort for the preservation of our liberties so it ought to be the first thing laid aside, when those liberties are firmly established.”²³⁸

—General George Washington

The short answer: yes. Take away all the pretext, all the ill-intent, all the corruption, and the GWOT could have been avoided easily by parties willing to engage in serious dialog and rational restraint. It would have been tough to swallow the fact that UBL murdered thousands and the United States did not avenge their deaths immediately, but patience could have avoided bloodshed, and UBL would eventually have been brought to justice. But, seven days after the attack, Bush signed a law authorizing the United States to use force against those responsible for the attacks on September 11th. He also threatened anyone who was providing safe haven to UBL and AQ. The threat was clearly aimed directly at the Taliban, who were undeniably providing safe haven for AQ and possibly for UBL. Less than one month after the September 11th attacks, the bombs started flying.

Even looking at the situation objectively, how much dialog between America and the Taliban could possibly have taken place in less than a month? And if any had taken place, would America have decided not to invade? Daniel Bynum suggests that at one point during the Afghan war the Taliban had sought peace negotiations and was rebuffed by the United States.²³⁹ Good-faith negotiations aimed at averting war have a long history of success. America has been able to avoid war with such antagonistic countries as Russia, the former Soviet Union, Cuba, China, and North Korea by choosing to discuss differences rather than fight to the death to resolve them.

An interesting prospective foe should have been Pakistan. Remember, Bush threatened the same fate to any country that was harboring UBL or AQ. Bin Laden was found in Pakistan,

living in plain view, quite comfortably and remarkably unmolested by the authorities, yet Pakistan did not suffer the same fate as AQ. If America could choose, and it did, to give Pakistan a pass, then why not the Taliban?

The Holy See, Pope John Paul II, pleaded for more dialog aimed at avoiding bloodshed in Iraq right up until the waning hours before the invasion of Iraq. Ecclesiastical statements exist showing that John Paul II implored the United States to settle its grievance with Iraq through negotiation and that on March 5, 2003, as well as March 20, 2003, the day of the invasion, the Pontiff's envoys were still pushing for a peaceful resolution.²⁴⁰

The United States is not responsible for September 11th, nor did we deserve to be attacked by radical criminals. Violence when trying to justify a grievance is never the answer, and it will never be. It is a distortion of the Rule of Law under which American domestic policy exists. Anger and nationalism certainly could justify retaliatory or preventative military action, but was the military action we saw necessary, or were we just part and parcel to Bush's bloodlust?

The United States is the most powerful entity on Earth, capable of bringing any number of countries to their knees using sanctions. Just like no country could stop America from imposing its military will on them, no country could stop America from imposing sanctions. The imposition of sanctions against the Taliban might very well have resulted in military engagement, but America seemingly had no interest in sanctions. The 800-pound gorilla is always viewed as the bully when starting a fight.

Only the inner sanctum of the Bush administration knows for sure if anything other than a global war was discussed as an option, but if it was, they did a great job of keeping that from the American public. President Bush never fully stood behind one reason for the war. The

existence of multiple justifications implies deceit. There are always differing opinions on how to proceed in every situation. There are always multiple versions of what is perceived to be the truth. In the case of the September 11th attacks, that truth is that criminals with distorted views of Islam killed thousands of innocent civilians. There will never be justification for their action. But their actions did not justify the hundreds of thousands of lives lost since then as a direct or indirect consequence of the GWOT. Could there have been another course of action America chose? The US military has a process called the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Within the MDMP is a provision that requires commanders to create multiple courses of action for each mission and compare them to identify the one that best fits the mission objectives. Each course of action requires comparisons of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness. Did the Bush Administration assess multiple courses of action and then decide upon the one which would result in turning our backs on trying to reach “lastness” with the Taliban, choosing to attack as soon as the plan was ready?

The United States was born of conflict. Rebellion against an oppressive monarchy resulted in the loss of life on both sides, including collateral damage to civilians. The Thirteen Colonies attempted in vain to reach agreements with Great Britain regarding taxes and tariffs but were left consistently frustrated. There were many, including George Washington, who were not proponents of war and negotiated with Great Britain to allow the Colonies to cede from the empire and form their own union. But in the end, war was the only option left for Americans who wanted true freedom.

Researchers commonly discover scholarly claims about specific situations varying as much as 180 degrees in the opposite direction. The recent chaos in the medical community regarding COVID-19 is a contemporary example of contradictory expert opinion. Sometimes it

is impossible to decide who is right or wrong. Sometimes, it is not as clear-cut as right or wrong. Perception varies based on one's viewpoint. A different viewpoint does not make an adversary wrong and the other right.

Negotiation and the Reliance on Interpretation Through the Hermeneutical Approach

The hermeneutical approach to interpretation teaches us that despite our steadfast reliance on what we perceive to be inalienable truths, like “If you’re not with us, you’re against us,” any truth is always open to interpretation. Bush 43’s lack of openness to interpretation while devising his coalition partner’s parameters for the GWOT has left a legacy that has rendered the American public unable, at times, to interpret an incident from any point of view other than ‘Islam must be the enemy.’

As a case in point, the recent suicide bombing in Nashville on December 25, 2020 is a prime example. The morning after the bombing, the author arrived at work to be greeted by staff members, all seasoned police officers and firefighters, who advised that “They blew up Nashville last night.” ‘They,’ meaning terrorist. Recent history has taught us that rushing to judgment on anything related to a terrorist attack is not prudent, so the author researched the bombings. Several colleagues, most of whom were highly educated, jumped to the conclusion that the bombing was conducted by Islamic terrorists. Many of them wanted blood. Shortly thereafter, we found out who “they” were: a lone white male with no religious ties, ample psychological baggage, and a large bomb.

President Bush had gone out of his way to stress to the American public that Islam was neither the problem nor the target of the GWOT. Still, the constant bombardment of targets who shared the same religious belief has rendered many reasonable people unable to interpret any situation involving an explosion as anything other than an act perpetrated by a follower of Islam.

This phenomenon was evidenced several years ago when an active-duty Army officer, Major Nidal Hassan, shot several people on an Army base in Fort Hood, Texas. President Obama was reluctant to brand this an act of terror. He was eviscerated for his decision. In the end, Obama was correct not to label this shooting an act of terror. There was never any proof the shooter acted at the behest of a rogue nation-state or terrorist organization.

Hermeneutics is the threat of tyranny, totalitarianism, and terror in politics, and it is essential to democracy because anyone adhering to the tenets of hermeneutics when trying to determine the right course of action in life will be forced to acknowledge that they may not be correct in their opinion.²⁴¹ Nobody likes to consider they are wrong, but hermeneutical thought provides for discourse without anyone being truly wrong or truly right. It respects a different perspective and requires the ability to hold one's ego in check. The hermeneutical approach to interpretation is the archenemy of mob violence, of jumping to conclusions and overreacting. It tempers all responses in both important decisions and the mundane.²⁴² Let's interpret John Caputo's statement on hermeneutics rather than just jumping to a conclusion that he is right or wrong: Hermeneutics "is the threat of tyranny, totalitarianism, and terror in politics."²⁴³

George W. Bush gave us the immortal, "You are either with us, or you're against us." He provided little or no data to substantiate that claim, leaving those nations who were not signed on to going to war against something other than a nation-state to worry that they would be the next target bombed if they failed to acquiesce. Bush made a statement that would embark all participants, willing or forced, upon a path of devastation, death, and destruction and that failed to provide any interpretation of that statement. Looking at a situation from the point of view of all those affected is the foundation of the hermeneutical approach to interpretation. Did Bush consider the points of view of every country that had a grievance, real or imagined, against the

United States? Could Bush's statement be considered a terroristic threat? The retaliatory strikes against global terror had already begun. Presumably, those targets were groups or nations that were against the United States. The point of view of most, if not all, predominately Muslim nations could arguably have been they were next if not declaratively with Bush.

Bush's reaction to the attacks on our country and subsequent statement seemingly lacked any objective interpretation of the gravity of telling countries that the perception of the United States regarding how that country felt (partnering) was more important than how any of those countries actually felt.

This comparison of Bush's statement to Caputo's quote is not meant to imply that Bush was a tyrant, a totalitarian leader, or a terrorist. It was simply meant to illustrate that Bush's decision to start a war by forcing the hands of America's allies, even those like Great Britain and Australia who have always been supportive militarily, was ill-conceived at best. There is reasonable evidence offered that the Bush administration had done its due diligence and taken into account the perception of his potential allies before making such a broad, overarching statement, but this cannot be completely determined. It does appear that Bush was trying to force the formation of a coalition by any means necessary, even by making a veiled threat against those who were not with America. Leaders should never have to threaten anyone to gain conformity. Leadership is influence, and an effective, credible leader gets people to follow because they choose to follow. Perhaps if the West took the time to understand a terrorist's perspective, it could assist in averting more disasters. Hermeneutical interpretation allows for analysis of both sides of the argument, not necessarily acceptance, rather a respectful acknowledgment of the existence of a point of view.

It would be fruitless to interpret AQs actions on September 11th in any way other than the outcome—mass murder. They were one organization that no longer needed to exist. But what if the Bush administration had engaged in meaningful talks with the Taliban, who they accused of harboring UBL and other terror organizations, to see why they were doing so and what it would take for them not to continue? Neither the Taliban nor the nation of Afghanistan participated directly or indirectly in the attacks. The United States acted in a grossly subjective manner and attacked a sovereign country, possibly without ever attempting to open a dialog to learn their point of view. Again, it is safe to say that most people in America, if not the world, cared little about what UBL and AQ thought. But America did not attack al Qaeda's country.

From a terrorist's point of view, terrorism is a rational problem-solving strategy.²⁴⁴ Citizens in America could never view terrorism as anything more than repugnant, but to a terrorist or prospective terrorist, their point of view is the only thing that matters to them. Keep in mind that terror cells do not recruit from an applicant pool of evil geniuses. When it is time to find a new suicide bomber to replace a former suicide bomber who was very good at their job, they don't send out applications, nor do they have a problem finding the next one. This is because terrorists have been traditionally very successful in humanizing themselves and their causes to certain demographics to elicit sympathy from them. They know that the demographic for the next successful suicide bomber is out there somewhere, they just need to find the right way to appeal to them. This was very evident in the southern Philippines during OEF-P, when the local populace started to side with the foreign Islamist fundamentalists instead of the government.

The perceived benevolence of Hamas in Palestine is well documented. The Palestinian Authority may or may not be wrought with terrorists, but one thing they are certainly wrought

with is corruption. The Palestinian Authority is not looked upon with the same favorable eyes that view Hamas because the latter steps up and supplies the beleaguered Palestinian people with quality-of-life enhancements that the Authority fails to, such as new schools and hospitals. If the Palestinian Authority cannot compete with the terrorist organization operating in their own backyard, then America cannot possibly convince any current or future terrorists that we are on the right side of the terrorism argument.

In the 1970s, then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made his famous visit to China aimed at opening a dialog with the reclusive country after years of isolation from the West. Kissinger, one of the premier statesmen of his time, remarked to his delegation that China was a “land of mystery.” After correction from the Chinese Premier, and further observation, Kissinger came to understand that what he perceived to be a mystery was anything but. There were 900,000,000 Chinese people who felt their lives to be normal, not mysterious.²⁴⁵ Kissinger had jumped to a benign conclusion about China based on his perception, without the benefit of the Chinese people sharing their views of their lives. He claimed that incomplete perceptions of other societies exist primarily due to self-containment, and if all the world’s people could relieve themselves of these perceptions, world order could be achieved.²⁴⁶

As previously mentioned, the Americans were sent to the Philippines to advise the Filipino military on how to defeat Islamist fundamentalists in their southern provinces. Part of the American strategy that was significantly successful was the positive engagement with the local inhabitants. These inhabitants, much like the Palestinians, were impoverished and received more assistance from ASG and JI than they did from Manilla. Therefore, just like the Palestinians, the indigenous population of the southern Philippines became sympathetic to the Islamists, often joining their cause. Once the American military realized the perspective of the

population (not necessarily agreeing with it but acknowledging it) and became sympathetic to what the islanders needed, they were successful in turning the population away from the violence that ASG and JI brought to their region. Negotiating by using a hermeneutical approach to interpretation was a key factor in America's success in the Philippines. One is left only to theorize as to the possible outcome of the GWOT had the Bush administration attempted the same technique in the Middle East as America did in the Philippines.

War is a Racket! – The Military Industrial Complex

“(A racket) is best described, I believe, as something that is not what it seems to the majority of the people. Only a small inside group knows what it is about. It is conducted for the benefit of the very few, at the expense of the very many. Out of war a few people make huge fortunes.”²⁴⁷

—Smedley Butler, Major General (ret.), USMC

This short answer to this main chapter—Could the GWOT Have Been Avoided?—is yes. The long answer is no because the military-industrial complex would have made certain the GWOT occurred.

In his farewell speech, President Dwight Eisenhower warned America to beware of a sinister foe, a foe of which many Americans had never heard: the military-industrial complex. Eisenhower had seen war from an angle most Americans never will. It was he who helped plan the invasion in Normandy, as well as the rest of the European campaign that sent many American soldiers to their deaths. If Eisenhower warned of an enemy, America would have been wise to heed this warning.

