The U.S., India, and the Colonial Question: America's Missed Opportunity

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that American relations with India declined significantly during the Second World War. This decline in relations between the two countries was the direct result of a failed India policy led by President Roosevelt and his State Department. This thesis focuses considerable attention on Roosevelt's relationship with the Indian National Congress. During World War II, America encountered nationalism in Asia and did not respond correctly to it. How to handle Indian nationalism became a pressing foreign policy concern for the Roosevelt Administration. As America grappled with its new foreign policy challenge in India, it began to reconsider some basic assumptions regarding the British Empire. Prior to the Second World War, the British Empire was viewed by American policymakers as a positive force for global stability. This thesis shows how this assumption was challenged during World War II by certain figures in the State Department. Roosevelt, however, did not respond adequately to advice regarding how to deal with Indian nationalism. Roosevelt's policy, as well as many in his State Department, was to avoid antagonizing Winston Churchill over the issue of Indian independence. William Phillips emerged as a key policymaker who urged Roosevelt to take a new foreign policy approach toward Britain, one that involved putting pressure on the British to offer more self-government to India. The broader implications of this thesis show that America began to alter its foreign policy approach in the East as a result of its coming to terms with the sweeping changes that were occurring there.

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Introduction

American relations with India changed significantly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. With this event, America entered the war on the Allied side against Germany, Japan, and Italy. Britain remained one of America's closest allies, and now that the two countries were allied against the Axis countries, the American-British alliance grew stronger. Meanwhile, India posed a strategic problem for the United States and a colonial problem for Great Britain. The main political party in India, the Indian National Congress, demanded its independence from Great Britain. The United States, caught in the middle of the deteriorating relations that had developed between Great Britain and the nationalists of India, attempted to play a role in calming the tensions between the two parties. America's policy toward the Indian National Congress during World War II failed in several ways and for several reasons. The Roosevelt Administration equivocated with respect to making firm commitments to Indian nationalism. This paper will argue that, because of Roosevelt's policy, American relations with India declined significantly during World War II.

There has been much recent historical scholarship written about the Indo-American relationship. Much of it has focused on diplomatic relations between America and India during the Second World War. American historians Kenton J. Clymer, Sarah Ellen Graham, and Eric S. Ruben are among some of the scholars that have written on the subject. Their work has focused on distinct aspects of the diplomatic relationship between America and India with most focusing primarily on the World War II years. They have also devoted attention to relations between India and America during the interwar years.

Kenton J. Clymer has argued that the Roosevelt Administration, led primarily by Cordell Hull and Sumner Wells, did little to improve relations between America and India during the Second World War. He illustrated the evolutionary process that William Phillips, Roosevelt's ambassador to India, went through while in India from January to May 1943. He explained how Phillips came to change his views about British rule in India. Clymer characterized Phillips as a committed Anglophile. The historian described the role that the Ambassador played in the creation of a euro-centric and Anglophilic State Department. Phillips, however, came to change his position while serving in India during World War II. He began to talk more about nationalism in India, and how it needed to be taken more seriously. Further than this, he also began to more broadly speak about nationalism in Asia.

Clymer concluded that the Roosevelt administration failed to satisfy the Indian National Congress because it did not act on Phillips' advice to take a less friendly position toward British rule. Phillips' analysis of India, Clymer pointed out, began to shape the conversation about America's role in the East. Ultimately however, since Roosevelt did not act according to Phillips' advice, the Administration's foreign policy in India demonstrated that Roosevelt was limited in what he could do to solve the Indian problem. He could not be fully committed to decolonization because to adopt the Ambassador's policy would result in a rupture of the Anglo-American alliance, something that Roosevelt wished to avoid.[1]

Historian Eric S. Ruben described the evolution of Roosevelt's thinking about the colonial problem. Early on, Ruben pointed out, Franklin adopted the ethnocentric thinking of his cousin Theodore. However, Roosevelt began to change his views about colonialism sometime

[1] Kenton J. Clymer, "The Education of William Phillips: Self-Determination and American Policy Toward India, 1942-45." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 8 Issue 1 (1984), 34.

around the 1930's. Ruben pointed out several principal elements concerning the Indo-American relationship during World War II. Like Clymer, he pointed out that Sumner Welles was a key figure in the Roosevelt administration who played a significant role in blocking America from responding to the Indian National Congress's demands for more self-government.[2] The historian described how both Roosevelt and Cordell Hull subscribed to the traditional American solution to the colonial problem. They both advocated a trusteeship scheme whereby independence would follow only after an "adequate" period of training in self-government.[3]

Much like Clymer, Historian Eric S. Ruben illustrated the changing dynamics that occurred between America and Great Britain during World War II. With Britain accepting Lend-Lease aid from America, the U.S. gained significant leverage over Great Britain after the war. America used this leverage to effect changes in Great Britain's colonial policies. America's relations with India, however, were severely hampered due to Roosevelt's timid policy toward Great Britain while the war was taking place. Ruben noted that the Roosevelt Administration "demonstrated timidity and extreme caution" toward the Indian nationalist agenda.[4]

An important note of Ruben's thesis was that Roosevelt genuinely wanted to help the nationalist cause, but his hands were tied by Great Britain. In Ruben's analysis, Roosevelt emerged as an anti-colonialist advocate who stood in stark contrast to a pro-imperialist figure like Churchill.[5] In addition to this analysis, Ruben also argued that Roosevelt saw the war as a chance to spread democracy around the world, as opposed to a war to maintain the status quo. An important conclusion of Ruben's analysis was that Roosevelt's opposition to colonialism was

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[2] Eric S. Ruben, "America, Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian Independence, 1939-1945." *India Review,* vol. 10, no. 1 (Jan 2011), 54.
[3] Ibid., 58.
[4] Ibid., 77.
[5] Ibid., 40-42.

pragmatic. According to the historian, Roosevelt discerned the signs of the times. He saw that anti-colonial support was the practical policy to take as supporting colonialism would alienate a "large percentage of the world's people" during a "time of worldwide upheaval."[6]

In another of Clymer's essays, his scholarship focused primarily on the evolution of the thinking of Jawaharlal Nehru. Clymer dialed in on Nehru's thinking regarding the United States. His analysis led to his conclusion that, after the Second World War, India chose to back away from a close alliance with the United States. He explained how America was surprised by this position. The historian contended that America shouldn't have been surprised by this development. Walking the reader through Nehru's intellectual influences, Clymer showed that Nehru was steeped in an anti-imperialist outlook and read works which argued that America was a rising imperialist power. Nehru's thinking about America was shaped very early on by these intellectual influences.[7]

As a result of America's equivocation toward Indian nationalism during the Second World War, Clymer wrote that Nehru may have decided not to "pursue closer ties with the Americans after the war."[8] This is a critical insight that Clymer leaves the reader with. Nevertheless, the historian did not leave the reader with the impression that he was absolutely sure that it was American policy during the war that was the final nail in the coffin of Nehru's decision to choose non-alignment. Given all of Nehru's earlier intellectual influences, he may have chosen non-alignment even if American policy had been more favorable during the war.[9]

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[6] Ibid., 77.
[7] Kenton J Clymer, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the United States: the Preindependence Years." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 14 Issue 2 (1990), 143-161.
[8] Ibid., 161.

[9] Ibid., 161.

This paper will briefly explore the main motivations that caused Nehru to choose a policy of non-alignment.

A significant portion of the historical scholarship concerning Indo-American relations notes that American foreign policy in India failed. The reason for the failure, most scholarship is agreed, was due to the "timidity" and extreme "caution" of the Roosevelt administration. Historian Sarah Ellen Graham argued in her diplomatic analysis that American propaganda in India was a dismal failure. It failed because it was incongruent with its actual policies in the region. This meant that American propaganda began to be looked upon by nationalists in Asia as a symbol of American hypocrisy.

Graham pointed out that America lit a fuse throughout the colonial world through its Atlantic Charter. Nevertheless, its policies could not live up to the anti-colonialist principles of the Charter. As such, American propaganda undermined America's ability to forge closer and friendlier relations with India. Much like Ruben, Graham pointed out that American interest in India was solely pragmatic. When Pearl Harbor occurred, this was a turning point that allowed America to exert more influence in Asia. With British military failures in Singapore, Malaya, and Burma, this lent more credibility to the argument that America had the right to interfere in British colonial policy.[10]

Indian historian and scholar M.S. Venkataramani took a wholly different approach in his analysis of America's involvement in India during World War II than many of his American counterparts. The historian challenged the assumptions of many American historians such as

[10] Sarah Ellen Graham, "American Propaganda, the Anglo-American Alliance, and the Delicate Question of Indian Self-Determination." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 33, Issue 2 (Apr 2009), 234-236.

Robert Dalleck, Clymer, and Ruben. He contended that a consensus has been built around Roosevelt which views the President as a champion of colonial liberation. Venkataramani disagrees. In contrast to this, Eric S. Ruben argued that Roosevelt was a big and innovative thinker who could see that the British Empire was fast running out of steam. Because of this, Roosevelt boldly moved with the times and supported nationalist aspirations for independence.

The historian M.S. Venkataramani believed Ruben's analysis to be false. He argued that Roosevelt and his associates "failed to examine what the forces set in motion by the great struggle against fascism and totalitarianism [would mean] for the shape of the world in the immediate future."[11] Roosevelt was pragmatic. He understood that the British Empire was a necessary force of stability. And Roosevelt thought, according to the historian, that the Empire would remain a viable force for many decades to come. My own research takes issue with many parts of Venkataramani's analysis. The primary evidence shows that Roosevelt did have a grasp on significant changes taking place within the British Empire.

Historian Michael H. Hunt, in his book about the ideology of American foreign policy, analyzed key elements of its policy from roughly the time of Teddy Roosevelt to the Vietnam War. His main argument was that American Foreign Policy was informed and motivated by a racist ideology with respect to the non-white, non-European, and non-Anglo-Saxon world.[12] From Teddy Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson, foreign policy thinking contained within it the same racist tropes about non-white peoples. Paternalism was at the heart of American foreign policy. It was America's destiny to train inferior races in the art of good government, an art that only

[11]M S Venkataramani, B K Shrivastava, *Roosevelt, Gandhi, Churchill: America and the Last Phase of India's Freedom Struggle* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1983), 338.
[12]Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (London: Yale University Press, 1987), 69-91.

Britain and America were qualified enough to teach to other countries and races.[13] This racialized foreign policy, Hunt noted, lasted through World War II.

For the purposes of this research, Hunt's analysis of American foreign policy from roughly the start of the twentieth century until the Second World War will serve to illustrate a fundamental part of American foreign policy thinking. It will be shown that Roosevelt's foreign policy ideas were very similar to the foreign policy ideas of Woodrow Wilson. Colonial trusteeship emerged as the solution to the colonial problem. This plan, however, did not satisfy nationalist groups during the Second World War as memories of the failure of the trusteeship schemes following the first World War still lingered. Colonial trusteeship was also ideologically racist as it was predicated on the idea that non-white races needed a period of colonial tutelage before they could govern themselves.

Historian Gary R. Hess, in his 1967 work *America Encounter India,* argued that America failed to "take a position based on its prime interests in Asia."[14] Failure to do so led to the decline of America's prestige in the region. He pointed out throughout his work that Indians expected America to come to the aid of their cause, as most Indians had an image of America as a great champion of freedom. When America and India forged closer relations with each other during this time, it was a transformational relationship, Hess argued. It was also a relationship and a moment that provided America with many opportunities to forge closer relations with India. Roosevelt, however, failed to take advantage of this. Hess carefully pointed out the specific ways in which Roosevelt failed. He also showed how American policymakers, once they recognized the implications of their failed policies, scrambled to change their policies. In

[13] Ibid., 69-91.
[14] Gary Hess, *America Encounters India, 1941-1947* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 186-187.

showing this, Hess showed how America exerted pressure on Britain to make changes in its colonial policy. This came too late, however, according to Hess. Nevertheless, by 1947, relations between America, India, and Britain had been transformed.

An important development that set the context for the beginning of the Indo-American relationship was the series of constitutional reforms throughout the 1930's that the British enacted in response to the Indian National Congress. The Congress Party wanted Britain to grant Indian Dominion status such as it had done for its colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The British promised reforms that would gradually move India toward more self-government. The reforms, however, failed, in large part because the constitutional changes did not significantly alter the role of the Viceroy's power in India.

In 1939, two significant developments occurred. First, the constitutional changes that Britain promised to India remained unfulfilled. Second, as war broke out in Europe, the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, declared India to be a belligerent. The Indian National Congress was indignant. In his memoirs, Nehru recalled the sense of injustice and anger that he felt. He wrote about how "rotten" a "system" it was that Indians had to live under. The system was such that "one man, and he a foreigner and a representative of a hated system, could plunge 400 millions of human beings into war without the slightest reference to them."[15] In Dec 1941, the Congress Party issued a statement that expressed its frustration with the British, declaring that:

> The whole background in India is one of hostility and distrust of the British government and not even the most far reaching consequences can alter this, nor can a subject India offer voluntary or willing help to an arrogant imperialism which is indistinguishable from fascist authoritarianism.[16]

[15] Ruben, 43.
[16] Ruben, 43.

The Congress Party had announced its position of neutrality. About three months later, Sir Stafford Cripps was sent to India with an offer of post-war Dominion status. America sent its own representative to the negotiations to see what role it could play. The negotiations broke down, accomplishing little.

The Cripps mission, as it came to be referred to, was the final straw that broke the camel's back with respect to the Indian National Congress trying to work with the British Government. In this context, Indian nationalists began to look toward the United States for assistance. They called on President Roosevelt to exert pressure on Britain. Roosevelt, however, failed to do what was necessary to achieve that end.

In Eric D Pullin's analysis of Indo-American relations during World War II, the historian focused primarily on "U.S. information activities."[17] He identified the Cripps Mission and Gandhi's "Quit India" campaign as major "public relations" challenges for America.[18] Eric D. Pullin concluded that the use of American propaganda as a diplomatic tool failed to achieve its goal of forging better relations with India. His analysis also pointed out the limits of America's support for anti-colonialism, arguing that "Gandhi's strain of nationalism" proved problematic for some Americans.[19] In his article the historian pointed out how India was a problem for America from a strategic and military point of view. American concern about India was an apprehension about what a "politically unstable India" meant for the Allied war effort.[20]

[17]Eric D. Pullin. "Noise and Flutter: American Propaganda Strategy and Operation in India during World War II." *Diplomatic History.* Vol. 34 Issue 2 (Apr 2010), 298.

[18]Ibid., 280.
[19]Ibid., 276.
[20] Ibid., 278.

Pullin examined a critical moment that transformed Indian relations with Britain, and by extension, Indian relations with America. He described the "diplomatic collapse" of the Cripps mission, and how it had a substantial impact on Gandhi's decision to launch a massive civil disobedience campaign. After the failure of the mission, Gandhi began to direct a lot of his frustration of the British toward the United States. His plan to launch a civil disobedience campaign began to be assessed by American officials in New Delhi as an action that would negatively impact the Allied War effort. The alarm that Gandhi's actions set off caused American propaganda activities to change in some ways. What the historian mostly examined in his analysis of American propaganda was the organization and content of it. He examined its advertising campaigns and the ways that they failed. He pointed out various leaders who criticized the propaganda, highlighting a lack of coordination among the various functional levels of the propaganda agency, the historian argued.

What the propaganda activities of Robert Aura Smith (head of propaganda for a time until Ralph Block assumed a greater role) revealed to Indian nationalists, argued Pullin, was the Roosevelt "administration's refusal to develop a distinct Indian policy."[21] Ralph Block attempted to make American propaganda more coherent. The historian pointed out, however, that Block's attempt to make that change was a "belated attempt."[22] The question that Pullin posed was whether American propaganda activities, if they were "more sustained," could have possibly "encouraged a more positive image of the United States in India."[23] Pullin left the question unanswered. This thesis will not delve into the details of the organizational structure of

[21] Ibid., 298.
[22] Ibid., 298.
[23] Ibid., 298.

American propaganda. The thesis will, however, argue that a much more negative image of the United States was held by Indian nationalists by the war's end.

In his diplomatic article, historian Auriol Weigold, focused attention on the journalism of Louis Fischer and Edgar Snow. Weigold showed that a propaganda war took shape after the failed Cripps mission, and that Louis Fischer was critical in keeping at bay some of the more extreme anti-nationalist sentiment spread by Great Britain. While the propaganda war escalated when Gandhi was arrested in August 1942 by the British authorities for his activities, Weigold noted that "Roosevelt remained on the sidelines." According to the historian, the anti-Gandhi and anti-Congress Party propaganda led by Britain sought to "swamp liberal opinion in America."[24] Auriol Weigold showed that British leaders were concerned about which way public opinion in America concerning Indian nationalism moved. Lord Halifax, for example, held the view that American public opinion was flexible and that it changed easily, and the historian pointed out that Halifax was concerned that "Britain could well lose the support of the American press" over the issue of Indian Independence.[25]

The historian pointed out that Louis Fischer issued a warning to nationalist India as it took Gandhi's lead. When taking Gandhi's lead and engaging in civil disobedience, Fischer warned that if the action was perceived or interpreted in America as likely to result in hurting the war effort, nationalist Indians would lose a lot of "American public support for their freedom movement."[26] This paper will show that Fischer's observation was true. Gandhi's decision to launch his "Quit India" campaign proved a turning point with respect to how American public

[24]Auriol Weigold, "Cripps' offer and the nationalist response: Constructing propaganda in the United States," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies,* 86.
[25] Ibid, 87.
[26] Ibid., 85.

opinion viewed Indian nationalist's demands. Public opinion began to grow impatient with Gandhi, and Gandhi's actions hurt the nationalist cause, at least so far as the cause sought to garner American public support.

