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THE *REPUBLIC*: A CITY IN TRANSLATION
OR
NO TRANSLATION IS INNOCENT

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ABSTRACT

Many of us think of translation as the process of bringing a foreign author's work into our own language. More often than not, however, this proves to be a utopian task. As any bibliophile knows, there tend to be more than one translation for any given work, none of which are identical. Whether these differences boil down to semantics or sentence-structure, it is clear that the common understanding of the word "translation," although not altogether useless, has been shown to be inadequate; there are no translations that are equivalent to the original text, evidenced by handfuls of different translations of the same work. Challenging traditional thinking, I propose reading translations as new works of art, importantly and intimately related to but distinct from their sources. This thesis illustrates how to read translations as works of art using various English translations of Plato's *Republic*. The meat of this thesis, what is discovered during the course of our readings, adds to our knowledge of Platonic philosophy and the nature of translation. Standing at the intersection of English and philosophy, this thesis studies the construction of new knowledge in each translator's work, elevates the status of translations, and offers the possibility of opening new and exciting conversations.

DEDICATION

To my parents for selflessly putting me
Through school and enriching my
Education with artistic training.
This is the culmination of my present education.

With special gratitude to
Arnold Slotkin for the many unforgettable hours
Spent in his library's armchair.

And to Joyce Slotkin for recounting to me
How stars waxed and waned in the
Heat of Iraqi summers.



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—A.H. Slotkin

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INTRODUCTION

I. Preamble

Many of us see translation as a mode of hearing a foreign author's thoughts in one's own language. The Latin word *translation*, the precursor to "translation," is the sum of *trans* or "across" and *ferre*, "to carry." Hence, translation denotes carrying a text into another language so it can be heard. In this way, the original text and its translation are semantically bound such that the translated text cannot be thought of or spoken about without referencing the original work. The purpose of translation is pragmatically important. Militaries around the world are keen on hearing foreign combatants' words in their own respective languages to stifle wartime threats. However, translations of military communications are one thing, and translations of a work of art are quite another. I will argue that translations of artworks are themselves new works of art, importantly and intimately related to but distinct from their sources—the originals. In defending this claim, I will use as my central illustration various translations of Plato's *Republic*.

The *Republic* answers the question, "What is justice for human beings?" by demonstrating how a just state should be arranged. A just human being is one who does not allow "the three classes [wisdom, courage, and temperance] of thing within his soul to interfere with one another" (Griffith 141). In addition to defining justice, Plato makes one of the first arguments in Western history for gender equality while maintaining the equally radical thesis that philosophers rather than politicians should rule countries. To get an idea of the important differences among translations, we should begin by reading two passages from two select translations as pieces of art.

Reading translations as pieces of art entails studying how the author or translator presents and interprets a selected passage, such that we must attend to differences between translations. A translator's intentions, however, are not under consideration here, since a writer's intentions may not be reflected in his or her language. Without knowing these translators' intentions, consider the following from Allan Bloom's *The Republic of Plato* and Benjamin Jowett's *Plato's the Republic*:

> **Bloom:** "Well, then," I said, "let's sum up the worst man. He is awake, presumably, what we described a dreaming man to be" (Bloom 256).
>
> **Jowett:** Let us sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man: he is the waking reality of what we dreamed (Jowett 336).

This passage (576b) is commonly interpreted as the conclusion to Plato's psychological analysis of the tyrannical mind. Tyrants are governed by lawless desires that, for normal people, only occur in dreams. Although the two translations appear to represent the tyrannical individual in the same way, a careful rereading brings a handful of important differences to light.

The largest difference in word choice between the two passages in the previous paragraph is Jowett's inclusion of "what we dreamed" (336) and Bloom's usage of the phrase, "a dreaming man" (Bloom 256). By writing, "He is the waking reality of what we dreamed" (Jowett 336), Jowett implicates the reader in sharing the tyrant's lawless thoughts. After all, the word "we" ties the reader to the text—the character is talking about *us*. Bloom's phrase, "a dreaming man" (Bloom 256), however, does the opposite. Who is the dreaming man? He is a representation of human beings in general. Because he is an abstraction, readers may separate themselves from the tyrant's lawless behavior.

After all, it is easier to differentiate one's waking self from "*a* [emphasis added] dreaming man" (256) than "what *we* [emphasis added] dreamed" (Jowett 336). What is additionally interesting about the passage is that each translation's semantic effect on the audience is mirrored in their grammatical structure.

Allan Bloom's translation is two sentences long, with the sentence break occurring after the phrase, "Let's sum up the worst man" (Bloom 256). His use of the period "." Indicates a breaking in thought, leading the reader to place equal emphasis on each sentence as they read passage 576b. If the thoughts expressed in both sentences were connected, they would have flowed into one another. Bloom's period helps readers to distance themselves from the tyrannical mind by separating the passage into two sentences. Jowett, on the other hand, uses a colon to connect each thought, making it difficult to differentiate oneself from the tyrannical individual's thoughts.

Reading translations as art opens our understanding of the source text (the translated text) to new and interesting interpretations, deepening our interest in the text. By no means is engaging in close or careful readings of English texts the only way to approach the *Republic*. For instance, readers may circumnavigate translations of Plato's work by learning ancient Greek. A close reading of the *Republic* in the source language brings the reader closer to Plato's intended meaning since he or she is reading Plato's own words. The aim of this thesis, however, is to offer readers a mode of reading translations that adds a new layer to our understanding of the text, making the translator's meaning and the standard interpretation of Plato's meaning accessible. Consider that a close reading of only two translators' renditions of two sentences lets us reframe our

understanding of the text. This way of viewing translations will become more worthwhile when we approach meatier passages.

My thesis begins by introducing the reader to translation theory, the phenomena of translation, and how I choose to read translations. The second chapter demonstrates how to critically evaluate a translator's presentation of the common understanding of a source text by analyzing different presentations of what is understood as Socrates' argument for gender equality (451d). The third chapter studies how translators interpret a text's common understanding by attending to different interpretations of the popular, Platonic definition of political justice (433a-b), while the fourth chapter synthesizes the goals of the previous two chapters in reading translations of the most famous passage on philosopher kings (473d) as works of art. Because the second, third, and fourth chapters have different goals, their methodology may differ, ranging from tabulating differences in the number of words to attending to differences in word choice.

My choice in methodology and ordering is purposeful. They mirror the two main objectives of translation theory as described by James Holmes in his speech, "The Name and Nature of Translation Studies" (1972): "(1) to describe the phenomena of translating and translation(s) as they manifest themselves in the world of our experience, and (2) to establish general principles by means of which these phenomena can be explained" (Holmes 5). I chose to model my work after Holmes' description because he states the goals of translation theory in a way that is accessible to readers without prior knowledge of the subject. The first goal is empirical because it requires attending to already existing translations to describe "the phenomena of translating and translator(s)," whereas the latter goal is an example of pure theory: theory without direct, practical application,

which informs our empirical understanding (5). The first chapter establishes the theoretical principles of my argument, whereas the next three chapters address translation theory's empirical goal, with the conclusion touching on either as is appropriate.

II. Translations to Be Discussed

Listed below are the five translations I will be using to illustrate my thesis and my reasons for including each book:

Benjamin Jowett (1894): Benjamin Jowett's *Plato's the Republic* was published posthumously in 1894, making it the oldest translation in this list. Having read different translations of Plato's *Republic*, I find that Jowett's work does a remarkable job explaining the common understand of Plato's philosophy. Jowett's work is welcomed in our discussion so as to avoid a natural inclination to favor modern texts. Moreover, this thesis was conceived after engaging in the argument about Platonic censors mentioned in the previous section. Because Jowett's work helped me begin my thesis, I will be, in part, including the text to privately measure my growth in thought.

Allan Bloom (1968): Allan Bloom's work highlights the importance of reading translations as new works of art. At the heart of *The Republic of Plato* is a degree of irony used to mask Plato's Socrates' philosophy. Bloom's "Interpretive Essay," which is printed at the end of his translation, indicates this is how he interprets the text (see his discussion of Books II-VI of the *Republic*). The object of irony is the just city, suggesting that Socrates does not believe it is ideal. Socrates' speech may or may not be ironic, but to ignore what Bloom saw as irony in Socrates'

speech is a mistake. Reading the dialogue as being ironic deepens our understanding of Plato's philosophy, which is why this text is used in this thesis.

G.M.A. Grube (1974): G.M.A. Grube's *Republic* presents the common understanding of Plato's philosophy while retaining a high level of readability. More interesting, however, is what we may find by juxtaposing the *Republic* with C.D.C. Reeve's translation. Because C.D.C. Reeve revised Grube's work, including both texts may allow us to infer Grube's influence on Reeve's thought through their possible similarities in translation.

C.D.C. Reeve (2004): C.D.C. Reeve's *Republic*, according to Richard Polt, makes "even highly abstract points come across in a clear and smooth way" (Polt 458). I am inclined to agree with Polt, although I would also add that Reeve's text maintains a measure of accessibility without oversimplifying the topics under discussion. His decision to make the text more conversational by "replacing all the 'he saids' with the name of the speaker" (458) heightens the literary nature of what we understand as metaphors, allusions, and allegories. Some, like Joe Sachs, would consider it to be a detrimental move (see Sachs 14), while others would consider it to be refreshing. Comparing the text alongside Grube's work may deepen our discussions, making them more worthwhile.

