Dedication:

I wanted to dedicate this thesis, and all the work that went into it, to all of the people who have supported me throughout this whole process. Thank you to my parents, Vinay and Kirti, who always kept me grounded and made sure that I was not stressing too much. Thank you to my friends, who forced me to take breaks and ensured that I remained sane. Thank you to Richa Patel for putting up with me and motivating me to complete pages and chapters. Thank you to my committee who provided helpful feedback and vibrant discussions. A special thank you to Jinee Lokaneeta for pushing me when I needed to be pushed and making sure that I was confident in my work. Another special thank you to Elizabeth Patterson for helping me throughout the research process.

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From Colony to Country:
Models of Decolonization and Their Application to Post-Conflict State Building

A Thesis in Political Science

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Abstract: Given the legacy of colonialism in Africa and the importance of the decolonization period to the development of African states as well as the number of states emerging from conflict situations, it is important to revisit and re-examine the methods through which the former colonies gained independence and ascended to the status of a nation state. This thesis will explore the different transition models employed during the decolonization period and how they can be applied to modern day post-conflict state building. In order to accomplish this, two transition models will be examined: the British Model implemented in non-settler African colonies and the French Model implemented in non-settler African colonies, with the central focus being placed on how transition policy during the decolonization period affected post-independence institutional stability. It will be argued that the more institutionally inclusive the political institutions were during the decolonization process, the more stable the institutions in the territory would be following independence. It will be further argued that the nature of nationalism and the role of the key leader during the transition had an effect on the levels of institutional stability that occurred. By examining the ideological visions of the decolonization models of the British and the French, as were implemented in the non-settler African colonies, and exploring how they were implemented in two cases, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, this thesis will demonstrate a divergence between vision and implementation. The focus of this paper will rest in evaluating the different models and how the outcomes can help inform a different type of transitional policy that can be applied today.

Keywords: Colonization, Decolonization, Colonial Policy, Assimilation, Indirect Rule

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

From the late 18th century to World War II, colonial empire building had been seen as a 'necessary' and 'natural' international practice, with many of the dominant powers taking part in the scramble for colonial holdings. Following the end of World War II, however, dominant international sentiment shifted towards a largely anti-colonial struggle to liberate non-self governing territories and ensure that the principles of self-governance and national sovereignty were upheld throughout the world. Major colonial powers began to discuss and adopt practices aimed towards exiting formerly conquered territories amid increased nationalist struggles and international pressure to conform to a changed world sentiment. Within 20 to 30 years following the end of World War II, many colonial holdings had transformed into and emerged as independent and self-governing states. It is important to examine the process through which this transition occurred, known as decolonization, for it impacted the events that occurred in the territories following independence. This thesis will focus on two different 'transition models' that were employed during the decolonization period from different actors, bearing in mind the crucial question: How did transition policy during the decolonization period affect post-independence institutional stability and therefore political institutionalization?

Although the reasons behind the emergence of decolonization practices is important in the political history of many parts of the world, the ways in which decolonization occurred holds broad implications that can be applied to issues being faced today. The decolonization period can be defined as an era of transition, where

dependent colonies were being prepared to take the reins of government and become a part of the independent nations states of the world. Many of these colonies were heavily dependent on the controlling power and lacked the necessary institutions or skills required to govern themselves without collapsing after a few years. In order to prepare the colonies for the independence, various decolonization practices were adopted with the general aim of aiding the colonies on their path to self-governance. This is not to say that there were no colonial powers that fought against the independence of their colonies, but by the 1950s almost all of the major colonizers were adopting practices that aimed at self-governance for their territories.

On the eve of decolonization, most colonial holdings lacked similar self-sustaining, stable, and strong institutional structures that would have allowed for immediate independence. Therefore, a system of institution building and transfer needed to take place, which manifested itself via the decolonization process. Just as modern post-conflict states often transition from one set of structures to another, so too did the former colonies. This study will focus on two of these transition models implemented in non-settler African colonies. Focus will be placed on examining whether the models had an effect on the emergence or absence of powerful institutions that may indicate relative footholds for stability in contemporary times.

Given the widespread prevalence of state failure and collapse, this thesis will strive to examine the following primary question: How did the transition policy of two colonial powers, the British and the French, in non-settler African colonies during the decolonization period affect post-independence institutional stability and therefore

institutionalization? As an extension, this thesis will delve into a secondary question concerning what can be learned from such transition models in reference to their application to modern day transitions in the form of post-conflict state building. By examining how states moved from dependence on a foreign power, without an independent national government, to constituting a nation, this thesis will be able to draw out key institutional features that helped guide countries during this crucial period of post-conflict state building.

This thesis proposes three main arguments that will serve to address the main research question. The first argument states that the more inclusive institutions are during the transition period, the more stable the institutional structure will be following independence. It is understood that there are various levels of inclusivity and therefore differing levels of institutional stability. This notion is a central component of this study, in that it is to be understood on a continuum rather than exclusively as dichotomous extremes.

Inclusiveness alone does not explain the institution stability during the post-independence era. Rather, it is mediated by the nature of nationalism within a given territory and the response by the colonial government during the transition period affects the stability of the institutional structure following independence. The second argument of this thesis states that nationalism plays a key role in the way that political agents interacted with existing colonial structures and affected the degree to which those structures persisted over the years. It will be argued that nationalism can run contrary to institutional stability for it could lead to the emergence of a single group mentality or

powerful party that often takes control of political and economic power. This allows for a greater risk of institutional instability, especially if it results in the subduing of opposition groups for the sake of national unity.

In addition, another argument that mediates institutional stability is the role of the key leader or the key party. This third argument follows that the more a key leader or party is promoted during the transition period within an institutional structure, the less stable the institutional structures will be following independence. The promotion of a key leader or group creates an unleveled political dynamic that favors the promoted individual or group, which may not necessarily align with equitable regional or ethnic distribution. This may also lead to authoritative control of the country by the leader or party outside of or instead of the described constitutionally prescribed institutional system.

In theory, the inclusiveness of institutional structures during the transition period should lead to more stable institutional structures following the end of the transition. This thesis, however, acknowledges that this does not always happen in practice. Other factors affect the levels of institutionalization and institutional stability and therefore need to be addressed. The nationalism and key leader arguments present examples of pitfalls that work against institutional stability and that need to be accounted for when approaching transition policy. What should be noted is that the institutional inclusion argument refers to the theoretical approach that was to be adopted, while the nationalism and key leader arguments refer to the challenges institutional stability faces in practice.

To accomplish these tasks and frame the arguments, this thesis will adopt the following structure. This chapter introduces the scope of the thesis, definitions of key concepts, the methodological framework that this thesis works within, the selection and justification of case countries and transition models that are discussed, and the scope of the thesis. Chapter II explores the British model of decolonization implemented in their non-settler colonies in Africa. Their colonial administrative structures, both in the home country and abroad, are examined in addition to their application via an analysis of the governance structures implemented in colonies such as Ghana, the former Gold Coast. Chapter III discusses the French Model of decolonization implemented in their non-settler African colonies, focusing on the French colonial reform period and the administrative structures and laws in place during the post-World War II era. The application of these colonial policies is examined in terms of Côte d'Ivoire, which serves as a case country for the French models. Chapter IV examines the post-independence developments in the case countries and chronicles the role key leaders and nationalism played in the evolution of the post-colonial states that mediated the possibilities of stability in each case. Finally, Chapter V provides some concluding remarks of this thesis' findings as well as some future research that can be pursued.

(a) Definitions

This section will attempt to draw parameters around what is included in the main definitions that will be discussed and adopted throughout this thesis. This study focuses on political institutions, which for the purposes of this thesis, refers to the rules of the game that define how a society functions. Even more, they are the "…collections of

structures, rules, and standard operating procedures that have a partly autonomous role in political life."[1] Drawing on the new institutionalism school of thought, this thesis will hold that institutions are not only tangible structures dictated by things such as constitutions and legal referendums, but also include the rules governing behavior, what is considered legitimate, and what is considered the norm. James March and Johan Olsen note that, "Institutions simplify political life by ensuring that some things are taken as given. Institutions provide codes of appropriate behavior, affective ties, and a belief in legitimate order."[2] Therefore, in this thesis institutions will include both constitutionally and legally created mechanisms through which governance and politics are enacted as well as the ways in which various political actors, namely political parties and opposition groups, and nonpolitical actors act, react to and coexist with existing schemes of rule.

Although there are a variety of different institution types, this study will focus primarily on political institutions. Political institutions refer to the rules and structures that dictate political incentives, power dynamics, and government functions.[3] They determine the bureaucratic and legal rules of a society including the way many of the other institutions, such as economic or social institutions, are formed and interact with one another. This is not to say that political institutions hold a primary status over all other institutions. Rather, they form and are formed by other institutions, which interact with one another on a variety of different levels. This thesis, however, will focus on political institutions.

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[1] March, *Elaborating the "New Institutionalism"*, 4
[2] Ibid, 8
[3] Acemoglu, *Why Nations Fail*, 80

It is further recognized that there are a number of institutions that play a crucial role in the composition of the state, including but not limited to educational, economic, cultural, and social institutions. The decision to focus on these political institutions stems from the fact that these institutions impact the allocation of resources and shapes the policies that govern other institutions. These structures dictate the rules by which society functions within and, by extension, who wins or loses because of them.[4]

The rules of the game dictate how a society functions and invariably creates and enforces different levels of discrimination or bias. Therefore, examining political institutions becomes paramount in understanding the development and relative levels of stability within a post-colonial nation. This is not to imply a unidirectional causal relationship between political institutions and other institutions. Rather, it is recognized that a bi-directional or multi-directional relationship could exist. The focus of this thesis rests, however, in the political institutions, the levels of inclusion of the indigenous populace, and how they affected the post-colonial nations after independence. Seeing as the 'rules of the game' are ultimately the main focus of this thesis, focusing on the structures that define them becomes paramount.

For this study, governance structures will refer to the hierarchical and bureaucratic structures in place that dictate how political and legislative decisions are formed, made, and carried out. Governance structures that will be focused on in this study include, but are not limited to, executive and legislative councils, colonial administration apparatuses, and government departments and organs.

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[4] Ibid, 79

In addition to institutions, this thesis will spend a fair amount of time alluding to the concepts of political and institutional stability and instability. For the purposes of this thesis, political instability will refer to states that have experienced coups, civil wars, or military rule for an extended amount of time and/or have highly extractive political institutions. Extractive political institutions refer to political institutions that "…concentrate power in the hands of a narrow elite and place few constraints on the exercise of this power."[5] Additionally, states largely dominated by a single party with a strong, charismatic leader will be regarded as politically unstable in the long run. Though short-term stability may appear from their rule, long-term stability is often predicated on the emergence of another popular leader who can replace him/her, making stability highly volatile. Institutional stability for this study will refer to the persistence of institutional structures and the extent to which political actors operate within the confines prescribed by a constitution, and reflect accountability and the relative distribution of power within society. When institutional and political stability are discussed in this study, the assumption will be taken that the levels of stability occur on a continuum rather than between dichotomous extremes, i.e. stable or unstable.

(b) Theoretical Framework

This thesis shall draw its base assumptions and theoretical direction from the new institutionalism school of political science, with a keen focus on historical new institutionalism.

[5] Ibid, 81

Institutionalism refers to the general methodological approach to examining and studying institutions, namely political institutions, and their social construction.[6] As part of the theoretical assumptions of new institutionalism, this thesis capitalizes on the notion that "Institutions have shown considerable robustness even when facing radical social, economic, technical, and cultural change."[7] This becomes of immediate importance given that the main point of institutional stability rests on the relative endurance of colonial structures in post-colonial countries. It is to noted, however, that the structures in place following the colonial period are not direct copies of the colonial governing structures. Rather, decolonization is taken, in this thesis, as a 'critical juncture'[8] that allowed for change to occur within the colonial schemata, thereby leading to the adaptation of the colonial structures rather than completely replacing them. A 'critical juncture' refers to events or factors that impact existing economic and political structures and distributions that may lead to the reinforcement of or change in existing institutions.[9] During and following the decolonization process, existing institutions from the colonial period were adapted and transformed to fit societal needs and conditions, therefore reinforcing the notion of institutional endurance.

Given these general new institutionalism assumptions, this thesis will operate under historical institutionalism, one of the main strains of the new institutionalism school. According to Elizabeth Sanders:

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[6] March, *Elaborating the "New Institutionalism"*, 4
[7] Ibid, 11
[8] Ibid, 12
[9] Acemoglu, *Why Nations Fail*, 101

> [t]he central assumption of historical institutionalism (HI) is that it is more enlightening to study human political interactions: (a) in the context of rule structures that are themselves human creations; and (b) sequentially, as life is lived, rather than to take a snapshot of those interactions at only one point in time, and in isolation from the rule structures (institutions) in which they occur.[10]

Historical framing will therefore be of central importance in this study as a way to gain a better understanding of the nature of current institutions within former colonial nations as well as examine which institutions endured and to what extent.

Additionally, this thesis' focus on decolonization and the transition from colony to country intrinsically calls for an understanding on the nature of institutional change. As stated before, institutions are enduring structures that do not readily change. Over time, however, various 'critical junctures' allow for institutions to evolve and be remade, though they most often contain the main overall core structural characteristics of the original institutions. The question then becomes, what causes these 'critical junctures' to occur in the first place? Historical institutionalists give three main explanations for this. One explanation states that institutional change is precipitated by the political and economic elites within a given nation and that change occurs in a top-down fashion.[11] A second explanation refers to the effects that social organizations, such as lobby groups, have on changing institutional structures, a change which occurs from the bottom-up.[12] The third explanation calls on the complex interactions between society and the state,

[10] Sanders, *Historical Institutionalism*, 39
[11] Ibid, 45
[12] Ibid, 48

citing the effects that social movements within a nation have on the changing of institutions.[13]

This thesis will examine each of these different interactions in order to demonstrate the evolution of colonial institutions towards institutions that support self-governance by the local indigenous populace. The top-down approach will be examined via the construction and development of colonial policy by policy elites in the colonizing country, who were affected by changing international norms and practices as well as their own domestic governing structures. This top-down institutional change will also be explained in the post-independence context via the role that key leaders or policy makers played in transforming or entrenching the institutional system. The bottom-up approach will be examined in reference to the rise of nationalist parties that agitated for independence and affected either the course of decolonization policy or the timetable in which self-governance was to be attained. Additionally, these nationalist groups persisted after independence, becoming the major political party, or parties, that affected the levels and instances of institutional change. Finally, societal interactions as a motor for institutional change will be examined via anti-colonial struggles and agitations for independence, both in the colonial territory and through international opinions. Taking any of these approaches independently will cost having a more open view to the complex nature of decolonization and overall institutional change.

As mentioned before this thesis shall operate in regards to decolonization transition structures and therefore within a framework of assumptions regarding

[13] Ibid, 50

colonialism. It should be stated at the outset that the colonial system was exploitative and extractive in nature. Therefore, it is important to understand that references to the level of institutional inclusion or perceived 'benevolent' decolonization practices occurred within a highly exploitative system. Additionally, throughout this thesis the term post-colonial refers to the period of time following the formal independence of the former colonies from the colonizers. Neo-colonial states are discussed when there is a significant and obvious involvement of a former colonial power within the bureaucratic and administrative functions of a post-colonial State.

The aim of this thesis, as was enumerated previously, is not to state that one model of transition is better than another. Rather, it is to examine the roles that institutional inclusion, nationalism, and the key leader played in the levels of institutional stability following independence and to extract lessons that can be learned from the different approaches adapted to different conditions in order to inform a more novel approach to modern State transition following a conflict situation. The different models are assessed on their successes and failures, rather than their effectiveness in relationship to one another. As this is the aim, the following two chapters address each model individually, outlining the main approaches and methodologies that were adopted. The analysis on the shortcomings and victories of each model are more synthetically discussed in Chapter V, placing focus on the specific struggles faced by each model and how they affected the outcomes that resulted.

(c) Model and Case Country Selection

In order to examine the different decolonization models implemented in non-settler African colonies and their effects on post-independence institutional stability, this thesis adopts the case study method. It allows for a detailed examination on how the different policies were implemented and how they played out in the post-independence era. Case selection occurred on two levels. First, the British and the French decolonization models implemented in their non-settler African territories were selected. Second, the cases of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire were selected using the Most Similar Systems design.

A number of nation states and international organizations or corporations participated in empire building, whether they called it that or not, during the various stages of the colonial era. As was stated previously, this thesis focuses on Great Britain (modern day United Kingdom) and France as the main actors.

Great Britain is arguably one of the most 'successful' empire builders, during the age of colonialism in terms of the number of colonial holdings, thus becoming the poster child for the indirect ruling method. Because of its importance as a hegemonic power prior to World War II and its influence in the colonial arena, Great Britain's decolonization approaches are de facto models that need to be examined if we wish to look at the major decolonization models in place during the shift from colonial rule to self-governance. The British decolonization models were applied over a number of colonial holdings and therefore reflect major transition models that were adopted during the time. This thesis examines the dominant British decolonization model applied to non-settler colonies in Africa.

Next to Great Britain, France was considered the biggest colonial power during and after the carving up of Africa. Having pursued its empire parallel to Great Britain, France amassed numerous colonial holdings in a number of continents by the eve of World War II. Because of its importance as a major colonial power, examining how France pursued decolonization will provide a second array of methods employed during the decolonization era. This thesis examines the French decolonization model implemented in non-settler colonies in Africa.

It is noted that there were a number of models that existed during the decolonization era, including but not limited to the Belgian model, the German model, and the Dutch model. This study, however, did not see them as major models within Africa. The purpose of this thesis, once again, is to see the main models implemented in non-settler African colonies, with the specific question of whether the application and inclusiveness of governance and political structures within a transitional model helps us understand the relative stability and/or instability in particular post-colonial countries. Chapter V discusses how the research can be expanded to include the other models that were dominant during the era and the implications this may hold for creating a transition model that could be applied today. Once again it is important, and crucial, to note that this thesis is operating under the base assumption of the inherently extractive nature of colonialism. Therefore nothing should be taken within in this thesis to be condoning colonial practices. Rather, the attempt is to empirically assess the methods that were adopted to transition former colonies from these oppressed states to self-governing territories will be examined and evaluated based on the idea of State structure transition.

It is at this point that it becomes important to note that the nuances of colonial and decolonization policy were dependent on the colonial power controlling and administering the colony as well as on the specific territory in which the policy was implemented. Colonial policy within the British Empire differed between those implemented in Asia and those adopted in Africa. Even within the African holdings, British colonial policy differed in construction and implementation among West Africa, Central and East Africa, and Southern Africa. This was largely due to the difference in the type of colony being dealt with. Some colonies with relative autonomy, which were largely settler colonies, had different sets of institutions and, in the case of South Africa, gained 'independence' relatively early on. This phenomenon was not only restricted to British colonial policy, but was also present in the way that France administered its colonies, with its main settler colonies being the North African territories. For the purposes of this thesis, non-settler colonies are examined in order to assess the transition process between colonialism dominated by a foreign power to a system in which local rule, in theory, was to prevail or not. Focusing on non-settler African colonies allows us to understand how institutions were further developed or ignored during the decolonization process in territories where the complication of European settler interests played little to no role in the construction of policy.