As stated at the outset, most historical scholarship on American relations with India tends to focus on relations during the Second World War. This is understandable as this was a time when relations between America and India took on a new dimension. Also, it was a time when colonialism came under constant attack and was, in many respects, a system that was being challenged in effective ways. The World-War-II-Indo-American relationship was one small part of a bigger story that could be traced back to the first World War. This paper will attempt to bring to light some of those earlier currents that later shaped American relations with India from 1941 to 1947. In so doing, this paper will place World-War-II-Indo-American relations within a larger context that deals with the race and color issue. It will also point out the important consequences that emerged from the deterioration of wartime relations.

Chapter 1: Roosevelt's Diplomacy

On April 19, 1945, William Phillips, who had previously been sent to India in 1943 as President Roosevelt's "Personal Representative," wrote a memorandum to the Secretary of State. In this memorandum, Phillips stressed the importance of the American government doing something to break the political deadlock in India that began in April 1942 following the failed Cripps mission. Phillips characterized American policy toward India as being a policy in which the goal was "not to disturb our relations with Churchill by unduly pressing upon him our concern with respect to India."[27] Phillips was picked to serve as Roosevelt's representative in India due to the fact that the British believed that he would espouse views on the Indian problem that were favorable to British rule. Phillips, however, began to espouse a view that ran contrary to British interests.[28] The reason for this change was due to Phillips' assessment that America's policy of supporting the British in India would have a negative impact on forging good relations with India in the post-war world. In this memo, Phillips reminded the Secretary of State that with Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter, as well as other statements that the President had made on "behalf of dependent peoples," India had come to "expect that [it] would have the sympathy of [America] in her aspirations for eventual self-government."[29]

From roughly the early months of 1942 to 1945, America and India entered into a much closer relationship than at any other time in the history of its relations.[30] The event which

[27] Memorandum by Mr. William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of State. 19 April 1945, *FRUS* 1945, VI.
[28] Kenton J. Clymer, "The Education of William Phillips: Self-Determination and American Policy Toward India, 1942-45." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 8 Issue 1 (1984), 23.
[29] Memorandum by Mr. William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of State. 19 April 1945, *FRUS* 1945, VI.
[30] Ruben, 45.

brought America and India into a diplomatic relationship was the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. This event brought America into the war, and the first wartime problem that America faced was a string of Japanese military successes in the Far East. By February 1942, Japan had captured parts of Burma. Military planners believed that its next target was India. Suddenly, India caught the attention of America in an unprecedented way. For some perspective into this change, the diplomatic historian Eric S. Ruben noted that prior to 1939, references to India in the American *Congressional Record* were very few. In 1939, there was only 1 mention of India for that year. The focus given to India was related to immigration restrictions of Indians and whether they might be relaxed. In 1940, there was not a "single reference to India" in the Record.[31] In 1941 and 1942, however, India was front page news, as it was now in America's military interest to prevent Japan from capturing it. Roosevelt was dealing with a public that had previously been largely isolationist, and he had to make sure that support for the war remained high. If the public thought that the British military had made a significant blunder in the Far East, and then sent in American troops to clean up its mess, this would be a problem for Roosevelt's efforts to keep isolationism at bay.[32]

On Feb 25, 1942, The Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt in which he described the nature of a meeting held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Long noticed that there was a serious "undercurrent of anti-British feeling." He went on to say that the "Far East was at the forefront of their

[31] Ibid., 45.

[32]FDR to Churchill, March-April 1942. Map Room Papers, Box 2, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum. Concern about isolationism on the part of Roosevelt can be inferred by a letter that Roosevelt wrote to Churchill after the President discovered from Louis Johnson that the Cripps mission failed. Roosevelt told Churchill that his main concern was "American public opinion." He wrote that if "India should…be…invaded by Japan," the "prejudicial reaction on American public opinion can hardly be overestimated." The implication is that Roosevelt was mainly concerned about what happened in India in so far as the outcome had an influence on American public opinion concerning the U.S.'s role in the war.

thoughts."[33] The issue at stake was whether India would be willing to fight on behalf of Britain, and it was thought that India was highly unlikely to fight for Britain given the fact that Britain still retained "mastery over [Indians]. [34] The committee saw the situation in India as an opportunity to "require England to make adjustments of a political nature within the framework of her Empire."[35]

For the committee, the issue was a question of protecting American interests in the Far East, "gathering strength wherever we should."[36] Long characterized the committee's sentiments as "patriotic." He thought that Roosevelt should act in some way on behalf of the committee's wishes. The committee was curious as to what the position of the State Department was on the issue. Long thought that if Roosevelt failed to respond to the issue, then the "matter" might be used as justification for an "attack against the Administration for its…failure…to use the force of its authority in arranging for large-scale military support of the manpower which the United States in now putting into the Far East."[37] The Committee Meeting that Long documented was an example of the policy of American interference in British imperial policy. The committee members made the argument that, since America was financially, and now militarily, assisting the British in the war, and since British imperial policy in Asia jeopardized the Allied war effort, America had the right to "demand" to Britain that "India be given a status of autonomy."[38] This policy, however, was not practiced during the war.

[33] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles). 25 Feb 1942, *FRUS* 1942, I.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.

On the same day that Long observed the committee on foreign relations, Roosevelt telegrammed his ambassador in London, Henry Winant. He explained to Winant that he was "somewhat concerned over the situation in India" given that the "British defense will not have sufficiently enthusiastic support from the people of India themselves."[39] Roosevelt asked Winant to get a gauge for what the Prime Minister thought about "new relationships between Britain and India." Roosevelt informed Winant of the main reason for why he "hesitate[d] to send [Churchill] a direct message." It was because, "in a strict sense," the problem was "not our business." However, now that America was involved in the war, this meant that "from the point of view of the conduct of the war," the matter of India was "of great interest to us."[40]

Roosevelt knew and kept his place. In trying to influence Churchill to change the existing relationship between India and Britain for the improvement of the war effort, he did not coerce Churchill nor give an ultimatum. He politely made suggestions to Churchill. In a letter written to Churchill on the same day that Roosevelt wrote to Winant, Roosevelt opened the letter in a non-confrontational way, writing that "the following is purely a personal thought based on very little first-hand knowledge on my part."[41] He told Churchill to treat his suggestion as "something I would say to you if you and I were alone." Roosevelt made some important points and spoke progressively about developments in the East which had made obsolete the "old relationship" that existed between the East and the West. He mentioned how India felt as if the British had "no real desire…to recognize a world change which has taken deep root in India."[42]

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[39] Ibid.
[40] President's Secretary File, Box 3, India, Telegram from President Roosevelt to Henry Winant, 25 Feb 1942.
[41] Map Room Papers, Box 2, FDR to Churchill, Jan-Feb 1942, Letter from President Roosevelt to Churchill, 25 Feb 1942.
[42] Ibid.

He suggested that Britain make an overture to India to ease some of the tension. Roosevelt was worried that there was not "sufficient spirit to fight" against the Japanese in India.[43] If, however, Britain offered India temporary Dominion status during the war, this might alleviate a lot of the hard feelings that India held toward the British Empire. This, however, was also "merely a thought" of the President, and he ensured and told Churchill that "it is, strictly speaking, none of my business except in so far as it is part and parcel of the successful fight that you and I are making."[44] Roosevelt was correct in his analysis of a lot of the problems that had occurred in the East prior to the Second World War. Nevertheless, he was not willing to get involved. He concluded his letter to Churchill by saying, "For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this!"[45]

In March 1942, the British sent a diplomatic mission to India, led by Sir Stafford Cripps, with an offer of Dominion status after the war. America was involved in the negotiations as well. Louis Johnson was sent as Roosevelt's personal representative, and it was unclear to Churchill, Eden, as well as some members in the Roosevelt administration, as to exactly what Johnson's role would be during the negotiations. The Indian National Congress wanted more control over the defense of the country, but the British refused to offer this concession. Louis Johnson proposed a "substitute defense amendment" that brought the parties closer to an agreement.[46] No agreement was reached, however, and Harry Hopkins meanwhile informed Roosevelt of a troubling development happening in London. The London Government began to think that "Louis Johnson [was] acting as your personal representative and under your instructions."[47]

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[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Telegram from Louis Johnson to President Roosevelt, 11 April 1942. President's Secretary File, Box 3, India, FDRL.
[47] Ibid.

Hopkins moved at once to convince "the Prime Minister and Eden that Johnson is not acting as a mediator on your behalf."[48] This is an important correspondence to consider as it demonstrated the priority of the Anglo-American alliance over an American alliance with India. It also showed how uneasy the British were with respect to America meddling in what they considered their private imperial affairs.

As Roosevelt was informed by Johnson that the negotiations failed, he wrote to Churchill and tried to convince him to re-open the negotiations. He suggested that Sir Stafford Cripps be sent back to New Delhi. Roosevelt's concerns centered around the success of the Allied war effort in the East. He was concerned about how American public opinion would react to the failure of the Cripps mission. Churchill was satisfied with the outcome of the mission. Churchill's goal, after all, was to use these negotiations as propaganda to say that the British did all that they could do to help India. Churchill thought that public opinion in America believed the mission failed over "broad general issues,"[49] which is what he desired. Roosevelt disagreed. He told Churchill that the American people thought differently. According to Roosevelt, the people thought that the failure resided in the fact that the British refused the Indian people self-government. Roosevelt was concerned about how the failure of the mission would affect the war effort, and then consequently how that would affect public opinion and morale in America. Roosevelt anxiously wrote to Churchill:

> If the present negotiations are allowed to collapse because of the issues as presented to the American people and India should subsequently be invaded by Japan with attendant serious military or naval defeats for our side, the prejudicial reaction on American public opinion can hardly be overestimated.[50]

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[48] Ibid.
[49] FDR to Churchill, March-April 1942, Map Room Papers, Box 2, FDRL.
[50] Ibid.

After the failure of the Cripps mission, India moved into a period of political deadlock that lasted for the remainder of the war. The Indian National Congress felt betrayed. Sir Stafford Cripps had advocated for India's Independence for a long time, and now he had taken a pro-Churchill position. The INC felt that America had not done enough. Sarah Ellen Graham wrote that "while Johnson's role was appreciated by Nehru," after the Cripps mission, "Roosevelt was now seen as failing to support democracy and freedom."[51] Ralph Block supported this observation by Graham. In a letter to Robert E. Sherwood, he outlined to him the development of Indian disappointment. The letter was written on Jan 19, 1944. At the outset of the letter, Block outlined, according to his Indian informant, the evolution of Indian disappointment with the United States. The informant told him that "American prestige and Indian regard for Americans has declined noticeably since the rejection of the Cripps proposal."[52] The informant explained to Block that after the failed negotiations, the fact sunk in for many Indians that they had "been misled by Johnson's enthusiasm into believing that the United States Government would effectively interfere to obtain India's independence."[53]

As political deadlock continued, Gandhi tried to find ways to break it. On July 1, 1942, Gandhi sent a letter to President Roosevelt via the American journalist Louis Fischer. Fischer was a diplomatic backchannel that the President used to assess the situation in India. Gandhi asked President Roosevelt to try to convince the British to re-open negotiations. Appealing to Roosevelt's idealism, he argued that the "Allied declaration that the Allies are fighting to make the world safe for freedom of the individual and for democracy sounds hollow, so long as India

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[51] Graham, 243.
[52] Ralph Block, General Representative in India, Overseas Operations Branch to Mr. Robert E. Sherwood, Director of Overseas Operations, Office of War Information, Social Security Building, Washington DC, January 19, 1944; Records of the Office of War Information, 1926-1951, Record Group 208; National Archives and Records Administration of the United States, College Park, MD.
[53] Ibid.

and, for that matter, Africa are exploited by Great Britain."[54] Gandhi called on Roosevelt to do something as he explained in his letter that it was useless for India to approach Britain herself. He mentioned how the "British policy, as exposed by the Cripps mission…has opened our eyes and has driven me to the proposal that I have made."[55] His "proposal" referred to his civil disobedience campaign and he tried to use it as a pressure point to get Roosevelt to act to force the British government to re-open negotiations.

Gandhi's attempt to get Roosevelt to act on the INC's behalf failed. Roosevelt responded to Gandhi a month later with vague platitudes about how America had always "striven for and supported policies of fair dealing…and of all related principles looking towards the creation of harmonious relations between nations." It was an evasion of Gandhi's specific concerns. Roosevelt informed Gandhi that he believed that the best course of action to take would be to make a "supreme effort to defeat those who would deny forever all hope of freedom throughout the world."[56] India's needs would have to be postponed, Roosevelt said. He also attached a statement made by Cordell Hull on July 23, in which Hull laid out the principle that American foreign policy would support freedom movements on a purely conditional basis. Part of the statement read that the United States would "support attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it."[57] Since the Indian National Congress had remained neutral, the implication of Roosevelt's decision to include Hull's statement in his letter, was that the President disapproved of Gandhi's actions, and thought that

[54] President's Secretary File, Box 39, India, Letter of Gandhi to President Roosevelt, 1 July 1942.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Venkataramani, 347.

neutrality was not a worthy position to take. Roosevelt's letter never reached Gandhi because of Gandhi's arrest and subsequent imprisonment.[58]

Gandhi's letter, as well as Roosevelt's response, was one example of President Roosevelt beginning to take a much less favorable view toward the Indian National Congress. Roosevelt had always acted mildly toward Churchill, never confronting him in a meaningful way over the Indian issue, but by July and August of 1942, Roosevelt began to abandon even politely suggesting to Churchill that he should act to solve the Indian problem. He now gave up on that and decided that it was best not to interfere in any way. In July 1942, Roosevelt received a letter from Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek informing him of the terrible situation in the Far East. Chiang thought that granting India more self-government would help the war effort in the Far East.[59] He wrote a lengthy message to Roosevelt about the awful situation that could possibly occur in the Far East if Japan were to take control of India. For Chiang, the logic of events led him to believe that India's concessions needed to be met immediately.[60]

Roosevelt sent Chiang's letter to Churchill, despite Chiang's request to keep the letter confidential. He asked for Churchill's advice and Churchill told Roosevelt that he did "not agree with [Chiang's] estimate of the Indian situation."[61] He asked Roosevelt to "dissuade Chiang Kai-Shek from his completely misinformed activities," and to "lend no countenance to putting pressure upon his Majesty's government."[62] Roosevelt listened to Churchill's advice. Sumner Welles, Roosevelt's Undersecretary of State, disagreed. This was a little out of character for Welles. He had always taken a pro-British position with respect to India. For example, in a 1941

[58] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State, 19 May 1944, *FRUS* 1944. Vol. V.
[59] FDR and Chiang Kai-Shek, 25 July 1942, Map Room Papers, Box 10, FDRL.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Map Room Papers, Box 2, Churchill to FDR, Part 2, 30 July 1942
[62] Ibid.

Press Conference, Welles challenged "pundits in the United States" with respect to American intervention in India. He thought it unfair to make "intervention in the Indian situation a test of liberalism."[63] His overall argument was that India represented a "tremendously complicated and delicate problem" that the United States was not properly equipped to solve.[64] In response to Chiang's assessment, though, Welles took a position of American interference. He told the President that the "State Department" agreed with Chiang Kai-Shek's estimate of a "desperately serious situation" likely to occur in India following the meeting of the Indian National Congress on August 6. Welles thought that mediation by China and the U.S. could "do no harm."[65] And he spoke also of how it was in America's military interests in the Far East to get involved.

When Roosevelt responded to Chiang Kai-Shek's letter of July 29, he expressed sympathy with the Chinese leaders' sentiments and ideas. He agreed with Chiang about the dangers of the unsettled situation in India and how such a situation, with Gandhi disrupting the British administration, could "reap benefit" for the "Axis powers."[66] Roosevelt, however, reminded the Chinese General about the difficulties involved in the United States advising the British government as well as the peoples of India. Roosevelt told Chiang that it was the feeling of the British government that "suggestions…from other members" of the United Nations concerning a solution to the Indian problem would "undermine the authority of the only existing government in India."[67]

Given these circumstances, Roosevelt informed the Chinese nationalist leader that he thought it would be "wiser for you and for myself to refrain from taking action of the kind which

[63]Ruben, 54.
[64]Ruben, 54.
[65] The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt. 29 July 1942. *FRUS* 1942. Vol I.
[66] President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. (n.d.). *FRUS.* Vol I.
[67] Ibid.

you had in mind for the time being."[68] In telling the Chinese General of Britain's feelings about its government in India being undermined if China, the U.S., and/or any other countries attempted to advice Britain about what to do in India, he spoke on behalf of Churchill. Churchill had told Roosevelt, in response to Chiang's letter, that the situation in India was under control and the defense of India was not a problem "provided that [the Government of India's] authority is not undermined."[69]

In another correspondence with the Generalissimo, dated August 12, 1942, the President related to Chiang about how, despite several efforts made on both their parts to affect a settlement to the Indian controversy, it has proved "thus far…impossible." That being the case, it was best, Roosevelt said, to refrain from "offering active mediation to both sides in the controversy."[70] Roosevelt was disconcerted about Gandhi's civil disobedience campaign, saying that he wished that "Mr. Gandhi could see more clearly" the possible consequences of his actions. Roosevelt thought that Gandhi did not understand that the "very worst thing that could happen to the people of India would be victory by the Axis powers."[71]

Roosevelt said to Chiang that it should be both Chinese and American policy to declare that "we have not the moral right to force ourselves upon the British or the Congress Party."[72] Roosevelt said, finally, that he thought it wise that "no open or public appeal or pronouncement" be made regarding this matter, believing that such a policy would "best serve the people of India."[73] In this telegram to Chiang, the Roosevelt "policy of silence" with respect to the Indian

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[68] Ibid.
[69] Churchill to FDR, Part 2, 30 July 1942, Map Room Papers, Box 2, FDRL.
[70] President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, 12 Aug 1942. *FRUS* 1942. Vol. I.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.

problem began. “No open or public appeal or pronouncement” would be made. In an August 4 Press Conference, when asked what he thought about Gandhi’s suggestion that the “American government persuade the British to get out of India,” Roosevelt refused to comment.

