It seems clear upon reflection that my distinction between "presentation" (or "constitution") and "re-presentation," and thus also between "original revelation" and "special/decisive revelation," is but another way of making the Greeks' distinction between "nature" ( $\phi \upsilon \sigma \iota \varsigma$ ) and what exists "by nature" ( $\phi \upsilon \sigma \epsilon \iota$ ), on the one hand, and "convention" ( $\nu \upsilon \mu \iota \varsigma$ ) and what exists "by convention" ( $\nu \upsilon \mu \iota \iota \iota$ ), on the other. And the same is true, of course, already of Kant's distinction between "rational" and "natural," on the one hand, and "empirical" and "historical," on the other, as well as such recent distinctions as Boff's between the order of salvation's "constitution" and the order of its "manifestation."

Note especially, in this connection, Kant's distinctions between "a continually occurring divine (though not empirical) revelation for all men" and "special revelation"; and between "(pure) rational faith" and "empirical (historical) faith," or "revealed faith (fides statuaria)."

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