| |
| author |
Nicholas Masferrer Ramirez
| | title |
The Limping Violinist: Why Thomson's Defense of Abortion Does Not Establish the Conclusion that Abortion is Morally Permissible
| | abstract |
In this paper, I will attempt to show that Thomson's argument that abortion is morally
permissible even if the fetus is a person does not logically follow from her violinist analogy as
portrayed in her essay, "A Defense of Abortion". I will not attempt to prove that abortion is
morally impermissible. I merely attempt to argue that we cannot arrive at the conclusion that
abortion is morally permissible from her analogy. I will do so by identifying four key ways
Thomson's violinist analogy is too disanalogous to pregnancy to establish her conclusion. In my
first two objections, I will put aside the question of whether or not the violinist analogy succeeds
in establishing abortion to be morally permissible in cases of rape. In these sections, I will argue
that Thomson is wrong to argue that her analogy also establishes the conclusion that abortion is
morally permissible in non-rape cases. In other words, even if she has proven the former, her
argument does not prove the latter, despite what she claims. Nevertheless, my final two
objections to Thomson's argument will apply to both cases of consensual sex and rape. Only my
final objection will provide a consideration for the moral impermissibility of abortion if the fetus
is a human person. I will then conclude with some thoughts on the nature of bodily rights
arguments, how pro-life advocates must change their strategy in defending human life, and a few
possible ways pro-choice advocates can attempt to defend the moral and legal permissibility of
abortion if they so choose.
| | school |
The College of Liberal Arts, Drew University
| | degree |
B.A. (2022)
|
| advisor |
Darrell Cole
|
| committee |
Patrick McGuinn
Seung-Kee Lee
|
| full text | NRamirez.pdf |
| |