Gandhi was imprisoned sometime in early August for his planned civil disobedience campaign. Ralph Block’s information to Bob Sherwood also included the observation by the Indian informant that after the “imprisonment of Gandhi and other Indian leaders,” Indian nationalists realized more fully that “America would not interfere.” Block said that the “feeling in favor of America and Americans had been so emotionally intense that the Indian reaction was one of a disappointed lover leading, in disappointment, to bitterness and suspicion.”[74] Indians, however, still had “excessive admiration for President Roosevelt.” The only problem, according to some nationalists, was that “[Roosevelt] has, for the time being, apparently been pocketed by [Churchill].”[75]

President Roosevelt’s capitulation to Churchill began to become a problem for American relations with India. In a *New York Times* article of Nov 12, 1942, Rajaji, a member of the Congress Party, was quoted extensively, commenting on how Roosevelt’s acquiescence to Britain was, possibly, part of a broader pattern of American foreign policy that would continue in the post-war period. For Rajaji, the more successful the British were in the war, the more this raised fears among Indians that the British will “harden” when it comes to making “concessions towards Indian nationalism.”[76] He asked the question, “Will America fight for India after this war if during the war you allow yourselves to be dictated to by Mr. Churchill?”

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[74] Ralph Block, General Representative in India, Overseas Operations Branch to Mr. Robert E. Sherwood, RG 208.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Herbert L. Matthews, “Indians See Threat in Churchill Talk,” *New York Times,* 12 Nov 1942.

For Rajaji, the answer was for "the America Government" to "tell the British" that "they must solve the Indian problem."[77] The crucial issue for Rajaji was that the war needed to be won in the right way and for the right reasons, not to help Britain "retain her empire." A victory in that way would be unfavorable for India. Rajaji pointed out that "Indians will come to dislike Allied successes if they merely increase British arrogance."[78] America was stuck in the middle of this, perceived by some nationalists as complicit in helping Britain to maintain her Empire.

Rajaji's comment about America's involvement with Great Britain, and how it looked as if Roosevelt was complicit in assisting Great Britain in the retention of her Empire, is confirmed in a January 21, 1941 telegram that Roosevelt sent to his Tokyo Ambassador, Joseph Grew. In this telegram Roosevelt revealed his thinking about the strategic importance of the British Empire.[79] Venkataramani described American foreign policy at this time as global-minded. A strong alliance with Britain was crucial, noted the historian, as it gave America "access to various parts of [the British] Empire." American influence could thereby be extended to "every corner of the globe," something that was vital for "American security in the future."[80] American foreign policy was basically Europe-First, more concerned about Russian encroachment in Europe than about developments in Asia.

By 1943, Roosevelt sent William Phillips to India to see what might be done about the problem of the political deadlock. But Roosevelt was merely saving face as he was still not willing to confront Churchill on the issue in any meaningful way. Nevertheless, Phillips was sent, and while he was there he ended up taking a position that ran counter to Roosevelt's

[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] The President to the Ambassador in Tokyo (Joseph Grew), *FRUS 1941,* IV, 5.
[80] Venkataramani, 321.

position. Phillips was an interesting choice for the job and proved to be an interesting candidate as he advocated an American policy for India that was hostile to British policy. The British picked him for the job as Phillips was believed to be comfortably entrenched in the British camp.[81] As Phillips toured India, his thought on the subject began to change. Clymer argued that Phillips laid out a very clear approach to India for Roosevelt to pursue. Roosevelt should "attempt to modify British policy."[82]

Roosevelt, however, was not willing to take this course, and over time, Roosevelt came to view Phillips' advice as too "radical." Phillips witnessed the decline of America's prestige in India and documented it. He saw that there was a "rising trend of criticism against the United States by Congress sympathizers."[83] In Jinnah's newspapers, he reported to Roosevelt that Muslim League supporters accused America of "underwriting…British platitudes."[84] According to the Indians, the war was none of their concern. It was the last thing on their minds. "There is very little thought given to the war among Indians." They viewed it cynically as an imperialist war. America had always been a country that Indians had admired, and now, Phillips wrote, "Indians are coming more and more to disbelieve in the American gospel of freedom of oppressed peoples."[85]

Phillips saw that nationalism had gained considerable strength, and his position was that it should not be ignored. Relations with Asia would be essential for America after the war, and if

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[81] Kenton J. Clymer, "The Education of William Phillips: Self-Determination and American Policy Toward India, 1942-45." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 8 Issue 1 (1984), 18-19.
[82] Ibid., 27.
[83] Mr. William Phillips, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in India, to the Secretary of State. 1943 February 12, *FRUS 1943,* IV.
[84] Mr. William Phillips, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in India, to the Secretary of State. 1943 April 16, *FRUS 1943,* IV.
[85] Mr. William Phillips, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt of India, to the President. 1943 April 19, *FRUS 1943,* IV.

India remained convinced that America did not do enough to help, then that would hurt future relations. One problem Phillips saw was that America made promises that it couldn't keep. He advised against the OWI's advertisements as he thought that they raised unrealistic expectations. In a February 25 letter to Roosevelt he mentioned how Indians looked to America for assistance because of "our historic stand on liberty."[86] He also noted in a March 3, 1943 letter that the Atlantic Charter has given "great impetus" to the desire for freedom in the colonial parts of the world. The President's speeches have also encouraged the colonized world to this end, Phillips said. It was time, thought Phillips, to make real on the promises. Wallace Murray, the State Department's advisor on political relations, suggested to the President that Phillips should ask the Viceroy to be able to visit Gandhi and Nehru in jail, and importantly, the request should be made "for the record."[87] Welles advised against it. Hull told Phillips that a request could be made, but only on a "purely personal basis." Murray wrote that he thought that this "overcautious attitude" toward the British was not good for America's future relations with Asia.[88]

Toward the end of his stay in India, Phillips mentioned again to the President how important it was for America to make the overtures necessary that could convince Indian nationalists that the war was truly being fought for the principles in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. Nationalists needed to be convinced that the war was not merely one of "power politics."[89] The Atlantic Charter gave India great hope. Nevertheless, as Graham noted, the

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[86] Mr. William Phillips, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in India, to the President, 23 February 1943. *FRUS 1943,* IV.
[87] Memorandum by the Advisor on Political Relations (*Murray*) to the Undersecretary of State (*Welles),* 6 April 1943. *FRUS 1943,* IV.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Mr. William Phillips, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in India, to the President. 14 May 1943. *FRUS 1943,* IV.

Charter was never intended to "serve as a blue-print for post-war planning." The main reason why Churchill and Roosevelt met on the day of August 14, 1941 to sign the Atlantic Charter, a document that had its roots in Woodrow Wilson's 14 points, and that contained within it, in Article 3, the principle of self-government, was for reasons peculiar to their own domestic concerns. For Roosevelt, signing the Charter was for the same reason that he wrote to Winant on Feb 25, 1942. As President, he had to deal with a small minority of the public that had isolationist tendencies. If a mess were to happen in the Far East, those isolationist tendencies might reach a broader audience. At the time of the signing of the Charter in August 1941, Roosevelt saw that for he and Churchill to sign it together was a good way to maintain "public support for lend-lease by associating Churchill with established U.S. principles."[90] One of the unintended consequences of the Atlantic Charter, however, according to Graham, was that it "set up a standard that Washington's actual policy positions…could not live up to."[91]

The reason the situation in India reached the tension that it did, apart from American expectations not being met, had to do with the fact that the United States happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. When Phillips travelled through India in 1943, he lived among people who had been desperately fighting for their independence for roughly twenty years. Because India was promised more self-government after the First World War and never received it, it was now determined to make sure that the same thing didn't happen again. In an August 28, 1941 letter to President Roosevelt, Savarkar, a member of the Hindu Mahasabha Party, called on Roosevelt to "declare explicitly if Anglo-American announcement" of "war aims covers India's

[90]Graham, 232.
[91] Ibid., 232.

case."[92] He mentioned how it was declared that freedom for India would come one year after the war. He wanted to know "whether America guarantees" this. He talked about the disappointment that India felt after the first World War. "If America fails to do" what it is now saying, India will be forced to see the Allied statement as "another stunt like war aims of the last Anglo-German war."[93] He commented that the "war aims" of the first World War were "meant only to camouflage imperialistic aggressions of those who have empires" against those who don't have them.[94]

Ambassador Phillips described India's impatience toward the possibility of its independence. Indians believed that it was during the war that they could exert the best possible leverage to attain independence. In a February 23, 1943 letter to Roosevelt, Phillips wrote:

> Certainly, Indians look to us for help in their struggle, which presumably it will be difficult for us to give during the war. And after the war, they believe that any such help will come too late, since whatever persuasion we can exercise over the British can be better done now than when the general scramble begins for a post-war settlement.[95]

This was an important observation since it revealed something about the nuances of the situation in India. Roosevelt did not heed Phillips advice. When Phillips returned to America in May 1943, he and Roosevelt had a conference about India. The press was eager to hear about it. In a May 14th press conference, the President was asked about his conference with Phillips. His response was, "I don't think I have any news on it." He was asked if Phillips would be returning to India. He said, "I suppose so."[96] This was right in line with the Roosevelt policy of silence and it was a clear strategic move on Roosevelt's part to distance himself from Phillips, the American

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[92] Radiogram from Savarkar, Bombay, India, 8-28/41, President's Official File, 48H, India, FDRL.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Mr. William Phillips to President Roosevelt, 23 Feb 1943, *FRUS 1943,* IV.
[96] Presidential Press Conferences, 891-896, April 19, 1943 - May 14, 1943.

diplomat who antagonized the British. It made good political sense since it showed Churchill that Roosevelt would not be drawn into discussing matters of such a nature. It would make the British look bad and the Indians look good. More importantly, it would anger Churchill.

By January 1944, political deadlock had still not been broken in India. The British had cracked down on Gandhi during his fast, believing that a hardline policy toward him was necessary to maintain British rule. This was Phillips' assessment. He thought that the Viceroy's thinking was that if the British gave in to Gandhi's demands, it would make them look weak, and so undermine their control. The U.S., it appeared to India, stood idly by while this happened. Anti-American sentiment built little by little. Gandhi had presented the idea, shortly after the Cripps mission, in his newspaper *Harijan*, that Roosevelt could gain leverage over Churchill through the use of Lend-Lease to "insist on the implementing of the Indian demand as a condition of her financing Britain."[97] He also began to propagate the idea that the U.S. military presence in India meant the "defense of the British Empire."[98] These ideas resonated as was confirmed by George Merrell, the State Department's Officer in Charge at New Delhi. He confided to Secretary Hull about his worries about Gandhi's influence, and he identified that America's foreign policy needed to be one in which a distance was kept from the British. This distance from the British would be accompanied by a non-committal position toward Indian nationalism. This was the "key American foreign policy challenge in India," Merrell thought.[99] But this was precisely the problem. For Indian nationalists, an American noncommittal position toward their cause implied a pro-British position.

[97] Pullin, 284.
[98] Ibid., 284.
[99] Ibid., 284.

On January 17, 1944, Roosevelt set out to write a statement of America's military objectives in the Pacific. He wrote to Hull, asking for advice on his statement, and adding that he thought that the statement would "clear up a good deal of anti-American feeling in India."[100] Roosevelt wrote that "American objectives in India or elsewhere in continental Asia," involved getting to Singapore and Batavia and returning to Manila. It also involved "expelling the Japs from Burma, Malaya, Java, and other colonial territory."[101] He wrote that this action was "military" as opposed to territorial. Roosevelt referred to the territories in the Pacific as "colonial territory." Hull advised Roosevelt to change the wording of "colonial territory" to "Japanese-occupied territory." The reason being was because the use of the term "colonial territory would be offensive to the Burmese and play into the hands of the Japanese Propaganda Ministry."[102]

Hull also took issue with the phrase "get to Singapore" and "return to Manila." It was better to say that America's objective was to "drive the Japs from Singapore" and to "free the Philippines from the aggressors."[103] This slight change in wording was deemed by Hull to be important, thus showing how tense and how suspicious the colonized world was about Allied war aims. Hull said that Roosevelt's original wording "might possibly give ill-wishers a chance to claim that the Allies' only real interest is imperialistic."[104]

An instance of India being in a tense mood, and an instance that demonstrated the worsening of Indo-American relations, was a series of riots that occurred in India in and around May and June of 1944 because of a miscommunication. In a press conference on June 23, 1944, Roosevelt took time to mention how Indians said that after the capture of Rome, the President, in

[100] President's Official File, 48H, India, Correspondence between Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, 17 Jan 1944.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.

his radio address, "hadn't mentioned the Indian troops" that contributed to the campaign. He said that there were "one or two protests from India" because of it, and that "their feelings were rather hurt." Roosevelt sought to clear up the miscommunication, saying that he did mention the "East Indian troops" that contributed to the fall of Rome.[105]

In May 1944, Gandhi was released from prison. Roosevelt wrote a letter to Gandhi two years earlier. At the time, the letter could not be delivered to Gandhi because of his arrest. Roosevelt requested that the letter be kept with the Mission at New Delhi until it was possible to deliver it. When Gandhi was released in May, the State Department began to discuss whether it was a good diplomatic idea, both with respect to Indo-American relations and British-American relations, to deliver the letter. Merrell, the Officer in Charge in India, advised against sending the letter because some of its content, he said, was no longer "timely" given the "changes in the world situation as well as the present political situation in India."[106]

If the letter were now transmitted to Gandhi, this could prove bad for Anglo-American relations as, if the British discovered this, the Government of India would wonder "how Gandhi's letter evaded censorship in India."[107] Merrell went on to say that parts of the letter, particularly the part that involved Hull's "military considerations," would "awaken only skepticism as Gandhi in common with most Indian nationalists probably doubts that the U.S. has used the full measure of its influence during the past two years to support the attainment of freedom by India."[108] This correspondence was representative of the "overcautious attitude" that the State Department took, which Murray had advised against. It is not clear if Merrell agreed

[105] Presidential Press Conferences, 957-959, June 13, 1944 - June 27, 1944.
[106] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State, 19 May 1944, *FRUS* 1944. Vol. V.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.

with the nationalist opinion that America had not done enough for its cause. What is clear, though, is that nationalists believed that America had not done enough for their cause, and that the State Department was very aware of this.

As time went on and Roosevelt did nothing to break the political deadlock, feelings of Indian resentment toward the United States reached a boiling point. Indian nationalists were not certain about what an allied victory meant for the future of India. This is reflected in a letter Gandhi wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt shortly after Franklin's death in April 1945. Gandhi showed no enthusiasm for an allied victory, and he even showed contempt for Franklin Roosevelt. Writing from Bombay, he told Eleanor "congratulations…because your illustrious husband died in harness and after war had reached a point where allied victory had become certain."[109] For Gandhi and other Indian nationalists, an allied success, if it meant that Churchill would have a say in shaping the post-war world, was not advantageous for them. And it looked as if America was following the lead of Churchill. Nationalists certainly accused America of this during the war, and Gandhi here reflects that his feeling was, at this time, still the same. The 1944 Presidential election also showed that America had not considered the future status of the colonial world as, even at a time when "victory over Hitlerism was clearly in sight," there was no mention or concern over the "implications of Churchillism for world peace."[110]

Major riots broke out in Calcutta and Bombay throughout the last months of 1945 and the early months of 1946. The rioting erupted after a soldier from the Indian National Army was brought to trial. The rioting demonstrated that there were considerable feelings of resentment over the presence of American troops. Ordinary Indians demanded that not only Britain "quit

[109] Telegram of Condolence sent by Mr. Gandhi to Mrs. Roosevelt. 18 April 1945, The President's Secretary's File, Box 39, India, FDRL.
[110] Venkataramani, Shrivastava, 286-287.

India" but America quit it as well.[111] The Associated Press reported that two "American officers were beaten by a mob," and "United States vehicles were set afire."[112] The *New York Times* reported that a "new outburst of rioting…injured eighteen United States soldiers."[113] An American flag was burned.[114] Even though Congress Party members publicly condemned the rioting and the subsequent loss of life and property that it caused, this event showed the degree to which ordinary Indian citizens still felt insecure about their future status in the post-war world.