(d) Scope

In terms of the factors of post-colonial development and state stability that are examined, this thesis focuses almost entirely on institutions and their role in state

development. This is not to elicit, however, the misleading conclusion that good institutions are the only factor in state stability and development. It is accepted wisdom that other factors, such as but not limited to pre-existing ethnic tensions, racial discrimination, availability of resources, and global integration, play a crucial role in the development of the State. The development of political institutions, however, shape, are shaped, and reflect the underlying sentiments and intricacies within a given political system. Therefore, by examining political institutions and their functions, including the parts of the population with direct access to representation or the lack thereof, we are able to gain both a sense of underlying cultural, racial, and economic tensions that exist both during and after colonialism.

Although home policy is discussed to a certain degree, the full complexity of political dynamics at home is for the most part out of the scope for this thesis. Home politics refers to the political discussions and in-country party stances on a variety of issues relevant to the specific country in question. In the context of decolonization, this would refer to the political discussions surrounding colonial practices and the intricacies of parliamentary debates, including party alliances and voting blocs. This thesis refers to and explains some of the political dynamics that occurred during decolonization debates but does not delve into the full complexities of parliamentary or other political debates that occurred at that time. The prospect of further exploration of this area is explained more in the last chapter.

A further restriction of this thesis is placed on the geographical area of focus. Although it is recognized that colonization was widespread and colonial policy differed

from continent to continent, this thesis addresses colonial policy in regards to Africa, and more specifically in the context of non-settler colonies. Africa was chosen as a the continent of study due to the amount of countries with a history of civil wars, coups, conflict or other forced change or challenge that threatens the stability of the states and a history of colonial domination. Furthermore, focusing solely on Africa, where many transitioning and collapsed or failing states are geographically located, we can understand more fully the colonial factors still at play. This in turn allows us to pinpoint specific persisting colonial issues that needs to be addressed if progress is to be made in understanding whether the differences in transition policy had an impact on the outcomes in the various former colonies. It also follows that the successes of colonial practices during the time of transition can help inform us of general practices that have worked in specific contexts. Though the cases studies will be primarily located in Western Africa, colonial policy is discussed in a more general sense as well, as it applies to former non-settler colonies.

It is important, however, to note from the outset that colonial policies and decolonization practices differed from region to region even within Africa. Therefore, this thesis strives to highlight the ideological vision of decolonization transition policy in general and how it played out in the context of the two case countries. General conjectures on the absolute success of a specific practice due to a success in a singular case study are and should be avoided. Rather, the case countries will serve to demonstrate how the decolonization policies were put into practice and the outcomes that followed in the post-colonial era. Focus is placed on how the ideological visions of institutional

transition diverged from practice and how it can inform modern day post-conflict state building efforts. Though the scope of this thesis is limited, there are important implications that can be taken from this study. The main focus of this thesis is to open up the discussion on modern day transition policy to include models used during the decolonization process and observations that can be derived from them. This thesis discusses general models and the levels of institutional stability and addresses how the observations can be applied to modern day post-conflict state building. Doing this allows us to approach modern day state building practices from a different angle, thereby opening up a different way of thinking that may aid in fostering long-term stability in nations following state collapse. By understanding the mistakes that were made during the decolonization transition period within former colonies, we will be more able understand what practices need to be avoided in terms of modern day post-conflict state building. In order to accomplish this, this thesis examines the levels of institutional inclusion in the different non-settler African decolonization models of the British and the French and how nationalism and the key leader affected institutional stability in the post-independence era.

CHAPTER II: THE BRITISH MODEL

By the eve of World War I, Great Britain retained its place as a hegemonic power, with colonial holdings in Africa and Asia. Following the end of World War I, however, and especially World War II, British power began to wane and international sentiments began to become increasingly anti-colonial, pushing the British to take steps to dissolve its empire. With the loss of its hegemonic status and under increasing pressure from the United States ,the United Nations, and its own economic burdens, Great Britain shifted its focus to decolonization policy. This chapter will focus on the British model of decolonization implemented in non-settler colonies within Africa, emphasizing how the British developed an ideological decolonization policy emphasizing institutional inclusion, the role that nationalism had on the actual implementation of the policy vision and how this British model adapted accordingly.

The British model in these colonies placed more emphasis on indigenous participation in local administration, which allowed for increased political education of a rising elite who would take on the mantle of governance following independence. This chapter argues that this British model was more susceptible, i.e. changed more readily, to factors of institutional change. What emerges is a model that focused more heavily on the evolution of institutional structures and the inclusion of indigenous political elites.

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the main administrative apparatuses used in colonial policymaking, namely the Colonial Office, as well as the main colonial administrative approaches adopted in order to control and maintain their colonial holdings. This is followed by a discussion of the events leading to decolonization and the

process itself, with the key components of institutional inclusion and nationalist movements being highlighted. The third section examines the colonial practices within the context of Ghana, observing the implementation of the decolonization vision implemented by the British and the emergence of a key leader as well as nationalist groups, honing in on how they interacted with the existing colonial structures. The last section provides a brief summation of the major points in the chapter as well as its main conclusions.

(a) Administering an Empire

In order to understand how the British approached decolonization, it is important to understand how they approached colonial policy. The administrative structures at home tasked with developing colonial strategies, with its inefficiencies and efficiencies, and the colonial strategies themselves speak to the way colonialism was implemented in the various territories and the institutions that resulted from them. This section outlines some key aspects of the British administrative structure and the ideological way they approached colonialism. British colonial policy went through eras of testing and restructuring, from the failure of maintaining and properly administering the American colonies to the experiences in Asia following World War II. Throughout Great Britain's colonial legacy, adaptation, evolution, and necessity stood out as the defining characteristics moving forward towards eventual decolonization in the colonial holdings. The British drew lessons from failures and restructured policy in response to them, allowing for a more coherent decolonization approach, especially in its African holdings.

Examining the workings and obstacles faced by the main administrative policy apparatus of the British Empire at home allows for the examination of the top-down mechanics of colonial administration and how they affected change within the system. Additionally, the bureaucratic efficiencies or lack thereof speak to the coherence or incoherence of the approach to decolonization policy. Generally speaking, British colonial policy was officially dictated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who in turn answered to the Cabinet. Colonial policy, however, was not solely created and implemented by the Secretary in practice. On the contrary, inter-departmental relationships within Whitehall, the workings in the Colonial Office, and the individual colonial governments all had a role when it came to shaping and discussing colonial policies and strategies to be applied to various corners of the British Empire.[14] Among these key administrative apparatuses, the Colonial Office played a key role in the development of colonial policy discourse, regardless of the lack of political sway and power it had at any given point.

In the British colonial system, there were different delineations of colonial holdings, which each had different levels of autonomy and therefore different policies. As of 1907, the Colonial Office was split into two main departments, the Dominions department and the Crown Colonies department. This organizational scheme was placed as an overarching framework over the traditionally geographically dependent sub-departments. Within the Colonial Office, "[t]he Dominions Department…covered all the dominions (as the self-governing colonies were coming to be called)…It was concerned

[14] Porter, *British Imperial Policy and Decolonization*, Volume 1, 12

with crown colonies only in those cases where contiguity with a dominion meant that the conduct of their business 'must necessarily be in the same hands…"[15] All other colonies were placed under the Crown Colonies Department within the Colonial Office. In 1925, the subject of dominion affairs became the responsibility of a separate government department, which would later transform into the Commonwealth Relations Office following World War II.[16] The distinction made between the Crown colonies and the Dominions present an interesting view on the administrative differences inherent in the differing nature, or differing stages of the self-governing process, of various territories. This speaks to the seemingly evolutionary nature of British colonial policy, though it may not have been intentional. By providing a hierarchical delineation that designated the differing stages of colonial development, it allowed for a base system of institutional evolution, which would serve as a base for the evolutionary approach to decolonization.

In terms of the colonial policy implemented in the non-settler colonies, the British placed more emphasis on implementing indirect ruling systems. Indirect rule refers to the usage of pre-existing local and traditional structures to administer, maintain, and dispense law in the territory being colonized. The theoretical underpinnings of such a practice rested in the notion that using pre-existing structures would allow for the lessening of local uprisings and the maintenance of order.[17] In terms of British colonial policy in the non-settler colonies in Africa, this was first successfully implemented in the colonial holding of Nigeria, where military necessity and lack of British colonial officials within

[15] Cross, "The Beginning and End of the Commonwealth Office", 113-4
[16] Ibid, 114
[17] Post, "British Policy and Representative Government", 35-36

the colony necessitated the usage of localized structures in order to maintain a grip on the territory after conquest. The implementation of the indirect rule policy was spread throughout the other West African colonies and existing colonial policy in other regions were adapted to fit this model in one way or another. [18] Although indirect rule has its place as the main British colonial practice during the colonial period, it was not without critics, especially from the native populations. Some local populations saw that the indirect ruling system acted contrary to local interests, with many chiefs and appointed officials looking towards the governor and the capital rather than to their people.[19] Additionally, the indirect ruling structures adopted early on did not include the rising educated elite in the country until later in the late 1940s. These educated elites became one of the main sources of nationalist struggles throughout the 1920s and up till independence.[20] The importance of the indirect ruling system rests on the fact that it allowed at least some type of local institutional building, however selective, which thereby allowed for the training of future political elites within the given territory.

(b) Decolonization and the March Towards Self-Governance

Having discussed the main British colonial practice instituted in many of the non-settler African holdings, we can now turn our attention to the major pushes towards decolonization that occurred on the eve of, during, and after World War II. A combination of societal and bottom-up pressures pushed Britain to adopt colonial reforms, and eventually decolonization policies, lest there be a large eruption of violence.

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[18] Ibid, 35
[19] Ibid, 35-37
[20] Ibid, 40

Events leading up to World War II

The workings of the Colonial Office and the changes in policy prior to World War II demonstrated a movement towards institutional changes within the colonial apparatus, in part spurred on by the slow rise of nationalist movements and societal agitation for less exploitative and politically equal practices. Additionally, investments in education had the effect of creating an educated elite that would provide a basis upon which nationalist movements would grow and political parties would develop, each pushing for institutional change that would ultimately result in independence.

The economic depression that plagued the globe in the 1930s began to cause farmers in some of the African colonial holdings to become restless, many of who were vocally against British exploitative practices. This vocal opposition eventually gave way to the outbreak of riots in some of the colonies.[21] It is at this point that we begin to see more prominently the interactions between society and the State, in this case the colonizing power, in order to precipitate institutional change. In order to combat this and to follow the British colonial tradition of colonial self-sufficiency, the Colonial Office under MacDonald, began to push for reforms in the area of colonial development.[22] This included providing and promoting education within the varying colonies as well as the adoption of social programs aimed at building infrastructure, such as telecommunications, railroads, and other technical systems. Prior to World War II, the British crown financially supported and endorsed the creation of technical schools that would train and educate a class of rising elites within the society. In order to pay for the

[21] Porter, *British Imperial Policy and Decolonization*, Volume I, 14-16
[22] Ibid, 16-17

costs of education, the British government used some of the funds gained from crash crops within the colony and reinvested it in education. By 1936, talks of including this new class of elites into the governing structures of the colony began to draw more attention.[23]

It is important to note that all of these practices, though they benefited the indigenous population, were not necessarily founded in an altruistic desire on the part of the British to help out the local population. The British's practices were deeply connected to self-interested notions of developing the colony to make more of a financial gain or to ensure that colonial subjects remained loyal to the British crown and increase any profits that would result.

World War II and Its Aftermath

The outbreak of World War II placed significant economic strains on the British Empire, which resulted in the limitation of the Colonial Office to follow through with reforms during and after the War. Therefore, MacDonald's plans at reforming colonial development policy, which included increases in monetary allowances that aimed at supporting areas such as education and infrastructure, came under attack. MacDonald, however, was able to safeguard the colonial development reforms during the war by claiming that there was a linked and interdependent relationship between social welfare development and the economic benefits that both the colony and the empire could gain.[24]

> Political planning during the war was essentially an administrative exercise and was often little influenced by indigenous colonial or 'nationalist' demands. Progress towards self-government, it was held, depended upon economic advance

[23] Ibid, 17-18
[24] Ibid, 19-20

> which in turn necessitated improvements in the machinery of the colonial state. The integration of divided societies was one aspect of such administrative reform; another was the closer association of territories in regional groups.[25]

In order for economic advancements to occur in the colonial holdings, a certain degree of evolution of the political institutional structure needed to take place. Increased economic productivity and output predicates itself on having a workforce able to conduct the tasks assigned to it and have a structure that could ensure that everything is running efficiently. This necessitated the need for increased education, infrastructure, and technological advances that all had an effect on the development of the colonial territory. Additionally, political structures needed to keep up with the rising class of educated elites and their demands for representation, thereby increasing the push for more inclusive political institutions for them on a local level.

Still the meetings of the Colonial Development Committee, tasked with formulating the specifics of the policy to be adopted, were suspended and the Colonial Office was faced with a dual responsibility to the British tax payer, i.e. not squandering funds that could help provide relief, and to the colonial subjects, i.e. protecting the achievements of colonial administrations and the interests of the local populace.[26]

By the end of World War II, the British found it increasingly difficult to maintain its grip on its expansive empire. This struggle, due largely in part to political and economic factors, resulted in discussions on the eventual and gradual movement of the colonies towards self-governance, though the term ‘independence’ was not mentioned. Aside from the economic strains plaguing Britain, the decision towards opening

[25] Ibid, 32
[26] Ibid, 18

discussions of self-governance was largely due in part to two main factors: (1) changing international sentiment and (2) experiences with nationalist movements.

Following World War II, Great Britain no longer commanded the amount of power it once did during the height of the colonial era. With the new hegemonic rising of the United States and the Soviet Union, both of who had strong anti-colonial attitudes, as well as the push in the United Nations for decolonization, Great Britain found itself with the need for institutional change.

> The Second World War heightened both the harsh reality and the rhetoric of imperial commitments. On the one hand it revealed Britain's inability to defend a two-hemisphere empire, plunged the country deeper into debt, encouraged nationalist resistance and subjected Britain to American anti-imperialism.[27]

Largely spearheaded by American anti-colonialism and the ideas of free trade practices that went along with it, colonial discussions shifted to talks on the attainment of self-determination of peoples in non-self governing territories. The effects of World War II, both politically and economically, had an important effect on the colonial reforms that resulted during the post-World War II era.[28] Therefore, World War II provided a "critical juncture" in the institutional evolution of the colonial institutional apparatuses.

The era following World War II also saw the loss of some of Great Britain's colonial holdings in Asia due in part to strong nationalist movements, which necessitated the need for power transfers in those holdings.[29] The explosive nature of the nationalist movements and the violence that accompanied them prompted the British Crown to adopt practices in order to ensure that levels of violence of that magnitude were not present in

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[27] Porter, *British Imperial Policy and Decolonization*, Volume I, 25
[28] Ibid, 25
[29] Low, "End of British Empire in Africa", 34

the African holdings. Responding to violent nationalist uprisings was costly and required a fairly large amount of manpower. In order to avoid having to deal with outbreaks of violence of this caliber, the British decided to pursue the route of self-governance for its holdings in order to secure its own national and international interests.

General Approach To Decolonization In Non-Settler African Colonies

In trying to come up with a plan for the decolonization of the non-settler colonial holdings in Africa, the British focused on gradually leading the colonies towards self-governance through a set of general and specific overarching policies. In 1946, discussions on the direction of colonial policy centered on developing the colonies and their resources to benefit both the colonial subjects and ensure that the difficulties faced by the British in regards to nationalist groups were mitigated.[30] In keeping with tradition, the British model in the non-settler colonies in Africa was one of an evolutionary nature. This evolutionary model focused on the progression from Crown Colony to Dominion to Self-governing State.

The general set of policy prescriptions given for the march towards self-governance in these African holdings were founded on creating and supporting a system of sustained development within the colonies. This included investing in agriculture, transportation, and education. Education of the colonial subjects became a key point in British colonial policy, as it was argued that colonial universities allowed for the education of future leaders in the colony. This, in practice, proved to be difficult to

[30] Ibid, 35

achieve given the increased agitation of nationalist movements for a more expedient move towards self-governance.[31]

Colonial development policy was not new in British colonial policy circles and was in discussions prior to the start of World War II under MacDonald's plan for colonial development in the Colonial Office. There was an emphasis being placed on the importance that economic development played in the achievement of self-governance in the territory as well as for the benefit of the British Crown. Discussions on development policy focused mainly on how the political development of the colonial holdings was less important than developing and investing in education, training of local African authorities, and the economic growth. These were seen as a prerequisite for the achievement of self-governance down the line.[32] Following World War II and part of the general policies adopted, emphasis was placed on revising and restructuring the indirect ruling schemata that was in use by the British during the pre-World War II era, with focus being placed on further developing local government. Moving away from an older chief-oriented local structure to one including a younger native administration allowed for local government activity to focus on advancing the development goals set out by the British Crown. Additionally, such a system was seen as a way of building the foundation for a new government system that would persist when the colony became self-governing. This system change also allowed for nationalist politicians to become more locally oriented, giving them some semblance of political training to the extent reachable within the colonial framework. All in all, keeping with the Cold War tradition, the British aimed

[31] Ibid, 35
[32] Ibid, 39-40

at instilling democratic principles and ideals within the developing society.[33] This was a way of imbedding its institutions within these colonies.