Joe Sachs (2007): The newest translation on this list, Joe Sachs' *Republic*, is also the most creative. Although Sachs admires Bloom's translation, he "aims at a less antiquated and more fluid diction" (Polt 460), which is why his translation is most in line with our language's conventions of usage (see 460a and 476a of Sachs' translation, *Republic*). His translation raises questions about how much creativity

a translator may use in translating the source text. I chose to include Sachs' work because his language is so natural sounding to the modern ear.

CHAPTER ONE

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TRANSLATION THEORY

> *While you're reading it—which is really the first translation, in your mind's eye or in your mind's ear—you're thinking, how would this sound in English, how would I do that?*
>
> —Paul Mann, *An Interview with Richard Howard*

I. Introduction

This chapter is a brief overview of translation theory. Using examples from translations of Plato's *Republic*, I will illustrate and discuss the views of several noteworthy translators, translation theorists, and literary scholars such as Ezra Pound, Marcus Cicero, and Wolfgang Iser. I will then introduce three forms of translation (metaphrasing, paraphrasing, and imitating) that all translation "may be reduced to" (Dryden 17). Standing on the shoulders of giants, namely Ezra Pound, James Holmes, John Dryden, Marcus Cicero, and Wolfgang Iser, I will add my voice to the conversation by expressing how I choose to read translations, which is novel in its analytic approach toward using translations to open new and exciting discussions and ideas.

II. Theories of Translation

Marcus Cicero's dialogue, *De re Publica* or *On the Commonwealth* (51 BC), is the first translation of Plato's *Republic*. *De re Publica* covers many of the same topics as Plato's work, namely the nature of justice itself. The English title "Republic" is derived from Cicero's work, which focuses on the Roman republic rather than the Greek *polis* or city. Other authors have since translated the *Republic* into their respective languages, with philosopher and Neo-Platonist Thomas Taylor writing the first English translation of Plato's complete works in 1804. All translations, however, differ in their portrayal of the

source text. Consider the differences between Benjamin Jowett and Allan Bloom's translations of the same passage (377c):

> **Jowett:** Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children authorized ones only (Jowett 72).
>
> **Bloom:** "First, as it seems, we must supervise the makers of tales; and if they make a fine tale, it must be approved, but if it's not, it must be rejected. We'll persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved tales to their children" (Bloom 55).

Jowett and Bloom's translations most notably differ in their portrayal of the intensity of what the character Socrates proposes. Jowett frames Socrates' proposal in authoritarian language, referring to his position as censorship according to which the government will desire mothers to tell authorized stories. Bloom's tone suggests something different.

Rather than referring to Socrates' position as censorship, Bloom calls it supervision, and instead of desiring mothers to tell authorized stories, they will be persuaded to do so. But in both instances, the republic will be involved in the creative writing process for Allen Bloom's "makers of tales" (55) and Benjamin Jowett's "writers of fiction" (Jowett 72), just as it will be for C.D.C. Reeve's "storytellers" (Reeve 323), Robin Waterfield's "story-writers" (Waterfield 71), and Joe Sachs' "those who make up the stories" (Sachs 70). But Bloom and Jowett's differences in translation highlight their similarities, the product of engaging in a common understanding of the source text. As the reader-response theorist Wolfgang Iser suggests, there exists a "consistent pattern in

the text" that readers and translators pick up on but interpret differently (Iser 62). The consistent pattern in *Republic* 377c is the government's interference in what poems citizens may or may not read.

As each translator engages in or reacts against this or any other pattern in the text, they begin to enter into dialogue with one another. As Ezra Pound remarked, "When I 'translated' Guido eighteen years ago I did *not* see Guido at all. I saw Rossetti had made a remarkable translation of the *Vita Nuova*, in some places improving (or at least enhancing) the original" (Pound 85). What Pound saw as he translated the *Vita Nuova*—Rossetti's remarkable translation—suggests that a translator's work influences how the original text will be interpreted. English-speaking readers will never read the *Republic* without reference to already existing, English translations. As an example of the influence a translator has on how a source text is read, consider the popularity of the term "philosopher king," defined as "philosophers [that] rule as kings" (Bloom 153) or "kings [with] the spirit and power of philosophers" (Jowett 203).

The philosopher king makes an appearance in most English translations of the *Republic* as the dialogue's characters construct a theoretical, ideal city "in our discussion" (Grube 40), "in idea" (Jowett 60), or "in our speech" (Sachs 60). Each new inclusion of the term "philosopher king" is a nod to previous translations and has shaped the way English readers see the *Republic*. However, the term does not belong in Plato's work. "King" is a gendered word denoting a male ruler, and Plato is commonly seen as arguing for gender equality. It would be inconsistent to claim that the ideal rulers of the ideal city are kings. Justification for the inclusion of the word "king" comes from Plato's own words: "Ἐὰν μή, ἦν δ᾽ἐγώ, ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ

βασιλῆς…" (Plato 233). But by browsing *A Greek-English Lexicon*, *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon*, and the *Homeric Dictionary*, as well as Tufts University's *Perseus Digital Library*, one may question whether philosopher kings are under discussion in the passage above. If they are not under discussion, the common understanding of the source text may wrongly lead us to see Plato's philosophy as being inconsistent in this respect.

Tufts University's *Perseus Digital Library* defines "*βασιλεύσωσιν*" as "to be king, rule, reign" (Perseus Digital Library), with its root, "*βασιλεύω*," expressed in the *Republic* (576d-e) as "*to be governed by a king*" (Liddell, et al.). What seems like a robust position begins to break down, however, when we consider the use of the term "*βασιλεύω*" in other ancient Greek texts. Homer's *Illiad* and *Odyssey*, as well as Aristotle's *Politics* support the inclusion of the phrase "philosopher king" in English translations of the *Republic*. *Βασιλεύω* is translated in these texts respectively as "*to be king, rule, reign*," "*to be king of, rule over*," and "*to be governed by a king*" (Liddell, et al.). But there are passages in the *Illiad* where the same term is "also [said to be] of a woman…*reigned as queen*" (Liddell, et al.) or to "be king or queen" (Autenrieth). The word is also used more generally in Plato's *Laws* as "*to be governed* or *administered*" (Liddell, et al.) and the intermediate edition of Liddell, et al.'s dictionary cites *Βασιλεύω* as meaning "*to be master of a thing*" in much of Plutarch's work (Liddell, et al.). Given the multi-gendered definitions of the same word, as well as the Platonic argument for gender equality (451d), a translation that captures the sense of what is expressed in the Greek should include a gender neutral term or the addition of the phrase, "philosopher king or queen."

The mistake of including the term "philosopher king" comes from attempting to translate the text word-by-word rather than sentence-by-sentence or phrase-by-phrase. It is no coincidence that English speakers have interpreted Plato's work to include "philosopher kings." Most English speaking countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were patriarchies that subscribed to the idea that women belong in domestic settings while men were better fitted for public life. These ideas were commonplace despite the fact that a queen ruled nineteenth century Britain for about seventy years. By using the term "philosopher king," these translators rebel against our common understanding of the *Republic*, which is seen as including more than one argument for equality of the sexes. "Philosopher kings" complicate our relationship with Plato because our common understanding of his work diverges from his philosophy.

As each translator engages in, rebels against, or expounds on a common understanding of Plato's work, our idea of him changes. When reading the term "philosopher king," we perceive Plato as having a patriarchal mindset. As subsequent translators followed in Jowett's footsteps by interpreting Plato's rulers as men, we find that a translator's work influences subsequent translations (see 473d of Griffith, Reeve, Sachs, and Waterfield's translations). As Ezra Pound explains in relation to his own work:

> I saw that Rossetti had made better English poems than I was likely to make by (in intention) sticking closer to the direction of the original. I began by meaning merely to give prose translation so that the reader ignorant of Italian could see what the melodic original meant (Pound 85).

Rossetti's work influenced Pound's translation, but Pound's work can have just as much of an influence on how we read Rossetti's writing. After reading Pound's translation, no one would read Rossetti's more advanced translation in the same way again since our interpretation of Rossetti's work would be influenced by Pound's interpretation of the "melodic original" (85). Translators affect how past and future translations of the same work will be read when they enter into discourse with other translators.

If we read Allen Bloom's *The Republic of Plato*, our reading of Benjamin Jowett's translation, *Plato's the Republic*, would be changed, just as our reading of *The Republic of Plato* influences our reading of later translations. As if we are climbing a spiral, we may have a similar longitude to our starting point, the first book of Jowett's work. But being above the point, our latitude is different after reading Bloom's translation. This point is important to keep in mind when studying translations because translators, like any reader, are influenced by the previous translations of texts they read. There are connections between texts to be made, which may raise varied and interesting philosophic questions. The same may be said more generally for re-readings.

Each time we read any translation of the *Republic*, we walk away with a different understanding of the text, adding a previously unrecognized layer of complexity. It may seem at this juncture that the text is not static, but it is precisely because the text is static that it is open to new interpretations. Interpretation has the power to dictate a text's meaning because the intended meaning of the original author is never readily available. As popular opinion has it, much of what Plato wrote is metaphorical and therefore cannot be understood literally. But translators lack the cultural insight to fully understand these metaphors, which, like all metaphors, are formed within the context of shared insights

among speakers. The metaphor, "The American Dream," for example, would make little sense to someone without the cultural insight to understand the national *ethos* centered on freedom and the idea of self-fulfillment. Because translators do not have the insights ancient Grecians have, they are only left with Plato's original words and the limited sense that he is writing metaphorically. Because ancient Greek does not perfectly carry over into English, Plato's words are open to interpretation and therefore their meanings between translations may differ.