In an interview with Mahatma Gandhi shortly after the failed Cripps mission, Louis Fischer expressed disappointment over some of Gandhi's statements about America. He told Gandhi: "I think it very unfortunate…that you have uttered some unfriendly words at the expense of America." Gandhi explained to Fischer that it was his style, that he intended "to shock" the American public. During the interview, one gets the sense that Fischer understood that at this point Gandhi was directing a lot of his frustration over the failed Cripps proposal at the United States. Fischer told Gandhi that there was "great sympathy for the cause of Indian freedom" in America. He informed Gandhi that there were "important men in Washington" who were "working on the idea of a Pacific Charter."[115] Gandhi, however, displayed a sense of urgency, saying to Fischer that he was not "interested in future promises."[116] The Pacific Charter, Fisher said, was having trouble being realized due to the fact that Washington understood the implications of the charter as establishing a principle that would effectively mean the "end of

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[111]Hess, 168.
[112] The Associated Press, "12 Americans Hurt as Indians Riot Over Trial of Pro-Japanese Troops," *New York Times,* 22 Nov 1945.
[113] George E. Jones, "14 Killed in Calcutta Rioting; Jinnah Threatens a Civil War," *New York Times,* 12 Feb 1946.
[114] Hess, 168.
[115] Yogendra Yadav. "Interview with Louis Fischer." *The Gandhi-King Community* (blog), December 11, 2012. http://gandhiking.ning.com/profiles/blogs/interview-with-louis-fischer

[116] Ibid.

imperialism." And "how can we announce [the end of imperialism] while Britain holds India?" Fischer asked.[117] That was the dilemma as far as Fischer and the State Department were concerned. The U.S. was allied with Britain, and as this was the case, in the eyes of many Indian nationalists, America began to be identified with imperialism.

[117] Ibid.

Chapter 2: The Propaganda War

As the Second World War progressed after the failure of the Cripps proposals, a propaganda war took place between Great Britain and the Indian National Congress. This propaganda war involved ideas on both sides meant to sway public opinion in one direction or the other. Nationalist sympathizers in America, although, found themselves less equipped than the powerful British propaganda machine. British propaganda ultimately won the contest for American public opinion. The Indian historian Venkataramani noted that the "propaganda war between the two sides was a wholly unequal contest" with the "nationalist point of view" at a severe disadvantage as it had not even a "small fraction of the resources that British agencies and pro-British organizations" had at their command to sway the "American public" toward its side.[118] In the end, Hess noted, the British "emerged victorious" in the "struggle for the American mind." By April 1943, a poll revealed that the American public lost interest in the issue because of the changing circumstances of the war. One change that occurred that caused the public to pay less attention to the Indian issue was the military need for "Indian participation" in the war.[119] There was less need, military, for Indian participation in the war at this point, and with the Japanese threat less inevitable and less pressing, the public lost interest in India. Close to half of the sample polled in the April poll believed that independence for India should wait until after the war. Forty-three percent believed that America should leave India alone as it was thought to be an exclusive British problem.[120]

[118] Venkataramani, 224.
[119] Hess, 127-129.
[120] Ibid., 127-129.

Immediately after the failed Cripps proposals, and given the way in which the story was being distorted in the press, both Gandhi and Nehru grew frustrated. Nehru remarked on how "rotten" the nationalist press coverage was. Gandhi noted that "British propaganda is so well organized in America against the Indian cause that the few friends India has there have no chance of being effectively heard."[121] It was the failure of the Cripps mission, indicative of the failure of diplomacy, which led Gandhi to consider civil disobedience. This in turn led much of the American public to turn against Gandhi, as British propaganda subsequently depicted Gandhi as pro-Japanese. When the OWI investigated the direction and content of American press coverage from roughly the Cripps Mission to the arrest of Gandhi in August 1942, it found a trajectory in which the Indian National Congress gradually lost favor with American public opinion. The OWI's observations also revealed different ideas that shaped the propaganda narratives on both sides of the debate.

The Office of War Information conducted a survey of intelligence in February and March of 1942. Concerned about the shape and content of opinion regarding America's involvement in the war, the OWI reviewed American press comment. The OWI found that the "United Nations concept" was accepted for the most part. The OWI also recognized that after the British military blunder in Singapore, the press increasingly reported anti-Churchill and anti-British view-points. The OWI report said that the "fall of Singapore had brought in its train a good deal of recrimination, directed particularly at the British."[122] But regardless of this, the report said that there still remained a "high degree of admiration for Winston Churchill." The papers wherein

[121] Pullin, 283.

[122] President's Secretary File, Box 155, Office of War Information-Survey of Intelligence, Feb-March 1942.

Churchill was criticized were referred to as "isolationist newspapers." The OWI was concerned that these kinds of criticisms of the British, of Churchill, and overall of Singapore, with an emphasis on "British military and naval commanders…shackled by outmoded doctrines of warfare," was in the end indicative of a "renaissance of the old isolationist attitude."[123] The Chicago Tribune was cited as one of the newspapers that spread this "isolationist" sentiment, attacking "British imperialism."[124] It was also mentioned that more "liberal papers" than the Chicago Tribune pointed out the fact of "Britain's failure to pledge India a greater degree of independence." With increased newspaper attention on Chiang Kai-Shek, the OWI noted that this was bound to focus on the theme of Indian Independence.[125]

Continuing its report, the OWI wrote about Chiang Kai-Shek and his recent "statement" concerned about "Indian aspirations for independence," and how his statement received a "great deal of editorial attention." The OWI assessed quite positively and optimistically on the side of American opinion being sympathetic with the Indian Nationalist cause. The report said, "the realization of Indian hopes is generally supported by the American press." The reasoning for the support was both idealistic and pragmatic. Support for the cause was a "means of procuring the full mobilization of Indian resources on the side of the United Nations," but it was also "because of a genuine desire to promote Indian freedom." This section of the press constructed a narrative of the war which attempted to speak to the needs of the colonial world. The papers "recognized that the status quo can never be restored in Asia."[126] They pointed out that Britain ought to follow what the Americans did in the Philippines. In the final observation of this report, the OWI

[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.

noted that some papers went one step further in viewing the war in a broader and more idealistic way. The report noted that "some [papers] are beginning to think in terms of a genuine democratic war for the liberation of all the world, regardless of race, creed, or color."[127]

Many papers argued that those who supported the Indian nationalist cause were overly idealistic. They were also painted as dangerous, as they were bringing disharmony to an alliance which was needed to defeat a much greater evil than Britain, namely Germany and Japan. As such, their voices were silenced and discredited in critical ways. The reason for this had to do with the fact that the British had a powerful propaganda machine in America. Publicity for the nationalist cause had little chance of a fair hearing. After the failed Cripps proposals, and after Gandhi's proposed civil disobedience campaign, the British message was shown to be getting across much more effectively. In an OWI report of August 1942, the OWI said that "the developing crisis in India [had become] a leading editorial topic."[128] The OWI said that there "was great uneasiness over the decision of the Congress Party to conduct a non-violent rebellion against British rule."[129] The report noted that, "generally, comment was hostile to Gandhi and sympathetic towards the British." The OWI observed that some newspapers said that the President should intervene directly in the matter and compel the British to do something to break the political deadlock, while other papers "consider [intervention]" to be a "United Nations problem."[130] This was the idea of who was responsible for breaking the political deadlock in India. The "few friends" that India had in America called on the Roosevelt administration to

[127] Ibid.
[128] President's Secretary File, Box 155, Office of War Information-Survey of Intelligence, 1942 August.
[129] Ibid.
[130]Ibid.

address the problem. Others said, as the OWI reports revealed, that it was a United Nations problem. The British, however, considered the problem to be nobody's business except theirs.

As the war in the Far East continued during the first half of 1942, and as America's British allies were failing miserably in the Far East, there started to develop a credible argument that the U.S. should intervene in the Indian problem. The "few friends" that India had in America started to make a moral argument that it would be a positive factor for the war effort if the Allies were honestly fighting for the principles of democracy that they claimed to be fighting for. One way to do that, they thought, would be to pressure the British to give India her independence immediately. They thought that this would also motivate the colonized world in the Near and Far East to throw in its lot with the Allies. India's neutral position would be abandoned they thought, and India would gladly contribute to the Allied war effort, thus resisting the Japanese, rather than possibly going over to its side. The argument on the other side was that, as nice as all that sounds, there were too many divisions in India to realistically assume that independence for it would not likely create a highly unstable situation in India that the Japanese would exploit for its advantage. The British propaganda machine went into full motion beginning with the Churchill government sending Sir Stafford Cripps to India in March of 1942 with a post-war offer of Dominion status for India.

When Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in India, one of the first delegates that he met with was Gandhi. When Gandhi saw his plan, he told Cripps, "If this is your entire proposal to India, I would advise you to take the next plane home."[131] The problem with the offer, according to Gandhi and other nationalists, was that it made a promise of Dominion status in the future, after

[131] Yogendra Yadav. "Interview with Louis Fischer." December 11, 2012.

the war. What the nationalists wanted was a guarantee for the present. Also, it had a clause which allowed for the Princely States and the Muslim League to opt-out of the Indian Union. The offer was antithetical and hostile to the Indian National Congress's aspirations for a unified India. The offer was designed to create a future independent India that was highly divided, fragmented, and weak.[132]

Sir Stafford Cripps had been a longtime advocate for India's Independence. As a member of the British Labor Party, he was a more liberal voice in Parliament for change in India. The fact that he came bearing such a bad offer to India proved to do great damage to the Indian cause. Nehru said that the Cripps mission did more to harm Indian relations with Britain than anything else ever had. For Churchill though, the Cripps mission was beneficial for his goal, which was to discredit the Indian National Congress. The propaganda that started to take hold was that the British made a fair offer to the Congress Party, but the Congress Party unreasonably and irrationally rejected it. Louis Johnson saw through all of this, informing Roosevelt about the back-handedness of Churchill. By the end of the negotiations, Johnson telegrammed Roosevelt saying that he was sure that "London wanted a Congress refusal."[133] He told Roosevelt that he believed that "Cripps was sincere," and that he wanted the matter to be solved, but he ultimately had "no freedom or authority."[134] Johnson informed the President that when an agreement was close to being reached, Cripps, "embarrassed," said that Churchill demanded separate code cables from both the Viceroy and General Wavell approving the agreement before Cripps was allowed to sign off.[135]

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[132] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (U.S.A.: John Day Company, 1946), 369.
[133] Telegram from Louis Johnson to President Roosevelt, 11 April 1942, President's Secretary File, Box 3, India, FDRL.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.

Johnson was convinced that what happened was intentional on Churchill's part, and that the problem could be easily solved. Johnson believed "[Cripps] and Nehru could solve the problem in five minutes" if Churchill didn't stand in the way. Johnson characterized Cripps' original offer as being "little more than the unkept promise of the first World War," and he commended the Congress for refusing the offer.[136] In an interview on April 23, just a brief time after the Mission, Johnson was asked at a press conference about the Cripps mission. He refused to comment at the time, but he added that there would soon be a "Johnson version of the story."[137] The "Johnson version" of the negotiations, revealed in his telegrams to Roosevelt, was illustrated by Anup Singh in an August 8, 1942 speech before the Post-War World Council.

Anup Singh, a PhD in Political Science, and a supporter of India's immediate independence, carefully went through the errors that the American public received about the failed Cripps proposal. In a speech before the Post War World Council, he began by saying that "once more the American press has let loose a flood of vilification against the leaders of India for their unpardonable sin in demanding now the overdue freedom of their people."[138] He was referring to the way the American press reacted to Gandhi's proposed civil disobedience campaign, and he identified it as the same "familiar behavior that we witnessed during Cripps' negotiations in India."[139] Singh's intention was to convince the American public that if it wasn't for the failure of the Cripps mission, Gandhi would not have decided to move forward with his

[136] Ibid.

[137] Wireless to THE NEW,YORK TIMES. 1942. "U.S. TROOPS IN INDIA, JOHNSON REVEALS." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Apr 23, 9.

[138] Dr. Anup Singh. "Freedom Now The Only Solution for India," 6 August 1942, 1253-3-3:16: Free India Campaigns, Ralph T. Templin Papers 1913-1996, United Methodist Archives and History Center.

[139] Ibid.

"latest move" of civil disobedience. If Americans understood why the Cripps' proposals failed, they would not be so "surprised by and indignant over" Gandhi's recent actions.[140]

Anup Singh asserted that it was false to say that the Indians "grudged British military control-as has been widely broadcast in America." The truth, according to Singh, was that Britain was unwilling to alter the powers of the Viceroy in any meaningful way.[141] This meant that the British offer was a sham and that a "provisional Indian government" would have been an "impressive farce." The problem wasn't that the various parties "could not agree amongst themselves." Anup's argument painted the British as irresistibly imperialistic and unwilling to "relax ever so slightly her imperialist control over India," and it showed that the Congress Party were the adults in the room who were willing to make the necessary compromises. The Party was "willing to give even more power to General Wavell, provided a genuinely representative, responsible Indian were made Minister of Defense."[142] The British, however, refused to grant this concession.

American press comment that was hostile to the Indian National Congress could be seen in an editorial written by Arthur Krock in the *New York Times* on January 25, 1942. The editorial was a synopsis of a recent foreign policy statement that Cordell Hull made. Krock described Hull's statement as giving "realism" to America's war objectives.[143] Krock said that Hull's speech was intended "most importantly" to "notify neutrals." Hull addressed, Krock wrote, those who were "sitting around with their hands in their pockets, looking for liberty to be handed to them on a silver platter."[144] The United States did not plan on creating a post-war world in which

[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Arthur Krock, "Hull Speech Dissipates False Dream of Utopia," *New York Times,* 25 July 1942.
[144] Ibid.

"utopias are passed out." Hull was trying to stimulate those people who found themselves under the control of the Axis to "antagonize" the enemy in any viable way with "guerilla warfare and underground resistance." When Cordell Hull mentioned the neutral countries, Krock editorialized that "no informed person in Washington doubts that Mr. Hull was looking straight at Mahatma Gandhi and the other leaders of the All-India Congress."[145] Krock made this statement at precisely the same time that Gandhi planned his civil disobedience campaign. The American public became aware of Gandhi's proposal and America did not enthusiastically accept Gandhi's plan. Public opinion turned against Gandhi and India.

Krock went on to criticize the Congress Party. He noted that Hull's speech was meant to address those who desired freedom and liberty, asserting to them that the principles had to be fought for and earned. Hull "sought to draw the post-war picture realistically by separating those who will want and merit the benefits of the victory from those who will not." He told the "All-India Congress…that freedom and liberty must be understood, wanted, fought for, and deserved," and that "[freedom and liberty] are not coming as gifts."[146] The Indian National Congress, however, wanted to participate in the war. The British, though, would not allow the Party or its supporters to take up arms. Nehru wrote about the possibility of organizing "guerilla units to harass the enemy," but without "training, arms, and the full cooperation of the regular army,"[147] it was not feasible. The Congress President, Maulana Azad, spoke of his desire to create an Indian National Army to resist the Japanese.[148] The British, however, would not allow

[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (U.S.A.: John Day Company, 1946), 375.
[148] Ibid., 372.

it. Meanwhile, Krock made the Congress Party look like a small handful of utopian dreamers looking for a hand-out of liberty without doing what was necessary to earn it.

In an October 5, 1942 article in the *New York Tribune*, the editorialist depicted the Congress Party as the problem. India agitation in the U.S., as well, was a big problem, a "peril," the article stated in its title. The author of the article, Geoffrey Parsons, noted that the British government made a recent statement which was clearly aimed at America. The agitation in favor of India in America was cited as a "Grave Danger to the War effort in Far East." The "hard facts of the situation," the British India Office thought, needed to be told. The article conveyed the British point of view, which was that Britain came to India with a fair offer that the various parties could not agree on. It came with open hands, in fairness, but the Indian parties could not agree and were not willing to make the necessary compromises, and even at "present, no measure of common agreement" has been reached.[149] The British government could not work with the Congress Party, as it was now emphasized that it was the main party getting in the way of "law and order." The Party was "responsible for disturbances." The Party was "threatening the maintenance of internal security" at a time when there was an "immanent possibility of invasion."[150] The British, therefore, had to step in for the sake of those who were more concerned about "economic security and peaceful existence" than about "political agitation." This narrative was believed by many in the U.S. The premise of this British argument rested on the assumption that the British made a fair offer to India. The reality, however, at least form the point of view of Indian nationalists, was that the British could not be trusted, and the offer itself was not fair to begin with.

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[149] Geoffrey Parsons jr., "British Deplore India Agitation in U.S. as Peril," *New York Tribune,* 1942 October 5, 1253-3-3:16, Ralph T. Templin Papers 1913-1996, United Methodist Archives and History Center.
[150] Ibid.

Another persuasive voice emerged to take the British point of view. His name was Norman Angell. In a letter to the editor of the *New York Times* published on March 1, 1942, Angell made a compelling argument for the position that the British must retain control of India until the war was complete. In fact, he made the argument that Britain must retain all her colonies for the duration of the war. Angell stressed that "Allied Unity" was essential for the success of the war effort and must not be compromised in any way. He argued that the so-called progressive argument that demanded Britain relinquish its control over its colonies immediately in order to do the right thing and put the war on a moral and righteous path, was in fact un-progressive.[151] This "progressive" council being offered by pro-independence groups would not have the desired consequences that they expected, Angell argued. The pro-Independence groups expected independence to be followed by a massive mobilization of more manpower for the war effort. Contrary to this, Angell thought that independence would lend military strength to the Axis.[152] He rejected the argument that the question of "independence" was merely a moral one, a "struggle between sheer power and moral right," with those for independence on the right side and those against it on the wrong side. The difficulty was that, according to Angell, there were too many internal divisions in India. If India were given its freedom, then the country would, Angell argued, take the form of the "present Irish difficulty in a far more serious form."[153] India would be divided among Hindu and Muslim. This would have repercussions in the Muslim countries where fighting was happening, "particularly in the strategically vital areas of Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq."[154]

[151] Norman Angell, "Situation in India Held Analogous to That in Eire," *New York Times,* 1942 March 1.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid.