Though development was a key issue as a general policy going into the decolonization period for the British, the Colonial Office still did not command a sufficient amount of political power to exert influence. However, as development became more and more central to development plans throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, the Colonial Office soon began gaining in relevance. The focus on development was also two pronged, in that it helped develop the colonies for self-governance as well as provided a means for the British government to supplement funds for at-home reconstruction without relying too heavily on American funding.[34]

The specific policies that were adopted by the individual colonial governments in the non-settler colonies in Africa were aimed at developing responsible self-governance. The specific nature of these colonial practices depended on each individual colony and varied from region to region. The differentiation by region is noteworthy due to the differing circumstances they were under. The non-settler African colonies, mostly in British West Africa, contained low levels of English settlers, most of who were colonial service members or British government officials.[35] In regards to the decolonization practices adopted:

> The principle features…were paternalism, gradualism and international co-operation through regional machinery. Britain welcomed United Nations participation in regional defence but insisted upon her sole right to administer her colonies; and while she declared that it was 'the duty of "Parent" or "Trustee"

[33] Ibid, 35-36
[34] Ibid, 44-45
[35] Ibid, 36-37

> States to guide and develop the social, economic and political institutions of the Colonial peoples until they are able without danger to themselves and others to discharge the responsibilities of government,' the draft refrained from mentioning independence, let alone a timetable for political advance.[36]

Though the British Crown, like other colonial powers, made a distinction between the strategies adopted in the differing regions, many African nationalist groups ignored such distinctions, dismissing them as unimportant in the march towards self-governance. Indeed the nationalist struggle was focused more on achieving independence in the fastest way possible.[37]

Challenges Faced By The Model

Though the development plan adopted as official British colonial policy did provide for a smoother transition between non-self governing and self-governing status in theory, it was not as easily carried out in practice. Rather, a number of policy complications were encountered by policymakers that led to a number of changes within the policy scheme and the timetable towards independence. For one, the development plan put into place by the British called for an increase in British officials present in the colonial holdings. This presented a problem as it was seen as a second wave of colonial invasion. Additionally, the nature of the development reforms that were being discussed called for a degree of authoritarian implementation and oversight. This did not sit well with nationalists.[38] Secondly, the democratically elected local governments were not always developmentally interested, thereby making it hard for the implementation of

[36] Porter, *British Imperial Policy and Decolonization*, Volume 1, 29
[37] Low, "The End of British Empire", 38-39
[38] Ibid, 45

development policy.[39] Thirdly, the creation of trade unions by British policy makers became a tool to enhance nationalist agitation.[40]

This last issue regarding trade unions is important in understanding the role that nationalism played during the transition period and the methods they used. Throughout the British decolonization process in the non-settler African territories, the role of nationalist actors was prominent. Nationalism was present prior to World War II, but increased in influence following it. The stationing of colonial troops outside of the colony allowed for the soldiers to see that anti-colonial sentiments were rising and that independence was looming on the horizon. Additionally, the growing discontent following the 1930s depression fed nationalist fires as many people flocked to nationalist groups to oppose exploitative practices by the British Crown. The main focus that nationalist movements had, therefore, was not on how to recruit the populace to their ranks. Rather, it was placed on organizing the anti-colonial population in a manner that would prove to be useful and effective.

This rising nationalist wave in addition to the economic difficulties faced by Great Britain following World War II, demonstrated that unwanted colonial violence for independence might be looming on the horizon. The British Crown realized that the scale and expansive nature of the colonial empire made it extremely difficult to provide sufficient troops to quell uprisings in each individual territory. Additionally, a number of wars for independence in the colonies would have huge human costs.[41] Therefore, the

[39] Ibid, 46
[40] Ibid, 47
[41] Ibid, 54

British Crown began to force a speed up of their development plan, focusing less on original planning and more on preparing the colonies as much as possible before independence. The task for British officials then evolved into presiding over constitutional conferences and urging them to join the commonwealth after independence was achieved.

Thus, it can be seen that nationalism played a key role in pushing forth and modifying British plans regarding self-governance of colonial territories. However, British policy was heavily influenced by the indirect ruling method that was championed during colonial administration. The idea of localized structures allowed for the British to include, even if it was selective inclusion, indigenous leaders, educated elites, and the general population into governing structures, which allowed for stronger institutional transition. The implementation of these policies often differs from the ideological vision. The next section will examine the British decolonization model within the context of the Gold Coast, modern day Ghana, and how the vision was put into practice.

(d) Structures in Practice: Ghana (Former Gold Coast)

Having a general grasp on the official British colonial policy to be implemented in the non-settler African colonies, we can now turn our attention to examine the Gold Coast, modern day Ghana, and the evolving local administrative apparatuses throughout the decolonization period. The Gold Coast will be used to examine the implementation of the British Model for non-settler African colonies and how it played out in practice. Focus in this section will be devoted to examining the local institutions in place in Ghana for the purposes of colonial administration and the changes they underwent in terms of

inclusivity during the decolonization process. Additionally, the role of nationalist groups in the process of institutional change and the creation of the Convention People's Party (CPP) will be chronicled. This section will also include the rise of Kwame Nkrumah, who would become the face of the Gold Coast's transition into Ghana and subsequently become its first leader. What will be observed is that the local institutions imposed by the British allowed for political and institutional inclusion, however selective, which lead to the emergence of a key nationalist group, party, and leader.

Pre-World War II Structures and Events

It is important to note at the outset the regional dynamics that affected the emergence of different nationalist groups, the equity of inclusion, and the political dynamics that resulted. The Gold Coast colony, established in 1874 as a British Crown colony, comprised of three regions: (1) the coastal regions, (2) the Ashanti region, and (3) the Northern territories. Though the 'unification' of these territories occurred in 1902[42], each of these territories had varying amounts of representation at the different stages of self-governance development. The differences and varying interests between these three areas gave rise to different nationalist movements, which would become different political parties that agitated for either the attainment of self-governance and independence, in the case of the movement that emerged from the coastal region, or for the continued involvement of the British out of fear of being subjugated by the power of the coastal region. This formed a divide within the society and reflected the relative power imbalance that has its roots in the selective inclusion of some areas into the

[42] McLaughlin, "Historical Setting", 17-18

political institutions. This is important to the development of the political institutions for it opens the way for the political party system that is inherent in democratic societies, such as the one that Great Britain tried to impart to its colonial holdings during decolonization.

With this in mind, we turn our attention towards the institutional structures implemented within the Gold Coast as well as the evolution of the inclusiveness over the years. Emphasis in British colonial policy was given to local governance and the building of local institutions. Among the non-settler African colonies, a system of dividing main colonial governance between two councils was a standard practice, having a colonial Governor at the helm of colonial administration.[43] First there was the Executive Council. This Council "…was a small advisory body of European officials that recommended laws and voted taxes, subject to the governor's approval."[44] The other main governing body throughout most of the pre-World War II era was the Legislative Council. Unlike the Executive Council, this Council "…included the members of the Executive Council and unofficial members initially chosen from British commercial interests."[45] However, three chiefs and three other African representatives were added after 1900. The African representatives were chosen from the Europeanized areas of the Colony territory, with representatives being selected from the Ashanti and Northern territories in later years. Before 1925, all members to the Executive and Legislative Councils were appointed by

[43] Ibid, 19-20
[44] Ibid, 18
[45] Ibid, 18

the Governor, with the number of official members being greater than the number of unofficial members.[46]

Local administrative structures played a role in the administration of the colony and were dominated by local leaders, though controlled by colonial interests. Regardless, the inclusion even at this minimal level allowed for an expansion of political governance knowledge, which played a role in the decolonization and post-independence era. The local administrative government apparatuses had their founding roots in traditional ruling systems and patterns of government. This meant that village councils and chiefs, who would be selected by the ruling class and needed to be accepted by the local population, attended to local needs.[47] These councils and chiefs would tend to the immediate needs of the local population, including the implementation of traditional law and ensuring the general welfare of the native village populations. This system was implemented in order to reduce the number of English officials that would run the colony as well as minimize the opposition faced from the local colonial population. British supervisors, however, mostly instructed the chiefs that sat on the councils, thereby affecting the degree to which local councils were being administered by colonial subjects in their own interest. It is important to note that this system of local administration, i.e. the inclusion of local chiefs, was for the most part restricted to the Coastal regions in the early years of the colony.[48]

By 1925, the provincial council system that existed in the coastal region was extended to the other two territories. This gave chiefs throughout the entire Gold Coast

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[46] Ibid, 20
[47] This reinforced cultural, class, and gender dynamics within the society.
[48] Ibid, 20

colony some sort of function in local administration. Through the Constitution of 1925, councils of paramount chiefs for all regions, except the northern provinces, were created. These councils of paramount chiefs "…elected six chiefs as unofficial members of the Legislative Council".[49] Through this system, the British Crown attempted to create a rift between the educated elites in Ghana and the chiefs, for the nominations for the African spots in the council were limited to chiefs. Thus, we see that the British did increase inclusion in political institutions, but this inclusiveness was largely selective. In 1927, a Native Administration ordinance was passed, which stated that the Gold Coast chiefs were to be placed under the supervision of British officials as well as regulated the powers and jurisdiction of these chiefs and councils. It was under this ordinance that the councils' functions and responsibilities were enumerated, including how to resolve disputed elections, the unseating the chief if he is no longer fulfilling his function, and the judicial powers delegated to them.[50] In 1935 the Native Authorities Ordinance was passed, which combined the central government with the local governing structures into one coherent governing system. Under this new governing system, "[n]ew native authorities, appointed by the governor, were given wide powers of local government under the supervision of the central government's provincial commissioners, who assured that their policies would be those of the central government".[51] This move, as well as the general increasing of chief powers, was not welcomed warmly by all of the native

[49] Ibid, 25
[50] Ibid, 20
[51] Ibid, 20-21

population. On the contrary, local native populations saw this move as a way to avoid popular participation by the native educated elites and colonial subjects.

Though the transformation of the governing systems within the Gold Coast is of central importance to its development, they did not occur in a vacuum. Development policies, though for the most part aimed at furthering British profit, unintentionally laid the groundwork for decolonization policy and the march towards independence. Social, transportation, and economic growth all contributed to the preparation of the native populations for the movement towards self-governance. Telecommunication systems and transportation networks were being created and installed, while improvements in agriculture, such as the increased production and export of cocoa, were being made. These exports provided some funding for infrastructure, education, and other social development programs. [52]

Ghanaian development was further enhanced during the tenure of Frederick Gordon Guggisberg, the Governor of the Gold Coast from 1919-1927. Guggisberg introduced a ten-year development plan to the Legislative Council that called for the improvement of "…transportation…water supply, drainage, hydroelectric projects, public buildings, town improvements, schools, hospitals, prisons, communication lines, and other services"[53] in that order of priority. He also hoped to fill technical positions, at least half, with native Gold Coast Africans, i.e. after they went through some training. Guggisberg introduced other plans that called for the creation of a main port in the Gold

[52] Ibid, 21
[53] Ibid, 22

Coast and Achimota College, a secondary school.[54] The creation of Achimota College and other educational facilities was important in the development of a new educated elite that would later agitate for independence and emerge as the future political leadership. Educational facilities first started out as missionary schools but later gained support and backing by the British government, paving the way for the establishment of technical schools in the area around 1909. By 1948 a number of educational institutions, such as University College, were established and featured British-styled education.[55]

World War II and Movement Towards Decolonization

By the eve of World War II, such developments in conjunction with existing structures provided the groundwork and mechanisms that would be capitalized during the decolonization process. Though nationalist movements and murmurs of self-governance existed prior to World War II, they gained more of a voice following the war. World War II functioned as a 'critical juncture' in terms of British policy.

Amidst growing international opinion in favor of anti-colonialism, the British Crown began to make a move towards transferring power in their colonial holdings. "As the country [Ghana] developed economically, the focus of government power gradually shifted from the hands of the governor and his officials into those of the Ghanaians."[56] This power shift was due in part to an acceleration of nationalist sentiments, fueled by ex-soldiers, urban workers, and the educated elite, and a looming fear of encountering the

[54] Ibid, 22
[55] Ibid, 22
[56] Ibid, 24

nationalist backlash witnessed in Britain's Asian holdings.[57] The nationalist movements present during the decolonization period within the Gold Coast interacted and shaped the political institutions around them. Increased agitation from these groups accelerated the decolonization process, which impacted the implementation of the ideological vision set out by the British.

Agitation for a better system of local representation began to accelerate and become more vocalized by nationalist groups. Using African-owned newsthesiss, nationalist groups advocated for a reform of the governing system and expressed their discontent with the current system. Partially in reaction to the increased local Gold Coast agitation for better representation, the British Crown added two more unofficial African spots to the Executive Council in 1943. The movement towards more self-governance in the colony, which was considered still to be a model colony in 1946, prompted then-Governor Sir Alan Burns to piece together a new constitution that mandated a few structural changes.[58] Under the new constitution of 1946, termed the Burns Constitution, the Legislative Council was reconfigured to be comprised of (1) six ex-official members, (2) six nominated members, and (3) 18 elected members. Though the council was more inclusionary, executive power still rested in the hands of the Governor.[59] The members of the elected committee were selected via indirect election. Relations between the chiefs, who the British saw as great partners that serve as representatives of the local indigenous

[57] Ibid, 24
[58] Williams, "English-speaking West Africa", 341
[59] McLaughlin, "Historical Setting", 25-26

populations, and the people they represented began to deteriorate, increasing the want for the new class of educated elites to enter the scene.[60]

Despite the level of political development achieved in the Gold Coast, independence and the attainment of self-governance was still not a topic of discussion.[61] Although the constitutional changes were welcomed by the Gold Coast colonial natives, they were not enough to placate the rising discontent among the population, namely ex-military members, who were resenting Britain's policies in "…a country beset with shortages, inflation, unemployment, and black-market practices",[62] farmers, who were reacting to the Crown's decision to cut down diseased cocoa trees to contain an epidemic, and the general population, who were discontent with the lack of economic improvement following the end of the war. Twenty months following the implementation of the Burns Constitution, riots broke out leading to the deaths of a number of individuals. The opposition to the menial reforms was further demonstrated by the exodus of school children from elementary schools and agitations against chiefs by the local colonial populace. These groups, along with others, joined the group of similarly discontented people, namely the ex-soldiers and dismayed farmers.[63]

In 1947, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was formed with the mission of attaining self-governance in the least amount of time possible. Formed around the coastal towns[64], they agitated for the replacement of chiefs with the new educated elites,

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[60] Williams, "English-speaking West Africa", 341
[61] McLaughlin, "Historical Setting", 26
[62] Ibid, 26
[63] Williams, "English-speaking West Africa", 343
[64] Ibid, 343

"[f]or these political leaders, traditional governance, exercised largely via indirect rule, was identified with colonial interests and the pasts. They believed that it was their responsibility to lead their country into a new age"[65]. They gained prominence amongst the populace and many key members were imprisoned after a series of riots in Accra and other cities occurred in 1948, though many of the members were unaware that the disturbances happened in the first place.[66] These disturbances, which took the lives of at least 29 people, prompted the head of the Colonial Office, Andrew Cohen, to move forward the timetable for self-governance in the Gold Coast. He believed that the riots by nationalists undermined the wider reform program aimed at preparing territories for self-governance in the African holdings.[67]

Rise of the Key Leader: Kwame Nkrumah

With this rise in nationalist sentiments and a push for a shorter independence timetable, came the rise of a key leader, Kwame Nkrumah, who would become the face of the decolonization movement in Ghana. In 1949 Kwame Nkrumah, a former secretary and member of the UGCC,[68] created the Convention People's Party (CPP) through which he and his fellow nationalists demanded that self-governance be achieved immediately, not in the shortest time possible as the UGCC proposed.[69] Nkrumah garnered popular support and used newsthesiss in order to further his clamor for self-governance.[70] The

[65] McLaughlin, "Historical Setting", 26
[66] Williams, "English-speaking West Africa", 343
[67] Low, "The End of British Empire in Africa", 39
[68] Williams, "English-speaking West Africa, 343
[69] McLaughlin, "Historical Setting", 27
[70] Williams, "English-speaking West Africa", 344

demands put forth by Kwame Nkrumah garnered support from the native populations, especially from workers, farmers, and the younger generation.[71]

The level of support Nkrumah and the CPP enjoyed influenced their inclusion in the revised structures following the implementation of the 1951 constitution. The riots in Accra in 1948 led to the creation of a new constitution in 1951, which called for the creation of an Executive Council, a majority of which was comprised of African ministers, and a Legislative Assembly with half of its elected members from rural districts and the other half from traditional councils throughout all of the Gold Coast territory.[72] These advances put forth in the constitutional discussions did not live up to the demands of Kwame Nkrumah and the CPP, thus prompting a series of nonviolent strikes and resistance to occur, known as 'positive action'.[73] After the protests turned violent in some areas in 1950, leading to a state of emergency being instituted,[74] Kwame Nkrumah and other leaders of the CPP were imprisoned. Despite this, Nkrumah won a seat in the Legislative Assembly during the elections of 1951 and was released and invited to take on a position closely related to a prime minister,[75] called the Leader of Government Business.[76] This speaks to the levels of influence he garnered from the local populations.

Thus, the CPP under Nkrumah began to work within the constitutional framework to advance the movement towards self-governance. In the span of a few years, the Gold

[71] McLaughlin, "Historical Setting", 27
[72] Ibid, 28
[73] Ibid, 28
[74] Low, "The End of British Empire in Africa", 39
[75] McLaughlin, "Historical Setting", 29
[76] Low, "The End of British Empire in Africa", 39

Coast's governmental system began to be transformed into a formal parliamentary system, though more traditionalist African members opposed it. "In 1952 the position of prime minister was created and the Executive Council became the cabinet. The prime minister was made responsible to the Legislative Assembly, which duly elected Nkrumah prime minister".[77] Under a new constitution in 1954, the role of tribal councils in the election of members of the assembly was abolished and direct elections for all members in a larger Legislative Assembly were instituted.[78]

While opposition parties such as the National Liberation Movement (NLM) and the Northern People's party threatened the CPPs goals of demonstrating that the Gold Coast was ready for self-government, the CPP won a majority of seats in a newly created legislature after the Legislative Assembly was dissolved.[79] The elections of 1954 and the rise of the NLM demonstrated the internal divisions within the Gold Coast. Independent and local groups were on the rise and often joined the ranks of the NLM in opposition to the attainment of self-governance. The actions and the opposition of the NLM during this election, among other factors, delayed the vote for elections until 1956.[80] In the elections of 1956, the CPP was able to gain a majority and the decision for independence went through.[81] The Gold Coast eventually merged with the British Trusteeship territory of Togoland and on March 6, 1957 was granted independence as the new nation of Ghana,

[77] McLaughlin, "Historical Setting", 29
[78] Ibid, 29
[79] Ibid, 29
[80] Williams, "English-speaking West Africa", 345
[81] Ibid, 346

the first sub-Saharan colony to achieve this. The Legislative Assembly was renamed the National Assembly and Nkrumah continued on as the prime minister.[82]

(e) Concluding Remarks

With this brief overview of the British decolonization model and its application in the Gold Coast, a number of important observations emerge in terms of the progression of institutional change, levels of institutional inclusion, the nature and role of nationalism, and the emergence of a key leader.

The decision to follow the movement of decolonization and adapt policies that would aid the colonies' transition to independence was a result of multiple factors that precipitate institutional change. For one, changing international sentiments, reflected in both the American anti-colonialism push and the self-determination rhetoric of the United Nations, coupled with economic hardships on part the empire forced the British to make steps towards dissolving their empire. These societal institutional changes were met with top-down policy that reflected the new sentiments, in terms of the expanding of political inclusion and autonomy within the territories, such as the executive council and legislative assembly of Ghana, as well as creating policies that aimed at evolving the territories into self-governing states. This change was also pushed for by nationalist groups, such as the CPP in Ghana, who, for a variety of economic and social reasons, began to become more vocal about the attainment of freedom and political rights. The interplay amongst these three factors resulted in a British model that was less resistant to

[82] McLaughlin, "Historical Setting", 30

change and therefore implemented policies that prepared the colonies for eventual independence.