In understanding how the power of interpretation plays out between contemporaries speaking the same language, consider the sentence, "THIS IS THE ONLY TRUE PHILOSOPHER'S STONE." Although the sentence does not change from person to person, its meaning differs depending on the individuals reading it. Some will read it as, "The stone that this phrase is carved into belongs to the only true philosopher," or, "The stone that this phrase is carved into is the only true stone and belongs to a philosopher." Alternatively, it may be read as, "Here is the only true philosopher's stone, a substance capable of transmuting base metals into gold," or in some nuanced way not mentioned here. Each reading is equally possible, and without the writer's input, we have no way of knowing which interpretation is the intended meaning of the phrase. Conversely, it is also possible that none of these readings captures its intended meaning. This level of ambiguity is present in translations of the *Republic*. Therefore, how a translator reads a work and in what context he or she reads it matters.

Some would contend that each age deserves a new translation of the *Republic*. As Richard Howard maintains, "Most works should be translated again every twenty-five years…most *later* translations are improvements" (Mann 1981). That is to say, language

needs to change for a text to be understood by new audiences in shifting cultures. His claim is predicated on a method of translation by which translators change the style or wording of the source text to capture its sense. In other words, as later translations move away from the original text's style and wording, they move closer to its sense or meaning, which is why they are improvements. But it may also be used as justification for translating a text word-by-word, supported by the idea that "most successive translations of a work attempt to move closer and closer to the original" (Mann 1981). Walter Benjamin supports Mann's idea, explaining that "what sounded fresh once may sound hackneyed later; what was once current may someday sound quaint" (Benjamin 74). Seeing new translations as better fitting the conventions of a translator's language may, in opposition to the previous methods of translation described above, support changing the source text's ideas and word choice as the translator sees fit. How then should we read translations?

III. How Translators Translate

Whereas previously we were engaged with theory and its practical application, this section is concerned primarily with theoretical speculation about how translators translate. As a scholar writing about translation theory having never translated a text in a foreign language, I will be synthesizing the views of different translators and translation scholars to support such speculation.

Richard Howard makes clear in the epigraph to this chapter that translation begins in the translator's mind by translating words on paper into interpretable ideas. To this end, any act of reading is an act of translation. Poet and translator Paul Valéry explains more generally that all writing and speech are instances of translation in action: "We have

one language for ourselves, from which all other ways of speaking differ more or less. One language for our friends, one for general intercourse, [and] one for rostrum" (Valéry 117). Everyone has a different way of speaking and a different language for different audiences. The language I use with my friends, for example, is not the same language that I use with my mother, since the former includes profanity while the latter does not. But not all translators agree on how to translate.

Some translators believe that the unit of translation, the segment of a text recognized as a unit for establishing "likeness" to the source text, should be as small as a single word (metaphrasing), whereas others maintain it should be widened to include whole sentences and paragraphs (paraphrasing). A third school of thought (imitating) contends that a translator should "[assume] the liberty, not only to vary from the words and the sense, but to forsake them both as he sees occasion" (Dryden 17). The *Republic* has been translated using all three of these methods.

III.I Metaphrasing

Metaphrasing (from the Greek *meta*, meaning "beyond," and *phrasis* or "speaking") is a lexical approach to translation, whereby the unit of translation is an individual word. John Dryden defines metaphrasing as the process of turning "an author, word-by-word, and line-by-line, from one language to another" (17). That is to say, metaphrasing is a lexical mode of translation based on the idea of equivalency, the ability to translate a word into a target language (the language the source text is translated into) with an equal and exact meaning. For instance, "It is raining" can be equivalently translated into French ("Il pleut"), German ("Es regnet") and Arabic ("تمطر انها" or "'*Innaha tumtir*").

When we speak about faithful or literal translations, we are speaking about the work of a translator that metaphrased the source text into a target language. Metaphrasing's first advocate is, not surprisingly, the man that coined the word "metaphrase"—the rhetorician Philo Judaeus. Judaeus believed that metaphrasing was a natural and intuitive mode of translation:

> Who does not know that every language, and Greek especially, abounds in terms, and that the same thought can be put in many shapes by changing single words [*metaphrazonta*] and whole phrases [*parahrazonta*] and suiting the express to the occasion (qtd. in Routledge 153)?

Although the use of the word "metaphrasing" has largely been phrased out, this mode of translation is the most well known to readers that lack knowledge of translation theory and or the ability to speak more than one language.

A bad translation, according to metaphrasers, is one that fails to create an equivalent translation of the source text. This is a strict position to hold, but it does allow us to peer into cultural differences between the original author and the translator. Consider the following translations of the Hellenistic word *ataraxia*: peace of mind, absence of disturbance, and happiness. "Peace of mind" reads more smoothly than "absence of disturbance," but if we break the word apart, we get the words *a / t / araxia*. *A* is Greek for no or not; *t* was included to make the word pronounceable, and *araxia* means disturbance. Therefore, one can argue that the second translation is the better of the two. And yet *ataraxia* entails happiness and peace of mind. Thus, because we are translating at the lexical level, we realize that the ancient Greeks thought about happiness differently than modern English speakers. Even our differences in how we think about

peace of mind—the Greeks describe it in the negative, "absence of disturbance," whereas we describe it in the positive—reveals a gap between the past and present that can be used to help translators create more faithful translations than was previously possible.

III.II Paraphrasing

Paraphrasing or translating with latitude is the process of expressing the source text using different words to capture its holistic sense rather than to reduce its sense to words. According to this school of thought, "*Nec verbum verbo cuabis reddere / Interpres… /* No word for word too faithfully translate" (qtd. in Dryden 17). By having the freedom to translate with latitude, translators discount the idea of equivalency, contending that no word can be faithfully translated into another language. While "Il pleut" (French) and "*'Innaha tumtir*" (Arabic) seemingly captures the meaning of "Es regnet" (German) and "It is raining," "Who would claim that anything has ever been *translated* into French [or Arabic or English] from either the classical of the Germanic languages" (Schleiermacher 53)? Friedrich Schleiermacher's question is counterintuitive at first. If I say, "*'Innaha tumtir*" to an Algerian, he or she would grab his or her umbrella just as a German would if I said, "Es regnet." The function of both phrases is identical, but the connotations of each are different. Algeria is one of the driest countries on Earth, experiencing less yearly rainfall than Germany (Al-Otaibi). By "*'Innaha tumtir*," an Algerian would (perhaps excitedly) be referring to the water that temporarily breaks a long drought, whereas a German would likely be referencing April's unpredictable weather and the saying, *April, April, der weiß nicht was er will* ("April, April, you don't know what you want").

Although “انها تمطر” functions like “Es regnet” in the literal sense, the association Algerians have with the word “rain” is lost in translation. As José Ortega y Gasset rhetorically asks, “Isn’t the act of translating necessarily a utopian task” (Ortega y Gasset 93)? Translation can only capture the denotation of a word rather than its connotations. If only the function or information of an author’s work is translated into the target language, no equivalent translation was made.

Ortega y Gasset’s critique of metaphrasing justifies paraphrasing and the expansion of the unit of translation to include whole sentences. After all, paraphrasing can capture the sense of the author’s information and rhetoric while ignoring lexical differences, which do not seem to be translatable. Different languages divide semantics in different ways, creating the need to paraphrase at an order higher than the word level to capture the meaning of an utterance. Perhaps the best example of the importance of paraphrasing comes from the Nigerian-American author Chris Abani’s TED Talk, *Telling Stories From Africa* (2007):

> The first Igbo Bible was translated from English in about the 1800’s by Bishop Crowther, who was a Yoruba. And it’s important to know Igbo is a tonal language, and so they’ll say the word “igwe” and “igwe”: same spelling, one means “sky” or “heaven,” and one means “bicycle” or “iron.” So “God is in heaven surrounded by His angels” was translated [later into Cameroonian patois] as…“God is on a bicycle with his angels” (Abani 2007).

The identical spelling but different meaning of the two “igwe’s” leads to a comical translation of the Bible unless the passage that includes, “God is in heaven surrounded by His angels” (Abani 2007), is paraphrased. Paraphrasing would lead the translator to

realize that the passage's sense does not support translating "igwe" as "bicycle" or "iron," which may find its way into the translation if the Bible was translated word-by-word. A paraphrased English translation would be truer to the Igbo Bible's sense than the more absurd, metaphrased translation.

III.III Imitating

Imitation, the most radical mode of translation, gives the translator creative liberty to deviate from the source text's structure and content. As John Dryden explains, imitation allows translators to freely change the author's words and sense of the source text as they see fit (Dryden 17). For instance, Marcus Cicero imitates Plato's conversational style and ideas to create his own story, *On the Commonwealth*. Rather than a conversation led by Socrates, the Roman politician, Scipio Africanus Minor, hosts various government officials and or intellectuals for three days at his estate to discuss Rome's current political situation, the development of the constitution, and the role of justice in government, among other topics.

Cicero's work appropriates the *Republic* by changing the dialogue to better fit his language's conventions and to frame Plato's ideas in a way that is more relevant or appealing to his fellow Romans. In this way, imitation may be helpful in reinvigorating old or foreign ideas by making them more applicable to the translation or target text's contemporaries. The imitation process reflects this reinvigoration. As Cicero writes,

> I translate the ideas, their forms, or as one might say their shapes; however, I translate them into a language that is in turn with our conventions of usage…I [do] not have to make a word-for-word translation but rather a translation that

> reflects the general stylistic features (*genus*) and the meaning (*vis*) of the foreign words (qtd. in Friedrich 12).

