Ogden Notebooks : Section 3: On Authority, 162-221
Created by Lashyia Meeks, last modified by Andrew Scrimgeour on Feb 07, 2018
- 162. The primal ontic source of all authority can . . .
- 163. According to E. M. Adams . . .
- 164. Adams asserts that "no one simply as a human being . . .
- 165. An office is defined or constituted by a certain imperative . . .
- 166. In some cases, "authority" is used to refer to someone . . .
- 167. Is there really any good reason not to say that, although x . . .
- 168. What does it mean to authorize?
- 169. Propositions, Instructions, and Performatives
- 170. My concern in what follows . . .
- 171. Concerning Authority
- 172. Here, again, in "Notes on the Doctrine of Authority" . . .
- 173. "The appeal to history is the appeal to summits of attainment . . .
- 174. Does it make sense to say that the distinction between . . .
- 175. What's the significance, if any, of Bultmann's distinction . . .
- 176. Could it be that religious authority properly so-called is . . .
- 177. There would appear to be three distinctions . . .
- 178. There would appear to be two distinctions . . .
- 179. Without implying that they are the only or even the most . . .
- 180. According to orthodoxy, establishing the principle that scripture . . .
- 181. If it is correct to say that x may be authorized without being . . .
- 182. In point of fact, the regret expressed in the attached note about my formulations . . .
- 183. Concerning the Authority of Scripture . . .
- 184. THE BIBLE AND CHRISTIAN MORALITY TODAY
- 185. How, if at all, is the moral teaching of the Bible authoritative . . .
- 186. In arguing, as I long have, that God is not properly an authority . . .
- 187. Will it do to speak of God as ontic (rather than ontological) . . .
- 188. Insofar as x is a source of Christian religious authority . . .
- 189. Could it be that religious authority includes a performative . . .
- 190. Whether or not Y's believing p simply because X . . .
- 191. Consider the following passages
- 192. If all nonexecutive authority can be legitimate only if it is authorized . . .
- 193. If epistemic authority is, in the nature of the case . . .
- 194. The general justification for believing things on the basis . . .
- 195. One is the bearer of authority de jure over . . .
- 196. Is authority in its "basic structure" a triadic relation . . .
- 197. According to Marxsen, the earlier Israelite understanding of the law . . .
- 198. It seems clear for several reasons, etymological included . . .
- 199. The larger context of Watt's study . . .
- 200. We could not understand or recognize an authority for which there . . .
- 201. What is a relationship of authority?
- 202. Consider the following passages
- 203. Consider the following passages
- 204. An authority may indeed be a reason for believing something . . .
- 205. To have moral (= deontic, executive) authority is to have an office . . .
- 206. Granted that all persons are bearers of authority . . .
- 207. What is a decision?
- 208. To allow that such a thing as "spurious authority" is possible . . .
- 209. Consider the following passages
- 210. According to De George, "in order to grant anyone epistemic authority . . .
- 211. I keep coming back to the thought that the distinction . . .
- 212. Consider the following passages "If Y knows P to be true . . .
- 213. It is essential to De George's analysis of legitimate epistemic . . .
- 214. In most of my previous work I have tended . . .
- 215. If De George is right, it would seem that religious authority . . .
- 216. To authorize is at once (1) to entitle and (2) to empower
- 217. What, exactly, is the auctoritas causativa of the Christian witness?
- 218. Bochenski allows as how "performatives" are "a third kind of independent...
- 219. According to Bochenski, there are not only the two kinds of independent . . .
- 220. If I understand Bochenski's reasoning . . .
- 221. I infer from Bochenski's argument that . . .