In terms of the changes implemented in the non-settler African territories, British colonial policy more or less centered on an approach of gradual development towards the attainment of self-governance. This process was relatively inherent in the indirect rule system, which was heavily dependent on localized structures for ruling through chiefs and, later, educated elites. Throughout the decolonization period, the British decolonization model placed more emphasis on expanding the level of political institutional inclusion, thereby allowing for the further political education of emerging leaders. This political inclusion, however, was selective, as was seen in the case of Ghana in terms of the inclusion of mainly educated, male elites from the coastal region. The fact, however, remains that the doctrine of gradualism was coupled with the education and development of a class of ruling elites that would be able to administer a country once independence was achieved. According to Sir A. Burns, the architect of the Burns constitution,

> The fundamental policy of this Government has been stated on many occasions. It is to educate the people of the Gold Coast, both individually and collectively, so that they may be able to stand on their own feet without support, to manage their own affairs without supervision, and to determine their own future for themselves. They must be trained in all technical and administrative work until they are able to conduct the public service without the assistance of European officers. Self-governing institutions, the Native Authorities and Town Councils, must be fostered and developed, so through them the African may learn the difficult art of government. The people must be encouraged to take a greater share in the day to day business of governing the country by the inclusion of an increasing number of African members in Advisory Committees, Commissions of Enquiry, and bodies of this kind. Our policy can achieve lasting results only if we carry the people

> with us, and give them the opportunity by constant discussion to share in the planning of their own future.[83]

This emphasis on imparting a political education to the upcoming ruling class is crucial. Although having strong political institutions is central to the success of a country in maintaining stability, those institutions would be meaningless if not coupled with actors who are able and skilled enough to utilize them to benefit the country on a whole. The level of institutional inclusion played a part in aiding the transition of the colony towards independence and influenced the institutional stability in the country following independence, as will be seen in Chapter IV.

In terms of nationalism, however, two important observations can be drawn from the survey of the British decolonization model and the Ghana case study. First, nationalism in the non-settler African territories was, for the most part, focused on agitating for independence from colonial rule and was met with a relatively pliable policy on the part of the British. This stemmed partly from the experiences that the British had in the Asian colonies and the lack of economic and political power coming out of World War II. Secondly, nationalist movements allowed for the basis of political parties and by extension political participation. The emergence of political parties within the colonial scheme marks an important step towards self-governance and, as was seen and will be seen, led to the emergence of important key political parties that would transfer over in the post-independence era, such as the CPP in Ghana.

Finally, the British decolonization model allowed for the emergence of key leaders who would take on the reigns of government following independence. In the

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[83] Rathbone, *Ghana*, Volume 1, 37

context of Ghana, the British promoted the role of Kwame Nkrumah, who became the face of the transition, garnered popular support, and emerged as the first leader of Ghana. In Chapter IV, the role he played in the early years of independence and the stability of the institutional structures will be examined.

CHAPTER III: THE FRENCH MODEL

Next to British colonialism, French colonialism represented a major force during the colonial era. Called *La France d'Outre Mer* (hereby called FDOM), the colonies were seen as an extension of mainland France, although the closeness of this relationship became more apparent following the events of World War II. In terms of institutional change, public disinterest in the colonial venture, reflected in the practices of policy elites, presented a hindrance via top-down response until the French empire moved closer to dissolution. Additionally, the French emphasis on cultural assimilation proved to be a driving force for colonial policy, which spurred on nationalist movements from the bottom. The assimilationist view that many colonial policymakers adopted in France drove their desire to keep the empire from dissolution and instead attempt to absorb the non-settler African colonial holdings into France itself. This ran counter to nationalist movements for independence and resulted in lack of institutional inclusion of locals and therefore a lack of readiness for independence.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the French colonial administrative structure and the ideological French colonial approach. This is followed by an overview of the period of colonial reforms and decolonization in the French territories, with a focus on the level of inclusion within political institutions and the rise of nationalism. The third section examines the implementation of the French non-settler African decolonization model within the context of Côte d'Ivoire, focusing on the lack of institutional inclusion, the rise of the *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), and the rise of Félix Houphouët-Boigny. What will be seen is that the French were relatively resistant to

changing international tides and wished to integrate the colonies rather than allow them to be self-governing, which resulted in limited institutional inclusion. Additionally, the anti-nationalist response by the French reinforced national unity and paved the way for the rise of key nationalist groups and a key leader that would take power following the transition.

(a) Running the French Empire

In order to understand how the French approached decolonization in the non-settler African colonies, it is important to understand how they approached colonial policies and the apparatuses in place to formulate and implement them.

The French colonial system was being controlled and administered by a number of different administrative apparatuses, including the Ministry of Overseas France, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Colonial Service. The Colonial Service "…provided adequate if primitive administrative system in the colonies; it organised supplies of labour…and it lobbied for and organised the building of minimal infrastructures required for the exploitation of the colonies".[84] Additionally, the Colonial Service reflected and maintained the ideological underpinnings of the continuation of colonialism and lobbied on behalf of such interests during talks of colonial reform amidst changing international opinion towards anti-colonialism.

All colonial legislation were enacted via decrees from the President of the French Republic, which were prepared by the Ministry of the Colonies, yet another governing body that deliberated French colonial policy. The issues concerning colonial policy,

[84] Lewis, "The French Colonial Service and the Issue of Reform", 155

however, were of secondary importance and therefore did not command as much attention. There also existed a consultative body, the *Conseil Supérieur des Colonies*, which contained one elected representative from each colony, except for Senegal, which operated under a commune system. The representatives, as well as the indigenous population that they represented, were considered to be French subjects rather than French citizens.[85]

Following the scramble of Africa, the French consolidated their rule over the areas that were attained, namely French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. French West Africa, or *Afrique Occidentale Française* (hereby referred to as AOF), and French Equatorial Africa, or *Afrique Equatoriale Française* (hereby referred to as AEF), were each controlled by a Governor-General for that region. Under him were governors from the individual colonies that oversaw the overall policies implemented in the territories. They were followed, if we were to go down the hierarchical chain, by district commanders, who were called *commandants de cercle*, who presided over the districts within a colonial holding, otherwise known as *cercles*. There was a poor or lack of communication between the district commanders and the governor as well as the Governor-General, allowing them to ascertain relatively more autonomy within the region. The bottom-most rung of the hierarchical ladder included local ruler apparatuses that could be controlled and replaced at the will of the French officials.[86] The lack of general and local institutional structures with adequate communication between them created inconsistent policy, which had an effect on overall institutionalization in the

[85] Ibid, 230-231
[86] Warner, "Historical Setting", 13-14

colonial holdings. Additionally, the highly arbitrary and selective nature of local inclusion adversely affected the level of political education garnered by the indigenous population.

The lack of a semi-coherent system for administration, i.e. one that can be sufficiently tracked and held accountable is both a reflection of the lack of interest in colonial affairs on the part of the French public as well as the complicated relationship between France and her colonies. French colonialism was not entirely embraced by the French public, who were not that interested in France's colonial venture, nor did French administration follow a structured and systematic approach. This complicated relationship and the lack of a coherent and single colonial apparatus played an important role during the reform talks throughout the 1940s. Additionally, there was no real relationship between the colonial governing apparatuses in France and the local administrative structures as well as no concrete administrative procedure or overall direction.[87] The lack of this type of relationship hindered hopes of development towards more indigenous inclusionary structures.

Had the French public, and by extension policy elites, been more invested in colonial administration from the outset, more efficient structures may have resulted. This may have then led to more effective policymaking, which affects the events of the decolonization period. A more structured governing apparatus at home makes for a more coherent policy and therefore a smoother transition, at least in theory. However, this was not the case and thereby affected France's ability to develop and institute effective policy

[87] Deschamps, "France in Black Africa and Madagascar", 231

during the decolonization period, which resulted in the lack of strong institutions in the colonial holdings during the transition from colony to country.

France's General Ideological Approach to Colonial Policy

An understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of colonial policy is important in our endeavor to grasp the political institutions used during the decolonization period. Political institutions more often than naught, reflect the attitudes encapsulated in colonial policy. French cultural attitudes towards the indigenous groups, namely in the usage of 'civilizing' rhetoric, presented itself in colonial administrative structures that were not highly integrating of indigenous subjects nor allowed them much power once they were integrated. This has powerful implications for the future developments of these areas, namely in the lack of a political education that would aid in the years following independence, which primarily resulted from political institutional inclusion.

With this in mind, France's colonial policy in the non-settler African colonies can generally be described as relatively culture-centric. This view is encapsulated in the main colonial ideologies adopted by the French: assimilation and association. Assimilation policy was founded in the spirit of France's perceived cultural superiority mixed with the mission to civilize the colonial world. "Assimilation presupposed the inherent superiority of French culture over all others, so that in practice the assimilation policy in the colonies meant extension of the French language, institutions, laws, and customs."[88] In essence, therefore, assimilation policy carried with it a denial of local indigenous customs and traditional structures in favor of the imposition of the French method of governance.

[88] Warner, "Historical Setting", 12

Although perceived cultural "superiority" was a hallmark of colonialism, regardless of the colonizing power, the French became known for imbedding this colonial "superiority" within their colonial policy, which thereby hindered local traditional structures and institution building.

Over the years, mainly after World War II, French colonial rhetoric evolved from assimilation to association. The push for association policy as the default for colonial policy emerged in the post-World War I era amid United States murmurs of anti-colonialism under President Woodrow Wilson. The association policy, in theory, was to represent and foster "…cultural accommodation and political cooperation."[89] The existence of a fundamental change in actual policy, however, is debatable.

In theory, association was a policy adopted by the French to replace the more culture-imposing assimilation policy. Under association policy, indigenous populations were allowed to maintain traditions and customs insofar as they were not against French national interest.[90] This, theoretically, allowed for a more ethnically conscientious approach to colonial rule, one that would allow for the usage of traditional rulers to act as an intermediary between the French government and the colonial, local populations. However, these local chiefs were often appointed by French officials and would only be in use so long as they did not go against French policies.[91] The fact does remain that this policy theoretically allowed for the usage of local indigenous structures and the fostering of local institutional inclusion, even if it was highly selective.

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[89] Betts, *France and Decolonisation*, 31
[90] Ibid, 12
[91] Ibid, 12

It is at this point that we need to make a distinction between French and British indirect ruling systems. The British system, as we saw in the last chapter, placed more emphasis on local chief structures relative to the French system. This became important during the decolonization period, where the British expanded those structures to transition to the inclusion of educated elites early on, whereas the French scrambled towards the end to try and create some semblance of political education via the institutional inclusion of educated elites.

Association policy in practice, however, still contained many remnants of assimilationist tendencies. This would be a theme throughout the reform period during the end of and following World War II. It must be noted that regardless of the formal declaration of cultural integration policy as established colonial policy, colonial rule inherently carries with it the side effect of cultural mixing. As Raymond Betts points out:

> By its very presence, colonial rule implied social and cultural transition. New customs and a foreign language disturbed old folkways; a wage economy turned to profit dislodged the older self-sufficiency and family labor practices of the countryside. French concepts of private property, when joined with the 'right of conquest', altered land patterns, intensifying large landholdings and allowing the establishment of a rural bourgeoisie composed both of French colonists and those few among the indigenous population who became collaborators in the colonial enterprise…The converse of this concentration of wealth was impoverisation of large numbers of the colonial peoples[92]

We can see that cultural imposition and skewed practices allowed for the creation of an elite class over a more disenfranchised class. This wedging was also apparent in the usage of assimilation and association policy as a type of divide-and-rule strategy. Assimilation was often applied only to the educated elite, and oftentimes only to those

[92] Ibid, 40

who were educated in European institutions, while others were subjected to association policies that denied the rights accorded to a French citizen.[93]

Additionally, the notions of cultural superiority held by the French colonial policymakers made for the reinforcement rather than change of the institutional schemata in place, namely during the march towards decolonization. This blocked institutional changes from occurring from the top-down, changes which may have better adapted to the changing times and prepared the indigenous populations better for self-rule. This was not to be the case and on the eve of independence, many non-settler African colonies, such as Côte d'Ivoire, felt unprepared for independence.[94]

Looking from a different perspective, assimilation and association policies that aimed at cultural integration and reinforced the notion of French cultural superiority had an effect on the rise of nationalism within the territorial contexts. The inability of a large portion of the indigenous colonial population to gain French citizenship status had an effect on the belief of the population that they could become French and therefore ascertain the same political rights. The denial of this contributed to a rise in nationalistic movements counter to the claim of French cultural supremacy. This provided bottom-up pressure for institutional change that was not met with a top-down solution from colonial policy elites. Therefore, we can observe two opposing forces, one pushing against institutional change and one pushing for.

It could be argued that if a country is without a strong political institutional system at home, especially a strong institutional and structured system that is supposed to

[93] Warner, "Historical Setting", 12
[94] Ibid, 23

be used to guide and eventually develop dependent colonies, they will be unable to provide a structured and bureaucratically efficient system abroad. This has implications in how the dependent territories develop and the level to which they are able to move forward.

Having examined the theoretical colonial policies adopted by the French as well as the general administrative apparatus and local governance framework, a point must be made as to why importance is being placed on these concepts. Once again, colonial policy and the theoretical arguments used to justify it are reflective of the general attitudes towards both the idea of colonialism, i.e. its importance, as well as indigenous populations and the amount of autonomy they should have. The colonial policy then connects to the overall structure of the administrative apparatuses, both at home and in use to administer the colonial territories, which excluded, for the most part, indigenous members and limited their influence once they were integrated into the system. This lack of indigenous populations within the ruling apparatus seriously hampered the political education of an upcoming political elite that would move on to rule the colony once independence was achieved.

(b) From Empire to Dissolution

Having gained an understanding of the main ideological underpinnings of French colonial and decolonization policy as well as the relevant institutional apparatuses, we can now turn attention to the movement in French colonial policy towards decolonization

and the model that was adopted in the non-settler African territories. This section will mainly focus on the transition towards decolonization, highlighting the post-World War II reform talks, the institutions devised to help achieve these reforms, with the relatively low levels of local inclusion, and the role that nationalism and institutional inclusion played in the relative unpreparedness of the colonies emerging from colonialism.

Developments Leading Up To World War II

In the 1880s, France began to a stronger colonial policy, mainly in reaction to the expansion of other European powers overseas as well as for the accumulation of wealth that came along with empire building. Following the events of the Berlin conference, France began to establish itself overseas, which was then followed by a series of efforts consolidate rule in that region.[95] After the consolidation and the creation of the three distinct regions, i.e. North Africa, AOF, and AEF, the French had no single administration authority presiding over French colonial policy, lacked sufficient public support for colonial investment and ventures, and did not have a well-designed development policy program that would have long-term benefits. France pursued empire building as a way to make France relevant in the sphere of international politics, mainly following the rise of the British as a dominating colonial force.[96] The need for maintaining relevance in the international system by having a colonial empire carried over to the post-World War II era and affected France's reluctance to conform with changing international sentiments and allow for the dissolution of the empire.

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[95] Ibid, 9-10
[96] Betts, *France and Decolonisation*, 14

Between the two world wars, questions regarding the relevance and ethical nature of continuing to have an empire began to surface on a larger scale, although such discussion did not yet dominate colonial deliberations. Such doubts were in part brought about by the rising anti-colonial sentiments of the United States President Woodrow Wilson following the end of World War I.[97] Those who threw their support for justifying the continuation of the empire referred to the maintenance of political order and economic development both at home and abroad, and were met with oppositional arguments claiming oppressive techniques and economic exploitation.[98] During this time, however, French colonial administrators started to become more reform minded, though the degree to which these reforms actually were discussed openly and acted upon was minimal. Colonial language, however, changed from one concerning power to seeing the empire as a responsibility.[99] In tandem with this, were movements to reform, reorganize, and restructure the colonial empire. The main push was the economic development of the colonial holdings, which were seen as being a benefit both for the colonies and, of more importance in the eyes of colonial policymakers, mainland France.[100]

In the 1930s, the French Socialist party began to push more vocally for increased preparation of the indigenous populations for independence in order to push for the end of colonialism and the dissolution of the French Empire. In this way, a major French political party was attempting to push for the idea of ending the empire quickly and with as much honor as possible. This represents the colonial self-doubt present in French

[97] Ibid, 22
[98] Ibid, 21
[99] Ibid, 22
[100] Ibid, 22-23

colonial administrative circles, thus demonstrating the split in colonial opinion by policymakers.[101]

It was at this time that colonial policy shifted from primarily assimilationist to association policy. Nationalist movements, some like those founded in Morocco and Algeria, found their roots in cultural opposition to French insistence on imposing their views on the populations, as well as from the devastation that followed the Great Depression.[102] These movements began to learn and adopt European methods of agitation, such as the role of political parties, the power of political rallies, the tactic of striking, and the technique of rioting. Political parties would become an important institution through which the indigenous colonial population would pitch their words and ideologies against the French cultural and political ideologies being imposed upon them.

The creation and workings of these political parties put in place by the indigenous populations found their inspiration from political parties, such as the French Socialist party.[103] Despite this, it would only be after World War II that these political parties would garner validity from the indigenous populations. Until then, the political parties were more or less groups of like-minded individuals without any, or little, ability to participate politically within the colonial ruling apparatuses. The reasoning behind the denial of political participation and the universal suffrage of indigenous people stems from the hesitance to give more political power to the local populations at the expense of French control, even if it meant the development, politically and economically, of the

[101] Ibid, 25
[102] Ibid, 38
[103] Ibid, 43-44

territory. By the dawn of World War II, anti-colonial sentiments had gained more recognition among the indigenous colonial populations in the non-settler African territories. The creation and adoption of the political party would prove to be a crucial step towards the independence struggle that would follow during the 1950s. These developments are paramount in setting the stage for the reform movements and policies moving towards the end of World War II. The lack of strong institutions and a consistent governing structure would prove to be detrimental to French colonial policymakers during World War II, prompting talks of significant reforms to take place during the tail-end of the war. The institutions that were present during the pre-World War II era were heavily assimilationist-dependent, thus allowing for anti-French cultural sentiments to rise in some circles of the indigenous population.

French Colonial Reform: During and After World War II

Despite the rise of some vocal nationalist groups within the non-settler African territories and murmurs of anti-colonial sentiments from the United States, French colonial policy by the eve of World War II was largely pro-empire. Even within these African colonies, in general, the well-educated elites had strong economic incentives to remain pro-colonial:

> …[M]any of the colonised, certainly among those who were well-educated, were comfortable with the colonial situation, by which they profited as businessmen, as lawyers, even a few as doctors. Among this same group there were some who looked with hope on the French efforts and therefore anticipated that appropriate action, particularly assistance with modernisation of old cultures, would follow the generous language of French ideology[104]

[104] Ibid, 47

Though this was the case, rising nationalist sentiments would prove to be a powerful tool in the post-World War II era for demanding and pushing forward of reforms, eventually leading to independence.

The trials faced by France during World War II enhanced the importance of the empire to many of the French colonial policymakers, namely Charles de Gaulle, who came to regard the preserving of the empire as a necessity for the revival of France following the war and crucial to maintaining her status as one of the dominant powers in the globe.[105] This is in line with the relevance argument that provided the basis of the continuing of the French Empire that was given as justification during the early years of colonialism.