The imitation process presupposes that language is only a mode of expressing ideas. Ideas must exist outside language for the same idea to be fitted “into the linguistic structures of one’s own culture” (12). Therefore, it is best to grasp the original author’s ideas (rather than adhere to the source text’s style) to create a new text aligned with the target language, making the ideas presented more accessible to the target audience.

There is considerable debate regarding if some imitations are translations at all. As John Dryden maintains, “when neither the thoughts nor words are drawn from the original…something new is produced” (Dryden 20). Some translation theorists see imitation as the lowest form of translation, if it may be called that. How free the translator is to disregard the original author’s voice in writing a noticeably different work and still consider it a translation is difficult to gauge. But because the translations included in this thesis are not imitations, we do not need to weigh in on this debate.

IV. Reading Translations as Works of Art

Evaluating translations of Plato’s *Republic* by their faithfulness to the source text’s lexicon raises the question, “Which translation is best (i.e., most faithful)?” The question requires us to know ancient Greek and is problematic when we consider words like *eudaimonia* for which we have no translation. *Eudaimonia* has at least three English translations: happiness, wellbeing, and human flourishing. Their senses may be similar, but they are not synonyms. Wellbeing, derived from the adjective “well” and the gerund of the verb “to be,” refers to a happy existence, whereas happiness describes an emotion. Human flourishing, on the other hand, describes a pleasurable state of being that an

individual thrives in, entailing a level of activity that is absent from the previous two words. Determining which is most faithful is not possible without knowing the source language and the cultural views that tie wellbeing, happiness, and human flourishing together. I am not in a position to read the source text in the source language. Rather, I can only read each translation as a product of or response to the standard interpretation of the ancient Grecian text.

The standard interpretation of Plato's work is responsible for similarities across different *Republics*, making comparison between them possible. For any professor choosing which translation to teach, this is pragmatically important, since Benjamin Jowett offers a different interpretation of Socrates' argument for censorship than Allan Bloom. Professors may want to teach a particular translator's argument to his or her students. Moreover, most people know Plato through the standard interpretation of his writings, which factors into the creation of any English *Republic*; otherwise, no two translations of the same passage would convey the same sense. In the spirit of scholastic exploration, we should evaluate these translations with the common understanding of the text in mind, since each translator's interpretation of the common understanding deepens our understanding of what so many of us know as "the *Republic*." But even if I could read ancient Greek and understand εὐδαιμονία as *eudaimonia*, I would run the risk of translating Plato's *Republic* rather than evaluating its English translation as a work of art.

Imitation is a more radical method of translation because it aims to create a text that "translate[s] the ideas…into a language that is in turn with our conventions of usage" (qtd. in Friedrich 12). An imitator uses the source text as a springboard to create a new text that tries to match the target language's "conventions of usage" (qtd. in Friedrich 12).

Evaluating translations as imitations centers on the question, "How well does this translation match the target language's stylistic features while capturing the source text's meaning?" I may be in a position to answer this question, but by synthesizing the goals of imitating and paraphrasing, a much more interesting question is raised: "What is each translation arguing?" There is value in each mode of translation, but I intend to read translations through this synthesized framework because of the question it raises.

The question, "What is each translation arguing?", demands evaluating each text as a paraphrase of the original and an art in its own right, making the translator a co-author. The translator, similar to an imitator, distills the original author's ideas or the common understanding of these ideas into their rewriting of the original text. But because language is a mode of expression, the translator, purposely or subconsciously, infuses his or her own interpretation into the text, creating new arguments alongside Platonic ideas. It is appropriate to think of the translator as a co-author.

Reading translations in this way is controversial because it entails seeing translations as containing a common understanding of the source text within the framework of a translator's thesis. Because translators cannot understand the *Republic* as ancient Grecians, they rely in part on a standard interpretation of the text. Their work then is a response to what many see as "the *Republic*." This position is predicated on the belief that the translator is not a neutral conduit through which Plato conveys his ideas. Plato's voice, if it ever breaks through, is irrelevant since we never have access to it. When I read or reread Benjamin Jowett, C.D.C. Reeve, Robin Waterfield, G.M.A. Grube, Allan Bloom, Tom Griffith, and Joe Sachs' *Republic*s, their voices are present throughout the text, showing themselves in everything from the text's physical layout to its footnotes

and the words used. We find a trace of C.D.C. Reeve's voice in the margins of his text as he writes each character's name (e.g., "GLAUCON:" or "SOCRATES:") next to their speech, making his work "the only translation [of the *Republic*] in which it is impossible to lose track of who is speaking" (Polt 458). Similarly, translators have the power to decide how long each character may speak, emphasizing the translator's voice by exerting power over the characters' voice.

We can measure this power by counting the number of words and sentences a character is allowed to use in comparison to his or her counterparts. Consider the table below, tabulating Thrasymachus' definition of justice (343b-d):

	Words	Sentences
Jowett (1894)	156	2
Bloom (1968)	167	3
Grube (1974)	169	4
Waterfield (1993)	201	3
Griffith (2000)	185	7
Reeve (2004)	177	4
Sachs (2007)	181	2

The table is "helpful in getting a first look at the textual object" (Yee 344). Each translation's word count and sentence count gives us an indication of how much space Thrasymachus was allotted to speak. At a first glance, Waterfield's (perhaps unintentional) decision to give 201 words to Thrasymachus conveys the sense that Waterfield places a stronger emphasis on Thrasymachus' response than Jowett had, giving Thrasymachus only 156 words. However, these numbers are only meaningful when looked at relationally. If Socrates' initial response to Thrasymachus' position (347b-e) is not far off in its number of words or sentences to Thrasymachus' position in either translation, neither translator has placed a greater emphasis on either character; both characters would remain equal in power at this juncture in the text.

As it happens, Waterfield allots Socrates 313 words while Jowett allots Socrates 304 words. The difference in speech between Jowett's Socrates and Thrasymachus is greater than the difference in the word count between Waterfield's Socrates and Thrasymachus. More attention is given to Jowett's Socrates than Waterfield's Socrates. Differences in word and sentence count conveys a difference in each translator's voice, possibly due to the writing style of their time period or their level of interest in the character. We find Plato's voice in the common understanding of the text when we come across his ideas, such as the existence of forms. But we only see these ideas through the way each translator presents them, subtly, as illustrated with Jowett and Bloom's translation in the beginning of this chapter. As the second title of this thesis suggests, "No Translation Is Innocent." Translations are therefore good or bad contextually.

Reading the *Republic* in the way I propose does not depend on knowing ancient Greek, falling instead at the intersection of philosophy, literary criticism, and pedagogy. Someone with a foot in philosophy and English but with no head for ancient Greek, like myself, is in a uniquely privileged position to evaluate translations in this manner. My understanding of translation, however, is in conflict with the standard interpretation of Plato's philosophy of language. As C.D.C. Reeve writes in his *Phaedrus* (265d-266a): "By defining each thing we can make clear the subject of any instruction…This, in turn, is able to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints" (Reeve 252). By carving nature at its joints, good language mirrors reality. We need look no further than simple subject-predicate sentences for an example of how good language "cuts up" reality.

The sentence, “Grass is green,” correctly designates the subject’s intrinsic property—greenness. And for Platonic metaphysicians, the passage carves reality in two, indicating the existence of physical objects (e.g., grass) and properties (e.g., green) such that the world is divided into physical objects and independent, immaterial, and non-temporal properties. A good translation within this philosophic framework should have the same truth-value as the source text. If *L’herbe est verte* (“Grass is green”) is translated from French into English as “Grass is not green,” the translator fails to accurately represent reality. Computer programmers working with various coding languages translate in this manner. Their code must have the same truth-value as the source code for a computer program to operate correctly. One code may be written more eloquently than another, but eloquence is largely irrelevant. This is not how we should treat literature.

Good translations of literature do not need to have the same truth-value as the source text because, in literature, how something is said may be more important than what is said. This is largely due to literature’s self-reflexive nature. All pieces of literature are products of their time, referencing the past and present during the text’s construction. Differences in connotation and meaning therefore are unavoidable in literature or art. While the way a computer code is written may indicate something about the time it was written by incorporating older pieces of code, it is not self-reflexive; literature aims to discuss an issue at hand along with itself. As each translator attempts to rewrite the *Republic* in English, they mention that the text is a translation (see Bloom 444, Grube 113, and Reeve 399), suggesting that translations of the *Republic* are neither the same text nor the same work.

A text refers to words contained in an author's work, a product given unique meaning by the circumstance under which it is read or interpreted. The ubiquitous story, "For sale: baby shoes, never worn," may share the same text as an advertisement in a newspaper, but the work is a story when read as a piece of literature indicating the possible death of a newborn. It is clear that source and target texts are not identical because their words and even phrases may be different. Moreover, the two are not identical because their context is different—one is the source text and the other is a translation. What connects all translations of the *Republic* with one another is that they each reference the common understanding of the source text. Rather than looking to find translations with the same truth-value as Plato's work, it is much more interesting to study how these translations are different from the source text and from one another. By engaging in close readings of different translations, we see how different translators carve out Plato's philosophy.