The term military-industrial complex (MIC) implies the existence of an organization or at the very least an organized movement but neither is true. The MIC is more akin to a deviant subculture that developed rather quickly over a century ago in the wake of the industrial revolution in America. This culture has no central leader, it does not hold a place on the stock

market, and it is not regulated. Our leaders only acknowledge its existence during private conversations. Official membership is not required. It exists at the convenience of Congress and the President of the United States, yet neither seldom, if ever, acknowledge it. The United States has arguably benefitted from this culture embedding itself into American military affairs but not near as much as the corporations that comprise the MIC.

While there is no definitive birthdate for the MIC, the late Smedley Butler, retired Marine Corps Major General and two-time Congressional Medal of Honor recipient, in his book *War is a Racket* sees the start of this period in the American industrial revolution, along with the staggering amount of money to be made by producing war-related material, as the catalyst for the MIC.²⁴⁸ In his 1935 text, twenty-six years before Eisenhower's speech, Butler warned of the perils of its existence.²⁴⁹

As the dust settled in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, American military power had reached a peak strength unrivaled throughout the world. American policy at the turn of the century spawned a new era for our young republic. Before 1898, the United States did not own a colony or possession outside of America and had a budget of \$1 billion.²⁵⁰ The spoils of the Spanish-American War resulted in new American colonies, which included Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines—early examples of “American globalization.” and how “war would prove to be an integral part of economic globalization.”²⁵¹ New possessions brought new business interests to American companies. In less than twenty years, the nation's annual budget would blossom to over \$24 billion.²⁵² In the Philippines, America invested \$600 million over a thirty-five--year period, not including the \$200 million invested by private industrialists, all, according to Butler, to “stir up” war with Japan.²⁵³ The result of this war would be the “compensating profit fortunes” for private industry “munitions makers, bankers, ship builders,

and manufacturers” who provided the material support for the war itself as well as the post-war reconstruction.²⁵⁴ Perhaps, almost a hundred years later, Thomas Friedman was right when he said, “the hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist ...”, and the American military is “the hidden fist” that keeps the world safe.²⁵⁵ As of 2020, this ‘hidden fist’ maintains eight hundred bases on foreign soil housing hundreds of thousands of American military personnel.²⁵⁶

While the list of private corporations profiting from war is lengthy, the largest of these companies is perhaps Lockheed Martin. Lockheed started its operations as a family-owned business when the Loughead brothers sought to capitalize on the growing aviation industry just after the turn of the century, and the name Lockheed is a derivative of their real surname. Their early business endeavors would prove to be mostly unsuccessful until they discovered the economic potential of the burgeoning military aviation industry. By 1930 the aviation industry found itself to be forever attached to the military, as over two-thirds of all aircraft purchased were for war-making.²⁵⁷ Over the next half-decade, Lockheed would develop into one of the largest beneficiaries of aviation contracts in America.

By the 1980s, Lockheed would still be growing its business through MIC contracts, never abandoning its aviation roots but constantly reimagining its place in the MIC world.

The think tank Center for Security Policy (CSP), organized in 1988, was formed and funded by multiple military contractors including Lockheed to provide structured aviation and aerospace lobbying (political influencing) services.²⁵⁸ Since that time, these think tanks, the driving force behind the MIC, have been responsible for billions of American taxpayer dollars being legally funneled to American corporations for the purposes of war-making.

In 1994, Lockheed merged with Martin Marietta, the latter being a major contributor to the aviation, aerospace, and electronics industry. This merger made the new Lockheed Martin the most powerful military contractor in the world, with a near-monopoly on US military, space, and energy contracts.²⁵⁹ Over the next thirty-five-plus years, Lockheed Martin would branch out to include government services far beyond the aviation industry upon which both companies were built, such as interrogation, police training (both domestic and global), military translators, intelligence analysts, and peace and stability operations.²⁶⁰

One might ask, “why would private corporations involved in providing war-making support be involved in peacekeeping?” The hallmark of the Lockheed corporation has and will always be the maintenance of a very diversified portfolio. They will make money however they can. It was this philosophy that would see Lockheed Martin enter into an agreement with the US military in the 1990s to provide stability and peacekeeping operations in post-war Bosnia, as well as constructing camps in Sudan for UN and African peacekeepers.²⁶¹ This was the beginning of Lockheed Martin’s roadmap to maintain financial solvency even in times of peace.

In 2006, Lockheed Martin purchased a company named Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) that later made its fortune through military contracting in the construction and maintenance of foreign military bases.²⁶² Lockheed Martin turned PAE into a juggernaut of military contracting, and to this date, even in times of peace, PAEs ‘job openings’ website boasts thousands of available international peacekeeping positions. One of the cornerstones of PAEs initiatives is serving as the logistics “backbone” of the African Union military.²⁶³

This chapter has briefly described the money-making process inherent in the relationship shared between the MIC and the US government, but the scope of influence by the MIC does not stop at America’s shores. Many companies who share a place in the MIC have benefited

financially by selling weapons systems to foreign governments. Caldicott claims that the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over thirty years ago was more about weapons contracts for the MIC than it was about protecting Europe.²⁶⁴ The foreign sales market is lucrative to the MIC for many reasons, including the fact that before any weapon systems are ever shipped overseas, the research and development costs for those systems have been paid for by the US taxpayer.²⁶⁵

The MIC has been, currently is, and will probably long be the driving force behind the future wars planned, fought, and finished by the United States. Nothing about the MIC is illegal; however much of it is questionable when one considers that they could have been the purveyors of every war since World War I. As Kissinger remarked, America must (and arguably has) made war part of its permanent policy.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

In 2007 the author had a conversation with Dr. Phil Zimbardo regarding the Global War on Terror. Dr. Zimbardo came to prominence in 1971 after he published the results of his famous *Stanford Prison Experiment*. In short, Dr. Zimbardo claimed his research proved that even a good person, when placed in a position where doing something bad is an acceptable option, will make that bad choice if enough external pressures are placed upon them.

The Global War on Terror inspired Dr. Zimbardo to publish back-to-back books titled *The Lucifer Effect* and *The Psychology of Terrorism*, respectively.²⁶⁶ The former dealt heavily with the war atrocities US soldiers were accused of committing during the GWOT.

The discussion we had was related to *The Lucifer Effect* theory.²⁶⁷ Dr. Zimbardo made a spontaneous utterance during our conversation that George Bush should be charged with war crimes. When pressed to explain this statement he related, in a very angry yet confident tone, that Bush had planned the invasion of Iraq before the attacks on September 11th and that Bush's invasion was without any doubt a war-for-oil. He then laid out exactly what was meant by war-for-oil, his words very closely matching the research information imparted in an earlier chapter of this paper. It was the first time I had heard the theory related to war for the stabilization of the Middle Eastern oil market by providing Western access to Iraqi oil.

Some five years later, the author had a conversation with Dr. Daryl Cole, a professor from Drew University, regarding a paper I wrote in his Just War class that claimed the GWOT was a just war under accepted American just war standards. Dr. Cole accepted my paper, graded it accordingly (and generously), then offered an eerily similar version of what Dr. Zimbardo had related years prior.

No one should ever waver in their opinion that the attacks by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, were wrong, a criminal act beyond the ability to process. But the author started to question Bush's GWOT and its motivations. Killing UBL and his coconspirators brought America justice and joy, but under closer academic scrutiny, nothing researched supported a claim that the GWOT, when viewing it in its entirety, was a just war under United States policy.

Bush may have started his incumbency as a starry-eyed do-gooder. Perhaps he was that anti-nation building politician who believed in his heart that the foundations of national security lay within every American citizen.²⁶⁸ But research has shown that at some point— perhaps due to the influence of his national security team comprised of former members of the pro-Iraq invasion PNAC, coupled with the profound emotion of having been the President of the United States during the worst attack on American soil that was the result of the worst intelligence failure in our history—Bush 43 morphed into the leader of the most expensive war in this nation's history.

According to Bob Woodward, Dan Balz, and Jeff Himmelman, in the early post-September 11th days President Bush “wanted to kill somebody.”²⁶⁹ He wanted to do so, 1) as a deterrent, 2) to provide emotional relief for the public, and 3) for vengeance.²⁷⁰ Still, there are no records indicating that Bush wished to “kill” anyone before the attacks. The attacks clearly triggered a change in Bush 43, but was there an active force aside from emotion and the former PNAC that drove Bush to war? Could Dr. Zimbardo have been correct about the *Lucifer Effect*, and if so, could the effect have played a part in Bush 43's decision-making? Or was there a third, and possibly more irresistible, force in play?

While this paper suggests Bush's foreign policy team as having more influence in the commencement of the invasion of Iraq than our own president, the MIC and its corporate think

tanks could have been pressuring all involved to hasten a war in the Middle East. These influential think tank groups like PNAC are not new to American policy. Dating back to the 1970s, international corporations have organized to create the forerunners of the 1997 PNAC.²⁷¹ The difference between the two is that the stereotypical think tank existing since the 1970s does not hide the fact that its corporate well-being is at the core of its recommendations, unlike the PNAC, which did not overtly claim to represent the interests of the MIC. However, as we have seen throughout the GWOT, at least one of the PNAC objectives (supplanting the Iraq oil market with Western oil companies) could not have been met without the MIC, inferring that the MIC had at least some influence on the decision to invade Iraq, if not the entire GWOT. If the claims of academia are correct regarding the influence of the think tanks and the MIC, then arguably no Presidential administration sets its own foreign policy, rather these influential groups set them.²⁷²

Consider that in 1998 the CSP presented then-PNAC member, soon-to-be Secretary of Defense and architect for the GWOT and the Iraq invasion, Donald Rumsfeld with their ‘Keeper of the Flame’ award.²⁷³ Recall earlier that Lockheed Martin, the largest military contractor in America, held a major influence on the CSP. While no clear leader was orchestrating the activities of these think tanks, it is odd that the same players seem to be interconnected.

Lockheed Martin, for all intents and purposes, is a legitimate military contracting company providing necessary services for the United States, yet one would have to question some aspects of its relationships with the Department of Defense. Caldicott offers a mind-numbing example of the dangerous relationships between America and the MIC when she uncovered that since 1978 the United States Air Force has requested only five C-130 military transports.²⁷⁴ Anyone with knowledge of or experience in the United States military can name more than five times they have either flown on a different C-130 or seen a different C-130

airborne. The problem, as Caldicott has uncovered, is that while only five have officially been requested, Lockheed Martin, at the direction of Congress, has authorized the building of 256 of these planes.²⁷⁵

This could be a profound example of the wisdom and strategic military planning prowess of the US Congress. It could be an example of the prolific government waste in spending US tax dollars. Or it could be a run-of-the-mill example of the power over the US military that the MIC enjoys to pad its profit margin while simultaneously directing presidential policy, power that exists in peacetime but grows exponentially during the time of war.

And this is not just wars waged by America. Most major military contractors provide arms to foreign governments, even those viewed by America as hostile. So lucrative are these foreign contracts that by 1999 the corporations manufacturing weapons systems for overseas imports outdid the combined sales of Russia, England, and China combined.²⁷⁶ And remember, the research and development for the creation of these arms had already been paid for by the American taxpayer.

Consider the Carlyle Group, an investment firm that does not produce any military-related equipment but invests heavily in corporations that do. According to Jamie Doward, Carlyle provides returns upwards of 36 percent to their investors.²⁷⁷ Doward refers to the Carlyle Group as the “Ex-Presidents Club” due to the number of former high-level American political players benefitting from the Group’s ventures. Doward claims that one member of the Group has ties to Rumsfeld.²⁷⁸

Why, or perhaps more importantly how, could the MIC become so powerful and accumulate such wealth? One of the answers lies in the composition of the US government. The Pentagon is the largest employer in the United States. It boasts 600 permanent buildings

worldwide and owns more than 40,000 properties and 18 million acres.²⁷⁹ Its budget is roughly seven times the size of America's education budget.²⁸⁰ The Pentagon is arguably the most powerful entity in the world, made more powerful by the MIC incessantly feeding it, even during peace.

Any possible success stories emerging from the GWOT are null and void if the conflict was not just. America's just war tradition has not been dramatically altered in decades. The standards require 100 percent concurrence with all five criteria for military action to be considered just. To review, those criteria are:

- A competent authority to order the war for a public purpose
- A just cause (such as self-defense)
- The means being proportionate to the just cause
- All peaceful alternatives are exhausted
- A right intention on the part of the just belligerent

After an assessment of the sum of all the GWOT pieces, the only real conclusion is that there is no possibility that the war was just. Bush and his foreign policy team tried their best to portray that America had a moral and ethical reason for all their actions but fell short on most attempts. Yes, America was attacked by a criminal terrorist organization. Needlessly, horrifically, 2606 civilian souls perished in that attack. The resulting GWOT aimed at that organization was just, no matter where they sought refuge. Arguably, America's bombing and occupation of Afghanistan was overkill, but in the end, America did not seek to overthrow the government of Afghanistan, rather they sought to punish the warlord-like orthodox Islamist group the Taliban for concealing the whereabouts of UBL. Even that action could have been seen as just.

The spread of the GWOT to Sub-Saharan Africa to root out terror organizations that threatened the world was at least carried out consistent with existing US policy with the use of surrogates.

The GWOT's lone resounding success, OEF-P, only occurred because America was invited to the Philippines, operating under strict rules of engagement. No American servicemembers fired their weapons, making this campaign inarguably just.