The end of World War II saw an increase in agitation for decolonization, due in part to the dominating anti-colonial stance of the United States. Additionally, the war, especially with the fall of France to the Germans, shattered the illusion of colonial invincibility and was a direct attack on the pride of the French people. Following the fall of France, the nation was essentially split, with the Vichy government taking over in France and a new government, led by Charles de Gaulle and called Free France, taking over in the AEF holdings. The other colonial holdings were being battled over between the two rival governments, as well as preparing for and weathering invasions from both the Allied powers and the Nazis. [106] The fact that the North African holdings were saved from the Germans by the Americans, who were better equipped, rather than the Free French government, further exacerbated agitation for decolonization. The indigenous

[105] Ibid, 58
[106] Ibid, 50

populations were also disgruntled at the fact that the local economy and administration were disrupted by the war, both in terms of land destruction and the conscription of the main labor force. During the war, the African holdings were used as a type of military reservoir through which the promise of French citizenship, jobs, and pensions were 'guaranteed'. The French, however, were unable to follow through with this promise, leaving the colonial troops feeling exploited. This had the further consequence of widening the gap between France's promises and her ability to make good on them.[107]

As early as when the tide of the War shifted to favor the Allied powers and Free France, de Gaulle began to discuss reforming the colonial system in light of the events of the war. The loyalty of the African territories following the fall of France had a deep impact on de Gaulle. As a way to reward them, and in so doing advance French national interests and maintain influence in the area, de Gaulle called for a conference to be held through which colonial reform would be discussed.[108]

> This conference was a turning-point in French colonial history, and colonial policy had never been so important to France as it was during the Second World War. Had there been no empire, there would have been no Free French territory…France's status as an imperial power thus became closely associated with her continued self-respect.[109]

It is to be emphasized that although de Gaulle was impacted by the willingness and readiness of the Africans, mainly in AEF, to rally to the Free French cause and help restore France's faith in herself, he did not pursue colonial reform purely out of an altruistic yearning to rectify French colonial policy.

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[107] Betts, *France and Decolonisation*, 61-63
[108] Ibid, 59
[109] Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 27

> Even if de Gaulle had not been moved by genuine gratitude to the Africans for their part in the war effort, he would almost certainly have felt it necessary to make some re-statement of colonial policy before the end of the war, in order to forestall any possible dismemberment of France's empire by her victorious allies. In 1919 only the defeated powers had been deprived of their colonies, but the international climate had changed since then, and the Second World War called the very existence of colonialism into question.[110]

This conference, held in the AEF capital of Brazzaville, discussed the consideration of a new way of going about colonial policy within the territories. The Brazzaville Conference would mark the beginning of French colonial reform talks, which would demonstrate the contradictory sentiments in France regarding reforming the colonial system and ultimately result in the under-preparation of the colonies as they gained independence. The lack of a coherent direction of decolonization policy caused minimal colonial reforms and transition mechanisms to take place and often affected the levels of inclusion within the colonial holding.

Convened on 30 January 1944, the Brazzaville Conference, held by de Gaulle, as chairman of the Committee of National Liberation of Free France, strove to pave the way to a new set of French colonial policies, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, that would reflect the changing of international sentiments regarding colonialism while still preserving the French colonial image.[111] Although called the *Conférence Africaine Française*, the Brazzaville Conference did not have any African members. Rather, members to the conference included colonial administrative officials and governors, leaders of parliament, a handful of trade union representatives, and a bishop. Félix Éboué, the

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[110] Ibid, 29
[111] Betts, *France and Decolonisation*, 60

governor of Chad, would be the only exception and would therefore represent the indigenous, anti-assimilationist viewpoint.[112] Emerging from the conference was a set of recommendations that were to be presented during the beginning of rebuilding France once the war was completed. Among these recommendations, was a push to create more jobs in the administration of the colony that would be open to the indigenous African populace. This would allow for more African participation in colonial administration, in a way preparing them for eventual self-governance. However, the high-power posts were reserved exclusively for French citizens, thereby curtailing the amount of experience that African administrators could gain in large-scale policy implementation.[113] The talks for expansion of administrative jobs for indigenous populations, however, would allow for some type of institutional inclusion within the colonial apparatus.

In terms of institutional changes that were to be made, the replacement of the old institution of the *conseils d'administration* by a sub-divisional and regional council consisting of traditional elites as well as a council containing European and indigenous representatives to be elected after the giving of universal suffrage to the colonial people, was discussed. The councils, however, would have a primarily advisory role with only the power to vote on the colonial budget.[114] This speaks to the underlying tone that talks of self-governance were out of the question. Officials were hesitant to give indigenous populations more power in the administration spheres on the fear that they would agitate more strongly for independence. The councils functioned more as an appeasement

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[112] Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 49-50
[113] Ibid, 50
[114] Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 51-52

mechanism than as an inclusionary indirect ruling structure. This would hinder the actual political education of local chiefs and elites and therefore add to the unpreparedness on the eve of decolonization, at least in theory.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle home political debates from the political institutions implemented in the overseas territory, especially in the case of French colonial policy following World War II. In the first two decades following the end of the war, France was faced with domestic annoyance at the decimated post-war economy, was occupied by the Cold War and the rise of the French Communist party, and experienced party fragmentation, which made policy making difficult. French identity of empire was shifting from being viewed as a cultural force with a primary mission to civilize to a more political force that wished to maintain its empire as a means to assert its relevancy in a fast changing world.[115]

Throughout the debates of the First and Second Constituent Assemblies tasked with developing the new constitution of the Fourth Republic of France, the Colonial Service emerged to be representative of the old colonial lobby bent on curtailing significant liberal reforms that would have paved the way for the development of self-governance in the territories.[116] Chief among the reforms proposed under the First Constituent Assembly was the creation of a French Union. Additionally talks about according rights to the indigenous African populations emerged, with a push to allow for political rights to be given to colonial subjects who were to be "…French educated and

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[115] Betts, *France and Decolonisation,* 66-67
[116] Lewis, "The French Colonial Service and the Issues of Reform", 155-56

assimilated colonial subjects…",[117] also known as the *notables évolués*. The creation of local assemblies that would result from direct elections, i.e. implying that universal suffrage would be granted, and a second council body that would function as a consultative body were recommended.[118]

Ultimately these reforms were blocked by the old colonial lobby for being too liberal, thus thrusting constitution talks into a second round.[119] This blocking of colonial reforms and the conversations that surrounded them demonstrate a dichotomy that was present in French colonial policy circles. On the one hand, there were those that wished to advance the colonies towards eventual self-governance, albeit within a collaborative framework and associated with France. On the other hand, the old colonial lobby say the giving of too much administrative control too the colonies as risking calls of independence from the colonies when France's mission should be to preserve its empire for political and economic reasons.

The Second Constituent Assembly focused more on the creation of the French Union (hereby the Union) and promoting the federalist principle. The Union was to consist of a Federal Assembly in Paris that had elected officials from both the overseas territories and departments as well as a High Council with representatives from the Associated States and the French government. The President of France was to become the presider over the Union. Local assemblies were to be denied actual power and the Federal assembly of the Union would not have any power over legislation in the oversea

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[117] Ibid, 158
[118] Betts, *France and Decolonisation*, 70
[119] Ibid, 70

territories. This would be taken care of by the French National Assembly. Additionally, the Second Constituent Assembly's recommendations denied free consent of the indigenous populations and steered clear of self-governance talks.[120] The constitution that resulted from these recommendations was adopted, thus inaugurating the Fourth French Republic and the Union.

These political debates within the Colonial and Governmental apparatuses allow us to catch a glimpse of the volatile nature of colonial policy following the end of World War II. The main takeaways from the French colonial reform talks on the eve of the adoption of the Constitution of 1946 include the lack the persistence of assimilationist ideology and the complicated relationship between the changing times that require liberal reform and the old colonial lobby that attempted to hold on to the idea of the French Empire. These conflicting forces, it can be sufficiently argued, allow for the lack of actual reform policy, leading to stagnation in colonial policy and a general maintenance of the status quo, albeit with some hints of reform mixed in. Of equal importance is the lack of actual indigenous inclusion within political governing structures. Although indigenous populations were given a seat in the French Union, their role was purely advisory and held no real implications in policy creation and/or implementation. The fear of self-governance on part of the old colonial lobby led to limited, if any, institutional inclusion of local populations in high levels of the French colonial apparatus.

The Union was a major part of the Constitutional reforms during the drafting of the 1946 Constitution. The Constitution in general espoused rhetoric of equality among

[120] Ibid, 71

all people, stating in its preamble, "*Il réaffirme solennellement les droits et libertés de l'homme et du citoyen consacrés par la Déclaration des droits de 1789 et les principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République*" [English translation: Reaffirms the rights and liberties of man and of the citizen embedded by the declaration of rights of 1789 and of the fundamental principles acknowledged by the laws of the Republic] [121] In *Titre VIII-De l'Union Française*, the constitution lays out the structure and workings of the main overlaying administrative structure that was built to represent colonial interests. The Union had three central organs: (1) the President, who was to be the President of the Republic, (2) *le Haut Conseil*, or the High Council, and (3) *l'Assemblée*, or the Assembly of the French Union. The High Council was to be composed of a delegation of the French government and a representative from each the Associated states. The main function of the High Council was to assist the government in the general administration and workings of the Union. The Assembly was to have half of its members being elected from the departments and territories overseas and half of it members being elected from the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic at a rate of two-thrids and one-third respectively.[122] It was to serve as a primarily advisory committee and had no real power over colonial administration. However, under Article 77, each territory was to institute an elected assembly, the parameters of which were to be determined by law. Though this allowed for some semblance of political education, the lack of actual power over colonial administration further entrenched the relative exclusion of indigenous populations from actual governing structures.

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[121] "Constitution De 1946, Ive République"
[122] Ibid, "Titre VIII"

Nationalism and French Decolonization Policy

These changes in colonial policy within the French system were also forged by and met with the rise of nationalist movements as they pushed for the attainment of independence within their individual territories. The effects of World War II, both in terms of economic well-being and the perceptions of the European colonizers, had a significant impact on the development and power of nationalist movements and pushes for institutional reform in the colonies. Following the end of World War II,

> …[T]he colonial possessions…suffered from economic disarray, a condition that aggravated discontent. Commerce all but ceased, with shortages of imports compounded by the shortage of exports. The colonial economy, never sound and still suffering from the effects of the Depression, was further weakened with the result that the local populations suffered from a loss of income and endured deprivation of certain food stuffs[123]

Still recovering from the devastation wrought by the Great Depression, the indigenous colonial people became more discontent with French policy in the territories, especially concerning taxes and low wages. Given the new 'liberties' accorded to them by the reforms in colonial policy, the educated minority and ex-military service members, who understood more clearly the inequities present in the colonial system, established trade unions, using them as a platform for agitation. The increased literacy rates in the colonies, due to the investment in education by French colonial policy, allowed for the usage of newspapers to disseminate ideas and garner public support for agitation.[124]

The rise of nationalist movements, especially in the lead up to independence, is important due to its effects on the political institutions in the local communities.

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[123] Betts, *France and Decolonisation*, 52
[124] Ibid, 72

Increased agitation by nationalist groups would, theoretically, be met with some policies aimed at mitigating dissent on threat of outbursts of violence. This perception of violence in the French case was of central concern, given the difficulties France faced in its Asian territories, namely Indochina. Additionally, international opinion shifted dramatically after World War II to an increased push for decolonization via the hegemonic United States of America's anti-colonialism stance and the United Nations. Although France did not support this notion due to its need and desire to maintain the empire, it could not ignore the winds of change.

That being said, French politicians in general were reluctant to give up the French empire. This reflected itself in the colonial policy responses by the French to the demands of the colonial people, which entailed indecision in the National Assembly and increased military action, especially in the North African territories. Algeria was a particularly tough case given that it was one of France's first African territories, was settled by a number of French citizens, and had come to be seen as integral to the identity of France itself. That being said, the independence movements of Tunisia and Morocco were not peaceful either, due to the fact that they too were seen as settler colonies integral to France's makeup. Algeria would be the last French colony in Africa to gain independence, in 1962, and a dreadful war would be fought in order to gain its independence.[125]

Compared to their interests in the North African territories, France was not as invested in the colonial holdings of AOF or AEF. The colonial holdings in the AEF

[125] Ibid, 94

territories were of some commercial interests but were abandoned early on, thus causing the territories to fall behind developmentally. The AOF territories were mostly gained via exploration and military venture and therefore had a core administrative unit in place before consolidation even occurred.[126] In the AOF holdings, there was limited civilian rule, except in Senegal, which operated using the four communes system and had residents with privileges of French residents.[127] After World War II there was significant economic and financial investment in the AOF holdings, namely through the *Fonds d'Investissement et de Développement Economique et Sociale des Territoires d'Outre-Mer* (hereby referred to as FIDES). The money from FIDES was used for improvements in areas such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare, with more money being given to AEF due to its comparative development lag.[128]

As the Fourth Republic neared its end, a new Constituent Assembly was created in order to come up with a new constitution that would establish the Fifth Republic of France. Under this new Constitution and the talks that accompanied it, discussion and language centered on equality in treatment rather than independence. It is here that the political party known as the African Democratic Rally (or *Rassemblement Democratique Africaine* hereby referred to as RDA), was created by Côte d'Ivoire's Félix Houphouët-Boigny along with other key West African leaders.[129] These leaders, as will be seen in the context of Côte d'Ivoire, would play an integral role as being the faces of the transition period and emerge as charismatic leaders following independence.

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[126] Ibid, 116
[127] Ibid, 117
[128] Ibid, 118-119
[129] Ibid, 121

On 23 June 1956 a *Loi Cadre* concerning measures to ensure the development and evolution of the FDOM was passed which constitutionally reformed the African colonies without amending the existing 1946 constitution. This law entailed the liberalization and decentralization of administrative apparatuses regarding the colonial holdings as well as established universal suffrage in an associated law.[130] This would prove to be a vital and pivotal move towards self-governance.

Seeing as the colonial holdings were edging more and more towards self-governance and independence, de Gaulle made one last attempt at unifying the colonies with mainland France via the creation of the French Community. This structure would replace the French Union and would be a super-parliamentary structure, presided over by the President of the French Republic, containing a council of ministers to be presided over by a premier, a senate, and a court of arbitration.[131]

> …de Gaulle had allowed the overseas territories four options at the time the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was submitted to referendum. They were: assimilation (becoming departments of France), retention of their status as overseas territories in accordance with the *Loi Cadre* of 1956, election to become 'member states' of the Community with the future possibility of independence and immediate independence by a vote of 'no' to the referendum…[132]

At first, territories, namely Côte d'Ivoire, were opposed to leaving the French community and declaring independence, especially after seeing the cutting of economic ties that resulted from the independence of Guinea.[133] This stemmed from a sense of economic integration with France and can be seen as a hallmark of the French assimilationist push.

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[130] Ibid, 123
[131] Ibid, 124
[132] Ibid, 125
[133] Ibid, 125

Colonial identity became invariably connected with French association. There was also disagreement among two camps with Leopold Senghor calling for a more British Commonwealth-type Community and Houphouët-Boigny calling for a more French Union-like Community. This led to the sinking of the Community plan, prompting Senghor to ask for independence of the Mali Federation under the provisions provided by the Community, a request that was granted by de Gaulle. This prompted Houphouët-Boigny to declare independence of the *Conseil d'Etente* and ask for Community approval after the fact.[134]

What can be observed through this overview of the French decolonization transition model is the lack of strong and unified decolonization policy and the lack of political inclusion of indigenous populations until late in the movement of decolonization. This would have an impact on the ways in which the colonies perceived their readiness for independence, as will be observed in the case of Côte d'Ivoire. Additionally, the rise of political parties and the key leader also emerged during and leading up to the transition period, which will be observed more closely in the context of Côte d'Ivoire.

(c) Structures in Practice: Côte d'Ivoire

Having examined French colonial policy, administrative apparatuses, and the general evolution of political institutions during the decolonization process, we can now proceed to chronicle these institutions within the context of one of France's many territories. This study has chosen to examine Côte d'Ivoire, one of the main colonies that

[134] Ibid, 125-126

made up French West Africa (AOF). Focus in this section will be placed on the lack of indigenous inclusion within political institutions and the ability to rule locally, the rise of nationalism that gave birth to the PDCI, and the subsequent rise of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d'Ivoire's first president. What will be observed is the relative lack of institutional inclusion within structures that would prepare chiefs and/or educated elites for independence and give them the necessary amount of political education needed to be self-governing. Additionally, nationalist pushes for colonial reform led to the emergence of a dominating party and leader, which holds important implications during the post-independence era.

Pre-World War II Developments

Côte d'Ivoire became an official French colony by a decree on May 10th, 1893,[135] after which a campaign was launched in order to subjugate the indigenous populace thereby establishing French supremacy in the region. Originally, a non-local governor, who in turn was supported by a secretary-general, administered the colony, but this structure changed in 1895 when the French colonial holdings in West Africa were consolidated to form French West Africa, or *Afrique Occidentale Française* (hereby known as AOF). The entirety of AOF would be administered by a Governor General, with each individual territory being administered by an appointed Governor. The Governor would have a Secretary General aiding him and would be above, on the hierarchical chain, district commanders. Côte d'Ivoire, like the other AOF and AEF territories, was split into districts which had local administrations headed by a local ruler

[135] Wodie, "Introduction", 3

hierarchy, mainly chief structures.[136] Early on, this was similar to the British indirect ruling system.

Prior to World War I, there were few instances of violent opposition to French rule in Côte d'Ivoire, mainly stemming from the fact that powerful Ivoirians understood the economic benefits they could reap if they went along with being a French colony.[137] In 1900, however, there were riots resulting from the institution of a head tax, in which the local king had to pay a tax to the French government in a way symbolic of submission to French authority. By 1906, under Governor Gabriel Angoulvant a development program was to proceed following the completion the forceful imposition of French rule in Côte d'Ivoire. In return for cooperation with French officials by the Ivoirians, France agreed to not intervene or touch local administrations and ruler selection, a promise that was not kept.[138] During the expansion of the French Empire, colonial officials were distributed rather sparsely and therefore the French relied on a system of indirect rule through which they ruled using local chiefs as proxies. Counter to their agreement, however, they would depose and replace chief if they did not agree or act in accordance to French colonial policies, a trait shared by many colonial structures. Additionally, villages in Côte d'Ivoire were regrouped and a uniform administration throughout the territory was established.[139] This indirect ruling scheme was emphasized early on in the colonial venture, but lost its emphasis following empire consolidation.

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[136] Warner, "Historical Setting", 13-14
[137] Ibid, 16
[138] Ibid, 11
[139] Ibid, 11-12

Under the policy of assimilation, the superiority of French culture was imposed and highlighted. The main aim through this policy was to attain French citizenship, a 'privilege' that few indigenous Africans were able to attain. When assimilation was forgone for the imposition of association, the Ivoirians were allowed to preserve their local customs and traditions so far as they were compatible with French interests. During the 1930s, small groups of Ivoirians were granted French citizenship, though they were all Western educated and deemed sufficiently 'Westernized'. Most of the population, however, remained French colonial subjects that were subjected to association policies. Additionally, these elites were opposed to independence due to the economic interests they had that came about through the colonial rule of the French.[140] This presents a powerful counterbalance to the rise of nationalism and further entrenched the continuation of the status quo.

