

Now that it has occurred to me, it seems obvious that there are uses for as well as a possibility of a further distinction analogous to that between “existential-historical” and “empirical-historical.”

This is the distinction with respect to the concept-term “transcendental,” which I have sometimes used in distinction from “historical”—as, for example, in the thesis: “A religion’s explicit primal source of authority is thus the *historical*, as distinct from the *transcendental*, source [implicitly] authorizing its claim to decisive existential authority” (5 December 1994). (Elsewhere, however, I have used “tranhistorical” in place of “transcendental”—as, for example, when I say, “the point is that the object side of the religious correlation is itself duplex, having a historical as well as a transhistorical aspect, each dialectically related to the other. Otherwise put: the object side of the religious correlation itself involves a correlation—in Boff’s terms—between an ‘order of *manifestation*’ and an ‘order of *constitution*’ relative to the subject side of the correlation” [10 June 1989; rev. 5 January 2001].) In the case of this further distinction, however, the distinguishing adjectives are not “existential” and “empirical,” but “existential” and “metaphysical,” which yield the distinction between “existential-transcendental” and “metaphysical-transcendental.” Whereas the first means the transcendental in its meaning for us, the second means the transcendental in its structure in itself—just as “existential-historical” means the historical in its meaning for us, while “empirical-historical” means the historical in its structure in itself. Of course, the difference, requiring one to characterize this distinction as only analogous to the other is the logical-ontological type difference between “the transcendental” and “the categorial”—“the historical” being simply a special case of “the categorial.”

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(over)

*N.B.:* Another use of the distinction is prominent in my answer to the question as to “the foundation of faith (*fundamentum fidei*)” (December 1992; rev. 26 November 1993; 15 June 2002). Presupposed by my answer, I point out, is “a distinction between *transcendental, ultimate reality, including strictly ultimate reality, in its meaning for us*, on the one hand, and the *historical reality through which the meaning of transcendental, ultimate reality for us is decisively re-presented*, on the other hand.” Thus I say, in response to the first question about “the essential or substantial foundation of faith,” that it is “the twofold reality of Jesus and God: Jesus as the *historical* reality through which transcendental, ultimate reality in its meaning for us is decisively re-presented; and God as the *transcendental, strictly ultimate* reality whose meaning for us Jesus decisively re-presents.”