That leaves Iraq. The war in Iraq was born of deceit. From its inception, at least three years before George Bush was elected the 43rd President of the United States, the mere thought of this war was unjust. It was planned and promulgated by the think tank PNAC, whose major players, most notably Paul Wolfowitz, were quite possibly representing the interests of the MIC. After their overtures for war in Iraq had been turned down by various parties for years, they finally got their shot. Planning began months before the September 11th attacks. Wolfowitz and his team would have to be patient, waiting for the right moment. The right moment came when the first plane hit the World Trade Center. Iraq posed no specific threat to the United States. A preventive attack fell well short of meeting the requirements of the just cause provision of the US Department of Defense *Law of Land Warfare Manual*. Even if there was no definitive proof that the Iraq war was fought to stabilize the Middle East by opening up the Iraqi oil market to American and British corporations, Bush was not truthful regarding his insistence that Iraq possessed WMD. This deceit could never make the invasion just. Even if Bush 43 did truly believe that the weapons existed, he did not exhaust all options. Walzer, a prominent scholar on just war tradition, said it best: "We can never reach lastness, or we can never know that we reached it. There is always something more to do: Another diplomatic note, another UN resolution, another meeting."²⁸¹ Never having interviewed Walzer, it is possible that he might

defend drawing a line at which enough time had passed and a decision had to be made. But conversely, with so much at stake, why not wait to see if lastness exists? Bush could have waited, should have waited, but did not. His incursion into Iraq reeked of ill-intent, therefore it could never be considered just. The Iraq War was about oil, stabilization of the region through providing Western access to the Iraqi oil market, not WMD, and certainly not about self-defense (prevention).

While Bush and supporters of his GWOT could point toward the premise that our actions brought peace to the region, there is a distinction between “negative” peace and “positive” peace. The latter implies that harmony reigns for all citizens of the state to which positive peace was brought. The former, however, implies a peace in which the burning injustice is simply changed from one intolerable situation to another, much as we have seen with civil strife in Iraq.

Lastly, none of Bush’s reasoning makes sense, unless you consider that his decisions were driven or made by the military-industrial complex.

It was Einstein who remarked: “You cannot simultaneously prevent and prepare for war. The very prevention of war requires more faith, courage, and resolution than are needed to prepare for war.” It is difficult to argue with Einstein, yet it appears neither Bush, the members of PNAC, the Pentagon, nor the MIC ever read those words.

Appendix 1

BACKGROUND: THE PRESIDENT'S QUOTES ON ISLAM

In the President's Words: Respecting Islam

The United States is a nation dedicated to religious tolerance and freedom, and President Bush has acted to ensure that the world's Muslims know that America appreciates and celebrates the traditions of Islam.²⁸²

- "Here in the United States our Muslim citizens are making many contributions in business, science and law, medicine and education, and in other fields. Muslim members of our Armed Forces and of my administration are serving their fellow Americans with distinction, upholding our nation's ideals of liberty and justice in a world at peace."

*Remarks by the President on Eid Al-Fitr
The Islamic Center of Washington, DC
December 5, 2002*

- "Over the past month, Muslims have fasted, taking no food or water during daylight hours, in order to refocus their minds on faith and redirect their hearts to charity. Muslims worldwide have stretched out a hand of mercy to those in need. Charity tables at which the poor can break their fast line the streets of cities and towns. And gifts of food and clothing and money are distributed to ensure that all share in God's abundance. Muslims often invite members of other families to their evening iftar meals, demonstrating a spirit of tolerance."

*Remarks by the President on Eid Al-Fitr
The Islamic Center of Washington, DC
December 5, 2002*

- "America treasures the relationship we have with our many Muslim friends, and we respect the vibrant faith of Islam which inspires countless individuals to lead lives of honesty, integrity, and morality. This year, may Eid also be a time in which we recognize the values of progress, pluralism, and acceptance that bind us together as a Nation and a global community. By working together to advance mutual understanding, we point the way to a brighter future for all."

*Presidential Message Eid al-Fitr
December 5, 2002*

- "Islam brings hope and comfort to millions of people in my country, and to more than a billion people worldwide. Ramadan is also an occasion to remember that Islam gave birth to a rich civilization of learning that has benefited mankind."

*President's Eid al-Fitr Greeting to Muslims around the World
December 4, 2002*

- "Ours is a war not against a religion, not against the Muslim faith. But ours is a war against individuals who absolutely hate what America stands for, and hate the freedom of the Czech Republic. And therefore, we must work together to defend ourselves. And by remaining strong and united and tough, we'll prevail."

*President Bush and President Havel, Czech Republic, Press Conference
Prague Castle, Prague, Czech Republic
November 20, 2002*

- "Some of the comments that have been uttered about Islam do not reflect the sentiments of my government or the sentiments of most Americans. Islam, as practiced by the vast majority of people, is a peaceful religion, a religion that respects others. Ours is a country based upon tolerance and we welcome people of all faiths in America."

*President Bush meeting with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
The Oval Office, Washington, DC
November 13, 2002*

- "We see in Islam a religion that traces its origins back to God's call on Abraham. We share your belief in God's justice, and your insistence on man's moral responsibility. We thank the many Muslim nations who stand with us against terror. Nations that are often victims of terror, themselves."

*Remarks by the President at Iftaar Dinner
State Dining Room*

- "Islam is a vibrant faith. Millions of our fellow citizens are Muslim. We respect the faith. We honor its traditions. Our enemy does not. Our enemy doesn't follow the great traditions of Islam. They've hijacked a great religion."

*Remarks by President Bush on US Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan
Presidential Hall, Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Washington, DC
October 11, 2002*

- "Islam is a faith that brings comfort to people. It inspires them to lead lives based on honesty, and justice, and compassion."

*Remarks by President Bush on US Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan
Presidential Hall, Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Washington, DC
October 11, 2002*

- "All Americans must recognize that the face of terror is not the true faith -- face of Islam. Islam is a faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world. It's a faith that has made brothers and sisters of every race. It's a faith based upon love, not hate."

*President Bush Holds Roundtable with Arab and Muslim-American Leaders
Afghanistan Embassy, Washington, DC
September 10, 2002*

- "If liberty can blossom in the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza, it will inspire millions of men and women around the globe who are equally weary of poverty and oppression, equally entitled to the benefits of democratic government. I have a hope for the people of Muslim countries. Your commitments to morality, and learning, and tolerance led to great historical achievements. And those values are alive in the Islamic world today. You have a rich culture, and you share the aspirations of men and women in every culture. Prosperity and freedom and dignity are not just American hopes, or Western hopes. They are universal, human hopes. And even in the violence and turmoil of the Middle East, America believes those hopes have the power to transform lives and nations."

*President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership
The Rose Garden, Washington, DC
June 24, 2002*

- "When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes."

*Remarks by President Bush, 2002 Graduation Exercise
, US Military Academy, West Point, New York
June 1, 2002*

- "America rejects bigotry. We reject every act of hatred against people of Arab background or Muslim faith America values and welcomes peaceful people of all faiths -- Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu and many others. Every faith is practiced and protected here, because we are one country. Every immigrant can be fully and equally American because we're one country. Race and color should not divide us, because America is one country."

*President Bush Promotes Compassionate Conservatism
Parkside Hall, San Jose, California
April 30, 2002*

- "We're taking action against evil people. Because this great nation of many religions understands, our war is not against Islam, or against faith practiced by the Muslim people. Our war is a war against evil. This is clearly a case of good versus evil, and make no mistake about it—good will prevail."

*Remarks by the President Bush at a Town Hall Meeting
Ontario Convention Center, Ontario, California
January 5, 2002*

- "Eid is a time of joy, after a season of fasting and prayer and reflection. Each year, the end of Ramadan means celebration and thanksgiving for millions of Americans. And

your joy during this season enriches the life of our great country. This year, Eid is celebrated at the same time as Hanukkah and Advent. So it's a good time for people of these great faiths, Islam, Judaism and Christianity, to remember how much we have in common: devotion to family, a commitment to care for those in need, a belief in God and His justice, and the hope for peace on earth."

*Remarks by President Bush in Honor of Eid Al-Fitr
The Diplomatic Reception Room
December 17, 2001*

- "The teachings of many faiths share much in common. And people of many faiths are united in our commitments to love our families, to protect our children, and to build a more peaceful world. In the coming year, let us resolve to seize opportunities to work together in a spirit of friendship and cooperation. Through our combined efforts, we can end terrorism and rid our civilization of the damaging effects of hatred and intolerance, ultimately achieving a brighter future for all."

*President Bush's Message for Eid al-Fitr
December 13, 2001*

- "According to Muslim teachings, God first revealed His word in the Holy Qur'an to the prophet, Muhammad, during the month of Ramadan. That word has guided billions of believers across the centuries, and those believers built a culture of learning and literature and science. All the world continues to benefit from this faith and its achievements."

*Remarks by President Bush at the Iftaar Dinner
The State Dining Room, Washington, DC
November 19, 2001*

- "The Islam that we know is a faith devoted to the worship of one God, as revealed through The Holy Qur'an. It teaches the value and the importance of charity, mercy, and peace."

*President Bush's Message for Ramadan
November 15, 2001*

- "This new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom and impose its views. We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it. We value education; the terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health care, or should leave their homes. We value the right to speak our minds; for the terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution. We respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims."

*President Bush Addresses the Nation
World Congress Center, Atlanta, Georgia
November 8, 2001*

- "All of us here today understand this: We do not fight Islam, we fight against evil."

*Remarks by President Bush
Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism
November 6, 2001*

- "I have assured His Majesty that our war is against evil, not against Islam. There are thousands of Muslims who proudly call themselves Americans, and they know what I know -- that the Muslim faith is based upon peace and love and compassion. The exact opposite of the teachings of the al Qaeda organization, which is based upon evil and hate and destruction."

*Remarks by President Bush and His Majesty King Abdullah of Jordan
The Oval Office, Washington, DC
September 28, 2001*

- "Americans understand we fight not a religion; ours is not a campaign against the Muslim faith. Ours is a campaign against evil."

*Remarks by President Bush to Airline Employees
O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois
September 27, 2001*

- "The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them."

*President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People
United States Capitol, Washington, DC
September 20, 2001*

- "I've made it clear, Madam President, that the war against terrorism is not a war against Muslims, nor is it a war against Arabs. It's a war against evil people who conduct crimes against innocent people."

*Remarks by President Bush and President Megawati of Indonesia
The Oval Office, Washington, DC
September 19, 2001*

- "The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent peace. They represent evil and war."

*Remarks by the President at Islamic Center of Washington, DC
Washington, DC
September 17, 2001*

Appendix 2

Jus ad Bellum Criteria²⁸³

1.11.1 Have, at their philosophical roots, drawn from principles that have been developed as part of the Just War Tradition. These principles have included:

- a competent authority to order the war for a public purpose;
- a just cause (such as self-defense);
- the means must be proportionate to the just cause;
- all peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted; and
- a right intention on the part of the just belligerent.

These principles may be reflected in modern law of war rules. For example, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the inherent right of States to use force in individual or collective self-defense—a just cause for military action. These principles have also been incorporated into military doctrine.

1.11.1.1 *Competent Authority (Right Authority) to Wage War for a Public Purpose.*

One longstanding criterion for a just war is that war must be ordered by a competent authority for a public purpose. This *jus ad bellum* principle (sometimes called *right authority*) acknowledges that the resort to military force is a prerogative of the State.

The criterion that war must be ordered by a competent authority for a public purpose is reflected in the requirement that armed groups must belong to a State to receive the privileges of combatant status. This criterion is also reflected in the general denial to private persons of the

entitlement to the privileges of combatant status. This criterion is also reflected in the condemnation under international law of certain types of private acts of hostility (such as piracy or terrorism) outside the context of patriotic resistance against an enemy State during international armed conflict.

1.11.1.2 *The Means Must Be Proportionate to the Just Cause (Proportionality – Jus ad Bellum). Proportionality*

Involves a weighing of the contemplated actions with the justification for taking action. For example, the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defense is to be judged according to the nature of the threat being addressed. Force may be used in self-defense, but only to the extent that it is required to repel the armed attack and to restore the security of the party attacked. As an illustration, assessing the proportionality of measures taken in self-defense may involve considerations of whether an actual or imminent attack is part of an ongoing pattern of attacks or what force is reasonably necessary to discourage future armed attacks or threats thereof. The *jus ad bellum* criterion of proportionality is different from the *jus in bello* rule of proportionality in conducting attacks. These concepts should not be confused with one another.

1.11.1.3 *All Peaceful Alternatives Must Have Been Exhausted (Necessity – Jus ad Bellum)*

The *jus ad bellum* condition of necessity requires that no reasonable alternative means of redress are available. For example, in exercising the right of self-defense, diplomatic means must be exhausted or provide no reasonable prospect of stopping the armed attack or threat thereof. The *jus ad bellum* criterion of *necessity* is different from the *jus in bello* concept of *military necessity*.

1.11.2 Council U.N. Charter Framework and the U.N. Security

The Charter of the United Nations provides the modern treaty framework for *jus ad bellum*.

Under the Charter of the United Nations, the U.N. Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The U.N. Security Council may determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and may decide what measures shall be taken under the Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security. For example, the U.N. Security Council may recognize that a State is acting lawfully in self-defense or that another State is the aggressor in an armed conflict. In addition, the U.N. Security Council may authorize the use of military force.