After the consolidation of power in the region and the creation of the AOF, French administrative systems were given more direct power, reducing the local rulers to low-ranked civil servants. The individual districts in the colonies, known as *cercles*, were to be governed and administered by a district commander who often operated with relative autonomy due to the poor communication between him, the governor, and the other district commanders. Attention was turned towards establishing colonial self-sufficiency, which is not to be confused with self-governance. These were policies that made the colony responsible for ascertaining resources for administration and defense,

[140] Ibid, 12

with France providing aid only when absolutely necessary.[141] Therefore we can observe de-emphasis on utilizing local ruling schemes in favor of more direct control. The reduction of status to a civil servant rather than a local ruler demonstrates the French idea of assimilation and relatively more direct control.

Until 1958, metropolitan France appointed a governor to administer the colony through a system of direct centralized rule that left little room for policymaking by Ivoirians. Additionally, the difference in application of Assimilation and Association policies between the educated elites and the regular indigenous populace allowed for a degree of divide-and-rule strategy to be implemented. Many Ivoirian elites went to universities in Europe, especially in France, and returned being considered closer as social equals to the Frenchman rather than fellow indigenous peoples. These new elites then fell into contention with traditional local rulers over the administration at a local level, causing some animosity and further dividing the educated Ivoirian elites and the traditional chiefs.[142] This prevented, at least in theory, major nationalist uprisings as the more powerful parts of the indigenous population, who had attained French citizenship, had an invested interest in protecting French colonial rule, a hallmark of assimilation.

The Ivoirians, those that were not Western educated and favored by the French, were considered French subjects without political rights.[143] As part of their tax responsibilities they were required to provide free labor for ten days out of the year in the mining, plantation, and public projects sectors. This was due in part to the need of a large

[141] Ibid, 13-14
[142] Ibid, 14-16
[143] Ibid, 16

number of workers to carry out these public work programs in order to develop colonial self-sufficiency.[144] They were also required to serve in the military and were subjected to a system of arbitrary and summary judgment known as the *indgénat*, which was abolished in 1946.[145] Thus, we see a differential treatment emerging between those considered more "French" and those considered subjects. This holds powerful implications especially in regards to the inclusion of indigenous populations later on in the decolonization process. Additionally, this favored a political elite class that was not a large one and therefore the number of politically educated and capable individuals were limited.

Rise of Nationalism and Houphouët-Boigny

During World War II and after the fall of France, AOF largely sided with the Vichy government, except for Côte d'Ivoire who leaned more towards Free France and the AEF. The Vichy practices in Côte d'Ivoire were harsh and included increased amounts of exploitation. These practices, coupled with the questioning of the French surrender as a sound political move, fed into the rise of nationalism that began to further develop during the interwar years.[146] These nationalist sentiments gained a stage to voice their concerns during the reform era of France that occurred after World War II and which saw participation of the African indigenous population in the formation of the 1946 Constitution of the Fourth Republic. Many Ivoirians wanted to push for political,

[144] Ibid, 14
[145] Ibid, 18
[146] Ibid, 16

social, and economic reform and were finally able to do so. Each territory was to elect two delegates to represent the colony at the Constituent Assembly.

It was here that Félix Houphouët-Boigny rose to prominence as one of the delegates to the Assembly as well as the co-founder of the African Agricultural Union (the SAA).[147] The formation of the union occurred after the passage of an August 1944 law allowing for workers in the AOF to organize.[148] Out of the six hundred delegates to the Constituent Assembly, sixty-three were African delegates, mostly the educated elites that called for liberal reforms, supporting the Socialist and Communist party proposals.

During the Constituent Assemblies, the French political left and the representatives from the African colonies pushed for local self-governance and political equality within the French governmental structure, i.e. citizenship. This was countered by the Right and Center's push for a Federalist system that would continue the tradition of French domination.[149] At the end, the more traditionalist end of the spectrum won out, leaving the African representatives with only a handful of gains in reforms. These gains included the abolishment of *indigénat* in 1945 and reforms concerning the granting of citizenship were passed. However, citizenship was not defined and therefore the development was not as revolutionary as one would have hoped. The denial of substantial citizenship status was supported by the French claim that the indigenous population was not yet ready for that type of responsibility.[150] The denial of citizenship on the ground of unpreparedness speaks to the larger reluctance of the French for institutional change and

[147] Ibid, 16-17
[148] Ibid, 17
[149] Ibid, 18
[150] Ibid, 18

has an effect on the level of preparedness on the eve of independence. If the colonies were not prepared for citizenship and were therefore not included earlier on in the institutional process, it would follow that they were not prepared for the institutional integration following independence.

Under the French Union system, AOF was considered an overseas territory and thus the French exercised control over the legislative and executive functions within the administration. The introduction of cash crops during the interwar period created a farming elite that competed against European farmers. Discontent among these farmers arose due to unfair practices, including forced labor, higher prices for yields, and access to protected markets, in favor of the European farmer. This led to a rise in nationalism among the Ivoirian farming community. [151]

The rise in nationalism following the end of World War II would allow for the further rise of Boigny, as he established a political party and became more vocal about the expansion of political rights. In 1946, a Constitutional referendum allowed for the freedom of speech and assembly to be given to the indigenous population. This led to the development of political parties in Côte d'Ivoire. Houphouët-Boigny as the co-founder of SAA went on to found the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (hereby referred to as the PDCI) in 1946. This party would be used by Houphouët-Boigny as a rallying mechanism in his push for greater equality and, at the last moments, independence.[152] This allowance of political parties demonstrates an important step towards institutional inclusion. The ability of nationalist groups, in theory, to voice demands as a collective further

[151] Ibid, 18
[152] Ibid, 19

strengthens their ability to institute change and gain more inclusion within political structures. Additionally, the emergence of the PDCI would mark an important move towards the nationalist foundations upon which Côte d'Ivoire would emerge following independence.

Between 1946 and 1947, France was pre-occupied with dealing with nationalist uprisings in its Asian holdings and dealing with unrest in its North African holdings. This allowed for French policies in AOF and AEF to focus on preemptively curtailing nationalist violence. This led to a number of reforms that aimed at addressing some of the concerns held by nationalist agitators as well as nationalists using the atmosphere to further their wants. In 1946, AOF territories were grouped under one elected council, called the Grand Council in Dakar. In the following year, Houphouët-Boigny and other West African leaders formed the African Democratic Rally (hereby referred to as RDA) in the Ground Council. This party, in addition to the Ivoirian party PDCI, was seen as a threat to French colonial policy but still became a strong force, having its roots in Côte d'Ivoire. This lead to the Colonial administration trying to manipulate elections and promote rival parties in an effort to curtail the influence of both parties. These discriminatory practices led to violence in 1949 against the colonial government.[153]

By 1951, due to the colonial government's efforts and the alienation of more moderate groups due to its affiliation with the Communist party via the RDA, the PDCI was close to collapse. To prevent the destruction of the party, Houphouët-Boigny disconnected himself and the party from the Communist party, expelled the communist

[153] Ibid, 20

leaning members of the RDA, and changed tactics to be more cooperation-centric.[154] This allowed him and the party to maintain relevance and continue to enjoy popular support.

As independence became more of an issue for the French to deal with, the PDCI and Houphouët-Boigny stated that they were not agitating for independence. Rather, they argued that the tensions within the party would not bode well for the creation of working democratic mechanisms. This, among other practices that promoted ethnic imbalances via French colonial administrative set-up, prompted Houphouët-Boigny to maintain the colonial relationship with the French instead of agitating for freedom.[155]

With the passing of the 1956 *Loi Cadre*, there was an acknowledgement of the growing nationalism both in Côte d'Ivoire as well as in the other colonial territories and drew on the suggestions that were given by African leaders that were allowed to participate in reform talks. The passage of this law essentially ended integrationist policies and granted a degree of internal autonomy to the individual territories, including Côte d'Ivoire. Universal sufferage was also established and the creation of district and representative councils formed on the basis of direct elections did away with the dual electoral system. The representative councils dealt with the formulation of the colony's own domestic policy, while France still dictated foreign affairs, defense, economic, and education policy. The Law also established the Council of Government, which assumed major executive functions in each of the various colonial holdings.[156]

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[154] Ibid, 20-21
[155] Ibid, 21
[156] Ibid, 22-23

During the dissolution of the Fourth French Republic and the creation of the Fifth French Republic under de Gaulle, the advent of a French Community was proposed in a referendum in September 1958. Each territory was given a choice whether to accept the constitution or cut off all bonds and ties with the French empire, thereby gaining independence. Côte d'Ivoire, essentially under Houphouët-Boigny, did not want to gain independence due to the lack of Ivoirian financial resources, a trained workforce, and the presence of only a few individuals that would be able to confidently and effectively govern on a high level.[157] The lack of personnel resulted from the lack of political institutional inclusion and therefore a lack of political education. Only a few educated elites, namely those educated in France, were included within the limited inclusionary structures. This created a relatively small group of individuals that had experience in administration and bureaucracy.

In March 1959, Côte d'Ivoire adopted its first constitution as a self-governing entity, which called for the creation of a unicameral legislature and an executive headed by a prime minister. The legislature was to be elected by the indigenous population via universal suffrage, while the prime minister was elected by a majority of the legislature, whom he was responsible to. During the first election, the PDCI managed win all the available seats and elected Houphouët-Boigny as prime minister. Houphouët-Boigny lost his arborrance and argument against independence after the independence of Mali and

[157] Ibid, 22-23

Senegal. In August 1960, Côte d'Ivoire withdrew from the French Community and gained independence under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny.[158]

(d) Concluding Remarks

When looking at the French colonial system and their methods in reference to decolonization in non-settler African colonies, it is often hard to see the political institutions that it imparted or tried to impart on its territories. This stems from a fundamental lack of a strong institutional system that would prepare the colonies for independence.

> …[U]nlike the British in their neighboring African colonies, where civilian rule was the norm and where consultative assemblies had been established by the early twentieth century, the French introduced little that prepared the indigenous populations for representative government[159]

This should come as no surprise, however, due to the focus of the French colonial policymakers on the retention of the empire rather than its political development. This reluctance from the policymakers at the top echelons of colonial policy worked contrary to the bottom-up movement for institutional change from nationalist groups. However, the combination of international opinion and the societal impetuses along with increased nationalist agitations pushed the French towards accepting the reality of the empire's dissolution.

When the French finally did decide that independence was inevitable and started to put in place political institutions that would facilitate an ease of transition from colony to country, it was too late. By the time such actions were taken, the colonies were already

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[158] Ibid, 23-24
[159] Betts, *France and Decolonisation*, 117

on their way out, like Côte d'Ivoire, and were largely institutionally unprepared for independence. This results from the late institutional inclusion of indigenous local elites in the governance structures.

However, in terms of nationalist creation, the French system allowed for the rise of political parties relatively early on in the decolonization process. This led to the prominence of key political parties, such as the PDCI in Côte d'Ivoire, which would become a major basis of political stability and support in the post-independence years. This rise of the party in Côte d'Ivoire was met with the rise of Félix Houphouët-Boigny and solidified his position as a key leader in both the transition period and the post-independence period that followed. The French model instituted in the non-settler African holdings was highly culture-centric and focused on eventual integration, which affected the levels of indigenous inclusion in the various territories. Towards the end of the decolonization period, France shifted to releasing the territories. Aside from the creation of political parties within individual territories, colonies, such as Côte d'Ivoire, were relatively underprepared, institutionally speaking.

CHAPTER IV: MODELS IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA

Having examined the two general approaches to decolonization policy in non-settler African colonies and their applications within specific country contexts, we can now turn our attention to examining how they affected post-independence institutional stability in the context of the two cases. In order to do this, the post-independence developments of both Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire will be examined. To reiterate the main findings of Chapter II, the British Model of decolonization was ideologically driven by a vision of institutional inclusion, even if they inclusion was to be selective, and rested on the desire of an evolutionary and logical progression from Crown Colony to self-governing state. As was stated in Chapter III, the French model was largely integrationist and for the most part strove for the encapsulation of the territories into France, thereby resulting in policies that favored French bureaucrats heading colonial institutions, with local indigenous populations not being fully accepted until a few years prior to independence of the colonies.

The general effectiveness of the British and French Models throughout the various former non-settler African colonies is difficult to assess given the historical, natural, and economic differences between the holdings that resulted in differences in both colonial administration and decolonization. Both Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, however, underwent decolonization models that were closely in line with the British and French decolonization policy vision implemented in their non-settler African holdings. By examining the specific country developments following independence in both Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, we will be able to draw conclusions on how the decolonization policies

implemented affected their post-colonial institutional stability and the role that institutional development played in the two countries. This becomes especially relevant when looking at modern day transition structures and policy.

As mentioned earlier, the transition models ideally envisioned by the colonial powers did not necessarily follow through in practice. In fact, here too there are two important factors that affected how these models played out in practice: (1) the nature of nationalism and (2) the role of the key leader. The focus of this analysis will rest on examining the role of nationalistic sentiments emerging from the anti-colonial struggle during the final years of colonialism and the role of the key transition leader following the attainment of independence. These two factors have an effect on institutional stability and viability within the country contexts.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the main developments in Ghana following its independence from Great Britain in 1957. The role of the main Ghanaian party, the CPP, and the legacy of the first leader, President Kwame Nkrumah, will be chronicled and will be connected to the series of military coups and civilian governments that emerged following the post-colonial period. The second section examines the main developments in Côte d'Ivoire following its independence from the French in 1960, with focus being placed on the differences between formal institutional structure and the actual administration of the country under the single party state, the unifying and authoritarian role of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, and the aftermath of his death. The final section brings together the main observations derived from the developments of post-

independence Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire as well as provides a timeline of the main events in the post-independence period.

(a) After Independence: Ghana

Following its independence in 1957, Ghana, the former British colony of the Gold Coast, underwent a series of governmental changes, ranging from a single-party state to *coup d'états* and military governments to a multiparty, constitutional democracy. Throughout Ghana's apparent struggles following independence, however, the main base institutional structures remained relatively intact during the civilian periods of rule. This analytical survey of post-independence Ghanaian history explores the role that nationalism, anti-western sentiments, and the need to forge a national identity apart from the interests of various local and ethnic interest groups played in the institutional stability of the country after its separation from Great Britain. Additionally, the role of the transition leader, Nkrumah, is examined to point out how a key leader during the transition period affected post-colonial institutional stability.

As was mentioned in Chapter II, the British decolonization model involved selective inclusion of indigenous populations within the political institutions as a way to increase political education, create a class of emerging leaders, appease nationalist sentiments, and transition the colony into a self-governing country. In terms of Ghana, this played out via the creation of local legislative and executive councils that later formed into a larger executive council and legislative assembly, which provided the groundwork for the parliamentary system. Additionally, these systems allowed for the selective inclusion of

largely political elites from the coastal region and developed in line with the emergence of the CPP and the rise of Nkrumah.

On March 6, 1957 Ghana formally gained independence from Great Britain following the adoption of the 1957 Constitution. Though Queen Elizabeth II was still represented in the colony by Governor General Sir Arden-Clarke until 1960, Ghana had become the first West African nation to gain formal independence from a colonial power and was hailed as being a model former-colony going into the post-independence era.[160] The 1957 Constitution provided a formal institutional structure complete with an amendment process that was intentioned to make it difficult to amend certain clauses of the constitution, namely the checks and balances clauses. Although the 1957 Constitution is not the current constitution under which modern day Ghana operates, the interactions between then President Nkrumah and the constitutional structure provide some interesting insight into the role that nationalism and the presence of a key transition leader play in the institutional and constitutional developments of the state.

Generally speaking, the 1957 Constitution provided for a combination of a strong executive, legislature (in the form of a parliament-like system), a judiciary, and a series of local institutions that allowed for the representation of chiefs and tribal councils. The rules governing these local institutions, which allowed for a more democratic representation of local interests and populations, could not be changed without a two-thirds vote in the National Assembly. Safeguards such as these were present in order to

[160] McLaughlin, "Historical Setting", 31

curb presidential power and allow for the growth of a democratic Ghana.[161] In addition, the protections of the tribal councils and chief structures can be regarded as a continuation of the British system of accommodating structures that represent and defend local interests. During the colonial and decolonization periods, the British made it a point to use local chief structures as a means of local governance. Throughout the decolonization era, these structures gained more and more autonomy, allowing for increased political participation and policy building. In this way, the British sought to lessen its own cost of administering the non-settler African colonies, which were mainly exploited for resources, and, unintentionally or intentionally, build local knowledge that would become important during the transition period.

Despite this, Nkrumah was able to create a single party state and centralize his own power, pursuing his ideological vision for a socialist and post-colonial Ghana. Following Ghana's independence, Nkrumah had a pan-African vision of unity and held onto socialist, and largely anti-West sentiments, stemming mainly from the anti-colonial struggle he championed during Ghana's transition to independence. Keeping in line with his vision and wary that opposition groups would be more willing to talk and negotiate with the imperialists, Nkrumah used his power and the power of the party structure to ban other opposition parties, thereby creating a single party state. He envisioned a unified continent, where the newly independent African states could resist the international pulls amidst the Cold War and further exploitation by Western powers.[162] The initial support for the CPP by the general population, reflected in the seats allocated to them in the

[161] Ibid, 32
[162] Ibid, 33

National Assembly, allowed the president to amend the constitution in a way that got rid of the special entrenchment clauses regarding chief representation, abolished regional assemblies, and silenced CPP opposition. With his now expanded powers, Nkrumah appointed himself president for life and in the early part of 1964 created and passed an amendment that allowed the president to dismiss any judge, thereby expanding executive authority into the judicial branch.[163]

Through the early years of Ghana's independence, the nationalistic principles that drove the anti-colonial independence struggle transferred over to a strong party base that supported and added to the power of President Nkrumah. The nationalistic and anti-colonial movements of the CPP and its prominence in the attainment of independence reflected its popularity among the Ghanaian population. This popularity became important following independence as it garnered support for Nkrumah and for the ideologies the party represented, thereby allowing for the centralization of the president's power and the furthering of the party's ideologies. The power of the party and the exclusion of opposition groups do demonstrate the lasting effects of the late institutional inclusion of other indigenous groups within Ghana. The CPP mainly represented the individuals and interests associated with the coastal regions, which was a hallmark of British selective inclusion of male educated elites from largely the coastal territory early on in the colonial process. Along with the president, the growth of support and power of the CPP allowed for them to pave way for Constitutional amendments to be enacted and

[163] Ibid, 34-36

aided the president's expansion of executive power and the furthering of his vision for Ghana.

The need for forging a new national identity and creating national unity became a paramount task for the Ghanaians, as it did in many other post-independent African nations. President Nkrumah's role and recognition in the transition period between colonialism and independence placed him at the forefront for change and allowed him to have the initial public support required to further his own vision for a more unified and solidified Ghana. Having played a prominent role during the years of transition, he was able to garner the necessary support of the people early on in his term as president, thereby allowing him to amend the constitution with relative ease.