CHAPTER TWO

GENDER EQUALITY (451D)

Ὧδε. τὰς θηλείας τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν πότερα ξυμφυλάττειν οἰόμεθα δεῖν ἅπερ ἂν οἱ ἄρρενες φυλάττωσι καὶ ξυνθηρεύειν καὶ τἆλλα κοινῇ πράττειν, ἢ τὰς μὲν οἰκουρεῖν ἔνδον ὡς ἀδυνάτους διὰ τὸν τῶν σκυλάκων τόκον τε καὶ τροφήν, τοὺς δὲ πονεῖν τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν περὶ τὰ ποίμνια;

—Plato, *Πολιτεια*

I. Introduction

The previous chapter gave us the theoretical framework to read translations as pieces of art, but we will pace ourselves by tediously breaking the process into its elementary parts that, having been fully explored, we will assemble them into a complete reading of a passage from each translator's *Republic*. In this chapter, I analyze how translators frame or present the common understanding of a source text by studying different translations of Socrates' argument for gender equality (451d).

II. The Common Understanding

Disembarking from patriarchal values that dominated most of Western history, each *Republic* includes arguments for gender equality in education and serving the state, sparking a lively debate about whether or not Plato was a feminist (see Julia Annas, Steven Forde, and Patricia Scaltsas). Some contend that he believed in equality of the sexes whereas others maintain that he supported gender equality insofar as women provided utilitarian benefits for the city. Regardless, most scholars read passage 451d as "the suggestion that the guardian women should perform the same job as the male guardians" (Coudmoundouros), "another radical proposal…the education for and job of ruling should be open to girls and women" (Brown), and a revolutionary proposal for "the function of guardianship [to] be performed by men and women" (Kamtekar &

Annas). What is commonly understood as an argument for gender equality, this passage (451d) is really a careful consideration of the function of guard dogs.

The function of a guard or watchdog is to guard against and watch for unwanted persons; dog owners purchase or train dogs with this express function in mind. Guard dogs are not all male or all female because "reproduction [roles] do not disqualify one sex from the task of guarding (451d)" (Forde 659). While there are biological differences between the two, most of which may be mitigated by neutering or spaying the animal, sex is not considered when the animal is "hired." As Patricia Scaltsas explains, "Male and female watchdogs have the same nature and education because they have the same relevant nature (with respect to guarding)" (Scaltsas 128). Because there is no reason to force female guard dogs into domestic roles, we should similarly allow girls to receive the same state-sponsored education as boys and allow women to serve the state alongside their male counterparts.

With this in mind, how does each translator present or frame what we commonly understand as Socrates' argument for gender equality?

> **Bloom:** "Like this. Do we believe the females of the guardian dogs must guard the things the males guard along with them and hunt with them, and do the rest in common; or must they stay indoors as though they were incapacitated as a result of bearing and rearing puppies, while the males work and have all the care of the flock" (Bloom 130)?
>
> **Grube:** Like this: do we think that the wives of our guardian watchdogs should join in whatever guardian duties the men fulfill, join them in the hunt, and do everything else in common, or should we keep the women at home as unable to

do so because they bear and rear their young, and leave to the men the labour and the whole care of the flock (Grube 114)?

Jowett: What I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs divided into hes or shes or do they both share equally in hunting and in keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we entrust to the males the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave the females at home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their puppies is labour enough for them (Jowett 170)?

Reeve: SOCRATES: As follows. Do we think that the females of our guard-dogs should join in guarding precisely what the males guard, hunt with them, and share everything with them? Or do we think that they should stay indoors and look after the house, [footnote] on the grounds that they are incapable of doing this because they must bear and rear the puppies, while the males should work and have the entire care of the flock (Reeve 399)?

Sachs: "This way. Do we imagine that the females among the guard dogs ought to join in guarding the things the males guard, and hunt with them and do everything else in common, or should they stay inside the house as though they were disabled by bearing and nursing the puppies, while the males do the work and have all the tending of the flock" (Sachs 145)?

III. Observations

C.D.C. Reeve is the only translator of the five to add a footnote to his translation of passage 451d. The third footnote of Book V, added to the end of the question, "Or do we think that they should stay indoors and look after the house" (Reeve 399), situates

Socrates' speech in its historic moment. According to the footnote, Socrates' argument takes place during a time when,

> Respectable, well-to-do women lived secluded lives in most Greek states: they were confined to the household (see 579b) and to domestic work and were largely excluded from the public spheres of culture, politics, and warfare (399).

Reeve's footnote accentuates the point that Socrates' argument is revolutionary, not because of its sophistication but rather because it comes at a time when equality of the sexes was discouraged. Narratives are influenced by their place in history. But Reeve's work makes a greater argument when he refers to *Republic* 579b to support his characterization of the condition of ancient Grecian women.

Footnote number three finds support in a later portion of the text (579b) showing that Greek women were not equal to men during Socrates' lifetime (??-399 BC): "He is mostly stuck in house, living like a woman, envying any other citizen who goes abroad and sees some good thing" (530). This passage supports the first claim in the footnote and makes the point that any text, whether it is a piece of philosophy or a translation of an older work, may be used as a historical primary or secondary source. That is to say, Reeve's *Republic* and any other text should be studied in the context of the narrative's historic moment and read as depicting some historic period of time. Every author is influenced by the world around him or her, while translators are doubly influenced by the time in which the source text was written. Although the *Republic* is primarily concerned with politics, ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics, Reeve is offering his audience a way of reading the text as a historical document by presenting the argument with a note to his readers.

Whereas C.D.C. Reeve footnotes this passage, Allan Bloom indexes his translation by topic throughout his book, *The Republic of Plato*, occasionally cross-listing passages under multiple headings. Bloom indexes passage 451d five times under the following headings: “Common, community, partnership, *koinon*,” “Guard, *phylax*,” “Hunting,” “Man *anēr*, a male in the strong sense of the word, as opposed to a woman or a human being (*anthrōpos*),” and “Shepherd, *poimēn*; sheep” (Bloom 477, 481, 483, & 485). This short grouping gives us insight into the topics that are under discussion in section 451d. Socrates discusses changing gender dynamics in the city or *community* as it relates to the role of the guardians or *phylakes*. His example revolves around the idea that *hunting* is a skill that *men* and women share in. Dogs are hunters in the sense that they are aggressive to unwanted or alien individuals, but are protective like a *shepherd* of their owner, their *sheep*.

Bloom’s indexical notes are a useful tool for learning or teaching *The Republic of Plato* to first year students or individuals encountering philosophy for the first time. It allows readers to grasp difficult passages by indexing their topics and studying them in the way outlined above. *The Republic of Plato* presents a way of studying philosophy through reductionism, which is particularly useful for beginners. Additionally, Bloom’s index allows readers to visualize connections between different passages by observing their overlap. Eight other passages, for example, are listed under the heading, “Hunting.” What do passages 451d-451e and 611c say about hunting? Is there a philosophic argument being made here, and how does this argument function within *The Republic of Plato*? The connection between these passages may have something to say about the

nature of communities, a topic of interest in any piece of political philosophy, and should be explored in a different essay.

Unlike the previous two translators, Benjamin Jowett fills his book, *Plato's The Republic*, with marginal notes on almost every page. Passage 451d is no exception, with Jowett summarizing Socrates' argument to his readers: "No distinction among the animals such as is made between men and women" (Jowett 170). Because it is a micro outline of Socrates' argument for gender equality, this note compliments Jowett's other marginal notes, giving readers a glimpse into his (possibly) original outline as he translated Plato's *Republic*. These marginal notes give the reader an overview of the general flow of the philosophic argument(s) made throughout the text. The marginal note for passage 451d flows into the marginal notes on the adjacent page: "Women must be taught music, gymnastic, and military exercises equally with men" and "Convention should not be permitted to stand in the way of a higher good" (171). When all three notes are read together, we are presented with the passage's place in Socrates' argument for gender equality. But perhaps the most intuitive manner of understanding how passage 451d is presented is through the content of the translation, hedging on an examination of each translator's interpretation of the common understanding of the passage.

Socrates' question regarding whether guard dogs should be treated like women leads to primarily two presentations of the way mothers were viewed in ancient Greece: as incapacitated or disabled. Bloom, Jowett, Grube, and Reeve make the argument that common sense or *doxa* at the time would have it that women were "incapacitated" (Bloom 130), "unable" (Grube 114), "[had] labour enough for them" (Jowett 170), and more generally "incapable" (Reeve 399). The view that ancient Grecians believed that

women were unable to perform a man's job because of their work at home is a common understanding of Plato's work. By describing the effects of childbearing and childrearing as being inabilities, Socrates argues that in order for women to participate equally in guarding the state, they need to decide against raising children because it is incapacitating.

The argument against childrearing is not new for readers. Socrates restricts childbearing for women to the years between age twenty and forty, while men may have children between ages twenty-five and fifty-five (Jowett 184). Additionally, philosopher rulers do not have their own children. Rather, as Socrates explains, "'The wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent'" (179). Given these positions, it is understandable for Sachs to present *doxa* as dictating that women were "disabled by bearing and nursing" (Sachs 145). To the modern reader, a "disability" has connotations of permanency. Disabled by child bearing and rearing, a guard dog, for modern readers, surrenders the possibility of engaging in the public sphere. Joe Sachs is the only translator to translate the ancient Greek in this manner, but in context, the word "disability" does not suggest that women were permanently unable to receive an education and serve the state. Pragmatically, it is difficult to rule a city during one's pregnancy. We should read the word "disability" as denoting a temporary difficulty that can be overcome like an inability. In short, Sachs' usage of the word "disability" reminds us to be mindful of the modern connotations we attach to words as we read the *Republic* as a piece of art.

