| |
| author |
Madison Dudziec
| | title |
Consociationalism and Ethno-Sectarian Conflict: Iraq's Political Fragmentation and Flawed Federalism
| | abstract |
Iraq today faces a significant amount of ethno-sectarian conflict and struggles to
maintain its democracy that was born in 2005. When the United States aided Iraq in
creating its new democratic constitution, specific institutions were put in place to prevent
the ethnic and religious tensions from allowing the government to consolidate democracy
and flourish. These institutions were created with the theory of consociationalism in mind
to give more minority groups representation in government to quell conflict via
proportional representation and federalism. This thesis aims to determine whether
consociationalism was effective in consolidating democracy in Iraq by easing ethno-
sectarian conflict. In this context, consociationalism is a theory discussed by Arend
Lijphart (1969) that argues that a government can still form in a significantly fragmented
or diverse state by giving representation to multiple groups to enable a power-sharing
agreement and cooperation. To determine if consociationalism has been effective in
consolidating democracy, I look at the power-sharing agreements created through
proportional representation and the current system of federalism in Iraq. Through my
research, I argue that consociational institutions fragmented Iraq's political parties that
have created instability in its parliament and its flawed asymmetrical federalism has
created unbalance in the strength of its provincial and regional governments. These
results suggest that more consolidated parties will help generate stronger parties. A
greater effort to decentralize the central government to create stronger regional
governments will better consolidate democracy in Iraq moving forward.
| | school |
The College of Liberal Arts, Drew University
| | degree |
B.A. (2021)
|
| advisor |
Jason Jordan
|
| committee |
Carlos Yordan
Jonathan Golden
|
| full text | MDudziec.pdf |
| |