1.11.2.1 U.N. Member State Obligations with Respect to U.N. Security Council

Decisions

Members of the United Nations have agreed to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

Members of the United Nations have agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the U.N. Security Council in accordance with the Charter. They have also agreed to join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the U.N. Security Council.

Moreover, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter prevail.

Prohibition on Certain Uses of Force. Under Article 1.11.3 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Numerous other treaties also reflect these prohibitions on the threat or use of force. The resort to force must have a legal basis in order not to violate these prohibitions. The legality of the use of force must be assessed in light of the particular facts and circumstances at issue.

1.11.3.1 *Aggression*

Aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force. Not every act of illegal use of force prohibited by Article 2(4) of the Charter constitutes aggression. Initiating a war of aggression is a serious international crime.

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314 suggested considerations that the Security Council should bear in mind in determining whether an act of aggression had occurred. Although this resolution states basic principles as guidance for such determinations, it recognizes that whether an act of aggression has been committed must be considered in light of all the circumstances of each particular case. The United States has expressed the view that the definition of the act of aggression in the Kampala amendments to the Rome Statute does not reflect customary international law.

1.11.4 *Rationales for the Resort to Force*

1.11.4.1 *Use of Force in Self-Defense*

The right to use force in self-defense is an inherent right of States.

1.11.4.2 *Use of Force Authorized by the U.N. Security Council Acting Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations*

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the U.N. Security Council may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace or security, including demonstrations, blockade, and other military operations.

1.11.4.3 *Use of Force with the Consent of the Territorial State*

Military action in the territory of another State is not a violation of Article 2(4)'s prohibition against the use of force against that State where it consents to such military action.

1.11.4.4 *Humanitarian Intervention*

Violations of law of war treaties applicable to non-international armed conflict generally have not been understood to provide an independent basis for intervening in a State.

Although the United Kingdom and certain other States have argued that intervention for humanitarian reasons may be a legal basis for the resort to force, the United States has not adopted this legal rationale. Consistent with this view, the United States did not adopt this theory as a legal rationale for NATO's military action to address the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo in 1999, but rather expressed the view that such action was justified on the basis of a number of factors.

Military action for humanitarian reasons may, however, be authorized by the U.N. Security Council.

Use of Force in Self-Defense. Article 51 of the 1.11.5 Charter of the United Nations provides that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until

the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

The Charter of the United Nations was not intended to supersede a State’s inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in customary international law. To constitute legitimate self-defense under customary international law, it is generally understood that the defending State’s actions must be necessary. For example, reasonably available peaceful alternatives must be exhausted. In addition, the measures taken in self-defense must be proportionate to the nature of the threat being addressed.

1.11.5.1 Responding to an Imminent Threat of an Attack

The text of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations refers to the right of self-defense “if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Under customary international law, States had, and continue to have, the right to take measures in response to imminent attacks.

1.11.5.2 Use of Force Versus Armed Attack

The United States has long taken the position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force. Others, however, would be inclined to draw more of a distinction between “armed attacks” and uses of force that do not give rise to the right to use force in self-defense.

1.11.5.3 Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad

A State’s right to use force in self-defense may be understood to include the right to use force to protect its nationals abroad. The United States has taken action to protect US nationals abroad when the government of the territory in which they are located was unwilling or unable to protect them. A State need not await actual violence against its nationals before taking such action if an attack against them is imminent.

1.11.5.4 Right of Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors

The inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, applies in response to any “armed attack,” not just attacks that originate with States. As with any other exercise of the right of self-defense, actions taken in self-defense against non-State actors must comply with applicable international law.

1.11.5.5 Right of Collective Self-Defense

Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations also recognizes a right of States to engage in collective self-defense with a State that can legitimately invoke its own right of national self-defense. Collective self-defense of a State must proceed with that State’s consent, although this consent need not necessarily be expressed in the form of an explicit request.

Some treaties include commitments by States to assist one another in collective self-defense.

1.11.5.6 Reporting to the U.N. Security Council

Measures taken in the exercise of national self-defense shall be immediately reported to the U.N. Security Council.

Index

Abu-Sayyef (ASG), xi, 86-89, 118
Administration, xiv, 5, 9, 52-53, 61, 63-65, 69-70, 71-72, 74-75, 77, 80, 81, 83, 86, 91, 96, 98-99, 100-105, 107, 112, 115-116, 118, 125, 129
advocates, 12, 17
Afghanistan, 4, 5, 8, 11, 48, 58-61, 80, 87-89, 97-100, 107-108, 116-127
Africa(an), 8, 53, 67, 74, 79-83, 93, 105-106, 109, 121-122.
 Sub-Saharan, 6, 8, 12, 66, 78, 106, 108, 127.
 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 81, 83, 124
AFRICOM, 82
aggressors, 13
Air War College, 7
Alexander the Great, 20
Allah, 22
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), 81
Allies, 4, 10, 28, 33, 77, 80-81, 94-95, 115.
Al Qaeda, iii, iv, 4-5, 48, 51-53, 57, 59-60, 62, 65-67, 69, 70, 98, 102, 104, 116, 124
 AQ, 5-6, 9, 53, 60-62, 69, 71-74, 100, 102, 107, 109, 112-113, 118
Al-Shabaab, 80-81
Anglo-Persian, 93
America(n), 1-9, 11, 16, 22-25, 29-35, 37-41, 44-45, 47-48, 51-54, 56-64, 67-68, 70-72, 77-99, 101-104, 106-128
Anscombe, 98-99
Aquinas, Thomas, 17-19, 23
Aristotle, 15
Army, 6-7, 12-13, 21, 46, 54, 57, 85, 87, 114
Army War College, 7
Asymmetrical, 22, 58, 85-87, 102
Attacks, 1-3, 5, 8, 10, 32-33, 35, 49, 50, 52-53, 55, 57, 58, 60-64, 65-68, 71-73, 75, 77, 80, 87-90, 99-100, 102-104, 106, 109-110, 112, 114, 117-118, 125-126, 129
 Imminent, 10, 15, 34, 42, 45-48, 50, 80, 104, 109
 Inevitable, 12, 15, 25, 34, 36, 42-47, 49-50, 67, 74, 104, 109
 Preemptive, 41, 42
 Preventive, 41, 42
 September 11, iii, 1-5, 10, 34, 36, 39, 52-53, 55-58, 60-68, 71-75, 77-78, 80, 87, 98, 100, 104-107, 109, 112-114, 118, 125-126,
 Targeted, 41, 42, 49, 50
Augustine, 16-17, 20, 68
Austria-Hungary, 30-31
Authority, 18-19, 60, 91
 Legitimate, 19
 Competent, 13, 23, 129, 138
Authorization for Use of Military Force Act (AUMF), 47, 60
Axis, 40
Axis of Evil, 49, 52, 66, 74, 77, 107

Bagdad, 74
 Bali, 88
 Bangladesh, 21
 baseline, 3, 8
 Belligerent, 3, 14, 30, 41-42, 44, 48, 110-111, 129
 Beslan, 55-56
 Bible, 17, 90
 Blair, Tony, 96, 97
 Blix, Hans, 75, 77, 78, 107
 Blue Jays, 1-2, 10
 Bosnia, 123
 British, 6, 30-31, 33, 36, 65, 73, 78, 82-83, 93, 95-96, 101, 105, 111, 130
 British Petroleum, 95
 Brookings Institute, 60
 Bush, 1-4, 6, 9, 46, 49, 52-55, 59-60, 62-68, 70-83, 84-85, 87, 90-94, 96-118, 120, 125-127, 129
 (41), 69, 83, 91
 Butler, Major General Smedley, 34, 36, 93, 120-122

 C-130, 128
 Caldicott, 123-124, 127-129
 capabilities, 30, 37, 46, 75-76, 107-109
 Caputo, 116-117
 Caribbean, 45
 Carlyle Group, 126
 Carnegie Center, 43
 Cartels, 57, 62
 Catholicism, 7
 Catholic Church, 16, 18
 Caucasus, 56
 Center for Security Policy (CSP), 123, 127
 Chechen, 55
 Cheney, Dick, 64-66, 73, 93, 96, 98, 105-106
 Chinese (China), 20, 22, 23, 36, 39, 40, 55, 93, 112, 119, 128
 Churchill, 36
 Cicero, 15, 17, 22
 civilization, 21
 Clausewitz, 55
 Clinton, Bill, 64-65, 67, 71, 83-84, 105
 Coalition, 9, 11, 49, 52-53, 67-68, 73, 79, 87, 91, 94, 97, 109, 111, 115,
 collateral damage, 102, 109, 114
 collectives, 14
 Colombia, 62
 Colonies, 30-32, 81, 94, 114, 121
 coltron, 80
 communist, 45

compensating profit fortunes, 122
 Congress, 98, 102, 121, 128
 Congressional Medal of Honor, 121
 Counterterrorism, 6, 54, 89-90, 108
 criteria (criterion), 11, 13-16, 18, 24-25, 43, 46, 48-49, 91, 101, 103, 104, 108-111, 129
 Cruce, Emeric, 24
 Crusades, 16
 Cuba, 45, 47, 112
 culture, 1, 12, 15-16, 20, 55, 85, 87, 121
 Czar, 32
 Czechoslovakia, 94

Danes, 12
 Defense, Department of, 13, 57, 127, 130
 Democracy, 5, 22, 25, 36, 56, 58, 61, 63, 68, 79, 96, 101-102, 116
 Democratic Republic of Congo Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), 83
 DeNiro, Robert, 3
 Dharma, 20
 Djibouti, 54
 doctrine, 37, 91, 103, 138
 Dymond, Jonathon, 25

Egypt, 46-47
 Eisenhower, 6, 24, 29, 81, 83, 111, 120-121
 England, 30, 34-36, 96
 Erasmus, 1, 24-25
 Ethiopia, 54
 EUCOM, 82
 Europe, 4-5, 13, 20, 30-31, 33-36, 44, 80-82, 85, 94-95, 98-99, 120-124
 evil, 2, 13, 17, 19, 21, 26-28, 62

failed states, 82
 Ferdinand, Archduke, 30-31
 Filipino, 85-87, 89, 119
 Five Powers Treaty, 39
 France, 30-31, 37, 39, 56, 80, 94, 98-99

Germans, 12, 33
 Giichi, Tanaka, 39
 globalization, 122
 God, 16-18, 24, 27
 good (goodness), 3, 17, 20-22, 26-28, 53-54, 73, 80, 85, 91-92, 94, 97, 102-103, 111-112, 118, 125-126
 Graham, Reverend Franklin, 66, 106
 Granada, 45
 Great Britain, 12, 25, 31-33, 37, 39, 41, 46, 80, 94-97, 114, 117

Great Depression, 35
 Great Satan, 58
 Ground Zero, 2
 groups, 6, 11, 13, 19, 22-23, 50, 52, 54-55, 59-60, 67, 84, 87-88, 98, 102, 104, 109, 117, 127
 Guam, 121
 GWOT, Global War on Terror, 3-11, 13, 43, 46, 49, 50, 52-54, 59-64, 66-68, 71, 80-85, 87, 89, 90, 91, 93, 100-104, 108, 112, 114-116, 120, 125-127, 129

 Haliburton, 93
 Hamas, 69, 119
 Hanson, Hamza Yusef, 66, 106
 Hatta, Lord, 37
 Hazmi, Nawaf al, 72
 Hermeneutics, 9, 115-118, 116, 120
 hidden fist, 122
 Hindu, 20-23
 Hitler, Adolph, 12, 34, 35
 Holocaust, 12, 34, 35
 Homeland Security, 55
 homeostasis, 12
 Hoover Organization, 42, 46
 Howard, Michael, 16, 24, 26
 hubris, 36, 91, 96
 Hussein, Saddam, 6, 46, 65-69, 71-79, 96, 98, 105-109

 imminent, 10, 15, 34, 42, 45-48, 50, 80, 104, 109
 inevitable, 12, 15, 25, 34, 36, 42-47, 49-50, 67, 74, 104, 109
 India, 20-22, 67
 Indonesia, 53, 67, 88
 Industry, 31, 36, 85-86, 94, 96-98, 111, 122-123
 Industrial Revolution, 37, 121
 influence, 34, 36, 44, 55-56, 58, 80, 83-84, 90, 117, 124, 126-127
 inspectors, UN, 67, 7, 75-76, 107, 109
 institution, 7
 Intelligence, 5, 9, 40, 43, 66-69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78
 cycle, 69, 71
 actionable, 70, 71, 73
 faulty, 73, 74
 intension(s), 21, 42, 94, 111
 invasion, 5-6, 8, 9, 21, 34, 44, 46, 50, 61-63, 65-71, 73, 74, 77, 79, 81, 83, 90, 91, 93, 102-103, 105-109, 111, 113, 120, 125-127
 Iran, 49, 52, 74, 77, 82, 95-96, 99
 Iraq, 6, 8, 9, 11, 17, 46, 50, 52, 59, 61-79, 82-84, 90-99, 101-103, 105-111, 113, 125-127
 isolationism, 36-37, 119
 Islam, 2-3, 23, 53, 54, 58, 60, 63, 80, 82-84, 88, 102, 114-116, 119-120, 129
 Islamic State Central Africa Province, 83

