

I find it significant that Hartshorne says of the so-called primary properties of physics essentially what he says of the first principles of metaphysics—namely, that they are "empty outlines"—"relational schema, not concrete descriptions of anything" ("In Defense of Wordsworth's View of Nature": 85; cf. "Religious Aspects of Necessity and Contingency": 148, 164).

But what is the difference, if any, between the two sets of concepts? Is it simply a difference in degree of abstractness—the properties of physics fitting the facts, the principles of metaphysics fitting the concepts that both fit and do not fit the facts?

I should say, on the contrary, that it is more than that, that, whereas the primary properties of physics are mediated *empirically*, by external sense perception of ourselves and our world, the first principles of metaphysics are mediated *existentially*, by internal nonsensuous perception, memory, and anticipation of ourselves, others, and the whole.

25 April 2005