Offering British colonies independence would play right into Hitler's hands. It would be an "addition to the enemy's power."[155] The United Nations would lose the naval bases that it needed. The idea of giving independence to India, or any other colonial territory, seemed to be terribly shortsighted to Angell. What was needed was a "world-wide system of association."[156] He compared the idea of each colonial territory achieving its independence to a kind of global "Balkanization" which would play out to Hitler's advantage as he would do with the newly freed colonial territories precisely what he did with the individual states in Eastern Europe: pick them off one by one.[157] There needed to be a "real union for mutual defense." Quoting from what was essentially a liberal magazine, the Nation, he wrote about how the magazine noted that Great Britain's retention of Northern Ireland proved to be strategically important for holding back a "German blockade."[158] He declared those who called for independence to be immoral and said that there was a "price that must be paid for the preservation of freedom," and it was "the "acceptance of those obligations-sometimes onerous-by which alone [freedom] can be defended." No more talk of "neutrality" he wrote; more talk of "partnership;" more talk of "equality of right" and less talk of "independence."[159] His argument was in stark contrast to the argument of Nehru and Gandhi.

Angell essentially made both a pragmatic and moral argument. He thought that "obligation" should be stressed during what was a very dark time. Instead, there was too much talk of "the rightness of absolute independence." The argument from the other side was that it was not right to ask people who lived under colonial domination to fight for other people's

[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.

freedom while their own freedom was not guaranteed. This side made the additional argument that it was also not smart or practical to ask those who were under colonial domination to fight a war under such conditions, the idea being that there would be no morale from which to draw from. There would be no "fighting spirit."

In an April 13, 1942 telegram from Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt, the Generalissimo informed the President about his "recent tour of inspection at the Burma front."[160] He told the President that in all of his "life-long military experience" he had never seen anything to "compare with the deplorable unpreparedness, confusion, and degradation in the war areas of Burma."[161] There was a "complete absence of fighting spirit" among all the military and civil elements. There was no sense of responsibility or obligation. Chiang observed that no one seemed to think of anything other than "their own safety." The Burmese forces could not "win the people's confidence." The enemy had control of a "majority of the people," and "anti-British sentiment" and "fifth columnist activities" were prevalent. There was no morale because Burma was still under British control. Chiang requested from Roosevelt three hundred aircraft to be sent immediately. Japan maintained air superiority. This uneven dynamic meant that the Chines forces were "fighting under the worst possible conditions…forced to make excessive sacrifices." The forces, however, were holding their own through "sustained hand-to-hand combat."[162] China contributed significantly to the war effort in the Far East. And it did so with minimal assistance from the Allies. Chiang was concerned that if morale was not restored in Burma, "defeat" would be "inevitable."[163]

[160]FDR and Chiang Kai-Shek, 1941-1942, 13 April 1942. Map Room Papers, Box 10, FDRL.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid.

Another member of the Post War World Council, Chu Hsueh-fan, President of the Chinese Association of Labor, gave a speech on August 6, 1942 at a council meeting in which he confirmed what the Generalissimo related to Roosevelt. The Chinese fought the war effectively and efficiently because they had morale. Hsueh-fan noted that it was "because we realized that our freedom and independence were at stake, we were willing to sacrifice our lives in national defense."[164] The Chinese had made tremendous sacrifices, and "until Pearl Harbor, [China] had fought single-handedly, with no air-force, nor navy, nor heavy artillery." He noted that "to date, the Chinese people stand undaunted and firm in their resistance." But this was not the case in Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies. For Chu, the difference in fighting spirit and morale was because the inhabitants in those areas felt as if they had nothing to fight for. The Filipinos, like the Chinese, also offered effective resistance, and this was because they had been "promised independence."[165]

Chu's argument was in sharp contrast to Angell's. Chu thought that his line of reasoning, namely that resistance to the Japanese was carried out much more effectively by those who knew that they had something to fight for than those who did not, was "sufficient to teach us a lesson." The lesson was that if "we want" India's help, "we must give [it] something to fight for." Angell said to never-mind all this talk of "independence." All members of the United Nations need to come together regardless of each other's respective status, and accept their "obligations," even though they may be "onerous." To that, Chu responded by saying that it was not right, smart, or practical to ask Indians "to give up their claim to freedom and fight for the United Nations," as

[164] Chu Hsueh-fan, "Save India From Japan," 1942 August 6, 1253-3-3:16: Free India Campaigns, Ralph T. Templin Papers 1913-1996, United Methodist Archives and History Center.
[165] Ibid.

some "would like to see" them do.[166] In any event, the British military did not fight effectively in the Near and Far East.

It was argued from the British point of view that the United Nations ought to be unified. Such was essential for the Allied War effort, according to many. Supporters of the nationalist point of view resented this assertion. The Chinese Nationalist, Lin Yutang, in a speech that was broadcast over the Colombia Broadcasting System, prepared by the Post War World Council, criticized the popular idea that "loyalty to the United Nations means loyalty to England."[167] He criticized the American press for "interpret[ing] unity of the United Nations as the duty to follow the [Cripps and Amery] version of the Indian situation." He opened his speech by saying that "India today is America's problem." He thought that London would not act undemocratically toward India unless it felt that it had America's "tacit approval." Lin Yutang was saying that the American public was responsible for holding Britain's feet to the fire. It was its responsibility alone. Britain, obviously, would not act. Washington would not act either, according to Lin Yutang. He was convinced, and said that, "today London will not do a single thing that the American public would not stand for."[168]

On January 26 and January 27, 1943, a small group of protestors took up the challenge of Lin Yutang. They were met with resistance. Their actions and the subsequent reactions to them, revealed that the principle of "allied unity" took precedence over the attempt to persuade Great Britain to relinquish control of India. On these dates, a small group of picketers protested outside the British Embassy in Washington D.C. The picketers called attention to the fact that India's

[166] Ibid.
[167] Lin Yutang, "Free India Now," Undated, 1253-3-3:16, Ralph T. Templin Papers 1913-1996, United Methodist Archives and History Center.
[168] Ibid.

freedom was long overdue, and they reminded America that it had an obligation to make sure that the present war being waged in Europe and Asia was being fought so that all nations might be free, not just some. Another demonstration was held on the same day. The picket was held outside of another British outpost, the Consulate in New York City. As picketing outside of a foreign embassy was illegal, the five men and women were quickly arrested that day, as well as the twenty-one others in New York.[169]

The activists called on Great Britain to live up to its higher principles. One of their signs read, "We Appeal to the Britain Of Democracy to Renounce the Britain of Empire." The day on which they were picketing marked the thirteenth anniversary of India's Declaration of Independence and they were attempting to inform the American public that India was still a colonial subject of Great Britain.[170] India was a nation that, at this time, was a slave to another nation, and Great Britain had shown no signs of giving up control of India. For these activists, such a circumstance was unacceptable, and they were determined to raise awareness of the hypocrisy. Their intentions were good, and they intended to set the war on a moral path, much like Abraham Lincoln did during the Civil War when he issued the Emancipation Proclamation, they argued.[171] Nevertheless, officials in government did not see the picketers' actions as desirable or beneficial in any consequential sense.

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[169] *Times-Herald Washington,* "British Embassy Pickets Halted," 26 January 1943. *New York Post*, "23 Picket British, Held." 27 January 1943. *New York World Telegram*, "Court Scolds Pickets Urging India Freedom," 1943 January 27, 1253-3-3:16: Free India Campaigns, Ralph T. Templin Papers 1913-1996, United Methodist Archives and History Center.

[170] *Times-Herald Washington,* "British Embassy Pickets Halted," 26 January 1943.

[171] Statement of a Picketer of the British Consulate to the Magistrate, (n.d.), 1253-3-3:16: Free India Campaigns, Ralph T. Templin Papers 1913-1996, United Methodist Archives and History Center. The picketers explained to the magistrate their position. The spokesperson said, "Your honor, this position we have taken is very important." The spokesperson continued, saying, "A study of the way Lincoln waged the civil war on its moral front, from September 1862, the date of his first Emancipation Proclamation, until his death, is suggestive for America now."

As the young men and women were taken into custody for picketing outside the British Consulate in New York, and as they eventually appeared in night court, they were told by the magistrate that their actions were "very dangerous" and "akin to sabotage."[172] He went on to point out that he believed they meant no harm and he judged them to be good people. Nevertheless, the Magistrate pointed out that their actions could create "friction between different political elements which are allied in this war."[173] The magistrate's thinking was that, at the present moment, the important thing was to have "unity and concentration above all on winning the war." This incident demonstrated the way that those who sought to place the war on a moral footing, framing it as a war for principles and ideals, were viewed as not only naïve, but also as "dangerous." This was the public opinion about the war that was hardening and making it difficult for India to get its message across.

Magistrates were not the only ones that were hostile to the sentiments of the picketers. There was a considerable resistance to Indian independence going on at both Harvard and Yale as well. The Council on Foreign Relations and the "American Defense, Harvard Group" lent considerable support to the pro-British narrative. The Council on Foreign Relations set up "high powered groups" to discuss some of America's interests with respect to both the war and the peace that would follow.[174] Professor Jacob Viner believed that it would prove beneficial for the United States to "avoid any hasty action in support" of colonial liberation on the grounds that if Britain perceived the United States to be an "over-exacting collaborator" it might "look elsewhere for the alliances [it] will insist upon as necessary for [its] own security in the post war

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[172] *New York Post*, "23 Picket British, Held." 27 January 1943, 1253-3-3:16, Ralph T. Templin Papers 1913-1996, United Methodist Archives and History Center.
[173] *New York World Telegram*, "Court Scolds Pickets Urging India Freedom," 1943 January 27, 1253-3-3:16, Ralph T. Templin Papers 1913-1996, United Methodist Archives and History Center.
[174]Venkataramani, 287-295.

world."[175] Viner outlined a policy which called for a "careful consideration" to be taken toward the question of a commitment to "support for independence of colonial areas." America must consider the "strategic consequences" of such a move.[176] The Professor held a magnanimous view of the British Empire. He thought that apart from American interference, Britain would "likely…go far in remedying what evils exist in her colonial empire." Venkataramani noted that Viner's "logic led straight to the policy of silence."[177]

The "American Defense, Harvard Group" worked closely with the British Library of Information, and as result, it was fed pro-British information. These British agencies that were connected to the Library made it their priority to make sure that the Harvard Group "had an opportunity to receive the right kind of information on the Indian question."[178] Leading the Harvard Group was Professor Perry. Working closely with the Acting British Consul General in Boston, they kept their relationship discreet, and worked to propagate the British point of view. T.A. Raman, considered an asset to the British, as he was known to be a "rational and realist Indian nationalist," was introduced to the Harvard Group. He went on speaking tours through the U.S. and his stops were carefully "mapped out by the British Library of Information."[179]

One of Professor Perry's greatest achievements toward silencing the nationalist point of view was when he attempted to cancel a class that would have been taught by those who espoused the "extreme Congress point of view." Together with Phillip Hendy, Information Officer of the British Consulate General, they worked to silence the voices of the major Indian nationalists, Taraknath Das, Anup Singh, Ramakrishna Sahu Modak, Mrs. Modak, and the

[175] Ibid., 287-295.
[176] Ibid., 287-295.
[177] Ibid., 287-295.
[178] Ibid., 287-295.
[179] Ibid., 287-295.

Reverend J. Henry Carpenter. Hendy informed Perry that the class would do nothing to "promote deeper understanding of India and Indian problems." It would rather "arouse indignation and allied disunity." In the same way that the magistrate believed that the activists actions would likely create "friction among allies" at a time when unity was needed, so too was this the thinking of Hendy, which then became the thinking of the Harvard Group. Tarkanath Das was identified as "emotionally vindictive as few but Bengalis could be," and the thinking was that the class would stir up "anti-British" feelings, especially if "incendiary Hindus were to be given an opportunity to establish contact with Irish catholic public-school teachers." The Indian nationalist point of view was being silenced because of what was argued to be the harmful consequences of "anti-British" sentiment which led to "Allied disunity."[180]

One member of the Harvard Group, Professor William Ernest Hocking, took a pro-nationalist position and was reprimanded for it. In April 1944, Hocking wrote an article in *Life* in which he did some "plain speaking" with respect to "Britain's imperial policies." Hocking caused an uproar. The Press Committee of the Group called an emergency session to discuss what it considered the "dangerous and disheartening elements" that made up the content of the article. Just like with the proposed Harvard course, Hocking's article was thought to be "dangerous" and "disheartening" because it would likely "weaken confidence in [the Allied] cause, invite recriminations among our allies, and give undue advantage to our enemies."[181] When Hocking was confronted, he pointed out to the committee that it ought to include more "anti-Tories" like himself. As the committee was composed, Hocking said that it was a "solid Churchill-o-phile front, impervious to any suggestion of sin on the part of the Empire."[182]

[180] Ibid., 287-295.
[181] Ibid., 287-295.
[182] Ibid., 287-295.

Professor Phillip Hofer of the Group responded that he was not ashamed to be called a Tory and he told Professor Hocking: "I still believe loyal friendship and a lack of meddling in British affairs will pay."[183]

Yale also contributed to the suppression of the nationalist point of view. Professor John Clark Archer revealed his pro-British views on Yale radio in November 1944. He was asked a question about Indian Independence, to which he replied, condescendingly, that Indians did not sufficiently understand the word. He said: "I'll challenge the very word independence. He went on to say, "Independence is a foreign word to India which Indians themselves are mispronouncing…India lacks what it takes for independence." According to Archer it was a mistake to make any cultural, political, or social connection between America and India. "We must not…interpret [India's] affairs by our own theories, practices, and experience." Archer continued, "we cannot apply to India our own tradition from Magna Carta through the Declaration of Independence to a written constitution."[184] In other words, India shared nothing in common with America. It was socially, culturally, and politically different. Archer was also acknowledging the cultural, social, and political affinities between the U.S. and Great Britain.

As Indian nationalists attempted to argue their cause in America, they came up against a current of American ethnocentrism. They were also dealing with a public, sixty percent of which, "according to a 1942 poll…could not even locate either India or China on a map."[185] India was exotic. The features of it that stood in contrast to the West were the features that were most often shown throughout America. Even Gandhi's non-violent civil disobedience movement, although

[183] Ibid., 287-295.
[184] Ibid., 293-294.
[185] Hess, 2.

it drew its inspiration from the West, i.e. Thoreau, was viewed as being more influenced by Gandhi's Hinduism. Gandhi understood the way that he was being misunderstood by the West. In the late 1920's, he was asked, "What is your message for the American people?" He responded: "I would like on the part of the people of America…an accurate study of the Indian struggle and the methods adopted for its prosecution."[186] On August 31, 1939, Louis Ogull, an American correspondent for the *Bombay Chronicle,* wrote a letter on behalf of Mr. Baburao Patel and Mahatma Gandhi. Mr. Patel, editor of a film journal in his country, was sent to America on a mission from Gandhi. His task was to "urge American film companies to cease depicting the great Indian people as little better than savages."[187]

Negley Farson and Webb Miller, foreign correspondents who worked in India in the 1930's, demonstrated their misunderstanding of India. Although they were not cheerleaders for British imperialism, they were reluctant to think that India would be better off with independence. They were, in that sense, "students of Kipling," and in their journalism they tended to emphasize "India's strangeness."[188] Reverend John Jay Holmes, who first met Gandhi in London in 1931, came to admire him. When he first met him, he knew that Gandhi would very likely be misunderstood in the West. When Webb Miller suggested bringing Gandhi to America, the Reverend did not like the idea as he thought that Gandhi would be subject to "vulgar curiosity and ribald jesting." Although Gandhi was *Time Magazine* Man of the Year in 1931, he was referred to in a patronizing way as the "little half naked brown man."[189] Holmes thought that

[186] Venkataramani, 351.
[187] Letter to President from Louis Ogull, 31 Aug 1939. President's Official File, 48H, India, FDRL.
[188] Neerja Chaturvedi, "The United States and India's Independence: The Role of Images and Perceptions." (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1997), 59.
[189] Ibid., 60.

Gandhi's "mainstream image" was very negative in America. As such, Gandhi was misunderstood, and the nationalist movement that he led was also misunderstood.

D.W. Brogan, a "British authority on American affairs," payed a visit to the United States in 1942 on a scouting mission. Brogan observed that in "general the typical American admired toughness and tough leaders like Churchill." Brogan concluded that if Britain wanted to win the approval of America for its actions in defending its Empire against Gandhi, it needed to be "tough" toward Gandhi. Brogan concluded that "British imperialism [was] defensible in American terms."[190] The British did precisely that. They dealt with Gandhi's proposed civil disobedience campaign harshly, as they dealt also in the same way toward Gandhi's fast. Americans admired qualities of "toughness," often associated with the West, and opposed qualities such as "otherworldliness, "fatalism," and "lack of fighting qualities," often associated with the East.[191]

Gandhi made a strategic mistake when he decided on his civil disobedience campaign. He believed that the American public would fully support his actions. In his interview with Louis Fisher, he told him: "I think many Americans have a soft corner in their hearts for me." As Gandhi began to more seriously consider carrying out his civil disobedience campaign, Bob Sherwood referred to Gandhi's belief that he would retain the "support of the overwhelming majority of the American people…even if the Congress decided to engage in civil disobedience" as a "dangerous illusion."[192] Sherwood was correct. It was at this point that the American public began to grow impatient with Gandhi. This impatience and lack of sympathy for Gandhi was because his actions were seen to offer aid to the enemy. Impatience with Gandhi was illustrated

[190] Venkataramani, 340.
[191] Ibid.
[192] To the President from Bob Sherwood, 1942 August 8. President's Official File, India, 48H, FDRL.

in a June 1942 cartoon in *The New Yorker.* The cartoon depicted "two fashionable ladies at tea." One said to the other, "It makes me so mad when I think how long I've been patient with India."[193]

Following the Cripps mission, American opinion turned against the Congress cause primarily because newspaper accounts of the mission tended to slant toward a pro-British view which said that the offer that the British brought to India was "eminently fair."[194] J.J. Singh, an advocate for India in the United States sent Nehru much of the newspaper accounts of the mission, and Lampton Berry confirmed what Singh said, namely that the Congress had lost American support. Berry wrote to Nehru, "As far as I have been able to ascertain, the American press comment which appears here represents the unanimous reaction of the American press." Nehru was greatly disappointed by American indifference to the nationalist position. He issued this critique to America on August 7: "May I, with all respect, suggest to the great people of America that they have all gone wrong with respect to India."[195] He added that he thought that Americans had always considered Indians to be a "benighted backward people." He said, "they have always considered themselves…to be infinitely better than us."[196] Feelings in sympathy toward the nationalist cause were overshadowed by British propaganda. Nehru's remark that the nationalist press was "rotten," and Gandhi's overwhelming observation that India's "few friends" in America stood no chance against the "well organized" British propaganda machine, proved to be accurate observations.