Islands, 6, 38, 45, 87
 Israel, 46-47, 53, 58, 69, 76, 96
 Italy, 30, 34, 39, 80

 Japan (Japanese), 38-41, 45, 86, 94-122
 Jemaah Islamiyah, 54, 88
 Jesus Christ, 90
 Jewish, 35, 58
 Jihad, 23
 Jihadist, 3, 5
 Jordan, 46, 75
 just, iii, 3-4, 6, 12, 14, 18, 19, 28, 33, 41, 44, 48, 53, 79, 93, 100, 101, 104, 110, 129
 cause, 3-4, 8, 13, 18-19, 29, 33, 35, 52, 53, 91, 104, 108-110, 129
 Christian, 8, 13-14
 criteria, 11, 13-16, 18, 24-25, 43, 48, 49, 103, 129
 doctrine, 37, 91
 Eastern, 14, 20, 23
 Jus ad bello, 7, 13,
 Jus in bellum, 7, 13
 Jus post bellum, 7, 13
 pre-Christian, 8, 14
 theory, iv, 8-9, 11-14, 17, 20, 23, 29, 34, 46
 tradition, iv, 7, 13, 16, 19, 34
 unjust, iii, 3, 44, 48, 68, 79, 98, 110, 130
 war, iii, iv, 3-4, 6-9, 11-24, 26, 29, 34, 37, 41, 44, 46, 49, 68, 91, 100, 102, 110, 125-126,
 128
 Western, 8, 13-16, 20, 23

 Kant, Emmanuel, 25-26, 101-103
 Kenya, 54
 Kissinger, Henry, 11, 99, 119, 124
 Kurds, 74

 Last Resort, 13, 19, 22-23, 44, 112
 Law, Cardinal Bernard, 66, 106
 Lastness, 44, 110, 114
 Lend-Lease, 35-36, 41
 Libby, Scooter, 64-65, 105-106
 liberal, ix, 3, 24-26
 democracy, 5, 22, 25, 36, 56, 58, 101-102, 116
 woke, 3
 Libya, 54, 82, 101
 Little Satan, 58
 Lockheed (Martin), 122-124, 127-128
 Loughhead, 122
Lucifer Effect, 125-126

Malaysia, 72, 87
 Manila, 87
 Manhattan, 2, 10, 53, 56, 91
 Manual, Law of War, 14
 Marines, 7, 121
 Marine Corps War College, 7
 Martin Marietta, 123
 Meiji Constitution, 37
 Mexico, 32, 33, 93
 Middle East, 3, 56, 58, 60, 62-63, 67, 69, 87-88, 96-97, 111, 120 125, 127
 middle-ground, 13
 Mihadhar, Khalid al, 72
 military, 2, 5-7, 9, 11, 14, 18, 21-22, 24, 29-31, 33-40, 42, 44-47, 52-55, 57, 59-62, 66-68, 70, 78, 81-83, 85-89, 91, 93, 95, 101-104, 106, 108-110, 113-114, 119-124, 127-129
 military advisors, 6
 military industrial complex (MIC), 6, 10, 29, 34, 36, 41, 121, 123-124, 127-129
 missile, 46, 47, 49, 69, 76
 morals (morality), 20, 24, 50, 91, 92,
 MS St. Louis, 35
 Museveni, Yoweri, 82, 83
 Muslim, 2, 23, 53, 66, 87, 92, 99, 106, 117
 mythology, 21

 Nashville, 115
 National Energy Policy (NEP), 98
 National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), 98
 nation building, 63, 65, 105, 126
 nation-state, iii, 6, 11, 13-15, 18-19, 22, 24-26, 50, 52, 57, 62, 67, 69, 91, 94-95, 98, 116
 Navy, 7, 38, 54
 Navy War College, 7
 Naval Postgraduate School, 7
 Nazi, 35, 94, 104
 nefarious, 34, 96
 negotiation(s), 9, 14, 26, 90, 110, 112, 113, 115
 Neo-conservative (NEOCON), 64, 105-106
 New York Times, 93
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 26-28, 91-92
 nihilism, 26
 Normandy, 120
 Normans, 12
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 124
 North Korea, 52, 74, 77, 112

 oil, 6, 9, 37, 39, 54, 58, 64-65, 75, 78, 80, 83-85, 92-98, 101, 105, 108, 111, 121, 122, 125-127

Operation Enduring Freedom, 59, 85
 Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, 85, 87
 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 62
 opium, 61-62
 Overseas Contingency Operation, 54

 Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), 124
 pacifist(s), 12, 25
 Paine, Thomas, 26
 Pakistan, 21, 49, 54, 61, 67, 113
 Palestinian Authority, 119, 120
 peace, 2, 11, 14-17, 19-21, 24-26, 40, 43, 47, 57, 82-83, 89, 95, 100-102, 109-110, 112-113, 123-124, 128-129
 Pearl Harbor, 36, 40, 41, 45
 peer-reviewed, 8, 101
 Pennsylvania, 53, 91
 perception, 53, 110, 115, 117, 119
 Perle, Richard, 64-65, 105-106
 Philippines, 9, 36, 54, 85-88, 90, 108, 110-111, 118-122
 Filipino, 85-87, 89, 119
 Philippine Army, 6, 87-89
 South Philippines, 118, 120
 philosophy (philosophical, philosopher), 8, 13, 15-17, 23, 24, 25-27, 55, 63, 101, 102, 103, 123
 liberal, 24
 Poland, 35, 94
 policy, iv, 6, 8-9, 11, 18, 43, 47-50, 64-65, 67-68, 81, 83-85, 97-99, 105, 108, 113, 121, 123-124, 126-129
 makers, 11, 34, 48, 105, 122
 politics (political), 9, 11, 14, 21-22, 26, 31, 37, 57, 58, 60, 68, 80, 84, 94-97, 123
 Pope, 90, 113
 Holy See, 113
 John Paul II, 113
 Powell, Colin, 68, 79
 Prime Minister, 39, 96
 probable cause, 50
 Project for New American Century (PNAC), 64-65, 67-68, 70, 87, 105-106, 111, 126-127
 Proportionality, 19, 109
 Psychology of Terror, 125
 Puerto Rico, 121

 Qur'an, 23

 Racket, 120, 121
 raid, 42, 46
 Ramayana, 21
 Rand Corporation, 15, 87-89, 116

Reich, Third, 12, 34
 religion, iii, 2-3, 12, 15-16, 20-21, 23, 27-28, 55, 85
 righteousness (righteous), 20, 21, 27-28, 90, 93, 102
 Rights of Man, 26
 Robespierre, 26
 Roman(s), 12, 15-17, 19, 22
 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (FDR), 34-36, 41, 63
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 38, 95
 rules of engagement (ROE), 88, 109, 111
 Rumsfeld, Donald, 64-66, 79, 105-106, 127
 Russo-Japanese War, 38
 Russia, 30-31, 38, 40, 44, 47, 55-56, 80, 85, 95, 108, 111-112, 128
 Russia Revolution, 32

 safe haven, 35, 112
 Sakhalin Island, 95
 samurai, 37
 September 11, iii, 1-5, 10, 34, 36, 39, 52-53, 55-58, 60-68, 71-75, 77, 78, 80, 87, 98, 100, 104-107, 109, 112-114, 118, 125-126
 Serbs, 30
 Shakir, Ahmed Hikmat, 72
 sinister, 120
 Six-Day War, 46
 smoking gun, 71, 76-78, 107
 Solimani, 49
 Somalia, 54, 81-84
 Sōseki, Natsume, 36
 South China Sea, 36
 Sovereign, 19-20, 22, 43, 48, 52, 55, 60, 62-63, 69, 74, 79, 96, 103, 118
 Soviet, 6, 11, 47, 80-81, 83-84, 95, 112
 Special Operations, 59, 88-89
 stabilization, 83, 84, 94, 96, 98, 108, 111, 125
 political, 9, 94, 96
 Standard Oil, 93
 Stanford Prison Experiment, 125
 stir up, 122
 strategy, 11, 21, 41, 43, 84, 118, 120
 Southern Manchuria, 95
 Sunnah, 23
 Sun Tsu, 55
 surrogates, 6, 11, 82, 108, 110-111
 Syria, 46, 54

 Taliban, 5-6, 49, 59-62, 104, 109, 112-114, 118, 129
 Tampico, 93
 terror (terrorist), 2-6, 9, 22-23, 49-50, 52-60, 62-63, 67, 69-70, 72, 78, 80-85, 87-90, 100-105,

107-111, 115-119, 125, 129
 groups, 6, 11, 55, 84, 87, 88, 102, 109
 think tank(s), 64, 123, 127, 130
 threat, 8, 15, 22, 24, 27, 33, 39, 42-49, 52-55, 57, 60, 63, 69, 71, 78-81, 83, 96, 103, 112-113, 116, 117
 Treaty of Portsmouth, 95
 Tripartite Pact, 39
 Saturday Night Live, 3
 self-defense, 5, 8, 9, 15, 19, 25, 42-46, 48, 50, 51, 100
 Spanish-American War, 36
 Spartan, 6
 State Sponsor of Terror, 54, 60, 69
 surge, 97
 surrogates, 6, 11, 82, 108, 110, 111
 territories, 32, 38
 Treaty of Versailles, 38-40
 thesis (theses), 7, 47
 Triple Entente, 31-34
 Triple Alliance, 33

 Uganda, 81-84, 108
 United Nations, 11, 47, 75, 82, 86, 107
 United Nations Peacekeeping Mission, 83
 United Nations Plan 181, 96
 United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), 75
 United States, iv, 5-7, 9-11, 13, 18, 29-30, 33-41, 43, 45-54, 56-62, 64-65, 67-69, 75, 77-87, 89-93, 94, 96-97, 99-100, 103-108, 110-114, 117-118, 121, 123-124, 126-128
 uranium, 75-76, 78, 80, 107
 Usama bin Laden (UBL), 53, 54, 58, 60, 71, 100, 109, 112-113, 118

 Veterans Administration, 10

 Walzer, Michael, 21-22, 44, 46, 48-49, 110, 130
 war, iii, iv, 1-4, 7, 11, 12-36, 38-47, 49, 52, 53, 55, 57, 59-62, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 76, 78-83, 85-87, 90-96, 98-104, 108, 110-112, 114, 116-117, 120-13
 Civil, 1, 6, 17-19, 22, 87, 111
 for oil, 9, 92, 93, 94, 125
 Great, 30, 34, 36
 Iraq, 97, 101-102
 just, 3-4, 6-9, 11, 13-24, 26, 29, 34, 37, 41, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 68, 91, 98, 100, 102, 110, 125, 126, 128
 law of, 13, 20, 26, 46
 making, 122, 123
 on drugs, 62
 spoils of, 94, 96, 121
 World War I, 3-4, 8, 11, 12, 30, 31, 33-36, 38, 41, 80, 86, 95, 124

World War II, 3-4, 8, 11, 12, 34-36, 41, 80, 86, 95
Washington, DC, 2
Washington, General George, 30, 41, 90, 112
Westphalia(n), 19-20, 31
Wilson, Woodrow, 29-34
Wolfowitz, Paul, 64-65, 68, 70, 72, 76, 105-106, 129
Woodward, Bob, 68, 126
World Trade Center, 2, 60, 71
Yellow Peril, 38

Zimbardo, Phil, 56, 59, 125-126
Zimmermann, Arthur, 32, 33
Zimmermann Telegram, 32, 33

References

- Arantz, Christopher A. "Just War Case Study: Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in 1982." MS Thesis, USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, July 2022.
- Axelrod, Josh. "A Century Later, the Treaty of Versailles and its Rejection of Racial Equality." NPR Online. August 11, 2019. <https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2019/08/11/742293305/a-century-later-the-treaty-of-versailles-and-its-rejection-of-racial-equality>
- Bandow, Doug. "Why America Shouldn't Threaten Preemptive War." Cato Institute, National Interest, October 21, 2018. <http://www.CATO.org/publications/commentary/why-america-shouldn't-threaten-preemptive-war#related-content>.
- Bauer, John W. "Justice: A Problem for Military Ethics during Irregular War." MS Thesis, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, May 2008.
- Baxter, Richard W. "War Termination and the Global War on Terrorism." MS Thesis, Navy War College, Newport, RI, May 16, 2003.
- Bellavita, Christopher. "Changing Homeland Security: The Year in Review." *Homeland Security Affairs – The Journal of the NPS Center for Homeland Defense and Security* 5, no. 1 (January 2009). www.hsaj.org/articles/106.
- Bellavita, Christopher. "How to Learn About Homeland Security." *Homeland Security Affairs – The Journal of the NPS Center for Homeland Defense and Security* 15, no. 5 (September 2019). <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/15395>
- Benjamin, Daniel. "Strategic Counterterrorism." *Foreign Policy at Brookings* 1-17, no. 7 (October 2008). https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/upload/2016/06/10_terrorism_benjamin.pdf.
- Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon. *The Next Attack*. New York: Times Books, 2005.
- Bergerud, Eric. *Touched with Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific*. New York: Penguin Books, 1996.
- Bonney, Richard. *False Prophets: The 'Clash of Civilizations' and the Global War on Terror*. Oxfordshire, England: Peter Lang Ltd., 2008.
- Braun, Jamison D. "Explorations on Just War: Has it Ever Existed." MS Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2006.
- Brubaker, Pamela, edited by James McCarty, Matthew Tapie, and Justin Bronson Barringer. *The Business of War: Theological and Ethical Reflections on the Military-Industrial Complex*. Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2020. Kindle.