CHAPTER THREE

DOING YOUR OWN: POLITICAL JUSTICE (433A-B)

> *Ἀλλ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ἐγώ, ἄκουε, | εἴ τι ἄρα λέγω. ὃ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐθέμεθα δεῖν ποιεῖν διὰ παντός, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατῳκίζομεν, τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἤτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη. ἐθέμεθα δὲ δήπου καὶ πολλάκις ἐλέγομεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, ὅτι ἕνα ἕκαστον ἓν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν, εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη πεφυκυῖα εἴη.*
>
> *Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καί τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν.*
>
> —Plato, *Πολιτεια*

I. Introduction

Much of the way we read a text or understand the standard interpretation of a text is shaped by how it is framed, but an author's interpretation of its common understanding shapes the text's meaning by adding onto or subverting its standard interpretation. Therefore, the conclusions that are drawn by studying a translator's interpretation are more controversial and arguably more exciting than what may be intuited by examining how it is framed. Chapter Three attends to each translator's interpretation of the common understanding of Plato's definition of political justice (433a-b).

II. The Common Understanding

In a book that aims to define the conditions of an ideal city or *polis*, readers should expect to learn what justice is. Bloom, Grube, Jowett, Reeve and Sachs' character "Socrates" attempts to give us a definition of "justice" (Frede), "political justice" (Cooper 152; Coumoundouros), "the condition that most enables a city to flourish" (Singpurwalla 5), and "the just relations of persons and classes within the city" (Korab-Karpowicz). The common understanding of Plato's definition of political justice is each citizen doing the

work he or she is best suited to do, while avoiding any ambition to undertake another citizen's work.

The standard interpretation of the epigraph above comes from the ideal republic's class system, which divides men and women into four categories: slaves, artisans or merchants or farmers, auxiliaries or soldiers, and guardians or philosopher rulers. Citizens are placed in each class based on their respective levels of education, with the exception of slaves, the citizens of conquered states or tribes (see 535a-540c). Because social class in each translator's *Republic* is tied to education, it is worthwhile noting the ideal city's curriculum:

Discipline	**Age**	
Gymnastics, Science, and Mathematics	Until age 20	(Examination Follows)
Higher Sciences and Mathematics	Until age 30	(Examination Follows)
Philosophy	Until age 35	
Holding Government Office	Until age 50	

Failing any exam ends a student's educational career. When a student fails the exam administered at age twenty, he or she is forced to become a merchant, artisan, or farmer, whereas failing the exam administered at age thirty leads to one becoming an auxiliary. Guardians complete the full curriculum, philosophizing for the remainder of their lives and taking office when needed after age fifty. "Doing one's own social work" (Cooper 153) without meddling in other work equates to performing the job an individual earns. As W.J. Korab-Karpowicz explains,

> Each social class receives its proper due in the distribution of benefits and burdens…The producers [farmers, merchants, and artisans] supply the city with goods; the [soldiers] defend it, and the philosophers, attuned to virtue and

illuminated by goodness, rule it impartially for the common benefit of all citizens (Korab-Karpowicz).

What does each translator have to say about the standard interpretation of political justice (433a-b)?

Bloom: "Listen whether after all I make any sense," I said. "That rule we set down at the beginning as to what must be done in everything when we were founding the city—this, or a certain form of it, is, in my opinion, justice. Surely we set down and often said, if you remember, that each one must practice one of the functions in the city, that one for which his nature made him naturally most fit…

And, further, that justice is the minding of one's own business and not being a busybody, this we have both heard from many others and have often said ourselves" (Bloom 111).

Grube: Well, I said, listen whether I am talking sense. I think that justice is the very thing, or some form of the thing which, when we were beginning to found our city, we said had to be established throughout. We stated, and often repeated, if you remember, that everyone must pursue one occupation of those in the city, that for which his nature best fitted him…

Further, we have heard many people say, and have often said ourselves, that justice is to perform one's own task and not to meddle with that of others (Grube 97-98).

Jowett: Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the

foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted;—now justice is this principle or a part of it…

Further, we have affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us (Jowett 147).

Reeve: SOCRATES: Listen, then, and see whether there is anything in what I say. You see, what we laid down at the beginning when we were founding our city, about what should be done throughout it—that, I think, or some form of that, is justice. And surely what we laid down and often repeated, if you remember, is that each person must practice one of the pursuits in the city, the one for which he is naturally best suited…

Moreover, we have heard many people say, and have often said ourselves, that justice is doing one's own work and not meddling with what is not one's own (Reeve 381).

Sachs: "Well then, hear then whether I mean anything at all," I said. "Because from the beginning the thing we've set down as what we needed to do all through everything when we were founding the city, this, it seems to me, or else some form of this, is justice. Surely we set down, and said often, if you remember, that each one person needed to pursue one of the tasks that are involved in the city, the one to which his nature would be naturally best adapted…

And surely we've heard it said by many others that doing what's properly one's own and not meddling in other people's business is justice, and we've said it often ourselves" (Sachs 127).

III. Observations

The most glaring difference between these passages is their differences in length:

	Words	Sentences
Jowett (1894)	87	2
Bloom (1968)	106	4
Grube (1974)	94	4
Reeve (2004)	106	4
Sachs (2007)	117	4

The brief variation in the number of words and sentences between books affects the oral, rhetorical technique at play throughout the text. All translations of Plato's *Republic* sound like a play when read aloud, helping the text employ a rhetorical technique I call "affirmative dialogue." When we read any translation of the *Republic* aloud to ourselves or to others, we find ourselves repeating the affirmative answers other characters give to Socrates. In section 433a-e of the *Republic*, much of what we say after reading Socrates' dialogue runs along the lines of, "Yes, we did say that," "Yes, we have," "Yes, that must be so," "It certainly does," "Absolutely," and "Of course" (Reeve 381-382). Instances where Socrates is answered in the negative are in response to questions about what his companion knows,

SOCRATES: …And do you know what I take as evidence of that?

GLAUCON: No, tell me (381),

or motivate Socrates' philosophy:

SOCRATES: …Will they have aim in judging other than this: that no citizen should have what is another's or be deprived of what is his own?

GLAUCON: No, they will have none but that (382).

Speaking and hearing these words after reading, repeating, and listening to Socrates' speech in our own words influences readers to agree with Socrates and the translator's argument. Each passage's wordiness and or format positively or negatively affect the text's readability, enhancing or hindering this back-and-forth rhetoric. After all, reading Socrates' speech as two sentences rather than four changes the speed and flow of the speech, and hence our impression of the text. As discussed earlier, the length of a portion of dialogue may influence the power of the speaking character. But more important than the effect of a passage's length is its content. In discussing a passage's content, we begin to evaluate each translator's rhetoric or logic, which is included in our final judgment of each argument.

Allan Bloom's translation distinguishes itself from the others by using the word "rule" rather than the more common "founding" or "principle." The sentence, "That rule we set down at the beginning as to what must be done in everything when we were founding the city—this, or a certain form of it, is, in my opinion, justice" (Bloom 111), has a double-meaning centered on the word "rule." We may read Bloom's work in one of two ways: within the framework of a common understanding or as a reaction against it. To do the former is to define "rule" as principle, and mirror its usage to Grube, Jowett, Reeve, and Sachs' presentation of justice as the first principle of the city. In this way, Bloom's work is in line with the standard interpretation of Platonic political justice. If founded on the principle of justice, the *polis* will only have its citizens perform their own work to create a just city. But if we take "rule" to mean the exercise of power or authority, we can see the more perverse double meaning of Bloom's translation.

Understanding the word “rule” not as principle, but rather as the exercise of power changes the meaning of Bloom’s second sentence. Now, Socrates and his friends, the city’s founders, have the authority “as to what must be done in everything” as any dictator would (111). Taking this rule as a form of justice (“This, or a certain form of it, is, in my opinion, justice” (111)), Bloom changes the definition of political justice to fit the character Thrasymachus’ earlier proposal (338c): “‘Just is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger’” (15). It is important to note that the word “stronger” is expanded to “cover all sorts of superiority” in Bloom’s footnote to the passage (444). This is to say, might makes right in Bloom’s city, which we may unknowingly consent to by only reading “rule” as principle. If we read “rule” as the exercise of power and justice as the advantage of the stronger, we are in a position to see our common understanding of political justice as a tool for maintaining power.

Doing one’s own work and not undertaking another’s profession not only masks Bloom’s double meaning, but is also dangerous in the context of the more ironic definition. When rule means the exercise of power, the common understanding of Platonic political justice becomes a method of maintaining control over a given population. “The minding of one’s own business and not being a busybody” (111) prevents citizens from looking at another’s line of work and, fueled by jealousy, revolting against their lot in life. In short, the standard interpretation propagates the idea that government knows what is best for its people. Moreover, the educational system, which ensures that only the educated rule, is a tool for legitimizing the government’s rule while guaranteeing that only individuals in line with Socrates’ philosophy become guardians. We can find support for this interpretation of political justice by turning our attention to

the noble lie (414e-415c) that Socrates maintains should be told to the ideal city's citizens to "persuade first the rulers and the soldiers, then the rest of the city, that the rearing and education we gave them were like dreams" (94). Like any noble lie, it is told by guardians to maintain social stability while advancing their agenda—the establishment of a "just" state. Of course, if we do not read rule as power, authority or superiority, the last sentence of the passage reinforces the idea that a just city should be founded on the ideal of minding one's own business. But both readings of Bloom's *The Republic of Plato* (433a-b) should be thought over or taught at length, since it raises the idea that the most virtuous nations are at risk of devolving into tyranny. Bloom's ambiguous usage of the word "rule" adds a new dimension to the political landscape of the Republic, a creation that differentiates his work from Plato's original text.