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[193]Hess, 127-128.

[194]Kenton J Clymer, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the United States: the Preindependence Years." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 14 Issue 2 (1990), 157.
[195] Ibid., 157.
[196] Ibid, 157.

When William Phillips returned from India, his account of the degree to which America was still involved in the Indian problem served to prove what was stated in the first paragraph of this chapter, namely that by April 1943, Washington had lost interest in the question of India's political status. Upon his return to America in May of 1943, Phillips noticed that in "Washington, officials were no longer interested in events in India." Ruben noted in his article that the lack of interest in India was because, during this time, "the Japanese threat to India had receded."[197] With the threat gone, there was less reason for America to push for a "settlement between Indian nationalists and the British government."[198]

[197] Ruben, 74.
[198] Ibid., 74.

Chapter 3: The Bigger Picture and the Consequences

On April 19, 1943, William Phillips telegrammed President Roosevelt informing him of a troubling development that Phillips judged was bound to be harmful to the American war effort in the Far East as well as America's post-war relations with Asia. He told the President that despite what was circulated in the press about the "magnificence of the Chinese military effort," the reality on the ground was much different. He wrote,

> Chinese apathy and lack of leadership and, moreover, Chinese dislike of the British, meet a wholly responsive chord in India, where, as I have said, there is little evidence of war effort and much evidence of anti-British sentiment. Color consciousness is also appearing more and more and under present conditions is bound to develop. We have, therefore, a vast bloc of oriental peoples who have many things in common, including a growing dislike and distrust of the Occidental.[199]

In numerous other instances, Phillips brought up the issue of color. Phillips encountered merely one factor that came in the way of the development of harmonious relations between India and the United States. Other issues persisted. The issue of what an independent India would look like after the war was a concern. Nehru had ideas of his own that differed in significant ways with the U.S.'s vision. Nehru was suspicious of what America's economic agenda would look like after the war. Nehru's ideas for an independent India, and America's goals in the post-war world were, in some ways, at loggerheads.

American relations with India was not the only set of relations that assumed a significant shift. American relations with Britain also changed in significant ways during the Second World War. Due to changes in the international environment, America found itself forced to alter its foreign policy. This change in American foreign policy grew out of three main determinants.

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[199] Mr. William Phillips, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to India, to the President. 19 April 1943, *FRUS* 1945, Vol. IV.

First, the British Empire was declining. Second, America was set to supplant Britain's role as the world's financial leader. Third, nationalism in the East had gained considerable strength and it needed to be adequately responded to. These three factors began to shape the thinking of statesmen like William Phillips and Wendell Willkie, as well as many others.

During the Second World War, America encountered a global racial problem that forced it to reconsider its foreign policy. This global racial problem that Phillips confronted and articulated to the President with urgency, was one that had been developing for decades. What Phillips and Willkie experienced when they travelled in the East during the war was the tail-end of the color problem that had been developing for nearly half a century. During the Second World War, the thinking among some, Phillips and Willkie among those people, was that if the color problem persisted it would create serious problems for the United States in the postwar world. Immigration reform became a foreign policy initiative that was argued would do a great deal to restore America's broken relations with India. In many ways, the crucial problem of race forced America to rethink its relationship with the British Empire.

Ralph T. Templin, an American missionary who spent considerable time in India in the 1930's, and who was a committed follower of Gandhi, wrote an article on August 7, 1947, in which he recalled a development that was at its height in 1932. It was in this year that Templin recalled that he and his missionary team discovered that "in India" the "greatest handicap in all our work was the dark background of our so-called Christian civilization."[200] During the six years prior to 1932, Templin wrote that there had been a "steady deterioration of the white man's prestige throughout the East."[201] Lord Halifax, Templin wrote, noticed this development also.

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[200]Ralph Templin, "Return to a Sick West." *Between Two Worlds,* 7 August 1947, 1254-4-1:11, Ralph T. Templin Papers 1913-1996, United Methodist Archives and History Center.
[201] Ibid.

Halifax identified the "defeat of Russia by Japan [in 1905] and the general failure of western civilization" as two of the main causes for the decline of the "white man's prestige" in the East.[202]

Dr. Stephen Pierce Duggan, Director of the Institute of International Education, began to discuss his views on the decline of the white man's prestige in the 1930's. On April 14, 1931, Dr. Duggan, in an "address before 200 members of the Parents Association of the Horace Mann Schools, 120th Street and Broadway," spoke about the "continued loss of prestige of the white race." Like Lord Halifax, he said that the Japanese defeat of Russia dealt a blow to white prestige. Also, the white man's "refusal to make good the promise of self-determination" that he made "during the [the first World War]" was regarded by colored peoples as a "moral betrayal."[203]

In a May 24, 1931 article, Dr. Duggan further articulated his ideas regarding the reasons for the loss of the white man's prestige. The colored peoples of the world began to take notice of the white man's hypocrisy. American missionaries in China and the Philippines, Duggan noted, preached the principle of the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal" while perpetuating inequality.[204] Duggan wrote that the "actions of the white man were nowhere in accordance with his preaching." As for the European powers, although many of them did not offer education to the natives as the Americans did, their missionaries taught "moral and religious doctrines which were not in conformity with the conduct of their fellow country-men."[205] This factor of a mismatch between the preaching and the actual behavior of the

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[202] Ibid.
[203] Dr. Stephen Duggan, "Decline in Prestige of White Race Seen," *New York Times.* 1931, April 15.
[204] Dr. Stephen Duggan, "White Man's Waning Prestige Among the 'Backward Peoples.'" *New York Times.* 1931 May 24.
[205] Ibid.

colonizers created an atmosphere of mistrust based on a growing realization of a very visible hypocrisy. America came to be just as guilty as this as its European counterparts.

Duggan went on to say that the "white man" failed to "appreciate" colored peoples changing attitudes during the Great War. Because of this failure to grasp the gravity of the changing situation, no significant changes were made toward the colored peoples of the world after the war. The status quo was returned fully intact. Duggan cited Amritsar as an example. Also, when the Japanese delegation to the Peace Conference asked for a racial equality clause, it was "met with a prompt and absolute refusal."[206] Japan asked to be treated according to the "principle embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations," and was told no.[207] This was, according to Duggan, the failure of the "white man" to grasp the changes that were happening. Duggan, writing in the early 1930's, positioned the "white man of today" as being on the defensive. According to Duggan, the white man had tried to "maintain his racial integrity by means of exclusion laws," and was active on the international front to prevent the "principle" of "racial equality" from being realized."[208]

America began a more expansionist foreign policy under the leadership of Teddy Roosevelt. Analyzing some of the ideas that influenced America's decision to pursue a more expansionist foreign policy serves to explain the larger trends and ideas that were part and parcel of America's foreign policy thinking. American foreign policy was ideologically racist.[209] It was based on a belief in the cultural, racial, and political superiority of the Anglo-Saxon races. This meant that the white races were considered superior in every way to the non-white races.[210] This

[206] Ibid.
[207] Ibid.
[208]Ibid.
[209] Hunt, 69-78.
[210] Ibid., 69-78.

also meant that America and Great Britain shared a common heritage. Roosevelt articulated American foreign policy in his 1902 address to Congress. He said that it was "incumbent on all civilized and orderly powers to insist on the proper policing of the world."[211] Roosevelt considered Great Britain to be a "civilized and orderly power." Speaking of its rule over India, he wrote:

> The successful administration of India . . . has been one of the most notable achievements of the white race during the past two centuries . . . If the English control were now withdrawn from India, the whole peninsula would become a chaos of bloodshed and violence.[212]

America's involvement in the Philippines was met with a mixed reaction by the public. There were some anti-imperialist voices that were against it.[213] Others supported it for trade purposes, while others believed that America should retain the islands in the belief that withdrawal would cause anarchy and instability.[214] Most policymakers believed that the Filipinos were not capable of self-government. They needed America's help to establish stable and effective government. Paul Leland Haworth, in his 1915 book, *American in Ferment*, noted that from the beginning of American control of the Philippines, there had been a "constant clamor for independence." Despite all the arguments for keeping or letting go of the islands, the "Philippine question," asserted Haworth, was "essentially a race question."[215] The islands were not profitable for the United States. In fact, they were a drain on the American purse.[216] The reason for staying

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[211] Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress, Message of the President, 2 December 1902, *FRUS,* #69.
[212]Ruben, 45.
[213] Lala Lajpat Rai. *A Hindu's Impressions and a Study* (Calcutta: R. Chatterjee, 1916), 296-298.
[214] Paul Leland Haworth. *America in Ferment* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Publishers, 1915), 125.
[215] Ibid., 126-127.
[216] Ibid., 126-127.

was the underlying belief that the Filipinos, as non-white peoples, were not able to create a stable government without the help of America.

There was a considerable difference between how the British Empire was viewed by American policymakers and how it was viewed by nationalists who were under its control. There was a consistency of thinking about the British Empire as a force for stability, peace, and order, that ran throughout the thinking of important policymakers in Washington. Starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, school textbooks even emphasized the theme of "trans-Atlantic ties" and connections between America and Great Britain.[217] A popular poetic paean, referring to Americans and Brits, went: "The voice of blood shall reach, more audibly than speech, We are One!"[218] Albert J Beveridge preferred to think of America as a "greater England with a nobler destiny." Thomas Mahan, a naval historian and military strategist, believed that the "two branches of the race" of Anglo-Saxons should unite in a mission to bring civilization to the world.[219] Americans were the ancestors and cousins of the British. The two peoples were essentially one, thought Mahan. They were tightly knit by "political traditions." The rest of the world was "alien" to the Anglo-Saxon races.[220]

Paternalism was certainly part and parcel of American foreign policy. America did a favor for the Filipinos, it was thought. It taught them self-government. Britain too, thought American policymakers, had done a favor for India and other territories in the East. When these points were argued, race was part of the discussion. In April 1914, Rear Admiral Richardson Clover of the United States Navy, toured India. While there, he noticed a growing rise of

[217]Hunt, 78.
[218] Hunt, 78.
[219] Ibid., 79-80.
[220] Ibid., 79-80.

"unrest."[221] There was something noticeably different from when he visited India twenty-five years earlier, he said. The Indians knew more about what was happening in the world. Despite this new development, Clover said that "their respect for whites has not grown as a result," identifying this as a problem.[222] Clover was relieved that the natives had no arms to mount a successful rebellion as it would "be a great misfortune for the people" as they are much "better off under English control than they would be with political liberty."[223] In 1919, after Amritsar, in which 379 Indians, including women and children, were killed for unlawful assembly, a majority of American senators defended the British action on account of their belief that Britain kept the peace in India, holding back the forces of "chaos."[224]

Some of the kindest language toward the British Empire came from James Smith and Cordell Hull. In 1920, James Smith, American Consul General in India, spoke of British rule of India in the most magnanimous terms. India was "governed wisely, justly, humanely." Having lived there for a "number of years," Smith said that he had the "most profound admiration for the Government of [India] and for the unselfish spirit of sacrifice in the interests of India as a whole" which is carried out in the "official acts of the civil administrators" in India.[225] In 1937, while visiting the Canadian Prime Minister to discuss the benefits of economic liberalism, Cordell Hull related in a memorandum his thoughts about the British Empire. He related how he informed the Prime Minister that his country would not want to "see anything said or done which would weaken a single link in the British Empire."[226] According to Hull, the British Empire was the

[221] Special Cable to the New York Times, "India Mutinous but has no Arms…" *New York Times.* April 19, 1914.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Ibid.
[224] Hess, 11.
[225] Ruben, 41.
[226] Memorandum by the Secretary of State, 18 February 1937, *FRUS* 1937, Vol. II.

"greatest stabilizer of human affairs in the world today."[227] He said that he told the Prime Minister that the very "future of human progress and civilization" depended on the British Empire being able to "continue to function" effectively.[228]

While American policymakers developed their ideas and fostered America's relationship with Britain, and as American foreign policy began to take a more expansionist shape, a young Indian nationalist named Jawaharlal Nehru began developing his own ideas regarding global affairs. The evolution of his thinking about foreign affairs, but particularly about the United States, is essential for understanding American relations with India during the second World War as well as during the post-war period.

In 1927, Nehru attended the Brussels Congress of Oppressed Nationalities. While there, he became aware of "American…economic and political dominance in Latin America."[229] Thereafter, he began to reconsider the idea that the United States Government would "prove a worthwhile ally for India's independence struggle."[230] Beginning in the late 1920's and into the 1930's, Nehru began to read the works of several different American authors. To name a few, he read the works of Jack London, John Reed, Upton Sinclair, and Scott Nearing. Clymer noted in his article that one thing that these authors shared in common was that their works tended to be "highly critical of American society."[231] Nehru was especially impressed with Nearing's *American Empire*, a work which criticized America's foreign policy, arguing that it was in the

[227] Ibid.
[228] Ibid.
[229] Graham, 227.
[230] Ibid., 227.
[231] Kenton J Clymer, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the United States: the Preindependence Years." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 14 Issue 2 (1990), 150.

control of American plutocrats who were determined to "rule the world both economically and politically."[232]

In a series of letters that Nehru wrote to his daughter in 1932 and 1933 while imprisoned by the British for his nationalist activities, Nehru's thoughts about American foreign policy were further expressed and developed. According to Nehru, America had perfected imperialism by making it less noticeable. This new imperialism was "economic imperialism" and America was the leader of it. Unlike British imperialism, this imperialism was carried out without displaying any "obvious outward signs."[233] America's bankers, its capitalists on Wall street, were behind the project. It was an imperialism that was "invisible." If one were to look at a map, Nehru told his daughter, there would be "nothing to show that [the people inhabiting the colonized territory] [were] not free in any way."[234] In reality, though, America's economic imperialism was "[annexing] the wealth or the wealth producing elements in the country" which it controlled. In this way, it "can exploit the country fully to its own advantage."[235] One such territory where America asserted its invisible empire was in the Philippines. It had "economic interests" in the Philippines that it was "anxious to protect," Nehru wrote.[236]

Writing again in 1944, Nehru recorded his thoughts regarding his vision for what was essential to him for building a viable Indian state that was independent in the true sense of the word. Nehru noted that for states to survive in the modern world they had to be big. "Small states were disappearing everywhere," he wrote. [237] He desired for India to be a large, unified state, as

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[232] Ibid., 151.
[233] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History* (NY: The John Day Company, 1942), 570.
[234] Ibid., 570.
[235] Ibid., 570.
[236] Ibid., 481.
[237] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (U.S.A.: John Day Company, 1946), 367

opposed to a weak and fragmented one. He also noted that industry was essential. He wrote that it can "hardly be challenged that, in the context of the modern world, no country can be politically and economically independent…unless it is highly industrialized and has developed its power resources to the utmost"[238] A country with a basis of "small-scale industry" for its economy, was likely to become a "colonial appendage" in Nehru's mind. Nehru noticed the contradictions in the modern age, pointing out that the "spirit of the age," with all its talk of internationalism, "was in favor of equality." Everywhere he looked though, the principle of equality was not practiced.[239] In the "name of individual freedom, political and economic systems exploit human beings."[240] And although individuals could not enslave other individuals, nations could still, and did, enslave other nations.[241]

Nehru saw that it was "clear that the economy of the U.S.A. after the war [was to become] powerfully expansionist and almost explosive in its consequences."[242] He asked himself: would "another era of imperialism" take hold after the war? He believed that it was very likely. For India, he wanted socialism. Quoted in *Time Magazine* in 1937, Nehru said that he hoped that the "logic of events will lead [the Congress Party] to socialism, which seems to be the only remedy for India's ills." Capitalism, according to Nehru, was linked to imperialism. They were two sides of the same coin. "Modern imperialism is an outgrowth of capitalism and cannot be separated from it," he said.[243] Nehru was also aware of the racialism that existed in the

[238] Ibid., 367.
[239] Ibid., 394-395
[240] Ibid., 394-395
[241] Ibid., 395.
[242] Ibid., 399.
[243] Walter Charles Mackett, "Some Aspects of the Development of American Opinion on India, 1918-1947." (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1957), 239

world. He wrote, "racialism is…a distinguishing feature of our times, and we have not only master nations but master races."[244]

Leading up to the first World War, America began to implement an immigration policy that excluded based on race. Indian nationalists became highly critical of this exclusionary immigration policy.[245] Because of this policy, American relations with India took a decided turn. Nevertheless, Indian nationalists sought to enlist America's help in their struggle for independence, seeing America as a unique nation, unique especially because it was the "first nation to emerge from a successful revolt against empire."[246] Lala Lajpat Rai, an Indian nationalist, travelled America during the years of the Great War. He wanted to establish links between India and America. He believed that America and India shared similar problems, and he hoped that his book would be a useful guide for India.[247] One troubling aspect of American society that he documented was its racism and its ethnocentrism. Speaking to a young Hindu girl in high school, she informed him that her school teacher did not teach Indian history. When the young girl asked the teacher why, the teacher said to the young girl that it was "because the Indians had done nothing to have a history; they were a backward people having nothing to their credit."[248] Before leaving America, Rai helped to establish a literary society that he hoped would work toward creating better relations between the East and the West.[249]

The first World War, followed by the Peace of Paris, marked a significant episode in relations between America and India, and between the East and the West. Great hope was placed

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[244] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (U.S.A.: John Day Company, 1946), 395.
[245] Hess, 7-8.
[246] Erez Manela, "Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and the Revolt against Empire in 1919." *American Historical Review* (Dec 2006), 1343.
[247] Lala Lajpat Rai. *A Hindu's Impressions and a Study* (Calcutta: R. Chatterjee, 1916), Preface.
[248] Ibid., 419-420.
[249] Ibid., 419-420.

in Woodrow Wilson's Peace Plan. For Jawaharlal Nehru, the war was supposed to have "revolutionized the fabric of human affairs."[250] When it did not, Nehru was greatly disappointed. He lamented about Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. He asked, "Where are they?"[251] Chinese nationalism, too, was eager for change, and disappointed when it never arrived. A young Mao, 25 years old at the time, criticized the fact that India was not represented by the nationalists at the peace table. He lamented, "So much for national self-determination!" Nehru was greatly disappointed that the war "ended without bringing any solace or hope of permanent peace or betterment."[252] Rather than the East and the West coming closer together, the two were torn further apart.