- Buchanan, Allen. "Justifying Preventive War." *University of Pennsylvania*, no.5: 127-142. n.d.
<https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1307-buchanana-justifying-preventive-war>
- Bush, George W. "National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism." White House. February 2003.
<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/71803.htm>
- Bush, George W. "Compilation of Homeland Security Presidential Directives HSPD 1-21." US Government Printing Office. January 2008.
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-110HPRT39618/pdf/CPRT-110HPRT39618.pdf>
- Butler, Smedley. *War is a Racket*. Petaluma, CA: Roundtree Press, 1935. Kindle.
- Bynum, Daniel and Benjamin Wittes, "War on Terror: Remembering the Gains of the Afghanistan War." Lawfare Institute-Brookings Institute. September 2021.
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/remembering-gains-afghanistan-war>
- Calbos, George. "Fighting the Global War on Terrorism – Are there Lessons from the Cold War?" MA Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 2005.
- Caldicott, Dr. Helen. *The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush's Military-Industrial Complex*. New York: The New Press, 2002. Kindle.
- Caputo, John D. *Hermeneutics: Facts and Interpretation in the Age of Information*. United Kingdom: Pelican Books, 2018.
- Catlett, Geoffrey A. "Regarding NATO: An Examination of the Alliance's Role in the Global War on Terrorism." MS Thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, May 2005.
- Chalk, Peter, and Bruce Hoffman. *The Dynamics of Suicide Terrorism*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005.
- Charmley, John. *Chamberlain and the Lost Peace*. London: Stoughton, 1989.
- Chatterjee, Deen K. *The Ethics of Preventive War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1976.
- CNN. "You're Either with Us or Against Us." CNN Online, November 2001.
<https://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/>.
- Copson, Raymond W. *Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview*. Washington: The Library of Congress, April 2003.

Committee on Homeland Security. *Compilation of Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD)*. Washington: US Government Printing Office, January 2008.

Cornwell, Rupert. *Ike Was Right All Along: The Danger of the Military-Industrial Complex*. The Independent UK: London, January 2011.

Creed, Barry P. "Integrating the Global War on Terrorism with the War on Drugs." MS Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 2007.

Dahl, Lawrence O. "Just War and Preemption Strategic Legitimacies." MS Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 2005.

Davis, Todd A. *"The Global War on Terror: 9/11, Iraq, and America's Crisis in the Middle East."* United States: Xlibris, 2008.

Davis, Shannon Sedgwick. "Uganda and Congo Are at War with the Islamic State: Denying the links between the Allied Democratic Forces and militant Islamists will Endanger Civilians." Foreign Policy Online. November 29, 2021.
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/29/congo-isis-uganda-adf-terrorism-islamic-state-museveni/>.

DeAlicante, Tony F. "Other Costs of Coalition Building – How to Buy Friends and Intimidate (Former) Enemies." MS Thesis, Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2002.

Department of Defense. *Department of Defense Law of War Manual*. Washington DC: Department of Defense, June 2015.

de Paulo, Craig J. N., Patrick A. Messina, and Daniel Tompkins. *Augustinian Just War Theory in Afghanistan and Iraq: Confessions, Contentions, and the Lust for Power*. New York City: Peter Lang, 2011.

Dershowitz, Alan, *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

DiMeglio, Richard. "The Evolution of the Just War Tradition: Defending Just Post Bellum." *Military Law Review* 186 (Winter 2005).
https://www.loc.gov/law/mlr/Military_Law_Review/186-winter-2005.pdf

Dipert, Randall R. "Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War," University at Buffalo, the State University of New York (SUNY). December 16, 2010.
<https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15027570500465728>.

Doward, Jamie. "Ex-presidents club' gets fat on conflict." *The Guardian* (May 23, 2003).
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/mar/23/iraq.theobserver>

- Draper, Robert. *To Start a War: How the Bush Administration took America into Iraq*. New York; Penguin Press, 2020.
- Dubik, James M. *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory*. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2016. Kindle.
- Dunbar, Scott. "Classical Hindu views of Righteous Warfare' (Dharma Yuddha) in Light of Michael Walzer's Just War Theory." PhD. Diss., University of Saskatchewan, July 201.
- Echevarria II, Antulio J. "Wars of Ideas and the War of Idea." Strategic Studies Institute, United States, June 2008. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/>
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Military-Industrial Speech." Farewell Speech, Washington DC, January 17, 1961.
- Elsa, Jennifer. "Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals before Military Commissions." Washington: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, December 2001.
- Epstein, Helen C. *Another Fine Mess: America, Uganda, and the War on Terror*. New York, NY: Columbia Global Reports, 2017.
- Engdahl, William F. *Myths Lies and Oil Wars*. Wiesbaden, Germany: Gertrud Engdahl, 2012. Kindle
- Ethics & International Affairs. "Striking First: A History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities." *Ethics and International Affairs* 17, No. 1 (Spring 2003). <https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal171/roundtable/866>
- Faddis, Sam. *The CIA War in Kurdistan: The Untold Story of the Northern Front in the Iraq War*. Philadelphia, PA: Casemate, 2020. Kindle.
- Feickert, Andrew. *U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia*. Washington: The Library of Congress, August 26, 2005.
- Ferguson, Niall. *Kissinger- 1923-1968: The Idealist*. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2015.
- Ferguson, Niall. *The Pity of War: Explaining World War I*. New York: Basic Books, 1999.
- Frank, Richard B. *Downfall: The End of Imperial Japanese Empire*. New York: Penguin Books, 1999.
- Freeman, Jr., Thomas. "Winning the War of the Ideas in the Global War on Terror." MS Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, May 2004.

- Friedman, Thomas L. "The Somalia Mission: Clinton Sending More Troops to Somalia." NY Times Online. October 7, 1993.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/07/world/the-somalia-mission-clinton-sending-more-troops-to-somalia.html>.
- Giduck, John. *Terror at Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America's Schools*. United States: Archangel Group, 2005.
- Gilbreath, Gregory P. "America's Targeted Killing Policy: Is it Right? Is it Working?" MS Thesis, United States Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 2013.
- Graff, Garrett M. *The Threat Matrix: The FBI at War*. New York: Back Bay Books, 2011.
- Gregory, Anthony. "War and the Common Good", The Independent Institute. June 7, 2008.
<https://www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=2421>
- Gray, Colin S. "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration." MS Thesis, Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 2007.
- Haltiwanger, John. "America's 20-year war on terror has killed up to 929,000 people and cost over \$8 trillion". Business Insider Online, September 1, 2021.
<https://www.businessinsider.com/us-war-on-terror-deaths-cost-over-8-trillion-report-2021-8>.
- Hartung, William. *Prophets of War: Lockheed Martin and the Making of the Military-Industrial Complex*. New York: Bold Type Press, 2011. Kindle.
- Hayat, Amer. "Islamic Concept of Just War and Laws of Armed Conflict (LoAC): A Contemplative Perspective towards Better Understanding of Jihad and Humanistic Dimensions of Islam." MS Thesis, USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, April 2013.
- Hayes, Stephen F. *The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein has Endangered America*. New York: Harper Collins, 2004.
- Heinrichs, Waldo. *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt & American Entry into World War II*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988. Kindle.
- Hoffman, Bruce. "Terrorism in the West: Al-Qaeda's Role in 'Homegrown' Terror." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 13, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2007): 91..
- Holmes, Matthew B., "Just War Theory and Its Applicability to Targeted Killing." MS Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 2011.
- Homeland Security Council. *National Strategy of Homeland Security*. Washington, D.C.:

October 2007.

Homeland Security. *National Disaster Recovery Framework*. Washington DC: Second Edition, September 2016.

Homeland Security. *National Preparedness Goal*. Washington, DC: Second Edition, September 2015.

Homeland Security. *National Response Framework*. Washington, DC: Third Edition, June 2016.

Howard, Michael. *War and the Liberal Conscience*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978.

Hoyt, Edwin. *Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict*. New York: Cooper Square Press, 1961.

John Paul II, Pope. *The Catechism of the Church*. Vatican Archives. October 11, 1992.
https://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/aposcons.htm.

Johnson, Toni. Islam: "Governing under Shari'a." Council of Foreign Relations. July 25, 2014.
<http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-sharia/p8034>

Joseph Jr., Alvin M. *The Long and the Short and the Tall: Marines in Combat on Guam and Iwo Jima*. Short Hills, NJ: Burford Books, 1946.

Junhan, Toh. "A Just Cause: The Eastern interpretation of Just War Theory." MS Paper, Australian National University, Canberra, AU, August 25, 2016.
<https://e-ir.info/2016/08/25/a-just-cause-the-eastern-interptetation-of-just-war-theory/>

Kagen, Robert. "It Wasn't Hubris Which Drove America into Afghanistan, it was Fear." The Washington Post Online, August 26, 2021.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/26/robert-kagan-afghanistan-americans-forget/>

Kammer, Virginia J. *Principles for Winning the Global War on Terrorism*. Joint Military Operations Dept., February 2005.

Kant, Immanuel. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Translated by H. J. Patton. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 2009.

Kissinger, Henry. *World Order*. New York: Penguin Books, 2014.

Kellogg, Davida E. "Jus Post Bellum: The Importance of War Crimes Trials." MS Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, November 2002.

Kimball, Daryll. "Disarming Saddam-A Chronology of Iraq and UN Weapons Inspections From

- 2002-2003.” Arms Control Association, August 2017.
<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iraqchron>
- Lang, Peter. *Augustinian Just War Theory and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: Confessions, Contentions and the Lust for Power*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2011.
- Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1987
- Lederach, John Paul. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC. United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997.
- Lee, Michael J. “Global Counterinsurgency: A Way Out of the Global War on Terrorism Quagmire?” MS Thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, May 2008.
- Malkin, Michelle. *In Defense of Internment: The case for “Racial Profiling” in World War II and the War on Terror*. Washington, DC.: Regnry Publishing, Inc., 2004.
- McCarthy, (Rev.) Emmanuel Charles. *Christian Just War Theory: The Logic of Deceit*. Wilmington, DE: Center for Christian Non-violence, 2018.
- Meierding, Emily. *The Oil Wars Myth: Petroleum and the Causes of International Conflict*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2020. Kindle.
- Meyer, G.J. *A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914 to 1918*. New York, NY: Bantam Dell, 2006. Kindle.
- Miller, Paul D. *Just War and Ordered Liberty*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Kindle.
- Moeckli, Daniel. “Terrorist Profiling and the Importance of a Proactive Approach to Human Rights Protection.” Paper/Lecture, Conference of the Association of Human Rights Institutes/COST Action 28 workshop, Vienna, September 2006.
- Moghaddam, Fathali M. *From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What they experience and why they come to destroy*. Westport, CT–London: Praeger Security International, 2006.
- Morrow, Patrick D. “Just War Theory and the 2003 Decision to Invade Iraq.” MS Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 2013.
- Mueller, Karl P., Jasen J. Castillo, Forrest E. Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, Brian Rosen. *Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006.
- Murphy, Jarrett. “Palestinians Get Saddam Charity Checks.” CBS News Online, March 14, 2003.
<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/palestinians-get-saddam-charity-checks/>

- Muttitt, Greg. "The Bush Administration Turned the War on Terror into a War for Oil." Jacobin Online, September 11, 2021.
<https://jacobinmag.com/2021/09/bush-blair-iraq-war-on-terror-war-for-oil-question-al-qaeda-saddam-hussein-wmds>.
- Muttitt, Greg. *Fuel on Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq*. New York: The New Press, 2012.
- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*. New York/London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Good vs. Evil*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Press, 2001.
- Nelson Jr., Judson P. "The Oddity of Waging War on a Tactic: Reframing the Global War on Terror as a Global Counterinsurgency." MS Thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, May 2009.
- Netanyahu, Benjamin. *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies can Defeat the International Terrorist Network*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995.
- Office of Homeland Security. *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. Washington, DC: The White House, July 2002.
- Palmer, Harold. *Christian Pacifism and Just War Theory: Discipleship and the Ethics of War, Violence and the Use of Force*. US: Logos Light, 2016.
- Parrott, Justin. "Jihad in Islam: Just-War Theory in the Quran and Sunnah". Yaqeen Institute. Politics and Practical Theology-Islamic Ethics. October 16, 2016.
<https://yaqeeninstitute.org/read/paper/jihad-in-islam-just-war-theory-in-the-quran-and-sunnah>
- Pines, Burton Y. *America's Greatest Blunder: The Fateful Decision to Enter World War One*. New York: RSD Press, 2013. Kindle.
- Pitman, Todd. "US Eyes West Africa's Coastline, Oil." *Washington Times*. August 11, 2005
- President of the United States. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010.
- President of the United States. *National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism*. Washington, DC: The White House, February 2003.
- President of the United States. *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*. Washington, DC: The White House, October 2018.