In contrast to our unorthodox reading of Allan Bloom's translation, Benjamin Jowett's translation, which does not have a double meaning, follows our common understanding of political justice. The "original [or first] principle" of the state is "that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted" (Jowett 147). But unlike other translations, Jowett positions his work as a piece of literature. He does this through the use of literary devices such as metaphor, personification, and allusion; all of which require specific attention to his rhetoric. Jowett begins his literary interpretation by creating a metaphor by which Socrates and his friends set down the foundation of the ideal city just as stonemasons set down the foundations of buildings: "We were always laying down [the original principle] at the foundation of the state" (147). The reader is implicated in the task through Jowett's marginal note to the right of the text: "We had already found her [justice] when we spoke of one man doing

one thing only" (147). Being literally and metaphorically outside the text, Jowett tells his readers that we found justice when we first read that citizens should practice one thing only, making clear the definition of political justice in *Plato's The Republic*.

What may seem unusual to modern readers, but would have been commonplace to Jowett's contemporaries, is his depiction of justice. "We had already found *her* [emphasis added]" (147) genders and personifies justice, taking part in a tradition that dates back to the ancient Greek goddess of divine justice, Themis. Jowett's allusion to Themis situates his work in the Greco mythological tradition (something Plato or any ancient Grecian would have access to), pushing his translation onto the boarder of philosophy and literature in such a way that serves to make more clear what it is that we—Socrates, his friends, the translator, and the reader—are accomplishing: a discovery of justice itself, which since before Jowett's time was personified as Lady Justice. Any reading of Jowett's *Plato's The Republic* is as much a literary venture as it is a philosophic journey, raising questions regarding whether philosophic works are narratives in a similar way to traditional "literature."

Like Benjamin Jowett's book, G.M.A. Grube, C.D.C. Reeve, and Joe Sachs' translations participate in the standard interpretation of passage 433a-b. Justice for all three translators is "the thing which…we said had to be established throughout" (Grube 97), "what should be done throughout it [the city]" (Reeve 381), and "the thing we've set down as what we needed to do all through everything" (Sachs 127). But each translator is in dialogue with one another in a way that they are not with Bloom or Jowett. All three reference the form of the Good or "the cause of knowledge and truth…something yet beyond being" (Reeve 460). According to the common understanding of Plato's

metaphysical doctrine, the Theory of Forms, the Good is a supreme entity or the *summum bonum* responsible for the existence of images, objects, and ideas as well as the possibility of acquiring knowledge.

Socrates creates an ontological chain of being, The Analogy of the Divided Line (see passage 509d-11e), according to which things that are closer to the Good are more real, while things that are removed from it are ephemeral; things that are close to the Good give us knowledge, whereas things that are removed from the Good can give us opinions or beliefs:



When a translator writes about political justice such that it is "established throughout" (Grube 97), "should be done throughout" (Reeve 381), and "what needed to be done all throughout everything" (Sachs 127), he or she references the conception of the Good because their language reflects how the existence of the highest form is described; we may just as readily use these descriptions to write about the nature of the Good. It would seem then that political justice is not only useful in creating just cities, but also helps a city to be good. But a truly good city is unattainable, since justice itself is only a copy of the Good, while the physical world appears to only copy forms (see 72e-78b of C.D.C. Reeve's *Phaedo*). That is to say, a city made in stone rather than in speech cannot truly be just but only just-like, a point drawn from each translator's rhetorical usage of natural terms and its logical place in the Theory of Forms. This is an important point for anyone looking to establish the ideal city, although it certainly sounds disheartening.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PHILOSOPHER KING (473D)

Ἐὰν μή, ἦν δ'ἐγώ, ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέσῃ, δύναμίς τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἐφ'ἑκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ'οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, οὐδὲ αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία μή ποτε πρότερον φυῇ τε εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ φῶς ἡλίου ἴδῃ, ἣν νῦν λόγῳ διεληλύθαμεω.

—Plato, *Πολιτεια*

I. Introduction

To read a translation as an art in its own right is to evaluate how the author presents the passage and how he or she interprets the common understanding of the passage, both of which are used to create the translator's own argument(s). Recognizing these elements in a translation allows careful readers to see how each translator is using Plato's name and the *Republic*'s reputation to establish his or her *ethos* to make and strengthen an argument(s). Because we learned to evaluate a translation by how the author presents the common understanding in the second chapter, as well as how he or she interprets the common understanding of the source text in the third chapter, we are in a good position to read passage 473d through both lenses.

II. The Common Understanding

Perhaps the most commonly recognized thesis in any translation of the *Republic*, Socrates contends that the world will not be right "until philosophers rule as king" (Coumoundouros), creating the idea of a philosopher king or "the master of the noble dogs [philosophers]" (Colman 2). This thesis stems from the belief that for a city to be just, it needs to be ruled by aristocrats. Today, the word "aristocrat" has negative connotations of wealth and power, but in its purest sense, aristocrat means the best of

something. When we say that aristocrats should rule the city, we are really saying that those that are the best at ruling should rule the city, a point that is intuitively true if a real city should ever come close to being like the ideal city. To this end, Socrates proposes, “That the philosopher is best suited to be ‘king,’ because he possesses a theoretical understanding of justice” (Morse 693). Given that we want rulers to rule justly, our common understanding of this proposal is attractive if we change the word “king” to “ruler.” Just as we would not exclude a guard dog from working because of its sex, we should not prevent a man, woman, or hermaphrodite from ruling so long as he, she, or any combination of the three is a philosopher. In this way, “the just state depends on the wisdom of the philosopher kings” (Frede). The importance of this idea can be weighed by its influence on real world events, with the philosopher Karl Popper accusing the idea of a “philosopher king” as being responsible for the rise of totalitarianism in the twentieth century in his book, *The Poverty of Historicism* (1957). Furthermore, Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was inspired by the idea of a philosopher king when he became interested in Islamic mysticism (Anderson 2). As *The New York Times* explains, “Plato’s ‘Republic’…helped shape his [Ruhollah Khomeini’s] vision of an Islamic state led by a philosopher-king” (2). Having acknowledged the thesis’ importance, we are ready to read this passage as a work of art. How has it been reworked by each author?

> **Bloom:** “Unless,” I said, “the philosophers rule as kings or those now called kings and chiefs genuinely and adequately philosophize, and political power and philosophy coincide [footnote] in the same place, while the many nature now making their way to either apart from the other are by necessity excluded, there is

no rest from ills for the city, my dear Glaucon, nor I think for human kind, nor will the regime we have no describe in speech ever come forth from nature, insofar as possible, and see the light of the sun" (Bloom 153-154).

Jowett: I said: *Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue wither to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils,—no, nor the human race, as I believe,—and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day* (Jowett 203).

Grube: And I said: Cities will have no respite from evil, my dear Glaucon, nor will the human race, I think, unless philosophers [footnote] rule as kings in the cities, or those whom we now call kings and rulers genuinely and adequately study philosophy, until, that is, political power and philosopher coalesce, and the various natures of those who now pursue the one to the exclusion of the other are forcibly debarred from doing so. Otherwise the city we have been describing will never grow into a possibility or see the light of day (Grube 133).

Reeve: SOCRATES: Until philosophers rule as kings in their cities, or those who are nowadays called kings and leading men become genuine and adequate philosophers so that political power and philosophy become thoroughly blended together, while the numerous natures that now pursue either one exclusively are compelled not to do so, cities will have no rest from evils, my dear Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race. And until that happens, the same constitution we have

now described in our discussion will never be born to the extent that it can, or see the light of the sun (Reeve 425).

Sachs: "Unless philosophers rule as kings in their cities," I said, "or those now called kings and supreme rulers genuinely and adequately engage in philosophy, and this combination of political power and philosophy joins together in the same position, while the many natures that are now carried away to one of the two in isolation are forcibly blocked off from that, there is no rest from evils for the cities, dear Glaucon, or, I think, for the human race, and this polity that we've now gone over in speech will never before that sprout as far as it can and see the light of the sun" (Sachs 169).

III. Observations

Recall that in Chapter One, I addressed the implications of using the word "king" to describe the ideal city's guardians. The use of the word "king" in any translation of passage 473d ultimately stems from patriarchal values because it necessarily excludes women from ruling the city. However, it is important to note that a translator may have included it as a rhetorical nod to his or her predecessors. Allan Bloom, G.M.A. Grube, and Joe Sachs' translations are less misogynistic than Benjamin Jowett and C.D.C. Reeve's translations. Jowett writes that the world will not be right until "the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy" (Jowett 203) while Reeve explains the need for "kings and leading men [to] become genuine and adequate philosophers" (Reeve 425). Both of these translators exclude the possibility of philosopher queens. But with the need for "kings and chiefs" (Bloom 153), "kings and rulers" (Grube 133), or "kings and supreme rulers" (Sachs 169) to become philosophers,

women may rule the ideal city, as "chiefs, "rulers," and "supreme rulers" are not gendered. How each translator chooses to present the world's current rulers affects the possibility of gender equality in what four of the five translations refer to as the ideal city.