The Indian nationalist, B.G. Tilak, devoted considerable work to trying to get the Indian National Congress a seat at the peace table. As Woodrow Wilson made lofty pronouncements about "self-determination," nationalists leaned on him to make good on his promises. Wilson's rhetoric, however, was designed to counter Bolshevik propaganda as opposed to practically serving as a model for future development in the East.[253] Nationalists, however, attempted to hold Wilson's feet to the fire. Tilak wrote to Wilson, saying that the "world's hope for peace and justice" was "centered in you as the author of the great principle of self-determination."[254] Wilson, however, preferred for the problem to be taken up in appropriate time by the League of Nations. Wilson preferred a more gradual move toward self-determination. For nationalists, it meant a denial of freedom. The mandate system of the League of Nations, with its colonial trusteeship program, was meant to provide a basis toward which self-government was the

[250] Manela, 1349.
[251] Ibid., 1349-1350.
[252] Ibid., 1349-1350.
[253] Ibid., 1332-1333.
[254] Ibid., 1347-1348.

eventual goal for mandated territories. Nevertheless, as Susan Kingsley Kent pointed out, "the reality of the [mandate system] never lived up to the rhetoric of trusteeship."[255] The needs of Britain "often conflicted with those of its colonies."[256]

American relations with India had always been very limited. The two countries, however, were brought into a conversation with each other when, in 1927, Katherine Mayo's book, *Mother India,* was published. The book was a bestseller in America, selling "over 250,000 copies."[257] The book caused an uproar in India as it was, Nehru later found out, "written with the active encouragement and support of British officials."[258] The book declared that Indian culture was deficient and was the cause of all of India's problems. It made the argument that India was in no way prepared for self-government. Nehru, who had previously not seen a need for nationalist publicity in America, now thought, convinced by his American friend Roger Baldwin, that publicity for the nationalist cause was necessary.[259] Mayo had expounded some of the ideas about India that Rai observed when he spoke to the young Hindu girl in America. Mayo's narrative consisted of the idea that British rule was not the problem in India. She attacked the moral character of the Indian people. She wrote,

> Inertia, helplessness, lack of initiative, and originality, lack of staying power and of sustained loyalties, sterility of enthusiasm, weakness of life-vigor itself-all are traits that truly characterize the Indian not only of today but of long past history…No agency but a new spirit within his own breast can set him free. And his arraignments of outside elements…serve only to deceive his mind and to put off the day of his deliverance.[260]

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[255] Susan Kingsley Kent, *A New History of Britain Since 1688: Four Nations and an Empire.* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 353.
[256] Ibid., 353.
[257] Graham, 228.
[258] Kenton J Clymer, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the United States: the Preindependence Years." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 14 Issue 2 (1990), 149.
[259] Ibid., 149-150.
[260] New York Times, "Book by Miss Mayo Rouses Hindu India." *New York Times.* April 19, 1914.

In response to Mayo's book, an Indian author, Dalip Singh Saund, wrote a book in 1931 that was a reply to Mayo's book and, also a "handbook on India for…use by the American public."[261] He wanted to clear up some misconceptions that existed in the American mind concerning India. As Mayo argued that Indians should not blame "outside elements" for their problems, Saund stressed that India's current ills were the result of British imperialism. In a chapter on why India was poor, he attempted to show that the British had greatly exploited the subcontinent for their own selfish ends. Then later, Britain justified its colonial rule over India as a civilizing mission.[262] The book's analysis of India was in sharp contrast to Mayo's analysis of India, and Saund confirmed what Duggan argued about the decline of the white man's prestige. He pointed out that many Indian nationalists referred to the first World War as the "White Man's Holocaust." It was at this time, and because of the war, that "respect for [the white man's] supposed superior civilization disappeared" among many in the colonized world.[263]

From the first World War to the Second, the colonized world had slowly begun to disbelieve in the "supposed superior civilization" of the West. This inter-war development continued into the Second World War. Color played a role with respect to relations between America and India. American immigration law, as it discriminated on the basis of race, proved an obstacle to an idea proposed in 1942 by Walter White of the NAACP. As a person of color, White took an interest in the Indian problem. White suggested to the State Department that a commission be sent to India to try to break the political deadlock. The commission ought to include one "distinguished person of color," the idea being that it would show the colonial world that America treated its colored citizens with the same respect and dignity it treated its white

[261] Dalip Singh Saund, *My Mother India* (L.A.: Wetzel Publishing Company, 1930), Preface.
[262] Ibid., 168-169.
[263] Ibid., 215.

citizens. The State Department decided not to follow through with White's suggestion claiming it would be hard to convince people in India that "inequality of races based on skin color was not a rather basic attitude of the American people."[264] That was not the only problem. Indians, too, were aware of provisions in American immigration law in which "natives of India" were "ineligible for naturalization" on the basis of their skin color. White considered the colonial problem in India to be one of the "most important problems confronting the United Nations and one which has considerable bearing upon the race question in the United States."[265]

When William Phillips arrived in India in January 1943, he encountered the growing tide of nationalism in the East. He also came into direct contact with the global racial problem. Although Phillips had been part of the "club" that helped create an American foreign office that was "aristocratic, racially arrogant, and drawn to Europe," some of his foreign policy assumptions began to change while in India.[266] Throughout the many letters he wrote to Roosevelt, many of them dealt with the issue of color. On February 19, 1943, Phillips informed Roosevelt of an interview he had with a leading member of the Congress Party. Gandhi had recently gone on a fast in protest of his arrest. Rajaji, the Congress party member who informed Phillips of this, pressed on Phillips the urgency for the U.S. government to "make its position clear" about what its role was in India. Rajaji said that if Gandhi died, there was the possibility that there would develop a "white against colored complex in the East."[267] He said that he thought that "bitter…anti-white feelings" would be felt among Indians if Gandhi died. If

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[264] A. Guy Hope, *America and Swaraj: The U.S. Role in Indian Independence.* (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), 31-34.
[265] Letter to President Roosevelt from Walter White, 31 August 1942, President's Official File, India, 48H, FDRL.
[266]Kenton J. Clymer, "The Education of William Phillips: Self-Determination and American Policy Toward India, 1942-45." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 8 Issue 1 (1984), 34.
[267] Mr. William Phillips, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in India, to the Secretary of State, 19 Feb 1943, *FRUS 1943,* IV.

America did not make its position clear, he feared that the "Asiatic mind" would begin to think that the "United States was collaborating with Great Britain," and that the two countries had "formed a sort of white bloc."[268]

Phillips saw that this development was not good for America's military position in the region. He summed up his correspondence by saying that there were two problems that needed to be dealt with: "(1) that of the so-called [white?] prestige, and (2) safeguarding of our own position in India as a military base against Japan." It was important to deal with the problem of "white prestige" and to make clear America's intention in the region because it would have considerable impact on "our future relations with all colored races."[269] In numerous other instances, Phillips spoke of the ways in which India placed America's actions within a racialized context. In a May 14th letter, he told Roosevelt about India's leaders wondering "whether the [Atlantic] Charter is only for the benefit of the white races." Willkie documented the color consciousness in the East as well. The East, Willkie wrote, had "lost faith in Western imperialism, and in the superiority of the white man."[270] Willkie, referring to America's foreign policy as a policy that still retained a lot of the vestiges of Western imperialism, brought up a point that others also made. More importantly, Wendell Willkie and William Phillips tried to inform the Roosevelt administration about the implications of American foreign policy.

John Davies recognized very well the implications of the part of American foreign policy that was in alliance with the objectives of the British Empire. He began to realize that America put itself in a precarious position because of this policy. On October 21, 1943, in a Confidential message to the State Department from New Delhi, Davies laid out the major dilemmas that were

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[268] Ibid.
[269] Ibid.
[270] Wendell Willkie, *One World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943), 107.

involved in a strong American alliance with the British Empire. Davies informed the Department of a conversation he had with Mr. Galvin, a British propaganda officer in India. They spoke at length about American relations with Britain after the war. Mr. Galvin thought that it was "essential" that there be a strong post-war Anglo-American alliance.[271] Where Mr. Galvin and John Davies disagreed was over the future of imperialism. Mr. Galvin said that he supported Churchill's actions in India. He mentioned how imperialism was essential to British identity. If British imperialism ended, he said, it meant that the people of Britain "cease to be British. We lose our standard of living." Davies told him that for the American people, the opposite was true. They associated a better world with the end of imperialism. [272]

Davies then concluded that America had partnered with British imperialism. He wrote: "American policy at this stage…was apparently based upon a conviction that we needed a strong Britain, that Britain must remain a first-class power." However, this could not be the case unless Britain kept its Empire. "It therefore seemed that we were committed to the support of the British Empire," Davies wrote. He summed up his observations by saying that:

> This conversation seems to me to point up how deeply we are embroiled in power politics because of our commitment to recreate Britain as a first-class power. We have so committed ourselves in the belief, presumably, that we need a strong Britain for our own defense and for a stable world order…We have chosen to bring a third-class island kingdom back to its anachronistic position as a first-class empire.[273]

With this observation, Davies challenged the idea that a strong Britain spelled a safer world. In fact, it spelled just the opposite. It meant a volatile and dangerous world as

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[271] John Davies, "British Intimations for the Future," October 21, 1943; Confidential File, 1943; India, New Delhi; Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 1788-1991; Record Group 84; National Archives and Records Administration of the United States, College Park, MD.
[272] Ibid.
[273] Ibid.

relationships based on subjugation meant that there would be a "constant struggle between the urge to revolt and the compulsion to suppress."[274] There would be a constant amount of "revolution and counter-revolution."[275] When Davies said that the predominating belief was that a "strong Britain" was necessary for a "stable world order," his words were echoes from past generations of American policymakers like Teddy Roosevelt, Arthur Beveridge, and Thomas Mahan. American policymakers, however, began to look at Britain differently during the Second World War.

Due to an American foreign policy that ended up sustaining the British Empire, American relations with India worsened. As the consequences of these worsening relations took shape, and as America saw that it was going to have to maintain good relations with India once the war was over, one way that America sought to make amends was through immigration reform. On March 23, 1945, Joseph Grew wrote a memorandum in which he shared a conversation he had with Indian Agent General, Sir Girja Bajpai. The subject was the recent tabling of the Indian Immigration and Naturalization Bill. Bajpai was concerned about the bill's failure to get passed. The failure meant the discrediting of America's image in India.[276] Less than three months later, on June 9, Joseph Grew wrote similarly regarding the same topic. Writing to President Truman, Joseph Grew informed the President of the importance of the passage of the bill. Quoting from Indian journals, he informed the President of the reality that India did not view America favorably. The tabling of the bill gave India further reason to continue to cast America in an unfavorable light. Grew quoted an editorial statement from an Indian journal: "not until America

[274] Ibid.
[275] Ibid.
[276] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State, 24 March 1945; *FRUS 1945*, VI, 164. Grew writes, "[Sir Girja Bajpai] spoke at great length of the importance of this legislation from the point of view of the reputation in India of the United States and of the very favorable effect on public opinion in [India] which the passage of the bill might bring about."

sees fit to revoke her various humiliating immigration barriers to Indians can we view America and the Americans with anything like the enthusiasm that its propaganda seeks to inspire."[277] He went on to say that, according to another Indian paper, Indians were cynical about the peace, believing that the "professions of the western powers apply only to the white races."[278]

Grew knew the world was being split into two camps, European and Asian, and by implication, this was a color divide. It was imperative that America responded to this development. A more peaceful world depended on it. The oriental races were fed-up with being treated as racially inferior. A bill allowing a quota for Indians to enter the country, as well as a provision for naturalization, was a first step toward treating the oriental races as equal. Grew even went so far as to contextualize Pearl Harbor within this racialized dilemma. He described Pearl Harbor as a "recent reminder of the bitterness which the oriental can achieve against westerners who treat them as racially inferior."[279] If the bill did not get passed, then the "peoples of Asia" may "conclude that they cannot hope to obtain equitable treatment from the white races."[280] There then is a "distinct possibility" that there will be a "color war" in the near future.[281] Roosevelt favored the bill as well. Shortly before he passed away, in a conversation with Charles Taussig, political advisor for the Caribbean, Roosevelt emphasized the numerical aspects of the problem. He said, "there are over 1,100,000,000 brown people" in the world. Those kinds of numbers of "potential enemies are dangerous,".[282] This is what Eric S. Ruben pointed out in his article when he said that Roosevelt's anti-colonial policy was pragmatic since it was a realistic assessment of the world situation. Roosevelt realized that to take the colonial

[277] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, 9 June 1945; *FRUS 1945,* VI.
[278] Ibid.
[279] Ibid.
[280] Ibid.
[281] Ibid.
[282] Hess, 155.

position was to alienate a "large percentage of the world's people" at a time of worldwide instability.[283]

America's newspapers were in favor of the bill. Their sentiments helped to push the bill forward, as many Congressman cited the newspapers as an argument for passing the bill. A lot of support for the bill centered around how it would help the Allied war effort. The *Los Angeles Times* wrote that with the "coming campaigns in Burma and Malaysia…the removal of discrimination against [Indians] may well boost Indian morale." The *St. Louis Dispatch* called the bill a "testament of racial good will." The *Baltimore Sun* noted that due to a "rebirth of nationalist sentiment," the "continued existence of these discriminations" provided a "rich source of…suspicion [among Indians] of our motives." The Bill also had "important post war ramifications," as "American prosperity" in the future would largely depend on "foreign trade." India was seen as a valuable future trading partner.[284] Peace and trade would be done a great service if the bill got passed.

Much of America's efforts to forge better relations with India failed. American trade with India was met suspiciously by India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. When an American official, Westmore Willcox, tried to persuade Nehru to allow substantial foreign investment into the country, Nehru refused to allow American investment to "compromise India's control of its economy."[285] In a letter to Asaf Ali, India's first ambassador to the United States, Nehru called the proposal that Willcox made "extraordinary." Nehru's thinking was based

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[283] Ruben, 77.
[284] U.S. Congress. Senate. *Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Immigration: United States Senate.* 69th Cong., 1st sess., 1945.
[285] Kenton J Clymer, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the United States: the Preindependence Years." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 14 Issue 2 (1990), 160.

on ideas that he developed throughout his political career. It had an impact on America relations with India.

When the Philippines was granted its independence on July 4th, 1946, it was thought by many American policymakers that this act would do a great deal to "offset doubts about [America's] dedication to self-determination." "Suspicion of U.S. motives," however, had "become profound," and some of the most ardent nationalists "expressed skepticism rather than praise for the U.S. policy." Nehru wrote to the Philippine Republic on Aug 3, 1946.

> We hope that this really signifies independence for this word has become rather hackneyed and outworn and has been made to mean many things. Some countries that are called independent are far from free and are under the economic or military domination of some great power. Some so-called independent countries carry on with what might be termed "puppet regimes" and are in a way client countries of some great power. We hope that is not so with the Philippines.[286]

Again, Nehru expressed political ideas that he developed throughout his political career. These ideas influenced American relations with India. In reading his letter to the Philippine Republic, one detects the political thoughts that Nehru recorded in his memoirs in 1944.

Nehru believed that Western imperialism was not only based on the desire to materially exploit the countries it controlled; it was rooted also in racial arrogance. Beneath the surface of it, Western imperialism was essentially racist. An Indian writer who understood Nehru well, P.D. Devandan, quoted in the Christian Century on February 19, 1947, said:

> To Nehru's way of thinking the breach is not only between India and Britain, it is between the East and the West. He sees no hope that the Western powers will relinquish their policy of imperialism, and he traces all imperialism to the racial pride and cultural arrogance of these ruling powers.[287]

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[286] Hess, 172.

[287] Walter Charles Mackett, "Some Aspects of the Development of American Opinion on India, 1918-1947." (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1957), 469-470.