- Rapier, Robert. "The Enormous Energy Legacy of President George W. Bush." Forbes Online. March 30, 2021. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2021/03/30/the-enormous-energy-legacy-of-president-george-w-bush/?sh=6efdb44b6c52>.
- Reiner, Toby. "New Directions in Just-War Theory: Advancing Strategic Thought Series." MS Thesis, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July 2018.
- Robinson, Paul. *Just War: A Comparative Perspective*. Ashgate Publishing, Burlington, VT, 2003.
- Rodriguez, Jr., Jose A. and Bill Harlow. *Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives*. New York: Threshold Editions, 2012.
- Rohlf, Michael. "Immanuel Kant," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2010. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/kant/>
- Robinson, Linda, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak. *U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014*. The Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1236/RAND_RR1236.pdf. 2016.
- Rosell, Richard G. "What Type of State Homeland Security Strategy Should the State of New Jersey Develop?" MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2007.
- Rotterdamus, Desiderius Erasmus. "Erasmus Against War," in *The Project Gutenberg EBook of Erasmus Against War*, edited by Lewis Einstein. Boston: The Merrymount Press, 1907. EBook #39487 <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/39487/39487-h/39487-h.htm>
- Scott, Peter Dale. *Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. Kindle.
- Silverstone, Scott A. *From Hitler's Germany to Saddam's Iraq: The Enduring False Promise of Preventive War*. Lanham, MD: The Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2019.
- Stares, Paul B. *Preventive Engagement: How America Can Avoid War, Stay Strong, and Keep the Peace*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018. Kindle.
- Stentiford, Barry M. "Success in the Shadows: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and the Global War on Terror, 2002-2015." MS Thesis, Combat Studies Institute Press, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 2018.
- Stephenson, Henry Alan. "The Justice of Preventive War." MA Thesis, Naval

- Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2004.
- Strauss, Barry. "Preemptive Strikes and Preventive Wars: A Historian's Perspective." *Hoover Institute* 44 (August 2017).
<https://www.hoover.org/research/preemptive-strikes-and-preventive-wars-historians-perspective>
- Sun, Tzu. *The Art of War*. Minneapolis, MN: Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, 2006.
- Thaves Davidann, Jon. *Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.- Japanese Relations:1919-1941*. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
- Tooze, Adam. *The Deluge: The Great War, America, and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931*. New York: Penguin Books, 2014. Kindle.
- Townes, Richard C. "The U.S. Army's Role in Homeland Security: What Changes are Needed?" MS Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 2002.
- Turner, Jim. *Winning the War on Terror*. US House of Representatives, Select Committee on Homeland Security, April 27, 2004.
- Vance, Lawrence. "Erasmus on Just War." Lew Rockwell Online, December 3, 2013.
<https://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/laurence-m-vance/can-there-be-just-war/>
- Vicars IV, Robert P. "Postmodern Morals, Ends, and Means: Shifting Ideas about Why, How and for Whom Wars are Fought." MS Thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, May 2013.
- Vidal, Gore. *Dreaming War: Blood for Oil and the Cheney-Bush Junta*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002. Kindle.
- Wallace, Michael. "The Mike Wallace Interview with Henry Kissinger." Info Wars, July 13, 1958. <http://www.infowars.com/henry-kissinger-advocated-limited-war-as-a-tool-of-foreign-policy-in-1958/>
- Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books, 1977.
- Weigel, George. *Faith, Reasons and the War Against Jihadism*. New York: Random House, Inc., 2009. Kindle.
- Wilson, Scott and Al Kamen. "Global War on Terror is Given New Name Bush's Phrase is Out Pentagon Says." Washington Post Online, March 25, 2009.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html>.

- Worthington, Andy. *The Guantanamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America's Illegal Prison*. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2007.
- Wright, Bryan. "Iraq WMD Timeline: How the Mystery Unraveled." NPR Online, November 15, 2005. <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4996218>.
- Zajac, Daniel L. "The Best Defense is a Good Offense: Preemption, Ramifications for the Department of Defense." MS Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July 2003.
- Zimbardo, Philip G., Bruce Bonger, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, and James N. Breckenridge. *Psychology of Terrorism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Zimbardo, Philip. *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*. New York: Random House, 2007.

Notes

¹ Desiderius Erasmus Roterdamus, “Erasmus Against War,” in *The Project Gutenberg EBook of Erasmus Against War*, ed. Lewis Einstein. (Boston: The Merrymount Press, 1907. EBook #39487) <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/39487/39487-h/39487-h.htm>

² Remarks by President Bush at Islamic Center of Washington, DC, Washington, DC, September 17, 2001

³ See Appendix 1 for a list of twenty-five examples when President Bush mentioned Islam favorably in public speeches.

⁴ Anthony Gregory, “War and the Common Good,” The Independent Institute, June 7, 2008.

⁵ Gary L. Gregg II, “George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs,” . <https://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/foreign-affairs> , n.d.

⁶ This number appears on Military.com. The number differs slightly depending on the website reporting the statistics, but generally the number is between 7000 and 7100.

⁷ Jill Kimball on Brown University Online reports that 900,000 people perished during the GWOT. The number differs moderately depending on the website reporting the statistics, but generally the number is between 800,000 and 929,000.

⁸ John Haltiwanger, “America's 20-year war on terror has killed up to 929,000 people and cost over \$8 trillion,” *Business Insider Online*, September 1, 2021.

⁹ Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism in the West: Al-Qaeda's Role in Homegrown Terror,” *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 13, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2007): 91.

¹⁰ The United States Coast Guard utilizes the facilities of the Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School.

¹¹ Niall Ferguson, *Kissinger- 1923-1968: The Idealist* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2015), 413

¹² Appendix 2 provides a very detailed description of the sub-criteria for each of the five primary criteria, taken directly from the DOD *Law of War Manual*.

¹³ Christopher A. Arantz, “Just War Case Study: Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in 1982” (MS Thesis, USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, July 2022), 2.

¹⁴ Paul D. Miller, *Just War and Ordered Liberty* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 21.

¹⁵ Ibid., 3

¹⁶ Ibid., 22.

¹⁷ Arantz, “Just War Case Study,” 3.

¹⁸ Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978), 13.

¹⁹ Miller, *Just War and Ordered Liberty*, 18

²⁰ Peter Lang, *Augustinian Just War Theory and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: Confessions, Contentions and the Lust for Power* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2011), xvi.

²¹ Harold Palmer, *Christian Pacifism and Just War Theory: Discipleship and the Ethics of War, Violence and the Use of Force* (US: Logos Light, 2016), 19.

²² Ibid., 19.

²³ Palmer, *Christian Pacifism and Just War Theory*, 19.

²⁴ Miller, *Just War and Ordered Liberty*, 38

²⁵ Palmer, *Christian Pacifism and Just War Theory*, 20.

²⁶ Ibid., 21-22.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Miller, *Just War and Ordered Liberty*, 7.

²⁹ Ibid., 6, 7.

³⁰ Scott Dunbar, “Classical Hindu Views of Righteous Warfare” (Dharma Yuddha) in Light of Michael Walzer's Just War Theory” (PhD. Diss., University of Saskatchewan, July 2011), 1.

³¹ Alexander the Great fought campaigns in India but was never fully able to conquer the subcontinent.

³² Dunbar, “Classical Hindu views of Righteous Warfare,” 11.

³³ Ibid., 18-19.

³⁴ Ibid., 1.

³⁵Toh Junhan, "A Just Cause: The Eastern interpretation of Just War Theory" (MS Paper, Australian National University, Canberra, AU, August 25, 2016). The Bhagavad Gita is a "spiritual guidebook" of sorts which guides the Hindu follower towards a righteous path.

³⁶ Dunbar, "Classical Hindu views of Righteous Warfare," 98.

³⁷ Ibid., 100.

³⁸ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

³⁹ Toh Junhan, "A Just Cause"

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Justin Parrott. "Jihad in Islam: Just-War Theory in the Quran and Sunnah." *Yaqeen Institute. Politics and Practical Theology-Islamic Ethics*. (October 16, 2016).

⁴³Howard, "War and the Liberal Conscience," 15. Erasmus's opine is eerily similar to Dwight D Eisenhower's address "The Chance for Peace" delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 4/16/53, when he remarked "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some 50 miles of concrete highway. We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people. This, I repeat, is the best way of life to be found on the road. the world has been taking. This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron."

⁴⁴ "Journal of Moral Theology, 8, no. 1, ed. Rachelle Barina, et al. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications (January 17, 2019).

⁴⁵ Howard, "War and the Liberal Conscience," 19

⁴⁶ Jonathan Dymond. "War: Its Causes, Consequences, Lawfulness, etc.," The Quaker Writings Homepage. (n.d.), <http://www.qhpress.org/quakerpages/qwhp/moral03.htm>

⁴⁷ Ibid. 31.

⁴⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Good vs. Evil* Cambridge, England: Cambridge Press, 2001).

⁴⁹ Benjamin Biebuyck, “On War and Warriors: Friedrich Nietzsche,” in *Philosophy of War and Peace*, ed. Danny Praet (January 1, 2017), 169.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Daniel W. Graham, “Heraclitus: fl. c. 500 B.C.E.,” in *The IEP: A Peer-reviewed Academic Resource* (n.d.) <https://iep.utm.edu/heraclit/>

⁵² William Mackintire Salter, “Nietzsche and the War,” *International Journal of Ethics* 27, no. 374 (April 1917). The University of Chicago Press Stable, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/2377396>

⁵³ Dwight D. Eisenhower. “Military-Industrial Speech,” Farewell Speech, Washington, DC, January 17, 1961.

⁵⁴ Burton Y. Pines, *Greatest Blunder: The Fateful Decision to Enter World War One* (New York: RSD Press, 2013), chap. 1, para. 1, loc. 404.

⁵⁵ Pines, *Greatest Blunder*, chap. 3, para. 14, loc. 529

⁵⁶ Smedley Butler, *War is a Racket* (Petaluma, CA: Roundtree Press, 1935), 18.

⁵⁷ Helen C. Epstein, *Another Fine Mess: America, Uganda, and the War on Terror* (New York, NY: Columbia Global Reports, 2017). 217.

⁵⁸ Pamela Brubaker, edited by James McCarty, Matthew Tapie, and Justin Bronson Barringer. *The Business of War: Theological and Ethical Reflections on the Military-Industrial Complex* (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2020), chap. 3, para. 4-6, loc. 1249

⁵⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Radio Address December 29, 1940,” in *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1943), 598-607, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/arsenal.htm>

⁶⁰ Natsume Soseki, “Kokoro,” ed. Meredith McKinney (New York: Penguin Books, 2010), Chap. 14.

⁶¹ Butler, *War is a Racket*, 2.

⁶² Eric Bergerud, *Touched with Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific* (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 4.

⁶³ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁴ Edwin Hoyt, *Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict* (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1961), 30.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 34.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 36.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 37.

⁶⁸ Josh Axelrod, "A Century Later, the Treaty of Versailles and its Rejection of Racial Equality," NPR Online, August 11, 2019. <https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2019/08/11/742293305/a-century-later-the-treaty-of-versailles-and-its-rejection-of-racial-equality>

⁶⁹ Hoyt, *Japan's War*, 44.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 60.

⁷¹ Ibid., 74.

⁷² Ibid., 194.

⁷³ Ibid., 206.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 205.

⁷⁵ Jon Thaves Davidann, *Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.- Japanese Relations: 1919-1941* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 159.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ William Safire, "The Best Defense". *New York Times*, April 14, 2003 <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/14/opinion/the-best-defense.html#:~:text=%20That%20favorite%20saying%20of%20heavyweight,emption%20as%20a%20last%20resort..>

⁷⁸ Barry Strauss, "Preemptive Strikes and Preventive Wars: A Historian's Perspective," *Hoover Institute*, 44 (August 2017). <https://www.hoover.org/research/preemptive-strikes-and-preventive-wars-historians-perspective>

⁷⁹ Daniel L. Zajac, "The Best Defense is a Good Offense: Preemption, Ramifications for the Department of Defense," (MS Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July 2003).

⁸⁰ "Evaluating the Preemptive Use of Force: The Slippery Slope to Preventive," *Ethics & International Affairs* 17.1 (Spring 2003). <https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/journal/868>

⁸¹ Henry Alan Stephenson, "The Justice of Preventive War" (MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2004).

⁸² Allen Buchanan, "Justifying Preventive War," *University of Pennsylvania*, no.5: 127-142. n.d. <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1307-buchanana-justifying-preventive-war>

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Stevenson, "The Justice of Preventative War," 14-16.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 15

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ "Attack Pearl Harbor," Neilson Library, Addams State University. n.d., <https://adams.marmot.org/Archive/event%3A181/Event?searchId=141080770&recordIndex=11&page=1>

⁸⁹ "Carnegie Council Ethics and International Affairs," 17, no. 1 (March 2, 1992).

⁹⁰ Strauss, "Preemptive Strikes and Preventive Wars," 18.

⁹¹ Zajac, "The Best Defense is a Good Offense," 20.

⁹² Henry Alan Stephenson, "The Justice of Preventive War".

⁹³ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

⁹⁴ Gary Solis, "Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict," *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 2, Article 9. (2007), <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/9>

⁹⁵ Gregory P. Gilbreath, "America's Targeted Killing Policy: Is it Right? Is it Working?" (MS Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 2013), 15.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 2.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Solis, *Targeted Killing*.

⁹⁹ Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 81

¹⁰⁰ Gilbreath, *America's Targeted Killing Policy*, 2.

¹⁰¹ Gregg, "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs."

¹⁰² Thomas Freeman, Jr., “Winning the War of the Ideas in the Global War on Terror” (MS Thesis, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, May 2004), 3.