Only four of the five translations above reference the ideal city by calling it "our State" (Jowett 203), "the city we have been describing" (Grube 133), "the same constitution we have described in our discussion" (Reeve 425), and "this polity that we've now gone over in speech" (Sachs 169). Bloom's translation references a "regime" (Bloom 153), not a city. There is an important, logical distinction between a regime and a city or state. The word "regime" refers to an authoritarian government or rule imposed on others by a state's elite. A city ruled by philosopher kings is a regime in Bloom's *The Republic of Plato* because it reserves knowledge for those that, by the state's authority, must rule. While many today believe that education leads to political power, with the dissemination of knowledge creating a better city (460), Socrates rejects this notion. Because those that are knowledgeable must become kings against their will (519d-520a), the text suggests that knowledge in and of itself does not affect social change because it does not necessarily lead to political power. As Bloom writes, "Political power and philosophy [must] coincide" (153). If the two were already united, there would be no need for Socrates to propose the existence of "philosopher kings." The power to rule does not come naturally to philosophers since education does not guarantee political power. If we follow the standard interpretation of political justice, the idea that individuals should perform the task "for which his nature made him naturally most fit" (111), forcing philosophers to be kings or kings to be philosophers violates the standard interpretation of Platonic political justice.

Although a clear contradiction, philosophers must become kings for Socrates because only philosophers can turn knowledge into responsible power, whereas non-philosophers who overstep their boundaries and do the work of another by learning philosophy are not made more powerful. Rather, they are made more dangerous by it, not knowing how to properly use their newfound knowledge. The implication is that knowledge is no longer "knowledge" if it is disseminated to everyone, since knowledge is a good thing but would produce unfavorable outcomes if given to everyone. As Bloom explains in his footnote of the passage:

> …Knowledge cannot be transformed into wise power except in the person of the wise man, although unwise power can be made more powerful by the use of knowledge gained from the wise. It is natural for some men to be philosophers and for some men to be kings; but it is not natural for kings to become philosophers (460-461).

With the notion that Socrates proposes a model by which he forces others to do work that is not their own while denying that knowledge is good for everyone, it is easy to see why Bloom contends midway through *Plato's The Republic* that Socrates' ideal city is in fact an authoritarian regime. As stated in the previous chapter, this idea of the "ideal city" is, as stated in the previous chapter, only a stone's throw away from Thrasymachus' definition of justice.

Bloom's point that Socrates proposes that knowledge does not entail political power is maintained in four other translations of the passage, all of which mention the need to have "political greatness and wisdom meet" (Jowett 203), "political power and philosophy coalesce" (Grube 133), "political power and philosophy become thoroughly

blended together" (Reeve 425), and "political power and philosophy [join] together" (Sachs 169). But not all translations agree. Grube supports Socrates' proposal in his footnote to the passage:

> It is important to remember in this context that the word *philosophos*…[means] a lover of truth and wisdom rather than a philosopher in our more restricted sense. Plato does not mean that the world should be ruled by pale metaphysicians from the remoteness of their studies; he is maintaining that a statesman needs to be a thinker, a lover of truth, beauty, and the Good, with a highly developed sense of values (Grube 133).

Grube's depiction of the philosopher ruler as a lover of wisdom, which he argues has developed values and practical, worldly experience, is agreeable to all since he or she embodies political power and philosophic knowledge. This interpretation of Socrates' proposal is at odds with Bloom's view. The split occurs with how the rule of the city is depicted, most notably regarding the relationship between the nature of philosopher kings and political justice. But whereas these translations disagree, there is a unifying sense in all five translations that the city is a natural entity.

The ideal city is depicted and interpreted to be a natural entity. As Grube, Reeve, and Sachs write toward the end of their translation of passage 473d, without a philosopher king, the city will "never grow into a possibility" (Grube 133), "never be born" (Reeve 425), and "never before that sprout" (Sachs 169). This wording is not present in Bloom and Jowett's work. Instead, the two write that without philosopher kings, "nor will the regime…ever come forth from nature…and see the light of the sun" (Bloom 154) and, only with philosopher kings will "our State have a possibility of life"

(Jowett 203). All five translations are similar in their final few words about the city in their respective translated passages: "see the light of the sun" (Bloom 154), "behold the light of day" (Jowett 203), "see the light of day" (Grube 133), "see the light of the sun" (Reeve 425), and "see the light of the sun" (Sachs 169). Natural language is rhetorically used in each translation to describe the creation of the city, suggesting that it is natural for human beings to come together to create cities or communities. If each natural description were a proposition in a logical proof, the conclusion would be that human beings are by nature political animals. But whereas Aristotle argues in his *Politics* that humans are political animals because we are social creatures with the ability to communicate and reason, Socrates in each translation of the *Republic* makes the subtle argument that humans are political animals because it is in our nature to create cities, even in speech. This argument is supported earlier (369b) when it is explained that human beings create cities because "not one of us is self-sufficient, but needs many things" (Grube 39). For this reason, although there may be disagreement regarding if the city is ideal or nightmarish, the creation of a city is necessary.

CONCLUSION

The significance of how we choose to read translations has been *writ large* throughout our discussion of the *Republic*, namely in regard to differences between translations. Consider Benjamin Jowett and Allan Bloom's translations of passage 377c, as we had in chapter one:

> **Jowett:** Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad…(Jowett 72).
>
> **Bloom:** "First, as it seems, we must supervise the makers of tales; and if they make a find tale, it must be approved, but if it's not, it must be rejected. We'll persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved tales to their children" (Bloom 55).

It is easy to imagine two people—one only having read Jowett's translation and the other only having read Bloom's translation—arguing about whether Plato supports censorship. These two may argue to no end. In other words, without *stasis* or a point on which they can agree, these two will speak past one another. We should dissolve the dispute by the changing the goal of reading translations of art. Instead of reading a translation of the *Republic* as the source text, we should read translations as pieces of art as we have done in chapters two, three, and four, allowing us to attend to differences between translations such that out of old books comes new knowledge.

Unpacking the differences between the two translations in the previous paragraphs unveils potential political differences between these translators. Bloom's language, which refrains from the use of authoritarian terms, may indicate that Bloom

does not see Plato's idea as oppressive, whereas Jowett does. Or refraining from using the word "censor" may be the beginning of an underhanded, rhetorical technique at play in Socrates' speech, something we first stumbled upon in chapter three. In section 433a-b of *The Republic of Plato*, the word "rule" presents the possible tyrannical nature of the ideal Platonic city. If the word "supervise" masks Socrates' argument for censorship in the context of section 433a-b, as well as 473d (discussed in chapter four), Bloom may be working to make Socrates' argument more appealing or devious.

Our close reading of passage 377c, as well as the topics under discussion in chapters two, three, and four, layers our understanding of the *Republic* with the translator's intended meaning, allowing us to harvest new knowledge from our understanding of an older book. After reading this thesis, someone may argue that we should all learn ancient Greek because we cannot know what Plato writes by reading translations. Reading the *Republic* in ancient Greek is intrinsically valuable, but reading Plato's work in his own tongue does not bring us closer to Plato because we do not know what it would be like to read the *Πολιτεια* as one of his contemporaries would have. We can only approach the original text as a modern reader trying to put him or herself in an ancient Grecian's shoes to try to understand the text's nuances and connotations. Even if we knew what it was like to read Plato as an ancient Grecian, we would still not fully grasp Plato's meaning. An author's intended meaning may not be represented in the words that constitute the text. Realizing this epistemological gap, I bave proposed reading translations as pieces of art to help us glean a deeper and more complex understanding of the standard interpretation of Plato's idea, turning our attention away from what Plato may have said.

This thesis offers one way of reading translations and one purpose of translation, which is to disperse and expound on a foreign author's ideas. Different translations offer different perspectives on what we think of as the standard interpretation of a text. If American history students in Germany were to read different German translations of former President Abraham Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address" (1863), they would experience different interpretations of the speech *and* its historic moment. With each translation arguing a different thesis, these students would be in a position to weave together each argument into a coherent web of beliefs in the same way knitters weave different threads of yarn together to make a blanket. It is pedagogically and pragmatically important, then, for us all to read many translations of the same source text through the framework and methodology demonstrated in this thesis. After all, because there is no exact translation, no one translation is objectively right or wrong. Each translation unravels an aspect of what academics call "knowledge" and what metaphysicians have termed the "Absolute" or the "Truth," which, given our insistence that translations that contain the standard interpretation of a work are only good or bad contextually, leads us to abandon Plato's conception of truth in favor of a radically monistic attitude toward knowledge, diagramed below:



The Good (G), the centermost point of *everything*, is contained in each translation, with each translator intersecting the Good (Xº) in accordance with his or her respective perspective (Â). Each translation, therefore, contributes to the philosophic arguments made in works like the *Republic*. Because of the philosophic, pragmatic, and pedagogical usefulness of reading translations as works of art, translations should be taught using close readings to deepen a classroom's understanding of the subject material at hand.

It is most likely the case that well funded schools already differentiate the differences between a translation and the source text in classrooms, but the discrepancies between the haves and have-nots can be startling. This thesis then may be used to inform pedagogical practices for teachers and professors that teach translations as their corresponding source texts. But even for those professors that already make clear the status of a translation, which, I expect, is the majority, my thesis offers a unique way to crack open a translator's intended meaning in front of students. Therefore, if it is not already being used in the classroom, it should be.

Reading translations as works of art changes the function of translations from serving as a conduit for the original author's voice to reworking the original text in such a way as to present new and exciting interpretations of the common understanding of old and or foreign ideas. Each and every translation promises to do such a thing when read through the framework I have provided, with some new knowledge from Plato's old books examined in chapters two, three, and four. In contrast to those that maintain translation is a mode of "hearing" the original author's voice in one's own language, we now have the pleasure to "hear" the translator's voice.

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