| abstract |
This thesis explores the persistent underdevelopment of passenger rail in the United
States through the lens of federalism, arguing that the decentralized American governmental
structure is the primary barrier to successful rail expansion. While numerous developed and even
developing nations have embraced conventional and high-speed rail as a core element of national
infrastructure, the U.S. lags behind with minimal rail investment, limited service coverage, and
inconsistent project success. Drawing on historical, political, and case study-based evidence, the
thesis demonstrates how the failure to coordinate effectively among federal, state, and local
governments has thwarted efforts to build and sustain robust passenger rail systems.
The study traces the evolution of federalism from the 19th century to the present,
examining how shifting power dynamics between government levels have alternately enabled
and hindered rail development. Early railroad expansion was driven by state and local initiatives
with limited federal involvement, resulting in a fragmented and inefficient network. In the late
19th and early 20th centuries, a period of cooperative federalism fostered extensive national
integration of railways. However, since the 1970s, federalism has created a system characterized
by fragmentation, intergovernmental distrust, and uneven funding responsibilities.
The thesis also critically evaluates alternative explanations for rail stagnation, including
geographic limitations, public opinion, lack of local transit options, lobbying by the automobile
and airline industries, and competition for infrastructure funding. While these factors are
relevant, they are shown to be secondary to the deeper structural issue of federalist misalignment.
The analysis culminates in three comparative case studies, six cases in total, of recent rail
projects—both failed and successful—across New York, New Jersey, California, Nevada, and
Florida. Projects that succeeded did so through intergovernmental cooperation, while those that
failed lacked unified support. The federalist structure, which requires the cooperation of federal,
state, and local governments, emerges as the most consistent and critical factor.
Ultimately, the thesis concludes that without structural reforms or enhanced
intergovernmental cooperation, the U.S. will continue to fall short in modernizing its passenger
rail system. Future pathways may involve adopting strategies from other federalist nations or
reestablishing institutional mechanisms that foster trust and accountability between governments.
By diagnosing federalism as both the root of past failures and the key to future success, this
research provides a foundational political framework for understanding and resolving the U.S.
passenger rail dilemma.
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