¹⁰³ When America applied counterterrorism methodologies without widespread bombing in the Philippines, they were successful and caused a dramatic shift in local loyalty from the ASG and JI to the Americans.

¹⁰⁴ Dershowitz, Alan, *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 5.

¹⁰⁵ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Minneapolis, MN: Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, 2006), 16.

¹⁰⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

¹⁰⁷ John Giduck, *Terror at Beslan: A Russian Tragedy with Lessons for America’s Schools* (United States: Archangel Group, 2005).

¹⁰⁸ Philip G. Zimbardo, Bruce Bongor, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, and James N. Breckenridge. *Psychology of Terrorism* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), 7.

¹⁰⁹ Robert Ursano, Carol S. Fullerton, and Ann E. Norwood. *Terrorism and Disaster: Individual and Community Mental Health Interventions*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

¹¹⁰ Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Law of War Manual,” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2015.

¹¹¹ The Stafford Act (1988) provides for the president to permit Federal troops for disaster relief but strictly relegates them to humanitarian and other relief actions.

¹¹² Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 198), 125.

¹¹³ Zimbardo et al., *Psychology of Terrorism*, 87

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Daniel Bynum and Benjamin Wittes. *War on Terror: Remembering the Gains of the Afghanistan War*. (Lawfare Institute-Brookings Institute. September 2021).
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/remembering-gains-afghanistan-war>

¹¹⁶ Bynum, *War on Terror*.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Andrew Feickert, *U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia* (Washington: The Library of Congress, August 26, 2005), 7.

¹²¹ Ibid., 10.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Helen C. Epstein, *Another Fine Mess: America, Uganda, and the War on Terror* (New York, NY: Columbia Global Reports, 2017).

¹²⁴ George Weigel, *Faith, Reasons and the War Against Jihadism* (New York: Random House, Inc., February 4, 2009), 80. Weigel quotes Bernard Lewis from 2006.

¹²⁵ Todd Davis, *The Global War on Terror: 9/11, Iraq, and America's Crisis in the Middle East* (United States: Xlibris, 2008), chap. 4, para.6, loc.1054.

¹²⁶ Ibid., chap. 4, para. 1, loc. 1030. Davis cites his source for the names of this group as Amy Goodman, the author of *The Exception to the Rulers: Exposing Oil Politicians, War Profiteers, and the Media that Love Them*.

¹²⁷ Weigel, *Faith, Reasons and the War Against Jihadism*, 80.

¹²⁸ Davis, *The Global War on Terror*, chap. 4, para. 5, loc. 1054.

¹²⁹ Robert Draper, *To Start a War: How the Bush Administration took America into Iraq* (New York, Penguin Press, 2020), 3.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid., 10.

¹³² Ibid., 107.

¹³³ Ibid., 37.

¹³⁴ Davis, *The Global War on Terror*, chap. 4, para.6, loc.1054.

¹³⁵ Draper, *To Start a War*, 26-27.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 73.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 80.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 93.

¹³⁹ Gore Vidal, *Dreaming War: Blood for Oil and the Cheney-Bush Junta* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002), 14.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Craig J. N. de Paulo, Patrick A. Messina, and Daniel Tompkins. *Augustinian Just War Theory in Afghanistan and Iraq: Confessions, Contentions, and the Lust for Power* (New York City: Peter Lang, 2011), 19

¹⁴² Bob Woodward, Dan Balz, and Jeff Himmelman. "Afghan Campaign's Blueprint Emerges," *The Washington Post*, January 29, 2002.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/01/29/afghan-campaigns-blueprint-emerges/d058ea89-c03d-40ca-9b27-08f90210970b/>

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Jarrett Murphy, "Palestinians Get Saddam Charity Checks," CBS News Online, March 14, 2003. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/palestinians-get-saddam-charity-checks/>

¹⁴⁵ Stephen F. Hayes, *The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein has Endangered America* (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), xviii.

¹⁴⁶ Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr. and Bill Harlow. *Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2012), 39.

¹⁴⁷ Draper, *To Start a War*, 140.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 136.

¹⁴⁹ Hayes, *The Connection*, 152.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 5.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 2.

¹⁵² Rodriguez, *Hard Measures*, 125.

¹⁵³ Hayes, *The Connection*, 17.

¹⁵⁴ Draper, *To Start a War*, 160.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 155.

¹⁵⁶ Sam Faddis, *The CIA War in Kurdistan: The Untold Story of the Northern Front in the Iraq War* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate, 2020), 83

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 86.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 216.

¹⁶¹ Draper, *To Start a War*, 303.

¹⁶² Ibid., 306.

¹⁶³ Epstein, *Another Fine Mess*, 25.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 130

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 35.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 37.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 22.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 23.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 26.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 161.

¹⁷¹ Shannon Davis, “Uganda and Congo Are at War with the Islamic State: Denying the links between the Allied Democratic Forces and militant Islamists will Endanger Civilians,” Foreign Policy Online. November 29, 2021. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/29/congo-isis-uganda-adf-terrorism-islamic-state-museveni/>.

¹⁷² Thomas L. Friedman, “The Somalia Mission: Clinton Sending More Troops to Somalia,” NY Times Online. October 7, 1993.

¹⁷³ Todd Pitman, “US Eyes West Africa’s Coastline, Oil,” *Washington Times*, August 11, 2005.

¹⁷⁴ Feickert, *U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism*, 12.

¹⁷⁵ Barry M. Stentiford, “Success in the Shadows: Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and the Global War on Terror, 2002-2015” (MS Thesis, Combat Studies Institute Press, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 2018), 1.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 8

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 47

¹⁸² “Bali Bombings,” National Museum of Australia (n.d.).
<https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/bali-bombings>

¹⁸³ Ibid., 57-58.

¹⁸⁴ Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak. *U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014* (The Rand Corporation), xviii.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., xix.

¹⁸⁶ Stentiford, *Success*, 97.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ George Washington, “Letter to Edmund Pendelton,” The Washington Library: Center for Digital History, January 29, 1795.
<https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/quotes/article/when-one-side-only-of-a-story-is-heard-and-often-repeated-the-human-mind-becomes-impressed-with-it-insensibly/#:~:text=Letter%20to%20Edmund%20Pendleton%20%2D%20Thursday,1795%20%C2%B7%20George%20Washington's%20Mount%20Vernon&text=%22When%20one%20side%20only%20of,becomes%20impressed%20with%20it%20insensibly.%22>

¹⁹⁰ Nietzsche. *Good vs. Evil*.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ David A. Rosenbaum, “The 2004 Campaign: A Closer Look at Cheney and Halliburton,” The New York Times Online, September 28, 2004. <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/28/us/a-closer-look-at-cheney-and-halliburton.html>

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Butler, *War is a Racket*, ii

¹⁹⁸ Greg Muttitt, “The Bush Administration Turned the War on Terror into a War for Oil,” Jacobin Online, September 11, 2021.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ William Marcy, Brown University Online (n.d.). https://www.brown.edu/Administration/News_Bureau/Databases/Encyclopedia/search.php?serial=M0120

²⁰¹ Ibid. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company delivered oil from what is now Iran to Great Britain. After Great Britain acquired a majority of the company, it was renamed British Petroleum. In the aftermath of WWI, Great Britain occupied Iraq, then-Mesopotamia, as a British colony.

²⁰² According to Muttitt in his book, at the time of the Iraq War, three-quarters of the world’s oil was off-limits to the fossil-fuel companies, as (some) governments preferred to run their oil industries in-house, as their economies were not generally best served by pumping as fast as possible.

²⁰³ Muttitt, “The Bush Administration Turned the War on Terror into a War for Oil.”

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Robert Rapier, “The Enormous Energy Legacy of President George W. Bush,” Forbes Online, March 30, 2021.

²⁰⁶ Henry Kissinger. *World Order* (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 22.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 23.

²⁰⁸ John Schwenkler and Mark Souva, “G.E.M. Anscombe on the Evil of Demanding Unconditional Surrender in War,” Oxford University Press's Academic Insights for the Thinking World, April 29, 2020. <https://blog.oup.com/2020/04/g-e-m-anscombe-on-the-evil-of-demanding-unconditional-surrender-in->

[war/#:~:text=Citing%20Thomas%20Aquinas%2C%20Anscombe%20argued,set%20right%20cer
tain%20specific%20iustices.](#)

²⁰⁹ This paper was started long before the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. At the time of this writing there is too little published, peer-reviewed data on the reasons behind the withdrawal. Because all that exists to date is nothing but non-scholarly conjecture, the author has decided not to include the Afghanistan withdrawal in this paper.

²¹⁰ Kant, *Metaphysics*, 17.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² George Bush, "Global War on Terror," (National Archives, September 20, 2001), <https://www.georgewbushlibrary.gov/research/topic-guides/global-war-terror>

²¹³ Ralph Potter, Jr., "The Moral Logic of War," *McCormick Quarterly* 23, (1970), 203.

²¹⁴ Strauss, "Preemptive Strikes and Preventive Wars," 18, and Zajac, "The Best Defense is a Good Offense," 20

²¹⁵ Draper, *To Start a War*, 11.

²¹⁶ Davis, *The Global War on Terror*, chap. 4, para. 1, loc. 1030.

²¹⁷ Ibid., chap. 4, para. 5, loc. 1054.

²¹⁸ Draper, *To Start a War*, 107.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 3.

²²⁰ Ibid., 37.

²²¹ Davis, *The Global War on Terror*, chap. 4, para.6, loc.1054.

²²² Vidal, *Dreaming of War*, 14.

²²³ Draper, *To Start a War*, 26-27.

²²⁴ Ibid., 73.

²²⁵ Ibid., 93.

²²⁶ Ibid., 136.

²²⁷ Rodriquez Jr., *Hard Measures*, 125.

-
- ²²⁸ Draper, *To Start a War*, 155.
- ²²⁹ George Bush, 2003 State of the Union Address.
- ²³⁰ Ibid., 303.
- ²³¹ Ibid., 306.
- ²³² Faddis, *The CIA War in Kurdistan*, 216.
- ²³³ Epstein, *Another Fine Mess*, 221.
- ²³⁴ Todd Pitman, “US Eyes West Africa’s Coastline, Oil,” *Washington Times*, August 11, 2005.
- ²³⁵ Henry Alan Stephenson, “The Justice of Preventive War,” and Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*.
- ²³⁶ Greg Muttitt, “The Bush Administration Turned the War on Terror into a War for Oil,” 2021.
- ²³⁷ Chester Pach, “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs”, UVA, The Miller Center, n.d.), <https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/foreign-affairs>
- ²³⁸ George Washington, “George Washington to the Executive Committee of the Continental Congress,” Founders Online: The National Archives, January 1, 1777.. <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-07-02-0395>
- ²³⁹ Bynum and Wittes, “War on Terror,” 2021.
- ²⁴⁰ de Paulo et al., *Augustinian Just War Theory in Afghanistan and Iraq*, 10-11.
- ²⁴¹ John D. Caputo, *Hermeneutics: Facts and Interpretation in the Age of Information*, (United Kingdom, Pelican Books, 2018), 11.
- ²⁴² Ibid., 11.
- ²⁴³ Ibid.
- ²⁴⁴ Fathali M. Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What they experience and why they come to destroy* (Westport, CT–London: Praeger Security International, 2006), 2.
- ²⁴⁵ Kissinger, *World Order*. 10.
- ²⁴⁶ Ibid., 10.

²⁴⁷ Butler, *War is a Racket*, ii.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., ii-iii.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., i-3.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 3.

²⁵¹ Brubaker, *The Business of War*, chap. 3, para. 1, loc. 1219.

²⁵² Butler, *War is a Racket*, 3.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Brubaker, *The Business of War*, chap. 3, para. 1, loc. 1219.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., chap. 3, para. 2, loc. 1232.

²⁵⁷ William Hartung, *Prophets of War: Lockheed Martin and the Making of the Military-Industrial Complex* (New York: Bold Type Press, 2011), 37.

²⁵⁸ Dr. Helen Caldicott, *The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush's Military-Industrial Complex* (New York: The New Press, 2002), 26.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 29.

²⁶⁰ Hartung, *Prophets of War*, 216, 223.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 223.

²⁶² Ibid., 224.

²⁶³ Ibid., 224.

²⁶⁴ Caldicott, *The New Nuclear Danger*, 38.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Zimbardo, et al., *Psychology of Terrorism*, and Philip G. Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil* (New York: Random House, 2007).

²⁶⁷ Dr. Zimbardo would eventually offer his services as an expert witness to service members accused of war atrocities, citing his “Lucifer Effect” theory as causing seemingly decent people to react in criminal fashion as a direct result of the pressures of war.

²⁶⁸ Weigel, *Faith, Reasons and the War Against Jihadism*, 109.

²⁶⁹ Robert Kagen, "It Wasn't Hubris Which Drove America into Afghanistan, it was Fear," *The Washington Post* (August 26, 2021).

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Caldicott, *The New Nuclear Danger*, 24.

²⁷² Ibid., 37.

²⁷³ Ibid., 27.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 33.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 40.

²⁷⁷ Jamie Doward, "Ex-presidents club' gets fat on conflict," *The Guardian* (May 23, 2003).

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 184-185.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 185.

²⁸¹ Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*.

²⁸² These quotes were retrieved from The White House: President George W. Bush.
<https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html>

²⁸³ From the United States Department of Defense *Law of Land Warfare Manual*