Nehru believed that the "stronger nations of the West" would conspire against the "weaker peoples of the East." He thought this because he was very unconvinced that the west would change in any significant way. This thinking, led in part, to his policy of non-alignment. The policy was a way of compensating for India's weakness, militarily and economically. It was also based on his extensive experience with the West which caused him to place no stock in the idea that the West would abandon its imperialism.

As America saw that it was in its interests to develop better trade relations with India, it did so at the expense of the British Empire. One can see the beginning of this idea in a memorandum written by William D. Pawley on Oct 15, 1944. In the memo, entitled "The effect of the Sterling Bloc on Anglo-American-Indian Relations," Pawley pointed out that Britain's Sterling Bloc should be dismantled. He noted that "under the so-called Sterling Pool every dollar of Indian sales to America is turned over to the U.K. in exchange for sterling." This situation made it more difficult for American exporters to enter the Indian market. Eventually, America got Britain to agree to end its "dollar pool," and "eventually to end the system of imperial preferences."[288]This accomplished two things. According to Gary Hess, it gave "the United States new opportunities in the Indian market" and it "lessened London's economic dominance over India."[289] It was motivated, just like immigration reform, by a need to forge better relations with the East, a reality that America began to see was in its prime interests.

[288] Hess, 165-166.
[289] Hess, 165-166.

Conclusion

As relations between the United States and India deteriorated during the Second World War, the main cause behind the decline of relations rested in the Roosevelt "policy of silence." When he wrote to Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek on August 12, 1942, he advocated a diplomatic policy that proved to negatively impact the Indo-American relationship. His reasoning was influenced by Churchill, who had successfully convinced the President that the time was not right to force change on India. He convinced the President that any action to attempt to bring change to the subcontinent on the part of the Allies would result in undermining the only government in India that could maintain stability. Roosevelt, caught between strategy and idealism, chose the former. Roosevelt's decision had an adverse impact on American relations with India since it created the perception among Indian nationalists that the U.S.'s "objectives" in the East were identical "with those of the European powers."[290]

The U.S. came into direct contact with the consequences and the implications of the Roosevelt policy of silence shortly after the war. In 1946, Washington was focused on communist influence in India. Many in Washington believed that anti-American sentiments in India were the result of communist agitation. George Merrell, however, believed this analysis to be somewhat inaccurate. The main "fault" for the spread of anti-American sentiment in India, Merrell thought, was because of America "overselling itself to Indian nationalists during the war."[291] The American historian, Merle Curti, while visiting Universities in India in 1946,

[290] Hess, 169.
[291] Hess, 169.

commented on Indian sentiments toward the role that the U.S. played in India during the war. He found that there was an expectation that the U.S. would play a more active role in helping India achieve independence, followed by great disappointment when the expectation was not met. He wrote, "I was asked on innumerable occasions why the American government had, in view of America's own revolutionary revolt against England, done so little to help the Indians in their struggle for freedom."[292]

Through drawing on the scholarship of Michael H. Hunt and M.S. Venkataramani, this paper has tried to situate the Indo-American relationship during World War II within a larger and broader context. As Michael H. Hunt demonstrated, American foreign policy was ideologically racist. From Teddy Roosevelt, to Woodrow Wilson, and on to President Franklin Roosevelt, the ideological racism of American foreign policy persisted. Even broader than this, American foreign policy beginning with the Monroe Doctrine and ending with the Second World War, was a policy that contained within it the "deeply ingrained American tradition" that the "United States should avoid involvement…in struggles for independence in other countries that did not clearly involve important U.S. interests."[293] The Indian historian Venkataramani backed up his argument by pointing out the fact that America offered no material support to Simon Bolivar when he struggled against Spanish rule, nor did it offer similar support to the Greeks when they struggled against Turkish rule. Henry Clay did, however, offer vocal support, but the support stopped short at that. For the historian, this was an American foreign policy that persisted until the Second World War. India, according to the author, was not aware of this "traditional attitude

[292] Hess, 169.
[293] Venkataramani, 333.

of Washington," and as it "looked to [America] for meaningful assistance" it was left disappointed.[294]

A handful of principal factors caused American policymakers to consider that the Anglo-American alliance needed revision. For William Phillips, it was in America's best interests to alter its relationship with Great Britain. The British Empire was on the decline. America was set to replace Britain as the world's financial leader, and the territories of the East that had been under colonial control for centuries, were about to be independent. These factors caused Phillips to develop a policy toward India that President Roosevelt considered "radical" for a man like Phillips. Joseph Grew, another very important policymaker in Washington, was concerned about forging better relations with India in the post-war world. His urgency to get the Indian Immigration and Naturalization Bill passed, and the content of his argument as to why it needed to be passed, revealed America coming to terms with its new role in the East. William Phillips and Joseph Grew were career diplomats. Their policy suggestions should be viewed as smart diplomacy, rooted in, according to Clymer, a "realistic assessment of the future of the colonial world."[295] Consequently, this paper is in many ways a lesson in diplomacy which captures an historical moment wherein realism won the diplomatic argument of the day.

Clymer argued that William Phillips' diplomacy was one that "drew on America's long-established tradition of support for self-determination."[296] This paper disagrees with that analysis. It is more accurate to say that Phillips broke with "America's long-established tradition" of not supporting self-determination. As Paul Leland Haworth noted in his 1915 work

[294] Ibid., 337.
[295] Kenton J. Clymer, "The Education of William Phillips: Self-Determination and American Policy Toward India, 1942-45." *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 8 Issue 1 (1984), 34.
[296] Ibid., 34.

in which he documented fundamental components of American political society, the Philippines wanted independence from both Spain and the United States. The U.S., however, retained the islands in the belief that Filipinos were better off under American tutelage. This was far from support for self-determination. The Philippines were to undergo a transitionary period of trusteeship whereby the islands would gradually be trained in self-government. This same trusteeship scheme was what European colonial territories came under after the first World War, a scheme that was the brainchild of President Woodrow Wilson. Nevertheless, the trusteeship system failed to live up to its promises. It ended up becoming a new form of imperialism. As this paper demonstrates, nationalist leaders from all over the world embraced Wilson's rhetoric of self-determination, calling on him to challenge the European powers at the peace table. Wilson, however, preferred for the matter to be worked out more gradually through the League of Nations. By the Second World War, nationalist leaders were a lot more impatient. They were determined to make sure that the peace of the present war was not the peace of the previous war. America found itself in a precarious position, and policymakers like Phillips urged the State Department to respond adequately to the "wave of nationalism that was sweeping the entire East."[297]

This paper has contributed to the Roosevelt historiography in crucial ways. It has demonstrated that Roosevelt's policy toward India evolved over time. The archival materials reveal a view of Roosevelt that is messy. In his February 25th, 1942 letter to Churchill, in which he politely suggested to Churchill that concessions toward greater self-government be offered to India, he demonstrated progressive ideas about colonialism. He identified it as a master-slave relationship. He pointed out that such a relationship was one that had been changing since the

[297]William Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952). 384.

first World War. He lauded America's progressive attitude by pointing out that the U.S. set a date for the independence of the Philippines. He also acknowledged that colonialism was running out of steam. His observations about colonialism were progressive and, according to this paper, accurate. Nevertheless, Roosevelt conducted his correspondence with Churchill privately. It was part of his, as Gary Hess characterized it in his work, "personal diplomacy."[298] This kind of diplomacy, in this particular case of dealing with Churchill, made polite, private suggestions, refraining from public pronouncements. This speaks to Roosevelt's competency. His policy toward Churchill was incompetent. He tried to be the voice of reason to a man who had a deep emotional attachment to India. As revealed at his press conferences, Roosevelt evaded questions related to the Indian problem, thus demonstrating his refusal to be more public about the problem.

When the U.N. met to discuss the colonial issue, immediate independence did not form the basis of discussions. Colonial trusteeship was once again the scheme that ruled the discussions. Roosevelt was in line with this thinking. What set his ideas apart from others, however, was that he advocated for trusteeship to be followed by full independence as opposed to "self-government," which was one step short of independence. Nevertheless, Roosevelt was well entrenched in the liberal camp, a believer in gradual reform. This meant that he did not openly challenge the European allies. Roosevelt said that he would consider France to be an acceptable trustee over Indo-China, if it agreed to the eventual independence of Indo-China.[299] His attitude was precisely the way Woodrow Wilson acted at the Peace of Paris. Ruben wrote that "Roosevelt was…imbued with the American anti-colonialist tradition." This compliment,

[298] Hess, 52.
[299] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Advisor on Caribbean Affairs (Taussig). 15 March 1945, *FRUS 1945.* Vol. I.

however, is far too generous. This thesis has tried to show that Roosevelt was much more of a traditional liberal than a radical anti-colonialist. Ruben's scholarship attempted to depict Roosevelt as an ardent anti-colonialist, opposed to Churchill in significant ways. That conclusion, although having some merit, is questionable in some ways and deserves further critique.

What mattered most about Roosevelt was not what he said, but what he did. And what he did was nothing. When Gandhi urged Roosevelt to pressure Churchill into re-opening negotiations, he told Gandhi that there was nothing to be done. What was needed first was defeat over the Axis powers. That was his policy. Do nothing now and do everything later once the war was over. Cordell Hull was of the same opinion and followed the same policy. So too did Sumner Welles. Some in the State Department, however, shifted policy from time to time, advising the Administration to not be too overcautious about interfering in Anglo-Indian relations. A major implication emerges from this. The question is, "Was the Roosevelt policy of silence indirectly responsible for the creation of Pakistan?" Some evidence suggests that William Phillips may have answered this question in the affirmative. Phillips wrote in his memoirs, *Ventures in Diplomacy*, published in 1952, about his experience in India during the war. He wrote about the British Labor Government assuming power in July 1945. With the Conservatives out, and the Labor Party in, Indian Independence was only a matter of time. Speaking in the context of Pakistan, Phillips wrote that attempts were "made to bring Jinnah and Gandhi together." Phillips then lamented, "But it was too late." He noted Jinnah's crusade for Pakistan. It was around this time that "Moslems had elected Jinnah as their national leader on a platform of

Pakistan."[300] And Jinnah was determined to use his authority to accomplish his long-held goal of a free and independent Pakistan.

Jinnah's ultimate election as national leader did not start in 1945. It could be traced back to August 1942, when the British government arrested the nationalist leaders and thousands of their followers. This had the effect of weakening the Congress Party and strengthening the Muslim League. This was Britain's policy. The Congress Party's main platform was Indian Independence. The Muslim League, fearing what it considered an independent India ruled by a Hindu-majority, preferred for India to remain within the British commonwealth. The British treated the Muslim League as a tool to push back against what it considered to be the harmful ideas of Gandhi and Nehru. Arresting Gandhi and refusing to give in to his demands when he fasted, was part of Britain's policy, under Churchill, of destroying the Congress Party. America, whether it realized it or not, tacitly supported this British policy when it refused to interfere in India. In this policy of non-interference, consistently advocated by Sumner Welles, America indirectly killed two birds with one stone: it weakened the Congress Party and strengthened the Muslim League. Phillips repeatedly suggested to Roosevelt and Hull that it would be good to publicly announce that the American mission in India pay a visit to Gandhi in jail, but the State Department told Phillips that a request to visit Gandhi could only be made on a "purely personal basis." William Phillips and Wallace Murray identified this as bad policy.

Phillips concluded that the effect of India being split in two resulted in a loss for India. He wrote, "If [India] had remained a united country, [its] voice in world affairs would be far more commanding than it is today."[301] The fact that India was an emerging nation, and therefore

[300] William Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), 395-396.
[301] Ibid., 396.

weaker than developed nations, was one reason out of many for Nehru's decision to choose a non-alignment foreign policy. Clymer has argued that Nehru's decision to not "pursue closer ties with the Americans after independence" was rooted largely in his disappointment over the U.S.'s equivocation concerning the support of Asian nationalist movements. Through studying Nehru's memoirs and the letters that he wrote to his daughter in 1932/33, one glimpses ideas that were part of Nehru's political thinking and were forces that also shaped his decision toward non-alignment.

America's involvement in India was pragmatic. If it were not for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, America would not have taken any notice of India. The Indian National Congress sought to enlist the support of America in attaining independence, judging that it had a narrow window of opportunity to extract concessions from Great Britain. It was, after all, British military blunders in the Far East that caused America to begin to craft an argument for American interference in British colonial policy. The rallying cry was "India is Our Problem, Too."[302] This position made the British government of Winston Churchill nervous. Churchill implemented a propaganda campaign to discredit the Indian National Congress as a result.

This thesis has suggested that British propaganda was successful for a few reasons. It was successful because Britain had effective resources at its disposal. But this thesis has also tried to suggest that Britain and America shared a political, cultural, and racial affinity for each other. This factor, along with traditional American anti-orientalist attitudes, helped Churchill's propaganda work since the propaganda presumably fell on fertile soil. This is what D.W. Brogan noted when he visited America. He suggested that Americans admired what were commonly

[302] *New York Herald-Tribune,* "5 Persons Are Arrested Trying to Picket Embassy," 27 January 1943. 1253-3-3:16: Free India Campaigns, Ralph T. Templin Papers 1913-1996, United Methodist Archives and History Center.

considered Western qualities, such as toughness and force. Brogan found that most Americans admired a leader like Churchill. On the other side of the coin, qualities often associated with the East, such as passivity, non-violence, fatalism, and otherworldliness were looked down upon by most Americans. Gandhi was, to Americans, the epitome of a lot of those qualities, which were also associated with Hinduism. There was a cultural divide that the British exploited. A Yale Professor announced on radio his opinion of the idea of a similarity between India's struggle for freedom and America's struggle for freedom. He ridiculed the idea that the two struggles had anything in common. This thesis has suggested that these ideas contributed to the success of British propaganda.

It was difficult for the nationalists to get their message effectively across for other reasons also. As the records suggest, a small group of concerned American citizens worked to raise awareness of what they considered to be a critical wartime issue: the immediate independence of India. They made the argument that giving India its independence was the right thing to do. It was the moral thing to do, they reasoned. They called on Roosevelt to act, arguing that to do so would be to change the moral direction of the war. They used Abraham Lincoln as an example, pointing out that when he issued his Emancipation Proclamation, he set the Civil War on a new moral footing and helped to raise morale. They believed that a critical moment such as that needed to happen with the present war. They envisioned the war as a war to end both fascism and colonialism. As this thesis has demonstrated, their sentiments were met with opposition. The magistrate presiding over the picketers denounced their actions as dangerous. They were believed to be creating discord among the Allies. Arguing in their defense, they believed that "Allied Unity" was no excuse for the preservation of colonialism.

Wendell Willkie agreed with the sentiments of these protestors. He often spoke of the need for America to announce a Pacific Charter. Nationalists in the East desired this, holding Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter with suspicion. Nationalists in the East increasingly desired a Pacific Charter to alleviate their post-war anxiety. A Pacific Charter was never announced. This leads to some questions: Was Roosevelt an effective wartime leader? Did he exercise appropriate moral leadership? In a February 24, 1942 Press conference, Roosevelt was asked about India with reference to the issue of colonialism. A press reporter asked him if he would comment about a recent statement made by Chiang Kai-Shek about India. Roosevelt evaded the question a little, saying that it might be better to not hastily offer an opinion on the matter. Pressed more by the reporter, Roosevelt said that he thought that it was better to "win the war before we start determining all the details…"[303] He said that the important thing was to have principles. When Walter White and the NAACP became involved in the India issue, Roosevelt grew impatient with White, asking him to be patient and saying that the issues at hand could not be expected to change quickly.[304] This management and diplomatic style of Roosevelt is one that deserves examination with the goal of assessing whether the Roosevelt National Policy was one that left much to be desired.

In many ways, there is an analogy in history. Lincoln ultimately steered the Civil War in the right direction through first freeing the slaves as a war measure and then through making the abolition of slavery a National Policy of his wartime Administration. By the summer of 1864, Lincoln made the abolition of slavery a condition for peace talks with the Confederate rebels.[305] This was no small move that Lincoln made. Likewise, Roosevelt faced a comparable situation.

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[303]Presidential Press Conferences, 804-808, February 10, 1942-February 27, 1942.
[304] Letter from President Roosevelt to Walter White, 12 September 1942. President's Official File, 48H, India, FDRL.
[305] James McPherson, *The War that Forged a Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 121-122.

He was called upon to state what America's war aims were, particularly in the East. Many wanted him to issue a Pacific Charter. But the Administration did not issue one for fear that it would antagonize its main ally. Many people were on Roosevelt's side. The idea was to win the war first and worry about everything else later. This policy caused Indian nationalists a great deal of apprehension. As Phillips revealed, many in India believed that it would be easier to extract concessions during the war than after. Phillips acknowledged that the opposite was true for America, namely that it was much harder for the Administration to effect change while the war took place. This reality put the United States in an inconvenient situation.

This thesis has attempted to lend more insight into, and has added to, the historical field of Indo-American relations during the Second World War. The thesis has focused primarily on diplomatic relations between America and India. World War II serves as a useful period to explore diplomatic relations since it was at this time that America assumed a new, and more official role with respect to India. The research of this thesis, however, has also tried to show the cultural relations that existed between the two countries. To do this, the thesis has retreated to an earlier period when Indian nationalists tried to forge closer cultural relations with the United States. Lala Lajpat Rai was an example of this effort. Focusing primarily on World War II, this paper has attempted to show the racial problems that existed at the time, and how those problems shaped relations between the United States and India. Ultimately, America had to come to grips with the new world that emerged during, and then after, the war.

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