This vision of the future was not without a price and the Nkrumah's presidency was not without opposition. The reforms he put into place, such as the series of welfare programs, were expensive and placed a strain on Ghana's economy. In reaction to this, many opponents began to emerge within the CPP as well as from the general population. This culminated in a bloodless military coup in February 1966 by the National Liberation Council (NLC) while Nkrumah was in China.[164] The NLC justified its takeover by asserting that the Nkrumah regime and the CPP were both 'corrupt' and 'abusive' and that there was an absence of the implementation of the democratic principles embedded in the constitutional structure.[165]

Despite the fact that in practice institutional stability was under attack, one could argue that Ghana had the institutional framework that had the ideological potential for

[164] Ibid, 36
[165] Ibid, 36

Ghana's stability and democracy. The role of nationalism and the personal power of the key leader attempted to change this framework, which resulted in instability and a loss of popular support. This was due in part to economic hardships wrought on by the number of reforms and programs enacted by Nkrumah. It can be argued, however, that the nationalistic and democratic idealism that was imposed and highlighted by the British retained its institutionalization. Though the coup was militaristic and authoritarian in nature, plans for the return to a democratic civilian government were already underway.

The NLC was faced with a number of problems bequeathed to them by the Nkrumah regime. In addition to the stratification of ethnic and regional divisions, which were tied to the level and time of selective inclusion during the transition and colonial periods, economic burdens that stemmed from Nkrumah's policies hindered the NLC's ability to institute rapid development. Moreover, the outcomes of the first regime placed a fear of unchecked authoritative power and by extension the creation of a strong central government. This fear manifested itself in relative support for military rule resulting from the coup.[166]

The NLC, which had a central executive apparatus containing four army officers and four police officers, promised to restore Ghana to a democratic government and created a representative assembly in order to draft a new constitution for the Second Republic. During this time, political parties were allowed to form and by the elections of August 1969, a number political parties existed with the main ones being the Progressive Party (PP) led by Kofi A Busia and the National Alliance of Liberals (NLA) led by Komla A.

[166] Ibid, 36-7

Gbedemah. The PP was seen as the opponent force to the CPP, while the NAL was more or less the successor of the CPP's right wing policies. Following the election, Busia became Prime Minister, while the presidential position for the first year and a half following the transition comprised of three military or policing personnel. This presidential position was dissolved in 1970 following the election of President Edward Akufo Addo.[167] Though the 1966 coup d'état affected the institutional stability of the country, plans to return to democratic institutions reflected the further entrenchment of the base democratic foundations institutionalized by the British. The coup itself, given that it planned to relinquish power and took steps to achieve this, represented more of a backlash against Nkrumah's policies and power than against the basic institutional foundations contained in the original 1957 constitution.

The main struggle that the Busia government was confronted with was the rebuilding of the shattered economy that resulted from Nkrumah's policies. In order to address these issues, the Busia government adopted a policy of expelling non-citizens and limited formal government involvement in small business. The austerity programs instituted by the government, however, proved to be costly and affected influential farmers and army personnel, who had in the past benefited from certain 'bonuses' from the Nkrumah regime. After trying to change the leadership of the military elements in the country, the Busia government fell to a bloodless coup facilitated by Lieutenant Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong in 1972.[168]

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[167] Ibid, 38
[168] Ibid, 39-40

The struggle that was faced by the Busia government that eventually led to its downfall would be seen again and again throughout Ghana's history following the Nkrumah's fall. Economic burdens plagued the country and the need for development and economic revival became paramount. Sound economic policy, however, was difficult to come by especially in light of the economic constraints resulting from the amounts of debt the country had. Though this was the case, the important point to draw from this was the fact that Ghana, despite military rule, was drawn back to its democratic institutional foundations. This was demonstrated by the eventual return to civilian governments that reflected the democratic and representative underpinnings inherited from the British.

Following his coup, Lt. Colonel Acheampong created the National Redemption Council (NRC), which sought to create a military government and did not wish to move back to democracy. The reasoning for this had its foundations in the Nkrumah regime's failures, which represented a single party state with a strong central government, and the Busia regime, which showed the pitfalls of socialist policies, to adequately address economic problems faced by the country. The NRC gained in popularity, for it provided price supports for basic food items and entered into negotiations regarding Ghana's debt abroad. In October 1975, the Supreme Military Council (SMC) was created to replace the NRC, which included a few senior military officials with little to no input from civilian populations.[169]

Over the years, the SMC's popularity began to wane, especially in light of rising international oil prices and the fact that the economic policies adopted under the regime

[169] Ibid, 44

hurt industries and the transportation sector. By 1977, the SMC began to shift towards a union government, in which civilian and appointed military personnel would run the government together. Although originally political parties were outlawed in the elections, the participation of political parties was allowed in 1979.[170] Before the elections were completed, however, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings staged a coup, through which military heads such as Acheampong were executed, and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) with the mission of serving the 'common good'. The elections were to take place and Hilla Limann was elected in 1979, thus starting the Third Republic of Ghana, which subsequently fell to another coup by Rawlings in 1981.[171]

Following the second coup, Rawlings established the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) with Rawlings, serving as the chair, Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah, two other officers, and three civilians. The PNDC and Rawlings reasoned that,

> Ghana's sorry economic condition…had resulted in part from the absence of good political leadership. In fact, as early as the AFRC administration in 1979, Rawlings and his associates accused three former military leaders (generals Afrifa, Acheampong, and Akuffo) of corruption and greed and of thereby contributing to the national crisis and had executed them on the basis of this accusation. In other words, the AFRC in 1979 contributed the national crisis to internal, primarily political, causes. The overthrow of the Limann administration by the PNDC in 1981 was an attempt to prevent another inept administration from aggravating an already bad economic situation. By implication, the way to resolve some of the problems was to stabilize the political situation and to improve the economic conditions of the nation radically. [172]

Therefore, we see that one of the major impetuses for staging the coup is founded in the detrimental economic situation that Ghana was in following the previous regimes. The

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[170] Ibid, 45
[171] Ibid, 46-48
[172] Ibid, 51

fear of the emergence of another powerful leader like Nkrumah or a further worsening of the economic situation allowed for the Rawlings administration to take the reigns of government. Just as economic conditions mediate institutional development at other times, here too what mediated this experience were economic fears. Therefore, the base institutional structures were not the issue. Rather it was the inability, or perceived inability, for various administrations to address such economic issues that provided a main drive for the coups.

Though the return to a military government, the Rawlings government began to have talks about moving towards constitutionalism once the economy had been stabilized, for it was a consistent problem for Ghana's stability. The fact remains that the Rawlings government began to adopt steps towards the democratic institutions imposed on them by the British system during decolonization. This progress, however, was to be gradual.

Following its inception, the Rawlings government appointed a 15 member civilian cabinet. Opposition talks, however, were still not allowed and members of attempted coups were executed. Although the PNDC wanted radical change of the system, there were disagreements on the approach and philosophy. Despite this, the regime began to institute economic recovery measures that included economic stability and inclusion programs aimed at integrating the bottom parts of the society. By the mid-1980s popular opinion and the economic stability lead to the need and desire to move back towards constitutionalism. This began with the creation of district assemblies, which allowed for more local participation in government. These assemblies also allowed for the

participation of local tribal authorities that were appointed by the PNDC.[173] This movement towards constitutionalism culminated in the drafting and passing of the Constitution of 1992, which resulted in the Fourth Republic of Ghana.

The setup of the government, which is the current Ghanaian constitution, included a legislative branch composed of an independent parliament of no less than 140 members, who were elected via direct elections.[174] The president heads the executive branch with a two-term limit with each term lasting four years.[175] The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the High Court and Regional tribunals.[176] What is fascinating is that the basic institutional framework for the 1992 Constitution can be seen as having derived from the 1960 Constitution, thereby suggesting a link between institutions derived from the colonial period and post-colonial institution building. Under the 1960 Constitution, the power in Ghana was largely divided between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. The President of the Republic led the executive branch[177], while the legislative branch comprised of a parliament, which in turn was composed of a National Assembly and the President.[178] Finally, the judicial branch included a Supreme Court and high courts led by a chief justice and appointed justices.[179] Besides some nuanced differences, the main institutional framework of Ghana remained relatively constant event through the eras of military rule, namely the structure of a

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[173] Ibid, 52-3
[174] Constitution Progject, *Ghana Constitution of 1992*, Chapter 10, Part I, 93(1)
[175] Ibid, Chapter 8, Part I, 66 (1-2)
[176] Ibid, Chapter 11, Part I, 126 (1)
[177] US. Department of State Titre III, 8 (1)
[178] Ibid, Titre IV, 20 (1)
[179] Ibid, Titre VI, 44

Presidnet as head of an executive branch, a Parliament-like system as the legislative branch, and a separate judicial branch.

This is important to note because the base institutional foundations were able to carry over from the inception of the country through the military coups and the tumultuous Republics. These institutions have their roots in the colonial institutions developed during the transition period, i.e. via the executive and legislative councils. The ideological vision of the British decolonization model implemented in non-settler African colonies attempted to implant these structures. The turmoil that challenged the stability of these envisioned institutional structures in Ghana had its roots in the key-leader phenomenon and the economic destabilization that went along with his ideological views. Nkrumah's popular support, the main reason he was able to manipulate the Constitution to solidify his own power, derived from the surge of nationalistic support that resulted from the anti-colonial struggles during the transition period. With the successful transition of power from President Rawlings to President Agyekum Kufour in 2000, the Fourth Republic of Ghana moved "…significantly closer to completing a process of transition to democratic rule that it had begun in the early 1990s, and marked a real step toward democratic consolidation"[180] The peaceful transfer of presidential power is a significant break from Ghana's history of military coups and a variety of civilian governments.

(b) After Independence: Côte d'Ivoire

Among the numerous French colonial holdings that gained independence during the 1960s, Côte d'Ivoire demonstrated relative stability throughout the first couple of decades

[180] Gyimah-Boadi, "A Peaceful Turnover in Ghana", 104

of independence. This section will examine the sources of Côte d'Ivoire's political stability and the institutional structures adopted in order to attain this level of stability. What will be observed is a stability created by the dictatorship of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the differences between formal political structures and the source of actual power, and the aftermath of Houphouët-Boigny's death that resulted in two civil wars and the need for United Nations intervention.

During the decolonization transition period, Côte d'Ivoire, represented by Houphouët-Boigny, was resistant to movements towards independence, stemming largely from a combination wanting to maintain economic ties with France and a feeling of unpreparedness. Under the French decolonization model, political inclusion occurred relatively late, thereby affecting the amount of politically experienced and educated populace that could take the reigns of government following independence. Additionally, under the French model, Côte d'Ivoire's PDCI grew in importance and came to dominate the political sphere with Houphouët-Boigny at the helm.

Côte d'Ivoire gained independence from France on October 31, 1960 when the National Assembly adopted a constitution. The constitution of 1960 created a political system that entailed "…a strong, centralized presidential system with an independent judiciary and a national legislature"[181] and was heavily influenced by the French constitution and ideologies. Borrowing language of universal suffrage and liberal principles from the French constitution and ideals of human rights from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen as well as the Universal Declaration of Human

[181] Handloff, "Government and Politics", 145

Rights, the Ivorian constitution created a system of independent executive, judicial, and legislative branches with an article that allowed for the existence of a multi-party system.[182]

The executive branch of the Ivoirian government, headed by the president and his cabinet, allowed for the president to have the powers of both a president and a prime minister, thereby "…subordinating the role of the National Assembly."[183] The strong executive had powers of appointment and dismissal over members of the judicial branch, ministers, and officials of the military. Under the Constitution, there were no term limits on how many times a president could be elected, but did state that they would serve five year terms. [184] The legislature had a similar five-year term and was to be elected via universal suffrage within a specific area. Although legislative power was to formally be in the hands of the National Assembly, which contained 175 members by 1980, President Houphouët-Boigny "Until 1980…handpicked the deputies [members of the National Assembly], who were automatically consented to executive instructions."[185] The president of the National Assembly, according to an amendment in 1985, would take up the mantle of president in the executive branch if the position were vacated.[186]

In addition to the executive and legislative branches, the 1960 Constitution called for the creation of a judicial branch based mostly on the French legal and judicial system and to a lesser extent on customary law. The lower courts included the Justice of the Peace

[182] Ibid, 145-146
[183] Ibid, 148
[184] Ibid, 148
[185] Ibid, 148
[186] Ibid, 149

Courts, the Court of Assize, the Court of First Instance, and the Court of Appeals. All of these courts were created via a presidential decree and also had a limited jurisdiction.[187] The superior courts mandated by the Constitution included the Supreme Court, which was divided into four sections each with a specific topical purview, the High Court of Justice, which was composed of members of the National Assembly and had the power to try the president on treason charges or try government officials.[188] The 1960 Constitution also called for the creation of an Economic and Social Council, which would assist the president on issues regarding or connected to economic or social policies.[189]

In terms of local government, Côte d'Ivoire was split into 49 prefectures by 1987. Each of these prefectures was lead by a prefect, who was constitutionally obligated to represent local interests. They were also given some powers of arbitrary detention for 48 hours during times of civil unrest. These prefectures were further split into sub-prefectures that performed almost purely administrative tasks and represented the lowest level of local government. [190] Houhpouët-Boigny appointed the heads of the prefectures and the sub-prefectures, as well as the larger departments.[191]

Although there were formal structures mandated by the Constitution of 1960, the level to which these structures exercised the power given to them differed greatly. The main ruling party on the eve of and following Côte d'Ivoire's independence, the PDCI, stressed the need for national unity following the end of colonial rule, which they defined

[187] Ibid, 151
[188] Ibid, 152-53
[189] Ibid, 149
[190] Ibid, 155-56
[191] Ibid, 24

as unanimous and unconditional support for the party and its leaders. Under President Houphouët-Boigny's leadership and constitutional power of appointment, positions of authority in the various branches of government were given to supporters of his regime, which worked to centralize and strengthen his own power. Presidential control over the National Assembly, via the appointment of political supporters to key positions, severely hampered the branch's ability to check the growing power of the executive.[192]

The growing influence and power of Félix Houphouët-Boigny led to the emergence of opposition groups, within the PDCI party and outside of it. In 1962, some more radical PDCI members formulated a plan to kidnap the President as well as other key leaders. The plot failed, leading to the capture and conviction of a number of members. Another supposed plot surfaced in 1963 and the alleged members were arrested, but later released in 1971 due to the lack of evidence.[193]

In the aftermath of the 1963 plot, Houphouët-Boigny instituted steps in order to garner the necessary amount of political and military loyalty needed in order to ensure the persistence of his power. Using ethnic differences coupled with political differences and rivalries, the President divided opposition groups and individuals while instituting a patronage system that rested on giving high-paying jobs to various individuals, with the appointments being reflective of the various ethnic groups.[194] Additionally, the President

[192] Ibid, 24
[193] Ibid, 25
[194] Ibid, 27

took direct control over the military and police forces, expanding his executive powers to allow himself to become the sole appointer of senior officials.[195]

By 1964, there was an emergence of a number of Ivoirian educated individuals capable and qualified to fill positions within the government structure. This influx led to an expansion of the departments and prefectures, thereby demonstrating, at least in theory, the new access to local government. Additionally, there was a purge of party members, around 200 in number, from the party due to allegations of treasonous discussions.[196]

Therefore, it is observed that Houphouët-Boigny became the de facto leader of the country following independence from France. He played an important and key role during the transition period, becoming not only a main player in the Ivoirian context, but also a key member of party formations during negotiations with France via the French community discussions. With this recognition and his charisma, the President was able to consolidate his power and institute a single-party state that served to further his idea of national unity, which was unwavering support for the PDCI.

It is important to note that Félix Houphouët-Boigny's consolidation of power coincided with a rise in public discord. High urban unemployment and the influx of foreign unskilled workers caused discord amongst the Ivoirian workforce. Moreover, new Ivoirian intellectuals and policy elites were excluded from the administrative apparatus due to the fact that French bureaucrats, who had more experience, were filling administrative jobs. This hints at a neo-colonial nature of post-independence Côte

[195] Ibid, 28
[196] Ibid, 25

d'Ivoire, a notion that was not well received by students and intellectuals that were pushing for a movement away from Westernization and towards socialism.[197] "It [The Ivorian Government] wanted to preserve Côte d'Ivoire's economic ties to France and to avoid staffing the administration with untrained bureaucrats. Consequently, many Ivoirians perceived Houphouët-Boigny as favoring Europeans over Ivoirians in employment."[198] Even following independence, the nature of colonial rule and the decolonization policy of the French reared its head in the creation of this neo-colonial like state. The creation of this neo-colonial state can be said to result from two hallmarks of French colonial policy. First, the neo-colonial relationship can be said to stem from the assimilationist nature of French colonial and decolonization policy. The cultural integration and the attempts at creating a close relationship with the colonies, reflected in part by Houphouët-Boigny's reluctance to jump at the first opportunity for independence, therefore can be seen as a source of creation for this neo-colonial relationship. Secondly, the French decolonization model did not have a sufficient amount of institutional inclusion until late in the decolonization process. This then led to the lack of able Ivorian bureaucrats and the need to rely on the French.

In order to continue to protect his control over power in the country, the President began to replace old loyalist leaders with younger intellectuals, namely by creating positions and shaping a sense of indebtedness among the intellectuals therefore resulting in their loyalty. While opposition was still existent, mostly due to public discontent over underemployment and unemployment, the administration used military force to quickly

[197] Ibid, 26
[198] Ibid, 26

and efficiently silence discontent, further solidifying the President's power. Furthermore, Houhpouët-Boigny capitalized on his own charisma and used it to garner public support and, if that failed to garner support or quell the masses, would blame other government officials, while discussing government inefficiency, to boost his own credentials.[199]

By the time of the global recession in the 1970s and 1980s, public discontent over the unemployment rate in Côte d'Ivoire led to demonstrations and expressions of frustration with both the economic situation and the single-party system that had dominated Côte d'Ivoire since its independence. Houphouët-Boigny promised reforms, but many of them were not executed.[200]

Since independence we can observe that Ivorian stability, or rather perceived stability, stems mainly from the authoritarian rule of a popular president with wide executive powers. Though the institutional schemata enumerated in the 1960 Constitution did provide a seemingly stable and French-like institutional structure, the rise of Houphouët-Boigny during the transition period allowed him to garner the necessary amount of public support during his rule in order to solidify his power and ensure stability through sometimes liberal uses of military force and public appointments.

Though this stability was generally welcomed in the post-independence African community, a fundamental problem was present: What happens after the charismatic leader is either no longer fit to fulfill his role as president or passes away? The question of succession was brought up throughout the 1980s by both party members and members of the international community, namely France who had a vested interest in Côte d'Ivoire

[199] Ibid, 27-29
[200] Ibid, 31

given the close economic, bordering neo-colonial, relationship they shared. Though a number of candidates were present and there were calls for the creation of a vice president position, handpicked by Houphouët-Boigny himself, the President refused to name a successor to avoid fissures within the party.

Following Houphouët-Boigny's death in December 1993, Henri Konan Bedie became the second President of Côte d'Ivoire but he did not enjoy his predecessor's level of national unity and support. Economic pressures placed significant strain on Bedie's presidency, eventually resulting in a coup in December 1999.[201] The bloodless coup was led by General Guei, who "…formed a government of national unity and promised open elections. A new constitution was drafted and ratified by the population in the summer of 2000. It retained clauses that underscored national divisions between north and south, Christian and Muslim, that had been growing since Houphouet's death".[202] When the opposition party's candidate, Laurent Gbago, came out ahead in the polls, General Guei halted the elections and declared himself the winner, claiming fraud in the polling process. This resulted in a fight that culminated in the instatement of Gbago as president, but resulted in new protests "…calling for new elections because the Supreme Court had declared their [the Rassemblement des Republicaines (RDR) party] presidential candidate and all the candidates of the PDCI ineligible".[203] Eventual calls for peace resulted and the RDR party recognized President Gbagbo's legitimacy.

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[201] United States Department of State, "1999 Coup and Aftermath"
[202] Ibid
[203] Ibid

This relative peace was short-lived for a coup attempt emerged in January of 2001, which eventually lead to the inclusion of the RDR party in the government.[204] However in 2002, exiled military personnel led an attack on the government facilities and ministers in three of the main cities, resulting in the death of the Minister of Interior. Government response led to the destruction of a number of homes, which resulted in the displacement of over 12,000 people.[205] The attempted coup metamorphosed into a rebellion, dividing the country into two, with the rebel group the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI) on one side and the government on the other. Other rebel groups emerged, such as the Ivoirian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP). [206] Efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) resulted in a ceasefire agreement between the two forces, with President Gbago requesting that France "…assign forces to monitor the ceasefire, pending the deployment of ECOWAS troops."[207] This underscores the close relationship that Côte d'Ivoire maintained with the French following independence.

In January of 2003, Ivorian political forces signed the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, which included "…the creation of a government of national reconciliation, to be headed by a Prime Minister appointed by the President in consultation with other political parties".[208] However, the talks to create the new government struggled with the

[204] United States Department of State, "2001 Attempted Coup"
[205] United States Department of State, "2002 Country Divides"
[206] Ibid
[207] United Nations, "MINUCI: Background"
[208] Ibid

reconciliation between the government and the rebellion groups.[209] Even the United Nations had to intervene, suggesting the need for outside efforts. The UN established the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in 2004 with the primary mission to "…facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by them in January 2003 which aimed at ending the Ivorian civil war. Its mandate was subsequently extended and adjusted on several occasions to meet new requirements and reflect the evolving situation in the country".[210]

Following the end of a UN-certified presidential election in 2010, in which Alassane Ouattara was declared the winner, President Lauraent Gbagbo refused to step down, launching the country into a second civil war. UNOCI forces and presence was required for the addressing of threats and ensuring the return to peace and stability within the country. The number of military and police personnel have been downsized in light of the progress made by June of 2014, however the mandate of UNOCI continued to persist.[211]

Through Côte d'Ivoire's tumultuous post-Houphouët-Boigny era, it is observed that President Houphouët-Boigny had a strong effect on the stability that existed following independence. This stability resulted mainly in part to the charismatic qualities of the President and the authoritarian methods that were employed to consolidate his power as opposed to stability resulting from a sound and persistent institutional structure that is not leader dependent. Additionally nationalist support following the independence of the country bolstered the support for the President and the need for national unity lead to the

[209] Ibid
[210] United Nations, "UNOCI: Background"
[211] Ibid

creation of a single party state that diverted from the formal constitutional institutional structures. This created a heavily leader dependent structure, thus necessitating the need for President Houhpouët-Boigny to choose his successor before his death. His inability to do so upset this 'stability' and resulted in two civil wars centered on the allocation of power.

(c) After Transition: Main Observations and Comparisons

A number of observations can be drawn from the examinations of the post-independent developments within Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. For one, both contexts had a key transition leader that took the reigns of government, in a rather authoritarian manner, following independence. In the Ghanaian context, President Nkrumah, with ample support for his policies via the CPP, consolidated his power through amending the 1960 Constitution in a way that favored and advanced his own ideological vision of Ghana, in that it would be largely anti-West and become a beacon for the pan-African ideal. In the Ivorian context, President Houhpouët-Boigny was given the reigns of government and utilized his popularity, charisma, and the support from the PDCI to consolidate his power and create an institutional structure that ran parallel to the formal structures laid out in the Constitution of 1960. His popularity, which had roots in the role he played during the transition period, allowed him to create a single party state and remain in power until his death in 1993.

Both the CPP in Ghana and the PDCI in Côte d'Ivoire also trace their roots to the nationalistic support they received during the transition period, which affected the way they ideologically approached post-independence governance. The CPP, which

championed the anti-colonial sentiment during the transition period and pushed for the liberation of the country from the yoke of colonialism at the earliest point possible, adopted, and supported, largely anti-West stances aimed at preventing further extractive and exploitative practices in Africa and the creation of pan-African unity that would stand to protect the interests of Africa as a collective against Western interests. The PDCI, however, had a rather close tie with the French colonizers, a claim that is supported by the fact that the party, under Houphouët-Boigny, was willing to join the French community and was hesitant to become independent immediately. This is not to say that the PDCI did not wish for the independence or championed a pro-colonial ideology. Rather, it is to demonstrate that a close relationship between the country and France had developed through the colonial period into the decolonization transition period and manifested itself via the allocation of bureaucratic positions of French bureaucrats and the importance of maintaining close ties with the French.

In the context of this thesis, the differences between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire arises in the nature of the institutional structures in place and how nationalist groups and leaders interacted with them. In the Ghanaian case, President Nkrumah worked within the constitutional confines to create the one party state whereas President Houphouët-Boigny created a parallel structure that negated the institutional checks and balance system via the appointment of key supporters within the military and political structures. When President Nkrumah was overthrown, the country went through a series of military and civilian governments that eventually resulted in the current Fourth Republic of Ghana. The failures of the military and civilian governments prior to the Fourth Republic largely

stem from the economic instability that resulted from President Nkrumah's policies during his presidency. The main institutional structures, stepping back and examining the institutional continuity between the First Republic and the Fourth Republic, remained relatively intact, with the parliament, executive, and judicial structures continuing at the core of the government structure.

Côte d'Ivoire during the initial post-independence years emerged as a stable country amidst a collection of newly created and destabilized African nations. Following the death of President Houphouët-Boigny, a different picture emerges. The perceived stability in Côte d'Ivoire rested mainly in the President's ability to be charismatic and retain a strong hold over the activities of opposition groups and the military. The failure to name a successor and the death of the President resulted in a struggle for power among various groups that culminated in the outbreak of two civil wars. Therefore, it can be inferred that the stability of Côte d'Ivoire did not result from the institutional stability but rather from the leadership, which created a parallel set of institutions that served to further the interests of the president and consolidate his power to create a stable state. It is further noted that the civil wars that resulted following President Houphouët-Boigny's death in Côte d'Ivoire warranted the need for international intervention, i.e. by the French and the United Nations. In Ghana, the series of government coups and changes were largely dealt domestically and tended to gravitate towards restoring democratic civilian government. In both cases, however, the decolonization models implemented, with their varying degrees of inclusion, did impact some institutional structure that would ideally allow for stability following independence. The role of nationalism and the key leader,

however, influenced these levels of stability, thus largely influencing the instability that was experienced.

Figure 4.1: Major Post-independence Events in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire

TIMELINE OF MAJOR POST-INDEPENDENCE EVENTS	
GHANA	**CÔTE D'IVOIRE**
1957 The Gold Coast achieves independence from Great Britain President Kwame Nkrumah elected	**1960** Côte d'Ivoire achieves independence from France President Félix-Houphouët-Boigny elected
1966 Bloodless coup d'état by the National Liberation Council Military rule established, but steps towards restoring civilian rule are being taken.	**1993** President Houphouët-Boigny passes away without naming a successor Henri Bedie becomes President
1969 Elections are held for the new civilian government. Political parties are allowed to form and participate in the election process.	**1999** Bloodless coup d'état by General Guei
1970 Kofi A. Busia is elected as the Prime Minister while Edward Akufo Addo is elected President	**2000** New constitution adopted General Guei halts elections, prompting protests Laurent Gbago instated as President, prompting new protests
1972 Bloodless coup d'état led by Lt. Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong and the creation of the National Redemption Council	**2001** Attempted coup d'état Inclusion of the *Rassemblement des Republicaines* (RDR) party in the government
1975 The Supreme Military Council is created to replace the National Redemption Council	**2003** Ivorian political forces sign Linas-Marcoussis Agreement
1977 The Supreme Military Council shifts towards a union government	**2004** The United Nations establishes the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
1979 Coup d'état by Flight Lt. Jerry John Rawlings The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council created Elections take place and Hilla Limann elected	**2010** UN certified election Alassane Ouattara declared winner President Lauranet Gbago refuses to step down Second civil war begins
1981 Coup d'état by Flight Lt. Jerry John Rawlings The Provisional National Defense Council established	**2014** UN military and police personnel downsized, but still present
Mid-1980s Movement towards return to constitutionalism	
1992 Adoption of the Constitution of 1992 and the establishment of the Fourth Republic Jerry John Rawlings elected President	
2000 Peaceful power transfer from President Rawlings to President Agyekum Kufour	

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

This chapter will begin with an analytical discussion of the main findings of this study, in which the three main arguments are examined in relation to the two main models, both in the context of general theory and practical example. The second section discusses the importance of this study and its application to modern day post-conflict state building, thereby demonstrating the lessons that can be learned from examining decolonization models. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of some future research that can be taken in order to further understand the impact that the decolonization transition models, institutional inclusion, nationalism, and key leaders had on post-colonial institutional stability.

(a) Main Findings and Assessment of Arguments

As was stated at numerous points throughout this study, three main arguments were made in regards to the non-settler African decolonization models adopted by two different colonial powers. To reiterate, the first argument states that as institutional inclusion during the transition period increases, so to does the institutional stability that followed during the post-independence era. The second argument centers on the nature of nationalism and how it affects institutional stability following independence. Finally, the third main argument states that the more a key leader is promoted during the era of transition, the less stable the institutional structure would be following independence. This section will re-examine and summarize the workings of the two models with respect to these arguments.

The British and the French model of decolonization implemented in the non-settler African colonies placed emphasis on different facets of decolonization policy, though some features, such as the usage of chief structures and the exploitative nature of the colonial institutions, were similar. The British model implemented in the non-settler African colonies mainly focused on the logical progression of crown colony to self-governing state with steps of gradual evolution imbedded in it. The French, on the other hand, were relatively reluctant for the dissolution of the empire and rather focused much of the decolonization period trying to integrate the non-settler African colonies into mainland France. Therefore, it can be said that the British model was generally evolutionary, while the French model was integrationist.

In terms of institutional inclusion, both models had some type of limited inclusion of locals within the governing structures. However, the extent to which they had power and the amount of the population that were actually included differ. Within the British context, local institutional structures were given a bit more power early on and included more institutional inclusion early on in the decolonization period, although selective. This was seen in the integration and usage of chief structures into the colonial apparatus and the creation of legislative and executive councils in colonies such as Ghana. The integration of a large number of political elites, once again however selective, made for a number of able politicians and bureaucrats emerging from the transition period that would be able to further the institutionalization of the structures in place on the eve of independence. This was seen in the case of Ghana in which the institutional structures in the 1992 Constitution closely resembled those of the 1960 Constitution and the

democratic idealism that the country experienced during the transition period carried on throughout the post-independence era despite the many coups.

With regards to France, a different picture emerged. France's longstanding history of cultural assimilation and the fact that the colonies represented a means of asserting relevance both prior to and after World War II, led to policies that were highly integrationist and aimed at the engulfing of the colonies into mainland France. This hindered the amount of political inclusion within the various territories, for any semblance of expanding the inclusive nature of the institutions was seen as pushing the colonies towards self-governance. This proved detrimental during the post-independence period, where French non-settler African colonies were relatively unprepared for the task of governance. In the context of Côte d'Ivoire, many policy elites, the limited few that existed, resisted independence, namely Félix Houphouët-Boigny, on the grounds of the close economic link between France and the colonies as well as the lack of preparedness. This led to small numbers of policy elites within the country and therefore few individuals to oppose the government and have the ability to take on the reigns of governance.

Switching focus to the second argument, both models interacted with nationalist clamors. In both contexts, these nationalist movements shaped colonial policies and helped provide a base party system within the countries following independence. In both cases, nationalist elements calling for post-independence national unity and unwavering party support occurred. In terms of the British model being examined, nationalism proved to provide a strong push for decolonization, especially in line with experience faced in

the Asian colonial holdings. In an effort to prevent an emergence of violence, especially in regards to the economic costs associated with it, the British negotiated more with nationalist groups, which resulted in the shrinking of the decolonization time line and the need for Britain to get the colonies as prepared as it could in the given amount of time. This occurred in the Gold Coast when the CPP under Kwame Nkrumah clamored for immediate independence and therefore shrunk the British timeline of institutional evolution that would allow for further entrenchment of institutional inclusion.

In terms of the French model, nationalism was largely ignored in some areas, such as Côte d'Ivoire, and met with strong opposition force in others, such as Algeria, which partly resulted from the status of the colony as either settler or non-settler. Additionally, the rise of political parties early on in the decolonization process and their representation in the constitution writing process for the Fourth French Republic allowed for the creation of a strong party base that carried over into the post-independence era and resulted in the further entrenchment of the key leader, Félix Houphouët-Boigny in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, and the emergence of a single party state.

In both models, key transition leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Félix Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire, were bolstered and went on to be the emerging leaders of the post-independence era. The political parties that supported them, the CPP and PDCI respectively, coupled with the large surge of nationalist support from the people on the eve of independence, allowed for these leaders to pursue policies in line with their own visions of national unity and identity. For Nkrumah this meant the move towards socialism and pan-Africanism and the outlawing of opposition groups that would

be perceived as more willing to negotiate with Western powers. For Houphouët-Boigny, this meant the move towards a more Western-oriented state and the control of the country via charisma, military might, and the single party state. The differences in both cases emerge in terms of the underlying institutional underpinnings upon which they were based. In the context of Ghana, strong democratic idealism was imbedded into the institutions imparted to the country by the British and were seen time and again in the clamor for the return to civilian, representative government following a military coups. In terms of Côte d'Ivoire, Houphouët-Boigny centralized his power and created a single party State, which collapsed following his death and unwillingness to name a successor.

Therefore, we see that institutional inclusion, in theory, would by itself allow for more institutionally stable consequences. On the other hand, the role of nationalism, especially in the case of colonialism where anti-colonial sentiments and freedom rhetoric allowed for strong national support behind limited groups of policy elites, and the key leaders that emerged during the transition, strong in their own ideals of the State, worked against this institutional stability, though in varying degrees in both Models.

(b) Towards the Future: Importance of the Study

Given the observations that can be drawn from this study, the next logical question becomes a question of application: Why is this important? As was said in Chapter I, the decolonization period was a period of transition, where colonies with one set of institutional apparatuses, i.e. heavily dependent on the colonizing powers, needed to be transformed into structures that would support a self-governing state. Modern day post-conflict s

tates undergo a similar transition, in which they go from one set of structures, often highly extractive, to trying to figure out the best institutional apparatuses to be put in place to further institutional and political stability. By looking at institutional inclusion and the methods adopted by these two models in pursuing policies aimed at local institution building, we are able to better inform a type of vision that is to be pursued in post-conflict institution building. Building institutions from early on and integrating local populations, even under the guidance of an international body such as the United Nations, would allow for the necessary political education during the transition period, which is needed for practical governance following the transition from one set of institutions to another. Additionally, nationalism that leads to the definitive promotion of a single party over others and the promotion of one key leader for the transition movement should be avoided as they work counter to institutional stability and often lead to political instability.

(c) Future Research

This section will aim at giving a quick and brief description of the steps for future research, if it is to be pursued. First, research can be expanded to include more colonial models, such as but not limited to, the Belgium, Dutch, German models. The models can also be expanded to include models of decolonization instituted in settler colonies in Africa or in colonies in other continents. This would allow the testing of the arguments within different contexts and the emergence of different, or similar, observations. Additionally, expansion of the research to include the workings of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, and its relationship with the colonial powers, how it interacted with

the colonial models and the outcomes of the process in terms of the post-independence developments within the trust territories. This research could also be expanded to examine more institutions, such as economic, social, and cultural institutions, which each play a role in the institutional and political stability of a country, especially following a transition. Finally, the examination of more case countries could also be pursued, in order to assess what remains consistent under each model and what depends on the colony's unique conditions.

Table 5.1: Main Arguments

	ARGUMENT	GHANA	CÔTE D'IVOIRE
A1	The more inclusive institutions are during the transition period, the more stable the institutional structure following independence	More inclusive institutions early on in the decolonization process. Despite the series of coup d'états, main framework of institutions persisted and there was a push to return to democratic rule	More inclusive institutions towards the end of the decolonization process. Following the death of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the country did not adhere to constitutional protocol, which resulted in civil war and the need for international intervention
A2	The nature of nationalism during the transition period affects institutional stability following independence	Regional nationalist groups emerged as different political parties during decolonization period. This would create a base for the multi-party state that emerged following independence and would only be hindered by the policies of Kwame Nkrumah	Main nationalist group was against immediate independence due in part to a relatively strong connection to the French, especially due to economic ties. Following independence, the State emerged as a single party state and promoted pro-Western policy
A3	The more a key leader or party is promoted during the transition period within an institutional structure, the less stable the institutional structures will be following independence	Promotion of Kwame Nkrumah during transition led to the emergence of a powerful single party State that was eventually overthrown due to backlashes regarding Nkrumah's economic policy	Promotion of Houphouët-Boigny during transition led to the emergence of a powerful single party State which fell into civil war following Houphouët-Boigny's death

Table 5.2: British and French Model Comparison

	BRITISH MODEL	FRENCH MODEL
General Approach	Evolutionary: Emphasis placed on progressive structure from Crown Colony to Dominion to Self-Governance	Integration: Emphasis placed on making the colonies part of France
Response to International Pressure	Relatively more responsive: Moved towards self-governance for the colonies	Relatively less responsive: Moved towards integration of colonies with France rather than self-governance
Response to Nationalist Demands	Relatively more responsive: Did not want a repeat of the experiences resulting from combatting nationalism in the Asian territories. Therefore, more responsive to nationalist clamor and adapted policy accordingly.	Relatively less responsive: Assimilationist policy, and later association policy, ran contrary to nationalism, in that it espoused rhetoric of becoming French
Local Inclusion in Governing Apparatus During Decolonization	Relatively more inclusion that occurred early in the decolonization process: Emphasis was placed on the method of indirect rule during the colonial period, which translated into the eventual and gradual transfer of power to the local populations. Local inclusion occurred earlier in the decolonization process and resulted in a relatively larger elite with political education	Relatively less inclusion until later in the decolonization process: Due to the focus on integrationist policy, the French focused less on expanding local inclusion in governing apparatuses, except for a few French-educated local elites. This resulted in the emergence of few elites with political education

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